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UNITED STATES STRATEGIC , NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN COMMAND PROGRAMS AND BUDGET

UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

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SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL C. D. HANEY
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
10 MARCH 2016

SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to be here today. Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony on the posture of United States strategic forces, my assessment of the President's Fiscal Year 17 (FY17) Budget, and how United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is confronting today's complex global security environment. I am also pleased to be here with Admiral Bill Gortney, Commander of United States Northern Command; and Admiral Kurt Tidd, Commander of United States Southern Command. I thank you all for your continued support to our Nation's defense.

I have the privilege of leading a motivated team of strategic warriors focused on mission excellence. While today, the Nation's strategic nuclear deterrent force remains safe, secure, effective and ready, we are working diligently to improve the resilience, responsiveness, credibility and flexibility of our operational plans and capabilities. USSTRATCOM is focused on deterring strategic attack, providing assurance to our allies and partners, and providing warfighting solutions to other Combatant Commands and partners across the spectrum of operations. While executing our global responsibilities, we continue to forge enduring partnerships with agencies and organizations across the U.S. government, academia, commercial industry, and Allied nations.

The momentum we have established is largely due to those who dedicate themselves to national security in spite of uncertainty and resource challenges: the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and civilians who carry out and support our strategic missions. Thank you for the opportunity to publicly acknowledge their service, devotion and professional skill.

Over the last two years, I have gained considerable insight regarding the progress and work remaining to deliver comprehensive strategic deterrence, assurance and escalation control.

My focus here is to provide clarity, make recommendations on required steps for continued success, and demonstrate how USSTRATCOM supports strategic stability and national security.

Much remains to be done to sustain and modernize the foundational nuclear deterrent force that we need to protect the Nation from existential threats in an increasingly uncertain and unpredictable environment. We must continue to meet critical investment timelines to ensure that aging platforms and weapons systems do not reach the point at which their viability becomes questionable.

The President's Budget offers a balanced approach to national priorities and fiscal realities, and reduces some accumulated risk as we pursue modernization across USSTRATCOM mission areas. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 provided near-term fiscal stability for these critical missions, and we appreciate Congressional and White House support in this effort. I support continued bipartisan efforts to achieve long-term relief from the constraints imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011, especially given the multi-year acquisition timelines required to modernize our strategic systems.

Maintaining and improving comprehensive strategic deterrence, assurance and escalation control requires a multi-faceted, long-term approach to investing in strategic capabilities and a renewed, multi-generational commitment of intellectual capital. As I look at trends in the security environment, continued long term investment is needed to ensure that current progress transitions into long-term success. Our allies and adversaries are observing and assessing the fiscal emphasis placed on our Nation's strategic deterrence and assurance capabilities. We cannot afford to send mixed messages on their importance by underfunding them.

GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Today's global security environment is complex, dynamic and volatile; perhaps more so now than at any other time. The dangers presented by this unpredictable security environment are compounded by the continued propagation of asymmetric methods, the unprecedented proliferation of advancing technologies, and the increasingly provocative and destabilizing behavior by current and potential adversaries. Some nations are investing in long-term military modernization programs, including capabilities that could pose an existential threat to the United States. A number of others are developing, sustaining, or modernizing their nuclear forces, including weapons and platforms that are mobile, hardened and underground.

Russia. Russia warrants our attention. Its new security strategy makes clear that Russia seeks to re-assert its great power status. Russia is modernizing its conventional and strategic military programs, emphasizing new strategic approaches, declaring and demonstrating its ability to escalate if required, and maintaining a significant quantity of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Russia has engaged in destabilizing actions in Syria and Ukraine (Eastern and Crimea), while also violating the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and other international accords and norms. Russia is also developing counter-space and cyber capabilities

Despite these activities, and assertions by some that the United States and Russia are in a nuclear arms race, there is continued adherence to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) by both nations. In compliance with a series of treaties, the United States has reduced its stockpile by 85 percent relative to its Cold War peak. Instead of dozens of delivery systems, we now have four strategic delivery platforms. We seek no new military capabilities in our nuclear forces. Rather, we seek to retain and modernize only those capabilities needed to sustain a stable and effective deterrent capability. We are on track to achieve New START limits of 1550 deployed warheads and 700 deployed delivery systems by February 2018.

The benefit of New START is that it promotes stability by maintaining equivalency in nuclear weapon numbers and strategic capability. It also promotes transparency via inspections and helps assure our non-nuclear allies they do not need their own nuclear deterrent capabilities. However, to maintain strategic stability as we draw down to New START central limits, the remaining systems must be safe, secure, effective and ready.

China. In addition to pursuing regional dominance in the East and South China Seas, China continues making significant military investments in nuclear and conventional capabilities. China is re-engineering its long-range ballistic missiles to carry multiple nuclear warheads and continues to develop and test hyper-glide vehicle capability. China's pursuit of conventional prompt global strike capabilities, offensive counter space technologies, and exploitation of computer networks raises questions about its global aspirations. While China periodically reminds us of its “No First-Use” nuclear policy, these developments – coupled with a lack of transparency on nuclear issues such as force disposition and size – impact regional and strategic stability.

North Korea. North Korea's behavior over the past 60 years has been very problematic. Today, North Korea continues heightening tensions by coupling provocative statements and actions with advancements in strategic capabilities, including claims of miniaturized warheads; developments in road mobile and submarine launched ballistic missile technologies. Most recently, North Korea has conducted its fourth nuclear weapons test and another missile launch of a satellite into space, furthering its ICBM research. These actions show disdain for United Nations Security Council resolutions and a dangerous lack of regard for regional stability.

Iran. As Iran follows the mandates of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, we must be vigilant to detect if Iran ever shifts its intentions to pursue a nuclear weapon. Iran continues

to develop ballistic missiles and cyberspace capabilities – and we remain focused on countering its destabilizing activities in the region.

Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs). Ungoverned or ineffectively governed regions remain incubators for those who seek to attack the world’s peaceful societies. VEOs recruit and operate freely across political, social, and cyberspace boundaries. The effect of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of VEOs could be catastrophic, and highlights the importance of our non-proliferation and counter WMD efforts.

In summary, the global strategic environment is increasingly complex. Unlike the bipolarity of the Cold War, today's multi-polar world with state, non-state, and mixed-status actors is more akin to multiplayer, concurrent and intersecting games of chess that severely challenge regional and global security dynamics. Future conflicts will not be contained within prescribed borders, stove-piped domains, or segregated areas of responsibility. We must view threats as transregional, multi-domain and multi-functional, requiring a comprehensive approach to strategic deterrence, assurance and escalation control.

USSTRATCOM IN THE 21ST CENTURY

USSTRATCOM counters diverse and complex threats through the execution of its fundamental mission: **to detect and deter strategic attacks against the U.S. and our allies, and to defeat those who attack if deterrence fails.** USSTRATCOM is assigned nine distinct responsibilities: **Strategic Deterrence; Space Operations; Cyberspace Operations; Global Strike; Joint Electronic Warfare; Missile Defense; Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction; and Analysis and Targeting.** These diverse assignments are strategic in nature, global in scope, and intertwined with Joint Force capabilities, the interagency process and the Whole-of-Government approach. **Each**

mission supports or is interconnected with the others, and their combined capabilities enable a comprehensive approach to strategic deterrence, assurance and escalation control in the 21st century.

Deterrence is a fundamentally human endeavor, firmly rooted in psychology and social behavior. At the most basic level, deterrence is achieved through one of two mechanisms. The first is an aggressor's recognition that unacceptable costs may be imposed for taking an action and recognition that forgoing this action may result in lesser costs. The second is an aggressor's belief that the contemplated action will not produce its perceived benefit, or that not acting will produce a greater perceived benefit. These elements combine to convince potential adversaries that they will not succeed in an attack, and even if they try, the costs will far outweigh the benefits. USSTRATCOM's capabilities underpin these fundamental elements of deterrence.

Achieving comprehensive deterrence, assurance and escalation control requires nuclear weapons systems along with a robust intelligence apparatus; space, cyberspace, conventional, and missile defense capabilities; global command, control, and communications; and comprehensive plans that link organizations and knit their capabilities together in a coherent way.

Priorities. USSTRATCOM is guided by my six overarching priorities:

1. Deterring strategic attack against the United States and providing assurance to our allies. Strategic attacks can occur through a variety of means in any domain. They may impact many people or systems, affect large physical areas, act across great distances, persist over long periods of time, disrupt economic or social structures, or change the status quo in a fundamental way.

2. Providing the Nation with a safe, secure, effective and ready nuclear deterrent force. Foundational documents such as the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the 2013 Report on Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the 2015 National Military Strategy have consistently repeated this mandate. I am committed to providing our Nation with a viable and credible nuclear deterrent force.

3. Delivering comprehensive warfighting solutions. To effectively deter, assure, and control escalation in today's security environment, threats must be surveyed across the "spectrum of conflict." Escalation may occur at any point, in varying degrees of intensity, with more than one adversary, in multiple domains, to include "below threshold activities" that would not ordinarily propel international action. Our actions and capabilities must convince any adversary that they cannot escalate their way out of a failed conflict, and that restraint is always the better option. Doing so requires a deeper, broader understanding of our potential adversaries, so that we can deny action; hold critical nodes at risk; and prevent activities, perceptions and misperceptions from escalating. We must also look at our military capabilities in a holistic manner, and fully integrate them within our other elements of national power. We must pursue a Whole-of-Government approach to deterrence, including allies and partners in our efforts, with ready forces in all domains.

4. Addressing challenges in space and cyberspace with capability, capacity and resilience. Space capabilities remain foundational to our way of life not only for the United States but for the international community at large. Yet some nation states are investing in counter-space capabilities. We must assure our continued access to space through improved space situational awareness, operating procedures, resiliency and other operational concepts central to our ability to maintain an advantage in space. Cyberspace underpins all of my mission

areas and has become a critical facet of national power. We must continue to develop a robust Cyber Mission Force with the authorities, skills and resources to protect our DOD networks against a maturing set of cyberspace threats. Additionally, cyber defense of future networked systems must be a design priority.

5. Building, sustaining and supporting partnerships. We aim to work seamlessly with the other Combatant Commands, across the federal government, commercial sector, academia and with partners and allies to apply the scope of the USSTRATCOM portfolio toward a synchronized pursuit of national objectives. This robust interaction must occur at all levels at USSTRATCOM and includes operations, planning, exercising and wargaming.

6. Anticipating change and confronting uncertainty with agility and innovation. Sound decision-making requires thorough analysis to prioritize our activities with flexible, agile and adaptable thinking. This effort includes a variety of wargames, demonstrations and exercises to evaluate deterrence and escalation control options. We will support the DOD Defense Innovation Initiative and the associated Advanced Capability and Deterrence Panel's efforts. This will help us identify new operational concepts, develop cutting edge technology, and enable a continuing evolution of ideas on how to deter current and potential adversaries.

MISSION AREA CAPABILITIES & REQUIREMENTS

We must maintain a military capability that provides our leadership with the decision space to respond in the best interest of the United States. This includes the ability to mitigate current and future risk as it pertains to nuclear, space and cyberspace threats. Therefore, prioritizing resources to meet our requirements necessitates a thoughtful assessment of national priorities in the context of fiscal realities. The President's Budget supports my mission requirements, but there is no margin to absorb risk. Any cuts to the budget will hamper our

ability to sustain and modernize our military forces, and will add significant risk to our strategic capabilities.

Nuclear Deterrent Forces

Today, America's nuclear forces remain safe, secure, effective and ready. For more than 70 years, thanks in part to our credible nuclear forces, the United States has deterred great power war against nuclear-capable adversaries.

Nuclear Triad. Our nuclear Triad is a requirement. The policy of maintaining a nuclear Triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems was most recently re-iterated in the 2014 QDR. Our Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Ballistic Missile Submarines, Air-Launched Cruise Missiles, and nuclear capable heavy bombers and associated tankers each provide unique and complementary attributes that together underpin strategic deterrence and stability—and each element is in need of continued investment. The Triad provides a hedge against technical problems or changes in the security environment and must consist of independently viable weapons systems and platforms which present adversaries with a complex, multi-pronged problem. The FY 2017 budget request funds the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program to replace our aging Minuteman ICBM fleet, which for decades have served to complicate an adversary's decision to launch a comprehensive counterforce strike on the United States. The FY 2017 budget request funds the Ohio-Replacement Program to ensure the uninterrupted deployment of the Triad's most survivable leg. The Long Range Strike-Bomber, Long Range Stand-Off Cruise Missile, and B61-12 gravity bomb are needed to provide the flexibility, visibility and ability to forward-deploy and to support our extended deterrence commitments to our allies.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Our ICBM force provides a responsive, highly reliable and cost effective deterrent capability. To maintain an effective Minuteman III force through 2030, USSTRATCOM supports several near-term sustainment efforts, including ICBM Fuze Modernization, Launch Control Center Block Upgrade, and Airborne Launch Control System Replacement. Vital ICBM security improvements include a UH-1N Helicopter Replacement, Payload Transporter Replacement and ICBM Cryptographic Upgrade. Beyond 2030, the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program is essential to recapitalize the ICBM force prior to Minuteman age out I fully support an integrated Ground Based Strategic Deterrent weapon system that recapitalizes flight systems, ground launch systems, command and control, and support equipment. I am encouraged by the ongoing Air Force and Navy effort to study the feasibility of sharing common technology between their respective programs in order to reduce costs and preserve the unique skills required to field capable ballistic missile weapon systems.

Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs). Recapitalizing our sea-based strategic deterrent force remains my top modernization priority. The Navy's SSBNs and Trident II D5 ballistic missiles constitute the Triad's most survivable leg. The Ohio-class SSBN fleet is undergoing significant sustainment efforts to maintain our nation's required high operational availability and extend the life of the D5 ballistic missile. USSTRATCOM continues to strongly support and work with the Navy as it modernizes the SSBN fleet. The Ohio Replacement SSBN, currently in development and expected to be fielded in 2031, will continue to serve as the Nation's survivable strategic deterrent into the 2080s. Despite a hull life extension from 30 to 42 years, the current Ohio-class will quickly approach the end of its effective service life. No further extension is possible. Any further delay will put the reliability of our sea-based nuclear deterrent at unacceptable risk. In addition, we must continue our commitment to the United Kingdom to

develop and field the Common Missile Compartment to ensure both nations' SSBNs achieve operational capability to replace the existing platforms.

Heavy Bombers. Our dual-capable B-52 and B-2 bombers are the most flexible and adaptable leg of the nuclear Triad and provide significant conventional capabilities. Bombers play a key role in stabilizing and managing crises by providing a visible signaling option and rapid hedge against operational and technical challenges in other legs of the nuclear Triad. Ongoing and planned sustainment and modernization activities, to include associated Nuclear Command, Control and Communications upgrades, will ensure our bombers provide credible deterrent capabilities until their planned end-of-service-life. I fully support the Air Force program for fielding a new, highly survivable penetrating conventional and nuclear Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B). When coupled with a new Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile and the B61-12 gravity bomb, the LRS-B will provide the President with flexible options to address a range of contingencies in non-permissive environments. Maintaining an air-delivered standoff and direct attack capability is vital to meeting our strategic and extended deterrence commitments and denying geographic sanctuaries to potential adversaries. The new LRSO is needed to replace the aging Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), which has far exceeded its originally planned service life, is being sustained through a series of service life extension programs, and is required to support our B-52 bomber fleet. Likewise, the B61-12 is needed to extend the life of aging gravity nuclear weapons and provide continued viability for both the B-2 strategic bomber and dual capable fighter aircraft supporting our NATO and extended deterrence commitments.

Foundational to the nuclear triad is a synthesis of dedicated sensors, assured command and control, nuclear weapons and their enabling infrastructure, treaties and non-proliferation activities.

Sensors. Indications and warning are necessary for maximum decision space, and strategic missile warning remains one of our most important capabilities. Along with persistent and tailored intelligence, our Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment network provides timely, accurate, unambiguous and continuous tactical early warning, allowing us to select the most suitable course of action in rapidly developing situations. While the Defense Support Program is nearing the end of its operational life, the Space-Based Infrared System program is on track to provide continuous on-orbit warning. The survivable and enduring segments of these systems, along with Early Warning Radars and nuclear detonation detection elements, are in urgent need of sustainment and modernization. We must continue to maintain legacy systems and address the ever-increasing risk to mission success. Prompt and sufficient recapitalization of these critical facilities and networks—to include electromagnetic pulse protection and survivable enduring communications with other nodes in the system—will be pivotal in maintaining a credible deterrent.

Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3). All USSTRATCOM missions require robust global Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) capabilities and infrastructure supporting the President's national-decision making process across a spectrum of scenarios. These communications capabilities are crucial to providing the President and his key advisors the right information to expand decision space. USSTRATCOM is teaming with the White House, national laboratories, and the private sector to develop a Global C4 system, setting the conditions for timely, informed National decision making

anywhere on the globe. The Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control and Communications System has proven effective in synchronizing and prioritizing modernization efforts, and articulating those priorities to Congress.

Maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent for the long term requires recapitalization of key systems and capabilities throughout the NC3 architecture. The unpredictable challenges posed by today's complex multi-domain, multi-threat security environment make it increasingly important to optimize our aging NC3 systems architecture while leveraging new technologies. Maintaining nuclear deterrence and strategic stability requires a command and control architecture comprised of interdependent fixed and mobile systems and nodes that deliver capability throughout the space, air and land domains. Through continued funding for NC3 modernization programs, we can ensure effective command and control of the Nation's forces well into the future.

