MASS ATROCITIES PREVENTION: THE ROLE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategic Studies

by

BRIAN L. BRAITHWAITE, MAJOR, USA
B.S., Weber State University, Ogden, Utah, 2004

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2015

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Mass Atrocities Prevention: The Role and Performance of the United States Army

Brian L. Braithwaite, Major, USA

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

In 2011, President Barrack Obama released PSD-10, designating the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide a “core national security interest,” and effectively ended the debate about whether the US military can or should play a role in atrocity prevention. PSD-10 established the Atrocity Prevention Board, which includes a representative from the Department of Defense, and directed it to create a “whole of government approach” to preventing mass atrocities. These events initiated a steady flow of strategic guidance and directives for all US government departments and agencies, including the military, to develop certain atrocity prevention capabilities. This study seeks to examine the Army role within the whole of government approach to preventing mass atrocities as outlined in strategic guidance. Using the Army’s capabilities-based development model, DOTMLPF, this study seeks to determine if the Army is meeting strategic guidance and to evaluate whether or not those efforts are effective.

Mass atrocities prevention; ethics; leader development and education
Name of Candidate: MAJ Brian L. Braithwaite

Thesis Title: Mass Atrocities Prevention: The Role and Performance of the United States Army

Approved by:

__________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Jackie D. Kem, Ph.D.

__________________________, Member
William L. Knight Jr., M.B.A.

__________________________, Member
MAJ Andrew J. Dial, M.A.

Accepted this 12th day of June 2015 by:

__________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


In 2011, President Barrack Obama released PSD-10, designating the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide a “core national security interest,” and effectively ended the debate about whether the US military can or should play a role in atrocity prevention. PSD-10 established the Atrocity Prevention Board, which includes a representative from the Department of Defense, and directed it to create a “whole of government approach” to preventing mass atrocities. These events initiated a steady flow of strategic guidance and directives for all US government departments and agencies, including the military, to develop certain atrocity prevention capabilities. This study seeks to examine the Army role within the whole of government approach to preventing mass atrocities as outlined in strategic guidance. Using the Army’s capabilities-based development model, DOTMLPF, this study seeks to determine if the Army is meeting strategic guidance and to evaluate whether or not those efforts are effective.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research would not have been possible without the encouragement, sacrifice and patience of my beautiful wife Brooklyn. Her willingness to take on more than her fair share of the work at home provided me with the opportunity to focus on this work.

I am greatly indebted to my thesis chair, Dr. Jack Kem for his guidance and instruction while conducting this study. I am very fortunate to have had the opportunity to work with Dr. Kem, both as my thesis chair and instructor at the Command and General Staff Officers Course. He is a master strategist and a talented and gifted educator. I would also like to thank the other members of my committee, Mr. William Knight and MAJ Andrew Dial, who gave freely of their personal time to assist and mentor me throughout this study.

Throughout my research, I had the pleasure of corresponding with several subject matter experts on the subject of mass atrocity prevention who deserve special recognition for their contributions toward improving the Army’s capability to prevent mass atrocities. Many thanks to Keven Gentzler and Michael Weaver from the Combined Arms Center, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, Dwight Raymond from the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), US Army War College, and Dr. David S. Frey, Associate Professor of History and Director, Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, United States Military Academy.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGURES</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLES</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Research Question</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Research Questions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations and Delimitations</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atrocity Prevention: Becoming a Priority</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Atrocity Prevention and Response Capabilities</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine and Planning Tools</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership and Education</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats to Validity</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectations of the Army</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Capabilities</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine and Planning Tools</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADRP</td>
<td>Army Doctrinal Reference Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFTTP</td>
<td>Air Force Tactics Techniques and Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APB</td>
<td>Atrocity Prevention Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>Army Techniques Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHGS</td>
<td>Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF</td>
<td>Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPG</td>
<td>Defense Planning Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Guidance for the Employment of the Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAPRO</td>
<td>Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARO</td>
<td>Mass Atrocity Response Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCWP</td>
<td>Marine Corps Warfighting Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Defense Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDSI</td>
<td>Personal Development Skill Identifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKSOI</td>
<td>Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD-10</td>
<td>Presidential Study Directive 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Regionally Aligned Forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1.</td>
<td>Six Step MAPRO Policy and Planning Framework</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.</td>
<td>Five Guidelines for Protection of Civilians</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.</td>
<td>Prevention and Response to Atrocities</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1.</td>
<td>Example Evaluation Chart</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.</td>
<td>Mass Atrocity Prevention Task List</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.</td>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.</td>
<td>Leadership and Education</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7.</td>
<td>Courses Offered at the West Point Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8.</td>
<td>Course Topics for A734 – Genocide Studies Seminar</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

America's reputation suffers, and our ability to bring about change is constrained, when we are perceived as idle in the face of mass atrocities and genocide.


The United States is committed to working with our allies, and to strengthening our own internal capabilities, in order to ensure that the United States and the international community are proactively engaged in a strategic effort to prevent mass atrocities and genocide.

— The White House, National Security Strategy, 2010

Every mass atrocity that takes place has severe social, economic, and political consequences that negatively affect the world for generations. After an atrocity, the entire global community bears the burden of bringing the perpetrators to justice, aiding the survivors, and remembering the victims. As the world leader, America has a special responsibility to take action to prevent atrocities. Additionally, as situational awareness increases due to technological advances, America’s responsibility to respond to atrocities also increases. The world is not ignorant of America’s position of power and will look to America for leadership. As a leader, America and its values are constantly on display; the world community’s judgment of America will be partially based on how well it responds to atrocities. Fortunately, in recent years America has taken a more proactive approach in dealing with this important issue. President Barack Obama has demonstrated that he understands this principle and has taken great strides toward making atrocity prevention a national priority.
In 2011, President Barack Obama released the Presidential Study Directive 10 (PSD-10) making mass atrocity prevention “a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States” (Obama 2011b, 1). This important directive brought the spotlight on a critical issue, that America and the world could no longer stand idle while tyrants or extremists commit mass atrocities. PSD-10 created the Atrocity Prevention Board (APB), attended by representatives from each of the departments and government agencies involved with national security and directed them to “coordinate a whole of government approach to preventing mass atrocities and genocide” (Obama 2011b, 2). The Department of Defense is represented on the APB and has a role within the whole of government approach to preventing mass atrocities and genocide.

Technological advances in communications and surveillance equipment such as improved satellite imagery and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles have provided new tools for governments to monitor high-risk areas and to help identify or even discourage atrocities. According to the Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) handbook, perpetrators are less likely to commit atrocities when they know there are observers. This is what the Mass atrocity Response Operations handbook refers to as “the power of witness” (Sewall 2010, 18). Technology has also made it more difficult for perpetrators to conceal their crimes. Ordinary citizens in almost every part of the world carry cellular telephones capable of recording audio or video evidence of atrocities. With the same devices, they can then transmit this evidence to the world via the internet. With the increased capability to detect potential and actual mass atrocities comes the increased responsibility to take action to prevent them.
Primary Research Question

Implementing a national atrocity prevention strategy requires the individual effort of every member of the APB in order to be effective. The efforts of the Department of Defense in this effort are essential to success. It is also critical for each of the service departments within the Department of Defense to embrace national strategy and to be proactive in achieving the desired ends. As of February of 2014, the Army had a total strength of 520,000 soldiers, as compared to the Marine Corps 190,000, making it by far the largest of the military ground forces, and arguably, the force most likely to confront potential mass atrocity situations (Simeone 2014). Four years after the call by the President to develop this much needed strategy, the question should be asked - is the US Army meeting its responsibilities within the ‘whole of government approach’ to prevent mass atrocities and genocide?

Secondary Research Questions

In order to answer the primary question, several questions first must be answered. The first question to ask is what are the responsibilities of the Army within the ‘whole of government approach’ to preventing mass atrocities and genocide? The answer to this question lies within the strategic guidance from the President of the United States, the National Security Council, and the Department of Defense. A detailed analysis of this strategic guidance will reveal the direction that the Defense Department has outlined and what it expects from the Army.

The second step in determining how well the Army is filling its responsibilities within the whole of government approach is to answer the question, what steps has the Army taken and what are they currently doing in order to develop the required mass
atrocity prevention and response capabilities? This is not an easy task considering the sheer size of the Army. This study will use the Army’s own capabilities based approach to developing capabilities in order to analyze how well they are meeting their responsibilities.

Assumptions

While seeking answers to the questions mentioned above, this study makes several assumptions. First, this study assumes that many senior Army leaders believe that there is an increased risk of mass atrocities around the world and that they are genuinely engaged in meeting the intent of their Commander in Chief. Another assumption is that the Army already possesses some of the required atrocity prevention capabilities and can simply include atrocity prevention with existing capabilities and prioritize it as necessary. Finally, it is assumed is that the capabilities that need to be developed will most likely be generated in the domains of doctrine, organization training, and leadership and education. The reasoning for this is that there are likely no additional materiel, personnel, facilities or policy solutions that are required in order to develop atrocity prevention capabilities.

Definitions

Today the term “mass atrocity” encompasses the crime of genocide as well as any widespread acts of violence against non-combatants or civilians for any reason. The definition of mass atrocities differs slightly between Army and Joint doctrine, so for the purpose of this study, I will use the definition of mass atrocity from U.S. Army publications, outlined in the Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Options: A Policy Planning Handbook released by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations
Institute (PKSOI). They define mass atrocities as “Widespread and often systematic acts of violence against civilians or other noncombatants including killing; causing serious bodily or mental harm; or deliberately inflicting conditions of life that cause serious bodily or mental harm” (U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 2012, 10).

The terms genocide and mass atrocities are often used in tandem in order to include all of the various motivations and methods for carrying out acts of violence against humanity. This study uses the following definition of genocide, agreed upon by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948 following the Holocaust of World War II (United Nations 1948, article 2).

In the present convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial, or religious group, as such: Killing members of the group; Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (United Nations General Assembly 1948, Article 2)

It is important to understand what is meant by the term ‘whole of government approach.’ Army Field Manual, FM 3-07 provides a definition of the whole of government approach, which reads as follows, “A whole-of-government approach encompasses coordination among all interagency partners. Such coordination is known as interagency coordination. Interagency coordination is defined as within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged United States Government agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an objective (JP 3-0)” (U.S. Department of the Army 2014, 3-1). When President Obama called for a whole of government approach to
preventing mass atrocities in PSD-10, he did so knowing that only through the cooperation of the many government departments and agencies could atrocity prevention become a reality. The APB would therefore be an important element of the overall atrocity prevention strategy.

The responsibility to protect (R2P) is another important concept relating to the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities. R2P has been a controversial but generally accepted concept within the international community and in national policy circles because it challenges the traditional definition of state sovereignty. The United Nations General Assembly in the 2005 United Nations World Summit Outcome first adopted R2P. The most up-to-date definition provided on the United Nations website of the Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide (UN Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide 2015) reads as follows:

The three pillars of the responsibility to protect, as stipulated in the Outcome Document of the 2005 United Nations World Summit (A/RES/60/1, para. 138-140) and formulated in the Secretary-General's 2009 Report (A/63/677) on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect are:

1. The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement;

2. The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility;

3. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. (United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide 2015)

Another important term that has recently been adopted by the Defense Department and included in recent doctrine to help in the prevention of mass atrocities is
the protection of civilians (PoC). FM 3-07 Stability identifies the PoC as “an important moral political, legal, and military consideration” and states, “The protection of civilians refers, in general, to efforts that protect civilians from physical violence, secure their access to essential services and resources, and protect human rights” (U.S. Department of the Army 2014, 1-8). It also defines a civilian as “a person who is not a member of his or her country’s armed forces or other militia” (U.S. Department of the Army 2014, 1-8).

