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THESIS

**FLUID LEADERSHIP: INVITING DIVERSE INPUTS TO
ADDRESS COMPLEX PROBLEMS**

by

Sylvia Moir

March 2016

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Lauren Wollman
Patrick Miller

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PROBLEMS**

Sylvia Moir
Police Chief, El Cerrito, California, Police Department
B.S., California State University Sacramento, 1993
M.A., University of Phoenix, 1996

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requirements for the degree of

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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2016**

Approved by: Lauren Wollman
Thesis Co-Advisor

Patrick Miller
Thesis Co-Advisor

Erik Dahl
Associate Chair of Instruction,
Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

History is replete with examples of misapplied leadership strategies. When singular methods are used to solve multifaceted problems, negative results are often the consequence. Complex issues in a complex environment require complex perspectives; the homeland security enterprise (HSE) needs leaders who can adapt their leadership styles according to emerging environments. Furthermore, the diverse agencies within the HSE must work together more frequently and dependably to make coordinated decisions that impact their broad community. This thesis proposes integrating multiple leadership models to generate innovative, diverse solutions that will strengthen the HSE. By examining dozens of models, the research developed a conceptual synthetic leadership model. It is recommended that this proposed model be implemented within HSE components and studied organizationally.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	After Action Report/Review
BSRI	Bem sex role inventory
C2	Command and Control
CAL	Complex Adaptive Leadership
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
EI	Emotional Intelligence
FDNY	Fire Department of New York
HSE	Homeland Security Enterprise
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
INS	Incident of National Significance
KSM	Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
MPD	Metropolitan Police Department of Washington, D.C.
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NYPD	New York Police Department
SL	Situational Leadership
SPOC	Seattle Police Operations Center
WTC	World Trade Center
WTO	World Trade Organization

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A noble effort is only worth joining when it is demanding and challenging. This thesis serves as the culmination of over two decades as a participant and witness of moments in time when men and women have led first responders as they protect and serve communities. In times of chaos and times of calm, during planned and spontaneous events, individuals have influenced the resolution of incidents and have made a difference in history and reduced harm in communities. The great undertaking of this thesis was borne of the experiences of those, like I, who served as willing contributors to the discipline of modern law enforcement and in the greater service of public safety. My gratitude rests first with those who wear a badge as a symbol of public trust and, regardless of the personal sacrifices needed, serve every day as the guardians of people.

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without exception, to give me faith for a collaborative, bright, and more secure future. I am eager to witness their prominence in the greater homeland security effort.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The problem is that we do not know how to live together in a changing world. We only know how to live based on truths from the past, which today inevitably results in one group attempting to impose their truths on another.

—David Bohm, *On Dialogue*

The homeland security enterprise today requires leaders who can adapt to the fluidity of emerging environments and represent hardiness and flexibility in the exercise of their responsibility.¹ Many agencies—diverse in both organizational purpose and individual employee makeup—must now work together to make decisions that impact a broad community. This diverse necessity would benefit from an appreciation for equally assorted disciplines represented to deepen solutions to complex issues by expanding the dynamic of voices at the table. This expansion demands that we broaden the models that we use while increasing the diversity of participants. Most prevalent in the enterprise is a hierarchical system. This traditional system has its merits and utility in rapidly emerging and active situations, but such a structure may limit decentralized decision making and adaptation to the pace and complexity of the modern environment.

Evolution in management and leadership thought created systems in which hierarchies flourished. A hierarchy, coupled with a rigidly adherent command-and-control approach, may not serve along the whole continuum from peacemaking to war craft, but it has proven its value in certain environments. As an example, command and control has been evaluated as a successful performance strategy in times of chaos and serves as an adhesive for the structure of the Incident Command System.

¹ The homeland security enterprise (HSE) is a broadly used term to describe the federal, state, and local agencies that compose the initiative to secure the nation from threats. HSE has been used since the organization of 22 disparate agencies under the structure of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The term distinguishes groups who have responsibility at all levels of public safety that, in whole or in part, have homeland security in their mission. The term is a tool for simplification more than a specific organization.

Integrating elements from other management models that reflect growing diversity and fluidity may be more suitable for the vast situations faced within the homeland security enterprise (HSE). Individuals and organizations wrestle with how to take action within the HSE continuum; considering methods outside the command-and-control structure will help take advantage of a progressive and innovative dynamic in the first responder community.

The majority of the HSE—including local, state, and federal agencies—is traditional in design: hierarchical in structure, and command-and-control in leadership style. While command-and-control structures have an important place in many of the situations that first responders face, the difficulty lies in the use of unyielding structures applied across a spectrum of events, both planned and unplanned. Existing after action reports and reviews (AARs) and congressional reviews suggest that leadership reform is vital for the complex future work of securing the nation and its people. The reform necessary does not advocate for abandoning command and control (C2) and its associated structure, but rather for an integrated method that adapts to the environment, the threat and the community served, and in which opposing traits and behaviors can be leveraged for their strengthening—rather than dividing—capabilities. To broaden the level of diversity to solve the complex problems facing the nation, we must consider what leadership looks like in the multi-level, multi-discipline, information- and intelligence-sharing environment before us.

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

The central exploratory research question in this thesis asks: How might multiple models of leadership be integrated to generate an innovative solution that proportionately acknowledges diverse behaviors and approaches? And how could this new synthetic model be applied to homeland security to improve leadership within the full HSE?

This research question implies that, despite notable successes and failures, room for improvement and enhanced performance exists in the HSE and first responder communities. It also assumes that diverse individuals and agencies lead differently and

that conceptual models may broaden the type of participants and their willingness to contribute to a mission.

B. LIMITATIONS

This research does not intend to prove or disprove the validity of leadership to organizations in the subsequent fulfillment of organizational goals and missions. This research examines leadership, distills several existing leadership models, and provides a basis for implementing a conceptual model that uses diversity to its advantage.

The most significant limit to this research is the absence of first-hand accounts, iterative surveys, or quantifiable data collection. Recommendations for future research include a field study that tests the conceptual model and includes a program evaluation consisting of both summative and formative evaluation.

C. RESEARCH DESIGN

Conceptual modeling is the most appropriate method for understanding the role that leadership plays in the HSE. Initially, literature was reviewed for the emergence of leadership as a separate and distinct theory as it departed from management. Later, natural and manmade incidents that involved one or more HSE disciplines were studied to select specific events during which leadership failed to some degree. Once leadership was identified as an essential piece of the success or failure of performance during an event, deductive reasoning supported examination of existing leadership models to determine which had broad applicability to homeland security.

Thousands of leadership models exist. Those examined in this thesis were chosen for their applicability to homeland security and for their ability to address the enterprise's current flaws—most notably, deficiencies in actual decentralized decision making, use of a singular leadership method across the array of situations faced in homeland security pursuits, and genuine learning from flaws.

The Hersey/Blanchard Situational Leadership (SL) Model, containing four styles, was appropriate as it is rooted in the flexibility of style for the given situation and the

maturity of the follower (actor).² The Goleman model of emotional intelligence (EI) recognized the coupling of a leader's technical skill with the social and self-mastery skills when engaged with a follower of differing development levels.³ The Five Practices of Exemplary Leadership Model by Kouzes and Posner identifies leadership as a set of observable behaviors that, when used, elicit the supreme outcome for individuals and organizations.⁴ Obelinsky's complex adaptive leadership and the adaptive leadership model of Heifetz, Linsky, and Grashow both recognize and address the heavy labor of complex adaptive work.⁵ These models offer components that, when joined, propose a new conceptual model for application within the homeland security realm.

This method demonstrates the importance of integrating the existing models of leadership into a robust conceptual framework more relevant to the multi-disciplinary, multi-mission field that makes up homeland security.

D. SUMMARY AND UPCOMING CHAPTERS

Leadership styles vary by individual, situation, organization, and the time in which they are practiced. The use of a single leadership model in the HSE, despite variation among disciplines and dynamic threats, may limit effectiveness. Both internal and external stakeholders—those within an organization or discipline as well as those from disparate disciplines, communities, and cultures—may not connect with strict adherence to the traditional command-and-control leadership style. Using an integrated and synthetic conceptual leadership model reflects esteem for a range of approaches to a common goal and may serve to bring varied thinking to a complex issue. Bringing different disciplines to a problem is not a novel idea, but it does offer promise given

² Paul Hersey and Ken Blanchard, "Life Cycle Theory of Leadership," *Training and Development Journal* 23, no. 5 (1969): 26–33, as referenced in Nick Obolensky, *Complex Adaptive Leadership Embracing Paradox and Uncertainty* (Burlington, VT: Gower, 2010); Paul Hersey, *The Situational Leader* (New York: Warner Books, 1984).

³ Daniel Goleman, *Leadership: The Power of Emotional Intelligence* (Florence, MA: More than Sound, 2011), loc. 377–380, Kindle edition.

⁴ James Kouzes and Barry Posner, *The Five Practices of Exemplary Leadership* (Hoboken, NJ: Pfeiffer, 2010), Kindle edition.

⁵ See Obolensky, *Complex Adaptive Leadership*; Ron Heifetz, Andrew Grashow, and Marty Linsky, *The Practice of Adaptive Leadership: Tools and Tactics for Changing Your Organization and the World* (Boston: Harvard Business Press, 2005).

complex problems in uncertain environments.⁶ Further, the conceptual model offered might provide permission for those with norms different from the predominant archetype to thrive, or for organizations to achieve amplified success across the multi-field HSE.

Chapter II contains the necessary background information, wherein diversity, anthropology, sociology, psychology, and biology were lightly investigated as they relate to the essential components of leadership in the multi-disciplinary field of homeland security.

Chapter III provides the background of early homeland security through Homeland Security Version 1 (HS V.1) and subsequent DHS reform, launched as Homeland Security Version 2 (HS V.2). The chapter proposes that learning from past experiences requires organizational intention and a different form of leadership to aid in the transformation. This illuminates the clear benefits to creating a different culture in the HSE with emerging permission for a different style of leadership.

Chapter IV, the summary of alternative models, provides an historical context of leadership theory and a foundation on which the source leadership models were built. This chapter defines the argument that a single use of leadership in a complex, dynamic HSE environment, or reliance on traditional forms of leadership, is part of the enterprise's struggle.

Chapter V, the conclusion, suggests that creating a conceptual model for HS V.2 will create strength in the collaborative efforts at various levels of government. It then presents the concluding proposal of support for a new synthetic conceptual model to be applied to homeland security, and recommendations for field-testing and future research.

⁶ See <https://dt.asu.edu/home> for a detailed description of the Arizona State University Decision Theater and its uses in uncertain environments.

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II. BACKGROUND

This chapter begins by inspecting the sciences considered influential in the scholarship of leadership: the study of humankind (anthropology), organisms (biology), society and behavior of individuals in groups (sociology), and the human mind and individual temperament (psychology). Once a light inquiry is made regarding the sciences, with focus on leadership and integration, the chapter concludes with a summary discussion of leadership.

A. THE STATUS QUO

History provides us with examples of the heroic leader who directs and commands in the boardroom and on the battlefield. In this traditional idea, the leader is independent, is involved in the minutiae, and takes little input from advisors. During catastrophic events, integrating multiple levels of government with a common structure, as prescribed in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), is a sound premise, but actual implementation proves difficult.⁷ Before examining the sciences behind leadership study, we must first understand how the levels of government view their respective roles before, during, and after an incident.

The National Incident Management System (NIMS) Training Program establishes the lines for who has authority during an event. The “basic premise of NIMS is that all incidents begin and end locally. The Federal government supports State, tribal and local authorities when their resources are overwhelmed or anticipated to be overwhelmed. The intention of the Federal Government in these situations is not to command the response, but rather to support the affected...authorities.”⁸ Local communities served by local disciplines are easily stunned during large-scale disasters; while NIMS guides the support nature of the federal response, coordinating the support is challenging. The rigidity of command-and-control management may also overwhelm locals if the event is sizeable.

⁷ The White House, *Management of Domestic Incidents* (HSPD-5) (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2003).