In space, we are transitioning from Military Strategic and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) to Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite communications systems. The AEHF satellite constellation system, coupled with requisite ground node and airborne platform Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight terminals (FAB-T) and the Presidential and National Voice Conferencing (PNVC) system, will extend enhanced capabilities to enable collaboration between the President and senior advisors under any circumstance and also assure connectivity with the nuclear forces.

Our efforts to field an air layer network supported by AEHF and a modernized Very Low Frequency/Low Frequency (VLF/LF) capability will increase resiliency and reliability across the NC3 architecture and begins to address the emerging threats to our space-based communications. I support the investment plan to replace our aging very low frequency receivers on the E-6B

Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) and the E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC), providing assured, world-wide survivable communications into the future. Additionally, the Air Force continues to fund the very low frequency receiver on the B-2 bomber fleet, and began a program to install next generation protected, assured, and survivable communications on the B-2.

Within the land component, there are efforts underway to upgrade fixed and mobile warning systems to enable them to leverage the evolving Space Based Infra-Red System (SBIRS) capability. Progress has also been made on the construction of the new USSTRATCOM Command and Control (C2) Facility, which will support all our missions and will be a key component of our future nuclear and national C2 architecture. The C2 Facility, which is on track for occupancy in 2018, serves as a visible reminder to adversaries of the importance and national commitment to modernize our aging NC3 facilities.

Weapons and Infrastructure. Today's stockpile remains safe, secure, effective, and meets operational requirements. However, our nuclear weapons (now averaging 27 years of service) and supporting infrastructure (some of which date back to the Manhattan Project) are in dire need of modernization and life extension. Surveillance activities, Life Extension Programs (LEPs), and Stockpile Stewardship efforts are essential to mitigating age-related effects and incorporating improved safety and security features without a return to underground nuclear explosive testing. Continued talent pool investment with our nuclear scientists and engineers is also paramount to providing viability to our stockpile requirements.

As a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), I work closely with my DOD and Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) counterparts to ensure we maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile. Active and sustained execution of the NWC's long-term "3+2" strategy to deliver three ballistic missile and two air-delivered

warheads is crucial to addressing near-term technical needs and future capability requirements. W76-1 and B61-12 LEPs are on track and are necessary to maintain confidence in the reliability, safety and intrinsic security of our nuclear weapons. Additionally, early activities are underway to synchronize the LRSO cruise missile program with the W80-4 warhead LEP to ensure these programs are fielded in time to maintain a viable stand-off nuclear capability. The President's Budget ensures schedule alignment of the cruise missile and its associated warhead.

Treaties. International agreements such as New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the Open Skies Treaty (OST), and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty contribute to strategic stability through transparency, confidence building, and verification. The State Department has primary responsibility for treaty administration, and USSTRATCOM remains closely involved in their execution. While these agreements have served valuable roles in promoting strategic stability, treaty violations are a significant cause for concern.

In meeting treaty obligations, the United States Air Force has eliminated all non-operational intercontinental ballistic missile silos, and is placing 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles into a non-deployed status. All intercontinental ballistic missiles now carry only a single warhead. The Air Force has also eliminated non-operational B-52G series heavy bombers, and is converting 42 B-52H's to conventional-only bomber missions. Additionally, the United States Navy is sealing four launch tubes on each Ohio class SSBN, removing 56 launch tubes from accountability under New START.

Budget. Sustaining and modernizing the nuclear enterprise infrastructure is crucial to maintaining a viable nuclear deterrent force. It is impressive to see today's systems working well beyond their expected service life, but we cannot rely on that indefinitely. Aging weapon

systems and supporting infrastructure are stressing our ability to maintain a viable and credible force.

I share concerns about the cost of modernization, but the greater worry is the cost if we do not make needed investments. To reverse the long trend of flat or even declining resources, there must be a sustained, multi-decade investment program to our weapons, delivery systems and supporting infrastructure. As stated by the Congressional Budget Office, the expected cost of nuclear forces represents roughly 5 percent to 6 percent of the total costs of the planned defense budgets for the next ten years. The importance of the foundational nuclear deterrent force to national security, assurance to our allies, our non-proliferation objectives and strategic stability far outweigh the expense of recapitalization. Failing to provide the resources requested in the FY 2017 budget request would delay the development of these programs and unacceptably degrade our credibility and ability to deter and assure. Our Nation must make this investment.

Space Operations

The U.S. must maintain assured access to space. Our national space capabilities allow us to globally navigate, communicate, and observe events in areas where non-space sensors are not feasible. Space capabilities are also a vital component of comprehensive deterrence and assurance and are critical to supporting our deployed forces and our national decision-making processes. Investment in these capabilities is vital to our national security. We greatly appreciate the continued support of Congress in helping to increase the resiliency and vitality of our space assets.

The space domain has increasingly become contested, degraded, and operationally limited. These are not new challenges. Some countries have clearly signaled their intent and ability to conduct hostile operations in space as an extension of the terrestrial battlefield. These

operations would deny U.S. forces the advantages of space, which have enabled us to favorably shape events in all corners of the globe.

In response to growing space threats, the DOD and Intelligence Community (IC) established the Joint Space Doctrine and Tactics Forum (JSDTF), which I co-chair with Ms. Betty Sapp, Director, National Reconnaissance Office. The JSDTF's goals are to ensure U.S. space policy, doctrine, operational concepts, strategies and planning scenarios reflect that space is a contested domain, populated by dynamic actors. We have already made significant improvements in the integration of exercises and wargames, and are revising associated joint doctrine, as well as new tactics, techniques and procedures for our space operators. The JSDTF will foster the transformation of how the U.S. operates in space by promoting seamless functionality between the DOD and IC – a tight bond we must continue to strengthen.

Another key initiative is the establishment of the Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center (JICSpOC) located at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado. This center combines the efforts of USSTRATCOM, Air Force Space Command, and the intelligence community with a goal to create unity of effort and facilitate information sharing across the national security space enterprise. At its current phase, the JICSpOC is providing a robust location to conduct comprehensive operational experimentation. The JICSpOC will ensure the space enterprise meets and outpaces emerging and advanced space threats and will provide vital information for national leadership, allies, partners and the Joint Force. It will also serve to enhance the Nation's deterrent posture by demonstrating the United States is prepared when our space capabilities are threatened.

A component to all of these efforts is Space Situational Awareness (SSA)—the information that allows us to understand what is on orbit, where it is, where it is going, and how

it is being used. Consistent with long-standing obligations and principles of the Outer Space Treaty and other international legal standards, our goal is to ensure space remains a safe domain for all legitimate users. Sharing SSA information and collaborating with other nations and commercial firms promotes safe and responsible space operations, reduces the potential for debris-producing collisions and other harmful interference, builds international confidence in U.S. space systems, fosters U.S. space leadership, and improves our own SSA through knowledge of owner/operator satellite positional data.

USSTRATCOM has negotiated SSA Sharing Agreements and Arrangements with 51 commercial entities, two intergovernmental organizations (EUMETSAT and European Space Agency), and ten nations (Spain, France, Italy, Japan, Australia, Canada, South Korea, United Kingdom, Germany, and Israel) and is in the process of negotiating additional agreements. Through these sharing agreements, USSTRATCOM assists partners with activities such as launch support; maneuver planning; support for satellite anomaly resolution, electromagnetic interference reporting and investigation; support for de-commissioning activities; and space object conjunction assessments.

The Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP) achieved initial operational capability in October of 2015, and USSTRATCOM is now operating GSSAP satellites to enable our cutting-edge SSA capabilities. GSSAP facilitates space-monitoring activities that contribute to global safety of spaceflight, as well as the peaceful access to space.

At the nucleus of USSTRATCOM's approach to space security is mission assurance—ensuring Combatant Commanders have required access to space-based capabilities. USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC-SPACE), located at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, leads the effort, and through the Joint Space

Operations Center (JSpOC), executes continuous and integrated military space operations and routinely tracks thousands of space objects in orbit around the Earth. This includes more than 1,300 active satellites operated by approximately 60 nations and a wide variety of government, commercial, and academic organizations. The JSpOC also maintains the catalog of all artificial Earth-orbiting objects, charts preset positions for orbital flight safety, and predicts objects reentering the Earth's atmosphere.

We must sustain judicious and stable investments to preserve the advantages we hold in this complex environment. Examples include the Space Fence program which will greatly expand the capacity of the Space Surveillance Network; investments in modeling and simulation that will increase our understanding of the space environment and adversary capabilities; and funding for satellite communications that are resistant to interference. We must also continue to seek innovative solutions with Allies and our commercial partners to ensure access to space operations remains available. These include active and passive protection measures for individual systems and constellations, and a critical examination of the architectural path we must follow to ensure resilience and affordability in our space capabilities.

Cyberspace Operations

This year will mark the sixth anniversary of United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). USCYBERCOM imparts an operational outlook and attitude to the management of the DOD's approximately seven million networked devices and 15,000 network enclaves.

Our primary focus for cyberspace operations within DOD is building the capability and capacity to protect DOD networks, systems, and information; defend the nation against cyberattacks; and support operational and contingency plans. The Cyber Mission Force (CMF) construct addresses the significant challenges of recruiting, training and retaining people, in

addition to acquiring the facilities and equipment necessary for successful cyberspace operations. We are creating 133 cyber mission teams manned by more than 6,000 highly trained people by the end of FY18. To date, 84 of those teams are fielded and assigned to a variety of missions, including our ongoing efforts to degrade, dismantle, and ultimately destroy ISIL. These teams support combatant commands and national missions. Budget stability is crucial to achieving this vision.

On 30 September 2015, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff signed the DOD Cybersecurity Culture and Compliance Initiative (DC3I), tasking USSTRATCOM and USCYBERCOM to lead implementation. DC3I fosters long-term improvement through training, inspections, reporting and accountability. Improving our cybersecurity culture requires a holistic approach that addresses people, processes, and technology. Such efforts will continue to be critical to defending our DOD networks.

Global Strike

USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike (JFCC-GS) operates from Offutt AFB, Nebraska. JFCC-GS provides a unique ability to command and control our global strike capabilities and build plans that rapidly integrate into theater operations. This includes integration of combat capability associated with kinetic and non-kinetic effects.

Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability offers the opportunity to rapidly engage high-value targets without resorting to nuclear options. CPGS can provide precision and responsiveness in Anti-Access/Area Denial environments while simultaneously minimizing unintended military, political, environmental or economic consequences. I support continuing research and development of CPGS capabilities.

Missile Defense

Ballistic missile proliferation and lethality continues to increase as countries acquire greater numbers of ballistic missiles, increase their ranges, and incorporate countermeasures. North Korea possesses the Taepo Dong 2 space launch vehicle/ICBM, and has displayed the KN08 road-mobile ICBM that is likely capable of reaching much of the continental United States. North Korea also possesses hundreds of Short- and Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles capable of threatening South Korea, Japan, and forward-deployed U.S. forces in Eastern Asia and the Western Pacific. Iran's ballistic missile capability also presents a significant challenge to U.S. interests in the Middle East. Iran's overall defense strategy relies on a substantial inventory of ballistic missiles capable of striking targets throughout Southwest Asia and parts of Europe.

Accordingly, effective missile defense is an essential element of the U.S. commitment to strengthen strategic and regional deterrence against states of concern. The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system protects the U.S. homeland against a limited ICBM attack from North Korea and potential future threats from Iran. However, continued investment in three broad categories is required to lower costs and improve our capabilities against growing threats: 1.) persistent and survivable sensors, 2.) increased inventories of Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) with improved performance and reliability and 3.) increased regional capability and capacity. These needs can be addressed by the continued funding of priority programs such as: Long-Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV), Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense follow-on, Overhead Persistent Infra-Red sensors, Upgraded Early Warning Radar, and Joint Tactical Ground Stations. Collectively, these improvements increase interceptor effectiveness and lower costs to defeat threats.

We have made significant progress in reaching our missile defense goals. To enhance Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) sensors and discrimination, we are using available

technology to improve sensors, battle management, fire control and kill vehicles, while fielding LRDR to improve tracking and discrimination for homeland defense against Pacific theater threats. We are also increasing the number of GBIs from 30 to 44 by the end of 2017. Upgrades continue to improve GBI fleet reliability, and the development of the RKV began last year with deployment expected in approximately 2020. The RKVs will be more reliable, cost-effective, and easier to produce.

The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) contributes to the defense of our deployed forces in Europe and our European NATO Allies. EPAA Phase 1 was achieved in December 2011. Phase 2 is going through testing and integration and we expect it to achieve operational capability in Spring 2016. Phase 3 remains on schedule to be operational in the 2018 timeframe and will provide defensive coverage against medium- and intermediate-range threats with the deployment of a second Aegis Ashore site in Poland and an upgraded SM-3 Block IIA interceptor. The EPAA continues to be interoperable with NATO's Ballistic Missile Defence system.

While significant investments in intercept technology have increased our missile defense capability, much work remains. Increases in the quantity and quality of threats increase the risk that adversary missiles will penetrate our defenses and reach their intended targets. We are working with the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization, the Missile Defense Agency and industry partners to explore improvements to the current BMDS. We must also examine the potential to prevent attacks by countering threats prior to launch. Efforts to defeat missile threats across the launch spectrum rely on awareness and warning and must be based on actions that are synchronized within a fully integrated missile defense architecture to maximize our limited defensive capacity.

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)

The U.S National Security Strategy states “there is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists.” The DOD Strategy for CWMD also affirms that the pursuit of WMD and potential use by actors of concern pose a threat to U.S. national security and stability around the world. As DOD’s global synchronizer for CWMD planning efforts, USSTRATCOM supports this strategy by leveraging the expertise resident in our Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC-WMD), the Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination (SJFHQ-E), and our partners at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)—all located at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. Together our organizations conduct real-world and exercise CWMD activities with the other combatant commands to identify, prioritize, and mitigate WMD risks posed by the proliferation of WMD technology and expertise to nation-states and non-state actors.

To execute the DOD Strategy for CWMD, we have identified a need for comprehensive situational awareness that incorporates collaborative tools, continuously assesses the WMD threat, and provides a holistic awareness of the WMD environment. This capability would provide an enhanced awareness of emergent catastrophic-scale WMD threats that require collaboration across the interagency and partner nations. There is also an urgent need to update agent defeat weapon systems and develop modeling and simulation to assess collateral damage during WMD weapon attacks. USSTRATCOM is working closely with DTRA to resolve modeling and simulation shortfalls and ensure that cutting-edge technology is applied to WMD consequence.

The National Strategic Research Institute (NSRI) at the University of Nebraska, a University Affiliated Research Center in partnership with USSTRATCOM and the DOD, is

providing our nation with cutting-edge mission-essential research and development capabilities in Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD). The NSRI experienced another successful year conducting scientific research to help ensure preparedness for WMD threats.

Joint Electronic Warfare / Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations

The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) reaches across geopolitical boundaries and domains, and is tightly integrated into the conduct of commerce, governance and national security. Commercial demand for spectrum access results in increased pressure on bandwidth traditionally used for military operations. Additionally, our potential adversaries are actively pursuing capabilities to contest our use of the EMS.

Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO) strengthens U.S. national objectives and enables the combat capability of the Joint Force by ensuring access to the EMS while denying adversaries the same. USSTRATCOM is developing JEMSO policy and doctrine, addressing capability gaps across the DOD, and working closely with the Combatant Commands, Services and other U.S. Government agencies through advocacy, planning and training.

Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (ISR)

The demand for ISR has outpaced our ability to meet all needs. At the same time, we are focused on increasing the effectiveness and persistence of ISR capabilities while reducing business costs. Located at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, D.C., USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for ISR (JFCC-ISR) is working with the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands and the Intelligence Community to improve the management of DOD's existing ISR capabilities. I fully support maximizing the agile use of the capabilities we have, while also enhancing allied and partner contribution and cooperation. These efforts are designed to increase the persistence of our ISR capabilities, reduce the risk of strategic surprise, and increase our ability to respond to crises.

Targeting and Analysis

Targeting requires dedicated analysis. USSTRATCOM's Joint Warfare and Analysis Center (JWAC) in Dahlgren, VA enhances our Strategic Deterrence and Global Strike missions by providing unique comprehensive analysis. JWAC's ability to solve complex challenges for warfighters—using a combination of social and physical science techniques and engineering expertise—is invaluable to protecting the Nation and helping the Joint Force accomplish its missions.

OUR PEOPLE

People remain our most precious resource and deserve our unequivocal commitment to their well-being. Just as we sustain and modernize our platforms and weapons, we must sustain and modernize our workforce. Maintaining a talent pool of nuclear scientists and engineers is also paramount to providing viability to meet our stockpile requirements. Likewise, investing in the future of the professionals who operate, maintain, secure, and support our nuclear enterprise is critical. Tomorrow's leaders must have the ability to stretch their intellect well beyond one-dimensional problems. They must be able to operate in a multi-dimensional environment with multiple activities taking place simultaneously.

My visits throughout the past year confirmed my belief that we have an outstanding team in all of our mission areas. I am honored to lead such a focused, innovative and professional group dedicated to delivering critical warfighting capabilities to the Nation. Whether they are underwater on an SSBN, underground in a Launch Control Center, in the air on a bomber, or supporting missions from cyberspace to outer space, these great Americans do all they can for our Nation.