**Limitations and Delimitations**

In order to be effective in the whole of government approach to atrocity prevention efforts, the United States must coordinate all of the activities of the many organizations and agencies in the National Security Council. This study will focus solely on the how well the Army is meeting its responsibilities within the overall strategy. One of the limitations of this study is the inability to access information regarding the efforts or strategy of the Atrocity Prevention Board, most of which is classified. Without this information, it is difficult to determine exactly which responsibilities rest with the Army and which rest with the other military services or government agencies. For this reason, this study will analyze Army efforts in general terms following their directive to be, “proactively engaged in a strategic effort to prevent mass atrocities” as stated in the 2010 National Security Strategy (Obama 2010, 48).

The first call by President Obama to develop a whole of government approach was issued in the August 2011 PSD-10. This research will limit its study of Army efforts to those that occurred between January 2010 and March 2015, a period of five years. Although there was some progress toward developing mass atrocity prevention capability prior to the release of PSD-10, most of the Army’s efforts in atrocity prevention came as
a direct result of the strategic guidance from President Barrack Obama starting with PSD-10. March 31, 2015 will be the information cut-off date for this study.

The Army uses a force development model called DOTMLPF that considers eight domains in order to develop required capabilities. The eight domains are Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities. This study will use the DOTMLPF model to analyze Army efforts to develop atrocity prevention capabilities as outlined in strategic guidance, but will limit its research to the four domains of doctrine, organization, training, and leadership and education in order to narrow the scope of this study. These domains are the most applicable to developing atrocity prevention capabilities.

The most important of these four domains is arguably leadership and education. Within the domain of leadership and education, this study will focus only on the education and development of Army officers. Once again, this is necessary in order to keep the study to a manageable size, and the only educational institutions and programs in the Army that address genocide or mass atrocities are found in officer educational institutions. Future research should investigate the benefits of atrocity prevention education for the Army Non-Commissioned Officer corps and enlisted personnel in relation to atrocity prevention efforts.

**Conclusion**

The US Army is obligated to embrace the president’s guidance and the directives contained in national defense strategy by striving to develop and improve its own capability to prevent, and when necessary, intervene to stop mass atrocities. As the largest of the military services, with thousands of combat and support troops deployed or
stationed around the globe, the Army is best suited to take the lead within the DoD in atrocity prevention efforts. If strategic guidance and moral imperatives are not enough reason for the Army to embrace the development of mass atrocity prevention and response capabilities, there are three more important reasons to do so. These reasons are, growing instability that increases the likelihood of atrocities, tougher international stance toward perpetrators with increased international pressure to respond, and increased public awareness of potential atrocities due to advances in communications and surveillance technology.

This study can serve as an azimuth check for policy makers to make sure the Army is adapting its doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education in a manner that enables it to fulfill its role within the whole of government approach to prevent mass atrocities. If the Army fully embraces mass atrocity prevention efforts it is likely the other branches of the military along with the other departments and government agencies will follow suit. Chapter 2 will review important literature on the subject of mass atrocity prevention to establish what we already know and help us to answer the question, “Is the US Army meeting its responsibilities within the whole of government approach to preventing mass atrocities and genocide?”
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This study seeks to answer the question, “Is the US Army fulfilling its responsibilities within the whole of government approach to preventing mass atrocities?” The topic of mass atrocity and genocide prevention has steadily increased in importance over the past two decades and today is at the heart of some of the most important international discussion. Author and political scientist, Joseph Nye points out in his book *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation*, that “Some of the most important debates in world politics today revolve around the meanings of terms such as sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, human rights, and genocide” (Nye 2013, 10).

This chapter will first review how mass atrocity and genocide prevention became a priority with a close look at PSD-10 and the call for a whole of government approach to preventing mass atrocities and genocide. With an understanding of how the issue of mass atrocity prevention has been elevated, this study will examine what the Army has done in order to develop the capabilities required of it in the whole of government approach to preventing mass atrocities and genocide. Most research on the subject of mass atrocities still focuses on why atrocities occur, whether or not mass atrocity prevention is achievable, or whether or not it is worth the effort. This study will leave those topics for others and simply focus on determining how well the Army is developing the capabilities required of it as directed in strategic guidance.
Atrocity Prevention: Becoming a Priority

The United Nations was organized in 1948 following World War II, and one of their first orders of business was to hold the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The allied forces were not fully aware of the genocide that was taking place inside Nazi Germany until they defeated the German forces and stumbled across the concentration camps. The world was shocked by the horrors of the Holocaust but the world was also too busy recovering from the many impacts of WWII to make major progress toward preventing future atrocities. Therefore, the efforts of the international community were primarily focused on punishing those responsible for the Holocaust and not on how to prevent another one. For the next four decades, the United Nations conducted many peacekeeping operations around the world to help stabilize troubled regions, but the problem of how to prevent sovereign states from allowing or committing atrocities against their own citizens had not been resolved.

In 1994-1995, two atrocities occurred that forced the international community to reconsider how to prevent abusive regimes from committing atrocities. Most embarrassingly, these tragedies occurred while international peacekeeping forces were present but they failed to intervene to stop them because there was not a clear policy in place regarding the issue of violating state sovereignty. At the individual state level, countries were also hesitant to get involved when it was not in their clear national interest to do so. The first mass atrocity was the failure of the UN security forces in Rwanda to prevent the slaughter of 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu men, women, and children over the course of 100 days in 1994 (Power 2002, 334). The second mass atrocity was the failure of UN peacekeeping forces to provide protection to the Bosnians who were taking
refuge at a declared UN “safety zone” in Srebrenica in 1995. This tragedy resulted in the execution of 7,000 Muslim men and boys (Power 2002, 392).

Both of the events above were highly publicized and forced the international community and the United Nations to start to develop a solution to the problem. As the world governing body, the United Nations felt tremendous pressure to develop a solution to prevent this from happening again. In 2000 then secretary general of the United Nations, Kofi Annan posed the following question in a special report to the General Assembly entitled *We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First Century*, “if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how *should* we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?” (Annan 2000, 35).

In 2001, the Canadian based group called the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty sought to answer Kofi Annan’s question and began to develop the concept we know today as the responsibility to protect (R2P) (ICISS 2001, VIII). The issue of state sovereignty and when it is or is not acceptable to infringe upon that sovereignty is perhaps one of the most difficult questions and the international community only slowly started to recognize it as a legitimate concept.

The concept of R2P was internationally accepted as part of the 2005 United Nations World Summit Outcome (United Nations 2005, 30). R2P attempts to hold world leaders responsible for genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, committed in their jurisdiction by redefining the idea of state sovereignty. The responsibility to protect states that the international community is “prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council...on a
case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations” (United Nations 2005, 30).

Although the international community voted in support of R2P, most states still only support it in practice or action as long as it refers to intervening to stop atrocities in distant lands. When the atrocity is taking place close to home and has an impact on local balances of power, states are usually reluctant to give up the notion of sovereignty. For example, in February 2014, Russia sent forces into Crimea, in violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, in order to protect ethnic Russians. There is no doubt however, that if another country were to enter Russian territory to protect civilians from harm, Russia would strongly object. The United States, as the world leader and a major contributor to peacekeeping operations around the world, accepted the concept of R2P in 2005 and supported its use in enforcing UN Security Council resolution 1973, sanctioning the use of force against the Qaddafi regime in Libya in 2011 (Obama 2011a).

This international and national acceptance of the R2P made mass atrocity prevention and response capabilities more critical for the US Army because of the implications it has for the possible use of military force in order to enforce it. R2P in general terms is the idea that when a state is the perpetrator of an atrocity or if it fails to provide protection to its citizens against human rights violations and mass atrocities, it becomes the responsibility of the international community to intervene, even though doing so violates that states’ sovereignty. A result of the United Nations and the United States endorsement of R2P is that now there is an increased likelihood of US military
involvement in intervention and peacekeeping operations around the world supported by this concept.

In 2008, the newly elected President of the United States, Barrack Obama, appointed Samantha Power, the current U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, as his assistant and Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights. Power, a leading expert on the subject of genocide, dealt with the horror of mass atrocities as a journalist in the former Yugoslavia and authored a popular book on the subject entitled *A Problem from Hell*. Ironically, in her book Power pointed out that-“No U.S. President has ever made genocide prevention a priority, and no U.S. President has ever suffered politically for his indifference to its occurrence. It is thus no coincidence that genocide rages on” (Power 2002, XXI). President Obama broke the status quo when, in 2011, he released Presidential Study Directive 10 (PSD-10) that declared the prevention of mass atrocities as “a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States” (Obama 2011b, 1). With this statement, preventing mass atrocities and genocide was for the first time formally recognized as priority by the President of the United States.

Once the United States, at the direction of President Obama, began to make atrocity prevention a priority, national strategy documents started to reflect the increased priority. The 2010 United States *National Security Strategy* specifically mentions the following,

The United States and all member states of the U.N. have endorsed the concept of the “Responsibility to Protect.” In so doing, we have recognized that the primary responsibility for preventing genocide and mass atrocity rests with sovereign governments, but that this responsibility passes to the broader international community when sovereign governments themselves commit genocide or mass atrocities, or when they prove unable or unwilling to take necessary action to prevent or respond to such crimes inside their borders. (Obama 2010, 48)
The first direct call by the President of the United States for departments and agencies to focus on their role in mass atrocity prevention came in 2011 with the release of PSD-10. PSD-10 is a short three-page document that clearly states that prevention of mass atrocities is “a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States” (Obama 2011b, 2). Rationale provided for this statement is that when mass atrocities occur it weakens national security by threatening regional stability. In addition, our reputation as a freedom-loving nation is tarnished because we are viewed as unconcerned bystanders while atrocities are taking place.

In PSD-10 President Obama called for the establishment of a Mass Atrocities Prevention Board to ensure the following four functions:

Accordingly, I hereby direct the establishment of an interagency Atrocities Prevention Board within 120 days from the date of this Presidential Study Directive. The primary purpose of the Atrocities Prevention Board shall be to coordinate a whole of government approach to preventing mass atrocities and genocide. By institutionalizing the coordination of atrocity prevention, we can ensure: (1) that our national security apparatus recognizes and is responsive to early indicators of potential atrocities; (2) that departments and agencies develop and implement comprehensive atrocity prevention and response strategies in a manner that allows "red flags" and dissent to be raised to decision makers; (3) that we increase the capacity and develop doctrine for our foreign service, armed services, development professionals, and other actors to engage in the full spectrum of smart prevention activities; and (4) that we are optimally positioned to work with our allies in order to ensure that the burdens of atrocity prevention and response are appropriately shared. (Obama 2011b)

The Mass Atrocities Prevention Board still meets regularly although their activities are not always transparent to the public. As stated above, the purpose of the board is to improve our ability to identify early indicators of atrocities, to facilitate the transmission of “red flags and dissent” from within our departments and agencies, to develop doctrine and capacity, and to improve our working relationships with our allies in order to share the burden of atrocity prevention.
In 2012, the United States encouraged and supported United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizing the use of force to protect the people of Libya (United Nations 2011). President Obama referenced this resolution in his address to the nation justifying the US involvement in Libya in 2011 (Obama 2011a). Regardless of whether or not one agrees with it, this example shows that R2P has already been used once as justification for intervention and it is safe to assume that it will be used to justify future operations. R2P raised the standards of human rights protection and therefore increased the workload of America as the world’s leading superpower and supporter of human rights.

