U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue Phase V: “Connecting Long Term Goals to Contemporary Policy”

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Introduction

This report summarizes a recently held track II conference among U.S. and Chinese analysts and officials on strategic nuclear issues. This report begins by explaining the history of this series of meetings as well as describing the backgrounds of the participants and format of this session. The substantive discussion that follows is organized thematically rather than strictly following the panel structure from the conference, so as to capture the key points in a more logical and analytical fashion. It begins by highlighting core findings with regard to each side’s nuclear policy and strategy and some discussion of their nuclear arsenals. In doing it particularly emphasizes the perceptions of each side regarding the other’s nuclear forces and strategies. Then it summarizes the key points regarding both sides’ views of arms control and disarmament policy. A few brief miscellaneous points are discussed before the report concludes with a number of policy recommendations and discussion of potential “ways forward” for further engagement between the two countries on these issues.

Background

The fifth annual session of the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue was held in Honolulu, HI from May 2 to 4, 2010. The Dialogue is a track II conference; thus, it is formally unofficial, but includes a mix of government and academic participants. The Dialogue is organized by the Naval Postgraduate School and Pacific Forum CSIS and is funded and guided by the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

As the leading agency responsible for addressing threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), DTRA/ASCO seeks to enhance American situational awareness of Chinese nuclear
strategies and capabilities, reduce the prospects for proliferation in Asia and beyond, and more broadly enhance American deterrence in a time of transformation. Particular interests guiding DTRA/ASCO’s leadership of this project have focused on identifying important misperceptions, misunderstandings, and key divergences in national interests, with a goal of reducing these over the long term.

Thus, the goal of this series of annual meetings has been to identify important misperceptions regarding each side’s nuclear strategy and doctrine and highlight potential areas of cooperation or confidence building measures that might reduce such dangers. The first four conferences of this series focused their discussions on general perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons, national threat perceptions in strategic affairs, the nature of current nuclear strategy and operational concepts of each side, regional issues pertaining to nuclear weapons issues, and strategic stability. (Conference reports for the first four years have been published previously and are available on NPS web pages.)

This year, the participants on the U.S. side included participants from think tanks such as CSIS, RAND, NBR, and CNA; universities such NPS, NDU, and Stanford; and observers from State, the Department of Defense, Pacific Command, and Strategic Command. The U.S. participants totaled over twenty persons. On the Chinese side, participants included one PLA officer of flag rank as well as two retired field grade officers working at official PLA think tanks, three analysts from “official” civilian Chinese think tanks, and two scholars from Chinese universities. The freeze in military to military ties imposed by China in the wake of the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan resulted in a lower-than-usual ranking Chinese delegation.

One of the goals of this series of meetings is to create something of a community of regular participants who develop some accumulated learning and perhaps some personal trust that might facilitate a more open discussion. Typically at least half of the attendees have participated in a previous dialogue, as was the case this year.

The meeting was organized around four panels (see the attached agenda) centering on connecting contemporary doctrine to long-term disarmament goals, which are a renewed emphasis for both sides. The meeting began with wide-ranging discussions about the potential for complete abolition of nuclear weapons in the distant future and the preconditions and process for achieving this goal. This topic, far removed from contemporary events, forced all participants off usual talking points and helped pave the way for a relatively frank and open discussion throughout the two days. Thereafter, each side discussed contemporary nuclear policy and missile defense policy for themselves and the other country. Finally, there was a discussion of near terms steps with regard to arms control and confidence building measures.

For these traditional panels, each had two short presentations. These sessions of the conference were structured to maximize time for discussion rather than focus on vetted presentations. While that is always the goal, in this particular instance it was—by and large—met. Most participants regarded these discussions as the most open to date.

The meeting also included breakout sessions in which smaller groups of participants engaged in very informal discussions about the meaning of a dozen specific terms such as “strategic stability” and “key point counterattack”. (The full list of terms is attached.) Each group was asked to discuss what the terms meant and provide some of the context for their usage. The goal
was explicitly not to come to consensus definitions, but rather to understand the commonalities and the differences of how the terms were used, and some sense of their role in each side’s thinking about nuclear issues (some terms were more commonly used by one side than the other). The resulting non-vetted, presentation served as the basis for a vigorous discussion in a plenary session the next day.

A few general points came out of this discussion. First, participants from both sides noted that some of the terms, while used in official documents, were not the most important terms. (Indeed, some were dismissed disdainfully.) The track II level is particularly useful for this sort of frank commentary about one’s own official documents. Second, in some cases, terms that were originally used in the 1950s in English were translated into Chinese to facilitate their understanding of U.S. doctrine. These terms might then be used by China as a way to communicate back to the U.S. without understanding the full nuance of the term (e.g., escalation control). In short, a sequence of incomplete translations is a recipe for misunderstanding.

It will be worthwhile to continue this discussion of definitions and concepts. One possible way forward to continue to develop this would be standalone projects for small teams of researchers.

**China’s Nuclear Modernization, Nuclear Doctrine, And No-First Use Pledge:**

Throughout the two days, and transcending the panel on contemporary doctrine per se, participants discussed China’s views on its own nuclear arsenal.

**Nuclear Strategy**

Chinese participants unanimously argued that the fundamental mission of China’s nuclear forces is to prevent nuclear attack against China. Most Chinese experts also agreed that China should only use nuclear weapons after a nuclear attack. One Chinese participant argued that this fundamental mission had remained stable and consistent for the last four decades. In support of this view, others cited relevant sections of the 2006 and 2008 Chinese Defense White Papers. With no allies or responsibility to defend other countries, Chinese experts emphasized that China has no need for extended deterrence. One participant suggested that unlike the United States (a point returned to in a later section), China’s no-first use (NFU) policy shows that it neither emphasizes the role of nuclear weapons nor has a policy of preemption.

Although Chinese experts mostly focused on the continuities of China’s nuclear forces, one highlighted the growing emphasis on conventional missiles within the Second Artillery over the last 10-15 years, mostly driven by the need to deter the threat of Taiwan independence. The implications of the conventional elements of the Second Artillery being focused on more offensive missions, while the nuclear elements of the Second Artillery are focused on defensive, retaliatory missions was not addressed by Chinese experts, but is worth exploring in the future.