⁸ FEMA, *National Incident Management System Training Program* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 2, https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/nims_training_program.pdf.

Partnering and coordination as parts of an integrated approach signal that the evolution toward a more diverse leadership concept is needed outside the first responder community as well.

1. Command-and-Control Style

The HSE leadership norm is largely a system in which specific functions and scopes of authority are drawn. If we borrow from the military that those in positions of authority require data from an array of sources to make the best decisions, then it makes sense that much of the HSE would be considered a command-and-control (C2) system. The theories underpinning the use of C2 come from military doctrine that is hierarchical in nature, with a Supreme Allied Commander responsible for operations in a theater of battle.⁹ The reporting elements for a single position are limited to avoid overburdening an individual with information or intelligence and to provide manageable communication and accountability. The first responder community, due to the nature of their work and the military's success, adopted a similar structure. Parallels between NIMS and C2 offer an area for further research and growth. According to author Eric Theriault,

The Department of Defense defines *command and control* as:

The exercise of authority and direction by a purposely designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.

Command and control, in other words, are both verbs and nouns. As verbs, they are what a commander does; they constitute a process. As nouns, they are the “arrangement” of people, equipment (including hardware and software), and procedures that helps commanders do what they do; they name a system.¹⁰

⁹ Hierarchy is considered a social and organizational construct for the description of authority held by members who occupy specific positions. The Oxford dictionary defines a hierarchy as “a system or organization in which people or groups are ranked one above the other according to status or authority.”

¹⁰ Eric Theriault, “Empowered Commanders: The Cornerstone to Agile, Flexible Command and Control,” *Air & Space Power Journal* 29, no. 1 (January–February, 2015): 99–111.

If C2 is a proven successful leadership style, the question, then, is: Why do we need something different? For broad understanding, Coakley offered, “Command and control involves the complex collection of functions and systems an executive draws on to arrive at decisions and to see they’re carried out. Thus, the acronym C2 may be used to refer to anything from information to sophisticated communications and computer equipment, to the executive’s own mind--the last involving education, training, experience, native intelligence, and other aspects of cognition.”¹¹ If generally applying Coakley’s explanation to the HSE, it is difficult to defend an argument to move away from C2, as it appears to provide the broadest amount of information from which a person in a position of authority can pull. This thesis does not advocate abandoning C2; rather, it suggests that adding a leadership model that appreciates an expansion of the functions and systems traditionally given validation within the system would strengthen the HSE’s domestic imperative. The concept of thriving, discussed in a forthcoming chapter, helps clarify the support for evolving the nature of C2 to bolster it rather than to make it extinct.

The military and the HSE are similar in that they operate in a calm field of peacemaking and prevention as well as in the fog of chaos that accompanies war and first response—where lives depend on clear and decisive tactical doctrine. The two fields differ substantially, thus demanding a different use of C2. The expansive continuum on which the HSE operates and the scrutiny that domestic operations bring mandate that a variety of actors from wide-ranging fields are included. Coakley argued for a holistic approach to C2 when he said, “Recognizing the multi-dimensional complexity of C2 and admitting the legitimacy of all the dimensions involved may enable us to develop a more balanced and consistent approach to improving C2.”¹² This thesis offers the same consideration within all levels of the HSE.

¹¹ Thomas P. Coakley, *Command and Control for War and Peace* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1992), 5.

¹² Coakley, *Command and Control*, 12.

2. Diversity

Expanding our evaluation of diversity to include individual attributes may help to distinguish how a multiplicity of approaches, attributes, and styles have the potential to strengthen leadership in the complex first responder community. Diversity is one of the imperatives in examining leadership; increasing diversity shows promise when it reaches beyond its traditional methods of numeric representation. Professor Mohamad Alkadry offers, “In a narrow sense, diversity in organizations is interpreted as representation, management, retention, and hierarchical progression of members of minority and gender groups in an organization.”¹³ This presents an opportunity to consider how past practices of measuring diversity may limit individual expression and adherence to group norms rather than strengthening the freedom of individual identity in leadership. The concern with narrowing individuals into groups is twofold: First, it assumes individuals conform to think, act, and speak as a member of a larger group with established norms, and second, as explained by Alkadry, “group-based representation could result in a form of passive representation that yields representation without power.”¹⁴ Instead, diversity should be a relative term when considering its growth and usefulness in the leadership model proposed in this thesis.

Even given the pitfalls of narrow diversity categorization, it is helpful to examine binary components such as gender when examining leadership in the first responder community. A prominent claim is that leadership is more closely associated with masculine tendencies borne of the competitive nature of men that evolved from primitive mating and hunting environments. Research shows, however, that women have held positions of influence in matriarchal societies throughout history.¹⁵ When women are given the same access to resources in a construct of equal value, the sexes have equal

¹³ Mohamad Alkadry, “The Diversity, Organizational Communication, and Citizen Imperatives for Public Sector Leadership,” *Competition Forum*, January 1, 2007, 2.

¹⁴ Alkadry, “Diversity,” 2.

¹⁵ Wendy Wood and Alice Eagly, “A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Behavior of Women and Men: Implications for the Origins of Sex Difference,” *Psychological Bulletin*, 2002: 128–141.

opportunity to dominate, and therefore to lead and have authority.¹⁶ While conducting field and data research, Professor Maria Lepowsky found that several cultures value the contributions of men and women equally and a certain “sexual symmetry” exists.¹⁷ There was no evidence of dominance or subordination in these societies.¹⁸ This equal status, which is not shared across cultures, alters the life-context of individuals and may help to explain the divide between genders in leadership prominence in the United States. If we accept that our only means for protection are the “masculine” methods, then we limit the strength of the feminine means and the matriarchic cultures that thrive.

The life-context and social roles occupied by specific groups of people may also alter the emergence of leaders. Wood and Eagly provide an evolutionary theory called the biosocial origin theory, which argues that psychological gender differences derive mainly from the evolutionary types of roles filled by women and men within specific societies.¹⁹ Simply stated, if an essential job task requires an employee to perform a physical skill, the group of individuals who are capable of performing that skill will be the prevailing group of employees in that profession. The group’s predominant employee type therefore provides a varied life-context for individuals.²⁰ It can be argued, however, that it is the continuation of specific roles created socially rather than via biological functions that furthers the ongoing limitations of the genders in professions. creates the social norm of the gender occupying the role and subsequently the narrowing and limiting norm.

While biosocial origin theory explains in part why specific genders dominate specific fields, authors Gerzema and D’Anotnio found that the most successful leadership models are those in which more feminine attributes are leveraged.²¹ This is especially

¹⁶ The term “dominate,” in this instance, is used in reference to number in the social group rather than as the converse to subordination. In this work, it is meant to surface cultural and social constructs and not to discuss supremacy.

¹⁷ Maria Lepowsky, *Fruit of the Motherland: Gender in an Egalitarian Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

¹⁸ Lepowsky, *Fruit of the Motherland*, xxx.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 699–727.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ John Gerzema and Michael D’Antonio, *The Athena Doctrine: How Women (and the Men Who Think Like Them) Will Rule the Future* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2013).

relevant in the HSE, as well as many other fields, in which gender diversity among employees is ever increasing.

3. Heritability of Leadership

Are leaders born, or are they made? Before creating an improved conceptual leadership model, the heritability of leadership must be resolved. Research shows that, while genetics plays a role, life context and experience play the most significant role in leadership emergence.²² This suggests that leaders are both born *and* made.

The heritability of leadership has been the source of conversation and research for decades. Studying fraternal twins (who share 50 percent of the same genetic makeup) and identical twins (who share 100 percent of the same genetic makeup), researchers found that environmental factors such as opportunities to practice leadership and the variance of role models played the most significant part in an individual's leadership abilities.²³ Although research concludes that up to 30 percent of leadership ability is based on genetic factors, the argument for development has emerged as the most prominent component supporting the argument that leaders are made.²⁴ This research asserts that environment and opportunity—rather than genetic makeup—build the foundation for individuals to emerge as leaders throughout their careers.²⁵ Lending support for the development theorists, the heritability research concluded that context, socialization, and factors outside the domain of genetics played a far more significant role in the emergence of leadership.

To address what genetics does not, it is essential to develop leaders. Learning, both as humankind and as organizations, helps us keep pace with the complex nature of protecting our nation. Along these lines, the creation of protocols and standard operating procedures has sought to increase the probability of success. While reliance on protocols can save lives, unbending adherence to rules and protocols can numb the imaginations of

²² Gerzema and D'Antonio, *The Athena Doctrine*.

²³ Richard D. Arvey et al. "Developmental and Genetic Determinants of Leadership Role Occupancy among Women," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 92, no. 3 (2007): 693–706.

²⁴ Arvey et al. "Developmental and Genetic Determinants," 693–706.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

those with a duty to protect others. The AAR is also a learning tool in addition to representing an accountability mechanism.

4. Expectancy-Value Theory and Diversity

While including perceptive outsiders in the first responder community has its merits, there are real and perceived risks to outsiders entering the field. According to expectancy-value theory, distinct elements influence if an individual will pursue a challenge.²⁶ For this work, it is important to consider that, if those who choose to support the HSE are diverse, it will influence the presence of other diverse people. The presence of a visible group representative may reduce the assessment of risk by another in the same group. For example, when a woman sees another woman in a position of power or authority in a hierarchy, that visible representation will provide some support for entrance into the hierarchy due to another woman's perceived assessment of female success.

The dominant factors for an individual entering a profession, according to expectancy-value theory are: expectancies (probability of success) and task values (motivation and how the task will serve the goals or aspirations).²⁷ Reviewing AARs from incidents of significance is explored later in this thesis, and the commonly identified failure among them is in the area of leadership. This is important because the incidents, whether planned or emergent, proceed through an evolution of action that, while unique to the incident, follows a common cycle. From chaos and crisis to sustained action, the use of a single leadership style lacks resonance and may compromise success. Expectancy value theory may justify varied styles of leadership and act as a sense-making piece for the discovered preference for feminine leadership as described by D'Antonio and Gerzema.²⁸

²⁶ Jacquelynne S. Eccles, "Understanding Women's Educational and Occupational Choices: Applying the Eccles et al. Model of Achievement-related Choices," *Psychology of Women Quarterly* 18 (1994): 585–610.

²⁷ Eccles, "Understanding Women's Choices," 585–610.

²⁸ Gerzema and D'Antonio, *The Athena Doctrine*.

5. Thriving

Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky provide another definition of leadership, stating that leadership is the mobilizing progress and individual capacity to tackle problems and thrive.²⁹ In an early connection between nature and the practice of leadership, the authors argue that leaders who achieve positions of authority use the natural evolution of thriving to persevere.³⁰ The concept of thriving argues that in order for a species to thrive, it must preserve the best adaptive mechanisms from the past, abandon what does not serve it currently, and harnesses the capacity to transform and use proven methods in the future.³¹ Thriving is used to distinguish the reasoning for a conceptual model based on the successes of the past (as identified in research and AARs) while disposing of pieces not considered pertinent. Using this concept derived from nature as the analogy, leadership can be strengthened when the concept of thriving is given a prominent position in evaluation.

The connection between thriving and leadership is important, but limited. Individuals, for example, are not necessarily aware which parts of their leadership behaviors are ineffective, which makes identifying what to discard difficult. Further, it accepts that organizations can effectively assess what helps them prosper and what does not. Though individuals and organizations may not be able to do this alone, evaluative research, such as this thesis, may help make broader assessments that can inform future action.

B. LEADERSHIP FOUNDATIONS

As previously discussed, homeland security is regularly referred to as the greater homeland security enterprise (HSE) because it is rooted in different disciplines. The leadership models employed vary by discipline, yet each discipline with its distinct parts

²⁹ Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky, *Adaptive Leadership*. See also Rafe Sagarin, *Learning from the Octopus: How Secrets from Nature Can Help Us Fight Terrorist Attacks, Natural Disasters and Disease* (New York: Basic Books, 2012).

³⁰ Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky, *Adaptive Leadership*. See also Sagarin, *Learning from the Octopus*.