The concept of the protection of civilians (PoC) is a relatively new phrase that has been gaining momentum and focus over the past few years in both international and US Military language. The idea of PoC has been around since early 1990 but has varied by definition. It started in humanitarian circles and was then adopted by the United Nations who used it in peacekeeping operations. It was only recently adopted by the US Army who included the PoC as part of their 2014 field manual on stability operations. The Army’s acceptance of the concept of PoC is an important step in elevating the priority of preventing mass atrocities. It is very important for the US Army to embrace the concept of PoC and implement it in all of its peacekeeping and stability operations in order to prevent atrocities in the future and uphold its high moral standards.

Simply put, the PoC is the protection of civilians during peacekeeping activities or conflicts. In March 2014, United Nations Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services conducted an Evaluation of the Implementation and Results of Protection of Civilian Mandates in United Nations’ Peacekeeping Operations. One of the findings in
the evaluation was that “There is a persistent pattern of peacekeeping operations not intervening with force when civilians are under attack” (United Nations 2014, 1). The report also found that since 2009 the UN has improved its guidance and structures to support PoC in the field. The United Nations is steadily increasing pressure on nations involved in peacekeeping missions to enforce PoC. If successful, intervention through the use of force to prevent mass atrocities will happen more frequently. The United States has already started to insert the PoC into its stability operations doctrine released in 2012 and 2014. An overview of this doctrine will be provided below.

The 2014 Amnesty International report, *Amnesty International Report 2014/15 The State of the World’s Human Rights*, clearly illustrates that there is an increased threat of mass atrocities around the world today calling this year “a devastating year for those seeking to stand up for human rights and for those caught up in the suffering of war zones” (Amnesty International 2015, 2). The report highlights mass atrocities committed in Syria, Nigeria, Central African Republic, South Sudan, the Ukraine, and Mexico, just to name a few (Amnesty International 2015, 2-5).

According to the *List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948-2013*, provided on the United Nations Peacekeeping website, the UN has conducted sixty-nine peacekeeping operations since its founding in 1948. Of those 69 peacekeeping operations, sixteen of them are still ongoing today (United Nations 2015). To put that in perspective, 23 percent of the peacekeeping operations that have taken place over the past 65 years are happening today. The high amount of peacekeeping operations and the need for many more in troubled regions around the globe increases the requirement for more and better atrocity education for Army personnel deploying to these environments that are at high risk for
mass atrocities. The Army also needs to have doctrine and conduct training to prepare itself for when it is called upon to deploy and conduct mass atrocity response operations.

There are clear signs that over the last decade, the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide has become a much higher priority to the national security establishment. In 2006, the *National Security Strategy* stated, “genocide must not be tolerated. It is a moral imperative that states take action to prevent and punish genocide” (Bush 2006, 17). Later on comments become more directive in nature; for example in 2010 the *Quadrennial Defense Review* states that, “Not all contingencies will require the involvement of US. Military forces, but the Defense Department must be prepared to provide the President with options across a wide range of contingencies, which include…preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities or large scale natural disasters abroad” (Department of Defense 2010, vi).

**Developing Atrocity Prevention and Response Capabilities**

The Army force development process is how the army identifies and develops desired capabilities to handle the challenges faced in the operational environment. The 2013-2014 *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook*, states that “Force development starts with the operational capabilities desired of the Army as specified in national strategies and guidance such as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), National Defense Strategy (NDS), Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), National Military Strategy (NMS), and the Army Strategy as well as the needs of the Combatant Commanders” (US Army War College 2013, 6-1).
Guidance provided in the documents and sources mentioned above outline the type of operations the Army must perform, the size of force they will have to accomplish those operations, the required effects they must achieve, the required attributes of the force, and where they have to operate. Strategic guidance also provides a visualization of the future joint operating environments. Specific concepts are then designed in order to prevail against adversaries within those JOEs. These concepts consist of various types of military operations and capabilities and are designed to provide solutions to operational challenges such as how to prevent or intervene to stop mass atrocities.

The Army uses a model called DOTMLPF in the first phase of force development to help identify how to develop required capabilities across the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. In developing mass atrocity prevention and response capabilities, this study will focus solely on the domains of doctrine, organization, training, and leadership and education in an effort to narrow the focus. In addition, when considering doctrine this study will consider applicable planning tools and handbooks produced or endorsed by the Army even if they are not official Army doctrine.

 Doctrine and Planning Tools

One year prior to the White House release of PSD-10, the Carr Center for Human Rights Study (Harvard Kennedy School) and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), in a collaborative effort, developed and released the *Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO): A Military Planning Handbook* (Sewall 2010). Although the MARO Handbook is not official Army doctrine, it is a helpful planning tool. Sarah Sewall, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Peace Operations in the
Department of Defense in the 1990s, founded the MARO project in 2007. Sewall, who was the creator of the project, along with her team at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and the Harvard Kennedy School, invited the US Army PKSOI to join them in their efforts with the project - they gladly accepted.

The major MARO project goals were to “develop a widely shared understanding of the specific and unique aspects of mass atrocities and genocides, and to create a common military approach (within the context of a comprehensive approach) to addressing these challenges.” It was also the hope of the MARO project that their efforts would catch on, and that the interagency and international communities would develop similar concepts and planning tools (Sewall 2010, 9).

Part one of the MARO handbook outlines the distinguishing characteristics that make a MARO different from other operations. Describing what makes a MARO different from other types of operations is a necessary first step. The authors of the MARO Handbook understood this when they said “Identifying the characteristics of mass atrocity and the particular challenges of a MARO is a prerequisite for developing relevant planning tools and the supporting doctrine, training, leadership, and materiel support” (Sewall 2010, 25). The handbook outlines multiparty dynamics, illusion of impartiality, and escalatory dynamics as three main distinctions of a MARO. In addition to these three distinctions, it lists eight key political and operational implications of those distinctions. These eight implications are, different information from the outset, advance interagency planning, speed versus mass, the power of witness, symptoms versus root causes, immediate non-military requirements, moral dilemmas, and political guidance. It is up to the reader to decide how distinct these characteristcics are from other operations. The
The MARO handbook itself points out that, at the time of its publishing, the United States did not recognize mass atrocity response as a unique operational challenge (Sewall 2010, 23).

The planning considerations laid out in part two of the MARO handbook are similar to how the Army currently plans for most types of operations. The participation of the PKSOI in the MARO handbook does demonstrate that although this project was conceptualized and driven primarily by civilians, the US Army was willing to invest resources to addresses mass atrocity prevention and response operations a year prior to the release of PSD-10.

![Figure 1. Six Step MAPRO Policy and Planning Framework](source)


Two years later in 2012, one year after the release of PSD-10, the US Army PKSOI released another policy planning handbook called *Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Options (MAPRO): A Policy Planning Handbook*. The MAPRO handbook was designed to be “a reference for policy makers to monitor, prevent, and if necessary respond to genocide and other mass atrocity situations” (U.S. Army Peacekeeping and
Stability Operations Institute 2012, 1). One of its major contributions is a six-step MAPRO Policy and Planning Framework shown above.

The difference between the MARO and the MAPRO handbooks is interesting. The MARO handbook, designed in collaboration with civilians, informs the military on how to conduct a response operation while the MAPRO handbook, designed by the military, informs policy makers on options available for both prevention and response. Although there is no contradiction between the two handbooks, the MAPRO handbook is more useful for planners because it targets policy makers who are primarily responsible for deciding how to act when faced with a possible mass atrocity situation. The MARO handbook acknowledges the fact that “Most of the vexing issues related to a MARO—e.g., how to identify perpetrators, whether to treat just the symptoms or also the root causes, the degree of risk to assume in moving swiftly—are properly resolved by civilian authorities” (Sewall 2010, 19). The MAPRO handbook acknowledges this fact and seeks to educate policy makers on their options for using the military in prevention or intervention.

JP 3-07.3 has a 10-page appendix dedicated to MARO’s. This is the first doctrine published that discusses MAROs in detail. It acknowledges from the start that it is difficult for leaders to distinguish a MARO situation from other circumstances and states that “While national level leadership will determine whether a particular situation should be categorized as an actual or potential mass atrocity, military commanders should incorporate MARO considerations in their planning and operations whenever possible” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2012, B-1).

Appendix B proceeds to outline the distinctions of mass atrocity situations. Most of the distinctions closely resemble those found in the *MARO: A Military Planning Handbook* with the exception of one, the fact that mass atrocity events are crimes under international law. What makes this distinction important is because forces that identify a mass atrocity must be prepared to treat it as a crime scene. A mass atrocity is more like a crime scene that a battlefield, and should be treated as such under international law. All evidence must be preserved and recorded so that perpetrators can be prosecuted. Appendix B then reviews the many MARO planning considerations including situational understanding, unity of effort and unity of purpose, strategic communication, and operational design.

Chapter 3 of ADRP 3-07 *Stability* includes the PoC as one unique characteristics of stability operations. It points out that during conflicts there are usually far more civilian casualties than military and provides lists of thirteen threats to civilians ranging from outright genocide to environmental threats. More importantly, it provides three “related but distinct conceptual lines” of PoC (U.S. Department of the Army 2012, 3-20)
which include, the protection of civilians during armed conflict, UN peacekeeping missions, and human security threats.

Chapter one of Army FM 3-07 includes the PoC as one of the related activities and missions for stability operations. It labels the PoC as “an important moral, political, legal, and military consideration” (U.S. Department of the Army 2014, 1-8). It also defines a civilian as “a person who is not a member of his or her country’s armed forces or other militia” (U.S. Department of the Army 2014, 1-8), a simple but important contribution. FM 3-07 states that PoC might be the purpose for an operation or it could be a supporting task for another operation. It helps to identify some of the factors that make civilians more vulnerable to threats and states that the most important aspect of understanding the threat is finding out the real motive of the perpetrator. It is especially important to know whether the perpetrators motives are driven by ideology because when this is the case deterrence is extremely challenging.
Figure 2. Five Guidelines for Protection of Civilians


FM 3-07 provides five overlapping guidelines for the protection of civilians as depicted in the figure 2 above that are designed to help units keep the protection of civilians in perspective as they execute operations. After going into detail about each of the five guidelines on figure 2, FM 3-07 ends with the following statement regarding MAROs. “Military support and supporting efforts of other agencies and organizations in response to mass atrocities may be key to the success of stability missions” (U.S. Department of the Army 2014, 1-11).

The Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force adopted the latest doctrine related to mass atrocity in November 2014. The Army ATP 3-07.31, the MCWP 3-33.8, and the
AFTTP 3-2.40 all accepted the MARO concept making it standard across those services. In the Army version, ATP 3-07.31, it is included as Appendix G, Mass Atrocity Response Operations. The information is essentially the same information that is found in Appendix B of JP 3-07.3. It provides an outline of MARO considerations, the attributes of key players, MARO planning considerations and approaches.

Organization

The U.S. Army is in the process of changing the way it operates in order to meet the increasing demand for stability and peacekeeping around the world. In addition to improving security generally, some of these changes lend themselves perfectly to helping prevent mass atrocities. One example of this is the Army’s new Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) construct. Designed for improving relationships with foreign militaries while improving the security situation in under developed and under governed regions, RAF has many benefits that serve to help reduce atrocities. The basic concept of RAF is to align Army Brigade Combat Teams with specific regions, under guidance of Geographic Combatant Commands, so that units can tailor their efforts to the unique problems of that region and develop expertise. In a March, 2012 blog post discussing Army efforts in implementing RAF, General Ray Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, said the following about RAF: “This concept improves Army support to Geographic Combatant Commands and capitalizes on the ongoing contributions of the Total Force – Active, Guard, and Reserves– to improve partner capacity, sustain strong relationships, and to assist our Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational partners in building a stronger global security environment. This combination of skills and
knowledge will continue to make U.S. Army units the security partners of choice” (Odierno 2012).

