

MEASURING THE IMMEASURABLE: AN APPROACH TO ASSESSING THE  
EFFECTIVENESS OF ENGINEERING CIVIC ASSISTANCE PROJECTS TOWARDS  
ACHIEVING NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
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## ABSTRACT

MEASURING THE IMMEASURABLE: AN APPROACH TO ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ENGINEERING CIVIC ASSISTANCE PROJECTS TOWARDS ACHIEVING NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES, by Major Orlando Nicholas Craig, 102 pages.

One of the fundamental struggles of U.S. conflicts in the post-World War II era continues to be how to utilize the military instrument of national power as a way to influence people and populations in order to achieve national objectives. In the 2014 *Quadrennial Defense Review*, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey specifies that conducting humanitarian assistance is one of the twelve different ways in which the U.S. military achieves national security objectives. Given this support, there is ever increasing reliance on Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA), specifically engineering civic assistance projects (ENCAPs), as a way to shape the operational environment. Given this increased utilization, assessing their effectiveness towards achieving national security objectives becomes paramount. However, an adequate method of assessment does not exist. The development of such a system will increase the value and effectiveness of ENCAPs given their expanded utilization in a fiscally austere environment that threatens to reduce or eliminate their funding.

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## ACRONYMS

AAR	After Action Review
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
AOR	Area of Responsibility
CCDR	Combatant Commander
CCMD	Combatant Command
DoD	Department of Defense
ENCAP	Engineering Civic Assistance Project
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HCA	Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
HES	Hamlet Evaluation Method
MoE	Measures of Effectiveness
MoP	Measures of Performance
NMS	National Military Strategy
OHASIS	Overseas Humanitarian Shared Information System
OP	Operational Level Task
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
SN	Strategic National Level Task
ST	Strategic Theater Level Task
TCP	Theater Campaign Plan
UJTL	Unified Joint Task List
USAFRICOM	United States Africa Command
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

USPACOM      United States Pacific Command  
USSOUTHCOM      United States Southern Command

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The United States and its allies have employed a different approach in this struggle for the hearts and minds of men. The Western strategy has been to assist the underdeveloped countries to maintain their political independence . . . and to improve their standard of living. Civic action has been a significant element of this assistance.

— Lt. Colonel Neil B. Mills, USMC, *An Analysis of Civic Action in Selected Underdeveloped Countries*

One of the fundamental struggles of U.S. conflicts in the post-World War II era continues to be how to utilize the military instrument of national power as a way to influence people and populations in order to achieve national objectives. Without any context, one would surmise that Lt. Colonel Mills made these remarks in reference to the recent, national and military strategies. Most would be surprised to learn that this is the observation, made in 1964, of a student at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College as he examined civic action in the context of U. S. Military and coalition operations in the Philippines, Malaya, Laos, Korea, and Vietnam. Fifty years later humanitarian civic assistance (HCA) is still a significant part of U.S. strategy. However, the question is, are these programs effective? This study will analyze a form of HCA known as engineering civic assistance projects (ENCAPs) to determine their effectiveness in achieving national security objectives.

#### Background of the Study

The U.S. military faces the challenge of achieving national security objectives in an age of rapid dissemination of technology and information. Thus capabilities once wielded by major powers in generations past are now available to smaller nations and

non-state actors alike. This, combined with the growth of globalization creates, arguably, the most complex operating environment the U.S. military has ever faced. The 2014

*Quadrennial Defense Review* states:

Global trends that will define the future security environment are characterized by a rapid rate of change and a complexity born of the multiple ways in which they intersect and influence one another. As a result, despite the growing availability and flow of information around the world, it is increasingly challenging to predict how global threats . . . will evolve.<sup>1</sup>

The current operational environment places the United States and its military at a transition point as, was the case after World War II, Vietnam and the end of the Cold War. However, this point is distinctly different as the U.S. faces varying types of threats that utilize asymmetric methods to exploit U.S vulnerabilities. The bureaucracy that hinders traditional, democratic states does not constrain these threats. Thus, they often succeed in defining the narrative and, therefore, influencing the population in their favor.

To succeed against this multifaceted threat, the United States utilizes all the elements of national power to shape the environment in an effort to achieve its national objectives and extend its influence. These shaping activities “described as routine military and interagency activities performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries, reinforce alliances, and ensure or solidify our relationships with allies and partners—will become increasingly important.”<sup>2</sup> The Department of Defense (DoD) uses the concept of engagement to accomplish this aim. Simply stated, “[engagement] is the related tasks and systems that influence the behaviors of people, security forces, and governments.”<sup>3</sup> The DoD views this concept as vital in its efforts to shape the environment as it “is rooted in [the United States’] efforts to reduce the potential for conflict, by deterring aggression and coercive behavior in key regions, and positively influencing global events.”<sup>4</sup> As a

result, the U.S. government deploys the military throughout the world in support of its vital interests. These “demands of American global leadership have required almost continuous American military commitment since the end of the Cold War.”<sup>5</sup> This demand falls upon the unified combatant commands (CCMDs).

Utilizing guidance from the national command authority, the geographic combatant commanders (CCDRs) develop a theater campaign plan (TCP) that seeks to achieve national security objectives within their particular area of responsibility. In conjunction with the Department of State, the CCMDs “[conduct] military engagement with foreign partners to promote specific U.S. security interests and encourage a democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces of other countries.”<sup>6</sup> More specifically, the CCDRs “[employ] regionally-focused forces to . . . achieve critical global and regional objectives.”<sup>7</sup> In his assessment of the 2014 *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)*, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey outlines conducting humanitarian assistance (HA) as one of the twelve different ways in which the U.S. military achieves national security objectives.

Humanitarian assistance (HA) covers a vast array of activities, operations, and functions. It is defined as those “activities conducted outside the U.S. and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.”<sup>8</sup> Additionally, these “operations are normally conducted in support of the United States Agency for International Development or the Department of State (USAID).”<sup>9</sup> These activities are conducted either in response to a natural or manmade disaster or as steady-state operations in support of theater security cooperation plans and campaign plans. Often, assistance operations occur in conjunction with the steady state HA programs. This

assistance falls into three distinct categories: security assistance, foreign internal defense and humanitarian and civic assistance. The U.S. military provides humanitarian and civic assistance predominately “to the local populace . . . in conjunction with authorized military operations.”<sup>10</sup> This assistance further delineates into specific categories including veterinary care, medical care, and basic construction. These construction missions are more commonly known as engineering civic assistance projects (ENCAPs).

### Research Questions

Given their increasing utilization, the main purpose of this research is to ascertain whether assistance ENCAPs achieve national security objectives. To determine if ENCAPs achieve national security objectives requires answering three secondary questions. First, the researcher must determine the objectives the CCMDs use ENCAPs to achieve. Second, one must scrutinize how the military assesses the effectiveness of ENCAPs towards achieving those objectives. Third, one should examine other methods of assessing the impact of ENCAPs. This will determine whether the methods the military uses are accurate and relevant.

### Significance of the Study

Combatant commanders regularly use ENCAPs in their areas of responsibility (AOR). From 2005 to 2010, the CCMDs spent over \$328 million implementing HCA projects across their respective theaters.<sup>11</sup> During fiscal years 2012 through 2014, United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), executed 89 ENCAPs valuing in excess of twelve million dollars. This amount totaled nearly sixty

percent of the total HCA budget for those CCMDs.<sup>12</sup> In his annual posture statement before the House Armed Services Committee, General John Kelly, Commander, USSOUTHCOM declared that:

Humanitarian and civic assistance programs encourage collective action and demonstrate our values and commitment to the region. . . . These humanitarian missions are one the most effective tools in our national security toolkit and . . . warrant greater employment.<sup>13</sup>

In addition to General Kelly, the commanders of PACOM and AFRICOM requested additional funding for additional HCA projects, which confirms the notion that CCDRs view these missions as a viable way to achieve theater objectives.

Despite their touted success, oversight organizations call into question the effectiveness of ENCAPs. The Government Accountability Office conducted a least two studies on this topic in the recent past. One study, carried out in 2012, found that the DoD could not directly link HCA activities, including ENCAPs, to specific effects or objectives. This was similar to the results of a study conducted in the 1990s.

Cuts to defense budgets further complicate this subject. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's assesses that cuts to defense spending "would significantly reduce the [DoD's] ability to fully implement [its] strategy."<sup>14</sup> Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander, USPACOM, expands upon this fiscal ambiguity stating: "budget uncertainty has hampered our readiness and complicated our ability to execute long-term plans to efficiently use our resources. These uncertainties . . . degrade our ability to reliably interact with our allies and partners in the region."<sup>15</sup> Determining how CCDRs can most effectively utilize ENCAPs to achieve maximum effect while minimizing their cost is crucial given the conditions of today's operational environment.

## Definitions

To ensure shared understanding throughout the course of the research, the researcher uses the following definitions as key terms:

Assessment: “[determination] of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective.”<sup>16</sup>

Baseline: “[information] collected before or at the start of a project or program that provides a basis for planning or assessing subsequent progress and impact.”<sup>17</sup>

Effectiveness: “A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom.”<sup>18</sup>

Efficiency: A measure of the outputs, qualitative and quantitative, achieved as a result of the inputs.<sup>19</sup>

Indicator: “An item of information that provides insight into a measure of effectiveness or measure of performance.”<sup>20</sup>

Output: “A final product or service delivered by a program or project to beneficiaries, such as goods, services, training, or facilities that a program is expected to produce to achieve its expected objectives.”<sup>21</sup>

Processes: “The activities that must be undertaken to achieve project objectives.”<sup>22</sup>

## Methodology

This research study is a meta-analysis of qualitative data utilizing a grounded theory approach to develop a theory concerning the evaluation and assessment of the effectiveness of ENCAPs. This study examines the effectiveness of ENCAPs in achieving the objectives prescribed by U.S. Law and DoD policy.

### Limitations and Delimitations

There are several limitations to this research. First, the period of research was limited to the nine-month timeframe of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College's master's degree program. Second, due to resources constraints and geographic considerations, the researcher was not able to visit any ENCAPs.

This study includes several delimitations. The researcher did not interview or survey the intended affected populations of ENCAPs to assess their impact. Therefore, the author did not utilize primary information from the affected population nor did the researcher conduct any quantitative research, such as surveys, of that population. Additionally, the author only researched ENCAPs funded with HCA appropriations and executed in the USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, and USAFRICOM AORs given the similarities of their respective operational environments. The researcher did not consider the limited HCA activities conducted by U.S. Central Command and U.S. Northern Command within the scope of the research. The researcher's primary source of data concerning ENCAP specifics was, both directly and indirectly, compiled from, the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS). This research assumed that the data in the system is accurate and correct. In addition to this, the researcher only examined assessment tools and policies of the DoD. This research does not include assessment policies of the CCMDs, as not all were available for the researcher to access. Furthermore, this study only used unclassified data, which reduces the totality of information to examine.

## Summary

This chapter introduced the topic of research, ascertaining whether ENCAPs are effective in achieving national security objectives. It provided a background of the problem and its relevance to today's operating environment. From this context, the researcher developed a primary research question. From this, the researcher derived secondary questions whose answers, when compiled, will answer the primary research question. Additionally, this chapter defined key terms and concepts to standardize understanding and provide a baseline for analysis throughout the course of the research. Finally, this chapter described the limitations and delimitations of the study to frame the scope of the thesis.

This study includes four additional chapters. Chapter 2 reviews pertinent literature to collect information regarding the secondary research questions. Chapter 3 describes the grounded theory methodology utilized and the analytical framework applied to answer the primary research question. Chapter 4 analyzes the results of that framework after applying it to the data collected in order to answer the secondary questions, and ultimately, determining whether ENCAPs achieve national security objectives. Chapter 5 reviews the findings of the analysis and proposed recommendations to decision-makers as well as highlights areas that warrant further research.

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<sup>1</sup> Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense), 6, accessed September 20, 2014, [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014\\_Quadrennial\\_Defense\\_Review.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2014), 6.

<sup>3</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-5, *U.S. Army Concept for Engagement* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February

2014), 5, accessed November 15, 2014, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-8-5.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 11.

<sup>5</sup> Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2014*, 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>7</sup> Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 23.

<sup>8</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), I-1, accessed November 13, 2014, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp3\\_29.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_29.pdf).

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, I-1.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> Government Accountability Office, GAO Report 12-359, *Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military's Efforts, 2012* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2014), 6, accessed September 20, 2014, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588334.pdf>.

<sup>12</sup> Statistics compiled from data in the annual reports to Congress regarding Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Programs for Fiscal Years 2012-2014 published in March each year. Joint Staff, *Department of Defense: Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Programs: Fiscal Years 2012-2014* (Washington DC: Department of Defense).

<sup>13</sup> United States Southern Command, *Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps, Commander, United States Southern Command before the House Armed Services Committee*, 113th Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 26 February 2014), 26, accessed November 6, 2014, <http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/documents/southcom%202013%20posture%20statement%20final%20sasc.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 53.

<sup>15</sup> U.S. Pacific Command, *Posture Statement of Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command before the Senate Committee on Armed Services* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 25 March 2014), 17, accessed November 6, 2014, [http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Locklear\\_03-25-14.pdf](http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Locklear_03-25-14.pdf).

<sup>16</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing

Office, 2010, amended 2015), 20, accessed May 7, 2015, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp1\\_02.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf).