³¹ Ernst Mayr, "An Analysis of the Concept of Natural Selection," in *Toward a New Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an Evolutionist*, 95–115 (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1988).

makes up the whole of the enterprise. The array of disciplines is important when considering a leadership model suitable for divergent disciplines with parallel goals. But precisely because of its distinctive makeup and the demand for an agile practice to address adaptable foes, the HSE is well suited to a more synthetic and complex model of leadership that invites diverse individuals representing varied disciplines and an array of approaches to tackle contemporary issues.

Foundational management and leadership works must be examined in order to understand the source models' structures that underlie our comfort and diverge from traditional competencies of effective leadership. The early developments of leadership theory may have worked in the production lines of the early 20th century, but we may now be able to appreciate, but discard, much of what worked in the past to address and overcome what we face in our future.

Understanding the past leadership and management foundation is essential to creating a new outlook. Much of the contemporary work on management and leadership is foundationally attributed to Mary Parker Follett's research and writings.³² Follett is known for revolutionizing organizations through their mixed disciplines of engineering, psychology, and sociology to create what is today considered *scientific management*.³³ Early in the Industrial Age, Frederick Winslow Taylor also sought to improve industrial efficiency through scientific inquiry. Shaving seconds off outputs through efficient actions was the measure of productivity and the central theme of Taylor's lifelong study. The work of Taylor, coupled with the time and studies attributed to Follett were appropriate at the time, as studying the physical movement of the worker superseded consideration of the worker's sources of motivation.³⁴ The shift toward studying the individual worker and his or her motivation became the focus of research and examination as the 20th century progressed.

³² Mary Parker Follett. *Dynamic Administration: The Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett* (New York: Harper & Row, 1940).

³³ Follett. *Dynamic Administration*.

³⁴ Fredrick Winslow Taylor, *Scientific Management* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1973).

Perhaps relying on the early theory espoused by Machiavelli, Douglas McGregor examined the motivation of the worker and the workforce and ventured into the emotional human realm with a footing in psychology. Arguably, per Bass, Machiavelli asserted that the preferred leadership style is one that drives employees from an emotion; that emotion, however, is often focused in fear. McGregor, too, examined polar perspectives and their effect on the workplace when considering alternatives to traditional styles. McGregor, however, considered the motivation from the lens of the manager with an ascription of “drive” within the worker.³⁵ His theories do not rest on a continuum; rather, they are independent of one another. McGregor, while describing the motivation from the manager’s perspective, was at the forefront of the management skill-development movement. The investigation of the worker-follower’s motivation and psychology exploded into prominence.

Investigating human drive at work gave birth to theories of motivation popularized by the work of McGregor in his Theory X and Theory Y.³⁶ Theory X suggests that workers are sluggish, motivated only by money, cannot be trusted, should be tightly supervised, and lack ambition and motivation. Theory Y emphasizes that the organization strives to create a synergetic relationship between the worker and manager because the worker is self-motivated and self-disciplined. This was the first glimpse into the effect of workers being part of the decision-making process and to the building of a synergistic relationship based on trust.

In 1978, James MacGregor Burns published what has been referred to as a comprehensive examination of management and leadership theories available at the time.³⁷ Burns was joined by Bernard Bass, who published the influential examination of leadership in an enormous text titled *Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*.³⁸ Both writings provided a decade of scholars’

³⁵ James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978).

³⁶ Bernard M. Bass, 1990, *Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*, New York: Free Press. P.43

³⁷ Burns, *Leadership*.

³⁸ Bass, *Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook of Leadership*, 255.

concepts on which to build research and compose new ideas about leadership. Of the evolving and expanding conceptualization of leadership, Bass said, “leadership research should be designed to provide information relevant to the entire range of definitions, so that over time it will be possible to compare the utility of different conceptualizations and arrive at some consensus on the matter.”³⁹ Bass’ expression offers students of leadership the consent to examine historical leadership thought to design and create new ideas and models for contemporary practice.

1. Leadership Evolution

In the 1970s and ‘80s, Stodgill, Burns, McGregor, and later Bass, offered the predominant theories attempting to define and evaluate leadership phenomena. In his work from 1974, Stodgill said, “There are almost as many different definitions of leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept.”⁴⁰ Early leadership research was focused on the setting of goals, leader-follower exchange and what Bass, in 1985, named the “economic cost-benefit assumptions.”⁴¹

Early leadership demanded that leaders emphasize transformational leadership components including inspiration, emotions, values, and behavior. Setting goals and managing people were not dead practices, but understanding the wide range of approaches to how leaders and followers think and reason was an emerging area of research called cognitive leadership.⁴² Combined with new leadership thinking, the cognitive and emotive segments of leading others are complete and attention can be paid to leaders’ actions and behavior. As noted by Dinh et al., “Notably, future research needs to develop integrative perspectives that consider how disparate leadership theories relate or operate simultaneously to influence the emergence of leadership phenomena.”⁴³ This

³⁹ Bass, *Bass & Stodgill’s Handbook of Leadership*, 19.

⁴⁰ Ralph Melvin Stodgill, *Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research* (New York: Free Press, 1974).

⁴¹ Bernard M. Bass, *Leadership and Performance beyond Expectations* (New York: Free Press, 1985).

⁴² Amy Donahue and Robert Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study of the Lessons of Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them,” *Homeland Security Affairs* II, no. 2 (2006): 1–28.

⁴³ Jessica Dinh et al., “Leadership Theory and Research in the New Millennium: Current Theoretical Trends and Changing Perspectives,” *Leadership Quarterly* 25 (2014): 45.

thesis recognizes the complexity of the leadership arena, research, models, and behaviors, and attempts to draw meaningful connections between the perspectives offered while widening the suggestion to consider another model.

2. Leadership and the Needs of Followers

A leader's ability to influence motivation has captured the attention of scholars for decades. Psychologist Abraham Maslow embarked on a lifelong pursuit of differentiating people and their sources of motivation.⁴⁴ Out of Maslow's work on positive psychology, he developed a "hierarchy of needs" model. This model argued that people are motivated to the degree that their needs are being met, and that lower-level needs must be fulfilled before higher-level needs can be met. Maslow's hierarchy explained in general terms what was important to humankind, and this explanation would later serve to personalize the study and practice of leadership. Like a closed pyramid, the hierarchy builds on the "basic needs" of all human beings (air, food, water, shelter, and sleep). The second pyramid stage is "safety needs" (e.g., protection from the elements, law, order, security, and stability). The third stage is "social needs" (such as love, belongingness, affection, and relationships), and the fourth stage is "esteem needs" (independence, mastery, status, dominance, prestige, and self-esteem). The fifth and highest stage, "self-actualization," represents the highest level of human growth, realizing personal potential, self-fulfillment, and personal growth.⁴⁵ Maslow's work is considered a closed triangle, which implies that a person ceases growth. This thesis argues, however, that the top level should be a continuous pursuit. The "needs" are also in the interest of the leader and should be sparked in the follower.

By arousing needs of followers in the upper segments of Maslow's hierarchy, leaders, particularly those considered transformational, demonstrate increased

⁴⁴ Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

⁴⁵ Maslow argued that very few people reach self-actualization and that the majority of people reach varying degrees of this fifth stage of being. Maslow further proffered opinion on the behaviors leading to self-actualization. Maslow has been criticized for the validity of his theory and its application to women and those who are not prominent white males. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*. See also Saul McLeod, "Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs," Simply Psychology, last modified 2014, <http://www.simplypsychology.org/maslow.html>.

organizational alignment and success. The necessary association between Maslow's hierarchy and leaders' ability to motivate followers was offered as a way to persuade individuals to exceed their own interests for the good of the group.⁴⁶ Further research cited by Bass emphasized the intellectually stimulating potential for followers when they identify with Maslow's hierarchy of needs, and have meaningful and individualized coaching and mentoring of their progression.⁴⁷ A decades-old theory with contemporary relevance, a modern expansion of Maslow's hierarchy includes the continuous pursuit of self-actualization and restructuring the closed pyramid to accurately reflect the lifelong pursuit of learning and ongoing development of leadership.⁴⁸ It makes sense, then, to consider Maslow's work as part of a conceptual model of leadership, whether explicit or implicit.

3. Leadership Gender Traits

If we argue that space exists for newcomers and those who are diverse, then we should explore the distinct traits of men and women. Early theories of leadership convey that the few "great men" differentiate themselves from others because of their innate physical, psychological, and social superiority.⁴⁹ Space exists, however, for leadership behaviors that have little to do with physical strength and stereotypically masculine traits. In one of the most often-cited standards of distinguishing traits by sex, psychologist Sandra Bem studied difference between men and women using the Bem sex role inventory (BSRI) established in 1974 and widely used for decades following.⁵⁰ The BSRI distinguished adjectives for male-related and female-related behavior, as shown in Table 1.

⁴⁶ Burns, *Leadership*.

⁴⁷ Bass, *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership*.

⁴⁸ Joan M. Keil, "Reshaping Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs to Reflect Today's Educational and Managerial Philosophies," *Journal of Instructional Psychology* 26, no. 3 (September 1999).

⁴⁹ Bass, *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership*, 37–38.

⁵⁰ Joanna Barsh, Susie Cranston, and Geoffrey Lewis, *How Remarkable Women Lead: The Breakthrough Model for Work and Life* (New York: Crown, 2011).

Table 1. BSRI List of Gender-Related Traits

Male-Related Traits	Female-Related Traits
self-reliance, strong personality, forceful, independent, analytical, defends one’s beliefs, athletic, assertive, has leadership abilities, willing to take risks, makes decisions easily, self-sufficient, dominant, willing to take a stand, aggressive, acts as a leader, individualistic, competitive, ambitious	yielding, loyal, cheerful, compassionate, shy, sympathetic, affectionate, sensitive to the needs of others, flatterable, understanding, eager to soothe hurt feelings, soft-spoken, warm, tender, helpful, gullible, child-like, does not use harsh language, loves children, gentle

Adapted from “Sandra Lipsitz Bem: Early Career Award,” *American Psychologist* 32, no. 1 (1977): 88–89.

Examining how leaders behave intersects with studying traits. In sampling 64,000 people worldwide, Gerzema and D’Antonio identified traits that resonate as an expression of quality leadership today. Respondents generally stated that the traits of pluralism are ideal, and the traditionally binary traits associated with masculinity have led to many of the problems currently faced across the globe.⁵¹ This finding was substantial in shifting the thinking about what followers want in a leader. The modern call is for leaders who work through obstacles with collaboration, humility, and reason rather than ideology, and this premise provides reasoning for the conceptual model offered later in this thesis.⁵² The research revealed that while the traits most closely associated with an ideal leader are feminine, exercising traits in both the masculine and feminine domains is necessary to thrive as a modern leader.⁵³

The trait theories, while significant for understanding leadership, fail in three key areas. First is that psychology claims to know clearly which traits lead to an individual achieving a leadership position. This conflicts with avoiding conflating leadership behavior and positions of authority, as it suggests that leadership is a position one should aspire to hold rather than an influence to create.⁵⁴ Secondly, trait theories often fail to

⁵¹ Gerzema and D’Antonio *The Athena Doctrine*.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Alice Eagly and Linda Carli, *Through the Labyrinth* (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2007), 39.

recognize that individuals must exercise leadership across various domains and that the traits may resonate in one job facet, but fail in others. Finally, and of equal importance, the trait theories largely evaluate success of individuals but not organizational achievements. Though trait theories are flawed, they are important for connecting the evolution of leadership research and they are key to understanding what may limit the advancement of the feminine leadership construct.

4. Emotional Intelligence and Leadership

The idea of emotional intelligence (EI) postulates that, to emerge as a leader, a person must positively read and interpret others' emotions and apply the companion emotion and behavior.⁵⁵ EI is not only a potential leadership development tool, it is also essential to including diverse leadership approaches in the complex and uncertain HSE. In a more academic method, Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso describe EI as “the capacity to reason about emotions, and of emotions to enhance thinking. It includes the abilities to accurately perceive emotions, to access and generate emotions so as to assist thought, to understand emotions and emotional knowledge, and to reflectively regulate emotions so as to promote emotional and intellectual growth.”⁵⁶ The team created a self-assessment tool for leaders to examine and develop their EI as part of their leadership growth.⁵⁷

Several researchers “argue that EI is a key component of effective leadership; George suggests that leaders high in EI are able to recognize, appraise, predict, and manage emotions in a way that enables them to work with and motivate team

⁵⁵ John S. Sosik and Laura E. Megerian, “Understanding Leader Emotional Intelligence and Performance: The Role of Self-Other Agreement on Transformational Leadership Perceptions,” *Group & Organization Management* 24, no. 3 (September 1999): 367–390.