The benefits of the RAF concept help to address several atrocity prevention tasks and capabilities required of the Army in strategic guidance and directives. A complete list of these tasks can be found in Table 1, page 38. The tasks that RAF directly addresses are to optimally position to work with our allies in order to share the burden, to be able to recognize and respond to early indicators, to provide options for supporting and stabilizing fragile and failed states, to send forces to advise and assist regional partners, and finally, to mobilize allies and partners.

Leadership and Education

A review of the US Army education system is needed to identify the measures currently being taken to educate leaders, soldiers, and civilians in mass atrocity identification, reporting, and prevention. Ethics and morals are perhaps the most important educational topic when dealing with mass atrocities. The Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO): A Military Planning Handbook, lists “moral dilemmas” as one of eight “key operational and political implications” of the distinct nature of mass atrocity response operations (Sewall 2010, 18).

There are many studies into the importance of morality and ethics as it relates to a leaders ability to deal with atrocity prevention and response operations. One such study outlining morality as it relates to atrocity preventions is a 38-page document written by Jacque L. Amoureux from Brown University entitled, Holding Institutions Morally Responsible: ‘Reflexivity’ as Reform (Amoureaux 2006). In this article, Amoureux talks about how although there is a lot of focus in the Army on the topic of retrospective
justice, such as use of the after action review (AAR) process. The AAR process is essentially reviewing past events to make a better future. Amoureux points out that it is less common to hear discussion of “reflexivity or moral learning.” He argues that institutions are moral agents that can “better meet their moral responsibilities when its members have developed moral reflexivity” (Amoureaux 2006, abstract).

This type of insight should be applied to the US Army and its position regarding mass atrocity prevention and response. Does the Army recognize the importance of moral character and reflexivity as it relates to mass atrocity prevention? Do the leaders and soldiers on the front lines possess the moral strength and reflexivity to act and prevent human rights violations? Is there an education system and legal framework in place to develop and support our Soldier in this endeavor?

Conclusion

The literature above shows the evolution of mass atrocity prevention as a national security interest and leaves no doubt as to the need for developing atrocity prevention capabilities. There is also clear evidence that the Army has taken steps to develop capabilities that meet strategic guidance. Most of the applicable literature in terms of Army capabilities development falls under the domain of doctrine. Some of the literature mentioned above is referenced later on in this study in an effort to identify directives that the Army has received and determine if the Army is meeting its responsibilities within the whole of government approach to preventing mass atrocities and genocide. The following chapter will outline the research methodology that this study will use to help answer this question.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In order to determine whether the US Army is meeting its responsibilities within the ‘whole of government’ approach to prevent mass atrocities, this study will first conduct a review of applicable literature. This literature review will include material relating to how mass atrocity prevention has emerged as a national priority, strategic guidance for the Department of Defense and the Army, and any Army doctrine or work already published relating to the prevention of mass atrocities. The second step of this methodology will be to conduct a thorough analysis of national strategy and guidance relating to the prevention of mass atrocities given to the Army between January 2010 and March 2015. This will result in a list of all of the specific and implied tasks and capabilities expected of the US Army.

The third step will be to use two methods to determine how well the Army is meeting the expectations found on the list of specified and implied tasks as well as in the development of capabilities and attributes required to meet those tasks. The first method will be a capabilities analysis across the four domains of doctrine, organization, training, and leadership and education, extracted from the Army’s capabilities-based DOTMLPF model. This study will focus on these four domains, as these are the most applicable to mass atrocity prevention and response efforts. This method of research will examine whether there are capability gaps in these domains, i.e., between what is expected of the Army and what it can actually accomplish.

The second method to determine how well the Army is meeting its expectations will be to measure the effectiveness of those efforts. To do this it will evaluate the
Army’s atrocity prevention efforts against two criteria, compliance and effectiveness. The first criterion, compliance, is simply whether or not the Army complies with strategic guidance. The second criterion, effectiveness, is the degree to which the Army’s efforts within each domain actually create the desired capability. These evaluation criteria were selected specifically to focus on how well the Army is accomplishing the strategic guidance it has received in order to answer the original question, “is the Army meeting its responsibilities in the whole of government approach to prevent mass atrocities and genocide?” At the end of this evaluation, the Army will be given a numerical rating based on how well they are meeting these expectations. The higher the score they receive the better. Below is a blank example of the evaluation chart that will be populated in chapter 4 to outline Army effort and their effectiveness in the four domains of doctrine, organization, training, and leadership and education (see table 1).

Table 1.  Example Evaluation Chart

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain:</th>
<th>Guidance / Tasks: Specified (S) or Implied (I)</th>
<th>Source:</th>
<th>Army Efforts:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Criterion (a)</th>
<th>NO (1)</th>
<th>Partially (2)</th>
<th>YES (3)</th>
<th>Score:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>The Army has not completed the tasks or lacks the required capabilities.</td>
<td>The Army has completed some of the specified and implied tasks, or possesses some of the required capability, but falls short of meeting all of the requirements.</td>
<td>The Army has completed all of the specified and implied tasks and possesses the desired capabilities in this domain.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Scale 1-6, Higher is better) Domain Total:

Source: Created by author.
Clarifying Army responsibilities and reviewing Army performance can inform leaders and policy-makers alike on what capability gaps still exist within the Army, and provide suggestions regarding how to acquire and/or mitigate those capabilities. Assessing how well the Army is meeting its expectations in atrocity prevention can shed light on new ways to improve Army education, training, and resourcing - ultimately providing support to the Army to meet the challenges of the future.

**Threats to Validity**

There are several threats to validity with this study that must be considered. First, there is very little information regarding the function and work of the Atrocity Prevention Board (APB). The APB has received criticism for this, mostly from human rights activists who are concerned that the White House is not doing enough to prevent atrocities. This study does not consider any classified information that might also have an impact on the study. At the time of this study, the author was a Major in the United States Army; his perspective on these matters should be considered in light of this fact.

The next chapter, chapter 4, will follow the methodology above by extracting Army requirements from strategic guidance, determine whether the Army has met those requirements, and analyze how effective Army efforts have been. By following this methodology, the answer to the primary question, “is the Army meeting its responsibilities within the whole of government approach to preventing mass atrocities?” should become clear.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Expectations of the Army

Determining whether the US Army is filling its responsibilities within the ‘whole of government approach’ to preventing mass atrocities, does not necessarily require a perfect knowledge of what the ‘whole of government’ approach is. As noted in the definitions in chapter 1, Army publication, FM 3-07 states that the ‘whole of government approach’ refers to coordination between “elements of the Department of Defense, and engaged United States Government agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an objective” (U.S. Department of the Army 2014, 3-1). It is the focus of the APB to determine and direct the whole of government approach to preventing mass atrocities – however, much of their work is classified. Therefore, any specific guidance from the APB to the Department of Defense or the Army is not available for consideration.

Therefore, this study will determine the Army’s role within the whole of government approach by analyzing strategic guidance at both the national and Department of Defense level, and extracting those tasks and capabilities specified or implied for the Army. The key national strategy and guidance documents regarding the prevention of mass atrocities are, listed in chronological order, the PSD-10, the 2010 NSS, the 2010 QDR, the 2012 White House document entitled Fact Sheet: A Comprehensive Strategy and New Tools to Prevent and Respond to Atrocities, the 2013 White House document entitled, Fact Sheet: The Obama Administration’s
Comprehensive Efforts to Prevent Mass Atrocities Over the Past Year, the 2014 QDR, and the 2015 NSS.

Of all of the strategic guidance provided, PSD-10 is perhaps the most helpful document for creating a picture of the desired end state or purpose for the Army in terms of mass atrocity prevention. The intent of this document was to establish the first Atrocities Prevention Board; however, this document also sends a clear message to the DoD and the US Army about how it is expected to contribute toward preventing mass atrocities. The first and most important take away for the military is in the following statement, “In the face of a potential mass atrocity, our options are never limited to either sending in the military or standing by and doing nothing. The actions that can be taken are many; these range from economic to diplomatic interventions and from non-combat military actions to outright intervention” (Obama 2011b, 2). There is an implied task here to explore and develop non-combat military options as well as prepare for outright military intervention (i.e., military direct action) in mass atrocity situations.

PSD-10 lists four specific goals that it seeks to achieve. The first is to recognize and respond to early indicators of potential atrocities. The second is to develop and implement comprehensive atrocity prevention and response strategies in a manner that allows "red flags" and dissent to raise to decision makers. The third is to increase the capacity to prevent and respond to mass atrocities, and develop doctrine to engage in the full spectrum of smart prevention activities. Fourth is to optimally position forces to work with our allies in order to share the burdens of atrocity prevention and response appropriately.
Finally, PSD-10 also called for an interagency review that would focus on seeking ways to better train and support the armed services in order to be better prepared to prevent and respond to mass atrocities or genocide. Education and training is an important part of sound strategy to prepare forces to respond appropriately.

The next source of strategic guidance relating to mass atrocity prevention is the 2010 National Security Strategy. This strategy, released one year prior to PSD-10, makes direct mention of mass atrocity prevention once when it states that we must strengthen our own internal capabilities to ensure that we are “proactively engaged in a strategic effort to prevent mass atrocities and genocide” (Obama 2010, 48). It does not include specifics about the kind of capabilities that need to be strengthened; the reader is left guessing as to what exactly is the role of the US Army in the strategic effort to prevent mass atrocities. However, several other statements in the document make it clear that the military will have to deal with the issue of mass atrocities prevention and response. One such statement is as follows, “Military force, at times, may be necessary to defend our country and allies or to preserve broader peace and security, including by protecting civilians facing a grave humanitarian crisis” (Obama 2010, 22).

Another important document released in 2010 is the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which is released by the Department of Defense every four-years and outlines the DoD strategy. The 2010 QDR mentions mass atrocity prevention twice. First, it states that “the Defense Department must be prepared to provide the President with options across a wide range of contingencies, which include…supporting and stabilizing fragile states facing serious internal threats, and preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities” (U.S. Department of Defense 2010, VI). Second, it lists preventing human
suffering due to mass atrocities or large-scale natural disasters abroad as one of eight challenges that the DoD is required to deal with.

In 2012, the White House released a detailed document entitled *Fact Sheet: A Comprehensive Strategy and New Tools to Prevent and Respond to Atrocities*, which contained the following list of things expected of the military in regards to mass atrocity prevention.

- **Military**
  - DOD will further develop operational principles (i.e., doctrine) and planning techniques specifically tailored around atrocity prevention and response. The Joint Staff has prepared an appendix on mass atrocity response operations to be included in its Joint Publication on Peace Operations. This document will help ensure that forces have the training and knowledge to succeed in atrocity prevention missions.
  - Geographic combatant commands will incorporate mass atrocity prevention and response as a priority in their planning, activities and engagements.
  - DOD will routinely organize exercises incorporating mass atrocity prevention and response scenarios to test operational concepts supporting mass atrocity prevention and response.
  - DOD will continue to develop more agile planning processes and tools so options can be developed quickly in emergency situations.
  - The faculty from the service academies will meet at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum at the end of May 2012 to discuss how to incorporate mass atrocity and genocide prevention into their curricula.