Discussions among the Chinese participants shed new light on how they understand and conceptualize “minimum deterrence,” which is the term often used to describe China’s nuclear doctrine. Minimum deterrence was described as a “dynamic and relative term” and repeatedly emphasized that China was concerned with capabilities, not numbers. This concept referred to the minimum capability required to deter nuclear use and possess a credible retaliatory
capability, although some suggested that “minimum” could mean a lot of different things. Other Chinese participants argued that although China’s requirements are to maintain sufficient forces for minimum deterrence, what that means in terms of quantity and quality of nuclear forces depends on many factors, including developments in U.S. missile defense plans. They emphasized the reactive nature of China’s force structure and argued that even if other factors compelled China to increase the quality or quantity of its nuclear forces, its general defensive doctrine would not change. The interactive element in China’s modernization was emphasized more than in previous dialogues.

Chinese participants argued that “lean and effective” (jinggan youxiao) is the preferred description for the requirements of China’s nuclear forces. One of the definition breakout groups discussed the term “effective and reliable deterrence” (youxiao kekao weishe),[2] but Chinese participants suggested that this was an older formulation. Participants argued that although “effective and reliable” had been discussed earlier in the decade, the 2006 and 2008 Defense White Papers had adopted the “lean and effective” formulation and that had become the official description of requirements. Chinese experts argued that these were the characteristics that China’s nuclear forces must have to ensure a second-strike retaliatory capability. Moreover, one participant clearly suggested that these were the criteria that China used in determining force posture. It was not clear precisely what “effective” meant, but Chinese participants emphasized that “lean” referred to limited numbers.

The American participants were particularly interested in “lean and effective” as principles for force structure planning and asked the Chinese participants to talk more about how this principle affected force structure decisions. One American participant suggested that being clear and open about how these requirements translated into force planning was exactly the kind of transparency the U.S. was asking for on nuclear capabilities, and indicated that providing such information would go a long way towards addressing many worries in the United States concerning China’s nuclear forces. Another American expert asked how China made the judgment that a certain number of nuclear weapons would guarantee China’s retaliatory capability. Others asked what important external factors, besides U.S. missile defense, could impact the size of China’s arsenal. Several U.S. participants asked how numbers factored into China’s assessments of whether its forces had met the requirements of being “lean and effective.”

Chinese participants did not provide very specific answers to these requests for more information on the analytical link between the requirements of a “lean and effective” force and force sizing decisions. What was promising was that a clearer link between this diplomatic phrasing of “lean and effective” and the force structure existed; this was apparent across the board in Chinese discussions. Fleshing out our understanding of that link would be an important goal going forward.

Transparency of China’s nuclear forces and doctrine came up at several different points during the dialogue. In response to questions about when China will become more transparent about its nuclear modernization, Chinese participants argued that China’s nuclear doctrine and the conditions under which it would use nuclear weapons was already very transparent. Echoing a common refrain in past dialogues, experts also suggested that the U.S. was not very transparent on these issues itself. One participant further cited the 2008 Defense White Paper that provided a much greater amount of official information on China’s nuclear modernization efforts.
The PLA has provided more information on some aspects of nuclear modernization, but the limitations on Chinese transparency on nuclear capabilities was clear. In estimating of the size of China’s nuclear stockpiles, Chinese experts were forced to cite American sources, because no official information is available from China. Nevertheless, in an important new development, Chinese participants suggested an understanding that the size of the Chinese arsenal and how it might affect the nuclear arsenals of other countries.

No First Use

While not a centerpiece of the agenda, Chinese participants reaffirmed China’s commitment to its NFU pledge. As part of the definitional breakout groups, Chinese participants defined NFU as “a policy of not using nuclear weapons unless attacked by nuclear weapons first.” In addition to claims of China’s peaceful and defensive strategic culture, a Chinese expert cited China’s historical experience as strong evidence for the credibility of the NFU pledge. During the Cold War China faced multiple crises and wars, and according to this expert, there is no evidence that China considered using nuclear weapons, threatened to use nuclear weapons, or even considered threatening to use them. Another Chinese participant further argued that China’s strong land forces made the NFU pledge more credible because it would be unlikely to face conventional military defeat that might lead to incentives to use nuclear weapons first. Even if China faced nuclear attacks from countries other than the U.S. or Russia, a Chinese expert argued that China’s conventional forces might be sufficient for retaliation and China might not even use nuclear weapons if attacked by nuclear weapons. Another expert supported this view by suggesting that American concerns about Chinese use of nuclear weapons during a war were based on the assumption that China would be facing a conventional defeat; given PLA modernization, this expert suggested this might not be the case. This echoes points made in previous dialogues in which the Chinese side suggests that the burden of escalation will fall on the United States. Another participant argued somewhat differently, that China’s nuclear and conventional were completely delinked, noting that even during the Cold War when China was weak militarily, Beijing was still comfortable with a minimum deterrent capability and stood by its NFU.

American participants pushed for greater clarity on the conditions under which China might consider abandoning its NFU, especially during potential crises. These questions led to clear frustration among Chinese participants. The implication was that pushing too hard for clarity, especially based in the context of hypothetical U.S.-China crises and war, would produce mistrust and make the relationship more adversarial.

Although sensitive to these concerns, several American participants highlighted the utility of such frank discussions. One expert argued that having such abstract and hypothetical discussions now helped identify potential areas of misperception, potential instability, and inadvertent escalation. Another expert also noted that understanding U.S. concerns about whether China’s NFU pledge will remain credible under a wide range of situations can help China understand why the U.S. does not adopt its own NFU policy. In the definition breakout groups, participants discussed several terms related to crisis and escalation, including “escalation control,” “inadvertent escalation,” “crisis stability,” and “nuclear threshold.” In these detailed discussions of hypothetical crisis dynamics, no Chinese participant admitted that these dynamics would put severe pressure on China’s NFU pledge, nor that in such a crisis China might have to reconsider its NFU policy.
Transwar Deterrence and Targeting

Discussions among Chinese participants also made it clear that China only sees a role for nuclear weapons in preventing escalation of war from the conventional to nuclear realm. Beijing sees no role for nuclear weapons in controlling war or escalation once the war had already become nuclear (at any level). This discussion emerged during the plenary discussion of the definition for “escalation control.” One group argued that the Chinese side is not convinced that this term has relevance in the nuclear context. In response, two Americans argued that Chinese nuclear doctrinal writings contain numerous references to controlling war and controlling escalation. In response, a Chinese expert argued that China only saw utility for nuclear weapons in preventing the war from going nuclear. However, once the war had crossed the nuclear threshold, the Chinese saw no role for nuclear weapons in controlling further escalation and saw no role for “nuclear warfighting.”