CONCLUSION

Achieving strategic deterrence, assurance and escalation control will require a multi-faceted, long-term approach to investing in strategic capabilities and a renewed commitment to sustaining intellectual capital. The sustainment and recapitalization of our Nation's strategic capabilities is sorely needed and must not be delayed.

In today's uncertain times, your support, combined with the hard work of the exceptional men and women of United States Strategic Command, will ensure that we remain ready, agile and effective in deterring strategic attack, assuring our Allies and partners, and addressing current and future threats.

STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL WILLIAM E. GORTNEY, UNITED STATES NAVY
COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND
AND
NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND



BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

MARCH 10, 2016

INTRODUCTION

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the posture of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). I am here representing the Commands' Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, National Guardsmen, Reservists, and civilians safeguarding our nation amidst the most diverse and challenging security atmosphere in our history. Brave men and women are confronting this rapidly changing defense environment head-on. It is an honor and a privilege to serve alongside them and I am grateful to the Committee for the support you provide.

North America is increasingly vulnerable to a vast array of evolving threats--from highly capable, national powers to disaffected individuals who act in response to extremist propaganda. These threats are growing and becoming much more diffuse and less attributable. Moreover, I believe that many of the crises originating as regional conflicts elsewhere in the world are rapidly manifesting themselves here at home and they continue to challenge our ability to warn and defend.

The complexity and volatility of our strategic environment demands that we advance and sustain the capabilities to protect our Homelands. I believe the President's FY17 budget represents a balanced approach to maintaining our strategic advantage within the realities of a fiscally-constrained environment. We are still feeling the impacts of sequestration, primarily because the majority of the Services' cuts were from the operations and maintenance accounts, which directly impedes their ability to provide trained and equipped service members to Combatant Commands. I thank the Committee for your support in passing the Bipartisan Budget

Act of 2015, which represents another important step toward permanent relief from the sequestration caps in the Budget Control Act of 2011.

We are resolute in our commitment to deter, prevent, and defeat attacks against the United States and Canada. We stand ready to provide rapid and robust support to the primary lead agencies responding to domestic disasters and the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) charged with combating transnational organized crime. And we continue to strengthen our regional and homeland partnerships; they are our center of gravity.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The expansive complexity of the contemporary security environment makes defending the Homeland a continual challenge. The spectrum of threats to our national security ranges from traditional nation-state military capabilities to individuals with access to increasingly destructive technologies. The diffusion of capability, the inexact art of predicting intent, and the complications of attribution all contribute to a blurring of lines between traditional military threats and asymmetric threats that trigger military support or response. Technological advances and proliferation coupled with pockets of instability will generate a growing array of potential threats against which we must posture ourselves. Many of our potential adversaries are pursuing advanced weapons development not seen in decades. Individually, they pose serious concerns to our national security and the international community. Collectively, they represent a vast spectrum of complex and volatile threats that I believe will only continue to grow and threaten the homeland if we hesitate to act decisively.

RUSSIA

A resurgent Russia continues to assert itself on the world stage. No longer content merely to pursue primacy within its near abroad, Russia's forays into Syria highlight Vladimir

Putin's willingness to employ military power to advance his agenda outside Russia's near abroad. Last year I stated that Russia is progressing toward its goal of deploying long-range, conventionally armed cruise missiles comparable to Western systems. In 2015 these efforts came to fruition, as Russia employed heavy bombers, surface vessels, and a submarine to launch advanced conventional cruise missiles at targets in Syria. These operations served as a proof-of-concept for weapons systems and tactics ultimately intended to provide flexible deterrent options in a future crisis.

Russia's strategic nuclear forces remain the only foreign military threat that could imperil our nation's existence, and Moscow continues to spend significant resources to modernize its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems. While Russia seeks to avoid a strategic conflict with the United States, Moscow perceives itself to be threatened by a coordinated Western effort to erode its sovereignty, weaken its economy, and undermine its regime. I am concerned these threat perceptions could prompt Russia's leaders to misinterpret our intentions in a crisis, leading to inadvertent escalation.

CHINA

As part of its long-term, comprehensive military modernization program, China continues to modernize and expand its strategic forces with a focus on improving its ability to survive a first strike and penetrate United States' missile defenses. Concerned that that United States precision strike and missile defense capabilities undermine its strategic deterrent, Beijing is working to improve the survivability of its nuclear force to ensure a credible second-strike capability.

China continues to supplement its modest silo-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force with a growing number of road-mobile ICBMs and is now in the process of

operationalizing its first viable class of ballistic missile submarines, which, if successful, would be China's first sea-based strategic nuclear deterrent. China is also developing a range of anti-access and area-denial weapons which, along with its cyber, counter-space, and strategic nuclear capabilities, are designed to discourage United States intervention in a regional crisis.

Meanwhile, Beijing's diplomatic strategy appears to be focused on limiting U.S. options by denying physical and political access in key regions around the globe.

NORTH KOREA

North Korea's recent hostile cyberspace activity, nuclear testing, and continued ballistic missile development represent a dangerous threat to our national security. North Korea's recent nuclear test and satellite launch demonstrate Kim Jong Un's commitment to developing strategic capabilities, as well as his disregard for United Nations Security Council resolutions. The regime's efforts to develop and deploy the road-mobile KN08 ICBM have profound implications for homeland missile defense, primarily because the missile obviates most of the pre-launch indicators on which we have traditionally relied to posture our defenses. While the KN08 remains untested, modeling suggests it could deliver a nuclear payload to much of the Continental United States. We assess Kim Jong Un is unlikely to attack our Homeland unless he perceives an imminent threat to his regime's survival. However, we are concerned the possession of a nuclear ICBM could embolden the regime's intransigence below the nuclear threshold and complicate our response to a crisis on the peninsula. While I do not believe that North Korea's efforts to develop a submarine-launched ballistic missile represent a near-term threat to the U.S. Homeland, the program underscores the level of effort and resources the regime is willing to devote to developing advanced weapon systems. As the combatant

commander charged with defending the homeland, I take this threat very seriously, particularly in light of North Korea's unpredictable leadership.

IRAN

Iran poses multiple significant security concerns to the United States, and I remain wary of its strategic trajectory. Last year's conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was a welcome development, but, Iran's continuing pursuit of long-range missile capabilities and ballistic missile and space launch programs, in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions, remains a serious concern. Iran has successfully orbited satellites using a first-generation space launch vehicle and announced plans to orbit a larger satellite using its ICBM-class booster as early as this year. In light of these advances, we assess Iran may be able to deploy an operational ICBM by 2020 if the regime chooses to do so. Additionally, Iran has invested in developing advanced offensive cyberspace capability and has demonstrated cyberspace operations that could threaten our critical civil infrastructure.

VIOLENT EXTREMISTS

In addition to the challenges posed by global and regional powers, a more insidious threat comes from extremists who undermine our national security through radicalization and violence. Here in the homeland, we face a pernicious terrorist threat from the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which I choose to refer to as Daesh. Their sophisticated and robust social media campaign is motivating citizens to do harm to fellow citizens. Daesh has a strong recruiting narrative amplified by abundant attention in traditional and social media, which can resonate amongst disaffected Westerners. The tragic attacks in Chattanooga and San Bernardino underscore the difficulty intelligence and law enforcement face in detecting

Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs) who do not show outward, reported signs of radicalization prior to an attack.

Meanwhile, we remain attuned to the potential for foreign terrorist organizations to conduct more complex, directed attacks in North America. Al-Qa'ida and Daesh have communicated their intent to attack North America, and Daesh demonstrated its capability to conduct horrific, large scale attacks with the November 13th attacks in Paris. In addition, we have observed a continued focus on aviation targets, most notably by the probable bombing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula in November. While much work needs to be done, since 9/11, our law enforcement partners and the wider Intelligence Community have vastly improved procedures to deter or prevent similar coordinated attacks, but terrorists are constantly adapting. We are prepared to support civil authorities when asked if a complex or large-scale attack were to take place.

TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) presents a dangerous and highly sophisticated threat to the United States and a challenge to global stability. Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) exploit infrastructure, corrupt officials, challenge societal norms, and are responsible for attacks on law enforcement and innocent civilians. TCOs represent the principal suppliers of illicit drugs into the homeland and the trafficking of precursor chemicals for use in illicit drug production. TOC erodes the rule of law through extortion, violence and other illicit activity, which creates a security vulnerability that could be exploited by state and non-state actors.

LINES OF OPERATION

In my statement to this Committee last year, I described the unique aspects of USNORTHCOM as the nation's homeland geographic combatant command (GCC) and NORAD as the nation's oldest bi-national command. I explained the importance of prioritizing our complementary and individual functions with a focus on our shared end states. Our key Lines of Operation are more critical than ever to our mission success. We map all of our activities to these Lines of Operation, which shape our activities and effort.

USNORTHCOM and NORAD **Lines of Operation**

- Defense of our Homelands
- Defense Support of Civil Authorities
- Homeland Partnerships
- Regional Partnerships
- The Arctic
- Professionalism and Excellence
- Warfighters and Families

DEFENSE OF OUR HOMELANDS

As the Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, my primary task is to defend the homelands. *Defense of our Homelands* is our dominant line of operation, and it is the core focus of USNORTHCOM and NORAD primary missions. We are ever mindful of the supreme responsibility we have of defending the security of the United States, our citizens, and our allies and partners. In 2015, we celebrated NORAD's 57th year defending North America against attack through our no-fail aerospace warning and aerospace control missions. NORAD was born in the Cold War and expanded to an internal threat focus after 9/11. By contrast, USNORTHCOM was born in the aftermath of 9/11 and shaped by the seminal nature of those attacks. Both Commands are ever-adapting within the strategic environment, and we work hard to develop our capabilities to outpace threats.

MISSILE DEFENSE

USNORTHCOM's most prominent homeland defense mission is *Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)*. Currently, our BMD architecture is designed primarily to defend against limited long range ballistic missile attacks from North Korean and Iran. In light of an evolving threat and the increasingly enigmatic and unpredictable nature of North Korea's dictator, Kim Jong Un, I believe it is imperative that the United States continue to develop more capable forces and broader options for effective ballistic missile defense. Our BMD architecture is comprised of a group of independent, yet interrelated components that form a complex and unified defensive network. This system of systems cannot be modernized and maintained sequentially; each component must be improved concurrently to outpace the evolving threat. I agree with and support the modernization priorities set by Vice Admiral Jim Syring and his team at the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), including improvement in our discrimination sensors, lethality of our kill vehicles, sustainment of the BMD architecture, and development of our kinetic and non-kinetic options. I am grateful to this committee for your support and commitment to modernizing our Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).

We are on the right path to improving our sensors through the development and deployment of the new Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR). This critical midcourse sensor is expected to provide persistent sensor coverage and vastly improve our target tracking and discrimination capability. The LRDR will help us evaluate our countermeasure options and increase the capability of our Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) interceptors.

We remain on track to deploy the final 14 interceptors in Alaska, which will give us 44 missiles in the ground by the end of 2017. Finishing the inventory is a big step toward the robust BMDS of the future, but it is critical that we not stop there. We need to continue working on

March 10, 2016

enhancements to the current Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), and investments in the future Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV). We need to invest in the lethality of our kill vehicles, and in ways to get us to the right side of the cost curve. Our adversaries are developing relatively inexpensive technologies, which we assess can reach the homeland. By contrast, our interceptors are vastly more expensive. Today, our BMDS is in an unsustainable cost model, which has us postured to shoot down inexpensive rockets with very expensive ones.

I believe that homeland defense is fundamentally an “away game”, and missile defense is no exception. Today’s GMD system is designed to intercept incoming threats after the launch is initiated. While that approach offers us sufficient decision space, we need to augment our defensive posture with one that is designed to defeat ballistic missile threats in the boost phase as well as before they are launched, known as “left of launch.” In concert with our public and private stakeholders, MDA is working on an emerging technology that will enable us to employ non-kinetic methods to defeat ballistic missile threats when we receive indications that a launch is imminent. I believe this technology will reduce the overall cost of engagement-based missile defense and provide us options to defeat ballistic missiles that continue to proliferate around the world.

We work closely with other GCCs, functional combatant commands, and partner nations to leverage capabilities that enable us to protect the Homeland. Thanks to agreements with the government of Japan, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) was able to deploy a second Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Model 2, or AN/TPY-2 to Japan, which dramatically improved our ability to “defend forward.”

In addition to the proliferation of ballistic missile threats, I am deeply troubled by the development of advanced long-range cruise missiles and the growing threat they represent to

North America. Russia possesses both conventional and nuclear cruise missiles with the range to reach North America and it has proliferated some advanced cruise missile technologies to other actors. This threat is real and it is imperative that we develop effective response options to outpace the threat and enhance our deterrence. We are working with the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO), MDA, and other stakeholders to improve our *Cruise Missile Defense (CMD)* capabilities.

Effectively countering and defeating cruise missiles requires a layered and integrated architecture that can defend across the full spectrum of the engagement sequence. Cruise missiles represent a real operational challenge because of their increased standoff capability, low altitude and small radar signatures. Although no single system can counter all cruise missiles, we have confidence in our layered architecture to defend the homeland. To defeat this more capable threat, we are working on enhancements to each of the individual systems, including our Indications and Warnings capabilities, wide-area-surveillance, and advanced fire control infrastructure.

We are in the first segment of our three-phase Homeland Defense Design (HDD) effort, which will improve our capability to find, fix, track, target, and engage growing air threats, such as those posed by cruise missiles, low-slow aircraft, and long-range aviation. In this first phase, we are testing and evaluating advanced sensors as well as integrated command and control capabilities. In addition to the new Stateside Affordable Radar System (STARS), we had begun a three-year operational exercise of the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS). This exercise has been an opportunity for us to see how well JLENS can fit into the existing Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) of the National Capital

Region (NCR), including deployment of a JLENS Fire Control System aerostat, which is designed to work in tandem with the surveillance aerostat.

Unfortunately, on October 28, 2015, the JLENS Fire Control System aerostat detached from its mooring station on Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and eventually grounded in a wooded area in northeast Pennsylvania. The Army is conducting a thorough investigation to determine the cause of the incident. Although this was a setback to our operational exercise, we still believe the JLENS system shows great promise in defense of the NCR. If the outcome of the investigation leads to the resumption of the operational exercise, we will work with the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as well as Congressional Defense Committees, on the way forward to continue our assessment of JLENS' performance in support of cruise missile defense.

AEROSPACE WARNING, AEROSPACE CONTROL AND MARITIME WARNING

In 1958, the United States and Canada formalized the bi-national agreement, which created NORAD to provide centralized operational control of continental air defenses against the threat of Soviet bombers. Every subsequent renewal of that agreement helped reshape the partnership to meet evolving threats to North America. After the fall of the Soviet Union, and in light of non-traditional aerospace threats, NORAD expanded its mission to include air sovereignty, warning, and assessment. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, NORAD's paradigm changed, and we began to focus on aviation security issues originating within Canada and the United States. For the last 14 years, Operation NOBLE EAGLE has defended our nation against 9/11-style terrorist attacks and other non-traditional aviation threats.

Aerospace warning and aerospace control of North America remains NORAD's primary missions. The command retains robust air defense capabilities to execute the air sovereignty

mission over Canada, Alaska and the continental United States. Today, we are confronted with an unprecedented spectrum of aerospace and maritime challenges, ranging from resurgence in Russian naval and aerospace activity to the proliferation of private Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS).

In addition to expanded military activity in Europe and the Middle East, we are observing a significant rise in Russian military assertiveness in the approaches to North America. Russian Long Range Aviation activity has surged, beginning with regular out-of-area patrols in 2007, culminating with a record number of out-of-area patrols in 2014 and the first-ever combat use of Russian heavy bombers in the Syrian conflict in November 2015.

NORAD is responsible for monitoring and identifying all aircraft of interest approaching North America that may enter the sovereign airspace of either Canada or the United States. On July 4th, 2015, NORAD fighter aircraft intercepted and visually identified two sets of Russian Tu-95 “Bear” long-range bombers flying in the United States Air Defense Identification Zone, one in the airspace west of Alaska's coast and another off the coast of central California.

Although none of the four bombers entered U.S. or Canadian sovereign airspace and were not a direct threat to our national security, they do represent a strategic demonstration of Russian military capability. I believe these flights are one way the Kremlin delivers the message that Russia remains a power with global reach.

In addition to increasing activity from state-actors and the potential for 9/11-style attacks, the growing availability and expanding capability of small manned and unmanned aerial systems will challenge the DOD, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and our law enforcement partners defending our airspace. UAS constitute a rapidly-developing industry, with increasingly sophisticated and yet simple-to-operate systems available for purchase by the general public,

increasing the likelihood that more of these aircraft will be used in the National Airspace System. Although the vast majority of these devices are operated in a lawful manner, their growing availability increases the likelihood of illicit use. Countering increased proliferation of non-traditional aviation technology (NTAT) will take a whole-of-community approach, with law enforcement at every level playing a critical role.

NORAD is postured to defend against threats to North America by aircraft, cruise missiles, and medium or large UASs. However, the layered detection infrastructure used to detect, identify, and track these threats is not designed for smaller non-traditional aircraft or UAS. On April 15, 2015, a small manned gyrocopter departed from Gettysburg, Pennsylvania and flew to the NCR, landing on the grounds of the Capitol in Washington, D.C. The gyrocopter unknowingly exploited an operational challenge in detecting and tracking low-altitude and slow-speed aerial vehicles.

