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SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN AFRICA

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Testimony
of
Assistant Secretary Linda Thomas-Greenfield
Bureau of African Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy
June 4, 2015

“Security Assistance to Africa”

Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify at this important hearing on security assistance to Africa. Thank you also for asking my colleagues from the Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and the Department of Defense to join me at the witness table. Our partnership and coordination are essential to any success.

Support to U.S. Strategic Interests

Given state fragility, conflict, and transnational security issues, the promotion of peace and security in Africa remains one of the United States’ highest priorities, and is critical to attainment of our democracy and governance, economic, and development goals. We are actively pursuing policies of partnership and ways to promote solutions that yield long-term results. In Fiscal

Year 2014, the Department of State committed approximately \$496 million in bilateral peace and security assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa. Resources are used to support conflict prevention and mitigation, atrocity prevention, stabilization operations, security sector reform, peacekeeping operations, targeted counterterrorism and counter-narcotics initiatives, counter wildlife trafficking, nonproliferation, conventional weapons destruction, and maritime safety and security programs throughout the region. With the overarching goal of helping our African partners, our security policy addresses three broad priorities: peacekeeping and the prevention of additional conflicts, strengthening the security sector in partner states, and countering terrorism and other transnational threats.

Through our bilateral and regional relationships as well as through our engagement in the UN Security Council, we are focused on enhancing the capabilities of our African partners to prevent and respond to crises. And as much as our approach encompasses traditional security sector partnerships, it also reflects a commitment to integrated security, to include women in the military and in the military's relationship with communities because it is accompanied by strategic initiatives that engage communities keeping and maintaining peace.

The Administration remains committed to building African peacekeeping capacity at the regional, sub-regional, and national levels, including through the provision of advisors, training, equipment, and other assistance. Peacekeeping

operations in Mali, the Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan contribute to stability within the respective sub-regions, as well as the entire continent. In South Sudan, the UN peacekeeping operation saved tens of thousands of lives since conflict erupted in December 2013, by taking the unprecedented step of allowing vulnerable civilians to shelter in its bases. More than 130,000 civilians continue to shelter at UN compounds across South Sudan. We will continue to build the capacity of African military and police peacekeepers through programs like the International Police Peacekeeping Operations Support (IPPOS) program, the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), and the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, which is primarily funded through GPOI. These initiatives, along with the new and complementary African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP), which focuses on strengthening critical gaps in rapid response capabilities, are critical for the long-term success of peace building in Africa.

Through the Early Warning and Response Partnership (EWARP), a Presidential initiative announced at the August 2014 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, we will continue to develop a full-spectrum of crisis management capabilities and strengthen the capacity of West African states and the African Union to not only improve their response mechanisms once a crisis develops, but to also proactively

identify and prevent crises in a more pro-active manner. Through consultations with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United States Mission to The African Union (USAU), and an extensive needs assessment, State and USAID have identified concrete lines of effort to be implemented over the next five years which meet U.S. objectives, respond to ECOWAS and African Union requests, and will enhance the long term early warning and response assets and capabilities of ECOWAS, its 15 member states and the African Union.

In the African context, we know that cooperating with and strengthening our partners' security institutions is a critical element, along with civilian assistance, of achieving our shared peace and security goals. That's why President Obama launched the Security Governance Initiative (SGI) at the U.S-Africa Leaders Summit last August. SGI is a multi-year effort that will initially focus on six partner countries – Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Tunisia. SGI provides us the opportunity to support partners to improve the management and accountability of the justice and security sectors, which are linked to their ability to more effectively and efficiently deliver security and justice to citizens. Through SGI we work together with partner countries to identify priority focus areas that will have a significant impact on citizen security and to jointly develop objectives and intended outcomes from the SGI partnership. SGI features a more holistic interagency approach for assisting our partners to more strategically and

comprehensively address shared security challenges and emerging threats. SGI also emphasizes the importance of joint assessment and analysis to ensure that partner countries are actively engaged in identifying the security governance challenges and opportunities that shape SGI engagement.

The continued violence perpetrated by al-Shabaab, al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, and other terrorist groups is concerning. In too many places the aspirations of Africa's young people are thwarted by political instability, armed conflict, and violent extremism. The al-Shabaab attack on Garissa University College in Kenya is a recent example of the horrific brutality of these violent extremists, where young people who were pursuing an education in hopes of contributing to their communities and their country, were targeted and killed. We are strongly committed to assisting African countries to increase their capacity to address the immediate threats posed by terrorist organizations and to prevent terrorists from using the region to recruit, seek sanctuary, or secure resources and financing.

We are pursuing these goals primarily through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PRACT). These programs mobilize resources and expertise from multiple U.S. government agencies to assist our African partners in building security sector capacity, extending effective government control over

remote areas terrorists may seek to exploit as safe havens, addressing the underlying causes of radicalization, and increasing the capacity of moderate leaders to positively influence populations that could be vulnerable to radicalization. Programming has strengthened the ability of partners to collect and analyze intelligence, support longer range patrolling, and understand strategies required to counter the violent extremist message.

Other transnational issues such as drug trafficking, maritime crime, and wildlife trafficking are key issues that also demand attention. U.S. programming in all these areas focuses on increasing national capacity and promoting regional cooperation. Through U.S. assistance, African partners will be better able to adhere to international commitments and contribute to global security. On Gulf of Guinea maritime security, I appreciate the resolution you sponsored last Congress, Mr. Chairman, condemning maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea. We continue to work with our international partners to support our African colleagues in their effort to implement the Yaoundé Process out of the 2013 West and Central African States' Maritime Summit in Cameroon.

Finally, as I noted during my confirmation hearing in 2013, “governments that respect human rights, including women’s rights, and democratic norms make stronger and more stable partners for economic growth, development, peace, and prosperity.” This remains a critical issue for me. We continue to encourage

security services to respect human rights and hold violators of human rights accountable, because doing so promotes the legitimacy of these services, improves the rule of law, and undermines extremist rhetoric calling on people to seek alternative justice. Additionally, as expressly targeted through SGI, our programs focus on developing accountability and oversight to mitigate corruption and bolster citizen input to the security system.

Effectiveness of U.S. Security Assistance

While the full impact of U.S. security assistance to help build the military, police, and other security service capacity of Sub-Saharan African countries may not be fully apparent for a generation, a persistent investment does provide near-term successes and will provide long-term effects. Our assistance aims to contribute toward building the indigenous military and police capacity of our African partners to ensure a more professional security apparatus that respects civilian control and human rights. Those professional African forces are critical to support our security policy interests on the continent.

Conflict in Africa threatens U.S. national security interests. Nowhere is that more evident than in the Horn of Africa. Our engagement in Somalia, where we have supported the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in their efforts to stabilize the country and expand the reach

of legitimate governance is a sign of our commitment to addressing conflict in the region. The success of AMISOM in reducing the territory held by al-Shabaab and stabilizing the Government of Somalia has come after years of investment from the international community in equipment, advisory support, and pre-deployment training. AMISOM has played a pivotal role, but long-term stability in Somalia depends on the creation of capable and regionally representative national security forces and a stronger Somali National Army. The Somali National Army is in its formative stages today, but the integration of regional security forces into the National Army in parallel with the political reconciliation will help bolster security to all regions of the country.

We cannot prevent every terrorist attack, but we can ensure that states are better prepared to work together and respond. For example, in 2012 and 2013, African forces – many of them U.S.-trained – responded to the crisis in Mali created by an internal conflict, coup d’etat, and the seizure of territory by terrorists, working alongside the French military to push back AQIM from safe havens in northern Mali. The intervention left AQIM scattered, fractured, and demoralized. And then, in 2013, the Malians took to the polls in a democratic election – an election that was a powerful rebuke to the restrictive rule and violent extremist ideology that AQIM and its allies imposed.

In addition, U.S. programming addresses new and present threats to stability and security in Africa. For example, IEDs used by Boko Haram pose an increasingly deadly threat to Nigeria and its neighbors. The U.S. stands out as the only donor partner providing counter-IED training to the law enforcement community and security forces in Nigeria, and we have found that this training has been paying dividends. Upon returning from Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) training, Post-Blast Investigation and Explosive Incident Countermeasure students recommended more practical exercises to their academy leadership for bomb technician training and worked with ATA to develop train-the-trainer curriculum to foster sustainable counter-IED capabilities for Nigerian security forces.

U.S. support for African Union-led efforts to counter the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is another good example of how we can leverage our involvement to enhance regional cooperation and capacity to counter cross-border threats. Prior to the transition to DoD funds in late FY 2012, State provided approximately \$57 million in State Department funds, primarily to support Uganda's ability to counter the LRA. As part of holistic support from State, DoD, and USAID and working in an extremely difficult operating environment across three countries, the forces of the AU Regional Task Force, national security forces, and LRA-affected communities, local and regional actors have significantly degraded the LRA's

capabilities, increased defections, and improved protection and resilience of local communities.

U.S support for the criminal justice sector in Africa, including for police and the courts, has registered successes as well. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a U.S.-funded project has helped to improve the investigation and prosecution of cases of sexual and gender-based violence. It trains police officers and investigators with doctors and lawyers, helping them to understand the terms and procedures that each uses in an instance of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), facilitating coordination between them. As a result, police, doctors, and prosecutors have formed networks in their own communities to better address and process SGBV cases.

In the Central African Republic, the Department is supporting the re-establishment of criminal justice institutions with training, technical assistance, and basic equipment for police, gendarmerie, investigators, prosecutors, judicial staff, and corrections officers. We are already seeing success. U.S. technical assistance, equipment, and support are aiding the investigation and preparation of more than 50 cases for the upcoming Criminal Court Session, the first for Bangui in more than two years. The Court session will enable dozens of individuals and parties to obtain a long-needed decision of justice on their cases.

Security sector reform efforts in Liberia have also borne fruit. The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and the Liberian National Police (LNP) – were both largely rebuilt from the ground up following the devastating civil war. Both of these institutions are now preparing for the withdrawal of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and currently provide for nearly all internal security requirements in Liberia. The LNP has proven capable of providing internal security under normal conditions and also during some unexpected and extraordinary ones, including the Ebola outbreak. Timely training, equipping, and mentorship of civilian law enforcement enabled the LNP to maintain security during the outbreak. Throughout the crisis, the LNP showed its increasing competency by using force judiciously, increasing community participation, and generally de-escalating conflict as it occurred.

