



The Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) is run at the Center on Contemporary Studies (CCC) and sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). PASCC awards and supports strategic studies and dialogues that anticipate and try to reduce the threat of WMD capabilities.



The CCC has a respected track record for providing research and timely analysis on a variety of topics to leading decision makers in the U.S. national security community. Located in the Naval Postgraduate School, the CCC is the research wing of the Department of National Security Affairs.

*Research in Progress* describes ongoing PASCC research. For more information, please contact [pascc@nps.edu](mailto:pascc@nps.edu).

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## Securing Compliance with Arms Control Agreements

Performer: National Institute for Public Policy  
(NIPP)

Project Lead: Kurt Guthe

Project Cost: \$145,565

FY16–17

### Objective:

This project will investigate four historical cases of arms control noncompliance to gain a better understanding of why noncompliance occurs and how it might be prevented or reversed. The problem of noncompliance with arms control agreements tends to receive less attention and analysis than that devoted to the agendas, proposals, negotiations, and verification for these agreements. Results from this study should be of interest to the community of government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and academic scholars that deals with arms control issues, as well as to members of the general public, especially in light of media coverage of Russian, Syrian, and potentially Iranian cheating on WMD-related agreements.

### Approach:

This research project will employ a case-study approach to gain a better understanding of why noncompliance occurs and how it might be prevented or reversed. The proposed project will examine four historical cases in which a country violated an arms control agreement and then one or more other countries attempted to enforce its terms. The project lead will employ a common set of questions in order to derive generalizations, with supporting examples, that can be used in the design of deterrents and responses to arms control violations. The answers to these questions are expected to provide insights and supporting evidence regarding conditions that encourage or discourage cheating, measures that deter cheating, tactics of violators, other factors that impede enforcement actions, and ways to compel the compliance of violators.