The airspace surrounding the NCR, known as the Washington D.C. Special Flight Rules Area (SFRA) is monitored by the Integrated Air Defense System (IADS), which is a vast network of radars, cameras, and other detection and warning devices. The IADS is extremely capable of identifying and tracking potential threats to the NCR--anything from large commercial aircraft down to small, single-propeller recreational aircraft. Our post-event analysis revealed that the gyrocopter was detected by several of our integrated sensors as it approached and transited the SFRA. However, some of the aircraft's operational parameters, including speed, altitude, and radar cross-section fell below the thresholds necessary to differentiate it from surrounding objects, including weather, terrain, and birds. This event reinforced the fact that detecting and tracking low-altitude and slow-speed aerial vehicles is a significant technical challenge. The post-event analysis was a turning point for the interagency community's efforts

addressing the technical and procedural changes necessary to detect, track, and mitigate threats posed by these non-traditional aviation technologies.

As the spectrum of aerospace and maritime threats expands, we test and evaluate our ability to warn and defend against a range of scenarios. We challenge ourselves to outpace the known threats and anticipate the unknown ones. In order to test responses, systems and equipment, NORAD conducts numerous exercises with a variety of scenarios, including airspace restriction violations, hijackings and responses to unknown aircraft. This year, we conducted fourteen robust interagency live-fly aerospace defense exercises. These training events are scenario-based and are intended to exercise all aspects of our airspace defense plans. Defending the airspace in the NCR requires close collaboration with all the interagency stakeholders; therefore, we coordinate and exercise with our key partners, including the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the National Capital Region Coordination Center (NCRCC), the Joint Air Defense Operations Center (JADOC), the Civil Air Patrol, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Continental NORAD Region (CONR) Eastern and Western Air Defense Sectors.

In addition to NORAD's traditional air defense role, our mission set also encompasses maritime warning, which includes the unique responsibility of providing maritime domain awareness and maritime warning of activities conducted in the maritime approaches and internal waterways of North America. Although NORAD does not have a maritime control mission, we are uniquely postured to process, assess and disseminate intelligence and operational information to our Canadian and U.S. interagency partners. The maritime approaches to North America are extremely congested, which makes executing a unilateral, bilateral or bi-national response to a threat challenging. We issued eight maritime warning advisories in 2015, providing a critical bi-national homeland defense support capability.

HOMELAND DEFENSE

Global violent extremism is on the rise and it is neither restricted to a single ideology nor constrained by borders. The 2015 attacks in Paris, Mali, Chattanooga, San Bernadino, and others represent a growing radical movement of groups and individuals inspired by a range of beliefs that promote or use violence to undermine our universal values. Here in the homeland, we are seeing a growing use of violence by domestic terrorists and HVEs, many of whom are radicalized by violent extremist groups like Daesh, and Al-Qa'ida.

We collaborate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DHS, and many other federal agencies to provide unity of effort to deter, prevent, and defend against threats to our Homeland. Our federal partners and allies have successfully deterred or prevented some violent plots, but blind spots and intelligence gaps are common when trying to counter terrorism, so we must prepare for those times when we have no specific warning. In making assessments of possible threats, we gather and share snippets of information and try to determine how individual threat reports may morph into threat streams. We assess these threats against four specific attributes: plausibility, credibility, specificity, and imminency. In a number of cases, we are able to establish that the threats are plausible and credible, but often times we lack specific and imminent pre-operational indicators, which makes preventing these attacks especially challenging.

As the Commander of USNORTHCOM, I am responsible for protecting DOD installations and personnel from domestic threats. One of my assigned tasks is setting the baseline Force Protection Condition (FPCON) for DOD installations in the Homeland. Earlier this year, we began to observe a growing focus on targeting members of the United States

military, in addition to virtual targeting of DOD personnel after Daesh released the names and addresses of U.S. service members.

On May 7, 2015, I raised the FPCON level in the United States to FPCON Bravo, which is only the second time that has been done since 9/11. My decision was a prudent measure to ensure increased vigilance and safeguarding of DOD personnel, installations, and facilities within my USNORTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). I believe terrorists will continue to emphasize targeting DOD personnel for the foreseeable future, so establishing a preemptive, unpredictable frequency of actions will mitigate threats to our installations, personnel, assets, resources, and infrastructure.

After the tragic July 16th shootings in Chattanooga, I released an additional force protection advisory that mandated several additional randomly-applied security measures within FPCON Bravo, with an emphasis on off-installation activities, including recruiting stations, Reserve centers, and Reserve Officer Training Corps units. With this threat not diminishing, these increased security measures will likely become our new normal, so we implemented measures that were practicable and sustainable for the facilities affected.

For the Homeland, I believe Daesh's center of gravity is in their narrative and a perception of success in bringing about a 21st century "caliphate." Our objective must move beyond defending against violent extremism to preventing it entirely by breaking their cycle of radicalization, which will require countering their narrative at the grassroots level. Countering the narrative of terrorists like Al-Qa'ida and Daesh requires a globally unified response, including positive and proactive contributions from national and local governments, local communities, and the private sector.

COUNTERNARCOTICS AND TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

The trafficking and the endemic abuse of illicit drugs represent a national security threat to the United States. The primary criminal drug threat is posed by Mexican TCOs, the main suppliers of cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana throughout the United States. TOC distribution networks and drug trafficking enterprises are expanding, most notably among the heroin and methamphetamine markets. Here in the homeland, TCOs maintain relatively low profiles to avoid confrontations with law enforcement, but their domestically-affiliated gangs commit violent crimes to maintain power in their territories and control their local drug markets. In addition to illicit drug trafficking, these intricate TOC networks move legal goods, weapons, natural resources, and people, with revenues comparable to the gross domestic product of small countries.

Combating TOC requires unity of effort among federal, state, local, and foreign governments. We will continue to work together with our interagency partners in assisting Mexico and other countries around the world to respond to the evolving threats posed by transnational criminal organizations. Central to this effort is strengthening our partner nations' ability to enhance the rule of law so that judicial, law enforcement, security, and community organizations can effectively combat the TCOs.

USNORTHCOM works very hard to develop the trusted partnership opportunities with our domestic law enforcement agencies and Mexican military partners to align and synchronize our efforts. We provide Title 10 counterdrug support to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, and we coordinate with the National Guard to synchronize DOD support to domestic law enforcement. When requested by Mexico, and in a manner consistent with the human rights provisions of the Leahy Law, USNORTHCOM cooperates with the U.S. Country Team and the

Mexican military to support efforts building C-TOC capacities to disrupt and degrade TCO activities.

We provide operational counterdrug support through our subordinate command, Joint Task Force North (JTF-N), which recruits and employs Title 10 units on a strictly voluntary basis filling domestic law enforcement gaps with mostly military-unique capabilities. In 2015, JTF-N provided support to 51 specific multi-domain and multi-LEA operations, including detection and monitoring, ground surveillance, and mobility support.

In addition to providing critical military-unique support to LEA, the operational support provided by the Title 10 units significantly benefits DOD, because in many cases, it simultaneously achieves many of the supporting unit's critical training requirements. The planning, interagency collaboration, and dynamic execution of these missions closely approximates the missions these units will perform during future deployments, and the setting of southwest border operations mirrors the austere environment common to many forward-deployed locations.

USNORTHCOM is just one supporting organization in the much larger interagency and international law enforcement effort to counter TOC in the global environment. We contribute, as the other combatant commands do, by addressing threats in our AOR, providing support to our interagency and host nation partners, and collaborating with each other to close gaps and seams. We will continue our efforts to enhance mutual trust, increase collaboration, improve C-TOC capacity, and to contribute to a cooperative defense of North America.

CYBER

Cyber threats are increasingly among the most serious national security dangers faced by the United States today, and I remain adamant in considering activity in cyberspace as integral to

an overall domestic attack assessment. More and more we are confronted by a range of actors, from nation states like Russia, North Korea, China, and Iran, to profit-motivated criminals and ideologically-driven hackers. Both state and non-state actors attempt to target critical infrastructure, information and telecommunication systems, and financial institutions. What makes cyber attacks so difficult to defend against is the speed at which the technology advances, coupled with the diffuse nature of the attacks and the difficulty to attribute the source.

Cyber attacks pose a serious risk to the networks and systems controlling our critical infrastructure. The U.S. military is dependent on privately owned critical infrastructure, an attack on which could yield potentially severe consequences in a time of crisis. We are working with our government and industry partners to isolate our vulnerabilities and identify ways to prevent malicious cyber activity while defending our networks.

In addition to the millions of daily vulnerability probes of our networks and other cyber sabotage activity, we have seen a rise in Chinese cyber espionage, resulting in a significant loss of intellectual property and sensitive information that resides on some of our unclassified systems. This loss of vital intellectual property has the potential to damage our national security and impede our economic growth.

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

As the USNORTHCOM Commander and a GCC with responsibility for 49 of 50 states, I have the responsibility to provide DOD assistance to federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal authorities within the homeland. *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)*, our second Line of Operation, is a unique authority by which we facilitate DOD support in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities. DSCA covers the spectrum of civil activities, from localized weather

incidents to the response to weapons of mass destruction events. The DOD has a long history of supporting civil authorities with specialized skills, capabilities, and capacities maintained for the battlefield that provide stability in the wake of catastrophic events at home. Our support has been significantly shaped by lessons learned in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, and we conduct vigorous exercises to forge our enduring partnerships with agencies and organizations across the country. We stand ready to support the lead federal agencies (LFA) in responding quickly to natural and manmade disasters and to the effects of terrorist attacks.

The most prominent and frequent support we provide is disaster response assistance to DHS's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Last year's FEMA major disaster declarations were mostly in response to severe storms, flooding, and wildfires. We directly supported disaster relief operations to several states that suffered widespread flooding, including South Carolina. One of the worst fire seasons in recent United States history occurred this past year, with wildfires spreading throughout much of the Western United States and straining federal, state, and local firefighting capacity. Of note, 2015 was the worst year on record for wildfires in Washington State, culminating in a rash of fires that resulted in a federal emergency declaration. As a result of widespread fires, the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) set the national Preparedness Level (PL) at PL5, the highest level, which indicated that wide geographic areas were experiencing major incidents which had the potential to exhaust all agency fire resources. For the first time since 2006, the NIFC submitted a Request For Assistance (RFA) through USNORTHCOM, with final approval by the Secretary of Defense for DOD firefighting support. In August 2015, NIFC's request was approved, and with the help of the United States Army, we deployed 200 soldiers from 17th Field Artillery Brigade located at Joint Base Lewis-

McChord in Washington to provide ground support to the fire-fighting effort. The crews assisted the fire prevention efforts, and constructed firebreaks to slow or stop the progress of the fire.

As incidents in the Homeland develop, we work closely with our interagency partners to provide options for DOD support, should they require our assistance. In November, the DHS and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) observed an increase in the number of unaccompanied children (UC) and family units apprehended along the Southwest Border, with a trend that was projected to exceed its organic housing capacity. The Office of Refugee Resettlement at HHS initiated a plan to expand its temporary capacity to house unaccompanied children, which included a request to the DOD to identify facilities capable of temporarily housing UCs. In support of HHS and with the help of the Services, we coordinated the use of several DOD installations that could be used for this purpose, under a reimbursable agreement between the agencies. In January 2016, 129 UCs arrived at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico under the care of HHS' Administration for Children and Families and USNORTHCOM remains ready to facilitate the use of other DOD installations if needed.

HOMELAND PARTNERSHIPS

The focal point of USNORTHCOM and NORAD's power and strength are in the partnerships that we create and sustain with joint, interagency, and multinational organizations. Our trusted partnerships are our center of gravity and are critical to our success across the spectrum of our missions. *Homeland Partnerships*, our third line of operation, underscore every one of our mission areas, and are best represented by the integration in our headquarters of nearly 60 DOD and non-DOD federal agencies, department representatives, and liaison officers. I view homeland defense as a team effort, and I rely on partnerships with my fellow combatant commands, the Services, and our interagency partners to accomplish this mission.

We have built on our partnership with the Joint Improvised-threat Defeat Agency (JIDA) and the resulting collaboration with the lead federal agencies to protect the Homeland from next-generation Improvised Explosive Devices (IED).

We continue to develop our key partnership with the DHS and provide support through frequent strategic, operational and tactical dialogue. I collaborate regularly with DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson through visits and monthly video teleconferences. I believe that his Southern Border and Approaches Campaign will further unify homeland defense and security along our southern border. We are underway with the first of three deliberate phases of support toward an end state of fully integrated and synchronized operational activities with DHS's new Joint Task Forces (JTFs).

REGIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

USNORTHCOM and NORAD do not face today's complex strategic environment alone. Our allies and partner nations actively contribute to the cooperative defense of North America. Strong and reliable *Regional Partnerships*, our fourth line of operation, are critical for us to protect our shared values and ways of life and defend our nations in depth. We are inextricably linked with our partners through geography, economies, and demographics, and conduct deliberate security cooperation with them to strengthen our defense in depth and advance our mutual security interests.

CANADA

For over 57 years, NORAD has been a model for international cooperation and a symbol of trust and confidence between the United States and Canada. Our partnership is reinforced by our common values, and today, the men and women who wear the cloth of these two great nations work side-by-side throughout USNORTHCOM and NORAD. We are fortunate to have

dedicated Canadian military members fully integrated throughout the NORAD Command and staff, including the three-star Canadian officer who serves as my NORAD Deputy Commander. This year, we hosted our 8th annual Tri-Command Staff Talks among USNORTHCOM, NORAD, and Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), during which we were able to advance several key initiatives, including combined training and exercises, and synchronization of our requirements and capabilities advocacy processes. Going forward, I will promote our alliance with Canada to enhance our interoperability and contribute to combined operations.

With our Canadian partners, we are focusing on a deliberate collaborative investment strategy to outpace current and potential adversaries and counter emerging threats through a seamless and layered defense. As a result of our recent NORAD Strategic Review directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff, we commenced an effort to modernize NORAD. One of the first parts of our modernization is the North Warning System, which is the linchpin of our ability to detect, assess, and track airborne activity along the northern border of North America. Over the next decade, a priority will be research and development in next-generation indications and warning systems for the northern approaches to improve detection, surveillance, and engagement of current and emerging threats, ensuring our ability to monitor, control, and respond if necessary.

MEXICO

This year, the military-to-military relationship between the United States and Mexico reached unprecedented levels of coordination. Today we are strategic partners, respecting the laws and sovereignty of our individual nations, while confronting shared security challenges. We have developed an enduring cooperative relationship with the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA) and the Secretariat of the Navy (SEMAR). We work closely with the

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Mexican military to enhance planning, tactical skills, communication capabilities to include cybersecurity, and incorporation of human rights principles. In 2015 alone, I personally met with top military leaders of Mexico on eight separate occasions to strengthen our relationships and enhance our coordination.

I expect the safety and security of North America will be a long-term fight, and we continue to help the Mexican military build partnership capacity at their pace. We continued our training and equipping efforts focusing on ensuring the timely delivery of a record Foreign Military Sales (FMS) investment of over a billion dollars by the Government of Mexico in UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV). We also began the process this year of partnering with U.S. and Mexican civil organizations to enhance the Government of Mexico's ability to control and regulate their southern border with Guatemala and Belize. The focus of our efforts in this region is to collaborate on improving the communications network and investing in a biometrics system to promote interagency coordination and reduce insecurity.

This past summer, in conjunction with our Customs and Border Protection Air and Marine Operations partners, we conducted our second annual bilateral security cooperation exercise with Mexico, which demonstrated the significant progress we have made in training, information sharing and interoperability with the Mexican military. The exercise employs a cooperative response scenario designed to exercise and refine procedures to monitor, track and coordinate a response to an illegal flight transiting the border between the United States and Mexico. We expanded the scope of this year's exercise by including a two-phase live-fly portion, with the first phase simulating a hijacked aircraft originating from the United States and transiting into Mexico. The second phase was a simulated stolen aircraft suspected of carrying

narcotics which originated in Mexico and transited into the United States. Not only did these two scenarios improve our information sharing and mutual warning processes, the enhanced air control procedures we developed provided the foundation necessary to streamline a coordinated response to suspicious aircraft transiting our shared border.

Our combined efforts to promote democratic values, respect human rights, and counter TCOs continue to be a key focus of the training provided by the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). This program provides a critical foundation for mutual security and democracy, and the relationships formed by the students at WHINSEC reinforce the trust and cooperation among the participating nations.

THE BAHAMAS

Increased tourism, maritime, and commercial activity complicated by a resurgence in illicit trafficking and foreign influence, makes the Caribbean region a significant challenge in maintaining our national security. We are working with our regional partners to build domain awareness and develop capabilities to counter illicit trafficking and smuggling. Our “third border” with The Bahamas is the basis for a partnership critical to the security of the United States. The Bahamian Government is a willing partner, though they are limited in their security capacity, so we are forging a strong partnership through our support of the Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) and are helping them build capabilities that enhance detection, monitoring and interdiction of the migrant and drug flows that transit their country.

THE ARCTIC

Climate change and receding polar sea ice in the Arctic combined with global interest in emerging economic opportunities and an increase in human activity pose unique security challenges for the United States. Although the Arctic remains a vast, harsh and challenging

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operating environment, many Arctic nations are demonstrating increased interest and presence in the region. I believe that *The Arctic*, our fifth line of operation, represents the intersection between geography and interests. I view the Arctic as an emerging region where we will be called upon to support other federal agencies and work with our regional partners to safeguard the stability and security of the region.