<sup>17</sup> Marla C. Haims et al., *Developing a Prototype Handbook for Monitoring and Evaluating Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance Projects* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011), 79, accessed September 20, 2014, [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical\\_reports/2011/RAND\\_TR784.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR784.pdf).

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 75.

<sup>19</sup> Margie Buchanan-Smith and John Cosgrave, *Evaluation of Humanitarian Action: Pilot Guide* (London, UK: ALNAP, 2013), 59-61, accessed November 14, 2014, <http://www.alnap.org/resource/8229#>.

<sup>20</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADRP) 5-0, *The Army Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2012), 5-3, accessed November 5, 2014, [http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR\\_pubs/dr\\_a/pdf/adrp5\\_0.pdf](http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp5_0.pdf).

<sup>21</sup> United Nations Monitoring, Evaluation and Consulting Division, *Glossary of Monitoring and Evaluation Terms*, August 2006, quoted in Marla C. Haims, Melinda Moore, Harold D. Greene Jr., and Cynthia Clapp-Wincek, *Developing a Prototype Handbook for Monitoring and Evaluating Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance Projects* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011), 13.

<sup>22</sup> Haims et al., 8.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

By the time of World War II, a propensity toward military civic action was already part of the fabric of the U.S. soldier.

—John Pauw, *Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action*

#### Introduction

The first chapter of this research introduced the topic of ENCAPs and their relevance to national strategy. It specified the primary question this research attempts to answer: “Do ENCAPs achieve national security objectives?” This chapter reviews the current and relevant literature and data regarding the topics related to ENCAPs. In accordance with a grounded theory, qualitative approach, this allows the researcher to open code the information into broad categories based on the secondary research questions. The structure of this chapter mirrors that review.

The first section, “What are the objectives of ENCAPs?” examines the current Department of Defense (DoD) and Combatant Command policies and reviews the theater campaign plan objectives where ENCAPs are used as a way to achieve that particular objective. Additionally, it examines the historical application of ENCAPs to provide context to the research. The second section, “How does the military assess ENCAPs?” studies the methods that the DoD and military use to assess the effectiveness of ENCAPs. It also reviews historical assessment methods to provide background to the process. The third section, “What other methods exist for assessing ENCAPs?” considers current

policies and processes for evaluating ENCAPs as well as reviews assessment models utilized by other government and non-governmental agencies.

### What are the objectives of ENCAPs?

To understand the objectives that CCDRs use ENCAPs to achieve, it is necessary to comprehend why CCDRs use them. This requires understanding the evolution of ENCAPs from their historical origins to their modern equivalents. This provides context for their use and their relation to the U.S.'s national strategy at a particular point in time. This allows the researcher to contrast current national security objectives and ENCAPs against historical examples to begin the constant comparative method of data analysis.

### What Objectives Have ENCAPs Been Used to Achieve in the Past?

The U.S. military traces the origins of HCA to the 19th centuries, shortly after the birth of the nation and the permanent establishment of its militaries. The concept of HCA, though named and defined differently, grew in correlation with the expansion of the U.S. and its emergence upon the world stage. This evolution eventually resulted in today's modern ENCAP. Reviewing this history provides both depth and breadth in terms of understanding the employment of ENCAPs and their relationship with national security objectives. This history divides into three distinct periods: the Civil War through World War I, the interwar period through World War II, and post-World War II.

The first begins at the start of the American Civil War and extends to the beginning of World War II. This period saw a dramatic expansion of the U.S. in terms of both territory and power. With this expansion, the requirement to manage and administer newly acquired territories increased exponentially. As a result, the military "conducted

explorations, governed territories, guarded national parks, engaged in public works, provided disaster relief, quelled domestic disturbances, and supported American foreign policy short of engaging in open warfare.”<sup>1</sup> These operations contained both civil and military aspects. Though the military did not formally develop and disseminate doctrine regarding these operations, commonalities in terms began to emerge. One of these terms was pacification.



Figure 1. U.S. Army Small Wars Activities 1861-1938

Source: Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941* (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 1998), 8-9, accessed May 8, 2015, [http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-66-1/CMH\\_Pub\\_70-66-1.pdf](http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-66-1/CMH_Pub_70-66-1.pdf).

Though not formally used in today’s doctrine, pacification contains many of the same principles and tenets found in modern HCA policy and guidance. LTC Robert L.

Bullard, who served in the Philippines defined pacification as “all means, short of actual war, used by the dominating power in the operation of bringing back to a state of peace and order the inhabitants of a district lately in hostilities.”<sup>2</sup> Broadly speaking, Bullard’s article argued that pacification included all the actions taken by the occupying power to stabilize the region. These actions are broken into two categories: military operations and civil operations. Civil operations were the modern equivalent of engagement and varied widely based on the environment and situation within the particular country. As the U.S. expanded, it conducted these operations in a variety of places.

Between 1860 and 1920, the U.S. military gained significant experience in small-scale contingency operations that would serve as the foundation of HCA doctrine of the future. The experience came from Civil War Reconstruction, the Indian Wars, and operations in China and Panama. During his tenure as military governor of Cuba, beginning in 1899, MG John R. Brooke “maintained law and order, gave wartime refugees emergency assistance, enforced new sanitation codes, and built roads, sewers, and schools.”<sup>3</sup> The U.S. took similar actions in the Philippines, where “roads, markets, clinics, and schools formed the basis of the Army’s nation-building campaign.”<sup>4</sup> Despite this vast experience, the lessons of these operations were not captured into doctrine until the inter World War period with the U.S. Marine Corps assuming the preponderance of the doctrine formalization.

Circumstances of this second period, uniquely positioned the U.S. Marine Corps to play a leading role in the development of pacification doctrine given its smaller size and rapid deployability. From 1901 to 1934, there were over fifty incidents of U.S. military forces, mostly Marines, conducting operations to protect American lives,

interests, and property.<sup>5</sup> It was in this role that the Marines, in conjunction with the Department of State, tried to “achieve the Small Wars’ complex political objectives.”<sup>6</sup> The impact of these missions naturally found their way into doctrine, culminating in the publication of *NAVMC 2890: Small Wars Manual* in 1940, which gave examples of HCA. This manual instructed U.S. officers and enlisted personnel to provide the initial leadership of newly established host nation military units until the host nation developed suitable leadership. One of the potential duties of this combined unit was “supervision of the construction of roads and bridges.”<sup>7</sup> As the interwar period closed, the Army reflected the lessons encoded by the Marines in both its policies and doctrine.

The Army recognized the need for examining small wars tenets as well. Especially as the specter of war loomed large in both Europe and the Pacific. As a result, it began to see the relevance of expanded doctrine in the realm of civic assistance. In 1940, “a study, prepared by a student committee at the Army War College . . . proposed [a] Basic Field Manual, entitled: Military Law, The Administration of Civil Affairs in Occupied Alien Territory.”<sup>8</sup> The concepts of the doctrine were the same in that “the process (indigenous troops working on nonmilitary projects) and outcome (nation building) were the same.”<sup>9</sup> Principles such as these laid the groundwork for future civic assistance with the onset of World War II.

The sheer scale and size of World War II gave rise to the concepts of security cooperation and civic assistance that exist today. The crucible of the world’s most cataclysmic war created a fertile ground for the development of civic assistance. Though distinct because their main purpose was reconstruction, the U.S. government developed concepts that would eventually link to civic assistance. An example includes the:

Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) Program, which was designed “to prevent such starvation and widespread disease and civil unrest as would clearly endanger the occupying forces and permanently obstruct the ultimate objectives of the occupation.”<sup>10</sup>

This program, managed by the precursor of the USAID, eventually evolved into the “Marshall Plan.” The impact of the plan was broad and the U.S., as a newly minted superpower, began to apply these lessons as an instrument of national policy.

The time after World War II marks the third period of HCA development. Initially, the containment of communism was the overriding factor in U.S. foreign policy. Thus, the U.S. government placed efforts in developing ways to counter communist influence. One of the methods employed was civic assistance. The first time the U.S. implemented this was during the Korean War through a program known as Armed Forces Assistance to Korea. A U.S. Army documentary described:

Americans have traditionally responded to friends in trouble. And in Korea, a country torn apart by war, our Soldiers are lending a helping hand. A gesture, which started as an informal assist, has mushroomed into a big organized program for the rehabilitation of certain areas of Korean life. Armed Forces Assistance to Korea . . . is an American Army project, which is destined to become a living monument of friendship between peoples.<sup>11</sup>

As the program expanded, so did the role of both Korean and American military forces. Together, the forces conducted combined operations to construct schools, clinics, markets, and other projects to “help raise this nation from the depths of poverty, giving a people strength to resist the nearby communist plague which feeds on adversity.”<sup>12</sup> By 1962, the program completed over 4,527 projects.<sup>13</sup> Following, similar concepts, the United States expanded HCA activities throughout the world including Latin America, and, in particular, Southeast Asia. During this period, “[the] U.S. found that no region in

the world was more dynamic, more diverse, or more complex than Asia, particularly as communist inspired insurgencies began to threaten the stability of the entire region.”<sup>14</sup>




Figure 2. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Activities, 1942-1976

Source: Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942-1976* (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2006), 6-7, accessed May 8, 2015, [http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/us\\_army\\_counterinsurgency/CMH\\_70-98-1\\_US%20Army\\_Counterinsurgency\\_WQ.pdf](http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/us_army_counterinsurgency/CMH_70-98-1_US%20Army_Counterinsurgency_WQ.pdf).

The Vietnam War represents another watershed moment in the development and implementation of HCA activities. The United States “fused all civilian and military operations into a new, unified programmatic effort - the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support Program (CORDS).”<sup>15</sup> This cooperation was unique in that it compelled collaboration through the development of joint objectives between the military and civilian implementers of U.S. policy in respect to pacification. Despite some discord,

the program was successful. By 1970, “the [Viet Cong] insurgency had largely been defeated, making it possible to hold elections in over 10,000 hamlets and 2,000 villages throughout South Vietnam.”<sup>16</sup>

However, as the Vietnam War grew increasingly unpopular amongst the U.S. population and its policy makers, this success was lost, and civic assistance became a target of blame for the war. Due to changing dynamics of the political and military environments, civic assistance fell from the limelight as an element of U.S. policy. In the country’s post-Vietnam recovery, the military focused its efforts on the defense of Western Europe and there was no stomach for civic assistance.

It was not until the 1980s that the U.S. slowly re-elevated HCA as a viable option for engagement within a region. The CCMDs continued to expand civic assistance programs within their AORs, especially in Africa and the Pacific. Today, the CCDRs continue to use HCA a strategic tool to influence and shape their respective operational environment.

The concept of HCA is nearly as old as the nation itself. Though terms and definitions changed over time, the principle remained relatively similar. As the U.S. grew in respect of its role in the world, so too did its use of HCA. This use began at the turn of the 20th century in operations in countries including China, Panama, and the Philippines. Despite practices not being codified into doctrine, military personnel shared ideas and experiences. As the U.S. emerged from World War I the U.S. Marine Corps, predominately, developed policy and doctrine concerning HCA, which the U.S. utilized throughout World War II. With the birth of the U.S. as a superpower at the dawn of the Cold War, it viewed HCA as a way to leverage the military instrument of national power

to counter the influence of communism. The largest examples of this occurred in Korea, where it was deemed a success, and Vietnam, where politicians and the American public perceived it as a failure. This perception created a lull in HCA activities through the 1970s. Increased defense spending in the 1980s saw the reemergence of HCA as a way for CCDRs to shape their AORs. This use continues today.

Understanding the history of HCA, of which ENCAPs are a subcomponent, provides the author context and perspective in terms of their use. Furthermore, it enables the researcher to triangulate data when conducting analysis. This triangulation provides background for use in examining the objectives of ENCAPs.

#### What National Security Objectives Link to ENCAPs?

To assess whether ENCAPs achieve national security objectives requires reviewing information from three areas. First, it requires a firm understanding of the national security objectives of the United States. The *National Security Strategy of the United States* defines these objectives. Reviewing this document allows the researcher to specify those objectives for later analysis. Second, these objectives should nest into subordinate DoD and military strategy. Therefore, the researcher needs to review DoD strategic documents to assess their linkage to the *National Security Strategy*. Finally, the doctrine of the joint forces will be examined to provide information on the mechanisms that the military uses to translate strategic goals into military objectives. This will form the basis for evaluating ENCAP assessment methods further into the research.

The requirement for the President to develop the *National Security Strategy* originated in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. It requires the President to identify “[the] worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of

the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.”<sup>17</sup> President Obama published the most recent *National Security Strategy* in February 2015 where he outlined “the principles and priorities that describe how America will lead the world toward greater peace and a new prosperity.”<sup>18</sup> The President intends to accomplish this through the advancement of four key areas: security, prosperity, universal values and international order. Naturally, the *Quadrennial Defense Review* reflects the essence of the strategic framework of the *National Security Strategy*.