With the urging of the United States, the Government of Liberia has removed corrupt and obstructive senior officials within the LNP and the Liberian Drug Enforcement Agency (LDEA), and replaced them with honest and professional officers. These important steps have led to key reforms and progress in organizational development and capacity within both organizations. As part of the U.S. West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative (WACSI), U.S. assistance also resulted in the first meaningful Liberian Drug Law and DEA Act being signed into law by President Johnson-Sirleaf. Both pieces of legislation are ground

breaking in their scope and aim to prevent Liberia from becoming a trans-shipment location or target destination for international narcotics traffickers. The United States has similarly supported specialized law enforcement units that are disrupting drug networks and other illicit trafficking across West Africa, including operationalizing a Transnational Crime Unit in Liberia and in neighboring Sierra Leone and creating Sensitive Investigations Units (SIU) in Ghana and Nigeria.

We continue working to increase African states' institutional capacity to analyze transnational organized crime trends, cooperate across borders, and conduct thorough investigations that facilitate prosecutions. As a result of U.S. assistance, several African states have joined the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, which encourages successful prosecutions and successful information sharing resulting in assets forfeited. Our Regional Training Center (RTC) in Accra has trained over 2,000 officials since its inception in 2011, and recent evaluation findings indicate that nearly 40 percent of respondents reported cooperating with fellow RTC alumni across borders, as well as nearly 60 percent reporting that use of skills learned at the RTC has resulted in successful criminal prosecutions in their countries. We receive letters and emails from individuals sharing these successes as well, such as a female police officer from Ghana who listed the various RTC-taught skills and technological approaches she used to conduct a successful anti-human trafficking operation. We are encouraged to see

such tangible results from a program that is less than five years old, and will use this feedback to continue adjusting and improving our training approaches.

Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations

The Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, largely funded by GPOI, is critical to our effort to build peace operations capacity among African partners. ACOTA provides training to contingents deploying to UN and AU operations, while building the capacity of our African partners to take over training themselves. Of the 26 current ACOTA partners, 22 are currently engaged in UN and AU peace support operations. ACOTA has trained and deployed approximately a quarter of a million military peacekeepers since 2003 and continues to be the premier pre-deployment program by training 77 battalions per year. In addition, U.S. Africa Command has conducted specialized and critically needed peacekeeping training for several GPOI partner countries in Africa, including but not limited to logistics, higher level staff, counter-IED, and gender in peace operations training.

The important role of policing and rule of law in peacekeeping and stabilization operations in Africa and the need to fill a critical gap there cannot be overstated. Since 2010, the United States, through the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs' (INL) IPPOS

program, has trained 5,619 police (35 Formed Police Units (FPU) and 699 Individual Police Officers (IPOs) for deployments to five UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, including Darfur, Liberia, South Sudan, Mali, and the Central African Republic. The African Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) who have benefited from IPPOS training assistance include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon Ghana, Togo, and Senegal.

African countries have made clear that rapidly responding to crises is at the top of their peace and security agenda. As mentioned earlier in the testimony, APRRP is a new investment of \$110 million to build the capacity of African forces to deploy peacekeepers rapidly in response to emerging conflicts. Such rapid deployments are critical to saving lives amidst emerging crises.

APRRP builds on our longstanding commitment to developing partner capacity to support African countries and regional organizations to meet the challenges they face. The United States will initially partner with six countries—Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda—to develop a rapid response capability program. This program will focus on improving capacity in areas such as mission management, transportation, equipment maintenance and repair, logistics, engineering, and interoperability with other Africa-based peacekeeping forces. Under this program, African partner nations will commit to

maintaining forces and equipment ready to rapidly deploy as part of UN or AU missions seeking to respond to emerging crises.

I look forward to hearing from my colleagues, listening to your insights, and consulting you further as we address these serious security issues. Thank you for your invitation, and for your consideration and support.

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Testimony
of
Assistant Secretary Puneet Talwar
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy
June 4, 2015

“Security Assistance to Africa”

Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for allowing me to speak with you today about security assistance in Africa. I commend the Committee for its focus on this critical topic. Thank you also for inviting my colleagues from the Department of State’s African Affairs Bureau and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Our teams work hand-in-hand to help our partners in Africa manage security and stability problems.

My statement will discuss the nature of security challenges in Africa, how U.S. security assistance addresses these problems, how different agencies in the U.S. government work together to plan and implement security assistance in Africa, how we measure the impact of our assistance, and our requests of Congress moving forward.

Security Challenges in Africa

We have made substantial progress addressing instability in Africa over the last decade. Our African partners are increasingly taking charge of their own security. We welcome these efforts to provide African solutions to African security challenges.

However, significant and complex security challenges remain. Conflict persists in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Somalia, and South Sudan. Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram threaten the regional and international order. Many African countries have difficulty monitoring their maritime domain, leading to piracy and other significant economic and security threats. Narcotics trafficking fuels corruption and undermine governments. And while some sub-Saharan African countries have achieved rapid economic growth in recent years, nearly 70 percent of sub-Saharan Africans live in extreme poverty – contributing to

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insecurity by feeding the desperation that can drive individuals toward crime and terrorism.

All of these problems point to the need for strong government institutions. We are committed to helping our African partners build institutions and reform security sectors, so that they can manage these challenges over the long-term.

Goals for U.S. Security Assistance in Africa

We want to work closely with you to achieve four main goals:

- First, we want to continue strong support for support peacekeeping operations throughout Africa, including in the Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. We provide urgently needed logistics support, training and equipment for African troops participating in these missions. We also build the long-term peacekeeping capabilities of our African partners through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and the new Africa Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP) – or “A-PREP” for short.
- Second, we want to build the military capabilities of our partners to conduct counterterrorism operations. Through the Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for East Africa Counterterrorism (PRACT), we provide counter-terrorism training and equipment to African militaries in East and West Africa.
- Third, we support the professionalization efforts of African militaries with training and advisory support, including through the Security and Governance Initiative (SGI) and the African Military Education Program (AMEP). Through our educational programs, we are helping to build African military forces that have a greater respect for human rights, the rule of law, and civilian control of the military.
- And fourth, we help African partners police their maritime domain and combat other transnational threats like poaching. Our Africa Maritime Security Initiative (AMSI) and Africa Conflict and Stabilization Border Security (ACSBS) programs, respectively, provide training to select African security forces to police their maritime borders and counter poaching.

Formulating, Planning, and Implementing Security Assistance in Africa

The Departments of State and Defense work closely to formulate, plan and implement security assistance in Africa. The Presidential Policy Directive on Security Sector Assistance (PPD-23), released by the Administration in 2013, guides this process. The directive mandates an inclusive, deliberate, whole-of-government approach to U.S. security sector assistance, which aligns activities and resources with our national security priorities. The directive calls for transparency and coordination across the U.S. government to develop long-term strategies for security sector assistance, which build the capacity of our partners in a way that is strategic and sustainable.

In real terms, this means that our planning process begins with the Joint Regional Strategy, which are strategic plans developed in Washington by regional bureaus in consultation with functional bureaus and our missions abroad. Under the Joint Regional Strategy, each mission creates an Integrated Country Strategy, which includes input from other agencies at posts and in Washington. These strategies outline the U.S. government's goals and objectives in a particular country and region.

Based on the goals and objectives of the Joint Regional Strategy, the Integrated Country Strategy, and Department of Defense theater campaign plans, the Department of Defense develops recommendations for most security assistance programs, and submits them to the Department of State for consideration. My bureau then convenes annual roundtables on security assistance each spring. At these roundtables, State Department and interagency counterparts come together to discuss the needs of a particular region and the status of existing programs. These roundtables inform our resourcing requests, which we coordinate with our regional bureau counterparts and submit to the Department of State's Office of Foreign Assistance for consideration. This process ultimately yields the requests submitted to the Office of Management and Budget and later to Congress.

Within the State Department, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) manages for of the main security assistance accounts: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, and the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) – the last of which DoD and my bureau co-manage.

Proposals for specific programs are developed and coordinated in different ways, through mechanisms that are both formal and informal. GPOI, APRRP, TSCTP and PRACT program proposals – funded by PKO – are developed through cables and proposal forms. For TSCTP -- DoD, State and USAID participate in an annual conference to ensure effective coordination. Proposals for GSCF programs originate from Combatant Commands, Posts, and State and Defense senior leadership.

Coordination with DoD on Africa security assistance is perhaps most important in the counterterrorism (CT) realm, where DoD has its own authorities but still requires State concurrence. My bureau works closely with the relevant regional bureau and the Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) to ensure a consolidated State position. In considering whether to support DoD proposals for counterterrorism assistance, State examines whether the assistance is consistent with foreign policy and is complementary with State's programs.

Security assistance in Africa is implemented through DoD, through contracts managed by State, or some combination of the two. While State has the overall policy lead on FMF and IMET, both accounts are currently implemented entirely by DoD.

For PKO-funded programs, the State Department determines the most efficient mechanism for implementing programs, based on assessments of cost, timeliness, host government preferences, and the implementer's capabilities. Possible options for implementation include DoD, State Department contracts, and grantee organizations.

GPOI programs are implemented either through the State -managed Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, or through U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). USAFRICOM will also serve as the primary implementer for APRRP activities.

The TSCTP program is the best example of a hybrid approach to implementation – the bulk of equipment and training for new equipment is implemented through State contracts, while skills-based training activities are generally implemented through DoD.

For GSCF, an authority that permits State and DoD to pool funding and expertise to address emergent and urgent challenges in the security and justice sectors, State and DoD jointly formulate, fund, implement, and evaluate programs.

The Impact of Assistance in Africa

The State Department measures the impact of our security assistance in Africa through a variety of mechanisms. We are working to develop a monitoring and evaluation program for FMF and IMET programs worldwide. Right now, our embassy country teams formally track IMET graduates that are in “Positions of Prominence” (such as General Officers and Chiefs of Defense). This allows State and DoD to maintain relationships with military leaders that understand the United States and appreciate the emphasis we place on professionalization, civilian control of the military, respect for human rights, and success on the battlefield.

For PKO, the State Department generally relies on contractors to implement monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities by program. We currently have M&E efforts ongoing for the GPOI, TSCTP, and PRACT programs. Since the inception of GPOI, for example, my bureau has contracted a metrics and evaluation team. This team collects extensive data to enable our program management office to track outputs, outcomes, and other performance-related measures. PM is working with AF to develop M&E programs for the other PKO funded programs.

Similar to PKO, State and the Defense Department contract out to a third-party to conduct M&E for GSCF projects. As GSCF is a new program, M&E efforts are still in the nascent stages.

