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Digital Acts of War: Evolving the Cybersecurity Conversation

Subcommittee on National Security, Subcommittee on Information Technology, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, United States House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, Second Session

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STATEMENT OF

MR. AARON HUGHES

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FOR CYBER POLICY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEES

JULY 13, 2016

INTRODUCTION

Chairmen Hurd and DeSantis, Ranking Members Kelly and Lynch, and Members of the Subcommittees, thank you for inviting me to discuss the Department of Defense's (DoD) strategy as it relates to cyberspace and how that applies to cyberattacks. It is an honor to appear before you today, and I appreciate the opportunity to explain the progress the Department is making to improve America's cybersecurity posture.

I plan to focus my testimony on the Department's strategy and missions in cyberspace, including through deterrence, and the threats and challenges posed by State and non-state actors. Improving our collective cyber defenses is a whole-of-government and whole-of-nation endeavor that also requires close cooperation with our allies, partners, and the private sector.

DOD STRATEGY AND MISSIONS

Recognizing that DoD relies heavily on cyberspace for virtually everything we do, the Department's Cyber Strategy guides our efforts in cyberspace. The Strategy directs the Department to focus its efforts on three primary missions in cyberspace: (1) defend DoD information networks to ensure DoD mission effectiveness, (2) defend the United States against cyberattacks of significant consequence, and (3) provide full-spectrum cyber options to support contingency plans and military operations.

One of the Department's key policy goals in cyberspace is to deter cyberattacks. Incidents described as "cyberattacks" or "computer network attacks" are not necessarily "armed attacks" for the purposes of triggering a nation-state's inherent right of self-defense (as recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter). In that vein, when determining whether a cyber incident constitutes an armed attack, the U.S. Government considers a number of factors including the nature and extent of injury or death to persons and the destruction of, or damage to, property. As such, cyber incidents are assessed on a case-by-case basis and, as the President has publicly stated, the U.S. Government's response to any particular cyber incident would come "in a place and time and manner that we choose."

DoD is supporting a comprehensive, whole-of-government cyber deterrence strategy to deter cyberattacks against U.S. interests. This strategy depends on the totality of U.S. actions, including its declaratory policy, overall defensive posture, effective response procedures, indications and warning capabilities, and the resiliency of U.S. networks and systems.

Fundamentally, deterrence is largely a function of perception, and DoD has three specific roles to play within a whole-of-government deterrence strategy. First, we seek to deny the adversary the ability to achieve the objectives of a cyberattack, so our adversary will believe any attack will be futile. We do this through strengthening our cyber defenses and reducing our attack surface. Second, we want to improve our resilience so our adversary will perceive that, even if any single attack is successful, we can reconstitute quickly so that their ultimate objective will not be achieved. The Department is already training to operate in a "cyber contested environment," to demonstrate that we can continue our mission even while under cyberattack. Lastly, for deterrence to be effective, the adversaries must believe that our ability to respond to an attack will result in unacceptable costs imposed on them. Costs may be imposed through a variety of mechanisms, including economic sanctions, diplomacy, law enforcement, and military action. Our task at the Department is to plan and prepare to conduct military operations, including through cyberspace, to impose costs on the adversary.

THE CYBER LANDSCAPE

We continue to face a diverse and persistent set of threats from State and non-state actors who probe and scan DoD networks for vulnerabilities. Although the United States has benefited greatly from the increasingly wired and interconnected global landscape, cyber threats are evolving, posing greater risks to the networks and systems of the Department of Defense and other Federal departments and agencies, our national critical infrastructure, and U.S. companies and interests.

In the last few years, there have been numerous high-profile malicious cyber or cyber-enabled events that have captured the public's attention, including incidents that have affected Sony Pictures Entertainment, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Department of Defense unclassified Joint Staff network, and the Ukrainian power grid. If malicious cyber actors gain access to DoD networks, they can potentially manipulate information or software, destroy data, and impair the functioning of systems that computers control. Although DoD maintains and uses robust and unique cyber capabilities to defend our networks, often these measures alone are not sufficient. Securing systems and networks is everyone's responsibility – from the commander down to the individual network user and across the Federal Government – and requires a culture of cybersecurity.

Criminal activity in cyberspace is a significant and growing problem, but nations in many ways still represent the gravest threats because of the skill and resources they can bring to bear. The States that we watch most closely in cyberspace remain Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Russia and China have developed advanced cyber capabilities and strategies, and Russian actors in particular are stealthy in their cyber tradecraft, and their intentions are sometimes difficult to discern. In September 2015, the U.S. and China agreed to neither conduct nor knowingly support the cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property for commercial gain; we continue to monitor China's compliance. Iran and North Korea have demonstrated the capability and willingness to conduct damaging and destructive cyber-attacks against the United States in support of their policy objectives. Finally, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) represents a serious and complex threat, and continues to use the Internet to intimidate its enemies, recruit fighters, incite violence, and inspire attacks. As part of the efforts of the 66-member Global Coalition to counter ISIL, the Department is providing integrated cyber capabilities and support to Operation INHERENT RESOLVE.

At DoD, protecting the territory and people of the United States remains our highest priority, and we remain vigilant, and devote substantial resources and effort preparing for threats that could be directed against the U.S. homeland, and infrastructure that the Department relies on to operate during a contingency.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

In line with the President's 2011 *United States International Strategy for Cyberspace*, the Department works with foreign partners bilaterally and multilaterally – through NATO, for example – to advance cyberspace cooperation to defend U.S., allied, and partner interests. Our international partners bring varying capabilities and expertise, but the Department prioritizes international cyberspace partnerships to enhance cyber defense and to build greater collective security. Cooperation in cyberspace increases our capacity to detect, monitor, prevent, and defeat threats in cyberspace while working to ensure that our allies and international partners develop and build strong cyber defense capabilities.

Beyond the Department's engagements with the international community, DoD supports the Department of State's diplomatic efforts to promote a framework for stability in cyberspace that includes affirmation of the applicability of international law to state conduct in cyberspace,

the identification of voluntary peacetime norms of state behavior in cyberspace, and the promotion of cyber confidence-building measures. In particular, as voluntary measures of self-restraint, the Department believes peacetime norms can contribute to conflict prevention and stability.

CONCLUSION

The Department is committed to the security and resiliency of our networks and to defending the U.S. homeland and interests from cyberattacks of significant consequence. We have undertaken comprehensive efforts, both unilaterally and in concert with our allies and partners, and the private sector to improve our Nation's cybersecurity posture and to ensure that DoD has the ability to operate in any environment at any time. Our relationship with Congress is absolutely critical to everything the Department is doing in cyberspace. To that end, I am grateful for the Committee's interest in these issues, and I look forward to your questions.

Testimony of Christopher M. E. Painter, Coordinator for Cyber Issues
U.S. Department of State
Before the House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Subcommittees on Information Security and National Security

Hearing on "Digital Acts of War: Evolving the Cybersecurity Conversation"

July 13, 2016

Chairmen Hurd and DeSantis, Ranking Members Kelly and Lynch, members of the Subcommittee on Information Technology and the Subcommittee on National Security, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today on this very timely subject.

Over the last few decades, the Internet and information and communications technologies (ICTs) more broadly have brought profound benefits to the United States and the rest of the world – enabling innovation, connecting people to information and services, and providing a new forum for people to express their views and to dissent. Given all of these benefits as well as our growing dependence on technology, it is not surprising that governments as well as certain non-state actors have increasingly come to view cyberspace as a place where they too can pursue their objectives. A number of militaries around the world – including our own – have publicly stated their intention to operate in cyberspace, while still more are actively developing their cyber capabilities. Reports of cyber incidents potentially linked to state-sponsored activity have become a regular feature of the public conversation on cybersecurity issues.

Although there is no question that we face new challenges, our goal remains what was articulated in the President's 2011 U.S. *International Strategy for Cyberspace*: "to promote an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable information and communications infrastructure that supports international trade and commerce, strengthens international security, and fosters free expression and innovation." We must work every day to ensure that even as the number and variety of online threats grow and evolve, the Internet remains a place where people can do business, connect with friends, and express their views. We need to ensure that the Internet remains a greater source of stability than it is a source of instability and that governments and other actors behave responsibly as they conduct their activities in cyberspace. In short, we need a framework for international stability in cyberspace.

During my time today, I will discuss the framework for stability in cyberspace that the U.S. government and the State Department in particular are working to promote internationally and some of our recent successes in that regard. Much of what I will address on this topic is also covered by the *Department of State International Cyberspace Policy Strategy* that was submitted in April as required by the Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2016 (Public Law 114-113). I will also discuss some of the other topics raised in your invitation, including when an incident in cyberspace might rise to level of an armed attack and how the U.S. government thinks about the proper response to individual cyber incidents, including through public attribution.

Building a Framework for International Stability in Cyberspace

The Department of State, working with our interagency partners, is guided by the vision of the President's *International Strategy for Cyberspace*, which is to promote a strategic framework of international cyber stability designed to achieve and maintain a peaceful cyberspace environment where all states are able to fully realize its benefits, where there are advantages to cooperating against common threats and avoiding conflict, and where there is little incentive for states to engage in disruptive behavior or to attack one another.

This framework has three key elements: (1) global affirmation that international law applies to state behavior in cyberspace; (2) development of an international consensus on and promotion of additional voluntary norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace that apply during peacetime; and (3) development and implementation of practical confidence-building measures (CBMs) among states, which promote stability in cyberspace by reducing the risks of misperception and escalation.

Since 2009, the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UN GGE) has served as a productive and groundbreaking expert-level venue for the United States to build support for this framework. The consensus recommendations of the three UN GGE reports in 2010, 2013, and 2015 have set the standard for the international community on the applicability of international law in cyberspace, voluntary peacetime norms, and CBMs. The conclusions captured in these reports have in turn been endorsed by political leaders in a range of settings. When it reconvenes in August 2016, the UN GGE process will continue to play a central role in our efforts to promulgate this framework fully.

Applicability of international law. The first and most fundamental pillar of our framework for international cyber stability is the applicability of existing international law to state behavior in cyberspace. The 2013 UN GGE report was a significant achievement that affirmed the applicability of existing international law, including the UN Charter, to state conduct in cyberspace. The 2013 report underscored that states must act in cyberspace under the established international obligations and commitments that have guided their actions for decades – in peacetime and during conflict – and that states must meet their international obligations regarding internationally wrongful acts attributable to them. The 2014-2015 UN GGE also made progress on issues related to international law by highlighting that the UN Charter applies in its entirety, affirming the applicability of the inherent right of self-defense as recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter, and noting the law of armed conflict's fundamental principles of humanity, necessity, proportionality, and distinction.