The *QDR* is the Secretary of Defense’s primary vessel for synthesizing the *National Security Strategy* into strategic guidance for the DoD. The most recent *QDR* nests with the *National Security Strategy* by taking its objectives and organizing them into defense missions in terms of three strategic pillars. By acting through these pillars, the United States will build security globally by “[continuing] a strong U.S. commitment to shaping world events . . . to deter and prevent conflict and to assure our allies and partners of our commitment to our shared security.”<sup>19</sup> Two of the methods the DoD uses to achieve this is through HA and building partner capacity, which are both objectives of HCA. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff further refines the objectives and incorporates them in the *National Military Strategy (NMS)*.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen described the purpose of the *NMS* as “[providing] the ways and means by which our military will advance our enduring national interests.”<sup>20</sup> The *NMS* further links with the *National Security Strategy* and the *QDR* by outlining and describing U.S. military objectives, operational concepts, budget and fiscal requirements and inherent risk. Also, it must include assessments of the strategic environment threats, both U.S. and ally capabilities

and capacities, and critical assumptions made in their regard. Ultimately, the *NMS* provides “the vision [of] a Joint Force that provides military capability to defend our Nation and allies, and to advance broader peace, security, and prosperity.”<sup>21</sup>

To reach these objectives, CCDRs develop a TCP. The TCP identifies military objectives for the CCDR’s AOR that nest with the broader security objectives of the *National Military Strategy (NMS)*, *QDR*, and *National Security Strategy*. By identifying these objectives, the CCDR conducts operations to “[shape] perceptions and [influence] the behavior of both adversaries and partner nations, [develop] partner nation and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, [improve] information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access.”<sup>22</sup> Generally, these activities fall under the umbrella of theater security cooperation of which HCA is a further sub-component.

Security cooperation is a relatively new term for joint force doctrine and whose definition is still evolving. The origin of the concept derives from DoD Reform Initiative Directive #40 that transitioned the Defense Security Assistance Agency to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which took effect in 1998. Despite the establishment of the agency in 1998, DoD did not develop a formal doctrinal definition of security cooperation until 2004. This definition remains the same today:

Activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.<sup>23</sup>

Broadly, security cooperation falls into seven main categories of which HCA is a sub-component of the more expansive HA category.

To determine whether ENCAPs achieve national security objectives requires defining those objectives. Through reviewing literature across three categories. First, to define the most current objectives as specified by the President, the author examined the *2015 National Security Strategy of the United States*. Second, the researcher reviewed the current *QDR*, and *NMS* to gather data on strategic objectives as defined by the DoD and senior military leadership. Finally, the researcher studied joint force doctrine to collect information on how CCDRs translate strategic guidance into military objectives. With this data, the researcher will use constant comparative analysis to assess the level of synchronization through the chain of command to determine if ENCAPs link to national security objectives.

#### What Are the Legal and Policy Requirements of ENCAPs?

Identifying the objectives of ENCAPs in their entirety entails more than just studying their history and national security policy. It requires reviewing both U.S. law and DoD policy, which forms the legal basis for the program as well as provides supplemental guidance to their implementation. Since HCA is a program established by law, reviewing 10 U.S.C will provide additional data in regards to ENCAP objectives. Combining this with the examination of DoD policy ensures that all objectives of ENCAPs are identified. Understanding their legal evolution begins with the success of the aforementioned Armed Forces Assistance to Korea Program.

Given the achievements of the program, Congress created the Draper Committee to analyze the effectiveness of HCA as a tool to counter communist expansion. This committee, in combination with other elements of the U.S. government, began conceptualizing the objectives of HCA. Prior to the escalation of the Vietnam conflict in 1965, the U.S. government developed several key pieces of policy and legislation that shaped civic assistance through the 1970s. In March, 1961, President Kennedy declared a “new generation of military leaders has shown an increasing awareness that armies cannot only defend their countries—they can, as we have learned through our own Corps of Engineers, they can help to build them.”<sup>24</sup> To delineate responsibilities from the newly formed USAID, Congress mandated that civic assistance executed by the military be limited to:

assisting foreign military forces in less developed friendly countries (or the voluntary efforts of personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States in such countries) to construct public works and to engage in other activities helpful to the economic and social development of such friendly countries . . . and be coordinated with and form part of the total economic and social development effort.<sup>25</sup>

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 amended 10 U.S.C. to encode civic assistance into law and formalized both the term and definition for HCA. It also required that HCA, if utilized, would be “provided in conjunction with military operations.”<sup>26</sup> Additionally, the law authorized the DoD to execute HCA activities if those activities promote “the security interests of both the United States and the country in which the activities are to be carried out; and the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities.”<sup>27</sup> It continues to define activities considered HCA:

1. Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas of a country that are rural or are underserved by medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary professionals, respectively, including education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided.
2. Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
3. Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
4. Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.<sup>28</sup>

Based on these requirements, the DoD issued its policy guidance further refining these requirements.

The primary policy that the DoD issues concerning HCA activities is DoD Instruction 2205.02. This policy emphasizes the two primary requirements of HCA. First, HCA activities must “[serve] the basic economic and social needs of the [host nation].”<sup>29</sup> The DoD further delineated these needs by implementing HA goals for all projects funded by Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Appropriation. These five goals are:

1. Improve the basic living conditions of the civilian populace in a country or region that is susceptible to violent extremism and/or otherwise strategically important to the United States.
2. Enhance the legitimacy of the [host nation] by improving its capacity to provide essential services to its populace.
3. Promote interoperability and coalition-building with foreign military and civilian counterparts.

4. Generate long-term positive perceptions of [the] DoD and the [United States government] with [host nation] civilian and military institutions.
5. Enhance security and promote enduring stability in the [host nation] or region.<sup>30</sup>

The policy goes on to reaffirm 10 U.S.C in that HCA activities cannot duplicate ongoing projects or programs executed by either the Department of State or the USAID. It encourages the DoD to coordinate with these other entities so that efforts are complementary. However, the DoD does not need explicit concurrence from the interagency to execute an HCA project. If there is disagreement, the project nomination must note it.

While meeting a humanitarian need, HCA projects are simultaneously required to improve the readiness of U.S. military forces, the second requirement. The intent is that U.S. military personnel improve their readiness to respond to contingencies. Furthermore, U.S. forces gain experience while enhancing interoperability with coalition partners.

To identify all of the objectives of ENCAPs requires reviewing both their legal and policy requirements. Generally, these two sources require two broad objectives for ENCAPs. First, the ENCAP must meet a humanitarian need for the population of the host nation. Second, ENCAPs must reinforce and improve the operational skills of U.S. military personnel. During analysis, this information, combined with the data collected concerning national security objectives, and context gleaned from a historical examination will allow the researcher to conduct constant comparative analysis in accordance with the grounded theory methodology. Furthermore, three sub-questions

must be answered to ensure that the researcher saturates the information concerning objectives of ENCAPs and can triangulate data for validity.

### How Does the Military Assess ENCAPs?

To determine whether ENCAPs achieve national security objectives requires answering three secondary questions. The previous section reviewed the literature regarding the first secondary research question. The second of these questions asks, “How does the DoD assess the effectiveness of ENCAPs?” This question divides into smaller areas of research. The first area examines current assessment methods in terms of legal and policy requirements, joint force doctrine, and HCA tasks specified on the unified joint task list (UJTL). The second area studies the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), a historical method used during the Vietnam War. Gathering information concerning these systems will allow the author to compare them to other models during analysis.

### How Does the DoD Currently Assess ENCAPs?

The requirements to assess the effectiveness of ENCAPs emanate from four different sources. Since HCA is a military operation, joint force doctrine is the first source and prescribes an assessment process as it applies to military operations. Similar to doctrine, the UJTL identifies two tasks that specifically relate to HCA. Both of those tasks include assigned metrics to aid in the assessment process. U.S. law and DoD policy are the third sources of assessment requirements. CCMDs derive the fourth source when, referencing specific legal requirements, and policy recommendations, they develop their

assessment models. However, because these models were unavailable at the time of research, they are not examined.

Military doctrine indirectly provides a framework for ENCAP assessment. Joint doctrine defines assessment as the “[determination] of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective.”<sup>31</sup> To determine the level of progress, measures of performance (MoPs) and measures of effectiveness (MoEs) are used to aid in evaluation. Doctrinally, “MoPs measure task performance . . . [and] are generally quantitative, but also can apply qualitative attributes to task accomplishment.”<sup>32</sup> MoEs are different in that they “assess changes in system behavior, capability, or [operational environment].”<sup>33</sup> To assess the change requires the development of indicators. For HCA activities, gathering baseline data prior to the start of the project achieves this objective. Assessors can measure the data again in the future and compare it against the original set of data to evaluate the change. Some potential indicators are prescribed in the HCA tasks identified on the UJTL.

The UJTL contains two explicit HCA tasks. The first task is Strategic Nation Level Task (SN) 8.1.5.1, which can direct a joint force to conduct HCA activities. If assigned this task, the joint force would “provide assistance in conjunction with military operations or exercises to fulfill training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace.”<sup>34</sup> The UJTL list specifies different metrics related to this task with most of the focus on time-based metrics related to plan development and transportation.

The second HCA task is Strategic Theater Level Task (ST) 8.2.4, which directs a joint force to coordinate HCA activities. Specifically, the joint forces “[provides]

assistance to the local populace with predominately [U.S.] forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises.”<sup>35</sup> The metrics for this task are predominately quantitative with a focus on benefits to U.S. forces and measuring the level of regional expertise that exists within the unit conducting HCA. Other metrics concentrate on gathering information from polar questions related to interagency coordination, and integration of HCA goals with theater and national objectives. Some of the metrics of both tasks derive from requirements outlined by U.S. law and DoD policy.

Requirements specified in Title 10, United States Code, and subsequent DoD policy dictated by DoD Instruction 2205.02, encompass the third source of requirements for the assessment of ENCAPs. The stipulations of U.S. law are quite simple. The law requires that the DoD submit an annual report to the U.S Congress regarding HCA activities. The only legislated requirements of this report are:

1. a list of the countries in which humanitarian and civic assistance activities were carried out during the preceding fiscal year;
2. the type and description of such activities carried out in each country during the preceding fiscal year; and
3. the amount expended in carrying out each such activity in each such country during the preceding fiscal year.<sup>36</sup>

Typically, this report entails more information in order to illustrate HCA activities to members of Congress. In addition to the specific requirements specified by law, the DoD includes an executive summary that compares the current fiscal year’s activities to the previous fiscal year. Furthermore, the DoD provides an assessment of whether HCA activities meet both the security objectives, and the training requirements specified by

law. To make this assessment, the DoD, via DoD Instruction 2205.02, directs the CCMDs to collect additional information to aid in the assessment of HCA activities.

Enclosure 3 of *DoD Instruction 2205.02 Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Activities* identifies the DoD's policy requirements in regards to assessment of HCA activities. The policy recognizes the importance of assessment stating that they "are an essential part of the HCA programs."<sup>37</sup> It describes the use of assessments as a tool to aid in determining whether projects meet objectives, provide training to military personnel, and are meaningful uses of resources. In summary, the DoD directs that HCA "be assessed to determine their initial and long-term effects within the [host] nation."<sup>38</sup>

The policy specifies that this assessment occur in two phases. The first assessment is the initial after-action review (AAR), completed by a project manager in OHASIS, within thirty days of project completion. This is required for all HCA projects and is mostly a final summary of quantitative outputs related to the ENCAP. The second phase of assessment occurs one year after project completion. Its format nearly mirrors that of the initial AAR with an additional section to assess outcomes. Both formats utilize a mixture of quantitative and qualitative questions to evaluate projects. However, the one-year assessment's feasibility is subject to the CCMD in that it "will determine the cost effectiveness . . . [accounting for] the impact of travel costs, budgets, and personnel availability."<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, the CCMD has the discretion of selecting the criteria in determining which projects to assess, thus creating the fourth source of assessment requirements.

Four sources establish the assessment requirements and models for ENCAPs. Joint force doctrine serves as the foundation as it provides the fundamentals for assessing

military operations in general. Supporting doctrine are the specific HCA tasks specified in the UJTL. These tasks establish metrics by which joint forces can assess their operations with respect to HCA. Portions of the metrics of the UJTL are derived from both 10 U.S.C. and DoD Instruction 2205.02. Together, these serve as the third source of HCA assessment requirements. The requirements of the law that authorizes HCA are fairly simple. DoD policy builds upon these by requiring an initial AAR within thirty days of project completion, and a one-year assessment if it is feasible for the CCMD. If the CCMDs conduct the assessment, they can determine the criteria for selecting which projects to assess. This creates the final source of ENCAP assessment requirements. OHASIS contains templates for both the initial AAR and the one-year assessment. Both of these evaluations nearly mirror each other with the exception that the one-year assessment contains a section to evaluate longer-term outcomes. Understanding how the assessment requirements and how military currently assesses ENCAPs enables their comparison to other models as the research progresses.

#### How Has the DoD Assessed ENCAPs in the Past?

To facilitate this comparison, research warrants examination of historic HCA assessment models. One such system is the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). Though not exclusively utilized for assessing ENCAPs, the HES, employed by U.S. officials during the CORDS program in Vietnam is worth exploration.

South Vietnamese with their American advisors began efforts to assess the security situation in Vietnam in the early 1960s. These early reporting systems focused on three key areas. The combined U.S.-South Vietnamese staff designated the three areas as pacification progress, administrative control, and military security.<sup>40</sup> Despite the

inclusion of the other three areas, the report emphasizes, in conventional fashion, was in the realm of military security.