I would like to take a minute to highlight a few examples of our successes across the continent.

The GPOI program’s capacity building efforts are enabling partner countries to train, sustain, and deploy peacekeepers. We have worked hand-in-hand with our African partners to develop instruction programs and training centers. Our progress is most evident among the six APRRP countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda), all of which are GPOI partners, and represent some of the most capable peacekeeping contributors on the continent. Ethiopia, for example, is the largest single contributor of peacekeepers in the world, deploying a critical stabilizing force into the contested Abyei region

between South Sudan, as well as providing peacekeepers to missions in South Sudan, the Darfur region of Sudan, and Somalia. Similarly, Tanzania responded to an urgent request for forces to establish the Force Intervention Brigade to strengthen the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This force has played an integral role in enhancing civilian security and helping stabilize the eastern DRC.

In response to the 2013 insurgency in Mali, we provided food, fuel and water to help African troops operate in the harsh desert environment. We did this within a month of African peacekeepers arriving in country.

For a relatively small amount of funding, the United States provided airlift and refueling services for French counterterrorism operations across the Sahel. The U.S. government has spent roughly \$3.5 million per month to support the French. The Defense Department estimates that conducting these operations on our own would cost \$120 million per month. While the situation on the ground remains challenging, French operations helped create the conditions for last month's signing of Mali's peace agreement by the government and some armed groups. This is an important step on the path towards sustainable peace, and we are watching closely as talks continue. Bolstering this fragile effort to ensure peace remains the best hope for long-term stability in the region.

For the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership program, we are providing critical training and equipment capabilities to directly help partner nations actively fighting the terrorist threats in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel. We recently provided 850 sets of body armor to Cameroonian forces that are actively fighting Boko Haram on their borders. This protective equipment helps to limit the number of casualties that Cameroonian military forces are incurring, inherently fostering a greater willingness among these forces to more robustly execute mission tasks.

In Somalia, we have spent over \$430 million in PKO funds to provide logistics support, training, equipment and advisory support for African troops participating in the African Union Mission in Somalia. Since AMISOM first deployed in 2007, the force has grown from 4,000 troops to over 22,000 and has made tremendous strides in the past several years by bringing Mogadishu and other key urban areas (such as Baidoa, Beletweyne, and Kismaayo) under its control, in cooperation with the emerging Somali National Army (SNA). Most recently, Operation Indian Ocean, a joint-AMISOM-SNA offensive, succeeded in liberating Baarawe, the last major al-Shabaab stronghold in the country.

Sustaining our Assistance

One of our foremost challenges is sustaining counterterrorism programs, and for that we seek your support. Major procurements – such as aircraft – often require years of sustainment, including spare parts and follow-on operational and maintenance training. The costs of sustainment are generally much more than the initial investment. While State Department funds, such as FMF, can be used to sustain major systems in Africa, we do not have sufficient funding to do so. Accordingly, we ask for a \$9 million increase in FMF for Africa counter-terrorism sustainment, which we requested in FY16. This extra funding – while critical -- will not sustain all of our programs, and we are working with the Defense to address this problem.

Conclusion

More than ever before, we share security responsibilities with other nations to help address security challenges in their countries and regions, whether fighting alongside our forces; countering terrorist and international criminal networks; participating in international peacekeeping operations; or building institutions capable of maintaining security, law, and order. While we have enjoyed broad support from Congress on security assistance in Africa, I ask that you fully fund our request for FY16 – which includes a \$2.4 million increase for IMET.

We look forward to working with you to continue supporting our security assistance goals in Africa and improving the effectiveness of the programs. Thank you again for your continued support for security assistance in Africa.

Testimony
of
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Amanda Dory
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, African Affairs
Department of Defense
Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy
June 4, 2015

“Security Assistance to Africa”

Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for inviting the Department of Defense to testify with our Department of State colleagues on security assistance to Africa. Close partnership between the Department of Defense and Department of State is essential for successful security cooperation in Africa and I am appreciative of the opportunity to provide an overview of how the Department of Defense works closely with the Department of State to employ security assistance as a tool of statecraft in achieving our policy goals in Africa.

The Department of Defense implements security assistance in accordance with the Presidential Policy Directive on Security Sector Assistance (SSA), PPD-23 and U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, PPD-16 in support of its four goals which are to help partner nations build sustainable capacity to address common security challenges, promote partner support for U.S. interests, promote

universal values, and strengthen collective security and multinational defense arrangements and organizations. DoD focuses the majority of its security assistance in Africa on building African security force capacity, defense institutions, preparedness to support peacekeeping and crisis response, and capacity to combat transnational threats, to include: terrorism, illicit trafficking of narcotics, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional instability, piracy, and communicative diseases. These threats, if left unchecked, could potentially negatively impact the safety and economic prosperity of U.S. citizens and international partners within the United States and abroad. A modest, proactive investment in the development of effective security forces that abide by international human rights standards and the rule of law can be an essential component in establishing a security environment that encourage terrorism, and equally important, encourages the development of strong, effective, and prosperous partner states with shared values and interests.

The Department of Defense has embraced security cooperation in Africa as a practical tool for addressing emerging challenges posed by the security environment. Many of the conflicts in Africa which we hope to help address through security cooperation arise from a combination of local and international grievances and power struggles which often have an outsized impact on fragile

countries. DoD realizes that going it alone is simply not a feasible, effective, or cost-effective solution which is why the Department of Defense continues to focus on working by, with, and through African partners and international organizations as our primary approach to address security challenges in Africa.

Over the past five years, Congress has substantially increased security cooperation appropriations related to Africa. Within the Department of Defense, allocations have increased as well in response to growing security challenges. Together, this resulted in an increased allocation of core Title 10 security cooperation funds in Africa from \$53.7 million in FY 10 to \$379.6 million in FY14. This funding increase was principally driven by increased efforts to enhance African counterterrorism capacity through East Africa and Yemen Counterterrorism (1203), Global Train and Equip (1206 and 2282), and Global Security Contingency Fund (1207) authorities. We have also seen increased support for security partners during crisis response through DoD support under Presidential Drawdown authority. In FY15, the Department of Defense, in close coordination with the Department of State, has also participated in the development of three White House security cooperation initiatives in Africa: the Security Governance Initiative (SGI), the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP), and the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF).

. For context, DoD appropriated security assistance represents 29% and Department of State 71% of total security assistance from FY10 to FY14. Further security assistance remains approximately one sixth of all U.S. Government foreign assistance in Africa with the majority going to economic development and public health. Within Title 22 programs, DoD believes the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account is a particularly important program, providing flexibility to build and sustain our African partners with long-enough expenditure horizons to support our shared goals. DoD also finds particular value in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program which is essential for building professionalism and establishing bonds and common understanding between future U.S. and African senior military leadership.

The Department of Defense fully supports the broader U.S. Government commitment to develop African partners and regional organizations' ability to rapidly and effectively respond to crises through APRRP. The Department of Defense is working closely with the Department of State to determine requirements and identify priority capabilities that will provide the greatest return on investment for improving African crisis response capabilities. DoD through U.S. Africa Command will also play a key role in implementing APRRP capacity building

efforts to include, military equipment, training, and technical and advisory assistance. DoD will further continue to partner with State to implement broader peace operations capacity building activities through exercises and other authorities such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative.

DoD is also working closely with the State Department and other government agencies on the Security Governance Initiative to support the development of African security sector establishments. SGI, the Africa Military Education Program (AMEP), and other supporting Title 10 defense institution building programs such as the Ministry of Defense Advisor Program and Defense Institution Reform Initiative will become increasingly important as we look to buttress our near-term capacity building efforts into long-term partnerships with capable African militaries. These efforts help our African partners develop and expand the technical proficiency to effectively and efficiently govern and oversee their own militaries. In the long-run, this will lead to more professional and effective African militaries and protect U.S. taxpayer's investments in training and equipping security forces capable of independently managing security threats on the continent.

Beginning this fiscal year, the Department of Defense is also implementing the President's Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) to support a broader

approach to a sustainable and partnership-focused approach to counterterrorism. This effort builds on existing tools and authorities such as the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PRACT) to provide direct support to partner nations through building partner counterterrorism capacity and the provision of increased U.S. enabling support for African partners. DoD intends, pending congressional notification, to spend approximately \$466 million in FY15 CTPF money in Africa and is seeking an additional \$1.269 billion in FY16 funds to build partner capacity to counter terrorist threats in the Sahel/Maghreb, Lake Chad Basin, and Horn of Africa. As you are aware, State Department has a FY16 CTPF request as well that would focus on strengthening partner nation law enforcement and judicial responses. These funds will focus on enhancing our African partners' intelligence, mobility, and logistics capabilities and ensuring their ability to operate within international counterterrorism coalitions and in accordance with international human rights norms. CTPF is an indispensable tool for assisting some of our most resource challenged, but willing partners, with sufficient resources and expertise to counter a shared and growing terrorism threat.

In no area is the importance of close and continual Department of Defense coordination and cooperation with the Department of State more important than

counterterrorism. DoD relies on State to ensure that its efforts to build partner nation military counterterrorism capacity are balanced with other security sector priorities and integrated into effective host nation and multilateral strategies. A strengthened military fully proficient and capable of conducting counterterrorism operations cannot take the place of African police, border security forces, and a criminal justice system that delivers justice in the eyes of its population. Likewise, it cannot substitute for economic opportunities and alternative narratives to the ideologies of hate and revenge proffered by our shared adversaries. The Department of Defense also relies on the Department of State to help ensure the long-term value of its counterterrorism capacity building capacity efforts. State provides critical sustainment funding through Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and DoD supports the request to increase Africa FMF in FY 2016 in support of this end. However, even with increased funds State and DoD agree that the FMF funding levels are currently insufficient for sustainment needs and are working together to try to address this issue.

The Department of Defense also relies on essential day to day support provided by the U.S. embassies in Africa and America's unsung heroes, the frontline foreign service officers and broader embassy teams serving alongside our uniformed service members in harm's way to keep Americans safe. Effective

security cooperation in the military sector requires a balanced approach with other sectors of the security enterprise and right sizing of State funding and support to ensure that Defense and State efforts are not only aligned, but proportional to achieve the desired policy goals. I encourage Congress to consider these issues of proportionality, State's large comparative advantage in security cooperation in the non-military security sectors, and the importance of State foreign assistance funding for capacity building and long-term sustainment of U.S. Government security sector capacity building efforts in Africa when considering future funding levels for State FMF and CTPF.