The discussions of the term “key point counterattack” (zhongdian fanji) also deepened understanding of how China thinks about nuclear targeting. Chinese experts argued that because China has few nuclear weapons, it needs to be very selective in the targets it chooses. Chinese participants denied that it had a counter-force implication. The Chinese participants did not provide greater detail of the considerations and factors that determined what was a “key point.” It should also be pointed out that this phrase has not appeared in any of China’s Defense White Papers.

China’s Missile Defense Test

In January 2010, China reportedly conducted a successful high-altitude anti-ballistic missile test. However, the details of this test and the strategy behind such a system were not well understood by most Chinese. The Chinese side discussed its BMD test, but experts admitted that they had little specific data on BMD, which was a very sensitive issue within China.

Chinese experts offered a range of potential explanations for China’s BMD test and roles for a BMD system. One participant argued that China’s BMD system was not part of a larger move to develop space capabilities or weaponize space. On the contrary, this expert argued that bilateral interactions with the U.S. were sufficient to explain China’s motivations to develop such a system. Chinese participants cited articles by WU Tianfu and SHEN Dingli, which explained the BMD test as a response to American BMD systems. They argued that although China would prefer to live in a world without missile defenses, developments in U.S. BMD systems forced China to defend itself by developing its own BMD system. The logic of how a Chinese BMD system would reduce its vulnerability was not spelled out clearly, but Chinese experts suggested that this was the most widely accepted explanation for the Chinese test and BMD program. The Chinese side also suggested that one of the major changes in recent years was that Chinese officials and researchers have accepted that missile defense cannot be stopped, and the BMD program is an attempt to make the best of that situation.

Chinese experts offered a few other potential factors that might have led China to conduct the test and develop the BMD program. One expert suggested that many within China believed that the rest of the region and world would accept this as a reasonable defense requirement, and there was a broader sense that the international community wanted to accommodate China rather than challenge it. Another participant also noted that there was no international or domestic law that
prohibited China from conducting such a test. Other Chinese participants mentioned the importance of prestige and demonstrating to the world that it had such a capability. An American expert speculated that one reasonable factor for China to develop a BMD capability might be to defend itself against Indian nuclear weapons, but none of the Chinese participants directly engaged this point.

How a BMD system might be deployed was not clear, but Chinese participants were unanimous in their view that a BMD system would not change China’s nuclear doctrine or affect its own NFU pledge. Several Chinese participants suggested that China would not only continue its focus on defensive nuclear counter-attack, but that a BMD system would enhance the survivability of Chinese nuclear weapons, and therefore make NFU even more credible. The development of a BMD system, however, would not mean that China should not continue improving its own nuclear capabilities. Even with its own BMD system, effective deterrence would still rest on China’s ability to reliably penetrate the other side’s missile defenses, so U.S. BMD could still affect the size of China’s nuclear forces.

One Chinese participant also argued that Chinese experts have recognized that BMD is very expensive, so it may only serve a limited role in China’s future military modernization. The participant further argued that cruise missiles and other offensive weapons might prove more cost effective. Chinese participants did not address questions on the relationship between the BMD test or program and China’s anti-satellite (ASAT) capability.

U.S. Strategic Weapons Policy

The conference was timed in part to permit discussions of the recently released Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). In the event, the NPR only was released weeks prior to the conference. Because China had not yet formulated an official response to the NPR, there was no discussion of the formal PRC reaction or policy. On the other hand, the Chinese interlocutors were able to probe for additional understanding of the NPR while their government’s formal response was being developed, as well as express some initial concerns about the NPR. The timing also offered an opportunity for the U.S. to address ambiguities and provide a more comprehensive understanding of U.S. policy to better inform China’s official response.

While the Ballistic Missile Defense Review had been out longer, it is unclear how much the Chinese side has engaged with that at this time. Thus, discussions of policy in that area were also fruitful.

Nuclear Posture Review

The American side discussed the important elements of the NPR. The 2010 NPR contained numerous continuities with previous NPRs, such as continued emphasis on extended deterrence, discussion of strategic capabilities in a broader context, and repeated rhetoric of reducing the role of nuclear weapons. According to American participants, however, there were significant changes in this NPR. First, preventing the proliferation of nuclear terrorism has been elevated to the top of the U.S. nuclear agenda for the first time. This has included increased funding for cooperative threat reduction and the Department of Energy. This should be a positive foundation on which to develop Sino-American cooperation, as the interests of both countries converge on this issue. Second, the change in declaratory policy has eliminated ambiguity associated with
using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. Moreover, the NPR repeated that the “bar” for using nuclear weapons was very high. Third, the NPR devotes significant attention and funding to nuclear infrastructure, which has been neglected for many years. Fourth, the references to China in the 2010 NPR are much more positive.

In general, the Chinese participants were positive in their assessments of the NPR. (At the time of the conference, a short piece by retired Major General XU Guangyu had appeared in the PLA Daily, but it was never mentioned by Chinese interlocutors so it does not seem to represent the formal response to the NPR.) One Chinese expert suggested that the “NPR made an effort to send a positive message” and another explicitly said that this NPR had addressed some of China’s worries and decreased some of its concerns. All participants were pleased at the de-emphasis on nuclear weapons and saw the lack of calls for developing new nuclear weapons as a positive development. Chinese experts were pleased that the NPR did not mention Taiwan or name contingencies for potential use of nuclear weapons, and believed that China was less of a target in this NPR. The NPR’s negative security assurance was not quite a full endorsement of an NFU, according to one expert, but it was definitely a step in the right direction. Chinese participants were also pleased that the U.S. seemed close to accepting a nuclear relationship based on mutual vulnerability, but had questions on exactly what U.S. policy was on this issue.

Given the overall positive assessment of this NPR, several American participants asked what effect this would have on the relationship. Some asked if this would reduce mistrust and lead to more positive views of U.S. intentions, especially in the military realm. Others asked if this might encourage the Chinese to be more forthcoming in sharing information about their nuclear modernization. Still others asked if a more positive relationship in the nuclear arena might lead to greater cooperation in other issue areas, such as deeper cooperation on North Korea and Iran. The Chinese participants were somewhat guarded in their response to these big questions. Most Chinese experts suggested that it would help the overall relationship by removing an irritant and obstacle (i.e., the referencing of China as a potential target in the leaked portions of the 2001 NPR), and one participant said that it would encourage franker dialogue, but these responses were rather vague.