⁵⁶ John D. Mayer, Peter Salovey, and David R. Caruso, “Emotional Intelligence: Theory, Findings, and Implications,” *Psychological Inquiry* 15, no. 3 (2004): 197–215.

⁵⁷ John D. Mayer, Peter Salovey, and David R. Caruso, *Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) User's Manual* (Toronto, ON: MHS, 2002).

members.”⁵⁸ Supporters argue that EI can be developed, is necessary to building leadership capacity, and is important for developing relationships. Similar to the distinctions along gender lines, Goleman attributes variances among genders to contrasts in the way boys and girls are taught to deal with emotions as children.⁵⁹ In Chapter IV, EI is scrutinized and expanded as part of the conceptual model.

5. Social Capital and Leadership

Social capital provides routes to information and influence via relationships. It can be defined as a process that creates connections between people based on trust, where some sense of reciprocity is then demonstrated.⁶⁰ Useful to illustrate the connection between leadership and relationship, ecologist Rafe Sagarin explained,

There are *mutualistic symbioses*—relationships in which both parties benefit. There are *communalisms* in which one party benefits and the other party isn’t affected much at all either way. And there are *parasitic* symbiotic relationships in which one party gains and the other suffers. In reality, symbiotic relationships smear across these categories and change with time.⁶¹

In accepting that the homeland security enterprise is one in which women and other diverse individuals are considered similarly situated with newcomers, women need to scrutinize, understand, and engage in social capital, and men should consider that

⁵⁸ Jennifer M. George, “Emotions and Leadership: The Role of Emotional Intelligence,” *Human Relations* 53 no. 8 (August 2000): 1027–1055; C. Coetzee, and P. Schaap, “The Relationship between Leadership Styles and Emotional Intelligence,” paper presented at the 6th Annual Conference for the Society of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Sandton, South Africa, 2004; C.S. Daus and A. Harris, “Emotional Intelligence and Transformational Leadership in Groups,” paper presented at the 18th Annual Meeting of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychologists, Orlando, Florida, 2003; Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, and Annie McKee, *Primal Leadership: Realizing the Power of Emotional Intelligence* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2002).

⁵⁹ Daniel Goleman, *Emotional Intelligence: Why it Can Matter More than IQ* (New York: Bantam Books, 1995).

⁶⁰ Daniel Brass, “Social Capital and Organizational Leadership,” in *The Nature of Organizational Leadership: Understanding the Performance Imperatives Confronting Today’s Leaders*, eds. S. Zaccaro and R. Klimoski, 132–152 (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2001).

⁶¹ Sagarin, *Learning from the Octopus*, 173.

women largely engage in social capital for reasoning that differs from their own.⁶² The continuing obstacle for women and newcomers, then, becomes the means to generate social capital in order to build relationships and exercise leadership on a greater scale.

If we accept that social capital is worthy of generating, then proposing a leadership framework that connects people and creates value in the professional connection without the underpinnings of purely transactional process is important. The importance of generating social capital does not rely on something being broken to argue that the connectivity is desired and needed in a leader; it merely reflects the benefit.⁶³ Recognizing that social capital and building networks are essential to furthering leadership influence, any resonant leadership framework must acknowledge and embrace the distinct disadvantageous traits in each style that discount relationship-building as a leadership trait.

6. Networks and Leadership

Human beings are members of social systems, and networks provide linkages between individuals and groups in systems. Current leadership methods are largely based on tried and proven methods of increasing efficiency, often working against the natural human tendency to connect. The hierarchical system on which many of our organizations are built creates distance and chains of command to reduce reporting elements and construct a system to manage the expanse of organizations. These systems produce efficiency in traditional production, but do they work in today's environment of loose linkages between networked threats?

Derived from a basis of trust, connectedness, and collaboration, building linkages with and between people has been identified as a key to leadership success.⁶⁴ The hierarchical nature of government, by its very structure and adherence to bureaucracy,

⁶² Diversity for this work should be considered more than the embodiment of belonging to a cultural, sexual, or ethnic group. Diversity is represented by trait, education, professional group, and hierarchical position. This does not advocate that the physical presence of a group member should be ignored, as the presence may offer understanding in how similarity may reduce perceived risk reward.

⁶³ Gerzema and D'Antonio *The Athena Doctrine*.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

repels the formation of networks. Goldsmith and Eggers recognize this when they say, “the traditional hierarchical model of government simply does not meet the demands of this complex, rapidly changing age. Rigid bureaucratic systems that operate with command and control procedures, narrow work restrictions, and inward looking cultures and operational modes are particularly ill suited to address problems that transcend organizational boundaries.”⁶⁵

Understanding how internal networks function can create strength through collaboration across departments and outside the formal boundaries of government; the emphasis on network-building is essential in leadership, management, and policy. The homeland security leader of the future will have to acknowledge the barriers that hierarchy places when attempting to establish a network, and employ flexible, collaborative, coexisting methods to address the complex issues in the national security arena. As Eggers and Goldsmith say, “In a world in which elusive, decentralized, non-state entities like Al Qaeda and Hezbollah represent the biggest threat to Western democracies, the networked approach has become critical to national security. It takes a network to fight a network.”⁶⁶ Whether internal or external, examining and conceptualizing networks is a mandate for modern security leaders.

The notion that national security and homeland security are separate and distinct parts was at the center of HS V.1. Further, the early thought was that local first responders were not a legitimate part of the HSE. The connectivity became clear when several high-profile cases were “broken” by local patrol-level police officers conducting enforcement or investigative inquiries.⁶⁷ In a presidential study directive recommendation, the president stated: “Homeland Security is indistinguishable from National Security—conceptually, and functionally, they should be thought of together,

⁶⁵ William Eggers and S. Goldsmith, *Governing by Network* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2004), ix.

⁶⁶ Eggers and Goldsmith, *Governing by Network*, 7.

⁶⁷ Key cases include the bombing in Oklahoma City at the Federal Building in 1995; see Jayna Davis, *The Third Terrorist: The Middle East Connection to the Oklahoma City Bombing* (Nashville, TN: Nelson Current, 2004).

rather than separately.”⁶⁸ Connectivity between all levels of government is key to the leadership imperative to connect seemingly disparate parts and departments for a safer nation.

7. Learning and Leadership for the Individual and Organization

As described previously—with the expansion of Maslow’s work and the lifelong pursuit of self-actualization—research also suggests that individual leadership can be developed. In the first responder community, learning takes many forms, one of which is the AAR. The criticism of actions and inactions in the AAR is the functional equivalent to an accountability measure, but its value as a learning tool for leaders must not be overlooked. Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, and Annie McKee closely correlated leadership with the strengthening of individual aptitude for self-directed learning through five learning discoveries that take place in leadership development:

1. “Identify one’s ideal self”
2. “Identify one’s present self”
3. “Create a learning agenda to build on strengths and reduce gaps”
4. “Experiment with new behaviors, thoughts, and feelings to the point of mastery”
5. “Develop supportive relationships that make change possible”⁶⁹

The leadership development process lacks a linear sequenced progression; the amount of time and effort the individual must give for each level is inexact. Individuals comprise organizations and are naturally the concentration of focus, but scientist Peter M. Senge and others believe we should also recognize that organizations and systems have the capacity to learn.⁷⁰

The indication is that emotionally intelligent leaders must consider the whole of the system in which they operate for the effect of the actions that are undertaken. In line

⁶⁸ The White House, *Organizing for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism* (PSD-1) (Washington, DC: The White House, February 23, 2009), www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/psd/psd-1.pdf.

⁶⁹ Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee, *Primal Leadership*.

⁷⁰ Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization* (New York: Doubleday, 2006).

with emotional intelligence and learning, leaders must appreciate the effect of individual learning and behavior on their system.

8. Ethics and Principled Leadership

Ethics and principles also guide leadership and provide essential insights about expanding leadership norms. Ethics in the greater sense is about more than adherence to the rule of law; it is an approach to the process of choice and reasoning. Professor Joel Rosenthal prompted the question: “What is principled leadership?” Rosenthal suggested “three ideas at its core: (1) pluralism, an appreciation for diversity while exercising what is common in the human condition; (2) principles of rights, what he referred to as the ‘rock bottom moral argument’; and (3) fairness.”⁷¹ In summary, Rosenthal emphasized the importance of our moral obligation to continuously discuss and study ethics, which he suggests should be seen as “the rudder and keel—the things that keep one moving forward and in the right direction.”⁷² Leadership action has evolved from studying how employees move to how employees are motivated. The growth must include all disciplines and focus on including concepts, models, and actions that increase the probability of success—this ethical obligation and principled leadership theory are key components of the conceptual model suggested in this thesis.

C. UPCOMING CHAPTER OVERVIEW

The next chapter describes the existing leadership framework in the HSE. It presents a deeper understanding of leadership method pioneers such as Taylor and Follet, who suggested measures of efficiency might have hindered response in some significant events. The early thinkers set in motion the norms for what worker-leader interaction meant for leadership and management across our nation. The chapter presents a compelling argument that the scientific management foundation upon which much of the

⁷¹ Panel presentation by Dr. Joel Rosenthal of the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, as cited in Joseph R. Cerami, “Will What We Think We Know about Leadership and ‘Whole of Government’ Reform Kill the Prospects for Effective and Ethical Change?” in *Rethinking Leadership and “Whole Of Government” National Security Reform: Problems, Progress, and Prospects*, eds. Joseph R. Cerami and Jeffrey A. Engel, 1–28 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 2010).

⁷² Cerami, “What We Think We Know.”

United States (and later the Department of Homeland Security) was built, while useful for efficiency in a different time and in a different arena, may no longer fit the internal and external environment where we work; a distinctly new model is necessary.

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III. LEADERSHIP IN THE HOMELAND SECURITY ENTERPRISE


Research focus, academic articles, books, and journals are overflowing with models of leadership with seemingly endless applications. Examining leadership models through the lens of increasingly complex homeland security disciplines and recommending a new conceptual model for increased proficiency requires scrutinizing a handful of existing models.

A. HOMELAND SECURITY AS A METAPHOR FOR DIVERSE ACTION AND THOUGHT

Advancing the initiative to safeguard the United States from terrorism began in earnest following 9/11, with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Transitioning individuals from a lens of their specific, unconnected groups (e.g., police, fire, military, emergency medicine) to the greater group of homeland security practitioners was the emphasis. This transition was difficult early on, as the existing organizational cultures were not accustomed to the collaboration needed to be effective. Change had to occur to make the move succeed, and change may still be necessary as we evolve to a new culture of leadership.

Once the DHS was formed—of seemingly disparate organizations—individuals' behavioral, affective, and cognitive responses were aligned with protocol, process, and hierarchical adherence in their preexisting (command-and-control) hierarchies. The graphic in Figure 1 visually illustrates the movement from the distinctly concentrated connections to the broadly aligned connections. The shift was necessary and, with deliberation, it forms a basis for understanding the dynamic recognized today—one that reduces silos and brings a more diverse group of practitioners to the table working together to safeguard the nation.

Figure 1. The HSE before and after DHS



Because of the way disparate organizations were combined to form the DHS, a cycle of acculturation was inevitable. Combining nearly two-dozen agencies to create one large department was intended to increase accountability, communication, policy direction, and strategic alignment. Notwithstanding each organization's existing cultures, the individual departments went through stages similar to those described by Berry when an individual or group moves from one culture to another: assimilation, separation,

marginalization, and integration.⁷³ The benefits of merging the various departments under a single Cabinet-level secretary were important to minimize future failures as identified in the *9/11 Commission Report*; however, the merger was not accomplished without difficulty.