Norms of responsible state behavior. The United States is also building consensus on a set of additional, voluntary norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace that define key areas of risk that would be of national and/or economic security concern to all states and that should be off-limits during times of peace. If observed, these stability measures – which are measures of self-restraint – can contribute substantially to conflict prevention and stability. The United States was the first state to propose a set of specific peacetime cyber norms. Those norms are as follows:

- A state should not conduct or knowingly support online activity that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the use of critical infrastructure to provide services to the public.

- A state should not conduct or knowingly support activity intended to prevent national computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) from responding to cyber incidents. A State should also not use CSIRTs to enable online activity that is intended to do harm.

- A state should cooperate, in a manner consistent with its domestic law and international obligations, with requests for assistance from other states in investigating cybercrimes, collecting electronic evidence, and mitigating malicious cyber activity emanating from its territory.

- A state should not conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to its companies or commercial sectors.

In May 2015, Secretary of State Kerry highlighted these norms in his speech in Seoul, South Korea, on an open and secure Internet. The 2015 UN GGE report's most significant achievement was its recommendation for voluntary norms of state behavior designed for peacetime, which included concepts championed by the United States.

Confidence-building measures. Together with our work on international law and voluntary norms, cyber CBMs have the potential to contribute substantially to international cyber stability. CBMs have been used by governments for decades to build confidence, reduce risk, and increase transparency in other areas of international concern. Examples of cyber CBMs include: transparency measures, such as sharing national strategies or doctrine; cooperative measures, such as building points of contact networks to respond rapidly to cyber incidents; and stability measures, such as committing to refrain from a certain activity of concern. Cyber CBMs are being developed, and are in the first stages of implementation, in two regional venues – the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the ASEAN Regional Forum where agreement was reached in 2015 on a detailed work plan with a proposed set of CBMs for future implementation.

Although many of the elements of the framework I have described above may seem self-evident to a U.S. audience, it is important to recognize that cyber issues are new to many states and, as I am happy to discuss during the question and answer period, there are also states that hold alternative views on how to promote cyber stability. Notwithstanding these headwinds, as well as the fact that diplomatic negotiations on other issues can take many years, if not decades, the United States and its allies and partners have made substantial progress in recent years towards advancing our strategic framework of international cyber stability.

In addition to the GGE reports, I would like to briefly highlight a few examples from the last year that reflect our progress in achieving broader adoption of the framework.

- First, in September 2015, during President Xi Jinping's state visit, the United States and China made several key commitments on cyber issues. These include a commitment that neither country's government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property for commercial advantage, as well as a statement welcoming the 2015 GGE report.

- Second, last November, the leaders of the G20, meeting in Antalya, Turkey, strongly endorsed the U.S. approach to promoting stability in cyberspace. The leaders' communique affirmed that states should not conduct or support the cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property for commercial advantage. The communique also highlighted the 2015 UN GGE report I discussed; affirmed that international law, and in particular the UN Charter, applies to state conduct in cyberspace; and endorsed the view that all states should abide by norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace.

- Finally, although it received less publicity than the previous two developments, the 57 member states of the OSCE, which includes not only the United States and its Western allies and partners but also Russia and other former Soviet states, reached consensus in March 2016 on an expanded set of CBMs. This expanded set, which includes five new cooperative CBMs, focusing on issues like cybersecurity of critical infrastructure and developing public-private partnerships as well as mechanisms for the exchange of best practices, builds upon the existing 11 CBMs announced in 2013 that focus on building transparency and putting in place mechanisms for de-escalating conflict.

On the Concept of a "Digital Act of War"

Given the title of this hearing, "Digital Acts of War," I would like to discuss how the U.S. government thinks about these issues, which, consistent with its broader approach to promoting stability in cyberspace, is through the prism of existing international law.

As an initial matter, the United States has been clear that it believes that cyber activities may in certain circumstances constitute an armed attack that triggers our inherent right of self-defense, as recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter.

The United States has described publicly how it would evaluate whether a cyber activity constitutes an armed attack under international law. Of primary importance to such a determination are the actual or anticipated effects of a particular incident. When determining whether a cyber activity constitutes an armed attack sufficient to trigger a state's inherent right of self-defense, the U.S. government believes that states should consider the nature and extent of injury or death to persons and the destruction of, or damage to, property. Although this is necessarily a case-by-case, fact-specific inquiry, in general, cyber activities that proximately result in death, injury, or significant destruction, or represent an imminent threat thereof, likely would be viewed as an armed attack.

It is worth emphasizing that a determination whether specific events constitute an actual or imminent armed attack sufficient to trigger a state's inherent right of self-defense is necessarily a case-by-case, fact-specific inquiry. This is the case whether the events occur in cyberspace or elsewhere. As a general matter, states have not sought to define precisely (or state conclusively) what situations would constitute armed attacks in other domains, and there is no reason cyberspace should be different. In fact, there is a good reason not to articulate a bright line, as strategic ambiguity could very well deter most states from getting close to it.

Responding to Cyber Incidents

Finally, I would hasten to note that the U.S. government uses a whole-of-government approach to responding to and deterring malicious activities in cyberspace. This approach brings to bear its full range of instruments of national power and corresponding policy tools – diplomatic, law enforcement, economic, military, and intelligence – as appropriate and consistent with applicable law. This means that regardless of whether a particular incident rises to the level of an armed attack, the President has a range of options for responding.

As suggested in the invitation for this hearing, public attribution is one such option. In cases where the actors responsible for a particular incident have been determined, the U.S. government will consider whether to identify those actors publicly when we believe it will further our national interests, including our ability to hold the actors accountable. North Korea's 2014 cyber attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment, for example, which rendered thousands of computers inoperable and was intended to interfere with the exercise of freedom of expression and inflict significant harm on a U.S. business, represented behavior in cyberspace that is simply unacceptable. This, in combination with the strength of the evidence linking North Korea to the cyber attack, contributed to the U.S. government's decision to make a public attribution in that case. However, the U.S. government also maintains the flexibility to avail itself of the other options that I have mentioned as appropriate.

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In closing, I would like to express my appreciation for both Subcommittees' interest in these important topics. I look forward to addressing your questions.

Prepared Statement of GEN (Ret) Keith B. Alexander[*]
on Digital Acts of War: Evolving the Cybersecurity Conversation
before the Subcommittees on Information Technology and National Security
of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

July 13, 2016

Chairman Hurd, Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Kelly, Ranking Member Lynch, and Members of the Committee: thank you for inviting me to discuss digital acts of war with you today, and specifically, to engage in a dialogue with this Committee about the rules, norms, and constructs regarding acceptable behavior in cyberspace.

I also want to thank both Chairman Hurd and Chairman DeSantis for playing a leading role in the House of Representatives on cybersecurity matters, including through efforts like Chairman Hurd's legislation on state and local cybersecurity, which passed the House late last year, as well as Chairman DeSantis's leadership in looking into the Office of Personnel Management hack last year. And I know both of you have terrific partners in the ranking members on both your subcommittees, with Ranking Member Kelly's efforts on federal IT acquisition reform and Ranking Member Lynch's work on the OPM investigation.

As members of these subcommittees well know, the key systems and networks that make up what we call colloquially refer to as "cyberspace" constitute a set of critical assets that enable communication, promote economic growth and prosperity, advance the cause of freedom globally, and help ensure our national security and that of our allies. At the same time, cyberspace, as we know it today, has also become a digital battleground where nation-states and their proxies, organized criminal groups, terrorists, hacktivists, and others seek to gain an advantage on one another, whether through surveillance and espionage, criminal activity, recruitment, planning, and incitement to attacks, and repression of free speech and expression. Increasingly, we recognize that while the benefits of global connectivity far outstrip the potential costs, our increased connectivity makes us more vulnerable, as individuals, as groups, and as a nation. As a result, we also increasingly realize that we must proactively take steps to protect ourselves, our information, and our critical assets from the vagaries of crime, theft, espionage, and, yes, potentially destructive activities. And, perhaps most importantly, we understand that the increased connectivity of networked devices to physical systems makes it more possible to create real-world effects through cyber activities.

The numbers on the dramatic growth and expansion of our network connectivity are clear: by 2020, it is expected that IP traffic on global communications networks will reach 2.3 zettabytes, or 95 times the volume of the entire global Internet in 2005.[1] And, as you all know, underlying technology in this area is also growing rapidly, with processing capacity doubling

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[1] *See* Cisco, *The Zettabyte Era—Trends and Analysis* (June 2016) at 1, *available online at* <http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-networking-index-vni/vni-hyperconnectivity-wp.pdf>; *see also* Cisco, *VNI Complete Forecasts Highlights Tool*, *available online at* <http://www.cisco.com/c/m/en_us/solutions/service-provider/vni-forecast-highlights.html>.

every two years under Moore's law.[2] This combined growth in technology and IP traffic will be accompanied by rapid growth in the sheer number of IP-connected devices, particularly given our move towards the Internet of Things (IoT). Cisco estimates that by 2020 there will be 26.3 billion networked devices, the equivalent of more than three IP-connected devices per person around the world.[3] Traffic from wireless and mobile devices will also account for two-thirds of all IP traffic by 2020,[4] and worldwide mobile Internet penetration is expected to reach more than 70% around the same timeframe.[5]

And while this expansion of technology and connectivity means that we can expect to reap tremendous social, economic, and political benefits, it also means the attack surface for bad actors to target our nation is likewise expanding. And while we are all also well aware of the huge threat posed to our economic security by the rampant theft of intellectual property from American private sector companies by nation-states and their proxies—constituting what I have previously described as the greatest transfer of wealth in human history—I want to highlight an even more troubling trend that began to take hold in the past four years: the emergence of actual destructive cyber attacks, where cyber or other systems, data, or capabilities are permanently destroyed.