Although the overall response was positive, Chinese participants expressed some concerns and questions about U.S. nuclear policy as expressed in the NPR. Chinese participants were most concerned about the implications of conventional prompt global strike (PGS). Several Chinese experts asked for clarification on its purpose, what the capabilities will ultimate look like, and whether or not such capabilities could be targeted at Chinese nuclear facilities. One participant characterized PGS as a significant impediment to nuclear stability and disarmament. Some Americans tried to reassure the Chinese experts by characterizing PGS as a “niche capability.” American experts argued that the purpose was to have a capability to quickly respond to time-sensitive targets around the globe. Although the scope of the capabilities that will result from the PGS concept are still unknown, they suggested that it would likely be too limited to undermine China’s nuclear deterrent. Moreover, not only did the NPR endorse maintaining “strategic stability” with China, but public testimony by Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy James Miller referred to the need to develop PGS capabilities without undermining strategic stability with Russia and China.

Several questions were also raised about the scope of U.S. nuclear commitments and the conditions of use of nuclear weapons. One Chinese expert noticed a new reference to “allies and
partners,” and asked if this meant that Taiwan was a partner that would fall under America’s nuclear umbrella. This expert was pleased at the reduced emphasis on the use of nuclear weapons, but asked if war between China and Taiwan would be an extreme circumstance under which the U.S. might consider using nuclear weapons. A Chinese participant also asked for clarification on the negative security commitment in the NPR, according to which the U.S. would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons countries that were party to the NPT and in compliance. This expert asked who decided if a country was in compliance with the NPT. An American participant responded that the U.S. would make such a judgment, and emphasized that the aim of this approach was to incentivize states to fully comply with the NPT regime and see security benefits from being in full compliance. These issues on the conditions for use, especially as relate to Taiwan, are likely to come up in future dialogues.

Another Chinese expert was pleased with most aspects of the NPR, but asked for more information about increased funding for nuclear infrastructure, and wondered if this was a secret way to secure funding to develop more nuclear weapons. One American participant responded that this was not related to developing new nuclear weapons, but should probably be viewed as the domestic political price for getting approval for New START treaty with Russia. Another American emphasized that this infrastructure has been ignored for decades and improvements are required not only to guarantee the safety and security of U.S. nuclear forces, but this would become even more important as the U.S. reduces its number of nuclear weapons. Related to concerns about whether momentum for disarmament would last in the United States, one Chinese participant suggested that every administration does a new NPR and questioned whether the elements in this NPR would be enduring or if the next administration would likely change them. (The discussions of the BMD elements in the NPR are discussed in the section below on BMD.)

Chinese experts were still trying to figure out the meaning and implications of the NPR elevating China to the level of Russia. In the most negative response to this development, a Chinese expert argued that the assessment of China’s nuclear modernization as extending beyond deterrence was incorrect, and worried that elevating China’s status was also a way to overestimate the threat China posed to the United States.

Most of the discussion related to how each side defined a stable nuclear relationship and whether or not the NPR’s characterization of bilateral nuclear relations was a sufficient foundation for stability. Issues of stability were not only explored during discussions of the NPR, but also in the definitional breakout groups, as “strategic stability” was one of the terms that was discussed. The consensus definition was that a stable nuclear relationship required both sides to agree that they felt secure. Chinese participants argued that stability could look different in different bilateral relations. For example, U.S.-Russian stability is focused on numbers and parity, whereas China is not seeking parity. Therefore, from China’s perspective, nuclear relations could be stable with nuclear capabilities far weaker than the Russians might require. Discussions among Chinese participants also led to a distinction between “strategic balance” (zhanlue pingheng) and “strategic stability” (zhanlue wending), although all participants were clear that neither concept required numerical parity. Future engagement might do well to address the Cold War meanings of this term, as that will be reassuring to China.

In the discussions of the NPR, Chinese participants asked whether the U.S. had officially accepted mutual vulnerability as the basis of the nuclear relationship. The American participants
emphasized that the document did not use that phrase. Nevertheless, the U.S. participants emphasized that the U.S. does intend to communicate a positive signal to China. American participants referred to language in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) and NPR that the U.S. does not intend to undermine strategic stability or affect the strategic balance with Russia or China. The American side asked whether the Chinese saw these statements, and unofficial endorsement of mutual vulnerability, as adequate to reassure them on this issue. There is some sign that the Chinese are beginning to find a degree of reassurance in them, but that will need to be reemphasized in a range of fora.

Relatedly, American participants tried to correct Chinese misunderstandings regarding its lack of a NFU policy, as they have repeatedly in past dialogues. First, they suggested that the long-standing American position is to only consider using nuclear weapons as a last resort. Second, as has been stated many times by American participants in these dialogues and in other settings, they argued that not having an NFU does not mean that the U.S. takes nuclear weapons lightly or that it has a policy of preemption.

**Ballistic Missile Defense**

The U.S. missile defense plans have been a source of deep anxiety for the Chinese and have been discussed in previous dialogues. Experts from the American side discussed the details of the evolution of BMD architecture and the plans under the Obama Administration. They characterized the current approach as less comprehensive than the Bush Administration’s plans, more focused on theater missile defenses, and more focused on the terminal phase. The Obama administration’s approach is designed to address near-term threats by relying on proven technology. Current plans also call for deployment of relatively limited BMD capabilities.

The analysis and discussion by the American participants directly addressed several of the worries and concerns from the Chinese side. The American experts emphasized that the BMD architecture will not pose a threat to China in the near term. Although unlikely to completely reassure China and address all of its concerns, future frank discussions regarding the evolution of America’s BMD architecture may be able to correct some misunderstandings and eliminate some sources of mistrust.

Chinese participants did, however, express many military and political concerns with American BMD plans. First, Chinese participants argued that this capability does undermine China’s nuclear deterrence and increases instability. One expert suggested that it was difficult to believe that the U.S. would undertake such a large expense merely to deter small and medium-sized powers, so most Chinese experts have concluded that BMD must be aimed at China. Several participants argued that BMD was a signal of America’s hostile intent towards China and that developing these capabilities damages relations and reduces mutual trust. American experts responded by emphasizing the grave potential threat that the U.S. sees from small and medium-sized countries with nuclear weapons, and the importance of protecting the U.S. homeland from such rogues. In terms of BMD being aimed at China, several American participants pointed out that according to estimates of China’s nuclear modernization program, it could easily overwhelm the limited BMD system that the United States is building.