- **Government-wide**
  - All departments and agencies that have a role in atrocity prevention and responses have been directed to begin to develop curricula and programs to train military and civilian personnel in civilian protection and atrocity prevention.
  - These departments and agencies have also been directed to create performance incentives for work contributing to atrocity prevention.

Figure 3. Prevention and Response to Atrocities


In 2013, the White House released another fact sheet entitled *Fact Sheet: The Obama Administration’s Comprehensive Efforts to Prevent Mass Atrocities over the Past*
Year. This document, meant to advertise the progress made toward our national atrocity prevention strategy, highlights achievements made by the various departments within the government. The following activities are those that it specifically mentioned that fall within the scope of duties of the US Army.

1. Sending forces to advise and assist regional partners.
2. Providing training and equipment in support of United Nations and regional peacekeeping operations.
3. Developing doctrine, training, and mission planning on the protection of civilians.
4. Integrating the protection of civilians and the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence into bilateral training for troops deploying to UN missions.
5. Integrating mass atrocity response operations into general departmental plans and planning guidance.
6. Incorporating mass atrocity prevention and response concepts into Geographic Combatant Commands steady state planning as well as planning for specific contingencies.
7. Publishing formal doctrine on mass atrocity response operations.
8. Hosting tabletop and warfighter exercises on mass atrocity situations.

The 2014 QDR mentions mass atrocity prevention once while discussing challenges in Africa. It talks about developing stronger governance institutions, and building more professional and capable military forces that can then collaborate with the United States to provide security and stability. It then states the following about current efforts, “Multilateral peace operations under the aegis of the United Nations, African
Union, and sub-regional organizations are playing an increasingly prominent role in maintaining and restoring international security, including through prevention and mitigation of mass atrocities in threat environments that previously would have deterred multilateral action” (U.S. Department of Defense 2014, 5). Training groups and individuals to serve as part of a multilateral peace operations force are clearly identified as one way the US Army can invest in mass atrocity prevention.

The 2015 National Security Strategy refers to mass atrocities three times. The first mention is under the category of “top strategic risks to our interests.” Weak or failing states are listed as one of the top risks, and include mass atrocities as one of its negative consequences. Therefore, it is assumed that efforts to improve weak or failing states will reduce the likelihood of mass atrocities. The second mention of mass atrocities is a simple statement that, “We will continue to insist that governments uphold their human rights obligations, speak out against repression wherever it occurs, and work to prevent, and, if necessary, respond to mass atrocities” (Obama 2015, 19). The third mention of mass atrocities contains the most substance in regards to how we will approach mass atrocity prevention. Chapter 4 includes preventing mass atrocities as one of our national values and states the following.

The mass killing of civilians is an affront to our common humanity and a threat to our common security. It destabilizes countries and regions, pushes refugees across borders, and creates grievances that extremists exploit. We have a strong interest in leading an international response to genocide and mass atrocities when they arise, recognizing options are more extensive and less costly when we act preventively before situations reach crisis proportions. We know the risk of mass atrocities escalates when citizens are denied basic rights and freedoms, are unable to hold accountable the institutions of government, or face unrelenting poverty and conflict. We affirm our support for the international consensus that governments have the responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocities and that this responsibility passes to the broader international community when those
governments manifestly fail to protect their populations. We will work with the international community to prevent and call to account those responsible for the worst human rights abuses, including through support to the International Criminal Court, consistent with U.S. law and our commitment to protecting our personnel. Moreover, we will continue to mobilize allies and partners to strengthen our collective efforts to prevent and respond to mass atrocities using all our instruments of national power. (Obama 2015, 22)

The paragraph above indicates that in order to prevent mass atrocities, the United States intends to lead international responses, act to prevent rather than just responding to crisis, promote basic human rights and freedoms, support the R2P, support the International Criminal Court, and use all instruments of national power. There are many implications within these concepts that have impact on the US Army and should shape their purpose and end state regarding mass atrocity prevention. For example, an international response reinforces the modern reality that the US Army will function as part of a joint response rather than unilaterally. Therefore, the desired response to a mass atrocity situation is a joint response. There will be an emphasis on preventive measures as opposed to reacting to crisis; the Army should be prepared to exert every maximum effort to prevent such atrocities before they become a crisis. This will serve as both a cost savings and a life-saving measure.

National acceptance and support of the R2P concept will likely increase the need for trained and ready Army forces around the world, which increases the urgency for the Army to solidify its strategy. The final concept mentions the use of all instruments of national power. As the largest service representing a majority of the ground component of the military instrument of power, the Army can count on playing a key role in mass atrocity prevention efforts. Based on the strategic documents mentioned above, many specific or implied tasks apply directly to the military and the US Army. Below is a
display of all of the specified or implied tasks extracted from these documents that can reasonably be interpreted as applying to the US Army and shows them in table form (see table 2).

Table 2. Mass Atrocity Prevention Task List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Tasks: Specified (S) or Implied (I)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **PSD - 10**   | [I] To develop non-combat military response options  
|                | [I] To prepare for outright intervention  
|                | [S] To be able to recognize and respond to early indicators of potential atrocities  
|                | [S] To allow for "red flags" and dissent to raise to decision makers  
|                | [S] To increase capacity and develop doctrine to engage in smart prevention activities  
|                | [S] To optimally position to work with our allies in order to share burden  
|                | [I] To improve training  
| **2010 NSS**   | [I] To be proactively engaged in a strategic effort to prevent mass atrocities  
| **2010 QDR**   | [I] To provide options for supporting and stabilizing fragile and failed states facing serious internal threats  
|                | [I] To provide options for preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities  
| **2012 Fact Sheet** | [S] To develop doctrine and planning techniques tailored around atrocity prevention and response  
|                | [S] To develop doctrine, training and mission planning on the protection of civilians  
|                | [S] To integrate protection of civilians and the prevention of sexual and gender based violence into training for troops deploying to UN missions  
| **2013 Fact Sheet** | [S] To incorporate mass atrocity prevention and response concepts into geographic combatant commands steady state and contingency planning  
|                | [S] To provide options for preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities  
|                | [S] To integrate mass atrocity response operations into department plans and planning guidance  
| **2014**       | [I] To train troops to serve as a part of multilateral peace operations  
| **2015 NSS**   | [I] To mobilize allies and partners  
|                | [I] To speak out against repression wherever it occurs  

*Source: Created by author.*
All of these tasks combine to create an overall picture of the Army’s role in the whole of government approach to preventing mass atrocities. These tasks also create a picture of a desired end state that the Army should strive to achieve in terms of its own atrocity prevention capabilities. Based on strategic guidance, a possible end state for the Army could read be that the Army takes a proactive approach to its atrocity prevention efforts and has published doctrine that addresses smart prevention activities. This doctrine includes non-combat atrocity response options, MARO operations, supporting and stabilizing fragile and failed states facing serious internal threats, preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities, and the protection of civilians. Additionally, the Army has planning processes and tools that are agile enough to develop options quickly in emergencies, and that are tailored around atrocity prevention and response.

The Army is optimally positioned and engaged in advising and assisting regional partners around the world in a manner that increases our ability to identify and respond to early indicators of mass atrocities. Reporting procedures are established that expedite the flow of information up to decision makers, and at the same time encourage reporting of ‘red flags’ and other indicators of atrocities without fear of retribution.

The Army incorporates mass atrocity prevention and response into training exercises in order to test operational concepts. Army personnel are capable of identifying early indicators of potential atrocities and are prepared to respond to them according to appropriate principles outlined in Army doctrine and policies. The Army provides training and support for UN peacekeeping missions, by training personnel and units deploying in support of UN peacekeeping missions on the protection of civilians, and the prevention of sexual and gender based violence. The Army conducts tabletop exercises
on mass atrocity situations. The US Military Academy and other Army educational institutions include mass atrocity prevention and civilian protection in their curriculum and provide incentives for work contributing to atrocity prevention.

**Army Capabilities**

Before we begin analysis of Army efforts to develop the capabilities and characteristics outlined above, a quick review of the Army Force development process is important. As outlined in the *2013-2014 How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook*, “Force development starts with the operational capabilities desired of the Army as specified in national strategies and guidance such as the *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR), *National Defense Strategy* (NDS), *Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF), *Defense Planning Guidance* (DPG), *National Military Strategy* (NMS), and the Army Strategy as well as the needs of the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs)” (U.S. Army War College 2013, 6-1). Strategic Guidance given in the documents and sources outlined above explain the type of operations the Army must perform and the size of force, or at least the budget that they will have to accomplish those operations. They also explain the required effects they must achieve, the required attributes of the force, and where they have to operate. In the case of mass atrocity prevention, the effects and attributes requested of the Army are the ability to detect and respond appropriately, to prevent potential mass atrocities.

Strategic guidance also provides a visualization of the future Joint Operating Environment. Specific concepts are then designed in order to prevail against adversaries within those JOEs. These concepts consist of various types of military operations and capabilities, designed to provide solutions to operational challenges such as how to
prevent or intervene to stop mass atrocities. Since the release of PSD-10, the Department of Defense and the Army have included the prevention of mass atrocities into their estimate of the future operational environment and they have to begin to develop some of the required capabilities. The following sub-headings outline Army efforts to develop these capabilities within the four categories of doctrine and planning, organization, training, and leadership and education.

**Doctrine and Planning Tools**

In almost every case, strategic guidance for the military regarding mass atrocity prevention efforts includes some kind of directive to develop mass atrocity prevention doctrine or planning tools. Table 2 below depicts eight instances of specific calls to develop and publish such doctrine. It is simple to measure compliance to these requests in terms of Army performance; one need only to explore recent Army doctrine and search for reference to mass atrocity prevention and the PoC. The next few paragraphs will highlight Army planning tools and doctrine that has emerged to meet the requirements and directives listed.

The first major step taken by the Army toward developing doctrine was a collaborative effort between the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy School and the US Army PKSOI, to develop the *Mass Atrocity Response Operations a Military Planning Handbook*. The MARO project was already under development prior to the release of PSD-10 but was an important milestone in the development of future doctrine. This important work coined the term MARO that is used in subsequent Army and joint doctrine.
The Army PKSOI then developed the *Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Options a Policy Planning Handbook* (MAPRO) independently in 2012, which demonstrated that the Army was being both proactive and responsive to strategic guidance to develop options for the how the Army could and should respond to either prevent or intervene to stop a mass atrocity. *MAPRO* addresses, in detail, planning techniques and options for dealing with genocide or mass atrocity situations. Both the MARO and the MAPRO planning handbooks created a common language and a basis of understanding for policy makers and for future Army doctrine.

In 2012, the Army released ADRP 3-07 *Stability* that includes a page and a half section on PoC. This is the first time that PoC was introduced as an important consideration in Army stability operations and represents a significant step toward making Army leaders more aware of the concept of the responsibility to protect at the operational and tactical levels. Also in 2012, the joint community released 3-07.3 *Peace Operations* that includes an appendix outlining the principles of MARO. Although this joint publication was not an Army specific effort, it does provide an important doctrinal source for Army leaders to reference MARO principles.

In 2014, the Army released FM 3-07 *Stability*, which is a more detailed and in depth version of ADRP 3-07, that includes a four-page section on POC, including a paragraph on principles of MARO. This document provided another doctrinal source for referencing PoC and MARO in the context of stability operations. This same year the Army also joined in the release of ATP 3-07.31 / MCWP 3-33.8 / ATTP 3-2.40, *Multi Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations* that has an entire annex on the topic of MARO. This release was significant because it standardized
MARO concept across Army, Air Force, and Marine doctrine, facilitating joint coordination in future MARO scenarios. The significance of these two manuals, released in 2014, is that the Army included both MARO and PoC in its stability operations, which is completely in harmony with the directive to consider non-combat options for dealing with genocide and mass atrocity situations.