In 2012, we saw a set of destructive cyber attacks conducted against Saudi Aramco and Qatari Ras Gas, an attack that resulted in over 30,000 computers being disabled at Saudi Aramco alone.[6] And in February 2014, we saw the first-ever publicly reported destructive cyber attack by a nation-state on U.S. soil, with Iran conducting a cyber attack on the Las Vegas Sands Corporation in February.[7] This was followed later that year, in November, by the North Korea's attack on Sony Pictures.[8] These attacks represent a particularly concerning trend because they demonstrate an expansion in significant cyber capabilities from nation-states like China and

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[2] *See* Annie Sneed, *Moore's Law Keeps Going, Defying Expectations*, Scientific American (May 14, 2015) *available online at* <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/moore-s-law-keeps-going-defying-expectations/>.

[3] *See Zettabyte Era*, n. 1 *supra* at 2.

[4] *See Zettabyte Era*, n. 1 *supra* at 2.

[5] *See* Internet Society, *Global Internet Report 2015*, at 9, *available online at* <http://www.internetsociety.org/globalinternetreport/assets/download/IS_web.pdf>.

[6] *See* Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, *Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community 2013* at 1, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Mar. 12, 2013), *available online at* <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/2013%20ATA%20SFR%20for%20SSCI%2012%20Mar%202013.pdf>; Kim Zetter, *Qatari Gas Company Hit With Virus in Wave of Attacks on Energy Companies* (Aug. 30, 2012), *available online at* <https://www.wired.com/2012/08/hack-attack-strikes-rasgas/>.

[7] *See* Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, *Opening Statement to Worldwide Threat Assessment Hearing*, Senate Armed Services Committee (Feb. 26, 2015), *available online at* <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2015%20WWTA%20As%20Delivered%20DNI%20Oral%20Statement.pdf> ("2014 saw, for the first-time, destructive cyber attacks carried out on U.S. soil by nation state entities, marked first by the Iranian attack on the Las Vegas Sands Casino a year ago this month and the North Korean attack against Sony in November. Although both of these nations have lesser technical capabilities in comparison to Russia and China, these destructive attacks demonstrate that Iran and North Korea are motivated and unpredictable cyber actors.")

[8] *Id*.

Russia whose actions are more constrained by external political and economic considerations, to nations that might be more inclined to act or at least may be more unpredictable in the nature and scope of their actions. They are also particularly concerning because the fact of the attacks—and our nation's relatively limited, if any response to them—lay bare the fact that we have no real strategy or doctrine for how to deal with such events, much less deter other nation-states from undertaking them.

In order to develop such strategies and doctrines, and perhaps most importantly, to effectively deter these type of actions, we first need to understand better what constitute acts of war in the cyber domain. The reality today is that while we can all easily imagine acts that regardless of where or how they are undertaken, whether in cyberspace or otherwise, would constitute acts of war—the more challenging part is determining where that line should be drawn in the hard cases. That is, while there are cyber attacks with consequences that would almost certainly fall within the parameters of what we would be prepared to call acts of war—for example, attacks that cause major loss of life, destruction or incapacitation of significant portions of key infrastructure, or even attacks that cause massive economic damage—there still remains an enormous gray area of hostile nation-state actions that might approach, and even cross, the line.

In part, the determination of what constitutes an act of war is a legal determination and has legal consequences. International law, including the U.N. Charter, seeks to define when a nation may act in self-defense and how the international community might respond to a breach of the peace.[9] Similarly, a determination by the NATO Alliance that a member-state has been attacked could trigger the collective defense commitment in Article V of the NATO Treaty.[10] Indeed, this issue is all the more pressing given NATO's increased focus on cyber defense and its ongoing recognition, since at least September 2014, that activities in cyberspace can potentially trigger Article V obligations.[11]

At the same time, however, we cannot ignore the political and moral aspects of determining what constitutes an act of war. Even if a nation suffers an "armed attack" under the meaning of the U.N. Charter, it may choose not to respond. And many argue that the right of

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[9] *See* United Nations, *U.N. Charter* Ch. 7, Arts. 39, 41, 42 & 51, *available online at* <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/index.html>.

[10] *See* North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *North Atlantic Treaty*, Arts. 4-5, *available online at* <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm>

[11] *See* North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Cyber Defence Pledge (July 8, 2016), available online at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133177.htm> ("We reaffirm our national responsibility…to enhance the cyber defences of national infrastructures and networks, and our commitment to the indivisibility of Allied security and collective defence, in accordance with the Enhanced NATO Policy on Cyber Defence adopted in Wales."); *See* North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Wales Summit Declaration* (Sept. 5, 2014), available online at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm#cyber> ("To face this evolving challenge, we have endorsed an Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy, contributing to the fulfillment of the Alliance's core tasks. The policy reaffirms the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and of prevention, detection, resilience, recovery, and defence…. Cyber attacks can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability. Their impact could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack. We affirm therefore that cyber defence is part of NATO's core task of collective defence. A decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.").

self-defense does not require a nation to actually wait until an actual armed attack takes place and the consequences are suffered, in order to invoke its right of self-defense against an imminent, pressing threat.[12] Moreover, the decision of whether or not to go to war, what constitutes a just cause for war, and how a nation chooses to respond, including the means of warfare it uses in response, are profoundly moral questions with implications for the overall conduct of such conflicts going forward and the ethical constraints we can, and should, apply to ourselves in conducting even a war that is just and legal. These are issues that must be debated, both here at home, as well as through international institutions, so that we can at least see if it is possible to develop the beginnings of a reasonable international consensus on these matters.

In looking at these questions, particularly in a new domain like cyberspace, we have to think not just about the right and left boundaries of what constitutes acts of war and how and when we might respond, but also about the vital center, and the hard questions that lie within. And while there are no detailed answers to be immediately had in short form, we are also not writing on a blank slate: many have considered the implications on just war theory and international law of new domains or new methods or warfare before, whether with the advent of air war or the development (and use) of nuclear weapons.[13] Perhaps even more importantly, we are not even writing on a blank slate when it comes to cyberspace in particular. The Tallinn Manual, a NATO-sponsored effort, provides helpful guidance in this area,[14] and will likely continue to do so, as it is currently in the process of being updated.

When it comes to determining, whether as a legal, political, and moral/ethical matter, what type of acts constitute an act of war, there are some basic constructs one can look towards. First, it seems obvious that the extent of and nature of the damage caused will have some impact on this decision. Second, the intent of the threat actor matters. The nature and type of the systems or data affected by the attack will also certainly play a role, as will the potential immediate and downstream impact of the attack, including the economic, political, and social aspects of such impact. And, perhaps even more importantly, the ability to identify the source of the attack and publicly attribute it may play a crucial role in determining whether a given attack constitutes an act of war and whether or how a given nation might respond. It is fairly obvious

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[12] *See, e.g.*, White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Sept. 2002), *available online at* <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf> ("For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack."); Brian Egan, *International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL Campaign* (Apr. 4, 2016), *available online at* <https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Egan-ASIL-speech.pdf> ("Under the jus ad bellum, a State may use force in the exercise of its inherent right of self-defense not only in response to armed attacks that have occurred, but also in response to imminent ones before they occur….The absence of specific evidence of where an attack will take place or of the precise nature of an attack does not preclude a conclusion that an armed attack is imminent for purposes of the exercise of the right of self-defense, provided that there is a reasonable and objective basis for concluding that an armed attack is imminent.")

[13] *See, e.g.*, W. Hays Parks, *Air War and the Law of War*, 32 A.F. L. Rev. 1 (1990); Jill M. Sheldon, *Note: Nuclear Weapons and the Laws of War: Does Customary International Law Prohibit the use of Nuclear Weapons in all Circumstances?*, 20 Fordham Int'l L.J. 181 (1996) (collecting materials).

[14] *See* NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, *Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare* (2013), *available online at* <https://ccdcoe.org/tallinn-manual.html>.

where an attack is coming from if you see a land-based missile launched with a particular radar or heat signature or a bomber flying over your territory; it is much harder when the attacker is coming at you in cyberspace across a series of hop-points, some of which may be in your own territory, and employing sophisticated obfuscation methods that are widely accessible to a broad range of actors.

Beyond determining whether an act of war has actually taken place, one must be prepared to consider what might be done in response to such an act. Today as it stands, there is very little talk about our cyber capabilities, whether it comes to offense or defense. While it is not obvious that an attack in cyberspace requires a response in the same domain, it is fair to assume that a cyber response must at least be part of the calculus. Without much public discussion of our basic cyber capabilities, particularly on offense, we face two major challenges: it is difficult to have a reasoned discussion of how we might respond—at least in the cyber domain—and it is that much harder to deter offensive actions by others. After all, basic deterrence theory is premised on the notion of being clear on what a nation would likely to do in response to a defined set of actions by an attacker. Without talking about capabilities and defining what set of actions would trigger the use of those capabilities (as well as a clear willingness to actually undertake such a response), it is no surprise that deterrence does not work particularly well today in the cyber domain. And this is all the more important as we see the spread of cyber capabilities to more unpredictable nation-state actors, as discussed above, and even more worryingly, perhaps in the longer-run, to non-state, asymmetric actors like terrorist groups.

The fact of the matter is that today we are not well equipped to address these threats. We have yet to fully think through the doctrine or strategies in this area, much less the authorities and the rules of engagement. And while U.S. Cyber Command is beginning to build the forces and capabilities necessary to carry out this mission on behalf of the U.S. government and our nation, we are a long way from getting to where we need to be to make sure we do it right. In doing so, we also need to make sure that the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community are properly postured to protect the nation, both through the collection of intelligence and the readiness to respond. This means, in part, that the current approach to ensuring full cooperation and coordination through the dual-hatting of the Director of NSA and Commander of U.S. Cyber Command ought not be undermined by nascent efforts to divide the two out of a need for improved optics. Undermining our readiness and capability to act swiftly in order to address perception issues sets us on exactly the wrong course.

The current situation is particularly troubling because the reality is that the enemy will not wait for us to get this right. We cannot rely on a false sense of security; while our systems today are fairly resilient and we are working harder to make them more so, we must do more. Perhaps most importantly, given the fact that the vast majority of our key networked infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, the government and the private sector must learn to work together to defend our nation in cyberspace. Assuming that either the private sector or the government standing alone will be able to defend our nation is tantamount to the French reliance on the Maginot Line during the lead-up to World War II. We ought not repeat that historically catastrophic mistake.

I’m glad to be here today to discuss these issues with you and look forward to answering your questions.

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Witness Disclosure Requirement – "Truth in Testimony"
Required by House Rule XI, Clause 2(g)(5)

Name:

1. Please list any federal grants or contracts (including subgrants or subcontracts) you have received since October 1, 2012. Include the source and amount of each grant or contract.