Realizing that defeating the Vietcong insurgency in South Vietnam required a different approach, the DoD implemented the CORDS program in 1967. As a part of this program, the HES was “a new reporting device for evaluating the state of pacification throughout South Vietnam.”<sup>41</sup> The data “collected by the US military [included] measures of both selective and indiscriminate violence and levels of territorial control across all Vietnamese hamlets for a substantial temporal cross-section of the conflict.”<sup>42</sup>

The HES went through various iterations, but generally consisted of six categories with appropriate questions concerning conditions subordinate to those categories. Relevant to ENCAPs, the categories included Administrative and Political Activities, Economic Development, and Security. Each of these categories and its subordinate conditions were evaluated on a five-point, Likert-style Scale. The U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam implemented HES throughout South Vietnam. The DoD and national leadership found it to be “a modest, respectable device for indicating the status of the [Revolutionary Development] program in some 12,000-plus hamlets in Vietnam.”<sup>43</sup>

Though relatively short-lived, the DoD utilized HES, which provided a model of past HCA assessment. Understanding this system facilitates the researcher’s analysis of various models of assessing the effectiveness of ENCAPs. To further aid this analysis, requires the study of other models of humanitarian evaluation.

### What other methods exist for assessing ENCAPs?

To develop a holistic understanding of the topic of HCA assessment, it is necessary to exam other models of impact evaluation. Because HCA mirrors other humanitarian operations employed by governmental and non-governmental agencies alike, examining their assessment processes and systems is warranted. Three models were selected based on their relationship to the primary research question. The first model is the product of a DoD commissioned study related to HA. The second model emanates from a non-governmental organization that, similar to the purpose of HCA, conducts humanitarian work in an effect to improve the living conditions of impoverished countries through sustainable initiatives. An organization whose primary purpose is assessing humanitarian aid provides the third model for this research.

#### *Prototype Handbook for Monitoring and Evaluating DoD Humanitarian Assistance Projects*

In a 2012 audit of DoD HA and HCA activities, the Government Accountability Office observed, “[the] lack of consistent project evaluations appears to be a long-standing problem in the HCA program.”<sup>44</sup> One of the recommendations the study makes is for the DoD to use the *Prototype Handbook for Monitoring and Evaluating DoD Humanitarian Assistance Projects*, developed by the RAND Corporation in concert with representatives from the DoD, Department of State, USAID, and other non-governmental organizations. This handbook was the result of a DoD study commissioned in 2008 “to develop a handbook to support the monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian assistance projects funded by Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA)

appropriations.”<sup>45</sup> Given the linkage of ENCAP funding to this appropriation, this handbook is relevant to the assessment of ENCAs.

The intent of the authors was to design a “primer . . . to educate novice users on basic monitoring and evaluation concepts and terms, including topic areas that go beyond basic project-level assessment.”<sup>46</sup> Its audience was intended to be for those personnel who possess limited knowledge regarding evaluation processes of humanitarian aid. The handbook did undergo, albeit limited, pilot testing in two countries on a small number of projects.<sup>47</sup> Within this framework, it establishes a model and several processes for assessing HCA projects by recommending linking the project planning and assessment processes, and collecting baseline data.

The first of the most significant proposals it makes is establishing the linkage between the project planning cycle and the project assessment cycle. It states, “[while] a project is being developed, project planners should think about the results they wish to achieve, the processes that can be used to help ensure the desired results, and the indicators that can be used to measure results.”<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, it proposes that the desired outcomes should not just be focused on strategic goals. The approach towards assessment should be comprehensive in that it assesses each aspect of the project. This provides a holistic assessment as to its effectiveness. Critical to this assessment is the collection of baseline data.

For any HCA project to achieve objectives, CCMDs need to specify desired outcomes that correlate back to the specified objectives. To evaluate progress towards those outcomes, evaluators must identify indicators that measure progress. Crucial to this, is the collection of baseline data. Baseline data facilitates the comparison of original

conditions to those that currently exist, thus allowing the evaluator to identify the change in the environment and the progress towards desired outcomes.

To aid the evaluation process, the handbook developed proposed indicators for common DoD HA and HCA objectives. Moreover, it developed indicators for common DoD HCA projects including “water and sanitation, health infrastructure, non-health infrastructure, health services and disaster-related initiatives.<sup>49</sup>” The handbook concludes with worksheets organized into an appendix for use by a person assessing a particular project. The result was a collaborative effort with several other elements of the U.S. government to include USAID in the hopes that it could create commonality in the assessment process.

The *Prototype Handbook for Monitoring and Evaluating DoD Humanitarian Assistance Projects*, relevance to assessing ENCAPs stems from the DoD’s recognition that HA and HCA activities lacked proper evaluation. The handbook’s authors intended it to serve as an introduction of monitoring and evaluation techniques for both the DoD, and HA and HCA project managers. Specifically, it recommended linking the project planning process to the project assessment process. The study concludes with developed indicators for common HA and HCA objectives, and projects. Studying this model allows the researcher, through constant, comparative analysis; contrast it with other models of assessment to determine a core phenomenon in accordance with a grounded theory approach. However, to provide both depth and breadth in regards to understanding the assessment of HA, the researcher will review models from non-governmental agencies as well.

*Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning:  
World Vision's Approach to Design, Monitoring and Evaluation*

One such organization is World Vision International. Starting in 1950, World Vision seeks to “[work] with children, families, and their communities worldwide to reach their full potential by tackling the causes of poverty and injustice.”<sup>50</sup> They attempt to achieve this through working in concert with communities globally to address the underlying causes of poverty with the long-term hope of eliminating human suffering. World Vision works toward this goal via its six-step Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Monitoring Model. Of importance to this model, are three concepts that are pertinent to assessing ENCAPs. First is World Vision's distinction between projects and programs. Second is its required step of reflection. Finally, its emphasis on transition, which relates to the DoD's policy of host nation sustainment of HCA activities.

World Vision makes a deliberate separation between projects and programs.

World Vision establishes this separation through explicitly defining each term:

**Project:** a time-bound intervention carried out to meet established objectives within cost and schedule, and a collection of one or more activities usually involving a single sector, theme or issue.<sup>51</sup>

**Program:** a time-bound intervention, consisting of one or more projects that coordinate to achieve a desired program goal. A program cuts across sectors or themes, uses a multi-disciplinary approach, involves multiple partners [and institutions], and may be supported by several different funding sources.<sup>52</sup>

These definitions are similar to the military's definition that separate tactical engagements from campaigns. World Vision's perspective requires that projects that focus on outputs and short-term objectives synchronize into a larger program to achieve

sustained outcomes and effects. Critical to this synchronization is World Visions' concept of reflection.

World Vision reflects on its efforts to deliberately “planning and putting time aside to bring partners together to analyze project and program information, make informed decisions and recommendations about necessary changes in current projects and programs.”<sup>53</sup> In turn, this provides the opportunity for World Vision to learn by adjusting and reconciling its actions in a way that allows it to achieve its objectives in the best possible manner. World Vision does this from both the perspective of the projects and programs, as well as the organization. It then uses this information to address and act on issues internal to the business. This facilitates the growth of World Vision by alleviating the potential for the organization to become stagnant, by being trapped in a learning paradox. With respect to the projects and programs, World Vision incorporates as many stakeholders as possible, which promotes the transition process.

World Vision views transition as fundamentally crucial to its success as an international aid organization. This is reflected in that it specifies it as a step in its development model. World Vision defines transition as “business practices related to ending (or changing) its support to communities . . . in a way that empowers them to sustain program outcomes after [its] assistance has ended.”<sup>54</sup> Sustainability is the evolution of partner communities' efforts to progress from output-focused objectives to developing short, medium and long-term outcomes, to becoming goal oriented. World Vision looks for evidence of this growth in four areas including, service-delivery management processes, changes in personal behavior, implementation of policy, and citizen empowerment and innovation.

World Vision's Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Monitoring Model provides three concepts that relate to the assessment of ENCAPs. First, it delineates between projects and programs explaining a project's subordinate role in achieving the overall outcomes of the program. Second, by incorporating reflection into the project and program execution cycles, World Vision ensures that it maintains its ability to be a learning organization. By involving all partners in the reflection process, World Vision supports the step of transition. Because of their involvement over the course of the project and program, World Vision can assess the ability of their partners to sustain the developed capability by observing their management processes and changes in behavior.

This model provides another resource for comparison to answer the secondary research question. Additionally, this aids with the data triangulation process by providing another perspective through which to analyze collected data. An organization dedicated to the evaluation of humanitarian aid provides the final viewpoint.

#### *Evaluation of Humanitarian Action: Pilot Guide*

Similar to World Vision, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) has created different humanitarian assessment models. Stemming from the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda Report, ALNAP was established in 1997 "as a mechanism to provide a forum on learning, accountability and performance issues for the humanitarian sector."<sup>55</sup> It seeks to represent a cross section of the humanitarian relief sector. Its members include donor organizations, United Nations agencies, Red Cross and Red Crescent elements, and other non-governmental and academic organizations.

Its ultimate goal is “improving humanitarian performance through increased learning and accountability.”<sup>56</sup> In an effort to achieve this vision, in 2013 it published the *Evaluation of Humanitarian Action: Pilot Guide* with the goal of developing “better designed evaluations [that] could provide more compelling evidence for policy change and promote utilization.”<sup>57</sup> With respect to the primary research question, determining the effectiveness of ENCAPs, ALNAP discusses two theories related to assessment: the feasibility and suitability of conducting assessments, and utilizing a mixed methods approach to triangulate assessment findings.

ALNAP understands that evaluations of humanitarian efforts are necessary for both learning and accountability. However, it recognizes that conducting assessments of humanitarian activities are constrained by resources and time. The *Evaluation of Humanitarian Action: Pilot Guide* provides definitions for feasibility and suitability that are not unlike the military’s definitions. ALNAP develops concepts to aid in determining both feasibility and suitability of conducting evaluations.

In terms of feasibility, ALNAP contends that organizations must develop criteria concerning what evaluations to conduct with respect to its mission, goals, and resources. From a resource perspective, if it is impossible to evaluate all projects, evaluations should be strategically selected that increase the value of the organization while “[fulfilling] key knowledge needs in a timely manner.”<sup>58</sup> If a project warrants evaluation, the guide recommends that evaluations be completed and disseminated promptly as to provide the most pertinent information to the decision cycle of the organization’s executives. The pertinence of this information is addressed by the development of the assessment’s

suitability. Specifically, this suitability is best determined through a mixed methods approach.

Due to the complexities of the environments where relief organizations typically conduct operations, distinguishing between causation and correlation proves difficult. Therefore, ALNAP recommends a mixture of both quantitative and qualitative approaches when assessing humanitarian activities. Since a solely quantitative approach can cause inaccuracies due to evaluator bias and insufficient sample population size, integration of qualitative elements is necessary. This allows the evaluators to triangulate the results to ascertain better the interrelations and interactions within the environment. Thus, this increases the abilities of organizations to gauge more accurately the impact of their operations.

ALNAP was born from a recognized need to improve the evaluation and assessment of humanitarian efforts worldwide. With this mission, ALNAP published the *Evaluation of Humanitarian Action: Pilot Guide*, a combined effort of many entities and organizations that conduct operations in the humanitarian sector. Its premises for feasibility and suitability of evaluations, and recommendations to conduct a mixed methods approach to assessments are applicable to answering the secondary research question that concerns other ENCAP assessment models, thus illustrating its relevancy to the research.

### Summary

This chapter reviewed the literature regarding the primary research question, “Do ENCAPs achieve national security objectives?” Through open coding, the researcher categorized the data in themes related to the secondary research questions. The researcher

first reviewed information regarding the objectives of ENCAPs from both a historical and current perspective. The second category examined documentation concerning past and current DoD HA and HCA assessment models. The third topic studied other models for assessing the effectiveness of ENCAPs. This information will form the basis for analysis using a grounded theory approach in chapter 4. This methodology is discussed at length in the next chapter of this study.

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<sup>1</sup> Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941* (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 1998), 3.

<sup>2</sup> Robert Bullard, "Military Pacification," *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States* 46 (January–February 1910): 1-24, accessed May 8, 2015, <http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=njp.32101049985763;view=1up;seq=9>.

<sup>3</sup> Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941*, 105.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 162.

<sup>5</sup> Congressional Research Service, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2009*, by Richard F. Grimmett, January 27, 2010, accessed March 21, 2015, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32170.pdf>.

<sup>6</sup> Major Allen S. Ford, "The Small War Manual and Marine Corps Military Operations Other Than War Doctrine" (Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2003), 23, accessed March 21, 2015, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/ford.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> Department of the Navy, Navy-Marine Corps (NAVMC) 2890, SWM 12-10 *Small Wars Manual* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940; reprint April 1, 1987), 8.

<sup>8</sup> Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1964), 7.

<sup>9</sup> John W. De Pauw and George A. Luz, "The Role of the Total Army in Military Civic Action and Humanitarian Assistance: A Synopsis," in *Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action* (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1990), 10, accessed March 21, 2015, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA229482>.

<sup>10</sup> Ben Kauffeld, *USAID and DOD: Analysis and Recommendations to Enhance Development-Military Cooperation* (Carlisle Barracks: United States Army War College Press, 2014) 4, accessed March 20, 2015, [http://pksoi.army.mil/Publications/Papers/PKSOI\\_paper\\_Kauffeld\\_final.pdf](http://pksoi.army.mil/Publications/Papers/PKSOI_paper_Kauffeld_final.pdf).