I look forward to listening to your insights, answering any questions you may have, and providing additional thoughts from a defense perspective as part of what I hope will be a continued dialogue on how best to employ security cooperation as an effective diplomatic tool in Africa. Thank you again for the invitation and interest in hearing a defense perspective on this important issue.



**Statement of Lauren Ploch Blanchard
Specialist in African Affairs, Congressional Research Service**

**Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health
Hearing: U.S. Security Assistance in Africa
June 4, 2015**

Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee,

Thank you for inviting the Congressional Research Service to testify today. I will begin with a summary of some of the key trends and questions for U.S. policy and congressional oversight of security assistance in Africa. My prepared statement below also includes a more detailed discussion of current U.S. security assistance programs on the continent, with information on funding levels, where available, and the broad policy objectives behind them.¹

Today's discussion is timely. Driven by growing terrorism concerns and other security priorities, we are now seeing a major increase in U.S. security assistance to sub-Saharan Africa. While security assistance has long been considered an important foreign policy tool, both to build relationships and to address foreign policy priorities, U.S. officials have also increasingly viewed such assistance as a strategic instrument for mitigating potential national security threats and reducing the possibility that U.S. forces might be required to intervene overseas.² From northeastern Nigeria and Libya to Somalia, state weakness and instability have contributed to environments in parts of Africa in which violent Islamist extremist groups have been able to expand their reach across borders and share tactics, training, and weapons with other like-minded groups. Three years ago, there were four Africa-based groups designated by the State Department as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Today, there are twelve. At least one, Al Shabaab in Somalia, has attracted Western recruits, including U.S. citizens.

Fragile states and under-governed spaces present the international community with other potential threats, such as maritime piracy and illicit trafficking. Recent conflicts on the continent have taken a massive human toll, and they have been costly. In South Sudan, for example, the United States has provided more than \$1 billion in emergency relief aid in the past year and a half to stem a humanitarian crisis caused by that country's return to conflict. Conflicts like South Sudan's threaten to erode or erase the development investments the United States and other donors have made, and they place a broader strain on neighboring countries. As an indication of international concern with such conflicts, which dominate the U.N. Security

¹ This prepared statement includes contributions from CRS Analyst in African Affairs Alexis Arieff and Specialist in Middle East Affairs Christopher M. Blanchard.

² See, e.g., The White House, *Fact Sheet, U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy*, April 5, 2015.

Council's agenda, more than 80% of the U.N. peacekeepers deployed around the world today are serving in operations in Africa.

Twenty years ago, the U.S. Department of Defense saw few traditional strategic security interests in Africa.³ After large U.S. military aid allocations were made in the 1980s to counter Soviet influence (including via reportedly large arms transfers), U.S. military casualties in Somalia in 1993 took a toll on American willingness to intervene directly in African conflicts. By the mid-1990s, U.S. security assistance allocations were shifting toward a focus on conflict prevention and on building the capacity of African forces to keep the peace. The 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa and the 9/11 attacks, along with subsequent terrorist activity on the continent, changed U.S. perceptions. U.S. security assistance spending on the continent has since been on the rise, notably to respond to perceived threats from transnational violent Islamist extremist groups.

U.S. security assistance still comprises a small percentage of overall U.S. foreign aid to Africa, but both have grown considerably. Total U.S. aid to Africa in FY1985, for example, was just under \$1 billion, or roughly \$2 billion in today's dollars. Total U.S. aid provided by the State Department, USAID, and DOD for sub-Saharan Africa in FY2014 was at least \$7.8 billion, not including certain types of humanitarian aid or Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) funding. Security assistance in FY1985 for Africa was \$168 million, or about 17% of all U.S. aid for Africa at that time, according to testimony by State and Defense Department officials.⁴ In FY2014, security assistance, by CRS calculations, may have been roughly \$800 million, of which almost \$500 million was provided through State Department funds and almost \$300 million under DOD authorities, representing approximately 10% of the aid total for Africa.

Security assistance figures do not tell the whole story, though—U.S. military engagement on the continent has been growing over the past decade, and African militaries are benefitting from a growing range of activities and joint exercises with U.S. forces that are difficult to quantify in dollar terms.

A large proportion of U.S. security assistance today supports efforts to counter violent extremist groups on the continent, representing a broadening of U.S. security interests beyond the 1990s-era focus on peacekeeping capacity building. The largest share supports the African forces fighting Al Shabaab in Somalia. That effort, for which U.S. funding has totaled more than \$1.4 billion in the past decade, has been primarily funded through the State Department's Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, but PKO funds have been increasingly supplemented by DOD, using legal authorities granted by Congress to build the capacity of counterterrorism partners around the world and particularly in East Africa.⁵ Without U.S. and other donor support, the security gains against Al Shabaab in the past five years would likely not have been possible.⁶ But the mission is not over—Al Shabaab continues to pose a threat, increasingly in neighboring Kenya and other parts of East Africa, and Somalia is far from stable. Additional funds have

³ The document asserted that "ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa," but did note significant U.S. political and humanitarian interests. DOD Office of International Security Affairs, *United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa*, August 1995.

⁴ Hearing of the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, "Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1987," March 18, 1986.

⁵ Of the more than \$1.4 billion provided to date to counter Al Shabaab and protect Somalia's emergent national government since 2007, \$1.2 billion has supported the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and \$220 million has supported the Somali National Army. The AMISOM assistance funded through the State Department includes almost \$440 million in voluntary support and almost \$500 million in assessed contributions to the U.N. logistics support mission for AMISOM (UNSOA). DOD funding for AMISOM forces has totaled almost \$300 million, to date.

⁶ See, e.g., Bronwyn Bruton and Paul D. Williams, *Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Lessons Learned from the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2007-2013*, Joint Special Operations University Report 14.5, September 2014.

been provided to build the counterterrorism capacity of Somalia's neighbors, namely Kenya, Djibouti, and to a lesser extent, Ethiopia. DOD counterterrorism assistance to East African countries, under the so-called "Section 1206" (10 U.S.C. 2282) and related regional "train-and-equip" authorities, has averaged between \$40-\$60 million annually in the past five years (some but not all of which has supported AMISOM deployments by these countries). Planned and proposed assistance to Nigeria and its neighbors to counter Boko Haram appear set to represent a sizeable new DOD infusion of military aid to that sub-region, and DOD and the State Department both continue to allocate significant counterterrorism resources in the Sahel region of West Africa.

President Obama's new Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF), proposed by the Administration and authorized and funded by Congress on a limited basis in 2014, could represent a doubling of the United States' security assistance spending in Africa relative to FY2014 totals, if the funds requested in FY2016 are appropriated and obligated as the Administration has proposed. If Congress concurs with the Administration's assessment of the threats and security challenges on the continent, questions for congressional oversight center on whether the U.S. response is appropriately calibrated to meet them. In a tight budget environment, questions about the return on investment also arise. In order to make such assessments and answer such questions, Congress may examine the ways in which region-specific assistance information is reported by the executive branch. In the 1980s, for example, State and Defense Department principals routinely testified side by side and provided region specific assistance request and reporting information broken down by security and non-security assistance. Such reporting does not occur today for a variety of reasons. This leaves appropriators, authorizers, and executive branch implementers without a clear and common operating picture on current programs, priorities, and proposals.

Security assistance programs in Africa to date have produced mixed results. There are some clear successes, but there are also indications of challenges related to absorption, sustainment, and accountability. The State Department's PKO budget is also being used as one of the primary vehicles for counterterrorism assistance in Africa, and for important contingencies beyond its origins as a peacekeeping support mechanism. Congress originally drafted PKO with broad authorities, but Congress may wish to examine its current uses and scope given these trends. More broadly, it is extremely challenging to compile a comprehensive picture of how much security assistance is being provided to each African country, given the complex patchwork of legal authorities and programs under which the State Department and DOD are currently operating. This poses a potential challenge to congressional oversight efforts regarding both appropriations and overarching policy issues.

Potential additional considerations for Congress include the following: In addressing violent Islamist extremist threats, to what extent should the United States focus on improving partners' ability to meet near-term counterterrorism objectives versus longer-term efforts to counter radicalization? Does the current approach strike the right balance between military aid and law enforcement and justice sector investments? Between tactical training and long-term institutional development? Is U.S. foreign assistance to support improved governance and local service delivery keeping pace with security sector enhancements? While military aid *may* be able to facilitate operations that shrink terrorist safe havens and create a window of opportunity to improve stability, are such efforts sustainable if host governments are unable or unwilling to hold territory and improve conditions for their populations? And finally, what happens to U.S. security sector "investments" when partner governments' objectives diverge from those of the United States?

Many African countries face governance challenges that present potential risks for a partnership approach. For example, the political and security crisis in Burundi, which has been a major troop contributor in Somalia, presents U.S. policymakers with a dilemma, as there appear to be few options for replacing the more than 5,000 Burundian troops currently deployed in and around Mogadishu, who rely

heavily on U.S., UN, and European assistance. Uganda and Chad, both viewed as capable counterterrorism partners, are led by two of Africa's longest-serving presidents and have governance challenges of their own. Some U.S. security cooperation relationships may complicate the United States' ability to press other foreign policy priorities, including the promotion of human rights. Notably, the Administration has continued to partner closely with the Ugandan military while stridently criticizing its record on gay rights.

Finally, any broad examination of U.S. security assistance raises questions about partner nations' capacity to absorb and willingness to sustain and secure this assistance. In sub-Saharan Africa, these challenges are particularly pronounced. Donor-funded security assistance rivals or outweighs the defense budgets of several key African security partners (notably Burundi, Djibouti, Mauritania, and Niger, which all reportedly have defense budgets under \$50 million annually).⁷ Further, questions arise about partner countries' capacity to secure equipment transfers, which may present additional risks, as exhibited for example in Mali, where news reports suggest that soldiers who defected to insurgent and/or terrorist groups in 2012 took U.S.-origin equipment with them. Indeed, recent developments in Iraq and Yemen highlight the inherent dangers in defense transfers to fragile states.

