A CAUSE FOR CONCERN? THE SPREAD OF MILITANT ISLAM IN EAST AFRICA

by

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December 2015

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This thesis examines the spread of militant Islam in Kenya and Tanzania. We argue that Islamist militants who have gained a foothold in Kenya and are attempting to expand into Tanzania are behind an increasing number of attacks. We contend that spillover effects from the failed state of Somalia, along with influence from other external actors, are as important—if not more important—than other factors that receive the bulk of the attention, such as socioeconomic disparities and the perceived lack of political representation of Muslims. A third under-recognized but critical factor is the burgeoning population of Muslim youth. Ultimately, this thesis seeks to draw attention to the importance of these three factors. It concludes by offering options to counteract the spread of militant Islam in the region.

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<td>Africa Command</td>
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<td>AIAI</td>
<td>al-Ittihad al-Islami</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>AMYC</td>
<td>Ansar Muslim Youth Center</td>
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<td>AQ</td>
<td>al-Qaeda</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>Mombasa Republican Center</td>
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<td>Muslim Youth Center</td>
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<td>NCTC</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>START</td>
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<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Country</td>
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<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<td>TPDF</td>
<td>Tanzanian People’s Defense Forces</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>USSOCOM</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

Even as we deal with crises and challenges in other parts of the world that often dominate our headlines, even as we acknowledge the real hardships that so many Africans face every day, we have to make sure that we’re seizing the extraordinary potential of today’s Africa, which is the youngest and fastest-growing of the continents.

– President Barack Obama

At 5:30 a.m. on April 2, 2015, in Garissa, Kenya, Rashid Charles Mberesero, a Tanzanian national, and Abdirahim Mohamed Abdullahi, a Kenyan national, along with four other attackers assessed to be of Kenyan origin, departed their upscale Garissa hotel. Armed with AK-47s, suicide vests, and grenades, they drove two pickup trucks to the Garissa University where Rashid, Abdirahim, and three other attackers were dropped off at the gate. They immediately killed two unarmed guards and made their way to the hostels filled with students. Their plan, to kill as many Christians as possible, had been months in the making and had just entered its final stages.

Months earlier, the attackers had conducted a thorough casing of the university, reportedly even attending the university’s mosque to gain intimate knowledge of its layout and schedule.1 This reconnaissance completed, the scouts returned to Jubaland, Somalia, which shares a border with Kenya, and finalized their planning and conducted rehearsals.2 Not wanting to raise suspicion, the attackers then infiltrated back into Kenya using a well-traveled route through the Lag Badana Bushbush National Park, close to the

2 Ibid.
Dadaab refugee camp. Their aim was to blend in with the normal flow of refugees into Kenya.³

At Garissa University, the attackers moved from hostel to hostel. The siege endured for over 15 hours before Kenyan security forces successfully subdued the attackers, killing five, including Abdirahim. Before it was all over, 144 students were killed and another 79 injured.⁴ Almost all of the victims were Christians. And, in keeping with the *modus operandi* of the al-Shabaab attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in 2013, the attackers reportedly specifically sought out Christians, separating them from Muslims by asking religious questions or requiring passages to be cited from the Koran.⁵ The Christians were then systematically executed. Eight hours after the siege had reportedly ended, Rashid Charles Mberesero of Tanzania was finally captured, found hidden in the ceiling of a building and still holding onto explosives. His capture would be followed by the arrest of accessories who had supported the six attackers with logistics as they attempted to flee back to Somalia.

Those writing about terrorism in East Africa today consistently point to Muslims’ lack of political representation and socioeconomic disparity as the main drivers of militant Islam. Although it is true that these factors can be found within many East African countries, current explanations fail to fully account for why militant Islam continues to grow in the region.⁶ After all, similar conditions are found across much of Africa.