Moreover, recent decisions in BMD architecture show that the U.S. is focusing on defending itself from the threats of small and medium-sized countries, rather than optimizing the BMD
plans to counter a potential threat from China. The U.S. emphasized that the ground based interceptor (GBI) arsenal was limited in current plans. This issue, as well as the discontinuation of multiple kill vehicle research on missile defense interceptors, is important issues for assessing the direction of U.S. missile defense plans.

Second, Chinese experts argued that America’s cooperation with Russia on BMD, but lack of such cooperation with China, makes China feel unequal and undermines mutual trust in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. Several Chinese participants called attention to U.S. exchanges of information and coordination with the Russians on missile defense, including suggestions that the United States takes Russian concerns seriously while ignoring Chinese concerns. In response, several American participants told the Chinese that they should not view the decision to change European BMD deployments as a concession to the Russians, but rather as a decision based on American interests. The United States does share information on BMD with Russia, but American participants argued that the United States has also made great efforts to explain BMD plans to China. U.S. participants emphasized that if China wanted greater cooperation on BMD, Chinese government officials needed to make formal requests through official channels.

Third, Chinese participants raised concerns about the implications of BMD for Taiwan. One participant argued that Taiwan was the most important element in Chinese concerns about BMD. Militarily, Chinese experts worried that the U.S. might extend its missile defense architecture to defend Taiwan, which would undermine Chinese deterrence and send the wrong signals to Taiwan independence forces. Others also worried that coordination with Taiwan on BMD would tighten both the military and political links between the U.S. and Taiwan. In response, an American expert emphasized that missile defense would be ineffective for defending Taiwan from the more than 1,000 short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan. Another American participant argued that although missile defense cooperation could strengthen ties overall, the military coordination and integration with Taiwan has been very limited. This is likely an issue that will need to be continuously addressed through official and unofficial channels.

Fourth, Chinese experts were worried that BMD would lead to the tightening of alliances, and feared that these alliances would be increasingly aimed at China. Several participants raised concerns not only with the tightening of U.S. alliance relations with Japan, but also with South Korea, and Australia. Fifth, one Chinese expert raised a concern that the development of BMD would lead to a weaponization of space. An American responded that there was nothing in the BMD architectures that was space-based, except for the sensors. Lastly, a Chinese participant said that some Chinese scientists talked about possible offensive uses for some of the technologies associated with BMD. Several American participants asked for clarification on this point and argued strongly that the technology would not have any offensive purpose.

One Chinese participant argued that in response to American BMD efforts, China could either invest in countermeasures or increase the quality or quantity of its nuclear forces. In response to BMD, this participant argued that such modernization would only reflect China’s attempts to maintain its minimum deterrent. Another Chinese participant was pleased to hear some American experts recognize that this modernization would simply reflect China’s desire to guarantee the reliability and credibility of its nuclear deterrent. This expert expressed a fear that some in the U.S. would perceive this defensive and reactive nuclear modernization as a great threat to the U.S. and as evidence of an aggressive China.
Prompt Global Strike and NFU

The interaction between American emerging long-range precision strike capabilities (generally known now as prompt global strike) and China’s NFU pledge was discussed in several ways. Conventional attacks against China’s nuclear facilities drew more attention from the Chinese side given the discussion in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) on prompt global strike (PGS). One Chinese expert suggested that the possibility of such strikes might lead to a change in China’s NFU policy. This expert suggested that if the U.S. has this intention (and made it clear in declaratory policy), China might need to rethink its NFU policy. This participant further declared that the Chinese leadership might take such conventional attacks on nuclear facilities as a type of nuclear strike against China. It was not clear (and likely deliberately ambiguous) if Chinese perceptions of U.S. intentions, changes in U.S. declaratory policy, or actual conventional attacks would be enough to trigger a reconsideration of the NFU policy.

Similarly, the Chinese participants expressed different views on a potential role for Chinese nuclear weapons in deterring or responding to conventional attacks, although no one suggested this would violate Beijing’s NFU. But, if conventional strikes threatened to eliminate Chinese nuclear forces, or even its conventional short-range ballistic missiles in Fujian, some role for nuclear deterrence in the absence of actual use might be possible. It was not very clear, however, what role nuclear forces or nuclear deterrence might play in such a situation, though it is reasonable to conclude that one possibility would be nuclear signaling to enhance the credibility of nuclear threats.

Arms Control and Disarmament Policy

Beyond the NPR, of course New START and the broader Prague vision of the Obama Administration were important, timely topics to be discussed. The Chinese participants unanimously viewed President Obama’s support for disarmament as a positive step in the right direction. One Chinese expert was happy that President Obama endorsed a vision of a world without nuclear weapons in his Prague speech, and reminded the American participants that China had advocated a world without nuclear weapons since 1964. Chinese participants were also pleased that U.S. and Russia agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals as part of the New START treaty. They were equally unanimous however, as discussed below, that the new nuclear superpowers will need to make much greater cuts in nuclear forces before China would be ready to engage in multilateral nuclear discussions or negotiations. Both these initiatives are discussed below.

New Start

Although the Chinese participants viewed new commitments and reductions under New START as a positive development, several experts had questions and concerns. One expert suggested that before the treaty was signed, there were expectations that total warheads would be reduced to 1,000. This expert not only expressed some disappointment at the final figure of 1,550, but wondered if reducing to 1,000 would be difficult for the United States. An American responded that the smaller cuts were a result of an urgent need to reach an agreement that kept the inspection and verification regime intact, and that the treaty had to be acceptable to both parties in order to be concluded.
Another Chinese participant highlighted that the cuts were not as deep as some might think because the negotiation only addressed deployed warheads and did not reduce the huge number in nuclear stockpiles. This expert characterized this as shifting warheads, and not real disarmament. American participants recognized the limited nature of these cuts, but highlighted that the process was moving in the correct direction and the importance of preserving the inspection and verification regime. The American side highlighted the explicit aim in the new NPR not only to have further cuts, but also to move to count all warheads, not just deployed warheads, in such cuts.