We believe that while the likelihood of military conflict in the Arctic in the short term is low, international interest and presence are growing and it is necessary that the United States, and specifically the DOD, plan for a wide range of challenges and contingencies. Today, the often harsh operating environment yields significant variability in the pace and scope of change in commercial activity, which complicates our ability to plan and invest in our required capabilities. Constrained budgets and competing priorities dictate that we take a proactive, yet prudent approach to our investments in Arctic capabilities.

As the Commander of USNORTHCOM, one of my assigned tasks is to be the DOD advocate for Arctic capabilities. In this role, I am responsible for collaborating with DOD Arctic stakeholders to help identify capability requirements and shortfalls across the spectrum of DOD operations and champion their resolution with our trusted partners. Our Arctic Capabilities Advocacy Working Group (ACAWG) is a collaborative forum among DOD, interagency, and trusted international Arctic stakeholders, including geographic and functional combatant commands, the Joint Staff, the military departments and services, and DOD agencies that supports these actions.

Our ACAWG is taking a prudent, fact-based approach to Arctic advocacy and investment so that we do not over invest, under invest, or be late to need. We are looking at short, middle, and long-term material and non-material capabilities across the spectrum of DOD operations,

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including Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy. Our forces must be able to navigate, communicate, and sustain themselves to be effective in the region. To facilitate this, we are looking at capabilities that support domain awareness, communications, infrastructure, and sustainable presence.

Establishing a presence in the Arctic is an extremely costly proposition, with estimates running three to ten times the cost of building comparable facilities elsewhere. I believe that large fundamental infrastructure investments are not required to establish a large physical presence in the Arctic. Instead, we are concentrating on scalable infrastructure sufficient for us to support contingency and emerging Arctic missions, with a focus on qualified and equipped forces that have essential Arctic-capable platforms that can deploy and operate freely in the region, when required.

The United States has assumed the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council at a crucial time amidst growing international presence and interest in the Arctic. I believe that it is in the best interest of the United States that we accede to the Law of the Sea Treaty to give us a stronger position as we negotiate the complexities of territorial concerns and maritime security interests.

CONCLUSION

Our final two Lines of Operation, *Professionalism and Excellence* and *Warfighters and Families*, are perhaps the most pivotal because they underpin our endeavors across the spectrum of our assigned missions. We hold ourselves to the highest standards of personal and professional conduct. We reinforce our warfighters by ensuring that they are properly trained for their missions, while also providing the family advocacy programs, community outreach and service support functions that are critical to the families who, in turn, support our warriors.

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Despite what is likely to be an onerous fight against increasingly diffuse threats, we are very fortunate to be able to depend on the brave men and women who choose to wear the cloth of their nation and defend their fellow citizens. We embrace our no-fail mission at a time when our unique capabilities are needed most, and with your support, together with the exceptional men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD and our trusted partners, we will remain the greatest force for freedom, safety, and security for North America. I look forward to your questions.

**POSTURE STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL KURT W. TIDD
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
BEFORE THE 114TH CONGRESS
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
10 MARCH 2016**



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Introduction

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of the Committee: thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss U.S. Southern Command's activities in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. Before I begin, I would like to thank the Congress—and this Committee in particular—for its longstanding support to our mission and to our partners in the region. Our efforts are made possible through your help and by the hard work of our service components, Joint Task Forces, and our Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, Coast Guardsmen, civilians, and contractors.

In my short time in command, I have dedicated myself to expanding my knowledge of U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility (AOR). The Latin America and Caribbean of today is far different than it was a quarter of a century ago.¹ The region is home to a substantial middle class that actively seeks more responsive and transparent governments able to deliver promised services. There is little risk of armed conflict between neighboring states; border disputes are settled in diplomatic channels, not on battlefields. Governments are more democratic and respectful of human rights than at any point in the region's history. Militaries are more capable, professional, and among their countries' most trusted institutions.² These militaries are also some of our most reliable partners, committed to working with us and with one another to confront threats to hemispheric security.

Despite these improvements, the region still faces persistent, unresolved challenges. The slowing Chinese economy and falling global commodity prices are causing economic downturns across Latin America. Violent crime, widespread poverty, and fragile institutions continue to

¹ Secretary of State John Kerry, Remarks at the 45th Annual Washington Conference of the Council of the Americas. April 21, 2015.

² Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP): 2014 *AmericasBarometer*, Vanderbilt University.

plague many nations. Pervasive corruption, inequality, chronic unemployment, deteriorating citizen safety, and limited economic opportunity drive migration, propel young men and women to join violent gangs, or set the conditions for instability and potential violent radicalization. Lack of state presence, ineffective governance, and weak rule of law provide fertile ground for the drug trade and the spread of powerful criminal networks. Public frustration with slow economic growth, social exclusion, and endemic government corruption fuels social protests and unrest. In certain countries there is a troubling trend toward authoritarianism: elected leaders that shun democratic standards, abuse human rights, muzzle the press, and suppress the opposition. Natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanoes, fires, floods, and drought—as well as potential regional epidemics like the Zika virus—loom as ever-present dangers.

The good news is none of these challenges is insurmountable, but *all* warrant continued engagement. Because no nation in the region poses a direct, conventional military threat to the United States, Latin America tends to rank fairly low on force allocation priorities. This is understandable—but often requires what is, in my view, an unfortunate trade-off. Our attention to other parts of the world should not come at the expense of the significant gains made in our own hemisphere. Over the last twenty years, prudent engagement by the U.S. military has supported democratic governance and economic development, nurtured and developed professional defense forces, and encouraged greater security collaboration. Along with the State Department and other interagency partners, we have worked hard to realize a vision of the Americas where countries share responsibilities, cooperate as equals, and advance common interests and values.

Now, as criminal networks threaten the integrity of institutions and jeopardize citizen security, we must help countries build on the considerable progress achieved to date and continue working towards our shared priorities. As competitors seek to challenge our aim of being the region's security partner of choice, we must redouble our commitments and reinvigorate our partnerships. As the world works to contain the spread of violent extremism and confront challenges to a rules-based international order, we must seek new ways to strengthen our network of allies and partners. As we face an increasingly complex, interconnected security environment, we must look beyond borders and boundaries and seek not just whole-of-government, but whole-of-*hemisphere* solutions to our shared challenges. Mr. Chairman, positive and persistent U.S. engagement remains essential to advancing a Western Hemisphere that is prosperous, stable, and secure.³ With the continued support of the Congress and in full collaboration with our interagency and regional partners, U.S. Southern Command will continue working towards that goal.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, Members: I am humbled and honored to be part of the great team at U.S. Southern Command, and I look forward to working with you and your staffs in the coming years. I intend to focus my efforts in four key areas: ensuring we remain the premier security partner of choice in this hemisphere; deepening our interagency collaboration to generate heightened trust; becoming the innovation platform for the Department of Defense, interagency, and international partners; and enabling the critical transregional operations and initiatives of our sister Combatant Commands and interagency partners. We will continue to pursue an era of inclusive engagement with this vital part of the world and advance our

³ The White House, *National Security Strategy*. February 2015.

“Partnership for the Americas.”

Security Environment

The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests. The principal challenge remains *transnational criminal networks*, which are well-organized, well-financed, well-armed, and technologically advanced. These networks are efficient, adaptive, innovative, and exceptionally ruthless. They will transport *anything or anyone*—cocaine, heroin, weapons, people, even wildlife—if they believe the potential profit is greater than the potential risk. Enormous profits allow criminal networks to acquire capabilities that rival or even exceed those of the states that battle them, including high-powered rifles and machine guns, transport planes, and long-range submersibles. In response to these extraordinary circumstances, democratic governments have deployed their militaries to support overwhelmed police forces.

The overarching threat to our national security, however, is not just the range of illicit commodities that are trafficked, but instead the destabilizing operations, corruptive influence, and global reach of many of these networks,

some of which smuggle ‘special interest aliens’ (SIAs). Although the vast majority of SIAs are seeking economic opportunity, such

Spotlight: Syrian SIAs in the AOR

- *In 2015, partner nation officials detained six groups of Syrians in Honduras, St. Maarten, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Paraguay.*
- *In each case, access to fraudulent or stolen documents and corrupt law enforcement officials facilitated SIA movement through numerous countries in the AOR.*

as some from Iran, or are refugees fleeing war, like some from Syria, there is a risk that violent extremist organizations could exploit established networks, established smuggling routes, or other regional vulnerabilities—including lax immigration and border security, corrupt government officials, or the enabling capabilities of criminal organizations—to enter and move through the region undetected.

Let me talk for a moment on that last vulnerability. Whether Sunni or Shi'a extremists would wittingly collaborate with criminal groups to accomplish their goals is up for debate. Many people are quick to dismiss the possibility of these groups working together in this part of the world. They believe the absence of evidence of a relationship is evidence of its absence. Mr. Chairman, we at U.S. Southern Command can't be that certain. We know that extremist groups are ideologically-driven and want to harm the United States. We know that criminal organizations are profit-driven and will engage in illicit activities that increase their bottom line. We also know that both operate in the same dark underworld of illicit finance, fraudulent documents, and weapons trafficking and that violent extremist organizations have availed themselves of some of these criminally-provided services. What U.S. Southern Command lacks is the intelligence necessary to identify, monitor, and fully illuminate and understand these networks and the resources necessary to significantly disrupt, degrade and ideally dismantle them.

Like our counterparts in the U.S. Government and the Congress, we are also deeply concerned by the 'triple threat' posed by *foreign terrorist fighters*: they strengthen transnational terrorist groups, incite others back home to conduct attacks, and can ultimately return to launch acts of terror.⁴ ISIL's strategic communication efforts have resonated around the world, including in parts of Latin America and the Caribbean. Since 2013, we have seen a small number of individuals and their families leaving the region to join ISIL in Syria or Iraq. The appeal of violent extremist ideology to some Caribbean citizens and their subsequent travel to Iraq and Syria remains a concern; not just for us, but for our friends and partners across the region.

⁴ House Committee on Homeland Security, *Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorism and the Foreign Fighter Threat*. September 2015.

As in other parts of the world, the potential return of violent extremists is a threat. These individuals could be well positioned to spread ISIL's poisonous ideology and potentially inspire or execute acts of terror against U.S. or partner nation interests. Many partner nations are unable to monitor the potential return of foreign fighters and often lack robust counterterrorism legislation and capabilities to confront this threat. There is a significant and growing consensus—which I have personally observed during conversations with security chiefs across the region—about the threat of radicalization to violence in this hemisphere; San Bernardino and Paris are clear examples and dramatic wake-up calls that radicalization can happen anywhere. We will work with our partners to enhance support to the global coalition to counter ISIL, other transregional terrorist threats, and violent extremist organizations.

As a state sponsor of terrorism, *Iran's* nefarious involvement in the Western Hemisphere also remains a matter for concern. While Iranian engagement has waned in recent years, President Rouhani recently indicated that Tehran intends to increase economic, scientific, and cultural ties with Latin America though he has made this same pledge several times since his election in 2013. Additionally, *Lebanese Hezbollah* maintains an extensive regional network of supporters and sympathizers, some of whom are involved in trade-based money laundering and other illicit activities to generate revenue, a portion of which goes to support the parent organization in the Middle East. Lebanese Hezbollah also maintains an infrastructure with the capability to conduct or support terrorist attacks. As with every aspect of our counterterrorism efforts, the U.S. Government remains vigilant against these threats, working closely with our partners to protect the southern approaches to the United States.

Apart from what I have already discussed, several other trends impact *regional stability*. In El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, many of the conditions that caused the 2014 migration

crisis of unaccompanied children—high homicide rates, chronic poverty, and lack of economic opportunity—remain the same or are worsening, leading the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to call for action to respond to the ‘looming refugee crisis’ in the region.⁵ While apprehensions on our border are down, Mexico’s apprehensions at its southern border have increased dramatically over the past three years.⁶ Sustainable development and security gains *must* continue apace if the sub-region is to address its long-standing challenges. To this end, I would like to thank the Congress for providing funding to our State Department and USAID partners as part of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, a five-year initiative that will help State Department and USAID address the root causes of migration.

Central America is still awash in weapons and street gangs such as MS-13 and M-18, both of which originated in the United States and have close, direct, and growing ties with their U.S. counterparts. As an indication of how dire the situation is in El Salvador, its Supreme Court designated these groups as terrorists by ruling they violate the fundamental rights of the population and seek to usurp state power. Gangs are targeting the police and military with homemade grenades and car bombs and terrorizing Salvadoran citizens. According to the FBI, MS-13 is now present in 42 U.S. states, with a significant presence in Houston, Long Island, Charlotte, and Washington, DC.⁷ Mr. Chairman, the simple fact is that economic and security crises in Central America reverberate almost immediately through communities across our country.

⁵ Comments made by UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres on the release of The UN Refugee Agency’s report *Children on the Run: Unaccompanied Children Leaving Central America and Mexico and the Need for International Protection*. October 28, 2015.

⁶ Customs and Border Patrol apprehended 145,316 Central American migrants (including 39,970 UACs) at the US SW Border in FY 2015. From October 2014-April 2015, Mexican officials stopped nearly 93,000 Central American migrants, far exceeding the 49,800 detained in the same period 12 months earlier.

⁷National Gang Intelligence Center Assessment, November 2015.

Further south, rising crime, violence, and deteriorating economic conditions continue to plague Venezuela. Due to speculation about the potential end of U.S. immigration policies favorable to Cubans, an increasing number of Cuban migrants are traveling overland through Central America and Mexico to cross at the U.S. Southwest border, with over 30,000 arriving via this route in fiscal year 2015—in addition to more than 4,000 that arrived via traditional maritime routes through the Florida Straits. Haiti—one of the most unstable and least developed nations in the Western Hemisphere—will be especially vulnerable as the electoral crisis drags on and the United Nations stabilization mission draws to a close.

Our Colombian partners have made heroic strides battling the FARC, but a peace accord will not spell the end of their security challenges. Even if a peace accord is signed this spring, Colombia will

Spotlight: Colombia's Counter IED Capacity
The Colombian military, with our support and that of our interagency partners like JIDA, has reduced IED incidents by 21% in 2015. Casualties from IEDs are down 38% and the "found and cleared" rate for IEDs is nearly 80%.

confront other threats, including criminal networks that will gladly recruit experienced ex-FARC members and exploit the potential power vacuum generated by the FARC's demobilization. As an example, the transnational criminal network Clan Usuga is quickly becoming a significant threat to Colombian national security. The 3,000-strong group is comprised of former paramilitaries; has agents throughout Central and South America and Spain; and is expanding into Venezuela to increase its share of the drug trade. All of these issues warrant continued active U.S. engagement to ensure our partners in Central America and the Caribbean can address sources of instability and Colombia can deliver on the promise of a hard-won peace.

We must also contend with global competitors from outside our hemisphere that are strategically and purposefully operating in the Western Hemisphere. In this part of the world, *Russia's* actions are directly connected to its broader global efforts to demonstrate that Russia is

a global power capable of challenging U.S. leadership and the established rules-based international system. Russian officials' rhetoric, high-level political visits, and military-security engagements are designed to displace the United States as the partner of choice in the region. Over the past year, Russia continued to maintain a presence in Latin America, collecting information about the region and the United States. Since mid-December 2014, Moscow has deployed an oceanographic and a hydrographic research ship to Nicaragua; an intelligence collection ship to the U.S. east coast and Caribbean; and an additional oceanographic research ship to the Caribbean. This is four naval deployments to Latin America in less than twelve months, all of which involved data or intelligence collection. Russia also reached an agreement with Nicaragua for simplified port access and logistical support, and regularly broadcasts anti-American propaganda in Ecuador, Argentina, and Venezuela via Russian state-owned RT-TV, which also broadcasts to the United States, and via online news and Sputnik Mundo, which is targeted to Latin American audiences. Russia uses this media to create doubts about U.S. intentions and criticize U.S. policies.

We need to engage proactively and deepen security cooperation with our partners in the Americas. We strongly suspect that Russia's actions in the Western Hemisphere are not driven by events in this AOR, but rather are integrated into a larger, more holistic approach. This requires an equally integrated, transregional response on our part. When it comes to transregional competitors, we are closely coordinating with fellow combatant commanders to ensure we are contributing not just in our area of responsibility but across regional boundaries to ensure competitors are unable to exploit seams between our areas of responsibility.

In contrast to Russia, *China's* primary focus in the region is on trade and investment. Still, China seeks to forge security relationships as part of its strategy to increase its influence in

the region. Military engagements tend to focus on soft-power, with offers of training in Beijing, high-level visits, donations of equipment, and naval diplomacy efforts. During May - June 2015, a Chinese Naval Hydrographic Survey Ship made port calls in Brazil and Ecuador during its circumnavigation. The Chinese Navy's 20th Naval Escort Task Force made a port call in Cuba in November as part of their goodwill cruise around the world. Additionally, the Chinese hospital ship PEACE ARK visited Peru, Grenada, and Barbados in 2015 to provide medical services to local communities, marking the vessel's second visit to the region since 2011. Chinese defense firms also continue to make inroads into the Latin American arms markets through low-cost military hardware, no-strings-attached sales and financing, and offers of co-production facilities in the region. While China's competition for regional influence does not pose a direct military threat to our interests in this hemisphere, it does reinforce the importance of ensuring China's activities abide by regional political, economic and security norms. It also underscores the importance of the United States remaining engaged in this important part of the world.