<sup>11</sup> *The Big Picture*, episode 201, “Armed Forces Assistance to Korea,” produced by The U.S. Army Signal Corps Photographic Center, accessed March 22, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=npBi7CDI-4g>.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> De Pauw and Luz, 10.

<sup>14</sup> Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, *The Management of Security Cooperation*, 33rd ed. (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 2014), A2-9, accessed March 22, 2015, [http://www.disam.dsca.mil/documents/greenbook/v33/25\\_Complete%2033rd%20Edition.pdf](http://www.disam.dsca.mil/documents/greenbook/v33/25_Complete%2033rd%20Edition.pdf).

<sup>15</sup> Kauffeld, 7.

<sup>16</sup> Jeremy P. White, *Civil Affairs in Vietnam* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 9, accessed March 21, 2015, [http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/090130\\_vietnam\\_study.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/090130_vietnam_study.pdf).

<sup>17</sup> Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, *US Code 50* (1986), § 404A, accessed March 22, 2015, <http://nssarchive.us/50-usc-%C2%A7-404a-annual-national-security-strategy-report/>.

<sup>18</sup> White House Office of the Press Secretary, *White House Fact Sheet: The 2015 National Security Strategy*, February 6, 2015, accessed March 21, 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/06/fact-sheet-2015-national-security-strategy>.

<sup>19</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 12.

<sup>20</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy, 2011* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011), Cover Memorandum, accessed March 21, 2015, <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2011-National-Military-Strategy.pdf>.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), III-42, accessed March 22, 2015, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp5\\_0.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf).

<sup>23</sup> Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5132.03, *Department of Defense Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 24, 2008), 11, accessed March 21, 2015, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/513203p.pdf>.

<sup>24</sup> President John F. Kennedy, *Address at a White House Reception for Members of Congress and for the Diplomatic Corps of the Latin American Republics, March 13, 1961*, accessed March 22, 2015, [http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/JFK-Speeches/Latin-American-Diplomats-Washington-DC\\_19610313.aspx](http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/JFK-Speeches/Latin-American-Diplomats-Washington-DC_19610313.aspx).

<sup>25</sup> Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law 87-195 as amended through Public Law 113-296 (December 19, 2014), § 502, 171, accessed March 22, 2015, <http://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Foreign%20Assistance%20Act%20Of%201961.pdf>.

<sup>26</sup> Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations, US Code 10 (as amended 2006), § 401, 216 accessed March 21, 2015, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2013-title10/pdf/USCODE-2013-title10-subtitleA-partI-chap5-sec153.pdf>.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 2205.02, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 23, 2014), 2, accessed September 23, 2014, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/220502p.pdf>.

<sup>30</sup> Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, *Policy Guidance for DoD Humanitarian Assistance Funded by the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Appropriation*, June 5, 2012.

<sup>31</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Associated Terms*, 20.

<sup>32</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), IV-5, accessed March 21, 2015, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp3\\_29.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_29.pdf).

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *PDF Version of Approved Universal Joint Task List (UTJL)* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 7, 2015), 348, accessed May 1, 2015, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/ujtl\\_tasks.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/ujtl_tasks.pdf).

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 752.

<sup>36</sup> Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations, US Code 10 (as amended 2006), § 401, 216.

<sup>37</sup> Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 2205.02, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities*, 14.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>40</sup> National Archives and Records Administration, *Hamlet Evaluation System Files (HAMLA) 1967-1969 and Hamlet Evaluation System 1971 (HES71), 1971-1974*, compiled by Lynn Goodsell (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, July 27, 2007), accessed May 6, 2015, <http://media.nara.gov/electronic-records/rg-330/HES/132.1DP.pdf>.

<sup>41</sup> Ithiel de Sola Pool et al., *Hamlet Evaluation System Study* (Cambridge, MA: The Simulmatics Corporation, 1968), 9, Accessed March 21, 2015, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/839821.pdf>.

<sup>42</sup> Stathis N. Kalyvas and Matthew A. Kocher, “The Dynamics of Violence in Vietnam: An Analysis of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES),” *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 3 (May 10, 2009): 336, accessed March 23, 2015, [http://stathis.research.yale.edu/documents/KK\\_09.pdf](http://stathis.research.yale.edu/documents/KK_09.pdf).

<sup>43</sup> Anders Sweetland, *Item Analysis of the HES (Hamlet Evaluation System)* (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1968), 1, accessed January 6, 2015, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/documents/D17634.html>.

<sup>44</sup> Government Accountability Office, GAO Report 12-359, *Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military’s Efforts*, 2012, 22.

<sup>45</sup> Haims et al., III.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>50</sup> World Vision International, “Who We Are,” accessed March 22, 2015, <http://www.worldvision.org/about-us/who-we-are>.

<sup>51</sup> World Vision International, *Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning (LEAP): World Vision's Approach to Design, Monitoring and Evaluation* 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: World Vision International, 2007), 14, accessed March 23, 2015, [http:// www.wvi.org/sites/.../LEAP\\_2nd\\_Edition\\_0.pdf](http://www.wvi.org/sites/.../LEAP_2nd_Edition_0.pdf).

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 76.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 85.

<sup>55</sup> Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Buchanan-Smith and Cosgrave, 5.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 23.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The intent of a grounded theory study is to move beyond description and to generate or discover a theory, a “unified theoretical explanation” for a process or action.

— John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*

#### Introduction

As presented in the previous chapters, CCDRs conduct ENCAPs as a form of engagement to shape their respective AORs. Given this use, this study attempts to answer the primary research question: “Do ENCAPs achieve national security objectives, as is required by U.S. law?” Answering this question will require the researcher to answer three secondary questions. First, “what are the objectives of ENCAPs?” Second, “how does the military assess ENCAPs?” Third, “what other methods exist for assessing ENCAPs?” Since the primary research question studies a process, this research will use a grounded theory approach to develop a theory regarding the assessment process. This chapter outlines this approach, describes the research design and describes the data collection process and data analysis procedure. It closes by explaining the role of the researcher, and discussing the limitations and delimitations of the research.

#### Grounded Theory Methodology

This study will utilize the grounded theory method of inquiry. The researcher chose this approach because of the lack of knowledge regarding the factors and their interrelationships that comprise the process of determining whether ENCAPs achieve

national security objectives. This approach will facilitate a greater understanding of the variables and their interconnections within the system and the environment. John Creswell describes, “[the] intent of a grounded theory study is to move beyond description and to generate or discover a theory, a ‘unified theoretical explanation’ for a process or action.”<sup>1</sup>

Grounded theory inquiry is a process that evolves over the course of a study. It is an iterative five-step procedure. First, the research begins by gathering information. Using this information, the researcher then uses open-ended questions to gather further information. Crucial to this step is the task of memoing. These memos capture “ideas [and] attempt to formulate the process that is being seen by the researcher and to sketch out the flow of the process.”<sup>2</sup> Memoing is an iterative process that “consists of going back and forth between [data] . . . gathering new [information], and then returning to the evolving theory to fill in the gaps and elaborate on how [the process] works.”<sup>3</sup> This cycle “is called the constant comparative method of data analysis.”<sup>4</sup>

The researcher then open codes the data through examination of the information to identify broad themes or categories. As the data in these categories is studied, the researcher looks for patterns and generalizations. Based on this analysis, axial coding occurs where the researcher grounds the study in one category, known as the core phenomenon. The researcher then reexamines the data in relationship to the core phenomenon. These “categories consist of casual conditions (what factors caused the core phenomenon), strategies (actions or interactions that result from the core phenomenon), intervening conditions (broad and specific situational factors that influence the strategies [or core phenomenon]), and the consequences (outcomes using the strategies).”<sup>5</sup> Finally,

the researcher uses these generalizations to pose theories based on experiences and detailed data analysis. This is known as selective coding where “the researcher takes the model and develops propositions (or hypotheses) that interrelate the categories in the model or assembles a story that describes the interrelationship of the categories in the model.”<sup>6</sup>

### Data Analysis

After establishing the primary and secondary research questions, the researcher will utilize the grounded theory approach to develop a theory about the process of assessing ENCAPs. First, as will be presented in chapter 2, the researcher will conduct a review of available literature and data. This study will allow the researcher to begin open coding the information into the broad themes defined by the secondary research questions: objectives of ENCAPs, military assessment methods, and other assessment methods of ENCAPs. Through this iterative process, the researcher will identify a core phenomenon through axial coding.

Once the core phenomenon is identified, the data will then be analyzed in chapter 4 to determine causal conditions, context and intervening conditions, strategies, and consequences. Once reaching the point of data saturation, the researcher will answer the secondary questions. Through constant comparative analysis, the answers to the secondary questions will specify both the causal conditions, and contextual and intervening conditions related to the core phenomenon. From this, the researcher will answer whether ENCAPs achieve national security objectives at the end of chapter 4. With this answer, in chapter 5, the author will discuss recommendations and conclusions in relation to the identified strategies, and consequences.

## Data Collection

The primary method of data collection will be electronic through several types of academic, military and humanitarian organization databases and information systems. The researcher will collect data by querying key terms related to ENCAPs and their assessment in academic and government databases to identify similar research. These sources will reveal additional sources within their references that the author will further examine. Additionally, the researcher will examine the data in the OHASIS database, which serves as the DoD's primary database for cataloging and assessing various HA activities. Through this search, the author will gather data related to the objectives and assessment of ENCAPs. Additionally, because HCA is directed by U.S. law to be executed by the DoD, the researcher will examine that law as well as relevant DoD policy and military doctrine.

For other ENCAP assessment methods, the researcher will select three models to examine. The first model will be the *Prototype Handbook for Monitoring and Evaluating DoD Humanitarian Assistance Projects* as it was commissioned by the DoD. Given its similarity to the DoD's goal of developing the long-term effects that are sustainable by the host nation. The second model that will be analyzed is *Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning: World Vision's Approach to Design, Monitoring and Evaluation*. Finally, the last model the researcher will study is *Evaluation of Humanitarian Action: Pilot Guide* developed by ALNAP. The reason for this selection is ALNAP's mission is to improve humanitarian aid and development by focusing on evaluation. This provides another perspective to aid with data triangulation.

### Role of the Researcher

The role of the researcher in this study will be consistent with the tenets of qualitative research in that the researcher “[tries] to develop a complex picture of the problem or issue under study. This involves reporting multiple perspectives, identifying the many factors involved in a situation, and generally sketching the larger picture that emerges.”<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, this is congruent with a grounded theory approach as the researcher “begins with assumptions and the use of interpretive/theoretical frameworks that inform the study of research problems.”<sup>8</sup> The researcher developed these assumptions while planning, resourcing, and executing numerous ENCAPs while assigned to U.S. Army Pacific. As a result, the researcher must avoid bias by not surmising an answer to the primary research question. Instead, the researcher must allow “the analytic, substantive theory [to] emerge.”<sup>9</sup> The author will achieve this through triangulation, or “[making] use of multiple and different sources . . . to provide corroborating evidence.”<sup>10</sup>

### Limitations and Delimitations

As discussed in the introduction, there are limitations to this study. This research will be conducted in a relatively short time span. Additionally, the researcher was unable to visit any ENCAP sites. As a result, this research will not include primary source data from the populations who are the intended beneficiaries of the ENCAPs. Furthermore, this study only includes data relevant to ENCAPs, funded with HCA appropriations, conducted in the USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, and USAFRICOM AORs. This is due to their similarity in operational environments, and due to the limited HCA activities carried out by both U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Central Command. In addition to this,

only assessment models and policies of the DoD were examined, and the study does not include assessment policies of the CCMDs. Finally, this research only uses unclassified data from OHASIS and other databases and assumes this data is accurate and correct.

### Summary

This chapter discussed the methodology the researcher will use to assess whether ENCAPs are effective in achieving national security objectives. This study will be a meta-analysis of qualitative data using a grounded theory approach. This approach will answer the secondary research questions through axial coding and data triangulation, thus providing an answer to the primary research question. The identification of the core phenomenon will allow the researcher to examine the strategies and consequences thus facilitating the development of a theory to describe the ENCAP assessment process. The next chapter will analyze the collected data in relation to the primary and secondary research questions.

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<sup>1</sup> John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2013), 83.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 85.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 86.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 86, 89.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 86-87. Additionally, the broad outline of this process is discussed in detail in John W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2014), 66.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 47.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 44.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 89.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 251.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

Officials from many of DoD’s combatant commands told us that humanitarian assistance projects help them gain access and influence in foreign nations, build valuable relations, or promote stability in foreign countries or regions . . . but they did not provide any documentation to support this position.

— *Government Accountability Office Report 12-359*

#### Introduction

The previous chapter outlined the grounded theory, qualitative approach taken towards this study. Additionally, it explains the core phenomenon and its relation to the primary research question: “Do ENCAPs achieve national security objectives?” by answering secondary research questions. The first section will examine the objectives of ENCAPs. The second section will analyze how the military currently assesses ENCAPs. The third section will appraise other methods for assessing ENCAPs. Finally, the primary research question will be answered by describing the context and intervening conditions, and the causal conditions that create the core phenomenon and its impact on the primary research question.

#### Objectives of ENCAPs

CCMDs utilize ENCAPs with ever-increasing frequency as a method to shape their AORs. This is not without historical precedent. However, given this increasing use and cost, it is prudent to assess their effectiveness in achieving TCP, and, therefore, U.S. national security objectives. To do this, one must first analyze the objectives of ENCAPs and evaluate their linkage to ends identified by the *National Security Strategy*. The

objectives identified both by U.S. law, and DoD policy do nest sufficiently from the strategic, to the operational, to the tactical level. Broadly speaking ENCAPs and other HCA nest with the ends identified in the security, prosperity and values objectives of United States' 2015 *National Security Strategy*.