It can be argued that organizational cultures follow a similar path as societal cultures through norms, philosophies, values, and beliefs. If using Berry's acculturation framework to explain the stages of societal and individual variables experienced since the formation of the DHS, the process was predictable. Initially, the individuals relied on their training and experience while assimilating into the larger department. The amount of contact, distance, and degree of change to the individual mission either enhanced the individuals' resolve, or created stress. The first two steps as offered by Berry help explain why comfort in a hierarchical design remains internal, given the loosely connected networks of the adversaries faced today. The later steps of Berry's acculturation model include marginalization and integration. These steps are important for understanding the extent to which members within the HSE experienced marginalization, its effects, and perhaps the degree of integration with the use of the conceptual model proposed. This research did not explore the later steps, but offers them for future examination and research.

The cultural and leadership issues that arose upon the establishment of the DHS are most notable in the early missions of the individual departments, which did not change as a result of the merger. There was little evidence that the distinct departments had altered their course, even though they were now considered part of the larger mission of securing the nation. The DHS evolution serves as an example that one must continue to adapt to the changing environment and shifting threat, though some existing elements are conserved. And as organizations adapt, so must the leadership within the organizations. As author Joseph R. Cerami explains,

⁷³ Angela R. Febbraro, "Gender and Leadership in the Canadian Forces Combat Arms: A Qualitative Study of Assimilation vs. Integration," *Canadian Journal of Police and Security Services* 2, no. 4 (December 2004).

The immediate leadership challenge is to complete timely changes for reforms without the rash urgency and sometimes-erratic approaches caused by the panicky fear of a future homeland security disaster. Reform without the sky-falling platform of another 9/11 requires leadership that embraces homeland security professionals, Congress, and government agencies, as well as public organizations and citizens.⁷⁴

The evolution toward a DHS that advances in the space between tragedies requires individuals to recognize the benefits of expanding our leadership construct and to accept opposing approaches that strengthen rather than weaken the dynamic.

Allowing other modes of thinking, leading, and managing is at the core of the progress of homeland security and leadership's challenge to get there. The United States and the DHS can no longer rely on traditional command-and-control methods of combating security threats. In 2009, the call for change and evolution from HS V.1 to HS V.2 was openly stated by Homeland Security Professor Chris Bellavita, who wrote, "The time is now to think outside the box, deconstruct unnecessary bureaucracy, develop essential capabilities, and strengthen our communities at the core level."⁷⁵ We must break down barriers in order to promote other strategies and policies that will fortify our communities; the countermeasures to progress represent the leadership style that needs to be left behind.

B. WHAT EVENTS HAVE TAUGHT US ABOUT CURRENT LEADERSHIP MODEL FLAWS

Lessons can be learned from our responses in both planned and spontaneous events. Although this section points out select AARs with a focus on the incidents' flaws, considerable success was also achieved in the response and recovery surrounding each event. The briefs are intended to identify the common thread or specific flaw in leadership failure, and suggest that a new synthetic model of leadership may have led to a different outcome in one or many of the areas identified as deficient. Further, the events herein reflect those that are planned, spontaneous, natural, and manmade. In reviewing

⁷⁴ Cerami, "What We Think We Know," 17.

⁷⁵ Christopher Bellavita, "Changing Homeland Security: The Year in Review—2008," *Homeland Security Affairs* V, no.1 (2009).

the select events, it is important to consider that the AARs are summarized to highlight the problem that needs to be fixed. The scrutinized event AARs are meant to provide a picture, not the entire story surrounding the event.

1. Hurricane Andrew, 1992

The response to Hurricane Andrew was a planned event. The post-storm response and post-incident review highlighted issues regarding logistics of pre-staging supplies and, remarkably, a failure to have a single individual in charge with a clearly defined command-and-control system.⁷⁶ This specific shortcoming—insufficiently identifying a single authority figure with no apparent latitude for others across the hierarchy to adjust the plan—limited the strength in collective thinking and presented obstacles in the procurement and evacuee placement process. Another flaw that emerged during Hurricane Andrew was that the incident easily overwhelmed single first responders and rigid structures. Rigidly deferring to a single authority figure for all approvals and actions, and thus removing engagement from decentralized decision making, hampered successful outcomes in this incident. Thinking back to Taylor’s work with specific actions in a production line, it is easier to understand how this occurred. The lesson is for the leader to empower those at various levels to adjust the strategy when the adversary changes in intensity or direction. Waiting for permission to make adjustments compromised the response to this hurricane.

The conceptual model later proposed suggests that decentralized decision making could liberate individuals to take action to stand-up elements of NIMS. An incident commander, in knowing the capabilities of individuals on his or her team, can then give differing degrees of decision-making authority or suggestion permission to key actors in the incident command structure, strengthening the overall decision making. This response to the flaw of individual overload or absence of decentralized decision making may reduce the likelihood of failure.

⁷⁶ Philip D. Lewis (ed.), *Governor’s Disaster Planning and Response Review Committee: Final Report, Florida*, 1993 (Collingdale, PA: Diane, August 1993).

2. World Trade Organization Protests, 1999

Without knowing what the future would hold, the adversaries faced in Seattle may have been the first documented loosely networked organization faced by first responders. With months of advance planning, the events surrounding the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference shocked professionals and casual observers. Over five days, the public safety of the region was overwhelmed and operations were compromised. Command and control was eroded, and the incident commander “in the Seattle Police Operations Center (SPOC) did not know with certainty in near real time who was where and what was happening on the ground. This made it very difficult to maintain effective control from the SPOC.”⁷⁷ One of the limitations in Seattle was that the SPOC demanded control, perhaps based on a tradition of command coming from a central figure directing actions rather than creating an overarching leadership strategy. Individual platoon leaders relied on their vision of the field in front of them and on their training to make decisions independent of the incident commander; this decision was made as an organic outgrowth rather than a culture of the Seattle Police Department. It is only through studying current necessities that the Seattle WTO response could have served as a significant shift in the leadership needed today. Even planning did not prepare Seattle Police to imagine the magnitude of the protests and the agility with which the protestors would act.

The WTO Seattle protests were a harbinger for imagining “what could have happened.” The AAR criticized the absence of cross-agency integration for planning and collaborating during the event. Combining individuals at the point of crisis without training and exercising integration compromised the planning and response of Seattle Police. Leadership failed to plan for the protestors’ ingenuity, collaboration both in preparation and deployment, and for adapting their response to the chaotic conditions. The conceptual model proposed in this thesis, among other elements, proposes bringing creative collaboration to the planning phases of an incident.

⁷⁷ Seattle Police Department, *The Seattle Police Department After Action Report: World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference* (Seattle, WA: Seattle Police Department, April 2000), 6, www.seattle.gov/police/publications/wto/wto_aar.pdf.

3. September 11, 2001

Perhaps the most significant incident on U.S. soil for which a unified response was needed, 9/11 also serves as the clearest example of a necessary evolution to an integrated model of leadership. The 9/11 Commission identified a broad set of problems to fix when they described the key failures that led to 9/11. The report said, “We believe the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failures: in imagination, policy, capabilities, and management.”⁷⁸ The flaw most notably offered in the reflective response examination was that of interagency planning and collaboration—flaws that stretch across the spectrum of overall failures.⁷⁹ Further, in the aftermath of 9/11, evaluating an incident command system’s structure and hierarchy discovers many proven strengths, but limitations surface when individuals on the front line of an event response are prohibited from making decisions based on what is present for them, but invisible to those at different levels of command.

The conceptual model presented in this thesis suggests that the framework needed to combat the failures of imagination, collaboration, and decentralized decision making rest in the adaptive leadership concept, the decentralized decision-making structure, and a shift from the individual to the collective. The collective promotes strength in capabilities through collective rather than individual goal achievement. The conceptual model also offers to fix the failure in management through decentralized decision making and adaptive response to the chaos present in incidents of 9/11’s scale.

4. Hurricane Katrina, 2005

Incident commanders and decision-makers long for advance warning and identification of outcome probability. In concept, advance notice provides an opportunity to identify roles and responsibilities, open necessary branches of the incident command system, and to stand up resources needed to save lives. On August 28, 2005, the National

⁷⁸ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York: Norton, 2004).

⁷⁹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, *The 9/11 Commission Report*.

Weather Service gave the clearest predictor of known devastation when they issued a warning, stating:

MOST OF THE AREA WILL BE UNINHABITABLE FOR WEEKS...PERHAPS LONGER...HUMAN SUFFERING INCREDIBLE BY MODERN STANDARDS.⁸⁰

This warning should have provided well-defined probability for the scope of planning and response, but flaws kept the system from performing as needed. Arguments for a centralized, federally led response system made sense after Hurricane Katrina, but some argue that centralization is not what is needed to fix what the system that broke during Katrina. In support for decentralization with enhanced relationships, William Lester, writing for the *Public Manager*, offered,

The basic disaster response system can become more centralized under federal government control or become more decentralized and involve more collaboration. Either approach would require transformation of the current system, but a more centralized approach could jeopardize the basic federal relationship by making the national government the overlord of all disaster response with spillover effects into the broader state and national relationships. Many experts in disaster response recognize that this degree of centralization would hurt what is currently good about the system and derail the needed transformation toward more initiative and leadership in disaster situations. Hence, a more centralized approach is the antithesis of the type of transformation needed for effective disaster response.⁸¹

In a pronouncement that superficially conflicts with Lester's statements, the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina revealed, "Too often there were too many cooks in the kitchen, and because of that the response to Katrina was at times overdone, at times underdone. Too often, because everybody was in charge, nobody was in charge."⁸² This finding signaled that while many may have authority and leadership capability, deficiencies in the system or

⁸⁰ House of Representatives, *A Failure of Initiative: The Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina* (H. Rept. 109-377) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006); see also Christopher Cooper and Robert Block, *Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Failure of Homeland Security* (New York, Times Books, 2006).

⁸¹ William Lester, "Transformational Leadership and NIMS: The NIMS Promise of Collaboration Can Be Realized on the Ground through Basic Steps That Transform Theory into Practice," *Public Manager*, September 22, 2007.

⁸² House of Representatives, *A Failure of Initiative*, 12.

the individual kept one from assuming responsibility and acting accordingly. Lester asserted that transformational leadership was needed to bring about the change to actual decentralized decision making.⁸³ Transformational leadership begins at the top of organizations and creates a climate in which the structure and the culture helps people understand how to function and thrive in a decentralized system. This flaw in the Katrina response was not one of absent decentralized decision making; rather, the flaw was one of absent initiative in forming genuine decentralized decision making. The integration of a clear model of leadership that cultivated and fostered diverse inputs was absent.

The investigation called the government response to Katrina a “failure of initiative” and ultimately a failure of leadership.⁸⁴ Those with authority failed to use the advance warning to carry out an assertive strategy to safeguard the lives counting on them. Resources were available to decision-makers, however many were left inactive for reasoning still largely unknown. Networks and collaboration failed during Katrina and an alternative model of leadership may have helped to fix this flaw.

5. Washington Navy Yard Active Shooter, 2013

After failures at Columbine High School in April 1999, law enforcement trained to assemble rapidly, not wait for specialized tactics teams, bypass victims in need, and move toward the shooter to eliminate further threat. This change proved to be an adaptation long overdue. This departure from tradition and training and acceptance of a new norm likely saved lives in the Navy Yard shooting. The Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) AAR exposes successes based on the swift formation of police officers from a number of agencies. In the MPD AAR, titled *Section II Tactical Operations: Search for the Gunman*, an identified issue was that particular personnel from responding agencies were reluctant to take direction from the MPD forward operating commander who was responsible for directing teams inside the building where the active shooter was hiding. The early flaws identified are a lack of interagency

⁸³ Lester, *Transformational Leadership*.

⁸⁴ House of Representatives, *A Failure of Initiative*, 12.

collaboration and reverence to another agency—problems that may be successfully addressed in the conceptual model offered in this thesis.