Several Chinese experts questioned whether domestic support for nuclear reductions would continue and was concerned that this positive momentum would not last. They argued that there were several specific factors—such as the Democrats returning to power, expiration of START, and the NPT Review Conference—that pushed the U.S. government to focus on this issue now. But when these factors are no longer as prominent, they wondered if U.S. policy or U.S. focus on disarmament might change as well. One expert specifically cited the domestic opposition to the U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as an important factor that might limit the U.S. ability to follow through on disarmament commitments. Chinese participants also wondered about the implications for U.S. support for disarmament if the Republicans were successful in the mid-term elections or if they won the presidency in 2012.

Lastly, one Chinese participant expressed a worry that one goal of U.S. disarmament efforts, and especially its efforts to bring China into this process, was to “get China trapped” into disarmament and limit its nuclear modernization. Some suggested that such worries were fairly widespread, although the most suspicious views did not hold at highest political levels.

Future of Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament

Chinese participants recognized growing U.S. expectations for China to become more involved in disarmament and arms control, but they unanimously argued that China is not ready for multilateral negotiations aimed at reduction of strategic weapons. They forcefully argued that the large gap in nuclear weapons between China and the nuclear superpowers needed to be dramatically reduced before China would consider getting involved in such negotiations or discussions. Although China is not ready to engage in multilateral negotiations, Chinese experts expressed a willingness to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. One participant strongly averred that after the U.S. ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), China would as well; domestic political opinion in China had prevented China from ratifying it first. Chinese experts also expressed some support for putting the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at the center of non-proliferation regimes moving forward. China and the U.S. both recognize that Pakistan is the major obstacle to advances on the FMCT, but they each look to the other as the solution. The U.S. wants China to put pressure on Pakistan. China, on the other hand, views U.S. policy as the impediment, especially the nuclear deal with India. China wants the U.S. to make security guarantees to Pakistan or offer a similar nuclear deal as with the Indians. Although China has expressed support for strengthening the FMCT, there was no ground broken in this discussion on putting pressure on Pakistan to make that a reality.

Although China is clearly not ready to engage in multilateral negotiations anytime soon, Chinese participants were more specific than they have been in the past about the requirements and conditions under which China might join such negotiations, and their preferred modalities. One
Chinese expert argued that President Hu Jintao’s decision to attend the September 2009 UN Security Council summit on nuclear proliferation and disarmament and the April 2010 nuclear security summit showed the leadership’s sincere interest in participating in this process. Several other Chinese participants repeated Hu’s new commitment at the UN in September 2009 that China would participate in multilateral cooperation when the time and conditions were right. Chinese interlocutors emphasized that they viewed this as a positive step by the Chinese leadership.

Chinese participants described the conditions that might need to be met before China would join in negotiations. All Chinese experts noted the huge gap in capabilities between the nuclear superpowers and China. One expert suggested that China was not asking for equal numbers before China participated, but it would require some drastic cuts in overall nuclear capabilities. These cuts would also have to include significant reductions in nuclear stockpiles and the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons before China would participate. Several participants argued that their preference would be for any multilateral negotiations to be preceded by a NFU agreement or a non-use convention between the negotiating parties. Another Chinese expert also suggested that if such an agreement or convention was reached, China would be interested in moving very quickly into verification talks.

Chinese participants preferred that any multilateral process would be comprehensive in terms of the issues discussed and the players involved. In terms of issues, they did not want to have a narrow discussion focused solely on nuclear weapons, but preferred wide-ranging discussions and negotiations that included missile defense, space capabilities, and PGS. The Chinese experts argued that all of these issues were closely linked. In terms of players, there was a lack of consensus on the Chinese side as to who might engage in discussion. Some Chinese preferred any expanded nuclear dialogue to include at least the P-5, but others suggested the P-5 plus three (India, Pakistan, and Israel). Other Chinese experts, however, argued that if India was not involved then any Chinese cuts might give India an incentive to “sprint to parity” and challenge China. One expert argued that China would not be an obstacle, and that if other countries were willing to participate, it would be difficult for China not to do so as well.

Still, and consistent with past interaction with the Chinese at this sort of forum, there was interest in learning more about the U.S.-Russian negotiations.

It may be premature to include China in any formal arms control negotiations, but American experts argued that China should not wait until all of its conditions are met before becoming involved in discussions. An American expert suggested that it is too early to ask China to make commitments, but it is not too early to talk about principles and concepts. Another American argued that discussions involving the P-5 countries on how to implement the visions of the Prague speech and nuclear summits are necessary as soon as possible. Rather than waiting until the U.S. and Russia make deeper cuts in nuclear weapons, regional problems are solved, or other conditions are met, China should engage in discussions with other nuclear powers in parallel. American participants argued that early discussions on nuclear disarmament would not only make real breakthroughs easier once the preconditions were met, but China’s greater commitment to the disarmament process might also push others to be more committed to the process as well.
American participants also suggested several specific issues that China should pay more attention to in the short-term. Several American experts mentioned verification techniques and technologies as a difficult issue that would likely require many years of discussion and negotiation, and the earlier such discussions begin, the better. Even though further cuts by the U.S. and Russia would be required before any negotiations could occur, discussions could also begin on delivery systems, nuclear infrastructure, and production of fissile material. China is the only one of the P-5 that has not committed to stop production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; such a commitment would strengthen the non-proliferation regime and give new impetus to multilateral disarmament. One American suggested that because the U.S. and Russia are discussing issues that affect China, such as counting rules on bombers and deployed warheads, technology for verification, and notification for inspections, it is in China’s own interest to become more involved in these discussions.

The Chinese response to these suggestions was inconclusive. One participant responded that it was too early to talk about verification; other countries needed to reduce their number of nuclear warheads as a precondition. Still, future discussions on these issues would be useful, drawing a clear distinction between formal arms control negotiations which would occur much later and more informal discussions which could occur much sooner.

If China requires significant reductions in nuclear stockpiles before it will participate in multilateral negotiations, then it may be many years before China will consider such meaningful participation. According to an American expert, even with the positive momentum for disarmament, the next round of nuclear reductions will prove much more difficult. It is not clear that Russia will support deeper cuts or intrusive verifications, and it is also unclear whether American domestic politics will support such reductions. Although it may be many years before China participates in significant multilateral arms control negotiations, one American recommended a ban on testing physical ASAT weapons as a measure worthy of consideration. In the meantime, the U.S. and China should strengthen their relationship by cooperating in combating nuclear terrorism and exploring confidence building measures in the nuclear realm.