N/A

2. Please list any entity you are testifying on behalf of and briefly describe your relationship with these entities.

IronNet Cybersecurity, Inc. President and CEO

3. Please list any federal grants or contracts (including subgrants or subcontracts) received since October 1, 2012, by the entity(ies) you listed above. Include the source and amount of each grant or contract.

N/A

I certify that the above information is true and correct.

Signature: K B Alexander

Date: 7 July 2016

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

by

SEAN KANUCK

for

United States House of Representatives
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Subcommittee on Information Technology
Subcommittee on National Security

Hearing entitled

"Digital Acts of War: Evolving the Cybersecurity Conversation"

13 July 2016

2:00 pm

Rayburn House Office Building

Room 2154

Chairman Hurd, Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Kelly, Ranking Member Lynch, and distinguished Members of Congress:

It is my honor and privilege to participate in the hearing entitled "Digital Acts of War: Evolving the Cybersecurity Conversation" before the Subcommittees on Information Technology and National Security of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives. I thank you for your invitation and sincerely hope that my contribution will assist you in your work on this critical topic.

This Statement for the Record draws upon my twenty years of experience in the field of information and communication technologies (ICT), including: as an academic, as a professional attorney who specializes in public international law, and as a senior intelligence officer for the United States Government. The perspective offered herein has been ineluctably shaped by my service as the National Intelligence Officer for Cyber Issues (NIO/Cyber) from May 2011 to May 2016. Having led strategic cyber analysis for the US Intelligence Community for five years, I earnestly concur in the need to evolve the cyber security conversation beyond where it is today. That will require (1) deeper subject matter expertise by more policy makers and legislators, (2) broader inclusion of private sector concerns and recommendations in public policy, and (3) a genuinely strategic approach that is currently lacking.

Since 2013, the Director of National Intelligence has led his annual, written Worldwide Threat Assessment to Congress with the cyber topic because ICT not only pose a cyber security risk in their own right, but also are integral factors utilized in the conduct of nearly every national security threat today.[1] During my tenure as NIO/Cyber, the US Intelligence Community attempted to provide policy makers with a strategic framework to understand cyber threats and strove to dispel several misnomers about cyberspace, namely: (a) it is not a unique physical "domain"; (b) it does not fulfill the logical criteria of a "global commons"; (c) not all adversarial cyber operations qualify as "attacks"; and (d) a "cyber Armageddon" is a highly improbable scenario. Rather than revisiting those questions that have been previously addressed elsewhere, this Statement will simply take those understandings as its point of departure.[2]

In order to evolve the cyber security conversation, one must first know what has or has not already been established and/or achieved. For example, the question of what constitutes a digital act of war has been studied for over twenty years. Rigorous legal scholarship by both myself and Michael Schmitt in the mid-to-late 1990s concluded that an effects-based analysis would be required to assess the applicability of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter.[3] Most academic commentators around the world who subsequently turned to that same question have arrived at a similar conclusion. The extreme difficulty of observing or detecting actions in cyberspace – let alone divining intentions – leaves one with effects as the only legitimate measure upon which to base policy responses. The academic, non-binding Tallinn Manual (for which Michael Schmitt has served as editor) perhaps now offers the strongest and most articulate exegesis of the effects-based doctrine.[4] It essentially says that what constitutes an act of war is

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largely agnostic of the modality used to perpetrate the harm(s). Accordingly, a special notion of a "digital" act of war is yet another misnomer.

Politicians and the media may try to label significant espionage successes or compromises of personally identifiable information (PII) as acts of cyber war, but such parlance does not comport with legal reasoning. That does not mean that a wide array of policy options – ranging from demarches to sanctions to domestic law enforcement or counterintelligence measures – can not be leveraged to dissuade such activities. Rather, it highlights the complexities of the strategic ICT environment whereby sovereign powers are particularly susceptible to foreign intervention in their internal affairs. In fact, fixation on defining the precise threshold for a digital act of war (beyond the de facto effects-based analysis to be applied in any actual scenario) distracts from the important question of how cyber operations are actually being used today. They tend to occur in one of four types: (i) operational preparation of the environment for use during future kinetic military conflict (wherein the question of a digital act of war trigger would be much less relevant); (ii) espionage (which is not addressed by public international law); (iii) criminal activity by non-state actors (which is not the usual basis for declarations of war or military reprisals); and (iv) willful intervention below the threshold of armed conflict.

My experience as an intelligence analyst has led me to believe that most adversaries use cyber operations as a strategic alternative to armed conflict and intend to conduct such activities with the deliberate objective of avoiding military retaliation by their targets. The famous strategist Sun Tzu would applaud the use of such means to accomplish one's goals without engaging in costly combat. To concentrate predominantly on the issue of what constitutes an act of war in cyberspace largely misses the strategic appeal of asymmetric cyber capabilities. The entire purpose of many cyber operations is to exert coercive influence without engendering an international armed conflict.

A more worthy focus might be considering what progress has been achieved to date in establishing rules, norms of behavior, or confidence building measures for actions in cyberspace. 2015-16 was a benchmark year for non-binding diplomatic expressions of proposed rules of behavior (i.e. norms) for state actors in cyberspace. In July 2015, a United Nations Group of Governmental Exports (GGE) report was issued that not only reaffirmed the applicability of international law and the United Nations Charter to activities in cyberspace, but also recommended several normative principles – most notably for limiting cyber attacks against civilian critical infrastructures.[5] In September 2015, Presidents Obama and Xi reached an accord to proscribe state-sponsored cyber espionage for commercial gain, which was later embraced by the Group of 20 (G-20) leaders in their joint statement from November 2015.[6] Finally, in March 2016, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) issued its decision on confidence building measures to reduce the risk of ICT conflicts.[7]

While those expressions can be politically expedient and may contribute to the formation of customary international law over lengthy periods of time, one must nonetheless query what – if anything – has changed in the actual behaviors of cyber actors since those diplomatic pronouncements. I would offer that some nations may have altered their modus operandi or

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adjusted their target sets to some degree, but that the overall security of cyberspace has not been appreciably strengthened. In fact, one can make a reasoned argument that cyberspace is an increasingly contested, vulnerable, and volatile environment despite those diplomatic overtures. To my knowledge, no nation – not even the United States or our closest allies – has declared a sincere interest in outlawing the use of any particular cyber capability under all circumstances. Instead, prohibitive discussions have mainly centered on types of targets that are to be avoided where possible, which although consistent with the effects-based approach mentioned above does little in the way of creating tangible incentives for compliance with such rules. For example, despite the normative proposals cited above, private sector utilities (e.g. in the energy sector) and other critical ICT infrastructures remain preferred targets for cyber operators.

International negotiations regarding ICT are unlikely to yield concrete, enforceable rules of behavior in the near term because different nations have fundamentally different political objectives for those discussions. The United States defines cyber security primarily in the context of critical infrastructure protection (i.e. keeping the "pipes" up and running), while nations like Russia and China are equally concerned about regulating the informational content transiting those networks.[8] A failure to appreciate the import of that strategic distinction might lead one to overestimate the potential impact of diplomatic efforts on actual behaviors (overt, clandestine, or covert). In April 2016, the Russian Federation's lead cyber negotiator even expressed that the range of possible compromise achievable within the GGE framework might have been "exhausted" already.[9]

Since no country seems genuinely eager to forego its sovereign prerogative to develop offensive ICT capabilities and/or conduct cyber operations for national advantage, the international community is left with a Hobbesian paradigm wherein the infamous adage from the Melian Dialogue rings true, namely: "The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must." Given that unsettling reality, further inquiry into the causes of that systemic result is warranted.

The burden of proof currently lies with the victim to establish definitive attribution for an adverse cyber incident. Attribution has two essential components, and any policy decision to publicly attribute an incident (if positive attribution can be established) must be based on three additional considerations. As NIO/Cyber, I advocated a dualistic approach that included both technical attribution (i.e. forensic investigation of the victim's ICT networks, reverse engineering of malicious software code, etc.) and analytic attribution (i.e. an all-source intelligence assessment of potential perpetrators, their possible motivations, the geo-political context, and other expected indicators that might support each hypothesis). Detailed analysis and comparison of historic cyber events illustrate that different types of actors conduct different kinds of operations against different kinds of targets. Each has its own motivations and concerns which necessarily influence what kind of effects it perpetrates and/or what it does with any stolen data. For example, one would expect the "take" from a state sponsored theft of PII from a healthcare of financial institution to be handled much differently than if the same target had been compromised by a criminal element seeking to maximize the monetary value of that information. A holistic attribution assessment must take all of these factors (technical and contextual) into consideration.

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Despite significant advances by both public and private sector cyber security researchers in recent years, it still remains difficult to reach high-confidence attribution assessments within the "real time" parameters that would be required for executive decision making during an incident.[10] That necessarily leaves one in a post hoc reactive mode, and even if one eventually reaches an attribution determination, then the next grouping of considerations comes into play.

Any decision regarding whether or not to publicly attribute a cyber event must account for (1) the bilateral and/or multilateral political ramifications of making such an accusation, (2) the relative costs and benefits of disclosing the evidence required to substantiate an attribution statement, and (3) whether or not one is willing and/or able to punish the perpetrator to whom the event is to be attributed. In this regard, the political decision about the merits of public attribution is wholly independent from the underlying factual question about attribution. One can easily imagine scenarios where one nation may not choose to publicly confront an ally, a trading partner, or a key creditor nation. But, the dilemmas posed by the second and third considerations are even more difficult.

Cyberspace is possibly unique in that the victims of adverse events have a very strong incentive not to publicly prove what has been done to them and by whom. That is owing to the fact that the very same kinds of ICT, methodologies, and accesses that are used for cyber intelligence operations are also used for cyber attack operations. Accordingly, a revelation of evidence that could compromise sources and methods for future intelligence collection might also enable an adversary to develop countermeasures for national military capabilities as well. In other contexts, such as the nuclear model, the technological platforms for intelligence and reconnaissance are distinct from the platforms required for a retaliatory strike. Strategically speaking, no such bifurcation of platforms exists in the cyber arena – which in turn provides a strong disincentive, or at least a very high threshold, for any nation's willingness to "prove" an attribution assessment for the international community writ large.