In the debriefing, one law enforcement officer commented that, as he was a federal employee and the Navy Yard was a federal location, he did not need permission to enter the building.⁸⁵ Despite jurisdictional boundaries, the officer’s assertion reflected that training and communication are necessary for coordinated and disciplined responses to similar incidents. The assertion also begs the question of ego. The tactical movements in the new norm of active shooter response are difficult when the multiple teams and the area of responsibility for the teams are not clearly coordinated.

Described as rapidly decisive, reflecting a calm demeanor and assertive strength, the veteran commander on the Navy Yard shooting served as the anchoring point for the successful resolution of the incident. As described in the AAR, “A well-coordinated and effective response often hinges on the leadership of the initial response.”⁸⁶ When working with effective EI, the commanding leader gives clear direction associated with his or her authority. The leadership must have a wide range of experiences and not only set the standard for pace and demeanor, but also for tactics. The commander in the Navy Yard shooting exercised leadership in the tactical sense and reflected understanding of which tactics to use and why they were appropriate.

The Navy Yard shooting was selected for examination in this thesis because it was a spontaneous event that crossed boundaries of local, state, and federal jurisdictions. This event and its AAR findings largely represent key learning points because of their successes and areas for growth. The conceptual model proposes to fix the identified shortcoming of antagonistic and separate groups in response at the chaotic scene. The federal employee who took independent action without recognizing the command authority of the MPD scene supervisor diminished collaboration for the strongest outcome, and reflects the problem that needs to be fixed. This may appear to conflict with the assertion of strength through decentralized decision making, but the deeper dive into

⁸⁵ Metropolitan Police Department, *After-Action Report* (Washington, DC: Metropolitan Police Department, 2014), 31.

⁸⁶ Metropolitan Police Department, *After-Action Report*.

the reasoning for independent action in this instance was absence of relationship and respect. The conceptual model offers a remedy by infusing coexistence, the pluralism of leadership, and relationships as strengths.

C. LEARNING THROUGH FAILURE

Acknowledging breakdowns is essential to thriving. Although learning and strengthening are related, when asked to admit flaws, some are fearful of the consequences of such admission. The fear of failure has been linked to a denial of experimentation and imagination.⁸⁷ Recommendations overtly stated in the AARs are only useful as lessons when individuals and organizations have integrated learning with working and progressing.⁸⁸ Following this precept, the study of AARs may isolate the shortcomings of individuals and organizations and encourage advancing toward a previously unconsidered concept. A single model of leadership is not effective in every situation or when facing every challenge, as evidenced from the AARs.

When considering the failures identified in the AARs, the hegemonic masculinity may have contributed to the barriers in collaboration and creativity. Failure during events is equally attributed to style of leadership as it is to competence of the individual or the organization. As competence is addressed and enhanced, thought must be paid to expanding what has been traditionally considered skills of leadership in the first responder realm. The presence of an opposing theme and model of leadership encouraged in an organization may diminish the areas of failure in future events.

Learning to learn through the AAR process requires organizational intention and culture as well as the individual nurturing of group membership. In order to achieve what Barrett believes is crucial to organizational survival, the organization must have an adept learning system.⁸⁹ Barrett opines that the learning system reflects an organization's culture to "accentuate the success of the past, evoke images of possible futures, and

⁸⁷ Gerzema and D'Antonio *The Athena Doctrine*.

⁸⁸ Senge, *The Fifth Discipline*. See also Anthony Dibella and Edwin Nevis, *How Organizations Learn: An Integrated Strategy for Building Learning Capability* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1998).

⁸⁹ Frank Barrett, *Organizational Dynamics: Creating Appreciative Learning Culture* (New York: American Management Association, 1995), 4.

create a spirit of resilience, on-going inquiry that empowers members to new levels of activity.”⁹⁰ Barrett recognizes the following competencies within that learning system:

- Affirmative competence—focusing on strengths, successes, and potentials
- Expansive competence—challenging conventional practices
- Generative competence—developing integrative systems that promote realization of the effects caused by individual actions
- Collaborative competence—facilitating ongoing discussion and exchange of ideas.⁹¹

Respecting and valuing history in an effort to adapt and to evolve begins with scrutinizing homeland security failures. Failure often acts as the launching point for training mandates and the funding of such training. Learning from the vicissitudes in the field of public safety serves to surface learning; arguably, learning and leadership are natural partners.

The importance of learning and leadership is best summed up by Rafe Sagarin’s statement, “The best way to activate recursive processes is to intently focus on and reward successes. This does not mean that learning from failure is useless—it’s essential not to make the same dumb mistakes twice—but we do focus far too much on failure.”⁹² Perhaps the shortcoming of the AAR is the homeland security discipline’s predisposition to only discuss the failures, as the successes are viewed as “just part of the job.” The reasoning and existence of this tendency to avoid discussing success should be explored in future research.

D. ADHERENCE TO PAST PRECEDENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Protocols are designed to standardize performance, yet rigid adherence can be seen as a detriment during an incident. Public expectation is that the whole of government and the networks created in government are sustainable and stable services.

⁹⁰ Barrett, *Organizational Dynamics*, 4.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Rafe Sagarin, “Adaptable Solutions,” University of Arizona, accessed March 13, 2016, <http://adaptablesolutions.org/content/recursive>.

When private contracts end and private companies collapse, the American people have come to rely on the government's stability and presence. Almost immediately following Hurricane Katrina's August 29, 2005, landfall, criticism and condemnation of the government response began to surface. The most visible accounts painted pictures of a failure of initiative through delayed response, failure to implement evacuation plans, failure to collaborate, and obstructions to coalitions between government and non-governmental organizations. Reliance on connections was reflected in the review of the response to Hurricane Katrina, when the White House report said:

When programs operate out of regional offices, closer relationships are developed among all levels of government, providing for stronger relationships at all levels. By the same token, regional personnel must remember that they represent the interests of the Federal government and must be cautioned against losing objectivity or becoming mere advocates of State and local interests. However, these relationships are critical when a crisis situation develops, because individuals who have worked and trained together daily will work together more effectively during a crisis.⁹³

The external force of Hurricane Katrina showed the incongruence between the espoused values (protect and serve communities) and the basic underlying assumptions of local law enforcement; it was widely reported that police officers failed to respond or abandoned their posts. The essential leadership factor when creating written plans and conducting oral briefings is the consideration of the organizational culture and for the leader to provide clear messages about the expected adherence to the commander's intent.⁹⁴

Leaders are individuals who choose to influence groups through a strong value system and trust, and who help groups face the realities of their challenges, potentially causing some disequilibrium in the existing system. The predominant model of leadership used in the 9/11 era was command and control, with a central figure to direct the mission. The problems, while not solely rooted in the performance of an individual, arguably could have been lessened if imagination, initiative, and leadership behaviors had been

⁹³ George W. Bush, "Chapter Five: Lessons Learned," The White House, accessed July 14, 2014, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/chapter5.html>.

⁹⁴ Bush, "Lessons Learned."

altered. The consequences of single model of leadership operating in a rigid structure are significant when considering the complexity of the disciplines within the HSE and the premise that leaders emerge when their choice skills, traits, and the situation convene.

E. UPCOMING CHAPTER OVERVIEW

The next chapter sets the foundation for synthesis of the existing models into an alternate conceptual model that supports the synthetic nature of the homeland security effort and encourages alternative disciplines to join together for strengthened solutions to complex problems. The chapter relies on the lessons of early scholars who designed solutions to efficiency difficulties in production, but who struggle in applying the same methods given the fluidity of the current environment and problems faced today.

IV. ALTERNATIVE MODELS

We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them.

—Albert Einstein

The homeland security past has been dominated by leadership styles that are often singular, limiting to outsiders, and inelastic in structure. The lessons chronicled in the AARs remind us that the threats we face and the leadership necessary to address those threats require a leadership orientation that values an overarching objective while recognizing and appreciating potentially opposing opinions, behaviors, and approaches at all levels of an organization. Rooted in different disciplines with common premises, the entities that comprise the HSE rely upon various models used by individuals in exercising leadership. To account for the variety of professions that encompass the vast homeland security enterprise, consideration must be given to an array of leadership models. Whether a model is currently or previously used was not surveyed for this work, but this question could provide a launching point for a future study.

This chapter examines five leadership models that exist in the wider business and organizational environments. The models were selected because of their prevalence and content, in addition to their utility across the HSE. Each select model may provide the foundation to expand and include a new conceptual leadership.

A. SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP THEORY

The Hersey/Blanchard Situational Leadership (SL) model, containing four styles, provides a framework for how a leader should operate within the environment at any given moment.⁹⁵ Hersey and Blanchard argue that things happen in organizations because leaders use a style of leadership that works with the readiness and development of those who are carrying out the given mission. SL asserts that style and maturity must be matched for the achievement of desired results, but it is not without its downsides,

⁹⁵ Hersey and Blanchard, “Life Cycle,” as referenced in Obolensky, *Complex Adaptive Leadership*.

including the perceived self-awareness and self-correction of the individual leader. SL provides flexibility for the intertwining of emotion and traditional management theory, and therefore gives a compelling attractant for inclusion as part of a new conceptual model.

Whether in the business or first responder environment, SL has gained support because of its flexibility in rapidly changing situations and the high tolerance of the environment for such an approach.⁹⁶ Using SL, leaders are “able to place more or less emphasis on the task and more or less emphasis on the relationships and competencies of the people being led.”⁹⁷ The SL model reflects the desire of modern workers as found in other studies.⁹⁸

Designed to integrate the relationship that the leader has with the follower and the context of the task, the SL model provides quadrants of operational variations and leadership roles (see Figure 2). The SL model does not consider individual leadership traits, personalities, or gender, but provides a starting point for the construction of a new model. The SL model provides guidance for how a leader should act by “telling, selling, participating, or delegating with consideration for the maturity level of the group.”⁹⁹ SL was the first model to suggest that varied methods of leading would increase effectiveness largely due to the individualized method imported by the leader. The model also considers the fluidity of the exercise of leadership and respects that the dynamic involves a leader, follower, and environment. Its consideration is understandable because the model closely follows the first responder dynamic.


⁹⁶ “Supervisory Course Content,” State of California, accessed October 1, 2014, <https://www.post.ca.gov/supervisory-course.aspx>.

⁹⁷ Hersey and Blanchard, “Life Cycle,” as referenced in Obolensky, *Complex Adaptive Leadership*.

⁹⁸ “Situational Leadership Model,” The Center for Leadership Studies, accessed April 20, 2014, <http://situational.com/about-us/situational-leadership/>. See also Gerzema and D’Antonio, *The Athena Doctrine*.

⁹⁹ Hersey and Blanchard, “Life Cycle,” as referenced in Obolensky, *Complex Adaptive Leadership*.

Figure 2. Situational Leadership Theory Model



Source: Project Management Skills, accessed July 14, 2014, <http://www.project-management-skills.com/image-files/situational-leadership-model.jpg>. See also Paul Hersey, *The Situational Leader*, New York: Warner, 1984.

B. EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE (EI) THEORY

Psychologist Daniel Goleman's early work coupled technical skill with what Goleman identified as emotional intelligence (EI).¹⁰⁰ EI identified key components of: self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skill. Intelligence (or IQ) is largely determined genetically, and EI scientific inquiry examines if leaders are born with EI or if it is cultivated throughout life and can therefore be developed through

¹⁰⁰ Goleman, *Leadership*, loc. 377–380.

experience and purposeful mastery.¹⁰¹ Research suggests that EI is partially gained through genetics and partially advanced through time and through training the neurotransmitters within the brain's limbic system.¹⁰² When coupled with introspection and learning, EI has potential to expand the use of the appropriate leadership style in the multitude of situations within the first-responder community.

EI suggests that those with low self-awareness display unwillingness and discomfort discussing and exploring their limitations and strengths. People with low self-awareness are also uncomfortable with interactions in which they may confront their weaknesses; the “message that they need to improve [is seen] as a threat or a sign of failure.”¹⁰³ Tests to determine a person's EI are important assessment tools in leadership development. Goleman offers two measurement tools based on his model: the Emotional Competence Inventory and the Emotional and Social Competency Inventory.¹⁰⁴ Once the EI competency is assessed and acknowledged, the movement toward the type of EI leader can be pursued.