Army efforts to develop doctrine that addresses the prevention of mass atrocities are not complete. The Army is working on another training publication called ATP 3-07.6, *Protection of Civilians*. The second draft of this publication is currently in the editing process. The joint community is also in the process of developing appendix F to JP 3-07, *Stability Operations*, that will address the Protection of Civilians. JP 3-07.31 *Peace Operations* is also up for revision and the intent is to expand the appendix on MARO and address POC and MARO in the main body where it applies. Much of the doctrine that the Army has developed thus far relating to atrocity prevention is due to the hard work and effort of a few talented individuals. One of these individuals is Mr. Dwight Raymond, who works at the PKSOI, US Army War College. The work of Mr. Raymond is in much of the available doctrine regarding mass atrocity prevention.

As annotated in Table 3 below, the Army has met all of its requirements both specified and implied to develop doctrine that addresses mass atrocity prevention and PoC. The second evaluation criterion examines how effective their doctrine is in terms of how in depth it addresses mass atrocities, how well the doctrine nests with other doctrine.
The Army chose to include both MARO and PoC as considerations in stability operations. Including it in stability operations ensures that it will get the attention it deserves. Stability operations are an important part of Unified Land Operations. The Army defines Unified Land Operations in ADP 3-0 as the following. “Unified land operations describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution” (U.S. Department of the Army 2011, 1). Including PoC and MARO as part of stability operations will ensure that it gets attention and it also supports the goals of Unified Land Operations.

### Table 3. Doctrine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Guidance / Tasks: Specified (S) or Implied (I)</th>
<th>Source:</th>
<th>Army Efforts:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(S) To develop non-combat military response options</td>
<td>PSC-71</td>
<td>MARO, MAPPO, PoC, FM 3-07, ADP 3-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>(S) To develop doctrine to engage in small prevention activities</td>
<td>PSC-71</td>
<td>MARO, MAPPO, PoC, FM 3-07, ADP 3-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>(S) To prepare for outright intervention</td>
<td>MARO Handbook, JP 3-07.1, ATP 3-07.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>(S) To provide options for preventing human suffering due to man-made disasters</td>
<td>2016 QDR</td>
<td>MARO, MAPPO, PoC, FM 3-07, ADP 3-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>(S) To Develop doctrine and planning techniques tailored around strategy prevention and response</td>
<td>2012 Fast Sheet</td>
<td>MARO, MAPPO, JP 3-07.1, ATP 3-07.1, FM 3-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>(S) To develop more agile planning processes and warfare options can be developed quickly in an emergency</td>
<td>2012 Fast Sheet</td>
<td>Mission Command, MAPPO, MARO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>(S) To develop doctrine, training and mission planning on the protection of civilians</td>
<td>2013 Fast Sheet</td>
<td>FM 3-07, ADP 3-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>(S) To publish doctrinal doctrine on mass atrocity response operations</td>
<td>2013 Fast Sheet</td>
<td>ATP 3-07.2, FM 3-07, JP 3-07.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>The Army has not completed the tasks or lacks the required capabilities</td>
<td>The Army has completed some of the specified and implied tasks, or possesses some of the required capabilities, but fails to meet all of the requirements</td>
<td>The Army has completed all of the specified and implied tasks and possesses the desired capabilities in this domain</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>The Army has doctrine, planning processes, and tools that fail to adequately address mass atrocity prevention and tend to be not referenced or utilized in a manner that facilitates widespread use</td>
<td>The Army has doctrine, planning processes, and tools that are agile enough to develop options quickly in an emergency, and are tailored around strategy prevention and response</td>
<td>The Army is familiar with end efficient planning processes, tools, and doctrine that are tailored around strategy prevention and response, and are properly nested with other Army doctrines. Planning processes are agile enough to develop options quickly in emergencies</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Created by author.*
Operations by helping to ‘prevent conflict’ and ‘create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution’.

There is room for improvement in terms of increasing the amount of information regarding the PoC and MARO in Army doctrine. As mentioned above, the Army is working on improvements to existing doctrine as well as new doctrine that will include more information on MARO. For detailed information regarding MARO, one still has to reference the MARO and MAPRO handbooks.

Organization

As listed in Table 4 above, strategic guidance provided to the military, which falls within the realm of organization, calls for the Army to ‘optimally position’ itself to work with allies in order to share the burden of mass atrocity prevention. It also mentions sending forces to advise and mobilize our allies to take steps toward increasing stability, thereby reducing the risk of mass atrocities. Along the same line is the call to increase capacity to engage in smart prevention activities, and provide options for supporting and stabilizing fragile and failed states. Finally, the call to allow for red flags and dissent to raise to decision-makers was given in order to ensure that they receive information regarding possible atrocities as early as possible.

In an effort to optimally position itself in an environment of increased demand coupled with a reduction in forces and fiscal restraint, the Army has been developing the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept. The intent of the RAF concept is that brigades, divisions and corps are assigned to specific geographic combatant commanders around the world and are available for use in those specific areas as the need arises. The main benefits of RAF are that regionally aligned units would be better able to build
relationships of trust with partners and would gain a better understanding of the many aspects of their assigned region.

The RAF concept has the potential to meet the intent of optimally positioning forces to be able to partner with key allies and increase stability in regions that are at risk of mass atrocities. However, although the RAF construct would greatly facilitate the prevention of mass atrocities, it has not been yet been fully implemented and the steady demand for security forces worldwide make transitioning to RAF difficult. Additionally, the RAF construct does not plan to maintain the relationships between units and specific regions indefinitely. Under current Army planning, at a predetermined interval, units would realign with new regions losing some of its advantage. Despite its limitations, the RAF concept is a step in the right direction in terms of improving the position of the force to help prevent mass atrocities. As we partner with our allies in high risk regions, and help to increase their capacity to secure themselves, it will have a positive effect on other fragile and failed states in the region that also face serious internal threats.

Another program that is a powerful tool for increasing partner capacity and mobilizing allies and partners is the State Partnership Program. The state partnership program has been around for twenty years and has resulted in closer relationships between US National Guard units and our allies and partners in 74 countries. In this program, National Guard units from each of the American states partner with National Guard or equivalent forces of countries around the world. The program is “guided by State department foreign policy goals and executed by the states adjutants general in support of combatant commanders and US Chief of Mission security cooperation objectives and Department of Defense policy goals” (U.S. National Guard 2015).
Including mass atrocity prevention as a consideration in selecting partnerships within this program could be a powerful tool in influencing and developing our allies in manner that would help to prevent mass atrocities.

There are not any mass atrocity specific reporting procedures in the Army; however, there are systems that are currently in place that allow Soldiers and civilians to report red flags or dissent about human rights violations or atrocities. The primary method of reporting atrocities or any human rights violation is through the established chain of command and up to policy makers. The speed of this reporting system is directly related to the level of emphasis on atrocity prevention made by the chain of command. If individuals are aware of the early signs of atrocities, and leaders make them a part of their priority information reporting, the reporting process, through the chain of command, is very fast. If there is a situation where the command is not making atrocity prevention a priority, or they are willfully ignoring atrocities, Soldiers can report signs of atrocities through the US Army Criminal Investigation Department.

In many ways, technological advances have made concealing atrocities and genocide more difficult for perpetrators or bystanders. One reason for this is that the proliferation of smart phones and the availability of internet access have made it more difficult for commanders to control the flow of information within their own ranks. As mentioned above, the ultimate solution for allowing ‘red flags’ and dissent to flow to decision-makers is for decision makers to make preventing mass atrocities a priority regardless of whether it is in our national interest or political convenience to do so.
Determining how well we conform to strategic guidance in the domain of organization is difficult to measure because of the wording of some of the tasks. It is hard to define terms such as ‘optimally position’ or ‘smart prevention activities.’ It is fair to say that the Army is striving to optimally position itself around the globe, as evidenced by the programs listed above, but these efforts to optimally position itself did not begin with and are not motivated solely by the need to improve our ability to prevent mass atrocities. Our national interest is served in many ways as we work with and mobilizing our allies, support fragile and failed states, and advise and assist our regional partners.

The Army is still in the process of meeting all of the strategic guidance in the domain of organization (see table 4). While the Army is still working to improve its global position, major challenges, such as sequestration and the downsizing of the Army.
limit its ability to reach all of the areas it would like. Resources are limited and tough choices must be made to determine where to invest them. So the Army is not yet optimally positioned around the world and its allies and partners are not all fully mobilized, but it is actively engaged with many partners and allies given its limited resources.

Training

The Army has systems and facilities in place for units, staffs, and individuals to conduct MARO and PoC, related training but to date, this training is not adequately tracked. Part of the problem with training for MARO or PoC is that it has to compete with all of the other training requirements that commanders have to prioritize based on their mission requirements. As a result, the Army has completed all of the strategic requirements to facilitate and conduct training on mass atrocity prevention and PoC but because there is no mandatory requirement for every unit to conduct this training, it often takes a back seat to other training requirements and does not get the focus it requires to be effective.
### Table 5. Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Guidance / Tasks: Specified (S) or Implied (I)</th>
<th>Source:</th>
<th>Army Efforts:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(1) To improve training in mass atrocity prevention and response</td>
<td>PSO: IO</td>
<td>Availability of mass atrocity scenarios at Army training centers, METT and Army educational institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>(5) To conduct exercises incorporating mass atrocity prevention and response in joint operational exercises</td>
<td>2013 Fact Sheet</td>
<td>US Military Observer Group Washington (USMOG-W)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>(2) To provide training and equipment in support of UN and regional peacekeeping operations</td>
<td>2013 Fact Sheet</td>
<td>USMOG-W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>(5) To integrate protection of civilians and the prevention of sexual and gender based violence into training for troops deploying to UN missions</td>
<td>2013 Fact Sheet</td>
<td>USMOG-W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>(5) To host tabletop and/or light exercises on mass atrocity situations</td>
<td>2013 Fact Sheet</td>
<td>USMOG-W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>(1) To train troops to serve as part of multinational peacekeeping operations</td>
<td>2013 Fact Sheet</td>
<td>USMOG-W</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Evaluation Criteria (c)

- **Compliance:** The Army has not completed the tasks or lacks the required capabilities.
- **Partially:** The Army has completed some of the specified and implied tasks, or possesses some of the required capability, but fails short of meeting all of the requirements.
- **YES (3):** The Army has completed all of the specified and implied tasks and possesses the desired capabilities in this domain.

#### Compliance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO (1)</th>
<th>Partially (2)</th>
<th>YES (3)</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass atrocity prevention and PoC training is not readily available, units are not conducting MARO or PoC training.</td>
<td>Mass atrocity prevention and PoC training is available at Army training centers upon request by unit commanders. The Army conducts laboratory exercises on mass atrocity situations based on mission requirements and commander preferences. Soldiers deploying with peacekeeping missions receive the required training.</td>
<td>The Army prioritizes mass atrocity prevention and PoC training and incorporates it into all major national training exercises. The Army conducts laboratory exercises on mass atrocity situations with all brigade and higher staffs as part of their regular staff training program. All soldiers deploying with peacekeeping forces receive sexual and gender based violence training prior to deployment.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO (1)</th>
<th>Partially (2)</th>
<th>YES (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass atrocity prevention and PoC training is not readily available, units are not conducting MARO or PoC training.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Scale 1-6, Higher is better) Domain Total: 5*

### Source: Created by author.

Training centers, educational institutions, mobile training teams and post facilities all abound in opportunities to train units, staffs, and soldiers on various mission sets and skills including mass atrocity prevention and response. This training may include the PoC as part of stability operations, or conducting an all-out MARO as the focus of the unit mission. Whether or not commanders take advantage of training opportunities is completely up to them. Creating opportunities to train for mass atrocity prevention activities is relatively inexpensive because it does not require any additional organizations or facilities beyond those that already exist to train forces for other types of operations.