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⁵ Adow and Mathenge, “Attackers Slept in Garissa Hotel.”
⁶ For this thesis we define the core countries of East Africa as Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. The East African Community includes these three countries as well as Rwanda and Burundi; however, we exclude them in this study.
Information that has been released about the Garissa attackers reveals that both Rashid and Abdirahim fail to fit the profile of being poor, undereducated, politically underrepresented Muslims. In Rashid’s case, his home country of Tanzania has remained neutral in the fight against al-Shabaab and is not participating in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This, too, flies in the face of most explanations about the spread of militant Islam in East Africa. Further, both Rashid and Abdirahim were highly educated, with Rashid having completed technical school with a science background and Abdirahim earning a law degree. Abdirahim was also the son of a prominent Kenyan political official.7 In Kenya, reports have instead highlighted the importance of influence by external actors, especially in Abdirahim’s case. Even his fellow schoolmates noticed his radicalization. A recent article quotes one of Abdirahim’s fellow students as saying, “But it was in the moments after that lecture that they noticed trails of extremism in Abdirahim’s thinking. One student who engaged him afterwards said that he kept talking of death and waging jihad.”8 Abdirahim reportedly attempted to join the Islamic State, but failed to get to Syria and instead opted to join al-Shabaab with two of his high school friends.9

A. WHY MILITANT ISLAM HAS SPREAD IN EAST AFRICA: A REVIEW OF CURRENT ANALYSIS

Thus, far, contemporary explanations have failed to take into account the substantial role external actors have played in the current uptick in militant Islam in East Africa. Historic turmoil and instability in East Africa have served as catalysts for the creation of numerous extremist networks. More recently, external actors attempting to spread more radical forms of Islam, which has often become militant in nature, have exploited this instability. According to David Shinn, “The root causes are numerous and


8 “One of the al-Shabaab Attackers.”

sometimes complex even within a single dispute. They include ethnic, language and cultural differences, arbitrary boundaries, religion, ideology, competition for scarce resources including pasturage and water, unequal sharing of resources controlled by the state, and the sheer desire for power.”

Meanwhile, local factors affecting the spread of militant Islam are often overlooked or misinterpreted by outsiders. This confusion about causation leads to a misdiagnosis, whereby counteraction is taken to treat the symptoms, not the disease (to use a medical analogy).

In addition, much of the literature credits socioeconomic factors for the spread of militant Islam in East Africa. However, disparate socioeconomic factors exist across the continent and have not culminated in terrorist activities everywhere. Culture has also been the focus of academic attention and is sometimes treated as though it transcends all other competing theories for why radicalization expands. Granted, culture affects all aspects of life. But, as Richard Downie and Jennifer Cooke note for ethnicity, “Ethnicity is perhaps the most important form of identity in sub-Saharan Africa… But ethnicity does not tend to be a cause of violence in itself. Instead, as the most common form of self-identification, it is the one that is most commonly manipulated by unscrupulous operators.”

In short, there is no doubt that extremist groups are intimately familiar with these socioeconomic, cultural, and ethnic levers and understand how to manipulate them. But these factors by themselves fail to explain why militant Islam is spreading in East Africa.

While some authors focus on socioeconomic disparity or cultural and ethnic differences, others pay attention to the nature of political representation. The perception is that the Muslims are politically underrepresented in both Kenya and Tanzania. For example, efforts by a Mombasa-based organization on behalf of regional autonomy

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highlight local Muslims’ desire for more political representation along the Swahili coastline.\textsuperscript{13} Similarly, in Tanzania, the continued attempts by Zanzibar to attain autonomy suggest a degree of political alienation and the perception of underrepresentation by Muslims in government.\textsuperscript{14} This perception in Tanzania has historically applied mainly to Zanzibar. But as the mainland Muslim population grows, it appears increasing numbers of Muslims on the mainland also share this view.\textsuperscript{15} Unfortunately, perception overstates reality, and there is relative parity between Christian and Muslim political representation within Tanzania.\textsuperscript{16}

Again, while instances of poor socioeconomic conditions, ethnic tensions, and political underrepresentation can be found in East Africa, they also exist elsewhere in Africa and throughout the developing world. Couple this with the fact that regional terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda in East Africa and al-Shabaab, have been substantially reduced in size, and we should wonder why militant Islam not only continues to spread, but is doing so at an increasing rate? Could there be other factors that contribute to the spread of militant Islam in East Africa that remain unaccounted for? Could these factors be at such an early stage of development that their effects are not yet obvious?

B. INCREASINGLY RELEVANT FACTORS

According to Charles Stith, Jeffrey Haynes, and Isaac Kfir, militant Islamic groups are actively seeking methods by which to spread militant Islam throughout the East African region.\textsuperscript{17} Three factors appear particularly significant in relation to the spread of militant Islam in Kenya and Tanzania. First, external actors are responsible for much of the spread of Wahhabi and Salafi ideology. Kfir notes that this is a recent

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\textsuperscript{13} Kennedy Mkutu Agade, (Professor, United States International University-Africa), in discussion with the authors, September 10, 2015.