Overview: Security Assistance in Africa

Security assistance has long been viewed as an important foreign policy tool, and building partnership capacity and supporting stability operations have become increasingly important components of U.S. security strategy since September 11, 2001. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance states that “across the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursue new partnerships with a growing number of nations—including those in Africa and Latin America—whose interests and viewpoints are merging into a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity.” Recent U.S. official documents and statements have described a shifting, and increasingly volatile, global security landscape, with parts of the world experiencing unrest that is contributing to “a fertile environment for violent extremism and sectarian conflict, especially in fragile states, stretching from the Sahel to South Asia.”⁸ The Obama Administration's 2015 National Security Strategy states that “we embrace our responsibilities for underwriting international security because it serves our interest, upholds our commitments to allies and partners, and addresses threats that are truly global.”

Sub-Saharan Africa is an area of growing focus for U.S. national security policy. In 2007, President George W. Bush established U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), the U.S. military's first geographic command entirely focused on engagement in Africa.⁹ In 2012, President Obama issued the first *U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa*, identifying the advancement of peace and security on the continent among four main objectives.¹⁰ The 2015 National Security Strategy declares that “ongoing conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic, as well as

⁷ Estimates of African countries' defense spending data obtained from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2015*.

⁸ Department of Defense, *2014 Quadrennial Defense Review*, March 2014.

⁹ Prior to AFRICOM becoming a stand-alone command in October 2008, U.S. military involvement in Africa was divided among European, Central, and Pacific Commands. AFRICOM's area of responsibility (AOR) includes all African countries except Egypt, which remains in the area of operations of Central Command (CENTCOM).

¹⁰ The four pillars are: strengthen democratic institutions; spur economic growth, trade, and investment; advance peace and security; and promote opportunity and development. Within the peace and security pillar, the Administration identified five main lines of effort: counter Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups; advance regional security cooperation and security sector reform; prevent transnational criminal threats; prevent conflict and, where necessary, mitigate mass atrocities and hold perpetrators responsible; and support initiatives to promote peace and security.

violent extremists fighting governments in Somalia, Nigeria, and across the Sahel all pose threats to innocent civilians, regional stability, and our national security.” The proliferation of violent Islamist extremist groups in North and sub-Saharan Africa is of major concern to U.S. officials: 12 groups on the continent are currently designated by the State Department as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, of which eight have been listed since 2013. Despite notable economic progress in some countries and a popular narrative in recent years of “Africa rising,” instability in parts of the continent continues to cause large-scale human suffering and displacement, and remains a major challenge to development.

Out of more than 106,000 United Nations (UN) peacekeepers currently deployed around the world, more than 80% are serving in operations in Africa.¹¹ One of the world’s largest multilateral stability operations today is not a UN mission—it is the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), comprised of more than 22,000 African troops, most of them U.S.-trained and equipped. Many African countries are prominent troop contributors to other peace operations. Half of the UN’s ten largest troop contributors are African countries, and Ethiopia has become the world’s largest troop contributor to such operations between its personnel in UN missions and AMISOM.

The proliferation of stability operations on the continent (12, including the UN operations, AMISOM, the nascent multinational task force to counter the Nigerian violent extremist group Boko Haram, and the AU regional task force to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA) highlights the extent of ongoing conflict and state fragility in Africa. However, the increasing contributions of African forces to those missions also emphasize the growing capacity, and will, of many African countries to respond to these challenges.¹² Notable is the willingness of several African troop contributors (some in pursuit of their own perceived interests) to take on stabilization mandates that go far beyond traditional peacekeeping, deploying in an offensive capacity to countries with ongoing hostilities, like Somalia, where there is no peace to keep. Amid ongoing debates about the extent to which peacekeeping operations should become engaged in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism activities, the African Union has, to date, authorized three missions—in Somalia, Mali, and Boko Haram-affected areas—explicitly to counter violent Islamist extremist threats.¹³ With extremely limited AU financial resources, such deployments have required significant voluntary external assistance to troop-contributing countries, much of which has come from the United States and European donors.

In its FY2016 Foreign Operations budget request, the State Department describes the promotion of peace and security as “one of the United States’ highest priorities” in sub-Saharan Africa, citing state fragility, conflict, and transnational security issues. The request includes almost \$470 million in base budget funding specifically for Africa to support security sector reforms and capacity building; stabilization operations; counterterrorism and counter-narcotics initiatives; maritime safety and security programs; and other conflict prevention and mitigation efforts. Significant additional funding is being sought for Africa in the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request for the Administration’s Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF).

DOD’s security cooperation funding for Africa also appears set to expand substantially under its FY2016 request, primarily through its global request of more than \$2.1 billion in CTPF funding, to build on funds appropriated in FY2015. According to DOD, the CTPF request reflects “the vital role that our allies and partners play in countering terrorism that could threaten U.S. citizens.”¹⁴ In testimony on the FY2016

¹¹ U.N. Peacekeeping Troop Statistics for U.N. Missions in April 2015, available at www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources.

¹² For more information, see, e.g., Paul D. Williams, “Peace Operations in Africa: Lessons Learned since 2000,” Africa Security Brief no. 25, National Defense University, July 2013.

¹³ The AU mission in Mali transitioned into a U.N. peacekeeping mission in 2013, and no longer has a specific mandate to conduct counterterrorism operations.

¹⁴ Testimony of Defense Secretary Ash Carter, Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, *Hearing on the FY2016 Budget Request for the Department of Defense*, May 6, 2015.

DOD budget request, AFRICOM Commander Gen. David Rodriguez described the command's efforts to work with African partners and build their capacity as "vital to advancing our national interests of security, prosperity, international order, and the promotion of universal values." He also argued that "Africa's growing importance to allies and emerging powers presents opportunities to reinforce U.S. global security objectives through our engagement on the continent."¹⁵

The State Department and DOD's FY2016 requests for security assistance in Africa are discussed below, following a summary of the various authorities and programs under which that support is provided.

U.S. Security Assistance Accounts, Authorities, and Programs

The U.S. government provides assistance to foreign security forces through both bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Congress has authorized many of these efforts under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, as amended. Pursuant to these statutes, the State Department takes a prominent role in determining U.S. security assistance policy, its role as a foreign policy tool, and its possible impact on broader U.S. foreign policy. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 23, issued by President Obama in 2013, outlines policy guidelines for planning and implementing security assistance and strengthening coordination among agencies. It reaffirms the State Department's lead in policy, supervision, and general management of security assistance. The State Department administers the programs authorized under the FAA and the AECA, although DOD implements several of them. In recent years, however, Congress has also supported an increasing role for the Defense Department in shaping U.S. security assistance, often with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, through the authorization and appropriation of funds to conduct certain security cooperation activities, primarily for, but not limited to, counterterrorism purposes. The majority of U.S. security assistance in Africa is military aid; assistance to police and other law enforcement agencies is comparatively small. These programs and authorities are discussed below.

U.S. Assistance to African Militaries

State Department Authorities


The most widely known of the State Department's military assistance programs are the International Military Education and Training program (IMET), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and Foreign Military Financing (FMF). These programs are implemented by DOD's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and are managed at the U.S. embassy in the recipient country by AFRICOM's Offices of Security Cooperation (OSCs) or Defense Attaché Offices (DAOs).¹⁶ IMET provides training at U.S. military schools and other training assistance for foreign military personnel on a grant basis, and is primarily designed to build bilateral relationships and introduce participants to elements of U.S. democracy, such as the American judicial system, legislative oversight, free speech, equality, and respect for human rights. A subset of IMET training, Expanded IMET (E-IMET), provides courses on defense management, civil-military relations, law enforcement cooperation, and military justice for both military and civilian personnel. Other programs for which the State Department provides policy guidance are Foreign Military Sales (FMS), which allows countries to purchase U.S. defense articles, services, and training, and the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, which allows foreign militaries to acquire such items through grants.

¹⁵ Testimony of Gen. David Rodriguez, Senate Armed Services Committee, *AFRICOM 2015 Posture Statement*, March 26, 2015.

¹⁶ For more information on DOD's management of security assistance programs, see the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management's manual, *The Management of Security Cooperation* (The Green Book), available at www.disam.dsca.mil.

Globally, the FMF program is the largest grant-based U.S. security assistance program, having risen from just over \$3 billion in the late 1990s to more than \$5 billion today. Congress appropriates the bulk of FMF for Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, in support of Middle East peace treaties and other U.S. policy objectives. Sub-Saharan African countries are minor recipients of FMF (see Figure 1), totaling an average of under \$18 million annually over the past 15 years. For FY2016, the State Department has requested \$19 million in total FMF for sub-Saharan Africa, with just under \$7 million in bilateral requests spread across nine countries, and another \$12 million requested in regional funds from which other African countries may benefit. Africa's share of global IMET funding is proportionally larger, averaging \$12 million out of roughly \$100 million globally in the past 15 years. IMET funding is spread across a larger number of countries, with most African countries receiving at least \$100,000 in IMET assistance per year.

Figure 1. The FY2016 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Request
By region, in thousands



Source: State Department FY2016 Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justification

Note: This chart indicates enduring and OCO global FMF allocations as requested for FY2016.

The bulk of U.S. military assistance to African partners, however, comes through an often-misunderstood foreign assistance account known as Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Not to be confused with the Contributions to International Peacekeeping Operations (CIPA) account, which funds assessed contributions to UN operations and tribunals, PKO is often understood to finance voluntary assistance to peace operations, including training, equipment and deployment support for troop contributors.¹⁷ But the legal authority for the account is broader, allowing for support to a range of stabilization and crisis response initiatives: “The President is authorized to furnish assistance to friendly countries and international organizations on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for peacekeeping operations and other programs carried out in furtherance of the national security interests of the United

¹⁷ Funds for CIPA are appropriated in the legislation that funds State Department operations, rather than in the Foreign Operations appropriation, which governs foreign assistance, including PKO funds.

States.”¹⁸ Unlike FMF and IMET, which are implemented by the U.S. military with State Department guidance, PKO programs in Africa are often implemented by contractors overseen by the State Department, although U.S. military personnel sometimes participate in certain programs.

PKO appropriations have grown substantially in the past 15 years, from \$150 million in FY2000 to nearly \$500 million today (see Figure 2 for the FY2016 PKO request). Unlike other security assistance accounts, PKO funding has gone primarily to sub-Saharan African countries in the past decade, with funding levels for Africa ranging from \$200 to \$400 million annually. PKO funds have been the primary vehicle for U.S. support to AMISOM and other regional stability operations, including the original AU mission in Darfur in the mid-2000s, the early years of the Ugandan-led counter-LRA mission in Central Africa (beginning in late 2008), and the initial AU deployments into Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2013 and 2014. PKO is also used to build international peacekeeping capacity through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which has largely focused on training, equipping, and supporting African peacekeepers.¹⁹ According to State Department officials, roughly 60% of GPOI funding goes to African recipients, depending on requirements and available resources in a given year.