Command Priorities

To address these challenges, we work with our partners to defend the southern approaches to the United States, respond to regional contingencies, and promote security cooperation with the 31 nations and 16 areas of special sovereignty in our AOR. We focus on one no-fail mission and four priorities, which I would like to discuss today.

We continue to conduct safe, humane, legal, and transparent care and custody of the remaining detainees currently at Joint Task Force Guantánamo (JTF-GTMO). *Detention operations* are a demanding, sensitive, and often thankless mission. The medical and guard force deal with enormous stress and are subject to near-constant verbal and physical assaults by

detainees. Some of our female troops must continue to deal with the frustration of a temporary court order that prevents them from performing their assigned duties, even though they are all fully trained, immensely qualified, and embody the values of equality and diversity that our nation espouses to the world and holds dear. Despite these challenges, and as many of you have witnessed first-hand, the men and women at JTF-GTMO conduct the most humane, principled detention operations anywhere in the world, often exceeding the requirements of U.S. laws and the Geneva Convention. I thank you for your continued active support for these tremendous young men and women and invite you to continue to visit them to see for yourselves the conditions under which they labor, and the quiet professionalism with which they execute their duties.

Unlike the conduct of our troops, the condition of many JTF-GTMO facilities falls far short of acceptable standards. As the Congress knows, most of the facilities constructed to temporary standards are deteriorating rapidly due to the harsh environment, ongoing mission demands, and a chronic lack of funds for maintenance and recapitalization. Last year, rains associated with Hurricane Joaquin resulted in widespread leaks in troop housing—an unsurprising occurrence, given the dilapidated condition of these buildings. With no long-term military construction, we expect to continue addressing life, health, and safety issues in an incremental, piecemeal manner that rapidly becomes more costly than investment in new construction.

In concert with our law enforcement, intelligence community, diplomatic, and regional partners, we remain focused on *countering transnational organized crime (CTOC)*. Our Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) is at the forefront of our efforts to combat the illicit drug trade and to illuminate the networks engaged in this nefarious activity. Although receiving

only 1.5% of the total U.S. counterdrug budget, JIATF-S and its international partners disrupt *three times* the amount of cocaine seized at or within U.S. borders. While the U.S. Navy was only able to provide limited surface ships to Operation MARTILLO, increased U.S. Coast Guard

Operation MARTILLO FY 15 Disruptions	
Cocaine	192 MTs
% disrupted by partners	35%
Marijuana	62,995 lbs
Bulk cash	\$11.4 million

and U.S. Customs and Border Protection assets, as well as significant contributions by partner nations and Allies, helped disrupt 192 metric tons of cocaine in

FY2015. Operations like MARTILLO not only strike a blow to powerful criminal networks, they ultimately save U.S. lives and resources by stopping hundreds of tons of cocaine, heroin, and other drugs destined for our cities and towns.

In response to the insecurity that drove last year’s unaccompanied children crisis, we are prioritizing our capacity-building efforts in the Northern Tier of Central America. We thank the Congress for its support to our CTOC activities and for recognizing the important role security plays in addressing the sub-region’s long-standing challenges. Through equipment support, infrastructure projects, counterdrug training, and aggressive information sharing, we are

improving our partners’ maritime interdiction and border security capabilities and enhancing regional domain awareness. To

Spotlight: Support to Interagency Operations
In 2015, we supported U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Operation CITADEL, which targeted the smuggling of migrants from the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America into the United States. This operation led to the dismantlement of large-scale criminal networks and the rescue of many unaccompanied children.

complement these efforts, last year our Marine component deployed a Special-Purpose Marine, Air, Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) to help partner nations extend state presence and security in Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Belize. Working alongside Honduran military and government officials, U.S. Marines built roads and a C-130 capable airfield and provided essential water services to vulnerable populations. Working in tandem with Joint Task Force-

Bravo, the SPMAGTF promises to be one of our most responsive forces; sourced mainly by Marine Reservists, it provides us with an agile, forward-deployed, rapid response capability that is without equal.

We also dedicate significant effort to remaining vigilant against the threat of violent

Spotlight: DoD Rewards Program
In 2015, the DoD Rewards Program enabled partner nation authorities to bring 135 members of terrorist organizations to justice.

extremism, and I thank the Congress for providing the dedicated resources to support this important mission. Our *counterterrorism*

(CT) efforts center on building and supporting partner nation capacity to detect and defeat terrorist threats within their borders. We are working with partners from across the region to counter extremism, recruitment, and radicalization to violence in vulnerable communities. Over the past year our Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted multiple engagements such as subject matter expert exchanges, counterterrorism-focused exercises, and civil affairs activities. These efforts—coupled with support to U.S. Country Teams and interagency operations—ensure our nation and those of our friends remain secure. As discussed earlier, transnational organized crime and terrorist networks are intersecting layers of a global illicit economy. We will begin to explore if and how taking a counter network approach against illicit networks can improve our insight and successes in both our CTOC and CT efforts.

Whether countering transnational organized crime and terrorism, supporting disaster response operations, establishing cyber defense capabilities, or emphasizing a solid human rights foundation, *building partner capacity* is the cornerstone of everything we do. Our efforts help build and nurture committed and capable partners who can control their borders, address drivers of insecurity and instability, respond to natural and man-made disasters, and contribute to regional security—all of which help generate an extended layered defense of the U.S. homeland

and protect our interests. Although it is impossible to do justice to all the incredible work being done by our joint task forces, service components, and the National Guard's State Partnership Program, I would like to share a few highlights of our capacity-building efforts in the region.⁸

After 51 years of armed conflict, *Colombia*—a strategic ally, friend, and preeminent partner—is on the verge of ending the hemisphere's longest-running guerilla war. Thanks to its own efforts and our sustained assistance, Colombia has been transformed from a near failed state into a major regional player with significant political influence, world-class security forces, and a growing economy. The Colombian military has grown from an internal defense force to a respected exporter of counterdrug and counter IED expertise⁹ and is standing up a regional demining center of excellence. The Colombian Navy is also a regular contributor to NATO counter-piracy operations off the coast of Africa as well as counterdrug patrols in our own hemisphere with JIATF-South.

Colombia's transformation is remarkable, but it will still face an uncertain period with many new challenges even when an accord is reached. In many ways the hardest work lies ahead. For Colombia to successfully consolidate the promise of its decades-long struggle, the United States *must* remain as fully engaged a post-peace accord partner as we ever were during Colombia's struggles. U.S. Southern Command will continue to support Colombia's efforts to: take the FARC off the battlefield and out of illicit activities; successfully implement a new counternarcotics strategy and establish state presence; conduct humanitarian demining; and transform the Colombian military to adapt to an evolving security environment. On a broader

⁸ For a full overview of component activities, please see the Annex.

⁹ In 2015, USSOUTHCOM and the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement supported military and civilian law enforcement capacity-building activities by Colombian military and law enforcement personnel. USSOUTHCOM provided assistance to the COLMIL to execute 85 military BPC activities. These activities were focused on maritime interdiction, support to law enforcement entities, security and maintenance of vessels at port, riverine training, command and control, border security, intelligence training, and human rights training

level, it is also essential that we continue providing Colombia a robust and agile assistance package that will help it successfully address the new security, developmental, and human rights challenges posed by a post-accord environment.

To enhance the *professional development* of the region’s military officers and senior enlisted leaders, U.S. Southern Command conducts or facilitates International Military Education and Training (IMET), military and defense exchanges, and security seminars. Through the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) and William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, we are supporting the increased professionalization of regional defense organizations. These programs help build accountable, transparent armed forces that can ensure

Spotlight: Building Cyber Defense Capacity
We are building cyber security and cyber defense capabilities with seven regional partners and working with Brazil, Peru, Colombia, and Chile as they establish dedicated cyber defense commands or capabilities.

the sustainability of U.S. security cooperation investments, increase citizen safety, and uphold universal values such

as good governance, rule of law, and respect for human rights. We are also supporting the development of a competent and professional Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) corps through close interaction during engagements, exercises, and at defense institutes like the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) and Inter-American Air Force Academy (IAAFA).

As the only Combatant Command with a dedicated human rights office, we continue to make progress engaging our partners on this foundational issue. Last year, Paraguay became the 11th partner nation to commit to implementation of the U.S. Southern Command-sponsored *Human Rights Initiative* (HRI) within its military forces. We also supported civil-military dialogues in Honduras and Guatemala and held the first-ever HRI event in Haiti. Partner nations acknowledge their responsibility to respect and protect human rights, but generally lack the

resources to build strong programs. Requests for HRI assistance far exceed our ability to support—which is why we encourage regional militaries to share their expertise with one another. During last year’s TRADEWINDS exercise, Caribbean security officials led multiple training tracks on human rights issues, advancing our goal of increased human rights integration in multinational exercises.

Like HRI, our *humanitarian assistance and humanitarian and civic assistance programs* also yield significant ‘return on engagement.’ These programs help improve our

partners’ abilities to provide essential services to their citizens, reduce human suffering, and support economic development. But they do more than

Spotlight: Partnership with NGOs Aboard the COMFORT
More than 400 volunteers from NGOs and academic institutions worked alongside U.S. military members, serving as doctors, nurses, and surgeons. USNS COMFORT also hosted the NGO Operation SMILE, which provided 279 life-changing surgeries to patients in the region.

that— they remind the world that our military’s greatest strength is more than our proven ability to project power around the globe, it is the generosity and compassion of our people. There is perhaps no better symbol of that generosity than deployments by our world class hospital ship *USNS COMFORT*. As part of CONTINUING PROMISE 2015, medical and support staff from across the U.S. military and the region worked alongside nearly 400 volunteers to treat 122,268 patients and conduct 1,255 surgeries. In an historic event during the COMFORT port call in Haiti, U.S. and Cuban medics worked side by side to treat Haiti’s poor and exchange best medical practices. CONTINUING PROMISE is without a doubt one of the U.S. military’s most impactful missions, but future COMFORT deployments are in jeopardy due to the U.S. Navy’s budget constraints.

Additionally, our annual BEYOND THE HORIZON and NEW HORIZONS humanitarian exercises help advance security, prosperity, and good governance in equal measure,

while also building the capacity of partner nations to respond to disasters without request for U.S. assistance. As part of these exercises, U.S. Air Force and Army medical teams conducted readiness training that treated over 30,000 patients in El Salvador, Panama, and Honduras. In partnership with regional militaries and civilian agencies, we constructed disaster relief warehouses, emergency operation centers, schools, clinics, and hospitals in remote or under-serviced areas. These exercises were supported by private sector and NGO partners, who provided nearly \$4 million in donations of gifts-in-kind and services for the citizens of Latin America. In these and other activities, we work closely with other U.S. agencies—including the Department of State and USAID—to support their efforts in promoting resilient democratic societies through sustainable, long-term development.

I would also like to highlight one of our most successful capacity-building efforts: the *Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)*. In partnership with the State Department, GPOI allowed us to train and equip more than 3,500 peacekeepers (male and female) from six partner nations. These partners are currently deployed to four United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in Africa and Haiti. The relatively small investment--\$7.6 million in FY2015—not only supported training and equipping of peacekeepers, but also enabled El Salvador to deploy an attack helicopter unit to the UN Mission in Mali; allowed Peru to deploy a heavy engineer company to the UN mission in the Central African Republic; assisted Chile’s efforts to create a regional gender integration training capability; and helped Uruguay sustain critical enabling helicopter and riverine capabilities supporting the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. All of these efforts help maintain stability in war-torn states and troubled regions, protect civilians, and deliver critical humanitarian aid. Given the multiple benefits of GPOI, I fully support continuing and expanding this important program throughout the region.

The *State Partnership Program* and our *multinational exercises* continue to build a strong Inter-American system of persistent defense cooperation. A force multiplier to our efforts, National Guard units from 19 states conducted 215 activities that developed core competencies in regional military forces, promoted the concept of citizen-soldiers as public servants, and reinforced our bilateral relationships with 28 countries. In the Caribbean, we conducted a highly successful iteration of our annual TRADEWINDS exercise, which brought together more than 750 participants from 17 different nations to work together on real-life training scenarios related to disaster response and CTOC operations.

As part of Southern Seas 2015, UNITAS—the U.S. Navy’s longest-running annual maritime exercise—brought together North American, South American, Pacific, and African maritime forces from eight countries to improve interoperability and build working relationships at sea. Last year we had the largest U.S. force participating in the exercise’s history, courtesy of the creative employment of the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON and associated air wing during her transit through the region. While these types of maritime engagements offer unparalleled opportunity to engage with our partners in areas of maritime law and policy, discussion of issues like excessive maritime claims can become derailed by the United States’ status as a non-party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Accession to the Convention gives the United States a seat at the table and thus an immeasurably stronger position from which to engage our partners on maritime security concerns.

Finally, *contingency planning and preparation*—which includes other exercises like PANAMAX, FUSED RESPONSE, FUERZAS HUMANITARIAS and INTEGRATED ADVANCE—prepares our team to respond to regional crises and enhances interoperability with our interagency and regional partners. These efforts not only improve our planning, training, and

readiness, they build invaluable relationships across agencies, departments, and governments. For example, in the event of a natural disaster in Central America, our Joint Task Force Bravo—located at Soto Cano Airbase in Honduras—will be at the forefront of our response efforts. Essentially a small aviation regiment with 18 helicopters, JTF-Bravo is our only permanently deployed contingency force in the region. The outstanding men and women of JTF-Bravo regularly conduct life-saving search and rescue missions and provide humanitarian assistance and logistical support to Honduran and regional counterdrug operations.

We train for a variety of contingencies, one of which is a mass migration event. We work closely with our interagency partners in the State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and other regional partners to monitor increased migrant flows. Last year, we conducted a mission rehearsal exercise at U.S. Naval Station Guantánamo Bay to test our ability to support a response to a humanitarian crisis in the Caribbean. As the only permanent Department of Defense base in Latin America, the U.S. Naval Station provides persistent U.S. presence and immediate access to the entire region. It serves as a forward operating base for DHS-led migrant operations and a distribution and staging area for foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. If directed to execute today, resource and capacity challenges at the Naval Station would significantly impact our support to the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State operational and contingency plans. These challenges call into question our ability to provide safe care, custody, and transportation of interdicted migrants, which is especially concerning given recent increases in migrant flows.

Critical Needs and Concerns

U.S. Southern Command is committed to honoring the trust American taxpayers place in us, and we strive to make every defense dollar count. Through better business practices, we are

working to mitigate funding reductions and gain efficiencies throughout our headquarters. Our most significant challenge is under-sourcing of assets, an issue that will be compounded should sequestration return. For every additional capacity-building activity we conduct, we can further strengthen the security network that keeps our partners stable and our homeland secure. For every additional ship and air asset we are able to dedicate to the detection and monitoring mission, we can disrupt approximately 20 more metric tons of cocaine. And for every additional ISR resource we are provided, we can better illuminate threat networks in the region. Yet even with the limited resources we have, we punch well above our weight class. We are in fact, a world-class welterweight: we are fast and agile; we are well trained; and we have the strength and stamina for the long run—qualities that are essential for success against the threats and challenges in our area of responsibility.

To help mitigate shortfalls in the detection and monitoring mission, we employ creative and non-traditional approaches like adapting anti-IED technology for use in counterdrug operations in dense jungle and mountainous terrain. Looking ahead, we will continue to explore alternatives to traditional sourcing solutions, including driving innovation and experimentation into training and exercises. With a multitude of willing and welcoming partners in Latin America and the Caribbean, we have a unique experimentation training environment, perfect for expanding war gaming; testing new operational concepts, tactics, technologies and procedures; and exploring new ways to combine capabilities and improve interoperability. Additionally, we will continue to pursue opportunities to use innovative ISR platforms. I especially want to thank the Congress for the additional funding, which is helping increase our domain awareness and enhance ongoing CTOC operations.

While JIATF-South—through excellent interagency and partner nation coordination—has developed impressive air and maritime awareness of drug movements, when the networks hit terra firma we go dark. To address these blind spots, we are exploring how we might partner even more closely with the interagency and partner nations to improve synchronization and fully illuminate threat networks. We will work with our Central American partners, the Department of State, the intelligence and law enforcement communities, and U.S. Country Teams every step of the way as we improve our collective effort to degrade and disrupt the corrosive operations of criminal networks.

Finally, I thank the Congress for your continued support to U.S. Southern Command's talented men and women and their families. Unfortunately, our service members, especially our junior enlisted personnel, face a significant quality-of-life challenge: the lack of affordable housing. In almost all respects, Miami is the perfect city for our headquarters. I say 'almost' because the cost of living is one of the highest in the nation. Many of our assigned personnel cannot afford to live near the command, and government housing acquired through domestic leasing is expensive and extremely competitive. We are currently working with the Department of Army to develop our formal housing requirement, and we will work closely with the Congress as we move forward to improve the quality of life of our men and women in uniform.

Conclusion

In closing, I am sure members of this Committee will agree: nowhere is our own security more inextricably intertwined to that of our neighbors, partners, and friends than in Latin America and the Caribbean. In an increasingly chaotic and insecure world, this region can and should serve as a beacon of hope, peace, prosperity, and partnership. This is both the promise

and the potential of our shared home. It is a goal shared by our partners and one that we can achieve—but only by remaining engaged and only by working together. Day in and day out, the outstanding team at U.S. Southern Command is doing exactly that: we are building partnerships that protect our interests, defend our homeland, uphold the global common good, and advance security, good governance, and opportunity. Once again, thank you for your persistent, sustained support for your U.S. Southern Command, and I look forward to our discussion.