### Historical Objectives of ENCAPs

From a historical perspective, the U.S. executed ENCAPs as an element of its broader HCA strategy. Though terms have evolved over time, the DoD utilized HCA in essentially the same manner that it always has. From operations conducted in the Philippines, China, and Cuba in the early 1950s, through Korea and Vietnam in the 1950s to 1970s, the general objectives mirrored those currently outlined by DoD policy. The intent has been to execute HA and HCA operations to improve basic living conditions, improve security, gain access, and build host nation capacity. Thus, within the scope of the data analyzed, there is not a significant difference between historical objectives and present-day objectives of ENCAPs. Understanding this context provides perspective when analyzing the modern national security objectives as they relate to ENCAPs.

### ENCAP Objectives as Related to National Security

Security is the first of three areas where the *National Security Strategy* identifies the most objectives that relate to ENCAPs. The *National Security Strategy* states, “The United States government has no greater responsibility than protecting the American people.”<sup>1</sup> To achieve this, the military must be “postured globally to protect our citizens and interests, preserve regional stability, render humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and build the capacity of our partners to join with us in meeting security

challenges.”<sup>2</sup> To meet these objectives, the *National Security Strategy* identifies the intermediate objectives of “[combating] the persistent threat of terrorism,” “[building] capacity to prevent conflict,” and “[increasing] global health security.”<sup>3</sup>

The *National Security Strategy* outlines one indirect approach the U.S. will take in combating terrorism. The U.S. will “[pursue] a more sustainable approach that prioritizes targeted counterterrorism operations, collective action with responsible partners, and increased efforts to prevent the growth of violent extremism and radicalization that drives increased threats.”<sup>4</sup> This requires “[addressing] the underlying conditions that can help foster violent extremism such as poverty, inequality, and repression.”<sup>5</sup> The DoD acknowledges this and further refines existing DoD policy regarding the objectives of HCA activities including ENCAPs. Particularly, it aligns with its first goal of “[improving] basic living conditions of the civilian populace in a country or region that is susceptible to violent extremism and/or is otherwise strategically important to the United States,” and its fifth goal, “[enhancing] security and [promoting] enduring stability in the [host nation] or region.”<sup>6</sup> This linkage continues with the *National Security Strategy*’s intermediate objective of building capacity to prevent conflict. This links to the DoD’s second HA goal of “[enhancing] the legitimacy of the host nation by improving its capacity to provide essential services to its populace,” and its third goal of “[promoting] interoperability and coalition-building with foreign military and civilian counterparts.”<sup>7</sup> The same is true of the final intermediate objective of increasing global health security, which directly ties to the improvement of basic living conditions within the host nation.

Prosperity is the second area where the *National Security Strategy* identifies objectives that relate to ENCAPs. It contends that the United States’ economic leadership

ties to “shaping an emerging global economic order that continues to reflect our interests and values.”<sup>8</sup> One of the intermediate objectives supporting this is the elimination of extreme poverty. The purpose of this objective is “[to] prevent conflict and promote human dignity,”<sup>9</sup> which, “[decreases] the need for costly military interventions.”<sup>10</sup> This intermediate objective ties to four of the DoD’s goals for HA. Specifically, ending extreme poverty ties explicitly to “[improving] the basic living conditions of the civilian population in a country or region that is susceptible to violent extremism.”<sup>11</sup> The intent is that such development will be an alternative to resorting to violence. Additionally, the poverty objective “[enhancing] the legitimacy of the host nation by improving its capacity to provide essential services to its populace.”<sup>12</sup> In theory, this “[generates] long-term positive perceptions of the DOD and the United States Government with host nation civilian and military institutions; and [enhances] security and [promotes] enduring stability in the host nation or region,”<sup>13</sup> the DOD’s fourth and fifth goals for HA respectively.

Values is the final area where the *National Security Strategy* specifies objectives that connect to HCA activities, and, therefore, ENCAPs. It states “[to] lead effectively in a world experiencing significant political change, the United States must live [its] values at home while promoting universal values abroad.”<sup>14</sup> This objective “aligns [the United States] with the aspirations of ordinary people throughout the world.”<sup>15</sup> This values objective contains two intermediate objectives that link to ENCAPs.

First, the United States needs to “advance equality” by “recognizing that no society will succeed if it does not draw on the potential of all its people.”<sup>16</sup> Secondly, the United States will “support emerging democracies” by “[concentrating] attention and

resources to help countries consolidate their gains and move toward more democratic and representative systems of governance.”<sup>17</sup> Again, these intermediate objectives correlate to four of the DOD’s five goals of HA. Advancing equality, theoretically, encourages disenfranchised and alienated populations to participate in civil institutions thus reducing the possibility of their resorting to violent extremism, which are the DOD’s first two goals for HA. This effect then stimulates the conditions necessary for the DOD to achieve both “long-term positive perceptions” and “[enhanced] security and . . . enduring stability.”<sup>18</sup> This linkage from the *National Security Strategy* to DoD policy provides the foundation to drill further down to specific HCA objectives.

#### ENCAP Objectives Required by U.S. Law and DoD Policy

The objectives for HCA are a subset of DoD policy and, therefore, align with national security objectives. In accordance with U.S. law and further defined DoD policy, HCA activities must fulfill:

1. The security and foreign policy interests of the United States.
2. The security interests of the country in which the activities are to be performed.
3. The specific operational readiness skills of the Service members who participate in the HCA activities.<sup>19</sup>

These objectives nest with the DoD’s HA goals as the security interests of both the U.S. and the host nation, and the operational readiness of U.S forces, are achieved through all five of the DoD’s HA goals as defined by its 2012 policy.

To achieve these objectives, the law prescribes specific categories and types of projects the DoD can execute with HCA funding. These projects include:

1. Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas of a country that are rural or are underserved by medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary professionals, respectively, including education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided.
2. Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
3. Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
4. Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.<sup>20</sup>

The DoD further refines these by separating these activities into four different sectors.

These sectors include “disaster risk reduction, mitigation, and preparedness, health related projects and activities, education support and basic infrastructure.”<sup>21</sup> Within each sector, the DoD specifies intermediate objectives that nest with DoD HA program goals and with national security objectives.

Determining the objectives of ENCAPs requires analyzing the most recent *National Security Strategy* to determine the specific goals that the U.S. hopes to achieve. Furthermore, these objectives should reflect the DoD’s objectives for HA and HCA activities. Finally, HCA law and DoD policy should further nest these aims into specific types of ENCAPs that CCMDs can execute. Analysis shows that this linkage exists from the strategic, through the operational, to the tactical level. The Government Accountability Office concurred with this assessment, stating in a 2012 report, “DoD aligns its humanitarian assistance project planning with the goals outlined in U.S. and departmental strategies.”<sup>22</sup> With this linkage supported, it allows analysis to determine if ENCAPs achieve these objectives.

### Military Assessment of ENCAPs

To determine if ENCAPs achieve national security objectives requires analysis of the military assessment process. This analysis separates into two categories. The first category are the factors that directly influence the assessment process. The second category are those factors that indirectly have an impact on the assessment and evaluation of ENCAPs. By first scrutinizing the direct factors, it allows for greater evaluation of the indirect factors. Comparing this analysis to other methods will ascertain its overall effectiveness.

### Current DoD Assessment Formats

The first factor that directly affects the assessment process of ENCAPs are the requirements directed by the DoD. Though the DoD acknowledges, “[project] assessments are an essential part of the HCA program,”<sup>23</sup> the DoD only requires that HCA activities be assessed twice. The first assessment occurs within the first thirty days after completion. This assessment is the initial AAR for the project. The second required assessment occurs one year after project completion. The purpose of these assessments is to “determine whether project objectives were met, identify lessons learned that can be applied to future projects, assess how well projects are being sustained by the host nation, and sustain relationships with key host nation interlocutors.”<sup>24</sup> The logic of this purpose is sound, as joint doctrine requires that CCMDs assess their “progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective.”<sup>25</sup> However, the DoD does not require that ENCAPs or any other HCA activities be assessed again after the one-year period. For each of these assessments, the DoD provides a template in the

OHASIS database for project managers to utilize. These templates become a second factor that directly influences the assessment of ENCAPs.

The first template is for the initial AAR, which needs to be completed within thirty days of project completion. It consists of six main sections: project executive summary, host nation coordination and partnering, U.S. government coordination and partnering, evaluating outputs, visibility and sustainment, and documentation. Within each section, there is a combination of polar and Likert Scale questions, check boxes and text boxes that allow the project manager to input information. Data from the project nomination and approval process carries over to the relevant fields on the AAR form. However, the project manager is required to complete a significant amount of information based on the outcome of the project. Some of this information exists in the database already but does not appear in the AAR template.

The executive summary portion of the AAR does not specify the specific DoD HA goals for which the project is attempting to fulfill. To determine this information, one needs to refer to the original project description. This is relevant because OHASIS requires that the project manager input specific MoPs and MoEs related to this goal during the project nomination. These MoPs and MoEs are essential to assessing the impact of the project. As a result, the assessor does not have visibility of either the DoD HA Goals, project objectives or assessment criteria during the AAR process.

There are similar gaps in the host nation coordination and partnering portions of the AAR. The AAR does ask the project manager to assess the collaboration with host nation official, via a Likert Scale and to indicate the number of personnel trained. However, there is no question to evaluate the effectiveness of training as it relates to

promoting the interoperability with or the enhancing the legitimacy of the host nation. Additionally, the assessment implies that this assessment can be made without host nation input as it asks, “[to] what extent was the 30-day AAR conducted with assistance of any [host nation] representatives?”<sup>26</sup> This implication contradicts following questions as the AAR asks the assessor to gauge the “extent to which the community feels the project was responsive to local needs,” and the “extent to which the community feels the project will improve quality of life.”<sup>27</sup> Both of these questions clearly require feedback from the beneficiaries of the ENCAP. This feedback is necessary in determining whether the projects achieved the DoD HA goals of enhancing the legitimacy of the host nation, generating long-term positive perceptions of the DoD, and, potentially, begin to improve basic living conditions.

The third section of the AAR assesses the U.S. government’s coordination and partnering, and whether interagency partners performed in their prescribed role and provided the resources as agreed to in the project nomination process. The gap that exists within this section relates to the training of U.S. military forces. The AAR does not require the project manager or assessor to input the number of U.S. military personnel trained during the execution of the project as it does in the host nation section. Furthermore, this section does not list any specific U.S. military training objectives. Capturing this data is necessary for assessing the project's effect on the U.S. military personnel’s operational readiness as prescribed by DoD policy and U.S. law.

The fourth and fifth sections relate to and evaluate the project’s outputs and its visibility and sustainability respectively. The fourth section requires the assessor to rate the project outputs on a Likert Scale as they compare to the nomination. In addition, the

assessor may input external factors, such as weather, insurgent activity, tariffs, host nation leaders, access to materials or other external factors that “had an effect on the planning, implementation, or outputs of the project.”<sup>28</sup> If any problems remain with the project, the project manager can describe those issues in a text box for record keeping. The fifth section addresses the specifics of the visibility and sustainment, which relate to the DoD’s HA goals of enhancing the legitimacy of the host nation and generating long-term, positive perceptions of DoD by asking several specific polar questions. These questions include whether the U.S. government circulated information about the project, host nation media attended and if there is a permanent sign on the project that recognizes the cooperative efforts of the partners of the project. Once completed, the assessor can attach additional documentation to support the assessment. The intent of the AAR is to provide the initial assessment of the project by providing short-term data. The format is very similar to the one-year assessment template.

The purpose of the one-year assessment is to evaluate the impact of ENCAPs one year after project completion. However, DoD policy allows CCMDs to “determine the cost effectiveness of conducting each one year assessment, including the impact of travel costs, budgets, and personnel availability.”<sup>29</sup> As a result, the feasibility of completing the one-year assessments is at the discretion of the combatant command. Therefore, not all completed HCA activities or ENCAPs have one-year assessments compiled. Those that do, follow a format similar to the 30-day AAR.

The template mirrors that of the 30-day AAR with two exceptions. An additional section that serves to capture lessons learned, and the “AAR Execution” section replaces project executive summary. This first section captures the assessor’s involvement in the

project to that point that provides context to the assessment process. It also requires the assessor to describe methods used to assess the project. Related to this, it asks if the assessor visited the project site to aid in the evaluation, which, as DoD policy states, is not required if the CCMD deems that it is not feasible.

The next section addresses evaluation of the project outcomes. Specifically, it requires the assessment of DoD and CCMD goals with both a Likert Scale and narrative justification. Furthermore, the assessor evaluates the level of achievement of the specific project objectives both narratively and along a Likert Scale. This allows for the direct assessment of the project's impact on the CCMD's TCP goals as well as the nested HA goals of the DoD. However, a distinct gap exists. There is no direct correlation between the indicators identified in the project approval with the assessment of the objectives and goals. Therefore, if the assessor was not involved in the project planning or execution process, the assessor may not have knowledge of the specific indicators that project managers originally identified to assess performance and effectiveness. As a result, the assessor must review the objectives, MoEs, and MoPs prior to beginning the assessment, as it is not available in the assessment window in OHASIS for convenient access. Further affecting this, the assessment does not require host nation input regarding whether the project met the host nation's needs.