Beyond support for peacekeeping, PKO has also funded several major security sector reform initiatives in countries transitioning from conflict, including Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and Somalia. Prior to the outbreak of South Sudan’s internal conflict in December 2013, the United States had invested almost \$330 million in PKO funds since 2005 to support the transformation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the former rebel movement that with South Sudan’s independence became the new country’s national armed forces. In Liberia, more than \$200 million in PKO funds, along with some FMF and IMET, have been obligated in the past decade to support the stand-up of that country’s new military after years of civil war. Military reform efforts in the DRC totaling more than \$120 million in PKO in the past 10 years are ongoing, and in Somalia, the United States has, to date, invested more than \$220 million in PKO to help the war-torn country’s new army build its capacity to fight Al Shabaab alongside AMISOM and eventually assume responsibility for the country’s security.

The PKO account is also the primary State Department vehicle for counterterrorism assistance for African militaries through two regional programs, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for East Africa Counterterrorism (PRACT).²⁰ These receive roughly \$20 and \$10 million in PKO funding per year, respectively. Unlike many PKO-funded programs in Africa, which are implemented by contractors, these initiatives are primarily implemented by AFRICOM. TSCTP, the older and more established of the programs, began in FY2005; it is an interagency initiative funded through various accounts to counter extremism in the Sahel and the Maghreb.²¹ PKO-funded counterterrorism assistance in most TSCTP and PRACT partner countries is complemented by DOD-funded assistance, as discussed below.


¹⁸ PKO was first authorized under the International Security Assistance Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-384) as Sec. 551 of the FAA.

¹⁹ GPOI, created in FY2005, built on and incorporated a pre-existing peacekeeping capacity program for African countries, known as the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. From FY1997 to FY2005, the United States spent just over \$120 million on ACOTA and its predecessor, the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). An additional \$33 million in FMF funding supported classroom training under the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) initiative from FY1998 to FY2005. GPOI was originally intended to be a \$660 million, five-year program to train 75,000 troops by 2010; it surpassed that target, training nearly 87,000 peacekeepers during that time, 77,000 of them African. GPOI has been extended, with a new goal of training an additional 242,500 troops and building sustainable partner nation training capabilities.

²⁰ TSCTP partner countries are Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. PRACT partner countries are Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, and Uganda.

²¹ TSCTP builds on an earlier program known as the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI, 2002-2004).

**Figure 2. PKO Request Worldwide,
Enduring & Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)**
\$, in thousands



Source: State Department FY2016 Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justification

Notes: GPOI=Global Peace Operations Initiative (largely implemented in Africa); MFO=Multinational Force and Observers (Egypt/Israel); TSCTP=Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership; SGI=Security Governance Initiative (Africa-specific); OCO=Overseas Contingency Operations; APRRP=African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership

The State Department also uses the PKO account to fund several other smaller regional security programs, including the Africa Maritime Security Initiative (AMSI) and the Africa Conflict Stabilization and Border Security (ACSBS) program. The latter was the main vehicle for supporting the counter-LRA mission until FY2012, when Congress authorized DOD to begin funding it. More recently, ACSBS has served as a vehicle to fund security sector reform efforts in Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, and to train some of the AU troops that deployed to Mali and the CAR. Another regional PKO initiative is the Africa Military Education Program (AMEP), which aims to build military professionalization through instructor and curriculum development at African countries’ military education institutions. Since 2014, the State Department has used the PKO account to fund training and equipment for African military and non-law

enforcement security forces to counter wildlife poaching.²² Funding for this effort draws from prior fiscal year PKO funds dating back at least to FY2010, highlighting the flexibility of the PKO account—funds appropriated under PKO, unlike many other accounts, are authorized to remain available until expended.

DOD Authorities

Ten years ago, DOD, identifying instability in foreign countries as a threat to U.S. interests, issued DOD Directive 3000.05, charging the U.S. military with two broad missions—building a “sustainable peace” and advancing U.S. interests—and defining stability operations²³ for the first time as a core U.S. military mission with priority comparable to combat operations. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review subsequently articulated a growing emphasis on building partner capabilities to achieve common national security objectives, and expressed the need for new authorities and resources to do so. While serving as Secretary of Defense (2006-2011), Robert Gates made the case for an “indirect approach” to the war on terror, in which the United States would not rely on another large-scale deployment of U.S. forces, but instead work, where possible, “with and through” allies and partners to counter terrorism.²⁴

Congress has authorized new DOD authorities for security cooperation almost every year since FY2005, and the amount of DOD-funded security assistance programming has risen dramatically, including in Africa. The most prominent of these authorities has been the Global Train and Equip program, popularly known as “Section 1206” (of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act or NDAA, P.L. 109-163, under which it was first authorized), which was codified in the FY2015 NDAA (P.L. 113-291) as 10 U.S.C. 2282.²⁵ Other authorities have followed, including a three-year Section-1206-like authority specifically targeting East Africa and Yemen, which recently expired, and another specifically focused on funding the counter-LRA effort.²⁶ Section 1206 and related funding to build sub-Saharan African countries’ counterterrorism capabilities has increased steadily in recent years, totaling almost \$800 million in notified funding since the authority’s inception 10 years ago.²⁷ Two East African countries, Kenya and Uganda, have been the largest recipients of this assistance in Africa, totaling more than \$100 million each; with DOD assistance to counter the LRA factored in, Uganda is the largest cumulative recipient of DOD security assistance. Mauritania, Niger, Burundi, and Djibouti have also been major African recipients (see Figures 3 and 4).

²² To date, the State Department has notified its intent to support the following countries under this counter-poaching effort: Tanzania, Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique, and South Africa.

²³ DOD defines *stability operations* as “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.”

²⁴ Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 2009.

²⁵ Section 2282 of P.L. 113-291. Congress initially authorized Section 1206 in part to address lengthy administrative and procurement delays in similar State Department-funded programs, notably FMF. Section 1206, which requires the concurrence of the Secretary of State, was designed to improve the capabilities of foreign forces to conduct counterterrorism operations or to participate in stabilization operations with U.S. forces. For more information see CRS Report RS22855, *Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress*, by Nina Serafino.


²⁶ Section 1207(n) of the FY2012 NDAA (P.L. 112-81) and Section 1203 of the FY2013 NDAA (P.L. 112-239) authorize DOD to provide up to \$75 million annually from FY2012 through FY2014 to build the capacity of foreign militaries serving in AMISOM. Section 1206 of the FY2012 NDAA (P.L. 112-81), not to be confused with the original “Section 1206” (of the FY2006 NDAA) authority, authorized DOD to provide up to \$35 million per year in FY2012 and FY2013 to support Ugandan-led counter-LRA operations. The latter authority was followed by Section 1208 of the FY2014 NDAA (P.L. 113-66), which authorizes up to \$50 million per year through FY2017.

²⁷ AFRICOM’s AOR also includes Tunisia, which has received more than \$80 million in additional Section 1206 assistance.

Congress has also authorized DOD to support an initiative jointly administered by the Departments of State and Defense known as the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF).²⁸ Designed as a pilot project to pool the Departments’ respective funds and expertise to provide security sector assistance to partner countries, the authority requires State to contribute at least 20% and DOD not more than 80% of the funding for a given project.²⁹ The first GSCF project proposed for Africa, a \$10 million counterterrorism and border security project in Nigeria originally notified to Congress in FY2012, was put on hold and later re-scoped and re-notified in July 2014, with an additional \$30 million in DOD funds, to also include Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, with a focus on building their capacity to counter Boko Haram.

Figure 3. DOD “Section 1206/2282” Funding for Africa: Top Recipients

Cumulative funding since FY2006, in millions




Source: CRS analysis of DOD Congressional Notifications

Notes: C-LRA="Counter-Lord's Resistance Army"

²⁸ First authorized as Sec. 1207 of the FY2012 NDAA (P.L.112-81), the GSCF authority was codified as 22 U.S.C. 2151. The authority was extended through September 30, 2017 under the FY2015 NDAA.

²⁹ For more information, see, e.g., U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), *Building Partner Capacity: State and DOD Need to Define Time Frames to Guide and Track Global Security Contingency Fund Projects*, GAO-15-75, November 20, 2014 and CRS Report R42641, *Global Security Contingency Fund: Summary and Issue Overview*, by Nina M. Serafino.

Figure 4. DOD “Section 1206/2282,” “Section 1207n/1203” (East Africa) and C-LRA Funding: Top Recipients
Cumulative Funding since FY2006, in millions



Source: CRS analysis of DOD Congressional Notifications

Older DOD security cooperation authorities include Section 1004 of the FY1998 NDAA and Section 1033 of the FY1991 NDAA, which authorize DOD to provide counternarcotics assistance to foreign partners (including civilian security forces such as police), and the Combatting Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP; not to be confused with the newer, and larger, CTFP initiative).³⁰ Funding for African countries under these counternarcotics authorities has varied from year to year, ranging from \$12 million to \$38 million annually in the past five years, spread across more than 20 countries. Congress has also authorized DOD to support foreign forces that assist counterterrorism operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces under Section 1208 of the FY2005 NDAA, as amended (information on this assistance is classified). African countries have also benefitted from assistance through smaller DOD-funded programs to build more effective and accountable defense institutions, such as the Ministry of Defense

³⁰ The Combatting Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) is authorized under 10 U.S.C. Section 2249c.

Advisors (MoDA) program and the Defense Institutional Reform Initiative (DIRI), each funded at between \$10 million and \$12 million globally.³¹

In addition to these programs, AFRICOM conducts a range of other engagements with African partners, many of which are also intended, at least in part, to contribute to building their capacity to address shared security objectives.³² In the Sahel, in addition to assistance received through “Section 1206” and TSCTP, partner forces may also benefit from engagements with U.S. military personnel deployed in support of Operation Juniper Shield/Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS). In Central Africa, AFRICOM has supported the deployment of U.S. military advisors and military aircraft to facilitate Ugandan-led regional military operations against the Lord’s Resistance Army, on top of the authorized DOD-funded logistics support and equipment referenced above.³³ In Liberia, AFRICOM has provided mentors and advisors to support the development of the Liberian armed forces since 2010 through Operation Onward Liberty. In Somalia, AFRICOM has deployed U.S. military advisors to advise African troops fighting Al Shabaab. And in May 2014, AFRICOM deployed a small advisory team to Nigeria to offer assistance in efforts to support the rescue of more than 200 schoolgirls kidnapped by Boko Haram. That effort was reportedly stymied by limited cooperation on the part of Nigerian security officials and other challenges, but Nigeria’s new president, Muhammadu Buhari, has expressed support for U.S. assistance to address the Boko Haram threat. Obama Administration officials have suggested a new offer of advisory support may be imminent.³⁴ In the meantime, U.S. military advisors are assisting the nascent Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the Chadian-led regional effort to counter Boko Haram.