Annex: 2015 Joint Task Force and Component Accomplishments

Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) Key West, Florida

- **Joint Interagency Task Force South** contributed to the disruption of 192 metric tons of cocaine in FY2015, worth nearly \$3.9 billion wholesale. This represents 76 percent of all documented U.S. cocaine removals that were likely directed towards the U.S. market. JIATF-S employs an integrated defense forward capability for the ongoing efforts at the U.S. Southwest Border and for U.S. operations in the Western Hemisphere using tactical control (TACON) ship days, TACON flight hours, and by monitoring illicit air activity using Forces Surveillance Support Center relocatable over-the-horizon radar.
- **Operation MARTILLO:** The vast majority of JIATF-South successes came as a result of JIATF-South leadership and coordination of Operation (OP) MARTILLO, the multi-lateral effects-based operation designed to deny the Central American littoral routes to illicit traffickers. Begun on January 15, 2012, OP MARTILLO results to date include the disruption of 595 metric tons of cocaine, the seizure of \$25.8 million in bulk cash, and the seizure of 1486 detainees and 478 vessels and aircraft. OP MARTILLO has had the desired effect of increasing partner nation participation in U.S. efforts to disrupt illicit trafficking and counter transnational organized crime.
- **Operational Results and Impact:** In the air domain, over the past year, JIATF-South documented a 53 percent decrease in illicit air tracks destined for Central America (primarily Honduras). Decisions made by some of our partner nations to establish lethal air interdiction policies have impeded JIATF-South's efforts to share illicit air track information with those partner nations. Ultimately, air trafficking continues to be a declining percentage (3%) of overall cocaine flows. In the maritime domain, during the same period, JIATF-South documented a 20% increase in the overall volume of cocaine departing the source zone in South America. Eastern Pacific flow currently accounts for more than 68% of documented cocaine movement. It is assessed the increase in Eastern Pacific cocaine movement is at least partially caused by trafficker adaptation to focused law enforcement pressure in the Western Caribbean. JIATF-South is currently developing strategies to better apply requisite pressure against each threat vector, so as to curtail transit options available to traffickers. The increase in documented flow is partially due to increased law enforcement reporting and contributions from partner nations to augment collective situational awareness. JIATF-South identified several transatlantic maritime cases in FY15 and established a liaison officer at the Maritime Analysis Operations Center-Narcotics in Lisbon, Portugal to facilitate the targeting of these cases by European law enforcement agencies. JIATF-South Counter Threat Finance team targeted \$30.5 million in bulk cash and closely worked with DEA Lima, Peru on several investigations. JIATF-South Container Cell supported investigations resulting in 7 MTs of cocaine seized in commercial shipping containers and continues to develop relationships to increase situational awareness of global movements of cocaine via commercial shipping.

- **Supporting Defense of the Homeland:** The establishment of three Department of Homeland Security Joint Task Forces, JTF-East, JTF-West, and JTF-Investigations in 2015 has the potential to greatly enhance the interagency effort to defend the southern approaches. JIATF-South has been integrally involved with and fully supports the development of these organizations so that efforts to counter illicit trafficking will be synchronized to produce the greatest combined effect. Since its inception in September 2012, OP UNIFIED RESOLVE, the counter illicit trafficking operation supporting Puerto Rico, has substantially improved and formalized interoperability between JIATF-South, Coast Guard District 7, Coast Guard Sector San Juan, and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of Air and Marine Caribbean Air and Marine Branch in our shared Counter Illicit Trafficking operations. Under the new DHS JTF construct OP UNIFIED RESOLVE will be coordinated by Joint Task Force-East.
- **Role of Partner Nations:** In FY 2015, 50 percent of JIATF-South disruptions were marked by partner nation participation. The role of our Latin American partners should not be understated. Of the 250 illicit trafficking events disrupted by JIATF-South in FY 2015, 88 of these (35 percent) would not have been successful without the support of our international partners. Many Central American partners have greatly increased their ability to respond to illicit trafficking cases cued by JIATF-South including Guatemala, Panama, and Costa Rica who collectively responded to twice the number of events in FY15 compared to FY14. The success of JIATF-South continues to draw support as several additional nations have expressed interest in joining the international effort to counter illicit trafficking. The contributions of ships and aircraft to the Transit Zone effort by the U.K., France, the Netherlands, and Canada continue to be significant and needed.
- **Innovation and Transition to Counter Network Operations:** Recognizing the holistic nature of the threats and challenges to the U.S. from TCOs in the Western Hemisphere, JIATF-South's planning process is orienting the command and its focus towards countering the organizations responsible for undermining the stability and security of the region. With their authorities firmly planted in the detection and monitoring (D&M) of illicit trafficking, JIATF-South will employ several initiatives to focus their core mission set on illuminating illicit networks for disruption. Network focused D&M will rely on Tactical Development Analysis, Threat Finance Information, and Container Cell intelligence to develop awareness and increase effectiveness in a fiscally austere environment. Additionally, JIATF-South is leveraging interagency partnerships to develop the ability to detect and monitor illicit trafficking activity, using the cyber domain.

**Joint Task Force Guantánamo (JTF-GTMO)
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba**

- **Safe and Humane Custody and Control:** JTF-GTMO conducted safe, humane, legal, and transparent custody and control of detainees, including those convicted by military commission. High Value Detainees (HVDs) and non-HVDs maintained family contact via mail, telephone calls and, in areas which support this service, videophone conferences coordinated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). High quality care, to include routine and urgent medical care,

was provided to detainees on a 24-hour basis. General surgical care, dental care, preventative medicine, optometry and mental health services were provided, or arranged, as was targeted specialty care on a recurring basis.

- **Legal and Transparent Operations:** Assessments of detention conditions by the ICRC continued with four visits in 2015. All detainees were provided the opportunity to meet with ICRC delegates and medical personnel during these visits. Additionally, detainees are granted access to legal representation. For non-High Value Detainees, during FY 2015 JTF-GTMO scheduled 385 habeas meetings (259 were completed) and 222 commissions meetings (141 completed). With respect to High Value Detainees, JTF-GTMO scheduled 43 habeas meetings (29 completed) and 1,781 commissions meetings (894 completed). Committed to transparency, JTF-GTMO hosted 75 media representatives from 40 domestic and international news organizations and answered hundreds of media queries during the past year. Similarly, JTF-GTMO also hosted 166 Distinguished Visitor visits totaling more than 1100 personnel, including seven Congressional Delegations, Service Chiefs and senior DOD, DHS, DOJ and DOS policy makers.
- **Military Commissions:** Support for the Military Commissions process is a priority of JTF-GTMO. These proceedings are open to observation by the media, victim family members, non-governmental organizations and other visitors. In fiscal year 2015, JTF-GTMO supported 3 days of hearings which addressed pre-trial motions in the case of *U.S. v. Mohammad, et al.*, the five individuals accused of coordinating the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. (referred to in the press as “the 9/11 Five”) and 4 days of hearings to address pre-trial motions in the case of *U.S. v. Al Nashiri*, the alleged USS COLE bomber. Additionally, the Court arraigned and conducted 7 days of hearings to address pre-trial motions in the case of *U.S. v. Al Iraqi*, an alleged Al Qaeda commander charged with law of war offenses.
 - In the “9/11 Five” military commission, the judge’s 7 January 2015 interim order bars female guards from touching (absent exigent circumstances) the 9/11 Five detainee-accused during movements to and from attorney-client meetings and commission hearings. This order remains in effect until the judge hears evidence and argument and makes a final ruling. The cancellation of several commissions sessions in 2015 prevented the resolution of this issue. The practical effect of the judge’s order is that it prohibits female guards from participating in commissions-related movements of the 9/11 Five detainee-accused. Male guards therefore complete extra duties that female guards may not perform. The judge’s order resulted in fifteen (15) Equal Opportunity (EO) complaints because a portion of the guard force cannot perform their assigned duties based on gender. The EO complaints are unresolved.
- **Infrastructure:** Sustainment costs continue to rise due to the many facilities at JTF-GTMO that are past their designated lifecycle. Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (SRM) costs have steadily increased the last four years (\$19M, \$20M, \$21M, \$24M). Eight military construction (MILCON) projects, valued at \$231M, were planned for FY15-18 to address infrastructure concerns. Six of those projects, valued at \$207M, or 90% of the total Military Construction (MILCON) budget were cancelled in January 2015.

- **Detainee Movement Operations:** JTF-GTMO conducted 12 Detainee Movement Operations during Fiscal Year 2015 which transferred 35 detainees to 10 different countries.

**Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-B)
Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras**

- Joint Task Force-Bravo is a forward-based expeditionary joint task force operating as U.S. Southern Command's lead forward element in the Central American (CENTAM) region. The Joint Task Force integrates and synchronizes efforts, provides assets and capabilities to enable others to operate, and executes operations in support of the CCDR's priorities of Countering Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC), Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief, Building Partner Nation Security Capacity, and Contingency planning/support to promote regional cooperation and enhance security throughout Central America. JTF-Bravo performs the following missions:
- Facilitates integration of Partner Nation and U.S. Government agencies to develop a common understanding of Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO) and enables operations to counter identified TCO networks.
- Conducts combined operations with military and law enforcement elements from the U.S. and Partner Nations to disrupt and deter organized crime networks in Central America.
- Consistently refines and evolves a common understanding of the environment and its efforts to enable partners to counter threats to both the CENTAM region and the American Homeland
- Provides a running estimate of the environment to both synchronize and integrate operations to achieve the right, overall effects against Criminal Transnational Organizations / Illicit Facilitation Networks.
- Supports efforts dedicated to Building Partner Capacity by providing subject matter expertise and capabilities throughout CENTAM in areas ranging from medical support to the local population and fire-fighting capabilities, to logistical support to partner nation militaries.
- Serves as U.S. Southern Command's first responder for natural disasters and humanitarian events within CENTAM.
- Is prepared to provide SOUTHCOM a no-notice command and control node throughout CENTAM in a natural disaster scenario.
- Manages the only all-weather day/night C-5 Galaxy-capable airfield in CENTAM, supporting ongoing operations and maintaining readiness to facilitate humanitarian assistance and disaster relief throughout CENTAM.
- JTF-B's operations enable DoD, DoS, IA, and PN efforts throughout CENTAM. Over the past year, JTF-B provided air movement support to the Honduran military for twelve iterations of Operation CARAVANA during 2015 (moving 3,525 pax and 135,500 pounds of equipment), allowing them to position forces into isolated regions of eastern Honduras and posturing them to effectively deter Illicit Facilitation Networks. JTF-B also conducted 25 medical missions during 2015. These missions provided vital care to underserved communities within Central America, increasing the local population's faith in government, providing HN medical training, and fostering goodwill across

the region. In addition, JTF-B also assisted the Government of Belize in drug eradication efforts and supported U.S. Law Enforcement and military units in training the Belizean Defense Forces – providing time and space as the Belize forces continue to develop capacity.

- Finally, JTF-B conducted or directly supported a number of vital Contingency Operations, such as a high visibility mission to repatriate Central American citizens back to their home countries, supported 15 MEDEVAC missions in 2015 - including a Honduran Soldier seriously injured in a drug interdiction off the shore of Gracias a Dios, Honduras, a Search and Rescue mission of a missing American off the coast of Roatan, Honduras, as well as in the search effort for survivors of a capsized ferry off the coast of Nicaragua. JTF-B's continuing activities demonstrate U.S. commitment to CENTAM, posturing our Nation as the partner of choice and a force that will serve the people of Central America for years to come.

U.S. Army South (ARSOUTH)
Headquarters: FT Sam Houston, Texas

- **Security Cooperation:** ARSOUTH conducted 164 security cooperation events with 23 countries in U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility. These events represent both engagements and building Partner Nation capabilities with other militaries in the region.
- **Countering Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC):** ARSOUTH, with the support of the Texas Army National Guard, 72nd IBCT, conducted CTOC tactical training in Guatemala and Honduras. They also conducted information training in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. The four Mission Essential tasks trained were: Border Control Operations, Command Post Activities, Information Support to Operations, and Sustainment Operations. These training efforts contributed to the capacity-building efforts of our Partner Nations, enabling selected elements of their security forces to better focus on basic border control and security operations. U.S. Army South has supported 60 operations in the SOUTHCOM AOR, contributing to the arrest of 71 individuals including 14 HVT's, and seizure of 12.5 metric tons of cocaine and \$12.3 million. These operations have contributed to the disruption of TCO networks especially in Honduras and Guatemala.
- **Information Security Cooperation:** In addition to the CTOC training effort, ARSOUTH conducted Information engagements as a part of the Distinguished Visitor Program, Bilateral Staff Talks, and all regional Professional Development Exchanges, enabling military information capacity building in support of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Colombia, Chile and Peru.
- **Counter Terrorism:** ARSOUTH conducted 10 Subject Matter Expert Exchanges in six countries that included over 750 host nation soldiers. The engagements included: Medical, Search and Rescue, Logistics, Maintenance and Communications.
- **Civil-Military Relations:** ARSOUTH conducted Civil-Military Relations Professional Development Exchanges in Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, improving the ability of these countries to conduct inter-organizational coordination during humanitarian assistance / disaster relief operations and in countering transnational criminal organizations. These exchanges demonstrate the synergy and

value of interagency collaboration and provide an effective forum for executive-level information-sharing, both bilaterally and regionally.

- **Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP):** HAP focuses on activities which help build partner nation capacity to provide essential services to their populace, with particular emphasis on response to disasters and other crises, reinforcing citizen security, and sustaining stability in a particular country or throughout the region. ARSOUTH, as USSOUTHCOM's Executive Agent for the construction facet of HAP, completed 21 projects in 2015, and also initiated the planning for 22 future construction projects across the AOR.
- **Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI):** GPOI is a security assistance program to enhance international capacity to conduct United Nations and regional peace support operations. ARSOUTH, as USSOUTHCOM's GPOI construction executive agent, executed 14 projects in Central and South America and initiated the planning for three future projects (El Salvador and Uruguay).
- **Conference of the American Armies (CAA):** The CAA (20 member Armies, 5 observer Armies and two International Military Organizations) strengthens relationships and improves interoperability in peacekeeping and disaster relief operations through the creation and implementation of practical initiatives approved by the Army Commanders. Army South organized and led delegations representing the U.S. Army Chief of Staff at conferences on IEDs, Disaster Response, Interagency Operations and CAA Procedures in Colombia, Mexico, Brazil and Chile.
- **Exercise Beyond the Horizon (BTH):** Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Field Training Exercises were conducted in El Salvador and Panama. BTH El Salvador yielded six engineer projects and three general Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETEs), treating a total of 24,627 patients. In the El Salvador effort, over 1,760 U.S. troops participated, and the host nation provided 163 security, engineering and medical personnel. BTH Panama included an Ophthalmology specialty MEDRETE which removed 250 cataracts from pre-screened patients, while a general MEDRETE treated 4,760 local patients. Forty eight U.S. troops participated in these efforts, while the Panamanian Ministry of Health and the Panamanian National Police provided over 60 personnel for this bilateral collaborative initiative.
- **Exercise Fuerzas Aliadas – Humanitarias (FA-HUM):** This year's Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Table Top Exercise (TTX) was hosted by Honduras, to build Partner Nation capacity to respond to a major disaster and strengthen military/security force collaboration and cooperation in the region. The TTX exercised the coordination, response and integration of Honduras' SINAGER (National Risk Management System) members and other International Cooperation members. It greatly improved their ability to respond to an adverse event, activating SINAGER and national, regional, and international emergency protocols.
- **Exercise PANAMAX 2015:** This year's Joint/Combined operational exercise focused on the defense of the Panama Canal and designated ARSOUTH as HQ, Multi-National Forces-South. The Crisis Action Planning Phase had 127 participants - 82 U.S. and 45 Partner Nation personnel from 9 countries. ARSOUTH also hosted the CFLCC with Colombia as the lead country which included 62 personnel from 15 Partner Nations and 29 U.S. personnel. In addition, ARSOUTH participated in a bilateral exercise with the Government of Panama (PANAMAX–Alpha) where 20 U.S. personnel

worked with the Panamanians coordinating U.S. forces assistance during simulated security operations.

- **Exercise Integrated Advance 2015:** For 2015 Integrated Advance is a Command Post (CPX) and Field Training Exercise (FTX) focused in the Caribbean and designed to conduct combined security, peacekeeping and selected maritime operations. This Joint operational exercise focused on the interagency planning required for a U.S. response to a Caribbean Mass Migration. ARSOUTH formed the core of the JTF-MIGOPS with 127 personnel (including 52 from other military services and government agencies).