The sections concerning host nation partnering and coordination, and visibility and sustainment are nearly identical to the 30-day AAR template. The host nation coordination section focuses entirely on host nation implementation and does not address any other topics or issues. The sustainment portion asks the evaluator to assess the host nation's sustainment of the project in conjunction with the original agreement and if the

host nation is utilizing the project as intended. However, the terms of this original agreement are not available in the assessment window requiring the evaluator to review the information elsewhere in OHASIS. In terms of visibility, it asks if the original markings still exist and whether any information was distributed regarding the project. It does not specify if this is additional to the information disseminated after project completion.

The final portion of the one-year assessment captures lessons learned. It does this through three main questions. First, the evaluator needs to determine if there any outstanding “negative factors”<sup>30</sup> from the AAR. Second, the evaluator decides if there are ways to “capitalize on positive external factors or avoid negative external factors in planning or implementing future projects.”<sup>31</sup> Finally, the assessor can capture anything that future organizations can do “differently in the planning, execution or sustainment of this project”<sup>32</sup> In theory, this data will allow project managers and planners to incorporate lessons into future projects, thus increasing overall effectiveness. The evaluator captures these lessons in narrative form within a text box, and there are no mechanisms to standardize or sort the data. As a result, sharing knowledge regarding lessons learned throughout the ENCAP project cycle becomes difficult, which indirectly affects their effectiveness. Several other factors regarding the assessment template also indirectly influence the effectiveness of ENCAPs.

First, the assessment templates do not capture any baseline data or information regarding ENCAPs. This requires the individual making the assessment to review the project nomination and approval description to determine baseline data. However,

depending on the quality of the narrative description entered for the project's objective or summary, this data may not be available.

The second indirect factor that may influence the effectiveness of ENCAPs is the requirement that they “shall complement, and may not duplicate, any other form of social or economic assistance which may be provided to the country concerned by any other department or agency of the United States.”<sup>33</sup> The intent of this provision is to prevent the U.S. government from wasting money on duplicating efforts. It also implies that the DoD coordinate with other U.S. government departments and agencies to ensure a comprehensive approach towards achieving national security objectives. However, this creates the conditions where the DoD and another U.S. government department or agency may disagree on intent and goals on an ENCAP. The DoD addresses this potentiality stating that “non-concurrence does not require overall project disapproval,”<sup>34</sup> and that the dissenting department or agency's comments “will be included in the [project] nomination.”<sup>35</sup>

#### Historical DoD Assessment Formats

Similar to analyzing the historical objectives of ENCAPs, analyzing historical methods of ENCAP assessment provides both context and a source of comparison with other models. Though HES does not contain an explicit category for specifically assessing ENCAPs, it does offer a series of indicators across its categories of conditions that can be incorporated into ENCAP assessment models. The majority of these indicators occur in the security, health, education and welfare, and economic development categories. These indicators vary between qualitative and quantitative,

which mirror the *Evaluation of Humanitarian Action: Pilot Guide* recommendations.

This mixture may explain some portion of the relative success of the HES as a whole.

Studying how the military currently assesses ENCAPs and how it did in the past is critical to ascertaining whether ENCAPs achieve national security objectives. Because OHASIS “provides a convenient means to coordinate and collaborate at various organizational levels.”<sup>36</sup> and serves as “the official record for . . . HCA projects,”<sup>37</sup> it is the primary mechanism that captures ENCAP assessments. Reviewing both the 30-day AAR, and the one-year templates for assessing reveals strengths in the process as well as gaps in information that both directly and indirectly influence the assessment process. Analyzing the HES provides valuable perspective on an evaluation process employed in the past by the DoD. Given its relative success, at least statistically, it merits consideration when comparing to other methods of assessment. Understanding this process aids comprehension when comparing other methods for assessing ENCAPs.

#### Other Existing Methods for Assessing ENCAPs

Both governmental and non-governmental organizations conduct humanitarian operations, therefore, other models for assessing impact exist. Given the similarity between these operations and ENCAPs, these models are worth examining. This study focuses on three models developed for three separate purposes. This section analyzes those methods for comparison against the methods employed by the U.S. military.

#### *Prototype Handbook for Monitoring and Evaluating DoD Humanitarian Assistance Projects*

The RAND Technical Report titled *Developing a Prototype Handbook for Monitoring and Evaluating Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance Projects*

specifies the first model. Because of its effectiveness and clarity, many elements of the handbook were incorporated into OHASIS' most recent update. Specifically questions in both the 30-day AAR template and the one-year assessment template regarding host nation partnering and coordination are taken verbatim from the report. However, other elements that are a part of the study are not included in the OHASIS assessment templates.

The first of these elements is the baseline information. During the project development process, it is critical that project planners take an initial measurement of the desired outcome indicators. This allows the:

same outcome indicators collected at baseline are collected again after the project is completed, so that any changes caused by the project can be assessed. Outcome indicators are often collected again one or more times in the future to assess the sustainability of the project results over time.<sup>38</sup>

Neither of the templates overtly capture this baseline data nor require comparison for assessment purposes. This influences the assessment process, as there is no required evaluation of the specific ENCAP's effectiveness towards achieving the desired outcome indicators, which is the second area not included in the OHASIS system. Given the similarity in the types of HA and HCA activities that the DoD conducts, the study develops a variety of indicators for the project planning and project assessment processes, different strategic objectives, and the most common types of HA and HCA projects. These include water and sanitation projects, infrastructure projects, health services projects, and disaster preparedness projects.

The individual assessing the project then uses the provided worksheets to collect baseline information at the project's beginning, immediately after project completion, and then at the one-year mark. The indicators are basic and capture the major elements of the

specific objective or project. However, they do not contain theater specific demographic indicators. Additionally, the handbook only contains indicators for the previously listed types of projects. Similarly, the handbook only proposes indicators for capacity-building, positive visibility, and access and influence, which only covers some of the DoD's HA goals.

*Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning:  
World Vision's Approach to Design, Monitoring and Evaluation*

The project planning and assessment process utilized by World Vision is similar to that proposed in RAND's *Developing a Prototype Handbook for Monitoring and Evaluating Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance Projects*. It follows a similar process in terms of planning, but there are two distinctions to note. First, World Vision specifically codifies the difference between a project and a program into its policies. As a result, the organization understands that projects are elements that nest into the larger objectives of programs. Furthermore, the programs exist at the community level, which mirrors the military operational level. Therefore, there is a deliberate focus on delivering sustainable outcomes at the community level. This results in a concentrated effort over a period in a particular area. Though the program remains nested with World Vision's national strategy for that particular partner nation, the program focuses on developing sustainable outcomes for that specific region. World Vision achieves this concentrated effort through its Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning mode, which is the second distinction that relates to ENCAP assessment.

World Vision's planning model includes two additional steps that neither the military nor the *Prototype Handbook for Monitoring and Evaluating DoD Humanitarian Assistance Projects* include. The first is reflection. World Vision defines reflection:

as planning and putting time aside to bring partners together to analyze project and program information, make informed decisions and recommendations about necessary changes in current projects and programs, which lead to transformation of the program, individuals and the organization.<sup>39</sup>

Including this in the project planning and project assessment, theoretically, causes managers to assess the program, and adjust to achieve the best outcomes for all stakeholders. This reflection aids the subsequent step of transition. World Vision defines transition as:

Business practices related to ending (or changing) its support to communities. World Vision aims to assist communities in a way that empowers them to sustain program outcomes after World Vision's assistance has ended. At the project level, transition can refer to the end of a project, or change from one project to another, while the parent program continues.<sup>40</sup>

World Vision views transition as imperative to the sustainment of not only outputs, but also outcomes. Incorporating it into its planning and assessment process ensures that managers seek ways to achieve this with all stakeholders. It views transition on four different levels: service delivery and management, personal action and behavior change, policy change and implementation, and empowerment, citizenship and innovation. These levels are similar to the DoD's HA goal of enhancing legitimacy and work towards not only improving basic living conditions, but also achieving a long-term change in population. Additionally, reflection and transition promote learning and accountability, which directly relate to ALNAP's core philosophies.

### *Evaluation of Humanitarian Action: Pilot Guide*

ALNAP seeks to “improve humanitarian performance through increased learning and accountability.”<sup>41</sup> To achieve this, ALNAP publishes several different guides that practitioners of humanitarian efforts can utilize to assess their efforts. Of particular relevance, and where it differs from other methods of assessment discussed to this point, is its emphasis on both suitability and feasibility of project assessment. ALNAP acknowledges that both of these factors influence project evaluation and assessment and makes recommendations accordingly.

First, evaluators should schedule assessments so that the “results can best contribute to key decision-making moments.”<sup>42</sup> Second, from a resource perspective, if it is impossible to evaluate all projects, stakeholders should strategically select projects to assess that “add value to the organization as a whole,” and “fulfill key knowledge needs in a timely manner.”<sup>43</sup> Once establishing those parameters, it proposes a mixed methods approach, a combination of both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Furthermore, this assessment must be inclusive of all stakeholders to gather relevant and appropriate data.

This mixed methods approach is similar to the model developed in the RAND study. However, ALNAP differs from the RAND study in terms of evaluating outcomes. ALNAP understands that projects are assessed based upon the comparison of indicators. However, it cautions that there is a difference between causation and correlation. It recommends that those making assessments “[triangulate] information from a number of different sources, including beneficiaries and key informants,”<sup>44</sup> to truly gauge the project's impact.

Humanitarian operations are not unique to the military. As a result other organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, develop methods of assessing and evaluating project effectiveness in relation to achieving objectives. This study examined three models of assessment by three different organizations to compare and contrast with military assessment models. This analysis identified several similarities including general project planning and assessment steps, assessment purposes in terms of learning and accountability, and mixed methods approach. This analysis distinguished several differences with the method the military currently uses to assess its ENCAPs. Particularly, it does not adequately capture baseline data nor use all the pre-existing, standardized indicators developed in the RAND study. Furthermore, the military does not codify the elements of transition, as described by World Vision, into its assessment. Finally, the ALNAP model is the only one examined that recommends triangulating data to assess better whether outcomes are causal or correlated. This comparison facilitates an analysis of the effectiveness of ENCAPs in achieving national security objectives.

Core Phenomenon: Lack of Long Term Assessment  
of ENCAPs

During the course of axial coding, the researcher identified the core phenomenon as the fact that DoD policy does not mandate ENCAPs to be assessed long-term in order to measure their effectiveness. Grounding the research in this category, the researcher was able to go back and examine the causal conditions that create the core phenomenon.

In this case, Department of Defense Instruction 2205.02: *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities*, only mandates that projects be assessed long-term if considered cost effective. Furthermore, if the CCMD decides that conducting a one-year

assessment is feasible, it is up to their discretion to decide which and how many ENCAPs, or other HCA activities to assess. Though the lack of mandated, long-term evaluation is the primary cause of the core phenomenon, analysis of the secondary research questions identified several contextual and intervening conditions. These are “the actions that result from the core phenomenon.”<sup>45</sup>

Specifically, none of the currently utilized assessment templates captures baseline data. Therefore, there are no effective indicators through which to measure change. This creates a gap for evaluation, as progress cannot be assessed if the original inputs and conditions are unknown. This creates where the focus of assessment become quantitative, that is, focused on MoPs, as opposed to MoEs, which assess a change in the behavior of the system.

Should the CCMD decide to conduct an assessment at the one-year mark, it compounds this information gap. The one-year template specifically asks the evaluator to assess the level of achievement of DoD and CCMD goals on a Likert Scale. However, if no baseline information exists, this becomes an entirely subjective assessment based on the perceptions of the evaluator. This raises the potential for observation bias that in turn skews the evaluation of effectiveness. The lack of baseline data is not the only gap. None of the assessment templates captures data elements that would provide a holistic presentation of the effectiveness of the ENCAP.

Particularly, OHASIS does not capture data that relates to the effectiveness of ENCAPs in three other areas. The first area is in the realm of infrastructure assessment. Since the majority of ENCAPs require some form of construction, the assessment should evaluate the quality of this construction. Given their high visibility, ensuring that the

construction remains in a relatively high condition, facilitates long-term positive perception of U.S. efforts with a partner nation. The second information gap occurs in the area of efficiency. Though OHASIS captures the cost of projects as a whole, it does not provide a mechanism to standardize it across the CCMDs. Furthermore, OHASIS only captures the specific HCA appropriations for ENCAPs and does not capture other costs incurred by ENCAPs. The final area that lacks information that is necessary to facilitate a comprehensive assessment of ENCAPs relates to the training of U.S. military personnel. Though the ENCAP nomination requires listing the training objectives for U.S. military personnel, neither of the assessment templates specifically require evaluating those objectives.

#### Do ENCAPs Achieve National Security Objectives?

Due to the core phenomenon, its causal conditions, and the broader contextual and intervening conditions, there is not enough data to support the direct linkage of ENCAP objectives to national security objectives. However, analysis of the first secondary research question demonstrated the nested nature of the objectives of ENCAPs with the objectives of the CCMD, the DoD's HA goals, and, subsequently, the *National Security Strategy*. This logic suggests that the answer to the primary research question is yes, ENCAPs may achieve national security objectives. However, analysis of the DoD's assessment requirements revealed that the DoD does not conduct long-term assessment to gather data to confirm the veracity of the linkage. Furthermore, analysis of other methods of assessment reveal concepts that can aid in improving the DoD's model of ENCAP evaluation.