In addition to training and exchange programs and exercises, some African countries benefit from DOD transfers of excess defense articles (EDA) and drawdowns of in-stock defense articles. In Africa, EDA is often provided as a grant, with the recipient nation paying for the articles’ transport and refurbishment, except in certain cases where the State Department has provided funding for refurbishment. One recent example of an EDA transfer in Africa is the provision of a C-130 transport aircraft to Ethiopia. Given the Administration’s intent that the aircraft be used for the primary purpose of supporting regional peacekeeping operations, the State Department recently notified \$15 million in PKO funding, through its new African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP), discussed below, to repair and refurbish the aircraft and provide spare parts and training for its operation and maintenance.

³¹ MoDA was developed as a result of lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq, where security assistance had focused largely on building tactical proficiencies, with little focus on ministerial capacity building. DOD civilians serve as advisors to their foreign counterparts in partner nation defense ministries. DIRI, established in FY2010, also supports the development of partner defense ministries through the provision of subject matter experts.

³² Some African militaries benefit from training through interaction with U.S. Special Operations Forces in Joint Combined Exchange Training events (JCETs). U.S. forces routinely conduct a variety of bilateral and multilateral joint exercises with African militaries, such as African Endeavor, an annual communications and interoperability exercise with more than 30 African nations. Operation Flintlock, hosted annually in a Sahel country, is a multinational exercise that supports counterterrorism, rapid-response, and interoperability capacity among West and North African countries, similar objectives to TSCTP. African Lion, an annual exercise in Morocco that involves over 1,000 U.S. troops, has expanded since 2014 to include military forces from neighboring states and Europe in addition to Moroccan and U.S. soldiers. Offshore, the Africa Partnership Station (APS) is U.S. Naval Forces Africa’s flagship maritime security program, which aims to increase partner naval forces’ maritime awareness, response capabilities and infrastructure. DOD also conducts educational and academic exchange programs through several regional centers, including the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), and DOD’s service academies. The U.S. National Guard also engages with African militaries through its State Partnership Program, in which U.S. National Guard units pair with foreign countries to conduct a variety of security cooperation and civil affairs activities.

³³ For more information, see CRS Report R42094, *The Lord’s Resistance Army: The U.S. Response*.

³⁴ Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Signals Willingness to Expand Military Cooperation with Nigeria,” *New York Times*, May 29, 2015.

Police and Justice Sector Assistance

U.S. security assistance in Africa also includes support for non-military forces, including police, border security officers, and justice sector officials. The State Department administers most non-military security assistance, much of which is funded through the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) and Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) accounts.³⁵ INCLE funds support a range of country-specific, regional, and global programs that aim to build partner-country capacity to combat transnational crime, disrupt illicit trafficking, and extend the rule of law. In Africa, some INCLE programs work exclusively with police and/or focus on counternarcotics capacity building, while others focus on police and justice sector reform, border security, efforts to counter wildlife poaching, and other aims. NADR-funded Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) and Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) programs, among others, are key vehicles of U.S. counterterrorism assistance on the continent, and NADR funding supports components of TSCTP and PRACT.³⁶ Programs funded through NADR and Economic Support Fund (ESF)—which can be administered by either the State Department or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—also support efforts to counter violent extremist ideology and recruitment among vulnerable populations in several African countries.

Obama Administration Security Initiatives & the FY2016 Budget Request

The Obama Administration has overseen a significant increase in security assistance spending in sub-Saharan Africa and has proposed even more sizable increases in FY2015-FY2016—notably through the new Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF), first proposed in 2014, and through new security initiatives rolled out during the U.S.-African Leaders Summit (ALS) hosted by President Obama in August 2014 in Washington, DC.

New Programs Announced During the 2014 U.S.-African Leaders Summit

Security assistance initiatives announced during the August 2014 U.S.-African Leaders Summit are expected to be funded through a mix of State Department and DOD accounts. Sometimes referred to as “ALS Deliverables,” these include the following:

Security Governance Initiative (SGI). SGI is “a new joint adventure between the United States and six African partners that offers a comprehensive approach to improving security sector governance and capacity to address threats.”³⁷ The initiative is focused on both civilian (e.g., police) and military security institutions, and on the ministerial functions that oversee the security sector. The partners are Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Tunisia. The Administration has committed \$65 million for SGI in FY2015 and \$83 million per year thereafter, with no specified end-date. The State Department’s FY2016 request includes \$16.9 million in PKO funding for SGI, and SGI is mentioned as a target for an unidentified amount of Africa Regional INCLE funding (which totals \$17 million). DOD Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds have been identified as a major source of requested SGI funding—the FY2016 request includes \$47 million for SGI in its CTPF request (see below).

³⁵ As noted above, DOD’s “Section 1004” and “Section 1033” authorities also authorize DOD to provide counternarcotics assistance to civilian security forces.

³⁶ For further information on ATA, RSI, and other NADR-funded counterterrorism programs, see State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism, *Annual Report on Assistance Related to international Terrorism: Fiscal Year 2013* [latest available], February 11, 2014.

³⁷ White House, *Fact Sheet: Security Governance Initiative*, August 6, 2014.

African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP).³⁸ APRRP is a new program to provide specific African countries with relatively high-level military capabilities for use in AU and UN peacekeeping deployments. Such capabilities may include military logistics, airlift, field hospitals, and formed police units; equipment transfers are expected to be a significant component.³⁹ In the near-term, APRRP is focused on six countries: Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. The Administration has committed to \$110 million per year for APRRP, starting in FY2015 and ending no later than FY2019. Initial funding in FY2015 is expected to be notified through FMF and PKO; the FY2016 request includes \$110 million in PKO funding for APRRP.⁴⁰

African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC). ACIRC is a planned AU military force intended to provide rapid intervention capacity for peacekeeping, crisis-response, and disaster relief efforts on the continent. The Administration committed to provide “support, including training for headquarters staff and key enabler functions, such as engineers,” to “catalyze” the AU’s efforts to establish ACIRC.⁴¹ The Administration pledged \$3 million per year for ACIRC, starting in FY2016, although a specific funding request is not included in the FY2016 request. U.S. support to ACIRC appears to be on hold due to disagreement among AU member states over whether to proceed with the concept.⁴²

The Administration’s FY2016 Budget Request

DOD Funding

DOD’s FY2016 budget request for the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) would represent a dramatic increase in overall security assistance for Africa and would dwarf State Department-administered funds for the region if authorized, appropriated, and obligated as proposed. The request, which totals \$2.1 billion globally, includes approximately \$1.27 billion for East Africa, the Lake Chad Basin, and Northwest Africa, building on planned, but yet to be notified or obligated, DOD CTPF funding of more than \$460 million for these areas in FY2015 (see Table 1 below). The planned FY2015 funding would appear to be in addition to more than \$180 million in 10 U.S.C. 2282 (i.e., “Section 1206” counterterrorism train-and-equip) funding already notified to Congress for programs on the continent in this fiscal year (\$39 million of which was notified for Tunisia). Planned and proposed initiatives for FY2015 and FY2016 include border security enhancements and various training and equipment programs, including, for East African partners, potential fixed wing and rotary lift capacity. Efforts to build counter-IED (improvised explosive device); command and control; logistics; medical; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and other capabilities are also envisioned.

Approximately \$25 million of the proposed FY2016 funding for the Africa regional CTPF programs could be used, according to the request, to fund the lift and sustainment of allies, potentially France, a key partner leading counterterrorism missions on the continent. The Senate draft NDAA for FY2016 would authorize the provision of up to \$100 million in non-reimbursable logistical support per year to allied military forces conducting counterterrorism operations in Africa, an authority similar to DOD’s existing Global Lift and Sustain (10 U.S.C.127d).

³⁸ See White House, *Fact Sheet: U.S. Support for Peacekeeping in Africa*, August 6, 2014.

³⁹ In congressional staff briefings, Administration officials have portrayed APRRP as filling gaps in existing U.S. military capacity building programs in Africa, including military grants provided through FMF and peacekeeping training and equipment provided through the ACOTA program.

⁴⁰ To date, the State Department has notified \$15.5 million in FY2015 PKO funds for APRRP, for Ethiopia.

⁴¹ *Fact Sheet: U.S. Support for Peacekeeping in Africa*, op. cit.

⁴² See, e.g., Jason Warner, “Complements or Competitors? The African Standby Force, the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises, and the Future of Rapid Reaction Forces in Africa,” *African Security*, March 2015.

Table I. The Counterterrorism Partnership Fund: DOD's FY2016 OCO Request

\$, in millions

Region	FY2015 Plan	FY2016 Request
Sahel/Maghreb	113	262
Lake Chad Basin	133	338
East Africa	220	669
TOTAL, for Africa	460	1,270
TOTAL, Global	1,300	2,100

Source: FY2016 DOD Congressional Budget Justification

State Department Funding

PKO. The State Department has requested almost \$340 million in PKO specifically for Africa in FY2016 (68% of the global total, including OCO).⁴³ This includes \$131 million for Africa regional programs, under which \$110 million would go to APRRP, with the remainder divided among PRACT, ACSBS, AMEP, and AMSI. In addition, \$115 million is requested to support AMISOM and the Somali military. With the conflict ongoing in South Sudan, \$30 million requested in PKO funds for that country would likely go to supporting efforts to resolve or enforce stability there, including through support for a regional conflict monitoring mechanism. Funds for security sector reform initiatives in the DRC (\$14 million), CAR (\$10 million), and Liberia (\$2 million) are also included, as is a \$19 million request for TSCTP. In addition to the \$340 million requested for Africa-specific programs, a significant portion of the \$64 million request for GPOI would likely benefit African countries contributing to peacekeeping missions and AMISOM.

The FY2016 global PKO request reflects a significant increase from the FY2015 request, notably to support the new APRRP initiative. Requested funding for Africa would be an increase from appropriated FY2014 levels (\$157 million for African programs, not including approximately \$143 million for the assessed U.S. contribution to the UN logistics support mission for AMISOM, known as UNSOA).