Goleman's research identified that highly emotionally intelligent leaders were equipped to recognize and apply successful leadership styles. Goleman's emotional leadership styles used individuality rather than prescribing an archetypical leader to emulate. He argues that a leader can use any of the styles as demanded by the situation and the specific environment. Similar to SL, EI posits that the duality of leader and follower is central to realization of goals and completion of tasks. Different than an individual technique that is about the leader, the styles within the EI theory are about the leader in relation to the follower and the context. The following paragraphs describe the styles identified in EI by the style's name, use, and the reported impact to the organizational climate. The styles are considered for their utility within the synthetic model proposed in Chapter V.

¹⁰¹ Daniel Goleman, “What Makes a Leader?” *Harvard Business Review*, 1998, 2.

¹⁰² Daniel Goleman, *Working with Emotional Intelligence* (New York: Bantam Books, 1998), 6.

¹⁰³ Goleman, *Leadership*, loc. 377–380.

¹⁰⁴ Goleman, *Working with Emotional Intelligence*.

The visionary leader, a coaching style for long-term capability building, and the pacesetter leader are those who build challenges in identifying exciting and ambitious goals.¹⁰⁵ While these styles have use, they do not require deeper examination for sense-making around the needs of homeland security leadership.

Two styles that do offer salience in the HSE (and for the conceptual model) are the affiliative and democratic styles. These styles offer insight of studied methods and their results. The affiliative leader is one who creates connections with people, subsequently allowing the organization to act in a synchronized and congruous manner; this style is considered collaborative and focuses on the needs of individuals over the needs of the organization.¹⁰⁶ Often associated with visionary style, the affiliative style is best for healing rifts and divisions between people and teams, and within the organization, and working through difficult or stressful situations. This style has a reported positive impact on the climate and may propose the most compelling style for short-term use to build the cohesion needed in the homeland security domain. Synchronization is built by focusing on the individual, which furthers the idea that once the individual's emotions are addressed, the organizational health is furthered; the organizational goals are achieved as a logical result.

In describing the democratic leader, EI intimates that leaders must value commitment via the participation of each individual and the individuals' input in the organization's processes. The democratic leader considers and listens to both the good and the bad news, assigning equal value to each. Difficulty for the democratic leader lies in the skill of listening. Listening is a key component of the democratic leader style, but too much listening and not enough action can damage the leader's credibility once a decision point is reached. Typically used to gain buy-in and when simple inputs are needed, the democratic leader style has a positive impact on the climate, as individuals feel valued when listened to.¹⁰⁷ As with other styles, the democratic leader style requires

¹⁰⁵ Goleman, *Leadership*, loc. 377–380.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.* See also Goleman, *Working with Emotional Intelligence*.

judicious use; it should be used in moderation, only when appropriate. This fits the flexibility needed in the homeland security disciplines.

A third style relevant to the HSE, that of the commanding leader, expects adherence to rules and compliance to directions given, but not blind agreement. Overuse of this style in broad situations, however, results in negative outcomes and diminishes the effectiveness of the individual and the organization. Goleman labels the commanding leader as an individual who reduces fears and gives clear direction as a result of individual authority for command. Relative to the emerging or crisis situations often encountered by first responders, the commanding style has its purpose and place. Its shortcoming is when it is used in inappropriate situations or at inappropriate times along the peacemaking to war craft continuum. According to Goleman, the individual leveraging the style is viewed as distant and perhaps void of a democratic style; at times, however, the commanding leader style may be more appropriate than the democratic style. As Goleman explained, “Even if a leader has a strong vision, the democratic style works well to generate fresh ideas for executing that vision. The democratic style, of course, makes much less sense when employees are not competent or informed enough to offer sound advice. And it almost goes without saying that building consensus is wrongheaded in times of crisis.”¹⁰⁸ The commanding style is best used in times of crisis or when individuals are struggling to achieve results. Because this style degrades the relational connection between leader and follower and erodes the humanistic view of the leader, it is best used sparingly and only during appropriate incidents.

With EI styles in mind, a synthetic and flowing model of leadership may enhance the dynamic and distinct disciplines in the HSE, in which a single style will not resonate with all situations, disciplines, or individuals. The incidents that face the homeland security practitioner are as varied as the human beings that make up the organizations charged with carrying out the work to secure our nation, and therefore a multitude of approaches provide enriched potential.

¹⁰⁸ Goleman, *Leadership*, loc. 754–757. See also Goleman, *Working with Emotional Intelligence*.

C. FIVE PRACTICES OF EXEMPLARY LEADERSHIP MODEL

If we argue that conceptual models are useful for the development of leaders, and that a single style degrades effectiveness, then examining a model that distinguishes observable behaviors is useful. Kouzes and Posner set out to scrutinize which behaviors, when used, produce a personal best effect for individuals.¹⁰⁹ What surfaced from the research was a validated survey finding that five core behaviors, when used as practices, exposed the effectiveness of leaders and the response and action of followers. The Five Practices of Exemplary Leadership Model proposes that the engagement, level of commitment, and satisfaction of those who follow is enhanced when the following practices are carried out: model the way, inspire a shared vision, challenge the process, enable others to act, and encourage the heart.¹¹⁰

The first of the five practices, to “model the way,” suggests that effective leaders remain congruent in action and belief. The leader provides a distinct vision between the tasks or functions that the worker is carrying out and the goal to be achieved. In modelling the way, “the leader acts in accordance to principles of treating people so they are able to absorb challenges and remain committed to achieving their goals.”¹¹¹ The importance of the absorption rate is not unique to The Five Practices of Exemplary Leadership—it is visited in adaptive leadership—but the theory requires insight and “relationship between the leader and the follower.”¹¹² In both models, the leader must astutely evaluate the volume and degree of change that an individual can absorb at a given time and in the environmental context. Oversaturating the individual in the areas of challenges is a dangerous pitfall for the leader to evaluate and avoid.

The practice of exemplary leadership encourages the individual to arouse others. This assertion places much of the source of motivation and energy on the leader. “Inspire a shared vision,” as titled by Kouzes and Posner, appeals to the leader to “create a

¹⁰⁹ James Kouzes and Barry Posner, *The Leadership Challenge* (San Francisco: Wiley, 2002), 13.

¹¹⁰ Kouzes and Posner, *Five Practices*, loc. 2. See also Kouzes and Posner, *The Leadership Challenge*.

¹¹¹ Kouzes and Posner, *Five Practices*, loc. 60–68. See also Kouzes and Posner, *The Leadership Challenge*.

¹¹² Kouzes and Posner, *Five Practices*, loc. 60–68. See also Kouzes and Posner, *The Leadership Challenge*.

compelling concept of an outcome.”¹¹³ The energizing effects on the environment emit from the positive behaviors of the leader. This practice may be performed in the creation of a strategy, mission, or rallying cry for what the team will accomplish.

Encouraging and enabling individuals to confront shortcomings is central to the growth and success suggested in the third practice; “Challenge the process urges the questioning of the current situation of a project, goal, or the organization.”¹¹⁴ When creating an environment that supports active questioning based on growth, the active and passive experimentation and creative processes must be rooted in trust. In this practice, the leader shares the disposition to ask and answer questions, and the daring to seek new methods to achieve the group’s collective outcome.

The reciprocal energy that flows in the form of empowerment creates a space for what Kouzes and Posner describe as the “social process of ‘power-with’ instead of ‘power over.’”¹¹⁵ Titled, “enable others to act,” this fourth practice recommends that the leader advocate for the shared success of achievement. The group then achieves high trust and cohesion. The evidence that this practice is occurring lies in the movement from singular to plural in the group’s language, behavior, and celebration of success.

The final of the five practices in Kouzes and Posner’s model is for exemplary leaders to “encourage the heart” of individuals and teams. The leader must commit to consistently commending the accomplishments of milestones and objectives. By encouraging the heart, the leader provides external motivation for the individual and the team, engaging them in the shared achievement of goals.

Kouzes and Posner provided an alternative to the traditional leadership framework, often described as command and control, this is currently applied in HSE disciplines. The five practices help construct a model that creates synergy between the leader and follower. These exemplary leadership practices propose a model that

¹¹³ Kouzes and Posner, *Five Practices*, loc. 76–87. See also Kouzes and Posner, *The Leadership Challenge*, 15

¹¹⁴ Kouzes and Posner, *The Leadership Challenge*, 16–17.

¹¹⁵ Kouzes and Posner, *Five Practices*, loc. 133–123. See also Kouzes and Posner, *The Leadership Challenge*, 18

discreetly incorporates traditionally masculine and feminine leadership norms in a set of observable practices. The five practices are considered for inclusion in the synthetic model presented in Chapter V for use at all levels and disciplines in homeland security.

D. COMPLEX ADAPTIVE LEADERSHIP

Obelinsky argues that leadership approaches are aligned with the Taoist symbol of yin yang, in which opposites exist to support each other in a complementary dynamic rather than as two antagonistic, separate and static groups.¹¹⁶ Obelinsky associates his theory of complex adaptive leadership (CAL) and further offers that yin is a line to a traditional construct of feminine traits, while yang is associated with a construct of masculine traits.¹¹⁷ The CAL theory is vital to the HSE as it signals an overt statement of masculine and feminine norms with space for both in a single framework.

CAL provides a lens through which to convert the perspective from examining the individual to exploring the group. Oligarchy and polygarchy as opposing philosophies provide a frame in which to view CAL. Oligarchy simply means that a small group of individuals have control over the larger group or organization. Polygarchy, often seen in the political realm as merged with democracy, is leadership of the many by the many.¹¹⁸ While diverging from the central line of inquiry, the acknowledgement of oligarchy and polygarchy as theories on which to shift toward a broader method of scrutinizing leadership is helpful in laying the foundation for the proposed conceptual model.

CAL is more than mere technique; its substance and value is decentralized and distributive in nature. In the various disciplines that comprise the HSE, the range of complex incidents handled by specialists varies substantially. From planned or anticipated to unforeseen and emerging, the incidents that fall under the purview of the

¹¹⁶ Obolensky, *Complex Adaptive Leadership*.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Merriam-Webster defines oligarchy as a country, business, etc., that is controlled by a small group of people and defines polyarchy as government by many persons: "control of especially political leaders by their followers." For the purpose of this paper, the term polyarchy is used to express the dynamic nature of leadership by many and an interactive process of influence to transform the balance of power from individual to group. Understanding the distinction is essential to understanding the plurality of the leadership model suggested.

HSE disciplines have high stakes and high-scrutiny scenes in which the decentralized CAL hierarchy model thrives. The CAL model's output is rooted in its agility and ability to succeed with fewer on-scene managers, and reduced bureaucracy. Obelinsky characterizes CAL as more of a shared approach to leadership, in which followers and leaders engage in decision making, rather than a single figure making decisions in calm and chaos.¹¹⁹ Obelinsky also asserts that CAL is rooted in neuro-scientific research and demands a different, perhaps deeper-thinking individual at its leadership reigns.

E. ADAPTIVE LEADERSHIP

The environment of homeland security is dynamic and complex in its mission, consequence, and resolution. In some circumstances, the situation allows for contemplation and methodical approaches, while other situations are time pressured and have high stakes. To create a synthetic model of leadership that not only allows for, but also emphasizes the necessity for an alternate perspective and encourages alternate approaches, adaptive leadership proves insightful. Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky explain that “adaptive leadership would build a culture that values diverse views and relies less on central planning and the genius of the few at the top, where the odds of adaptive success go down.”¹²⁰ To be adaptive suggests that a leader recognizes the complex and dynamic environment and adjusts accordingly for greater achievement.

Considering adaptive leadership as a framework first requires an understanding of the “shared language” used for conceptual thinking, Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky suggest that adaptation as applied to adaptive leadership is akin to what is modeled in nature. The metaphor of adaptation serves as the groundwork for examining an organism in nature as an organization:

The concept of thriving is drawn from evolutionary biology, in which a successful adaptation has three characteristics: 1. It preserves the DNA essential for the species' continued survival (What DNA are we going to keep); 2. It discards (regulates or rearranges) the DNA that no longer serves the species' current needs; and it creates DNA arrangements that

¹¹⁹ Obolensky, *Complex Adaptive Leadership*.