The most common way to train for MARO and PoC is to insert scenarios or vignettes into standard training scenarios. The Army’s three largest training facilities, the
National Training Center in California, the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana, and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Germany have all conducted training that included elements of MARO and PoC and are capable of inserting MARO and PoC into training upon request by the commander.

The Mission Command Training Program located at Fort Leavenworth Kansas is an organization designed to train all staffs, brigade and higher throughout the Army in the conduct of mission command and Unified Land Operations. They travel to unit locations and execute live staff exercises with the use of simulations to provide realistic scenarios that challenge staffs. The MCTP designs their training to challenge the staff in their basic functions of mission command but ultimately the unit commander directs the training to accomplish their objectives. The MCTP employs many contractors that specialize in putting together special scenarios such as a MARO.

In 2013, all geographic combatant commands were directed to include mass atrocity prevention into their steady state and contingency plans as well as to conduct tabletop exercises that include mass atrocity prevention and response scenarios. Army personnel participated in and were among those who helped to facilitate this training. AFRICOM conducts quarterly atrocity prevention training that benefits Army personnel serving in AFRICOM.

Once again, the Army is meeting the requirement to facilitate and conduct the required amount of training as directed by strategic guidance, but many opportunities to train on atrocity prevention and PoC are missed due to competing requirements for training time and not being a priority for commanders.
Leadership and Education

Table 6 shows all of the mass atrocity prevention tasks extracted from recent strategic guidance that applies in the domain of leadership and education. The task extracted from PSD-10 calls for the development of important leadership qualities, attributes, and knowledge in order to recognize, report, and respond to potential mass atrocities. The other tasks deal with how to go about creating the leadership attributes mentioned above. One of the tasks is to develop curricula and programs to train military personnel on the protection of civilians and atrocity prevention. The next task is essentially the same thing but focuses specifically on including mass atrocity training in the curricula at the US Military Academy at West Point. Finally, a task calls for incentives for work contributing to atrocity prevention (see table 6).

Table 6. Leadership and Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain: Leadership and Education</th>
<th>Guidance / Tasks: Specified (S) or Implied (I)</th>
<th>Source:</th>
<th>Army Efforts:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(S) To be able to recognize and respond to early indicators of potential atrocities</td>
<td>PSD-10</td>
<td>Leader education at Service Academy, CGSOC, War College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>(I) To develop curricula and programs to train military personnel on civilian protection and atrocity prevention</td>
<td>2012 Fast Sheet</td>
<td>West Point, CGSOC, War College, Stability Operations and PwC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>(I) To incorporate mass atrocity prevention into the curriculum of the US Army War College</td>
<td>2012 Fast Sheet</td>
<td>West Point Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>(I) To create incentives for work contributing to atrocity prevention</td>
<td>2012 Fast Sheet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>NO (1)</th>
<th>Partially (2)</th>
<th>YES (3)</th>
<th>Score:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>The Army has not completed the tasks or lacks the required capabilities.</td>
<td>The Army has completed some of the specified and implied tasks, or possesses some of the required capability, but falls short of meeting all of the requirements.</td>
<td>The Army has completed all of the specified and implied tasks and possesses the desired capabilities in this domain.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Effectiveness | At least 95% of Army officers are capable of recognizing early indicators of potential atrocities and are prepared to respond to them appropriately. | At least 95% of Army officers are capable of recognizing early indicators of potential atrocities and are prepared to respond to them appropriately. The US Army Service Academy and other Army educational institutions include mass atrocity prevention and civilian protection in their curriculum. | At least 95% of Army officers are capable of recognizing early indicators of potential atrocities and are prepared to respond to them appropriately. The US Army Service Academy and other Army educational institutions include mass atrocity prevention and civilian protection in their curriculum and provide incentives for work contributing to atrocity prevention. | 1 |

| (Scale 1-5, Higher is better) Domain Total: 3 |

Source: Created by author.
To develop in its leaders the attributes and ability to recognize and respond to mass atrocities, the Army has three main centers that provide genocide and mass atrocity education. This includes the Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies (CHGS) at West Point, the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

One of the tasks for the Army was to add mass atrocity and genocide prevention into the curriculum at West Point. This task, from the Fact Sheet: *A Comprehensive Strategy and New Tools to Prevent and Respond to Mass Atrocities*, stated specifically “The faculty from the service academies will meet at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum at the end of May 2012 to discuss how to incorporate mass atrocity and genocide prevention into their curricula.” Four years prior to this fact sheet, forward thinking faculty at West Point already opened the Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies (CHGS) onsite. The CHGS provides the first opportunity for young Army officers to receive education on the topic of genocide and atrocity prevention. Their mission statement, as it reads on their website, is to educate Cadets about “genocide and mass atrocity and inspires them as officers to the cause of prevention. Intrinsic to this mission is the imperative to better educate the country’s current and future military leaders on how genocides have occurred in the past and what can be done to prevent them in the future” (Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies 2015).

The CHGS teaches two mass atrocity related courses, one on the Holocaust and the other on Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing. The topics that are covered in these courses are listed below in Table 6. The CHGS also provides many opportunities for atrocity prevention related educational experiences for Cadets who might not be enrolled in the
two courses mentioned above. For example, the CHGS has a close working relationship with the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington D.C., and provides educational opportunities for many Cadets to travel to the museum. Each year, 80 cadets from the freshmen class are able to spend one day at the Holocaust Museum in Washington D.C. Additionally, 40 cadets from the Law Department are able to spend two days at the Holocaust Museum. Together, about 3 percent of the total student population is able to visit the museum each year and learn from experts there about the Holocaust and the causes and effects of genocide. There are also several internships available to send Cadets to work with civilian and military organizations around the world that deal with almost every aspect of mass atrocity prevention. Other activities that provide extraordinary educational opportunities for select cadets are a two-week staff ride activity across Europe discussing war crimes, and a week and a half inter-service trip to visit concentration camps.
Other departments at West Point are also encouraged to include atrocity prevention into their curriculum to address the many different aspects of this broad topic. The focus of the CHGS was and is to educate cadets on the significance of genocide related topics across all of the various departments. In 2013, Cadets who enrolled in the genocide and ethnic cleansing course conducted a joint tabletop exercise with Cadets from the African History course. The exercise was based on a mass atrocity scenario in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; this is a very realistic scenario that actually played out in real life as depicted in the scenario while the exercise was underway. The genius behind this exercise was that the student enrolled in the genocide and ethnic

Table 7. Courses Offered at the West Point Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7. Courses Offered at the West Point Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) XH415 Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Study the processes and historical conditions that allowed for ethnic cleansing and genocide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Analyze the interaction of social, political, cultural, economic, religious, technological, legal, and military factors in shaping modern history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Analyze culture, demography and the processes of national, ethnic, racial and religious group identity construction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Consider the ambivalent roles of new sciences, social sciences, and technologies in the 20th century.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Scrutinize the economic, military and legal systems which contributed to the destruction or forced removal of populations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Examine individual agency and group dynamics, particularly as they affected the perpetration or prevention of atrocity. When possible, consider choices made by military officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) XH405 The Holocaust and its Legacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

cleansing course actually filled the roles within the joint staff of the task force trying to prevent the atrocity, while the Africa history course students filled the role of the local African leaders. Students in both courses benefited greatly from this experience, which serves as a perfect example of how to include atrocity prevention principles into other departments.

Each year, approximately 20 percent of Cadets at West Point are exposed to education on mass atrocities and genocide through the various educational opportunities previously mentioned. There is no doubt that this meets the intent of the strategic objectives to educate and prepare our future leaders to prevent and respond appropriately to instances of mass atrocities in the future.

The opportunities offered to the Cadets at West Point are tremendous and their ability to reach 20 percent of their student body is commendable. However, in terms of the Army as a whole, West Point represents only one source of new Second Lieutenants that commission each year. In 2010 for example, the Fiscal Year 2010 Lieutenant Accessions Plan projected 5,322 total commissioned Second Lieutenants. 1,000 of these through West Point, 1,722 through Officer Candidate School, and 2600 through the Reserve Officers Training Corps (Lesinski 2011, 12). When considering the total number of Cadets and Candidates from all of the commissioning sources, West Point success does not directly translate into overall Army success. Based on the numbers above, if 30 percent of a given year group of West Point Cadets received mass atrocity related education over the course of their four-year education, it would still only represent around 5.6 percent of the total Army commissioned officers for that year.
No standardized curriculum exists to educate the Cadets commissioned through the ROTC and the OCS program on mass atrocity prevention and the PoC; however, efforts have been made to change this. The CHGS is currently working to develop a case study called *Way of the Ordinary Soldier*, which will help to educate young leaders on how to respond appropriately to potential mass atrocity situations. One of the target audiences for this new case study will be the many cadets who commission through the many Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) programs around the country. Also of note is that many ROTC programs are located on university campuses across America that offer courses on mass atrocities and genocide. No study has been conducted to determine how many ROTC Cadets actually enroll in such courses, and it is unlikely that any of these courses cover such topics as MARO. Encouraging ROTC Cadets to enroll in genocide and atrocity prevention related courses through some kind of incentive program would mirror the call in the 2012 White House release, *Fact Sheet, A Comprehensive Strategy and New Tools to Prevent and Respond to Mass Atrocities* to provide incentives for work relating to atrocity prevention (Office of the Press Secretary 2012).

Once a Cadet commissions as a Second Lieutenant, they proceed to their Officer Basic Course to receive specialized training in the branch with which they are assigned and they then proceed to their first duty station. A few years later, following promotion to the rank of Captain, they will attend the Captains Career Course. Both the basic and captains’ career courses fall within the realm of training rather than education and do not currently include opportunities to educate officers on mass atrocity prevention. A quick look at the course schedule, provided on the website of the Infantry Officer Basic Leadership Course, reveals a very packed schedule of training at ranges and field
exercises with no time to spare for atrocity prevention (Fort Benning Maneuver Center of Excellence 2015). Across the various branches in both the Basic Officers Leaders Courses and the Captains Career Courses, little to no education on mass atrocity prevention is provided. Although time may not allow for in depth educational opportunities at these courses, inserting MARO and PoC into the already existing training exercises would be beneficial and perhaps more useful for this audience. This would require only minimal instruction prior to execution but would be very beneficial for these young leaders.

The next opportunity for education on mass atrocity prevention is the Genocide and Mass Atrocities Study Program at the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This opportunity occurs after an officer is selected for promotion to the rank of Major and attendance at the resident course. The genocide study program at CGSC started in 2010, offering one elective course on genocide. That same year congress designated funds as part of the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act that allowed for approximately ninety students from 2010-2011 to travel to Auschwitz and receive specialized training from leading experts on the topic of genocide and mass atrocities. In 2011, the number of genocide related electives also increased, along with faculty expertise. The concept of academic collaboration was then implemented, which meant that the topic of genocide and atrocity prevention was integrated into other topics of study. Genocide studies became a “focused track” of study for those students who decided to enroll; students who completed it successfully received a personal development skill identifier (PDSI) in their personnel files and officer record
briefs so that in the future their special skill sets can be more effectively used when the need arises.