## Summary

This chapter presented analysis regarding the three secondary questions outlined in chapter 3 in an effort to ascertain whether ENCAPs achieve national security objectives. Considering that the assessment of ENCAPs is a process, this study utilized a grounded theory approach to “[generate] a general explanation (a theory) of a process, action, or an interaction shaped by the views of a large number of participants.”<sup>46</sup> With this approach, the inquirer gathered and categorized information in an iterative manner to answer the secondary questions, which, in turn, suggests that ENCAPs may achieve national security objectives. However, that assessment includes the caveat that there is insufficient data to link directly ENCAP objectives to national security objectives. The next chapter will discuss the implications of this determination, any conclusions that can be drawn from it, and propose areas for future research in regards to the effectiveness of utilizing ENCAPs to achieve national security objectives.

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<sup>1</sup> President Barack Obama, *2015 National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The Whitehouse), 7, accessed May 7, 2015, [https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015\\_national\\_security\\_strategy.pdf](https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., iii.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, *Policy Guidance for DoD Humanitarian Assistance Funded by the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Appropriation*.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Obama, *2015 National Security Strategy of the United States*, 15.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>11</sup> Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, *Policy Guidance for DoD Humanitarian Assistance Funded by the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Appropriation*.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Obama, *2015 National Security Strategy of the United States*, 19.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, *Policy Guidance for DoD Humanitarian Assistance Funded by the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Appropriation*.

<sup>19</sup> Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 2205.02, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities*, 2.

<sup>20</sup> Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations, US Code 10 (as amended 2006), § 401, 216.

<sup>21</sup> Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, *Policy Guidance for DoD Humanitarian Assistance Funded by the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Appropriation*.

<sup>22</sup> Government Accountability Office, GAO Report 12-359, *Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military's Efforts*, 2012, 6.

<sup>23</sup> Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 2205.02, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities*, 14.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Associated Terms*, 20.

<sup>26</sup> Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "30-Day AAR Template," accessed May 7, 2015, OHASIS.

- <sup>27</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>29</sup> Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 2205.02, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities*, 14.
- <sup>30</sup> Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “1-Year Assessment Template,” accessed May 7, 2015, OHASIS.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>33</sup> Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations, US Code 10 (as amended 2006), § 401, 216.
- <sup>34</sup> Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 2205.02, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities*, 13.
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid., 11
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid., 12.
- <sup>39</sup> World Vision International, *Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning (LEAP): World Vision’s Approach to Design, Monitoring and Evaluation*, 76.
- <sup>40</sup> Ibid., 85.
- <sup>41</sup> Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action, “Who We Are,” accessed March 23, 2015, <http://www.alnap.org/who-we-are/our-role>.
- <sup>42</sup> Buchanan-Smith and Cosgrave, 23.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>44</sup> Ibid., 199.
- <sup>45</sup> Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*, 89.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There have been many civic action projects in underdeveloped countries in recent years, and increasing national interest indicates that there will be many more in the future. In the past, there have been successes and failures in civic action operations; both successes and failures are likely to occur in the future. But, learning from past activities is a logical method of improving those operations that are to follow.

— Lt. Colonel Neil B. Mills, USMC, *An Analysis of Civic Action in Selected Underdeveloped Countries*

#### Conclusions

This research sought to determine whether ENCAPs achieve national security objectives as U.S. law prescribes. Answering this question required answering three secondary questions: what are the objectives of ENCAPs, how does the military assess the effectiveness of ENCAPs, and what other methods exist for assessing ENCAPs? The researcher utilized a grounded theory approach to open code the data gathered by reviewing the literature associated with the three secondary questions. During analysis, the researcher then identified the core phenomenon, that the DoD does not assess ENCAPs consistently over the long-term to measure their effectiveness, through axial coding.

Identifying the core phenomenon allowed the researcher to evaluate the gathered data against the core phenomenon in order to determine causal conditions, and contextual and intervening conditions. This analysis revealed that the objectives of ENCAPs do nest with national security objectives. Therefore, the analysis suggests, ENCAPs may achieve national security objectives. However, due to the core phenomenon, there is no direct

corroborating evidence to confirm the linkage of the effects of ENCAPs to national security objectives. This lack of long-term assessment influences the effectiveness of ENCAPs.

### Strategies

As discussed previously, Creswell defines strategies as “actions or interactions that result from the core phenomenon.”<sup>1</sup> This does not necessarily affect the answer to the primary research question: that research suggests ENCAPs may achieve national security objectives. However, it does affect the DoD’s ability to determine to what level a particular ENCAP achieved particular objectives. There is little doubt that one could consider that a clinic in Mongolia, school in Thailand, or a bridge in the Philippines a humanitarian gesture. Regardless of that perception, within the current system, the extent to which a specific project achieves its objectives is unknown.

However, with the current assessment models, what is impossible to discern, is whether that particular project, or the resources consumed by the project, could have created a greater effect in another region or against another objective. The specifics of the U.S. law authorizing HCA appropriations sets the stage by only requiring quantitative statistics in the DoD’s annual report on HCA activities. The DoD, goes beyond, and rightly so, the base requirement in order to create a comprehensive overview of the program. However, measuring these intangible characteristics proves difficult. Therefore, there is tendency to focus on quantitative aspects. Moreover, even within those quantitative assessments, there are key areas related to project management that could be assessed but are not. These areas are efficiency of resources, engineer specific criteria,

and training evaluation. Combined, these information gaps create second and third order effects.

### Consequences

Simply stated, consequences are “the outcomes of the strategies.”<sup>2</sup> In relation to the assessment of ENCAPs, consequences equates to the repercussions created by the DoD’s inability to assess the level of effectiveness of ENCAPs towards achieving national security objectives. Though CCDRs tout their success in their yearly posture assessments, their assertions are usually only supported by short-term data, mostly related to outputs. This information gap prevents the DoD from being able to assess fully ENCAPs and HCA as a whole. Without this data, there is no way of assessing whether HCA funding levels are accurate, construction is of a sustainable and ergonomic quality, training opportunities provided are useful, or whether ENCAPs are as effective as they could be in meeting DoD HA goals. This current paradigm is summarized in the following figure:




Figure 3. DoD ENCAP Assessment: Current Axial Coding Paradigm

Source: Created by author.

Identification of the core phenomenon, as revealed through axial coding conceptualizes the theory that the DoD does not fully monitor and evaluate ENCAPs. Thus, the level to which they achieve national security objectives cannot be specifically determined. The question now becomes what to do about it?

### Recommendations

Several recommendations follow from these conclusions. Specifically, the research identified specific information gaps that prevent the holistic assessment of ENCAPs. The researcher, within the limitations and delimitations of the study, proposes a base model for assessing ENCAPs. To support further development of the base model, the author proposes several changes to policy and the OHASIS databases. Finally, as this model is only an initial concept, several areas warrant future research.

## Proposed Model for Assessing ENCAPs

To assess ENCAPs requires a comprehensive approach that assesses all elements of an ENCAP of the course of the project cycle and the project assessment cycle. In addition to refining the measures of effectiveness toward achieving DoD HA and CCMD objectives, assessment needs to include three other areas. First, it must include an evaluation of engineer specific qualities of the project. Second, the efficiency of the project needs to be evaluated in terms of overall costs. Finally, the assessment must include specific U.S. training objectives to provide an accurate appraisal of the projects training value.

Most crucial to better assessing the ENCAP's effectiveness over time is the development of indicators that allow measurement of progress toward the desired outcomes. Once the indicators are in place, it is crucial that the project manager collect baseline data on the indicators. This data provides the starting point for measuring change due to the particular project. Without this initial data, the entire assessment becomes purely subjective based on the assessor's' judgment and perception. Collecting baseline data is not restricted to desired outcomes it applies to engineer specific qualities of the project as well.

ENCAPs provide a lasting, visual symbol of U.S. cooperation with the respective host nation. Therefore, assessment of the quality of the engineer specific tasks and outputs is necessary over the long-term. This ensures projects quality in terms of sustainability, and ergonomics. Since the vast majority of ENCAPs consist of construction, or renovation of structures, infrastructure assessment is the logical model assessors can use to evaluate the structure over the long-term. First, OHASIS should

capture project as-built drawings as attachments within OHASIS to provide baseline data regarding final construction. The American Institute of Architects defines as-built drawings as “drawings . . . prepared by the contractor [that] show, in red ink, on-site changes to the original construction documents.”<sup>3</sup> Those conducting assessments in the future could reference the as-built drawings, if necessary, during or after the infrastructure assessment. *The SWEAT/IR Book* published by the United States Army Engineer School provides a very basic methodology for evaluating the critical components of infrastructure that does not require a trained engineer to execute. When executed over time, this would facilitate changes to facility plans and components to provide a final product that would enhance the long-term positive perception of the U.S. government.

To better assess the overall cost of an ENCAP, the assessment should incorporate other funding sources used throughout the project cycle. Broadly speaking, these costs delineate into three additional categories beyond HCA appropriation: transportation, life support, and host nation support. The sources of funding varies for these categories based on the type of exercise and project. However, incorporating these costs will aid in providing context to the true value of the ENCAP as it relates to assessment. This is relevant to maximizing the effects of ENCAPs given today’s fiscal uncertainties.

To complete the comprehensive evaluation of ENCAPs requires U.S. military units to define their specific training objectives for their unit when selected to participate in an ENCAP. Once specified, units need to assess their proficiency prior to, and after ENCAP execution. These results, when compiled, would provide specific data on specific

mission essential tasks for the DoD to quantify ENCAP's effects on the operational readiness of U.S. forces beyond just a qualitative assessment. Thus, described graphically:




Figure 4. Proposed DoD ENCAP Assessment Model

Source: Created by author.

This study identifies critical information gaps in the ENCAP assessment process. This model begins to address these shortcomings across four areas. First, indicators regarding the effectiveness of ENCAPs in regards to outcomes need to continue to be refined. Second, assessment needs to include a framework by which to evaluate the engineer specific components of the project. Third, all the costs associated with an ENCAP need to be captured to aid with the cost-benefit analysis. Finally, the assessment process needs to evaluate the training value received by U.S. military personnel through

the construction of the ENCAP. This model is by no means complete. To aid further development, requires discussing recommended changes to policy and areas warranting further research.

### Recommended Changes to Policy

The core phenomenon of this study is that the DoD does not evaluate ENCAPs long-term. Thus, assessing their true effectiveness is impossible given the gaps in information created by the core phenomenon. The core phenomenon is a direct result of the language of DoDI 2205.02 *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Activities*. The researcher recommends that the language of this policy direct the CCMDs to conduct long-term assessment of a portion of their ENCAPs. If this change is made, the researcher recommends that the assessments be incorporated into a searchable database to facilitate rapid and precise analysis of lessons gleaned from ENCAPs across the entire DoD.

### Areas Warranting Further Research

Given the recommended policy change, the impact of the core phenomenon, and the limitations of this study, there are several topics that warrant further research. First, given the relative similarity of the types of ENCAPs, development of a standardized list of indicators would ease the burden of the assessment process. Furthermore, a solid base of indicators exist within relevant literature. The HES, *Developing a Prototype Handbook for Monitoring and Evaluating Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance Projects, Assessing the Value of U.S. Army International Activities*, and the UJTL contain a wide variety of indicators for deeper analysis.

Furthermore, the DoD should expand research beyond just that of ENCAPs. HCA covers a variety of medical, veterinary, and dental activities that have the same requirements for assessment. Researching effectiveness in regards to those specific topics would further enhance the DoD's HCA efforts. Analyzing these efforts across the entire spectrum of HCA leads to the third research topic. Requiring no long-term assessment is a problem in and of itself, however, the opposite extreme exists as well. Mandating the long-term assessment of every HCA activity is not feasible in terms of resources. Therefore, researching what HCA projects to assess, and how often to assess them, would be of great utility in today's fiscally constrained environment.

### Closing

Though research suggests ENCAPs may achieve national security objectives, it is not without caveat. Specifically, the lack of long-term assessment prevents the DoD from assessing the extent of ENCAPs' effectiveness. Given widespread employment of ENCAPs across the CCMDs, addressing this gap is necessary. Particularly, it would enable the CCMDs to employ ENCAPs to maximize their effects in a fiscally constrained environment. This study concluded with a model that forms an initial approach to address the existing evaluation gap. However, the model only serves as a guide to the evaluation of ENCAPs based on the factors discovered during research. As Lt. Colonel Neil B. Mills noted in his 1964 MMAS titled, *An Analysis of Civic Action in Selected Underdeveloped Countries*, "the most important factor of all, and the one upon which all . . . guidelines are dependent, is the [military] officer himself. . . . It is for his consideration and use that they are offered."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*, 86, 89.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> American Institute of Architects, “Terminology: As-Built Drawings, Record Drawings, Measured Drawings,” *AIA Best Practices*, June, 2007, 1, accessed May 13, 2015, <http://www.aia.org/aiaucmp/groups/secure/documents/document/aiap026835.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> Lt. Colonel Neil B. Mills, “An Analysis of Civic Action in Selected Underdeveloped Countries” (Master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1964), 159, accessed November 20, 2014, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA365714>.

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