Another strategic consideration for public attribution relates to global power dynamics. If a nation has declared certain offenses to be unacceptable and announces that one has occurred, its reputation and the credibility of its deterrent mechanisms are then put to the test. Therefore, one can infer that nations might not wish to publicly attribute events for which they know they cannot exact satisfaction. And that dilemma is only exacerbated by the fact, mentioned above, that cyber capabilities are perishable once revealed. There is no analogue to a standing navy in port or intercontinental ballistic missile silo whose mere existence serves as a credible deterrent. In essence, today's cyber strategist would not be inclined to disclose specific offensive cyber capabilities unless she was prepared to use them imminently. Once again, the clear disincentives to publicize retaliatory capabilities or declaratory redlines – and even to prove that one was victimized – all render the cyber dialogue uncharacteristic of other strategic policy discussions.

High-confidence, public attribution remains one of the most pertinent topics in international cyber conferences. On the one hand, it seems like a natural prerequisite for any legitimate accusation or reprisal. But, on the other hand, the technical realities of cyberspace

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currently permit offenders to either evade punishment (based on insufficient public attribution) or else inflict further policy dilemmas and security compromises on the already afflicted victim.

The market for cyber intelligence has grown propitiously. Governments around the world now benefit from thousands of cyber security analysts in the private sector who are monitoring networks, remediating incidents, and investigating breaches around the clock. Private companies are also increasingly providing threat intelligence that is steadily approaching the all-source format used by governmental intelligence agencies and security services. Personally, I welcome that expanded industry focus from a defender's perspective even though I must also acknowledge that it complicates certain US military, intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement missions.

The private sector already owns and operates much of the critical infrastructure in the United States. It is also increasingly positioned to provide cyber threat intelligence and high quality attribution assessments. And private companies are also increasingly being targeted by a broad range of illicit cyber actors, whether as part of geo-political conflicts or by profit-motivated criminals. Any public policy discussions regarding cyber deterrence, norms of behavior, or strategic implications for US national and economic security that do not take account of private sector input should be considered lacking. That is not to say that the US Government should defer to corporations on sovereign matters, but rather that it must acknowledge that it no longer leads technological innovation for the nation or suffers the primary brunt of conflicts in cyberspace.

Another interesting observation from my analytic outreach to many industry professionals and academic international relations theorists over the years has been the centrality of improved resiliency for maintaining the fullest breadth of one's own national security policy options. As the preceding discussion about attribution and credible deterrents alluded, the weaker one's own cyber capabilities are, the more limited one's policy options will be in the face of an adversary's transgression. So it is very noteworthy, albeit counterintuitive, that a strong cyber offense requires an equally strong if not stronger cyber defense. That is what permits the freedom of maneuver.

In the case of the United States, that represents a call for improved cyber security practices across public utilities and other critical infrastructures throughout multiple sectors. It remains unclear if legislation, regulation, or market forces will eventually induce the desired result. It also remains unclear how US-based multinational corporations will navigate an increasingly complex environment of data privacy, data retention, encryption, event disclosure, and surveillance laws from multiple jurisdictions (both domestic and foreign). In the interim, I envision that the nascent cyber insurance market, along with heightened reporting requirements for data breaches or other cyber events by the Securities and Exchange Commission, will begin to incentivize companies towards adopting best practices for cyber security. That will in turn bolster other governmental efforts, such as the Cybersecurity Framework promulgated by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) at the Department of Commerce.

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I cannot purport to have solutions for all of the policy challenges that I have outlined in this Statement; however, with the Subcommittees' indulgence, I will offer some limited recommendations for consideration going forward:

- Concerted thought is required on the strategic realities that would be both necessary and sufficient to create an effective deterrent to foreign and domestic cyber threats. One cannot presume that diplomatic overtures automatically translate into behavioral changes, or that international law will not be honored in the breach.

- New normative frameworks should be considered which accept the prevalence of cyber operations – including against private sector targets during peacetime – and instead focus on holding actors strictly liable for any and all effects (intended or otherwise) caused by their deliberate actions.[11] Some form of enforcement mechanism is required to better constrain offensive cyber activity.

- US policy makers should consider the potential benefits of clear, declaratory redlines in cyberspace as well as the use of overt cyber operations where it is determined that US military or law enforcement action is warranted. The strategic uncertainty in cyberspace is partly owing to the ubiquitous use of clandestine operations to evade attribution and obfuscate sovereign influences.

- Improved cyber defenses and resiliency are required throughout US critical infrastructures in order to provide US policy makers the greatest breadth of policy options when confronted with adversarial events. Perfect cyber security is impossible, so risk mitigation and risk management models must be employed to maintain core operations and enterprise value even in a degraded environment.

- The US private sector should be consulted more thoroughly in connection with national policy decisions whose impact will be borne by those companies. Military and diplomatic strategies that could indirectly harm the US economy by imposing additional transaction costs, inducing foreign retaliation against US companies, or concealing dangerous vulnerabilities that can be exploited by our adversaries should receive careful review.

- Public agencies in the United States face extreme challenges in recruiting and retaining world class ICT talent. Cyber expertise is a qualitative vice quantitative endeavor (i.e. the number of congressionally authorized billets matters less than who is filling those billets). Additional consideration should be given to ensuring that the US Government employs more of the cyber "Olympians".

Once again, thank you for this opportunity to provide service to my country.

Respectfully submitted by Sean Kanuck.

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[1] See: James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 12 March 2013; James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 29 January 2014; James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 February 2015; and James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Senate Armed Services Committee, 9 February 2016.

[2] For discussion regarding points (a) and (b), see Sean Kanuck, "Sovereign Discourse on Cyber Conflict Under International Law" in Texas Law Review, Volume 88, Number 7, June 2010 (pages 1573-1580). For discussion regarding point (c), see James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 12 March 2013 (page 1). For discussion regarding point (d), see James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 February 2015 (page 1).

[3] See Sean P. Kanuck, "Information Warfare: New Challenges for Public International Law" in Harvard International Law Journal, Volume 37, Number 1, Winter 1996 (page 292). See generally, Michael N. Schmitt, "Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework" in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Volume 37, 1999.

[4] See generally, Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 15 March 2013.

[5] See "Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security", United Nations General Assembly document A/70/174, 22 July 2015. See also, "Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security", United Nations General Assembly document A/68/98, 24 June 2013.

[6] See the White House press release entitled "Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping's State Visit to the United States" dated 25 September 2015, and the "G20 Leaders' Communiqué" from the Antalya Summit held on 15-16 November 2015.

[7] See Decision Number 1202 of the Permanent Council of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe entitled "OSCE Confidence-Building Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use of Information and Communication Technologies" dated 10 March 2016. See also Decision Number 1106 of the Permanent Council of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe entitled "Initial Set of OSCE Confidence-Building Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use of Information and Communication Technologies" dated 3 December 2013.

[8] See generally: White House press release regarding Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21 entitled "Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience" dated 12 February 2013; Executive Order 13636 of 12 February 2013 entitled "Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity" in Federal Register, Volume 78, Number 33, 19 February 2013; United Nations General Assembly document A/69/723, Annex entitled "International code of conduct for information security", 13 January 2015; and Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Agreement between the Governments of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security, 16 June 2009.

[9] Statement made by Andrey Krutskikh to US Government officials on the margins of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament (UNIDIR) workshop entitled "The Application of International Law in the Context of International Cybersecurity" held in Geneva, Switzerland from 19-21 April 2016.

[10] See generally, James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Statements for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Senate Armed Services Committee, 9 February 2016 (page 3) and 26 February 2015 (page 2).

[11] See e.g., proposed norm number 22 in The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies working paper for the Global Conference on Cyber Security entitled "Food for thought for break-out group 'Confidence Building Measures, Norms of Behavior and Public-Private Cooperation for International Security in Cyberspace'" presented on 17 April 2015 in The Hague, Netherlands.

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Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
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Name: SEAN KANUCK

1. Please list any federal grants or contracts (including subgrants or subcontracts) you have received since October 1, 2012. Include the source and amount of each grant or contract.

NO GRANTS OR CONTRACTS.
I WAS EMPLOYED AS A CIVIL SERVANT BY THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (ODNI) FROM MAY 2011 TO MAY 2016.

2. Please list any entity you are testifying on behalf of and briefly describe your relationship with these entities.

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NOT APPLICABLE.

I certify that the above information is true and correct.
Signature: Sean Kanuck

Date: 11 JULY 2016

Prepared Testimony and Statement for the Record of

P.W. Singer
Strategist at New America

At the

Hearing on "Digital Acts of War."

Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Joint IT and National Security Subcommittee

July 13, 2016

Chairmen Hurd and DeSantis, Ranking Members Kelly and Lynch, and Members of the Subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the committee today.

My name is Peter W. Singer. I am Strategist at New America, a non-partisan thinktank with a goal of preparing the US for the new digital age; the author of a variety of books on security, including Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know, a primer on cybersecurity issues, and Ghost Fleet, which is a look at the future of war; and the co-host of the Cybersecurity podcast, which Chairman Hurd was kind enough to join us for an interview last year. It is an honor to speak at this important discussion today, designed to reboot the cybersecurity conversation.

There is perhaps no national security problem more 21st century in both its definition and form than cybersecurity. And yet to solve it, the ready solution in nearly every U.S. national security conversation today is the 20th-century framework of Cold War style deterrence. It argues that the best way to stop the frustrating array of cyberattacks on the United States -- ranging from credit card theft, to emails stolen from Hollywood studios, to the millions of security clearance records lifted from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), to not yet realized fears of a national power grid collapses or devastating military defeat through digital means-- is to demonstrate the capability and willingness to hit back just as hard.

This rhetoric of achieving Cold War deterrence by retaliation is appealing. It offers both simplicity, an easy answer that echoes back to a time of familiarity, and the allure of a rhetoric that seemingly demonstrates strength and resolve.

There is just one problem: Any cybersecurity strategy based on merely whacking back to end hacking is not going to work. This is a new technology and a new era, and U.S. deterrence thinking needs to reflect our new needs.

Not Your Grandfather's Deterrence: Why the Cold War Parallels Fail

In the Cold War, the challenge was huge, but the problem was relatively simple. The opposing sides possessed roughly the same type and number of weapons, and these weapons

affected them both in roughly the same way. The attack to be deterred was a clear and obvious one, with clear attribution that assured mutual and equal destruction in a massive mushroom cloud. Thus, building up a potent offense, and being willing and able to use it, translated directly into deterrence.

Today, though, there are seven key differences that mean the Cold War model of deterrence is not an apt one to deal with the threats of a new digital world.