A world without nuclear weapons is a vision that the U.S. and China both support, but both countries recognize that there is a long way to go to achieve it. Experts from both countries agreed that preconditions not only included resolving current challenges such as the Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs, but also deeper issues such as a resolution of regional conflicts and no threat of future proliferation. Although both sides agreed on the great challenges in achieving such a vision, experts from the U.S. and China had very different understandings of the institutions that would be most important. The American side emphasized the importance of strengthening the non-proliferation regime by bringing countries into compliance with the NPT, strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and adding verification power to the IAEA. A Chinese expert, on the other hand, focused on the importance of UN Security Council and the creation of regional security regimes as the key institutions for achieving a world without nuclear weapons. Although reaching “global zero” is an unrealistic goal in all but the distant future, these differences in the preferred institutions to support disarmament may prove to be an obstacle to China’s future involvement in non-proliferation in the near term.

Miscellaneous Topics

Finally, a few topics were raised in passing: North Korea, India, and space issues.
North Korea

Unlike some past dialogues, North Korea was not the subject for any of the panels, but there were some discussions about events on the Korean peninsula. One Chinese expert argued that although some have said China has accepted a nuclear North Korea, this was not correct. This participant suggested that China had no desire to protect North Korea, and was in a “great panic” over how to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons. The Chinese side emphasized that they perceived a nuclear North Korea as a real threat to China’s security interests, but China was in a difficult position because it needed to pressure the North Korean regime while still maintaining stability on the peninsula, which was China’s most important concern. Other participants echoed the importance of avoiding collapse of the regime. Chinese experts emphasized that China had continued to play a constructive role in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis. Some American participants, however, suggested that China’s continued support for the regime and unwillingness to punish North Korea even after aggressive behavior showed that China’s behavior was not particularly helpful or constructive. Chinese participants did not offer views on how China should respond to the North Korean torpedo attack on a South Korean warship (the Cheonan Incident).

The future of the Korean peninsula was also raised in discussions of what kind of ultimate resolution of the issue would be required to move towards a world without nuclear weapons. One expert summarized the Chinese position on the future of the peninsula as any reunified Korea should be: (1) nuclear free, (2) be accomplished through peaceful means, and (3) have no foreign interference before, during, or after unification. The United States was specifically mentioned in this context. Interestingly, another participant seemed to portray Chinese policy somewhat more moderately, suggesting that a West German model of reunification might be acceptable. It was unclear if the West German model simply meant a pro-U.S. tilt or incorporation within the U.S. alliance system (NATO in the German case, and thus the hub-and-spoke alliance system in the Korean case).

India

The potential threat to China from India’s nuclear weapons received more attention from Chinese participants at this dialogue than at previous dialogues. Even though India’s nuclear forces are currently smaller than China’s, one Chinese expert cited some Indian defense analysts who talked about India’s plans to surpass China in nuclear forces. Chinese participants seemed worried that if China became involved in nuclear disarmament talks with the U.S. and Russia, this might provide India with incentives to rapidly modernize and surpass Chinese capabilities. Chinese concerns about India’s “sprint to parity” seem similar to American concerns about a Chinese “sprint to parity.” These Chinese concerns may limit China’s willingness to engage in disarmament talks that do not involve India.

Space

Space was not the subject of any of the panels, but participants discussed space in the context of missile defense and arms control. Chinese participants argued that even though China’s missile defense test was not part of an effort to weaponize space, they believed the U.S. had already weaponized space, in part through its missile defense program. One expert argued that U.S. weaponization of space was a major obstacle to nuclear disarmament and creating a world
without nuclear weapons. Some Chinese participants suggested that contrary to the U.S., China opposed the weaponization of space and would be interested in negotiating treaties that limited military use of space. An American expert acknowledged that there was not much support in the U.S. for limitations or space arms control measures, but suggested that a test ban on physical ASAT weapons was worthy of discussion. In a brief discussion of China’s ASAT test, a Chinese participant noted the importance for China’s prestige, but also highlighted the coercive utility of the test, which made the U.S. more interested in discussing such issues. It is not clear if some Chinese also saw the potential coercive value of China’s missile defense test. Space issues will become more important in bilateral military exchanges as well as future nuclear dialogues.

Conclusions, Policy Recommendations, and Way Forward

This was one of the most open discussions between the two sides on this topic that has occurred in this series of meetings. Several factors likely account for this. Substantively, the new NPR clearly played a positive role. Additionally, the substantial continuity in participants led to a degree of shared understanding that facilitated communication.

Several areas would seem to merit consideration for the future. These are grouped into categories of U.S. policy, Chinese policy, negotiations/arms control, and process.

United States Policy

• More discussion about the continuing evolution of U.S. missile defense plans and capabilities would likely reduce misperceptions on the Chinese side. Formal government presentations as well as informal diplomacy, to a lesser extent, can advance this goal. China’s modernization responds in part at least to American missile defense programs. Since a more complete discussion of the changes in the current U.S. program should reduce Chinese concerns, increased U.S. transparency on BMD will likely advance U.S. interests.

• A similar point can be made for PGS capabilities and policy. The emphasis in PDUSD Miller’s testimony repudiating a desire to undermine China’s deterrent capability should be emphasized in other fora.

• Additional elucidation of “strategic stability” will be useful. The term has a cold war context. The comparison with the adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union will not be viewed favorably. But the elements of that term that touch on avoiding threatening the other sides’ deterrent force would be. This can be discussed by academics as they can characterize the context within which the term originates.

Chinese Policy

• China should provide more clarity about the analytical link between “lean and effective” and force postures. The term seems to have an analytic component that would be beneficial to elucidate.

• Chinese claims on transparency have typically depended on is characterization of it as a greatly weaker and more vulnerable power. As the growth in Chinese warhead numbers reduces
the potential for transparency to undermine China’s deterrent, China should explain what sorts of transparency will be forthcoming.

- The potential for catastrophe in North Korea should be discussed. If the North collapses, both the United States and China will face difficult choices. These should be probed more widely through official and unofficial channels. Any coordination of military activity in the context of a North Korean scenario will be highly challenging. Still, given the highly escalatory nature of that sort of crisis, even a deeper understanding of Chinese potential actions—absent explicit coordination with them—would be highly stabilizing.

**Formal Negotiations and Arms Control**

- Further discussion of the interaction between Chinese modernization plans and subsequent arms control negotiations is warranted. Clearly, future cuts cannot occur in the context of any rapid growth of the Chinese arsenal. This is likely to be a useful area for Moscow, Beijing, and Washington to discuss.