FMF. The FY2016 request includes \$19 million in FMF for Africa (less than 1% of the global total), compared to \$16 million in FY2014 (ibid). Top African FMF recipients in FY2014 were Liberia (\$4 million), Niger (\$2 million), Kenya (\$1.7 million), Nigeria (\$1.7 million), and Djibouti (\$1.4 million). Some of this funding was provided through two regional FMF programs (totaling \$5 million), for maritime security and to sustain counterterrorism equipment provided with PKO and DOD funds.

IMET. The FY2016 request includes \$16 million in IMET for African countries (14% of the global total), roughly the same as in FY2014 (which amounted to 15% of the total). Top African IMET recipients in FY2014 were Senegal (\$901,000), Nigeria (\$779,000), Kenya (\$748,000), South Africa (\$715,000), Ghana (\$668,000), Mozambique (\$630,000), Ethiopia (\$589,000), Botswana (\$576,000), Uganda (\$569,000), and Burundi (\$504,000).

NADR. The FY2016 request includes \$45 million in NADR for Africa in the enduring budget (7.4% of the global total, not including OCO). In FY2014, Africa received \$42 million in NADR funding (6% of the global total, including OCO), with top African recipients including Kenya (\$7 million for counterterrorism and border security), Angola (\$6 million for post-conflict demining assistance), and

⁴³ This figure is based on CRS calculations from the PKO request in the FY2016 Congressional Budget Justification. It may include some limited funding for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia through TSCTP and SGI.

South Sudan (\$2 million for demining and conventional weapons destruction). However, the majority of NADR funding appropriated specifically for Africa (\$23 million) was allocated as “regional” funding, for which a breakdown by country is not publicly available.

In addition to the FY2016 enduring budget request for NADR, the State Department is requesting \$390 million in NADR-OCO funding for its portion of the President’s Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (Congress did not appropriate funds for the CTPF for the State Department in FY2015). This request, if appropriated, would represent the most significant increase in recent years in U.S. efforts to build civilian counterterrorism capabilities and to counter violent extremism and radicalization in Africa, with up to \$250 million proposed to prevent and counter terrorist safe havens in the Horn of Africa (\$90 million), the Sahel (\$90 million), and in Libya and neighboring countries (\$70 million). Another portion of funding under this request, \$60 million to address foreign terrorist fighters, could focus, in part, on North Africa, which has been a significant source of foreign fighters, but also potentially on East Africa. Further, West Africa has been identified as one of several focus regions for a \$20 million initiative requested under the CTPF to counter Iranian-sponsored terrorism. These initiatives would be managed by the State Department Counterterrorism Bureau, in collaboration with regional and other functional bureaus.

INCLE. The FY2016 request includes \$49 million in INCLE for Africa (4.1% of the global INCLE request, including OCO funding). This would represent a decrease compared to \$66 million in FY2014 (4.8% of the global total). Top INCLE recipients in Africa in FY2014 were South Sudan (\$21 million), Liberia (\$12 million), and DRC (\$3 million). Nearly \$24 million was allocated to the State Department’s “Africa Regional” program, from which multiple countries may benefit.

Peace Operations Response Mechanism – OCO. In addition to funds requested under these accounts, the Administration has requested \$150 million in FY2016 for a new OCO account, the proposed Peace Operations Response Mechanism, to support potential peacekeeping requirements in Africa or Syria. The request is driven in part by unanticipated missions that have emerged in Africa in recent years, namely in CAR, South Sudan, and Mali. Congress did not appropriate funds in FY2015 for a similar request, then called the Peacekeeping Response Mechanism, although it did provide transfer authority of up to \$380 million to support such requirements, as required beyond funding made available in CIPA and PKO.⁴⁴

U.S. Security Assistance: Evaluating Progress and Mitigating Risk

Assessing the impact and effectiveness of U.S. security assistance is difficult. Neither the State Department nor DOD have used consistent metrics to systematically measure progress or evaluate the results of such assistance over time. Instead, for some State Department programs, such as PRACT and TSCTP, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that the agencies appear to have relied primarily on informal feedback from U.S. embassy staff to determine progress.⁴⁵ Other programs, like GPOI, which has its own evaluation team, have considered the number of individuals trained as one of several measures of success. DOD developed a qualitative assessment framework for evaluating Section 1206 programs and first reported on its results in 2013; its internal assessments, however, have not been publicly released. The lack of comprehensive assessment criteria, analysis, and supporting documentation poses challenges not only for conducting qualitative assessments, but also for the Departments’ decision-making on future programming and resource allocation, and for congressional oversight. Several assessments have raised concerns with the timeliness of security cooperation programs, the “patchwork” nature of current authorities, programs, and resources; and some partner nations’ capacity to absorb such

⁴⁴ Section 8003(d) of P.L. 113-235.

⁴⁵ See GAO, *Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts in Northwest Africa Would be Strengthened by Enhanced Program Management*, GAO-14-518, June 2014 and *Combating Terrorism: State Department Can Improve Management of East Africa Program*, GAO-14-502, June 17, 2014.

assistance.⁴⁶ Analysts have identified other shortfalls in the planning and implementation of U.S. security assistance programs in Africa, including insufficient efforts to track the trajectory of participants in military training engagements and persistent interagency disagreements as to where identified threats rank among U.S. national security priorities.⁴⁷ Both Departments have undertaken efforts to improve program monitoring and evaluation, although the result of those efforts, and the extent to which they are coordinated among agencies, are unclear at this time.⁴⁸ Measuring longer-term impacts for some capacity building programs may remain a challenge, given varying degrees of capability and political will on the part of recipient countries to bear sustainment costs, and limited U.S. resources and authorities for maintaining the capabilities built under programs like those funded under 10 U.S.C. 2282 authority.⁴⁹

Mitigating the potential risks associated with the provision of security assistance to fragile states in Africa is another challenge for the Administration and Congress. A recent RAND study suggests that U.S. officials face a major policy dilemma in Africa, where “the countries that are most in need of assistance are usually the ones least able to make positive use of it.”⁵⁰ That study, which assessed quantitative and qualitative research on the impact of security assistance in fragile states, found significant overlap between “countries of concern” in Africa (i.e., countries with low scores on indicators of state reach) and key U.S. counterterrorism partners (the TSCTP and PRACT partner countries). Democratic trends in Africa have raised concerns. Freedom House, which ranks levels of freedom around the world, suggests that the region has experienced backsliding over the past decade, with 43% of sub-Saharan African countries ranking Not Free and another 37% ranking Partially Free in its 2015 Freedom in the World index. From Burkina Faso to Burundi, a number of incumbent African leaders have taken steps to extend their terms in office, often prompting mass protests and, in some cases, violent responses from security forces. Several top security assistance recipients under current counterterrorism programs and proposed ALS deliverables have leaders who have been in office for more than 15 years, namely Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Rwanda, and Uganda. Armed forces reportedly continue to play a significant role in politics and governance in several top U.S. security partner countries, including Ethiopia, Mauritania, and Uganda, and the State Department’s own annual human rights reports have raised concerns with security force abuses in many of the countries considered “partners” in security cooperation programs.

The United States has taken measures to limit the potential for U.S. security assistance to be associated with abusive foreign governments and security forces through policy determinations and legal restrictions on aid. Among such restrictions are the so-called “Leahy laws,” which prohibit the provision of U.S. security assistance to foreign security force units that have been credibly implicated in gross violations of human rights.⁵¹ Congress also prohibits foreign assistance to governments that have overthrown elected

⁴⁶ See, e.g., Jennifer D.P. Moroney, David E. Thaler and Joe Hogler, *Review of Security Cooperation Mechanisms Combatant Commands Utilize to Build Partner Capacity*, RAND Corporation, 2013 and Christopher Paul et al., *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?*, RAND Corporation, 2013.

⁴⁷ Lesley Anne Warner, *The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership*, Center for Naval Analysis, March 2014.

⁴⁸ The State Department’s Political-Military Bureau is leading its efforts to expand monitoring and evaluation of FMF and IMET programs. A brief overview of this effort is described in the Department’s FY2016 Congressional Budget Justification.

⁴⁹ See GAO, *Building Partner Capacity: Key Practices to Effectively Manage Department of Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation*, GAO-13-335T, February 14, 2013.

⁵⁰ The RAND study cites quantitative studies on the aggregate effect of U.S. security assistance, noting that “material assistance (particularly arms transfers) has generally been found to be more problematic than assistance focused on training and education. Weak and autocratic states have difficulty making positive use of security sector assistance, and in many studies, such assistance was found to have potentially destabilizing effects.” Stephen Watts, *Identifying and Mitigating Risks in Security Sector Assistance for Africa’s Fragile States*, RAND Corporation, 2015.

⁵¹ The original Leahy law was codified in 1976 in Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2378d). It applies to assistance provided through State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations. The DOD Leahy law, which applies to DOD appropriations and had appeared in annual appropriations acts since 1998, was codified in the FY2015 NDAA as 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2249e. For more information, see CRS Report R43361, “Leahy Law” Human (continued...)

governments through military coups, and has enacted various other country-specific legal provisions related to security assistance and human rights concerns through provisions in annual appropriations and country-specific or issue-specific legislation. The Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (CSPA, P.L. 110-457), as amended, for example, restricts IMET, FMF, PKO for certain purposes, and the licensing of EDA and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) to countries implicated in the use of child soldiers. Six of the nine countries currently implicated are in Africa. Among them, however, the President has determined it to be in the national interest to waive the restriction for Rwanda and Somalia, and to provide a partial waiver for certain types of military aid in CAR, DRC, and South Sudan. Only Sudan (along with Myanmar and Syria) did not receive a presidential waiver.⁵² Some critics suggest that such waivers limit the effectiveness of the law and discourage accountability.⁵³ The Administration contends, however, that such waivers allow the United States to support military professionalization and participation in peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations. These considerations highlight the challenges U.S. policymakers face as they weigh the opportunities and potential consequences of security assistance in the region.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify about these issues. I look forward to your questions.

(...continued)

Rights Provisions and Security Assistance: Issue Overview, by Nina M. Serafino et al.

⁵² The most recent was released in June 2014; it includes the CAR, DRC, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, and Somalia.

⁵³ See, e.g., World Vision, "Child Soldier Prevention Law: Partial Enforcement Lets Some Offending Countries Off the Hook," October 2, 2014 and Human Rights Watch, "U.S.: Don't Finance Child Soldiers," October 3, 2011.