First is the different civilian versus military makeup of the issue. In the Cold War, while support of the population mattered, the basic competition of deterrence came down to the two sides' defense and strategic nuclear establishments. Today, the domain in question is civilian-owned and operated (even 98% of US military communications go over civilian systems), meaning everything from the technology itself is to many of the most important players are civilian, from the protectors (civilian government agencies like the FBI and DHS to cybersecurity firms) to the targets themselves (civilian agencies like the OPM or NASA to the individual victims of over $1 Trillion in cybercrime).

The relative position of the military and civilian world is also reversed. In the Cold War, the military led the way, including even funding the creation of the Internet itself. Today, it is the civilian world that is often doing cutting-edge work in everything from finding new zero days to building new means of encryption. This applies even to the human resources side. There was no private market in the Cold War for missileers in the same way that there is a booming cybersecurity industry that rivals and sometimes surpasses talent inside of the military, as well as makes it harder to retain.

Second, today, there is no "mutual" to balance, let alone "assured" nature of any action, nor "destruction" of the same scale. The United States is arguably more vulnerable to cyberattack than any of its adversaries, largely because of its wide commercial, military, and cultural dependence on the Internet. This feels daunting, but is, on balance, a good thing. North Korea, for instance, may be in the seemingly enviable position of being the world's least vulnerable nation to cyberattack. But this seeming strength comes at the cost of global isolation, dictatorship, and an economy that relies on military-run pig farms.

Likewise, while conventional and nuclear weapons have highly predictable, i.e. "assured," consequences, cyber attacks are uncertain by their very nature. Their impact depends on multiple, often unpredictable actions, and often have second and third orders effects unanticipated by their designers. The (at the time) covert operation to deploy Stuxnet in 2009-2010, for instance, was arguably one of the most successful digital attacks in history, as it successfully sabotaged Iranian nuclear research equipment. Yet, the software was discovered as it popped up in some 25,000 other computers located around the world, from Belarus to India, contrary to the operational plan.

Finally, while there are great threats and costs from cyber attack, no human has yet been directly hurt or killed by one. Of the very few attacks that have caused physical impact (three are most commonly recognized at this time: Stuxnet, the 2015 Ukrainian power grid hack, and a suspected attack in 2014 at a German steel factory), the actual destructive damage has so far been limited to less than a grenade could do, let alone the Hiroshima device. Looking forward, we can envision cyber attacks that would cause great physical damage and even

death, such as the take down of a city or even entire region's power grid. Yet, even in such worst fears, the death toll would still be orders of magnitude smaller than the toll of a single nuclear bomb, let alone the all out thermonuclear war between the US and USSR that threatened human existence and thus was truly MAD.

Third, there is an inverse relationship to conventional military strengths and weaknesses that guided us in the past. Underpinning Cold War deterrence strategy was that the United States perceived itself weaker than the Soviet Union in conventional warfighting, worrying about a quick takeover of Western Europe by a larger Red Army. Thus, it relied on the threat of nuclear response to avoid an unequal conventional war. Today, we face an opposite dilemma. It is the United States that has the conventional edge on its adversaries and our attackers see cyberattacks as their asymmetric way to work around a power imbalance. This points to a key aspect in our deterrence today: our willingness and ability to escalate in the opposite direction as the Cold War. If an act in cyberspace is an "act of war,' we retain the option to respond with acts of war in other domains where we may have an even great advantage, with the knowledge of that fact providing an added dose of deterrence.

Fourth, the timing is fundamentally different. The physics of a ballistic missile's speed and arc determined conceptions of deterrence during the Cold War. The critical 30 minutes it would take an intercontinental missile to fly across continents was essential to planning and strategy.

In cybersecurity, however, time operates by different rules. While cyberattacks seemingly move at digital speed, the ones that are actually effective take months or years to plan, organize, conduct, and -- most importantly -- detect. An attacker often carries out long periods of preparation and intelligence gathering, all with the goals of gaining and keeping entry. The alleged Chinese OPM hacks that stole sensitive data of over 21 million Americans may be on policymakers' minds now, but the attack actually started as early as March 2014, well over a year before it became an issue of defender or Congressional awareness. Indeed, the average time it takes a victim of a cyber attack to detect that they have been breached is 205 days. In its study of APT1, a hacking campaign linked to the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Unit 61398, the security firm Mandiant found that the unit spent as long as 5 years undetected inside several of its targets' networks.

It is not just about preparation or detection; the timeline of reaction is also fundamentally different. As opposed to the need to act within the tight, 30-minute window of Cold War missiles, in cybersecurity the defender's best move may well not be to strike back as rapidly as possible, but to show no outside awareness of the ongoing attack. This complicates the attacker's damage assessments. It even allows the victim to turn the tables and steer the attacker into areas where they cannot do harm, or feed them false information that undermines their whole endeavor.

The weapons also come with different timelines -- not just in their creation, but also in their utility. The Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) was conceived in 1956, and served as the central tool of U.S. nuclear deterrence for the next three decades of the Cold War. But its utility did not stop there. Indeed, roughly 450 Minuteman III missiles still protect the United States today, with plans for them to serve to 2030 or even beyond. By contrast, the most dangerous cyberweapons depend on new "zero days" -- vulnerabilities the

victim is not yet aware of. Yet, what is most potent today, a single software patch can render inert tomorrow.

Fifth is a fundamental difference in the players of the game itself, in their makeup, number, and interests. The actors who the United States is supposed to be cyber deterring are far more diverse than the Cold War list that included only the Soviet Union (which notably had a fairly similar power status and even nuclear doctrine). More than 60 countries have cyber-military capabilities, ranging from large and powerful states to weak regimes. Non-state actors also are in the game, and they range from transnational criminals to hacktivist networks to maybe the most difficult of all, proxy groups taking advantage of the grey space in between, sometimes working on behalf of states and sometimes on their own. Moreover, it is not just the different numbers, but that each actor comes with vastly different interests and stakes in the game. Akin to terrorism or crime, some players have assets or positions they greatly value, and thus are deterrable, while some value mere chaos, and thus are not.

Sixth, as diverse as the players are, another difference is the diversity of attacks they might carry out. Those vary from theft of intellectual property to online dumps of embarrassing Hollywood studio emails, to the (not yet realized) risks of a massive kinetic attack on critical infrastructure, such as using Stuxnet style digital weaponry against industrial control systems to collapse power grids or transportation networks. So when people talk today about their fears that US cyber deterrence has failed, they are both right and wrong. Not every kind of attack is being thwarted, yet the worst kind of attack that major states are capable of are indeed being deterred.

This variety reinforces a key aspect in the discussion of digital war: not all attacks in constitute an act of war. They range from acts of theft to protest to espionage that ranges from sabotage to subversion to the fear of an actual act of war, traditionally defined as political violence on a mass scale. The stealing of a secret, for instance, is vexing, but no nation has ever gone to war over such an event. Such distinctions are important not just in defining what is and isn't war, but also what is and isn't a US military responsibility. If every cyber threat becomes a military issue, not only is that inefficient in term of applying the right response, but it also over burdens an already busy US military.

While attribution is often identified as a central problem in cybersecurity and acts of war discussions -- unlike an ICBM, a cyberattack does not emit a clear plume of smoke to identify the attacker -- the existence of diverse attackers and diverse attacks muddies the water further: it can be incredibly complicated to determine the intent of an attack, even if its form and sender are known. When a Russian criminal group with ties to Russian intelligence was detected attacking U.S. banks in 2014, for instance, the security community debated whether it was regular old cybercrime, or an attack linked to Russian state interests, designed as a response to the sanctioning of the regime for its invasion of Ukraine. But even then, was the attack a retaliation that got caught? Or was it akin to a nuclear test in a crisis, a signal that was actually intended to be detected, as a warning of greater consequences if the United States pushed further?

The problem of comparison when it comes attack types does not stop there. Unlike in the Cold War, some cyber attacks that target the United States are the kind of attacks that we would actually like to carry out ourselves, or, in fact, already do. US Military and White

House officials reacted far more mildly to the OPM email breach than many in the public expected. Why? In part, it is because attacks targeting a government agency's networks are the bread and butter of the online espionage operations the United States implements against other governments. As Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said in June, 2015 after the discovery of the OPM attack, "You have to kind of salute the Chinese for what they did. If we had the opportunity to do that, I don't think we'd hesitate for a minute." When it comes to attacks like on the OPM, instead of telling the attackers "Shame on you," we need to look in the mirror and say "Shame on us for making their job so easy."

Seventh, and perhaps where the Cold War parallels fall short the most, is the idea that building up like offensive capabilities will deliver deterrence. This is a constant refrain: not just the need to build up U.S. cyber offense, but the need to make sure others know the United States has those capabilities. As James Cartwright, the four-star Marine Corps general who led much of the initial U.S. strategy in cyber issues until his retirement in 2011, said, "You can't have something that's a secret be a deterrent. Because if you don't know it's there, it doesn't scare you."

The problem is that the evidence so far disproves this link. Unlike concerns over bomber and missile "gaps" during the Cold War (which instructively turned out to be wrong), the United States' offensive cyberspace capabilities have never been in question. And for anyone somehow in doubt, there have been series of public releases that further confirmed it. These included Washington policymakers' leaks designed to take credit for Stuxnet, and then Edward Snowden's 2014 dump of some 1.4 million NSA documents. While Snowden's disclosures obviously angered his former employers, they also show that the experts at Fort Meade have much to be proud of. The NSA has developed unmatched, amazingly exotic capabilities, from a mindboggling scale of global monitoring devices to new classes of cyber weapons that use radio signals to jump software over the previously protective physical divides between systems. And the leaks show the capability is not mere lab work, but that the NSA has used them in operations against targets ranging from Iranian nuclear research facilities to Chinese command networks.

Yet despite this clear and continual gain in offensive capability and the demonstration of its potency, attacks on the United States have only grown, in both number and in intensity. In the year after the Snowden leaks proved the U.S.'s offensive prowess, there was 55% more data lost from hacking than the year before -- and that does not even include the operations targeting major government sites like OPM or the Pentagon's Joint Staff network that began in that same period.

In sum, the flaw is not with deterrence theory, nor with cyber weapons' utility. Rather, it is with the framing of the problem. We too often try to peel off the bumper-sticker version of complicated Cold War deterrence debates and apply it to a more complicated present and future.