U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (USNAVSO) Headquarters: Mayport, Florida

- U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/ U.S. FOURTH Fleet (USNAVSO/FOURTHFLT) employs maritime forces in cooperative maritime security operations in order to maintain access, enhance interoperability, and build enduring partnerships that foster regional security in the USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR).
- **CONTINUING PROMISE 2015 (CP 15):** U.S. Navy Hospital Ship USNS COMFORT completed her longest and most successful CP in history, conducting mission stops in 11 partner nations (Belize, Guatemala, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador, Colombia, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Haiti) from April through September 2015. The CP-15 medical team treated 122,268 patients, including 1,255 surgeries conducted aboard the COMFORT, along with 279 surgeries conducted by the non-government organization “Operation Smile” aboard the COMFORT. The CP-15 also featured 1,285 subject matter expert exchanges, 94 engineering projects, and 85 community relations events. Almost 400 members of non-government organizations deployed as part of the CP team, which included approximately \$5.24 million dollars in donations to the 11 partner nations. CP-15 sent a strong message of U.S. commitment and partnership with the people of the Caribbean, Central and South America, and directly impacted more people in our partner nations than any other U.S. Navy mission.
- **SOUTHERN SEAS 2015 (SS 15):** Task Force 49 (TF 49), led by Commander Carrier Strike Group Nine, deployed to the USSOUTHCOM AOR, sailing around South America from the end of September through mid-December 2015. TF-49 participated in both UNITAS Pacific, hosted by Chile, and UNITAS Atlantic, hosted by Brazil. This was the largest and most capable U.S. force to participate in UNITAS in the more than 50-year history of the multi-national maritime exercise. UNITAS is the longest-running naval exercise in the world. USS GEORGE WASHINGTON also conducted multi-day bilateral exercises with the Japan Self-Defense Force, the Peruvian Navy, the Chilean Air Force, and the Brazilian Navy as well as receiving distinguished visitors from Panama, Colombia, Uruguay, Argentina, and Paraguay.
- **SOUTHERN PARTNERSHIP STATION (SPS):** SPS is a series of Navy/Marine Corps engagements focused on Theater Security Cooperation (TSC), specifically Building Partner Capacity (BPC), through Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs) with partner nation militaries and

civilian security forces. SPS engagements include Community Relations projects that focus on our partnerships, shared interests, and shared values. 2015 SPS Deployments:

- **SPS Joint High Speed Vessel 2015 (SPS JHSV 15):** USNS SPEARHEAD built partner capacity while conducting TSC engagements through the use of Adaptive Force Packages (AFPs) ashore in Belize, Guatemala, Colombia, and Honduras. The Sailors, Marines, Soldiers, Airmen, NCIS Agents, and Civilian Mariners making up the SPEARHEAD Team built upon the firm foundation of the JHSV 14 deployment, and the persistent annual presence of SPEARHEAD and the AFPs in the USSOUTHCOM AOR are reaping rewards of partnership and interoperability.
- **SPS Oceanographic 2015 (SPS OCEANO 15):** With the support of the Naval Oceanographic Office, survey ship USNS PATHFINDER conducted hydrographic surveys in the Western Caribbean, shore-based Fleet Survey Teams conducted hydrographic surveys in coastal waters of Peru, Honduras, and Jamaica, and a Light Detection and Ranging aircraft and crew conducted hydrographic surveys in the coastal waters of Honduras. All SPS OCEANO surveys are conducted with the assistance of partner nation personnel and equipment, and support USSOUTHCOM's Oceanographic, Hydrographic, and Bathymetric Program and the Chief of Naval Operations Global Maritime Partnership Initiative. All hydrographic survey and environmental assessment data is shared to enable safe and effective maritime navigation and access to the littoral for naval and joint forces.
- **Operation MARTILLO:** Two frigates, one destroyer, one coastal patrol ship, JHSV SPEARHEAD, four fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft squadrons, and one scientific development squadron detachment deployed to support Operation MARTILLO, conducting D&M Operations under the tactical control of Joint Interagency Task Force South, targeting illicit trafficking routes in the waters off Central America.
- **USS COLUMBUS:** The Los Angeles-class fast attack submarine deployed to the USSOUTHCOM AOR. COLUMBUS visited U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and made two Panama Canal transits.
- **PANAMAX 2015:** Chile served as Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC) for the annual PANAMAX Exercise, which exercises defense of the approaches to the Panama Canal. Chile led a multinational staff of more than 50 military and civilian personnel from 16 Partner Nations (including the U.S.), all based at USNAVSO/FOURTHFLT Headquarters in Mayport. In this year's PANAMAX, the CFMCC staff worked through the Navy Planning Process to produce a Concept of Operations (CONOP) with notional forces, for presentation to the Combined Joint Task Force led by U.S. Army South. Now in its 13th year, PANAMAX focuses on ensuring the defense of the Panama Canal, increasing multinational force interoperability while supporting the training requirements of all participating nations' civil and military services.

12th Air Force (Air Forces Southern)
Headquarters: Davis-Monthan AFB, Tucson, Arizona

- **Security Cooperation:** Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces Southern) (hereafter AFSOUTH) led 50 security cooperation events in 11 USSOUTHCOM partner nations. Engagements focused on countering transnational organized crime, communications, aircraft operations and maintenance, ISR, space, cyberspace security, safety, command and control, space capabilities, aerospace medicine, air evacuation, expeditionary medicine, information sharing, mobility, Future Engagement Talks, logistics, aircrew search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The 571st Mobility Support Advisory Squadron completed 19 air advisor events in Belize, Brazil, Colombia, Curacao, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, and Peru, training 417 partner nation military members.
- **Legal:** The AFSOUTH Staff Judge Advocate promoted Law of Armed Conflict adherence and Human Rights Law in 9 legal engagement activities with Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, and Trinidad & Tobago.
- **Airlift Missions:** AFSOUTH executed 85 theater airlift missions, moving more than 4,267 passengers and 406 tons of cargo throughout USSOUTHCOM's area of responsibility.
- **System of Cooperation among the American Air Forces (SICOFAA):** SICOFAA strengthens relationships and improves interoperability in peacekeeping and disaster relief operations through the creation and implementation of practical initiatives approved by the Commanders of the 20 SICOFAA member Air Forces and the 5 observer Air Forces. USAF Chief of Staff and the 12 AF (AFSOUTH) Commander participated in the annual American Air Chiefs Summit (CONJEFAMER) in Mexico City in June 2015. Delegates from USAF and AFSOUTH participated in five SICOFAA committee meetings and the CONJEFAMER planning conference.
- **Medical Support:** AFSOUTH provided medical planning and oversight of detainee movement operations and forward operating location missions; delivered operational health expertise and steady-state planning for contingency and real world operations across USSOUTHCOM AOR; supplied counterdrug operations medical guidance and planning support; and coordinated USAF medical engagements for New Horizons and Beyond the Horizon exercises. Surgeon General provided Crisis Action Team support for PANAMAX and Integrated Advance. AFSOUTH International Health Specialists conducted 15 Theater Security Cooperation global health engagements with partner nations addressing flight medicine, air evacuation, force health protection, and expeditionary medicine advancing regional collaboration across the aerospace medicine enterprise.
- **NEW HORIZONS 2015 (Honduras):** AFSOUTH trained 120 US military personnel in this joint exercise. Engineering personnel constructed one new 1400 square foot school and drilled two water wells supporting 3,000 Honduran citizens. During the exercise, deployed medical personnel not only provided care for US members, but also volunteered their medical capabilities to the local hospital emergency room by treating 678 Honduran civilians and providing over 100 surgery consults. Additionally, deployed communications support personnel wired the local hospital offices

for internet capability. International Health Specialists conducted a 12 day infectious disease assessment for the local Ministry of Health and provided a final report with recommendations to improve local health conditions.

- **ISR:** AFSOUTH provided command and control for ISR missions in support of USSOUTHCOM priorities. AFSOUTH executed 939 ISR missions and 5,423 flight hours, resulting in over 4,544 images and nearly 9,235 minutes of video. This information assisted in numerous drug trafficking seizures in the SOUTHCOM AOR by the United States and its partner nations in FY15. AFSOUTH continues to assist critical partner nations in counter-drug/counter-narcotics trafficking efforts and is currently working to enable Air Force operational and ISR capability in both Guatemala and Honduras. AFSOUTH assists both Colombia and Peru in maintaining the strategic initiative against illegally-armed combatants who previously threatened the very existence of those nations.

Marine Corps Forces South (MARFORSOUTH)

Headquarters: Doral, Florida

- **Theater Security Cooperation:** In 2015, MARFORSOUTH completed more than 120 Security Cooperation events in 21 countries. This resulted in over 750 Partner Nation Marine Corps and Defense Force personnel trained. While continuing to foster long-term relationships based on mutual respect and common values, MARFORSOUTH conducted a variety of key leader engagements throughout the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility that reinforced our commitment to partner nation leadership. To meet shared security objectives in combatting transnational organized crime, MARFORSOUTH delivered tailor-made training to our partners by establishing persistent presence security cooperation teams in Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. This was training often conducted hand-in-hand with our Colombian Marine Corps partners through the U.S./Colombia Action Plan.
- **SPMAGTF-SC-15:** From June to November 2015, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South deployed Special-Purpose Marine, Air, Ground Task Force-SOUTHCOM (SPMAGTF-SC) to Central America. Leveraging a force one-tenth the size of those in CENTCOM and AFRICOM, SPMAGTF-SC temporarily deployed to one of the most austere locations in Honduras to provide support to partner nation militaries and populations living in extreme poverty and at the highest risk for involvement in illicit activities. Using SPMAGTF-organic aircraft and engineering support, Marines and Sailors throughout Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Belize focused on building and maintaining partnership capacity through shared values, challenges, and responsibility. The Marines built three schools, improved a partner nation military airfield, and provided essential water services to those in need. This force was instrumental in bringing together the national level government of Honduras with remote populations mostly segregated by terrain, expanding governance and visibility on key issues in the region.
- **SPS-JHSV 15 – Marine Detachment (MARDET):** MARFORSOUTH deployed 35 Marines and Sailors to Guatemala and Honduras in support of U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/U.S. Fourth Fleet's Southern Partnership Station (SPS) initiative. The MARDET provided engineer support to

the SPS mission and met emergent requirements under OPERATION ESCUDO UNIDO. This is the first iteration of SPS that included a USMC Deputy Mission Commander, who was an integral part of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command's C2 structure for the mission. 32 of the engineers supported airfield construction at Mocoron in Gracias a Dios, as well as humanitarian construction assistance and water purification projects in the area.

- **TRADEWINDS Phase II (Ground):** In June 2015, MARFORSOUTH, in partnership with the Belize Defence Force, Canada, and 17 other partner nations from the Caribbean Region, executed Exercise Tradewinds 2015 Phase II (Ground), a combined Field Training Exercise (FTX) in Belize, in order to enhance combined Counter Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC) operations capability and promote interoperability and multinational relationships throughout the theater. There were over 400 participants in the Belize-hosted, MARFORSOUTH-led ground portion of the exercise that accomplished the capacity building exercise through five distinct exercise tracks in a Subject Matter Expert Exchange (SMEE). The tracks included nine days of interoperability training in command and control, jungle tactics, military support to law enforcement, instinctive shooting, and riverine skills. Of note, Tradewinds 2015 facilitated the positive increase of mil-to-mil relationships between Mexico and Belize that resulted in training and cooperation that was exclusive of the exercise and enhances the border security of both nations.
- **MLAC-15:** In August 2015 U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South executed the Marine Leaders of the Americas Conference in Cartagena, Colombia to increase professional exchanges and strengthen relations among naval infantry forces within the Western Hemisphere. This sixth iteration was co-hosted by Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command on behalf of the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South and the Infanteria de Marina de Colombia. This event provided the Commandant of the Marine Corps with an opportunity to meet and engage senior Marine Corps and naval infantry leaders from 15 partner nations.
- **UNITAS AMPHIBIOUS 2015:** From 14-25 November 2015, approximately 1,000 representatives from Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and the United States participated in UNITAS Amphibious 2015, a combined Field Training Exercise in the vicinity of the Ilha do Governador and Ilha da Marambaia, Brazil, in order to enhance interoperability in Amphibious Operations, and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions. The U.S.-sponsored exercise, UA 2015, develops and sustains relationships- which improve the capacity of our PN security forces to achieve common desired regional goals. This annual exercise fosters friendly cooperation and understanding among all participating forces.
- **Security Augmentation Force (SAF):** The SAF is MARFORSOUTH's designated company of Marines that reinforces Diplomatic Missions in the AOR, as required in support of 'New Normal' requirements. In close coordination with Department of State, the SAF is postured in CONUS should an Ambassador decide that the local guard force is unwilling, unable, or insufficient to provide security to his mission. While there are currently no high threat posts in the AOR, the potential for a natural disaster is possible for some Embassy locations. MARFORSOUTH deploys its Marine Liaison Element to visit each Embassy, solidifies plans of action with the Country Team, and captures relevant information that will enable SAF in rapidly responding to crisis.

Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH)
Headquarters: Homestead, Florida

- **Building Partner Capacity:** SOCSOUTH elements worked with Partner Nation units in Belize, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Guyana, Panama, and Peru to improve their capacity to conduct ground and maritime interdiction, broaden and reinforce their civil affairs programs, engage in Military Information Support Operations (MISO), and develop their intelligence capacities. Through active engagement, SOCSOUTH helped Partner Nations develop self-sustaining capabilities to better protect themselves, contribute to regional security and stability, and collaborate with U.S. and other forces.
 - SOCSOUTH used episodic engagements-including 26 Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) events--with multiple Central American, South American, and Caribbean partners to develop U.S. forces' skills and enhance Partner Nation interoperability.
 - In Brazil, SOCSOUTH JCETs allowed U.S. and Brazilian counter-terrorism forces to share best practices for operating in a range of complex environments and assisted the Brazilians' capacity building efforts in preparation for the upcoming Olympic Games.
 - In Colombia and Peru, SOCSOUTH continued to partner with these Andean Ridge nations as they confronted narco-terrorist insurgencies and global illicit trafficking networks. Colombia's enhanced capacity is a significant supporting element of that nation's ongoing peace process.
 - In Honduras, SOCSOUTH teams and Colombian counterparts continued to help train National Police officers of the TIGRES special response unit as part of expanded U.S. support to Honduran authorities as they confront sources of insecurity in urban and remote rural areas.
 - In Belize, El Salvador, and Guatemala, SOCSOUTH teams engaged the Partner Nation in cooperative activities to reinforce their Naval Special Forces maritime interdiction capabilities. Guatemalan and Salvadoran Naval Special Forces conducted seven major maritime interdiction operations in support of Joint Interagency Task Force-South's (JIATF-S) multinational collaborative efforts against regional illicit traffickers.
- **Civil Affairs:** In 2015, 14 civil affairs teams and civil-military support elements engaged eight Partner Nations as they worked to enhance civil-military relations, reduce the vulnerability of key populations impacted by transnational organized crime or violent extremism, and improve/extend governance in underserved regions.
- **Military Information Support Operations:** SOCSOUTH maintained military information support teams in six Partner Nations supporting Colombia's Demobilization and Counter-Recruitment Programs, Guatemalan Interagency Task Forces, Panamanian security services' outreach programs in the Darien border region, the global DoD Rewards Program, and U.S. Government Anti-Trafficking in Persons efforts. These activities supported a broad range of efforts against transnational organized criminal and violent extremist organizations.

- **Intelligence Analytical Support to U.S. Country Teams:** SOCSOUTH provided support to U.S. Country Teams efforts focused on terrorism, human smuggling networks, and transnational organized crime.
 - SOCSOUTH helped develop host nation capabilities and country team support through a number of subject matter exchanges.
 - SOCSOUTH supported multiple U.S. Country Team and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) collaborations with Partner Nations, with emphasis on countering Special Interest Aliens involved in cross-border criminal activities.
- **Building Intellectual Capital:** SOCSOUTH, in conjunction with the Colombian Joint Staff College, conducted six Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)-funded seminars in Bogota, Colombia during 2015. Subject-matter expert presenters from the U.S., Colombia, and other nations collaborated with hundreds of participants from 18 Western Hemisphere and NATO countries. Late in the year, SOCSOUTH worked with Partner Nation defense and security institutions in El Salvador to build a complementary regional CTFP series in that country.
- **FUERZAS COMANDO 2015:** FUERZAS COMANDO is a USSOUTHCOM-sponsored, SOCSOUTH-executed multinational exercise featuring a Special Operations skills competition and a Senior Leader Seminar designed to promote military-to-military relationships, increased interoperability, and improved regional security. Approximately 700 military, law enforcement, and civilian personnel took part. The 2015 skills competition was held in Poptun, Guatemala and included participation by 18 Partner Nations and the United States. In the city of Antigua, distinguished representatives from each nation discussed approaches to combating terrorism, organized crime, and illicit trafficking at the Senior Leader Seminar.
- **FUSED RESPONSE 2015:** SOCSOUTH executes an annual CJCS-directed exercise to validate time sensitive crisis action planning, as well as training, readiness, interoperability and capability of Special Operations Forces in support of regional crises and contingencies. FUSED RESPONSE 2015 was a Joint and Combined exercise held across several locations in Honduras. U.S. military and civilian personnel and aircraft operated with their Honduran counterparts to refine rapid crisis response procedures and learn from each other's best practices.
- **PANAMAX 2015:** In this annual USSOUTHCOM-sponsored, 19-nation exercise, regional forces support the Government of Panama as it protects safe passage through the Panama Canal, ensures its neutrality, and preserves its national sovereignty. SOCSOUTH took part as a member of the multinational Special Operations team led by Brazil.
- **GATOR AIDE 2015:** Exercise GATOR AIDE is a Personnel Recovery exercise designed to validate USSOUTHCOM's non-conventional assisted recovery capabilities. SOCSOUTH worked with U.S. interagency partners to enhance each other's readiness to prepare for, plan, and conduct specialized search and rescue operations throughout the region.