¹²⁰ Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky, *The Practice of Adaptive Leadership*, 16.

give the species' the ability to flourish in new ways and in more challenging environments. Successful adaptations enable a living system to take the best from its history into the future.¹²¹

To be adaptive, an organization must conserve some, discard some, and advance into a better version of the previously known organism. Before engaging in the difficult work that adaptive leadership requires, organizations must be able and willing to withstand the imbalance that the crafting of new values and methods create. First, the organization must be evaluated for its adaptive capacity.

Adaptive capacity is “the resilience of people and the capacity of systems to engage in problem-defining and problem-solving work in the midst of adaptive pressures and the resulting disequilibrium.”¹²² The key characteristics of an adaptive organization according to Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky are:

1. Elephants in the room are named.
2. Responsibility for the organization's future is shared.
3. Independent judgment is expected.
4. Leadership capacity is developed.
5. Reflection and continuous learning are institutionalized.¹²³

Rather than a single-minded focus on a set of individual traits or attributes, adaptive leadership concentrates on the shift from self, to self in relation to others in order to “mobilize adaptive work.”¹²⁴ Part of the shift involves leaders who move from what Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky call “carrying the water”; closely related to heroic leadership, “carrying the water” is when the leader “does the work of others that they should do for themselves.”¹²⁵ “Giving the work back” implies that the person in authority does not take responsibility for completing the work or shouldering the obligation of solving problems, but empowers others with their portion of the adaptive effort. The

¹²¹ Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky, *The Practice of Adaptive Leadership*, 14.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 303.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 101.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 109.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 304.

practice of leadership in effecting adaptive change demands leaders who recognize their roles in relation to others to encourage distributed work rather than a “leap to action” by the leader in response to individuals engaging in “work avoidance.”

Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky suggest that distinguishing technical problems from adaptive challenges lies at the heart of imagining and exercising adaptive leadership.¹²⁶ Adaptive leadership is a philosophical approach and is a learned skill for which practice and courage are necessary. Technical problems “have known solutions that can be implemented by current know-how.”¹²⁷ Adaptive challenges are far more difficult to solve and require leadership rather than sole authority, largely because of the connective influence needed to effect such deep change. Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky explain that “adaptive challenges can only be addressed through changes in people’s priorities, beliefs, habits, and loyalties. Making progress requires going beyond any authoritative expertise to mobilize discovery, shedding certain entrenched ways, tolerating losses, and generating new capacity to thrive anew.”¹²⁸ The ability to diagnose the type of issue is an essential skill for those who are crafting H.S. V.2; they must be able to apply known solutions to technical problems, and must be mobilized to tackle the adaptive work necessary to meet the challenges before them.

F. SUMMARY

The collection of existing models provides a basis on which to construct a conceptual leadership model for the HSE. The distinctive makeup of homeland security requires a conceptual model that transforms as readily as the environment in which it is applied. Further, the concepts of learning and self-evaluation contained in existing models provide a connection across the models. Leveraging the key components of the existing models provides a glimpse into the composition of the conceptual model designed and described in the next chapter.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 19.

¹²⁸ Ibid. See also Ronald Heifetz, and Marty Linsky, *Leadership on the Line: Staying Alive through the Dangers of Leading* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2002).

V. A CONCEPTUAL LEADERSHIP MODEL FOR DIVERSE THINKING

Reformers have the idea that change can be achieved by brute sanity.

—George Bernard Shaw

Flaws have been exposed in thousands of AARs, and select failures were called out in a previous chapter of this thesis. The conceptual model proposed in this chapter does not aim to wholly fix the flaws previously presented; rather, it suggests that thinking about leadership in new ways may add mitigating approaches to the problems we face. The model suggests a shift in the appreciation for diverse people representing diverse perspectives as we approach complex and elusive answers to problems. We are at a place where rigid structures may hamper how we address the threats that we face and the missions that we strive to achieve. We have learned that similarities exist in the military and homeland security, but the ongoing domestic nature of the HSE demands consideration of an additional model to bolster the community. This thesis offers an additional leadership model that encourages diversity and pluralism to synchronize effort for better decision making.

Leadership is not about the singular. Quite the opposite, as the conceptual model endeavors to show, is the emphasis on the plural and reciprocal nature of leadership. As previously reviewed AARs have exhibited, a challenge for government is loosening the ties to bureaucracy, hierarchy, and centralization that reduce creativity and imagination. As said by Sun Tzu, “A military force has no constant formation, water has no constant shape: the ability to gain victory by changing and adapting according to the opponent is called genius.”¹²⁹ The flexibility necessary to lead in an ever-changing modern world must rely on what has been presented in the past and shaped for a thriving future.

¹²⁹ Sunzi, *The Art of War*, translator Lionel Giles (Amazon, 2012), loc. 252, Kindle edition.

A. A DIFFERENT APPROACH

We have learned that C2 has its place in the first responder community, and the research has shown that an alternative may strengthen the process. As Professor Lesley Prince offered when considering alternatives, “To be free from convention is not to spurn it but not to be deceived by it. It is to be able to use it as an instrument rather than be used by it. This suggests that a willingness to step outside the rules may be an important feature of leadership.”¹³⁰ The intentional practice of openness to alternative approaches and use of differing traits is a central piece to adapting traditional leadership behaviors.

The personality traits and composition of an individual also affects his or her leadership behavior; however, excesses of masculine or feminine traits likely put leaders in a disadvantage in any environment.¹³¹ The findings in this thesis assert that current challenges require members with a variety of approaches to strengthening prevention, planning, and response to threats. The traditional, heroic, and masculine leadership behaviors have utility in the direct action and response in crisis, but single use produces predictable barriers in the environment. Similarly, the cooperative, democratic, communal styles of feminine leadership could lack resonance in times of direct action, but fortify the prevention, planning, and creative functions. The union of “assertive competence with supportive friendliness” and the assertion that a blending and “modulation of their style to meet the demands of their particular leadership roles” has been proven as a strength that women have developed as they learn to lead in masculine environments.¹³²

¹³⁰ Lesley Prince, “Eating the Menu Rather than the Dinner: Tao and Leadership,” *Leadership* 1, no. 1: 119, doi: 10.177/1742715005049355.

¹³¹ Eagly and Carli, *Through the Labyrinth*, 48.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 123.

B. THE TRANSITION

When a newcomer enters an existing culture such as that of the first responder community—or more narrowly, a fusion center¹³³—some adaptation should be expected. Relying on Berry’s framework for acculturation, the four stages of acculturation are assimilation, separation, marginalization, and integration.¹³⁴ The Taoist yin yang symbol and its characteristics consider coexisting leadership doctrine and propose an emerging framework for an ethos beyond Berry’s fourth stage: for the HSE, let us consider a stage five—synchronization. Synchronization does not argue that people are undifferentiated; rather, the distinct components of individual diversity become a greater functioning whole of integration and collaboration.

Berry argued that four clear stages of acculturation occur, and if using his model as one means of making sense of the shift in the HSE, adding the fifth stage called synchronization ties in previously offered concepts. If we accept that once individuals pass through the stages and arrive at integration that their progression takes them to what Maslow considered self-actualization, then synchronization is the final stage of advancement. Harmony of action is realized when appreciation is afforded to the seemingly opposing traits.

C. WHAT THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL OFFERS

The conceptual model combines elements from existing models to propose a new framework, which proposes movement from the singular to the collective, and from sole appreciation of masculine or feminine leadership traits. The conceptual model proposed acknowledges the varieties of leadership as identified by Hersey and Blanchard and Goleman, then expands to include the follower and the evolution toward self-leadership and the paradox of opposing styles. Authenticity and diversity as expressed by the individual are at the center of the model, which touches each of the styles.

¹³³ Per the DHS, “A Fusion Center serves as a focal point within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information between the federal government and state, local, tribal, territorial (SLTT) and private sector partners.” See <http://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers>.

¹³⁴ Febraro, “Gender and Leadership.”

Considered a tool with which the behavior and action of leadership is generated, the conceptual model is largely considered to provide permission to leaders who exercise leadership in ways other than the traditional C2 style. It further encourages collaboration by bringing diversity in its many forms to a problem. The conceptual model can be used by local, state, or federal disciplines that comprise the HSE, and it offers a strengthening of cooperation to those charged with protecting communities. The model further suggests a structure that is vastly different from a hierarchy. Visually and culturally, the model implies an interrelated and continually streaming means of accomplishing the mission.

Accounting for the various lenses of gender and trade discipline diversity, leaders must be preconditioned to use a synthetic, agile, and suitable model based on the topography of their environment and the people in the environment. The creation of “reciprocity of purpose” is central to the fundamental connection necessary to create the leadership needed and to fulfill individual disciplines’ missions for the greater mission.¹³⁵ The difficulties in leadership given the unique texture of homeland security are smoothed with the use of a conceptual model in which seemingly opposing traits, principles, and actions actually serve to strengthen each other, and a clear allowance of other views and perspectives are drawn in and rewarded.

Consideration for a transformed HSE builds on the shortcomings of HS V.1 through inspection of the social narrative, content of specific AARs, and literature considered important for understanding leadership behaviors, traits, learning, and existing models. The alternative to traditional masculine leadership offers options for those in the complex and dynamic first responder and security fields. In examining HS V.1, the gaps were mostly around the use of a single style when space exists for the use of other styles.

The model provides a visible example of an archetypal leader that is socially constructed to be equally of diverse inputs—masculine traits and behaviors as well as feminine, of varying professional fields, and representing varying first responder domains. The visual model (see Figure 3) also offers that the harmony is not

¹³⁵ Kendall Zoller, Anthony Normore, and Bob Harrison, “Leadership Thinking: A discipline of the Mind for the Effective Law Enforcement Supervisor,” *Journal of Authentic Leadership in Education* 2, no. 4 (March 2013).

overshadowed by the flow of masculine and feminine traits due to the uniqueness of the homeland security environment.

Figure 3. Conceptual Model Graphic



The conceptual model of leadership proposed combines the visual for the yin yang, symbolizing strength through coexisting and complementary opposites, with the proposed added level of synchronicity. It may be more philosophy than practice, but the shift in the authorization for a different style is central to the leadership and cultural evolution in the first responder community, the creation of a new archetype, and potentially an evolved meme of leadership.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

A barrier to acceptance of the conceptual model is that it has intuitive appeal, but lacks the rigor of a field test or academic study. Academic permission to study the consistency of the model and measure its effectiveness is needed to test the theoretical and logical assertions of pliability and applicability across the spectrum of homeland security.

A worthwhile pursuit would be to create leadership development curriculum that illustrates the conceptual model in behavioral terms and delivers the curriculum to first line supervisors. The integration of the conceptual model and the analysis of collaboration and partnership strengthening should be studied for its effectiveness.

E. CONCLUSION

Contemporary leaders face an array of challenges, from external and internal complexities for which they are often asked to be all things to all people. Those who use varied traits to lead and encourage a hybrid model of leadership are the trailblazers for creation of an archetype that is not androgynous or singular, but provides latitude for distinct behaviors along a continuum of masculine to feminine, and values diversity of inputs depending on the condition faced. The strengthened leader is the one who invites a variety of disciplines, approaches, and experiences to contemporary problems. Further, those who use a conceptual model that invites diverse inputs may strengthen decision making in rapidly evolving and complex environments.

The truth of our past is that we have largely protected our nation and our communities from threats, both natural and human, but we have failed in some areas. The truth of our future is that those duty-bound to protect others must evolve commensurate with the uncertainty of circumstances and the interconnected nature of threats faced in the sphere of homeland security. Taylor and Follett started a movement by examining efficiency in the early 20th century and catapulted U.S. production into its place of prestige. In arguing for new models, the leaders of the 21st century must adapt to reshape the culture of leadership in an equally compelling way to secure a place of esteem as the missions are accomplished.

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