A Deterrence Path Forward

So what to do instead? There are the three better ways for the United States to draw the right lessons from the Cold War and reach more effective and more obtainable cyber deterrence goals.

1) Set the Norms

There is a huge value in delineating clear lines of behavior in a combined commercial, espionage, and warfighting space still at its infancy. During the height of the Cold War, the superpowers may have been a button press away from thermonuclear annihilation, but they still found a way to agree on certain norms. Sometimes these were formal arms treaties; other times they were tacit codes of conduct that guided everything from limiting spy-on-spy killings to avoiding interference with nuclear commands. Cutting across all was the goal of avoiding miscalculations that could unintentionally escalate into outright war.

Today, at the global level, much of the norm discussion in the UN GGE process has been about establishing potential rules of the road for military conflict in cyberspace. Inside US defense and political circles, by contrast, much of cyber deterrence and norm discussions has been on how to end the spate of government-enabled attacks on intellectual property, which was at the center of the agreement hammered out this fall between the United States and China. There is mixed reporting since on the impact of the agreement. The overall number of IP theft attacks are reportedly down, with some crediting the reduction to the agreement, while others credit unrelated forces like domestic Chinese government anti-corruption activities.

What is clear is that three activities will continue. Theft of intellectual property is integral to the Chinese mercantilist economic model, so while the number is down, the overall practice is, and by all indications, will still continue. In turn, the United States is wedded to the open flow of information, but Beijing sometimes interprets platforms that share freedom of speech as "information attacks" that threaten its internal stability. So China will perceive itself under continued attacks of a different kind from the US. And both sides, whose militaries are engaged in an arms race in the Pacific, will continue to engage in espionage to better position themselves if there was outright war.

This dynamic illustrates how reaching a formal prohibition on cyberattacks of any and all kinds between the 21st century powers unlikely. It does not mean, however, that there is no value in engagement and norm building. Rather than a treaty or agreement that unrealistically tries to create a Cold War-style regime of deterrence or arms control, the two sides need to flesh out a mutual understanding of the new rules of the game. Both sides must understand that their opponent will continue to conduct cyberactivities ranging from espionage to theft. The most important goal is not to stop every cyberattack, but to keep them from escalating into something far more dangerous.

This leads to a fundamental change in the typical deterrence discussion. In the Cold War, everything was targeted, from military bases to cities full of civilians, but outright attacks crossed the line. Today, the situation is inverted. While unwanted, some cyberattacks will have to be allowed, while certain targets must be made anathema.

This returns to the point that not all 'cyberattacks' are act of war. No one wants their state secrets stolen, for example, but it is part of the expected dance of great powers in competition. By contrast, there are other attacks that may not be clear acts of war, but they should be a focus on norm building to prohibit, as they make war more likely. Introducing

the digital equivalent of a dormant Tasmanian devil into a nuclear power facility's operating system should be off limits to both sides, not merely because it would be disproportional if actually used, but because simply the act of deploying it risks accident or event interpretation as an incredibly escalatory step of preparing for war.

Continuing to set and reinforce these guardrails has to be one of the key activities in the various bilateral and multilateral efforts in this space, from U.S. agreements on cybersecurity with to the two U.N. General Assembly resolutions that call for respect of the laws of war in cyberspace, to the Tallinn Manual process.

Yet, for all the laudable work in building norms, what threatens to undermine norm-building is inaction when acts clearly violate the norms. One of the consistently agreed upon norms is not to target clear civilian infrastructure with the intent to cause widespread damage (as opposed to monitor or steal information), even more so outside of declared war. Such attacks are viewed as violating the norms of necessity and proportionality that underpin the laws of war.

Yet, in December of 2015, this line was clearly crossed in an attack on the Ukrainian power grid. More than 230,000 civilians lost power, in a what has been positively identified as a cyber attack by both local authorities and international experts, and US officials have identified Russia as the attacker (going back to the issue of proxy actors, they have not made clear whether it was government or non government but government linked actors). It was the first proven takedown of a power grid, the long discussed nightmare scenario. Yet, in the story of action and consequence that is the key to maintaining norms, we had clear action, but as yet no clear consequence.

2) Deter Through Diversity

Nothing above argues against building up offensive capabilities for cyberspace. Cyberweapons have proven their value in espionage, sabotage, and conflict. And the digital domain will be as crucial to warfare in the 21st century as operations on land, air, and sea. Indeed, the cyber front of any war between the United States and China would feature not just military units like Cyber Command or the PLA's Unit 61398, but also non-state actors that might range from Chinese university cyber militias to Anonymous hackers joining in the fight with their own goals and modes, much as what has happened in the online ISIS battles.

This is a good illustration of another misperception: Cyberweapons are increasingly useful tools of espionage and war, but they are not akin to "weapons of mass destruction." The fear of a single big thermonuclear tit for tat maintained the nuclear balance; indeed, treating nuclear weapons as no different from conventional weapons is what many feared would unravel MAD. Offensive cyber capabilities, by contrast, are a key part of the toolkit to be used in both hot and cold conflicts. Indeed, the US has already crossed this line by openly admitting to conducting offensive cyber operations against ISIS.

We can and should continue to build our offensive cyber capabilities. The key to their optimal effectiveness, though, will be in doctrine building and integration; i.e. how we meld activities in the cyber domain with conventional operations in the air, sea, land, and space. Achieving ranges from bolstering training and operational planning to clarifying command

and control relationships. Indeed, if there is a historic parallel to worry about, it is not Cold War battles never fought, but a digital version of the 1942 Battle of Kasserine Pass, where a US military failure to bring together technologies and units across domains helped contribute to the early losses of World War II.

That a cyber weapon is not like a WMD does not mean the United States has no options to exact costs on would-be attackers to change their calculations, the goal of deterrence outside of war. Indeed, it may even have more. Just as the timeline is stretched out and the players are proliferated as compared to the Cold War, the options for responding are proliferated. True deterrence building responses can come after the fact and in other realms. For instance, our only option is not to respond to IP theft by taking the exact same action, in the same domain. The defender can also go after other assets valued by the attacker or even those valued by third party actors, from sanctioning companies benefiting from stolen fruit to personal level actions like threatening to revoke valued visas for regime leader family members to attend US schools. Indictments of individuals involved in hacking might serve a purpose not of actual prosecution and punishment, but as a different means of surfacing data about attribution, or to make access to the global financial system more difficult. This dynamism complicates things to a degree that even the most brilliant Cold War strategist would find vexing.

The raised options increase the complexity we have to work through. Leaders will have to game out not merely the first two moves of the response -- the simple "shoot and shoot back" dynamic that was the whole of thinking they needed in any Cold War nuclear exchange -- but plot out moves in multiple stages by multiple actors. For instance, the success of legal or trade sanctions will depend not just on whether a punishment for past attacks would stop future attacks, but also what the United States is prepared and willing to do in response to loss of market access were China, say, to respond in kind against some American firms.

Creativity and flexibility will beat simplicity in this dynamic. Indeed, the United States may even steal ideas from one attacker's playbook as a useful tool against another. From Sony to Snowden, leaked emails and documents have been among the most vexing incidents for cybersecurity. But the irony is that here the lack of mutuality is to our advantage; the U.S.'s system of government and open society is least vulnerable to them. For all the sturm and drang over revelations of questionable metadata collection and Angelina Jolie gossip, U.S. political and societal stability has never been at risk from this practice of what is known as "doxing," Yet, as Catherine Lotrionte at Georgetown University has noted, threatening to reveal the private financial data of a regime's leader, his family, or allied oligarchs, may be far more potent. In thinking through such targeting for cyber deterrence, we can see sometimes see what regimes fear most by what they ban. Witness the different responses to the Panama Papers, which were short-lived news articles of interest in the US, but led the Chinese government to censor discussion of even the word Panama on its social media.

Across all these efforts, the goal is not to prevent all attacks, like MAD did with nuclear weapons. Rather, it is to change the potential attacker's calculus on whether an individual cyberattack will be beneficial in the final tally.

3) Shake It Off: Build Resilience

The third, most apt lesson from a deeper dive into the Cold War deterrence debates is the value not just in raising the costs, but also in limiting the adversary's potential gains. This is known as "deterrence by denial" -- making attacks less likely by reducing their likely value. In today's parlance, this is the crucial idea of "resilience." If Congress wants to evolve the cybersecurity conversation, it should move resilience to the center of it.

In both strategy and football, sometimes the best defense is a good defense. A half-century ago, strategic planners did not just talk about striking back as the key to deterrence, but also on having "survivable" counter or "second strike" missiles that would nuke the other side, even if it tried a sneak attack. This is why the United States put missiles on expensive submarines and in hardened siloes.

Resilience today is about creating the capacity to power through an attack and shake it off, thereby limiting the gains to the attacker and recovering rapidly from any losses. Building resilience is not as politically appealing as striking back with new cyberweapons, because it means accepting that this is a digital world where the risk of cyberattacks is not going away. Yet it is more realistic, as well as where the United States would be getting far more deterrence bang for its buck. Most importantly to the problem we face in the diversity of cyber problems, it is useful for responding to them all. The great value of building resilience is that it applies to any kind of attacker and any kind of attack.

Unfortunately, despite the attention, rhetoric, and money the United States government spends on cybersecurity, it is still far from resilient against cyber attack. For every gain, there is still a major gap to be closed. In the military, the construction budget alone for Fort Meade, the combined headquarters of the NSA and Cyber Command, will reach $2 billion by the end of 2016, and the force will add another 4,000 personnel. Yet, the Pentagon's own tester still found "significant vulnerabilities" in nearly every major weapons program.

In the broader federal government, the cybersecurity budget for 2016 is 35 percent higher than it was just two years ago. Yet half of security professionals in these agencies think cybersecurity did not improve over that same period. The reasons range from continued failure to follow basic measures – the requirement for personal identification verification cards dates back to 2004 but still is not fully implemented -- to a failure to take seriously the long-term nature of the threats we face, most importantly in a world of renewed geopolitical competition. The exemplar of these failures was the OPM, which dealt with some of the most sensitive government information, and yet outsourced IT work to contractors in China -- despite warnings going back to 2009.

In October, the White House issued a post-OPM "Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan" that describes a key series of steps that every federal agency needs to take. It included the basic measures that should have been in place long ago: from identifying high-value assets that need to be protected, to accelerating the deployment of detection systems. Ensuring the implementation of these steps could be one of the most important things that Congress could do on cybersecurity. Indeed, it would likely matter more than passage of the much ballyhooed cybersecurity information sharing bill. While the bill had many laudable aspects, 87% of cybersecurity experts think it will not affect the number of major security breaches.