In 2012, four additional courses were added to the CGSC curricula covering the topics of peace and stability operations, MAROs, sources of conflict, and history, all relating to the topic of mass atrocity and genocide prevention. The following year, 2013, another elective course on Perpetrators and Bystanders was added to the program.

The program continues to develop today and students who enroll are committed to a four-credit, elective program that includes a trip to the US Holocaust Museum in Washington DC. Topics addressed in the program are listed in Table 7 below.

The CGSC continues to invest in their faculty through educator’s workshops and faculty expertise development to improve the quality of education on this important topic. However, despite the fact that the program continues to improve in content and quality, it is limited in the number of students that are able to enroll due to funding constraints. The original funding provided by congress in 2010 that helped to energize the program is gone and genocide studies must now compete with all of the other programs at CGSC for funding. In the 2015 graduating class., there were only nine student able to enroll in the genocide studies track
Table 8. Course Topics for A734 – Genocide Studies Seminar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Course Topics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Understanding Genocide and a Framework for Identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Early warning indicators, R2P and Protection of Civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Perpetrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Interveners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bystanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Conducting Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>History of Genocide Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>North America Clash of Cultures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Armenia: The Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Holocaust: The &quot;Jewish Question&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform (SSR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform (Application)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Conflict and Conflict Termination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Conflict Termination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Actors and Influences of SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Approach to SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Planning Approaches to SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Programs and Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Understanding the Role of Economics within and among Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Early Warning Economic Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Post-Genocide Mass Atrocity Economic Consequences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Post-Genocide Mass Atrocity Economic Response Operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CGSC, Department of Command and Leadership, A734 Seminar in Genocide Studies Attachment 1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, March 2015,).

After attending CGSC, the next opportunity provided to officers to study atrocity prevention is as a Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel at the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. There is one elective taught at the War College called Humanitarian Intervention that was previously called MARO. In addition to the Humanitarian Intervention elective, there is a lecture held on Holocaust Remembrance Day, which is mandatory for all students to attend.

Based on the information above, the educational opportunities offered on the topic of mass atrocity prevention throughout an Army officer’s career are still very limited. For
instance, only 20 percent of the USMA Cadets receive atrocity prevention related education, which amounts to roughly 4 percent of Army lieutenants commissioning in a given year group. In addition, only about 56 percent of Army Majors are selected to attend CGSC and only a very small number of those selected are able to take atrocity related elective courses depending on how much funding is available. The Majors who are not selected to attend the resident course at CGSC receive their training through distance learning or they attend shorter satellite courses. Electives at these satellite courses are optional. The satellite course at Fort Belvoir offers one elective on Genocide and students who enroll in that course travel to the Holocaust Museum in Washington. The last educational opportunity for Army officers is at the Army War College. Each year approximately 160 Army Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels attend the War College and have the opportunity there to take one elective course related to the prevention of mass atrocities (U.S. Army Combined Arms Center 2014, 1). Overall, opportunities for Army officers to receive mass atrocity prevention education are limited.

Evaluation

Across the four domains under analysis, the Army has made efforts to accomplish each of the directives that it has received in strategic guidance. Some of the atrocity prevention directives required the Army to develop new capabilities, while other directives either already existed or were already under development in order to meet other requirements. This study found that the Army, with the assistance of a few hard working and proactive individuals, has been compliant in producing doctrine, planning tools and options for prevention and intervention to prevent mass atrocities. Based on the evaluation criteria of effectiveness, Army doctrine is only partially effective. This is
because although the Army has doctrine planning processes and tools tailored around atrocity prevention and response, Army leaders and soldiers are still not familiar with this doctrine because it is so new. Additional updates and improvements are under-way, but official MARO and PoC doctrine today consists primarily of small sections or appendixes to stability operations doctrine. Including MARO and PoC with stability and peacekeeping doctrine is appropriate, but they need to be elevated from the annex into the main body of doctrine in order to get the kind of attention they deserve.

This study found that the Army is only partially compliant with strategic guidance in the domain of organization. This analysis is difficult for many reasons. The first difficulty is how to interpret the guidance in PSD-10 to “optimally position to work with our allies to share the burden” (Obama 2011b). Some would argue that the Army has always attempted to ‘optimally position’ itself around the world within the limits of geography, the budget, and available labor and resources. Most of the current reorganizing of the force such as the recent strategic shift to the Pacific, the RAF construct, or the downsizing of the military was driven by factors other than the prevention of mass atrocities. This research was not able to find any specific deployment of forces or movement of resources outside of the US intervention in Libya in 2011 done specially for preventing mass atrocities.

Once again, some Army decisions regarding the organization of the force have the possibility to improve its ability to prevent atrocities but there is no evidence that the prevention of atrocities has been a major consideration in making those organization changes. For this reason, the Army’s efforts to prevent mass atrocities within the domain of organization are also only partially effective. While the RAF construct, if fully
implemented, will improve the Army’s position to have more influence in certain areas, thereby identify, and prevent atrocities, the program is still in its infancy and its full implementation has not yet come to fruition.

The Army has been successful in developing the training resources and opportunities for units and staffs to train on mass atrocity prevention and the PoC. It has met strategic requirements to conduct this training and it will not be long before doctrine can be reviewed and updated based on training results. It is apparent however that many training opportunities are lost due to competing requirements, limited training time, and a failure to prioritize mass atrocity prevention and PoC when conducting training exercises. For this reason, this evaluation assesses Army training in this important category as only partially effective. Training is more effective with repetition.

The leadership and education domain is another area where the Army has made great strides in meeting strategic guidance but where it still falls short in terms of how effective their efforts are. The Army has developed amazing educational programs at the undergraduate and graduate levels but the number of Army leaders who are exposed to this education is severely limited. A basic understanding of the characteristics of a MARO and the importance of PoC to all Army operations is critical for Army leaders but throughout the current Army leader development and education system, many Army leaders will not receive this instruction.

Chapter Summary

The primary research question was, “is the US Army meeting its responsibilities within the ‘whole of government approach’ to prevent mass atrocities and genocide?” After reviewing the pertinent data, the answer to this question is yes, the Army is meeting
its responsibilities within the ‘whole of government approach’ to preventing mass atrocities and genocide. Since the release of PSD-10, the Army has made efforts to address almost every directive found in strategic guidance. However, the extent of Army efforts and their effectiveness in creating the desired atrocity prevention capabilities varies greatly between the domains of doctrine, organization, training, and leadership and education. The next chapter will review those variances and provide recommendations for the Army on how it can be more effective in its atrocity prevention efforts in addition to meeting strategic guidance.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary research question at the beginning of this paper was, “is the US Army meeting its responsibilities within the ‘whole of government approach’ to prevent mass atrocities and genocide?” The answer to the primary question is yes, the Army is meeting its responsibilities within the ‘whole of government approach’ to preventing mass atrocities and genocide. There is however, still much work to do in terms of enhancing the Army’s atrocity prevention capability. The following sections contain conclusion and recommendations for future study that may guide future efforts and study.

Conclusions

This study reached three conclusions that concern: the Army’s responsiveness to strategic guidance; the need for increasing Army leader’s sense of priority for atrocity prevention training; and the role mass atrocity prevention plays in determining how and where we invest Army resources worldwide. With regard to the Army’s responsiveness to strategic guidance, it is clear that it made an honest effort to meet its responsibilities as directed through strategic guidance. Overall, the Army has met its responsibilities within the whole of government approach to prevent mass atrocities. This by no means implies that the Army has done everything it can. There is still a lot of work that the Army can do across all the domains of DOTMLPF to improve its capability to prevent mass atrocities. In many cases, particularly in the area of developing doctrine, the Army has taken the lead in atrocity prevention efforts within the Department of Defense. This is right in line with broad guidance to take a proactive approach to preventing mass atrocities.
Army leaders need to recognize mass atrocity prevention as a priority before the Army can fully benefit from training and education efforts. The low levels of effectiveness within the domains of training, leadership, and education are a direct reflection of the fact that many Army leaders still do not consider mass atrocity prevention a priority. The Army finds itself in the position of having great educational and training resources at its disposal but not enough ‘buy in’ from key leaders to prioritize the training and fund the education.

The final point involves the role that mass atrocity prevention plays in determining the deployment of Army forces around the globe. The many requirements that compete for Army resources around the globe make it inefficient to deploy forces to areas for the sole purpose of preventing mass atrocities. The only time this might occur would be when such atrocities are a very likely possibility. Forces already deployed to regions in support of other national interests will be responsible for undertaking most prevention efforts by Army personnel. In the current environment of fiscal constraints and the downsizing of Army forces, improving the position of our forces, working with allies, and building partner capacity remains a key objective. Increasing the size and overall capacity of Army forces to identify and prevent mass atrocities is not realistic. As the Army’s resources decrease, so will their ability to identify and prevent mass atrocities around the globe.

Recommendations

The information and analysis in this study lead to three recommendations that could help the Army as well as the other military services to improve their efforts to prevent mass atrocities. The first recommendation is to provide instruction on the PoC

67
and the prevention of mass atrocities to all Army personnel – both officer and enlisted. In addition to educational opportunities available at the service academies and graduate level educational institutions, the Army should include PoC and MARO training at each of the officer and non-commissioned officer mid-level courses. The Army should assign one proponent for this training who will ensure that it nests appropriately with other training opportunities at the unit level and reaches the Army as a whole. Current training that relates closely with atrocity prevention and PoC includes Rules of Engagement and Law of War training, the professional military ethic, and the basic army values.

Secondly, commanders at all levels need to accept the idea that mass atrocity prevention is a “core national security interest,” as stated in PSD-10, and reflect that in their unit training schedules. All of the training resources that are available to units to train on PoC and atrocity prevention amount to nothing if commanders fail to include it as a priority in their annual training regimens.

Finally, as the Army down sizes its forces and adapts to a reduced budget, it cannot lose sight of its responsibility to do what it can to prevent mass atrocities. Just as the Army has included the PoC doctrine as part of its stability and peacekeeping doctrine, the Army must communicate to its leaders and Soldiers that the prevention of mass atrocities is an integral part of the traditional Army mission. As the Army stays engaged in developing its mass atrocity prevention capabilities, there will be instances in the future when Army personnel are able to recognize early indicators and react to help prevent another mass atrocity or genocide. The 2015 NSS states, “The mass killing of civilians is an affront to our common humanity and a threat to our common security”. No
cause is nobler or more appropriate for the Army’s effort than the prevention of mass atrocities.

**Recommendations for Future Research**

There are several areas identified throughout this study that would benefit greatly from further research. This study was limited in its scope by only researching and analyzing the four domains of doctrine, organization, training, and leadership and education. It would be useful to examine the remaining domains of the DOTMLPF model, materiel, personnel, and facilities to determine what capability exists therein. There is also another domain, policy, which also would be beneficial to the study of atrocity prevention in relationship to the military. A final topic for future research would be to examine how commanders can best manage or balance their training schedules to include mass atrocity prevention and the PoC with their other training needs.

In a November 29, 2005 Pentagon interview, a reporter asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, what guidance he had for military commanders in Iraq who came across instances of human rights abuses. He answered and said, “It is absolutely the responsibility of every U.S. service member, if they see inhumane treatment being conducted, to intervene to stop it” (Pace 2005). Like the individual Soldier on the battlefield, America shares this same responsibility globally. To do so, America’s military forces must develop the capability to prevent mass atrocities around the world.

The world will not be destroyed by those who do evil, but by those who watch them without doing anything.

— Albert Einstein