- It is premature to engage China officially on strategic arms control issues as a negotiating partner, for many reasons. That said, there is a range of possible ways for the two sides to talk about nuclear issues would be helpful. Track II meetings, official briefs, discussions of the full range of diplomatic negotiations—beyond arms reduction talks—can advance both sides’ understanding of the potential here.

- Further engagement on both CTBT and FMCT seems warranted, as there may be grounds for progress there.

**Process Related**

- More discussion on terminology, its context, and relevant definitions would be highly valuable. The Chinese side was interested in engaging actively on this, and was willing to provide a list of key terms in China’s nuclear strategy and policy to be addressed in future dialogues. U.S. participants too found this to be an important discussion. This is ideal for track II work. Most important among these would be a discussion of “strategic stability,” per above.
Appendix I: Conference Agenda, Participant List and Biographies

U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase V

Conference Agenda


2-4 May 2010
Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii

Sunday, May 2, 2010
6:30pm  Reception and Dinner – Rainbow Suite (Rainbow Tower)

Monday, May 3, 2010
8:30am  Continental Breakfast – Tapa Ballroom 3 (Tapa Tower)

9:00-10:00am Welcome and Introductions – Tapa Ballroom 3 (Tapa Tower)

Prof. Christopher Twomey

Mr. David Hamon, Analytical Services, Inc.

Col. (ret.) Zhang Tuosheng, CFISS

10:00am-12:00pm  Session 1: Global Zero, a declared goal of both

How does each side visualize the regional and global security environment in a world without nuclear weapons? (In particular, how would global and regional stability be affected?) What new threats or challenges would each country need to take more seriously in such a world? Working backward from such a future, what does the world look like during the period leading up to the elimination of the last weapon? What role does the NPT regime play in this evolution? What are the major obstacles to accomplishing this goal?
Each side has recently expanded on its nuclear doctrine. By April 2010, the United States should have completed its Nuclear Posture Review. In 2009, the leaders of the Second Artillery published articles in Qiushi and Zhongguo Junshi Kexue and the 2008 White Paper on China’s National Defense included a more extensive deliberation of the Chinese’ strategic doctrine than previous White Papers. Continuities with the past in both sides’ policy are well understood. However, further discussion of changes is warranted. What is the fundamental nature of the changes in each side’s policy? What are the sources of changes? What steps are being taken to carry out such changes? What interaction between the two sides developments does each side see? What is the relation between capabilities and the policy changes?

The participants will be divided into three breakout sessions that will each be asked to come up with short definitions of a designated set of four of the following terms as they understand them. Clearly, “consensus” definitions will not be possible in all cases; caveats and dissentions should of course be related as well.

Group A

- nuclear threshold
- escalation control
- counter-coercion
Strategic Insights

- key point counterattack

Group B
- extended deterrence
- inadvertent escalation
- no first use
- qualitative arms race

Group C
- deterrence by denial
- crisis stability
- effective and reliable deterrence
- first strike

Other possible terms
- strategic deterrence
- conventional deterrence
- spiral (of escalation)
- secure second strike
- peaceful use of space

Chairs for each group: Zhu Feng/Teng Jianjun/Yao Yunzhu

Wirtz/McDevitt/Kamphausen
6:00pm  Reception and Dinner – Rainbow Suite (Rainbow Tower) Tuesday, May 4, 2010

8:00am  Continental Breakfast – Tapa Ballroom 3 (Tapa Tower)

8:30-10:15am  Reports from breakout session – Tapa Ballroom 3 (Tapa Tower)

Chairs:  Zhu Feng/Teng Jianqun/Yao Yunzhu
         Wirtz/McDevitt/Kamp

Chairs:  Zhu Feng/Teng Jianqun/Yao Yunzhu
         Wirtz/McDevitt/Kamphausen

10:15-10:30am  Break

10:30am-12:15pm  Session 4: Missile Defense

How has the each side’s missile defense posture (capabilities, doctrine, and incorporation in broader national strategy) evolved? What are the sources of these changes? How do they contribute to security and stability?

What aspects of each nation’s policies are regarded as constructive and what as problematic? How has each side reacted to the other’s missile defense posture evolution? What is the range of possible future developments in this area faced by each side, and how might they interact? Do such systems suggest desires by each side for “absolute security.”

Chair:  RADM (ret.) Michael McDevitt, CNA

Presenters:  Dr. Dean Wilkening, CISAC, Stanford
             Dr. Wu Chunsi, SIIS

12:30-2:00pm  Lunch – Palace Lounge

2:00-4:00pm  Session 5: The Next Negotiations

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What issues belong at the table for future formal negotiations on confidence building measures and arms control discussions? In particular, after the current round of US-Russian negotiations what categories of issues should be American and Chinese priorities for international arms control, broadly conceived, negotiations? What should China’s role be in global or narrower multilateral fora? On space in particular, what concrete steps would advance the process beyond those already taken? What opportunities and challenges lie down such a path in general for each side?

Chair: Col. (ret.) Teng Jianqun, CIIS

Presenters: Mr. Gu Guoliang CASS

Amb. Linton Brooks, CSIS

4:00-4:15pm Break

4:15-4:45pm Session: 6 Lessons Learned and Way Forward

Facilitator: Prof. Christopher Twomey, NPS

4:45-5:00pm Closing Remarks

Mr. David Hamon, Analytical Services, Inc

Col. (ret.) Zhang Tuosheng, CFISS

Prof. Christopher Twomey, NPS

6:15pm Meet at Kalia Tower Lobby to walk to:

Chart House Waikiki Restaurant

1765 Ala Moana Blvd. (boat harbor side)
References

1. To some extent, these breakout sessions were already building on the foundations laid by the National Academy of Sciences and their Chinese counterparts in the publication of the 274 page *English-Chinese, Chinese-English Nuclear Security Glossary* (2008).

2. One Chinese expert offered a preferred translation of this term as “effective and assured deterrence.” However, assured, as in “mutual assured destruction,” is usually translated as *quebao*, not *kekao*.

3. One Chinese expert suggested that this phrase came from General ZHANG Aiping who in the mid-1990s developed an 8-character requirement for nuclear forces. This requirement was “tight defense, key point counterattack” (*yanmifanghu, zhongdianfanji*).