This same uneven implementation plays out across industry. While corporate boards are now talking far more about the problem, cybersecurity spending as a portion of IT budgets is still roughly a quarter of the rate within government IT budgets, while only 25% of key industry players, for example, participated last year in Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), which share needed cyber threat data -- the same percentage as in 2014. The outcome is that some sectors, like banking, take cybersecurity seriously, while others, like health care, manufacturing, and infrastructure, remain behind the curve. Of note to the concerns over Ukraine power grid attack is that despite this real demonstration of the risks, experts worry that US companies have not implemented key steps to better protect themselves, not just against the tactics used in December, but how they will naturally evolve in the future.

This concern extends down to the personal level. Unlike in the Cold War, individuals both face personalized cyber threats, but also can contribute more to national security. During the Cold War, "duck and cover" was about all that a population could do when it came to nuclear deterrence. Today, the vast majority of Americans use the Internet, and they can actually make a difference in its defense. Over 90% of cyber attacks would be stopped by basic measures of cyber hygiene, from two factor authentication on accounts to using different passwords for their bank accounts and fantasy football teams.

How this ties together to Congress's role in evolving the cybersecurity conversation is that *we have to rethink the role that government can play in linking cybersecurity policy, markets, and citizenry's behavior*. In other words, government can and should play the role it plays in cybersecurity that it does in other realms, from health to transportation.

Sometimes government can be a trusted provider of useful information to both business and the wider public. And sometimes it can go further to help shape individual and market incentives. For instance, the government created Center for Disease Control (CDC) to fill key gaps, funding research on under-studied diseases, and serving as a trusted exchange for information provided by groups ranging from universities to drug companies. A cyber CDC could meet some of the same needs in cybersecurity.

Similarly, U.S. buildings are filled with "EXIT" signs and fire extinguishers, while cars have seatbelts and crash bags. These demonstrate the efficacy of government in creating *both* voluntary standards and actual regulations to increase security. These regulations are then bolstered by insurance laws and markets that use the combined power of the public and private sector to incentivize good behavior and best practices. Such a system has positively shaped everything from building construction to driving habits.

So too, the government should support not merely research on the basic standards of Internet security , like the laudable NIST process, but now work to backstop them with the nascent cybersecurity insurance market. If Congress can aid in spurring that market to further develop, it can potentially have a massively positive effect on national security.

Last year, the cybersecurity marketplace collected $1.6 billion in premiums. It sounds like much, but is a drop in the bucket compared to the overall scale of the insurance industry (which collected over a trillion dollars comparatively), the scale of our digital economy, and

the scale of cybersecurity risk at both a personal, business, and national security level. Less than half of the Fortune 500 have insurance protecting them against cyber incidents (and, in turn, incentivizing and guiding them to undertake best practices to avoid and mitigate these risks), while among mid-sized firms, some 18,000 firms are not yet insured. The protections are also varied across sectors. Much as how banks were among the first to information share and adapt other best cybersecurity practices, so too here are other sectors behind; only 5% of US manufacturing firms have cyber insurance.

As Elana Broitman explores in her New America report on the needs of a cyber-legislative agenda, Congress can aid in injecting more life into this marketplace. We are certainly not at the point yet in the debate to where such insurance should be required, but Congress can 1) hold hearings to better understand the field and draw attention to its possibilities, 2) help establish an Insurance Laboratory within the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) cybersecurity process, 3) work with the industry and state partners to encourage the building of common cybersecurity insurance industry terms and language, something that requires regulatory cooperation across states, thus fitting with Congress's constitutional role; and 4) explore the passage of a Cyber equivalent to the Terrorism risk insurance cap (TRIA). Just as such legislation was designed to encourage best practices in protecting infrastructure from conventional terrorism threats post 9-11, the same kind of back stop against catastrophic cyber attacks against critical infrastructure sector (particularly from states in the event of war) would help encourage the spread of insurance that would, not so ironically, help make cyber attacks both less painful and less likely.

The challenge in building true cybersecurity resilience is not only about software and legal code, however, but also about people. Across government and industry, there is a growing lack of cybersecurity professionals; the consultancy Frost and Sullivan estimates that the global gap between security openings and skilled people to fill them will reach 1.5 million by 2020. Thus, even when positions are created and funded, they are difficult to fill, both in private industry and in government. For example, at last report, 40% of the cybersecurity positions at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) remained unfilled, leaving many field offices without expertise. Diversity is also a problem; less than 10 percent of cybersecurity professionals are women, lower than the already dismal rates in the broader IT world. How can we fill key gaps if we are only recruiting well from less than half the population?

The administration's work in creating a "Cybersecurity Human Resources Strategy" is another of the new, and much needed, milestones in building greater resilience by targeting gaps with scholarship programs and other incentives. But it will fail if it only puts new people in old organizational boxes, using the same pipelines.

Attracting more talented civilian expertise into the government can aid in an overall national strategy, by supporting a "deterrence by denial" strategy across broader networks. Consider, for instance, that after the embarrassment of the healthcare.gov rollout, the government created a Digital Service to bring young Silicon Valley innovators into government to do things like fix the federal health care website design. Even after the OPM debacle, however, there is still not a parallel one to shore up cybersecurity.

Here again, Congress can rewrite the conversation by pulling from best practices that bring together the public and private sector in a manner that cuts across traditional partisan lines.

A good illustration is the Pentagon's recent adaption of a "bug bounty" program. This is a program that offers small rewards (The Pentagon program rewards ranged from $100 to $15,000 for a person that identified multiple security gaps) to encourage a "crowd sourced" solution to cybersecurity; in essence it enlists the ingenuity of citizens to find the holes in our security before the bad guys do. The Pentagon's experiment with this project has been a success. Its first bug reports came in just 13 minutes after the contest started. After just 1 month, 1410 outside hackers had submitted 1189 reports to help to spot and fix vulnerabilities in the Pentagon's websites.

The cost was $150,000, an order of magnitude at least cheaper than if it had been contracted out, but the gains of the program were also about identifying and building out ties to cybersecurity talent beyond government. For example, one of the hackers who helped defend our military's IT systems via this program was 18 year old David Dworken, who did it during his high school AP exams. Congress could play a powerful role in aiding and encouraging the spread of such programs to other federal government agencies, as well as across state and local government partners and private industry.

Similarly, innovations are needed in our military organizational models. Several National Guard units have been retasked to focus on cybersecurity. They have performed admirably, even besting some active duty Cyber Command units in wargames. But the new units only serve as a means to organize talent already serving in the military. There is a far deeper and wider pool of talent outside the military that is simply not going to be accessed by this effort-- either because the individuals are unwilling to meet the various obligations that come with military service (an IT tech in the National Guard, for example, is still legally obligated to serve in any mission they are ordered to, whether it be a cyber 911, Haiti Earthquake response, or Iraq war) or because they are unable to meet the various physical or legal requirements for joining the military.

Here again, there are lessons to be learned from the past that are not usually part of our present day cyber deterrence discussions. During the Cold War, nations like Switzerland or China followed a different strategy, choosing an "active defense" model that was based on deterring attack not by massive retaliation but by mobilizing their citizenry for broader national defense. The United States was in a far different position in the Cold War, so this model was not an apt one for us in the nuclear age. Today in the new issue of cybersecurity, there is much to learn from others, past and present, as they wrestle with similar problems. Estonia's Cyber Defense League, for example, is a particularly good model. Rather than a traditional military reserve, it is more akin to the U.S. Civil Air Patrol, where citizens can build up their own aviation skills, but also volunteer to aid government in aviation-related emergencies. Just in this case, it is a mechanism for Estonian citizens to volunteer their expertise for cybersecurity. They aid in everything from "red teaming" -- finding vulnerabilities in systems and activities before the bad guys can exploit them -- to serving as rapid response teams to cyberattacks. Notably, the members are not just technical experts; the needed expertise that lies outside of government is about far more than just computer coding. For example, to defend the national banking system from cyberattack, a mix of hackers and bankers is better than just bankers or hackers.

These efforts have helped turn Estonia from one of the first victims of a state-level cyberattack, when Russian hackers partially shut down the country in 2007, to perhaps the

best-equipped nation in the world to weather one now. Estonia may not have the same capabilities as the NSA and Cyber Command, but it does have deterrence by denial and an involved populace -- giving it arguably better cybersecurity than the United States.

Conclusions: Reaching Real (Cyber) Security

The overall lesson from Cold War deterrence is that the most dangerous period was when both the new technology and the new competition were not well understood -- which made bluster and escalation seemingly easy remedies to complex problems. Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed and the U.S. built up a system that delivered actual deterrence.

Today, we have a similar choice when it comes to the risks of digital attack and the conversation we have about how to face them. The United States can build a new set of approaches designed to deliver true cybersecurity, aiming to both better protect ourselves while reshaping adversary attitudes and options. Or, we can keep talking tough and simple about cyber deterrence, and continue to be victims.

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Witness Disclosure Requirement – "Truth in Testimony"
Required by House Rule XI, Clause 2(g)(5)

Name: Peter W Singer

1. Please list any federal grants or contracts (including subgrants or subcontracts) you have received since October 1, 2012. Include the source and amount of each grant or contract.

USArmy War College – $3,000 for speech to Army Fellows 2014, 2015
DIA $500 for teaching training class 2013, 2014, 2015
US Navy War College $600 for teaching UAS class 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015
US Air Force Inst of Tech AFRL 7,000 for training course/lecture 2016

2. Please list any entity you are testifying on behalf of and briefly describe your relationship with these entities.

I am a strategist for New America newamerica.org, a nonprofit think tank based in Washington DC. Its financials are available at newamerica.org

3. Please list any federal grants or contracts (including subgrants or subcontracts) received since October 1, 2012, by the entity(ies) you listed above. Include the source and amount of each grant or contract.

New America has an Open Technology Institute that helped develop wireless "mesh networks". It received 3 federal grants for this work

9-28-2012 USAID 2,897,023.9
6-19-2014 Dept of State 900,000
6-23-2016 Dept of State 1,000,000

note: I do not work at OTI nor does the "mesh network" project relate to topic of hearing, digital warfare.

I certify that the above information is true and correct.
Signature: [signature]

Date: July 8, 2016