\textsuperscript{14} Augustine Philip Mahiga, (Former Tanzanian Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) and UN Special Representative to Somalia), in discussion with the authors, September 7, 2015.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.


development—within the last 30 years—in a region that has long-standing historical ties to the Arab world. These historical ties, based on trade, culture, and religion, have been used to new effect by Islamists, jihadists, and others coming from places like Saudi Arabia, Oman, Somalia, Iran, and Sudan. In addition to state sponsors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Islamic charities have also supported the spread of radical ideology and militant Islam.

The second factor contributing to the spread of militant Islam is a growing youth bulge. Studies about the impact of youth bulge on violence have typically centered on the Middle East and North Africa; this is predominantly due to the events of the Arab Spring. However, over the last few years, several reports, to include the most recent U.S. National Military Strategy, have sought to focus more attention on the susceptibility of pools of youth, to include those found in East Africa. Unfortunately, most of the youth bulge data is general, and not specific to Muslim populations in Kenya and Tanzania.

Third, we need to consider the continued negative impact of the failed state of Somalia on the security of Kenya and Tanzania. The spillage of ideology and the flow of fighters and resources between al-Shabaab and associated Muslim organizations in Kenya and Tanzania have acted as a catalyst to the growth of militant Islam beyond just Somalia.

Ultimately, socioeconomic disparity, culture and ethnic issues, and political underrepresentation all contribute the spread of militant Islam, but little evidence suggests they are the cause alone. Instead, the spillover effects from Somalia coupled with the convergence of external actors and a Muslim youth bulge in Kenya and Tanzania more accurately account for the growth of militant Islam in both countries.

C. APPROACH

This thesis utilizes a comparative case study approach. This method was selected in order to focus heavily on detailed, actor-specific evidence to facilitate qualitative analysis. We pay attention to factors such as socioeconomic and political underrepresentation. Our hypothesis is that a combination of external actors, Somalia spillage, and a Muslim youth bulge in East Africa are exacerbating the conditions already identified in the literature with regards to the growth of militant Islam.

Overall, it is apparent that local nuances and unique circumstances play an important role in the spread of militant Islam and cannot be underestimated or assumed away in the quest to explain its spread. This fact came to the forefront during our research, specifically when we traveled in the region and interviewed experts there. Taking local wrinkles into account greatly adds to the complexity of the issue and underscores a major theme in this thesis: it is impossible to isolate a single or even a few variables to accurately account for the causal linkages behind the spread of militant Islam in East Africa.

Our examination of the relevant literature has been augmented by travel and interviews with regional and local experts in both Kenya and Tanzania. We have drawn on accounts published by the Open Source Center, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, RAND Corporation, National Counterterrorism Center, Pew Research Center, University of Maryland Global Terrorism Database, Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel at West Point, Institute for Security Studies, The Economist and Economist Intelligence Unit, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Foreign Service Journal, Congressional Research Service, United States Agency for International
Development, and various United Nations Organizations.\textsuperscript{21} Finally, we have also drawn on personal experience and our first-hand familiarity with the region.

Kenya and Tanzania were chosen because both locations share a set of conditions but, conversely, also exhibit interesting differences. Similarities include demographics, socioeconomic conditions, culture (to include religion), a growing Muslim population, and high levels of influence from a diverse set of external actors. As for differences, these include the nature and arrangement of domestic politics, each country’s historical ties to the Arabian Peninsula, varying national policies regarding counterterrorism strategy, and geographic proximity (or not) to Somalia.

We begin in Kenya with a select set of terrorist incidents that have been chosen to highlight spillover effects from a failed Somalia, the importance of external actors, and the convergence of these two factors with a growing Muslim youth bulge. We provide a brief overview of each attack and background significant to the event. We then provided a brief analysis for each attack. We follow the same template in the Tanzania case study. We then move to a case comparison in Chapter IV. Finally, our conclusion summarizes the findings of this thesis and provides recommendations for addressing the factors we examine.

\textsuperscript{21} As a Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence, the University of Maryland manages the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) project and Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD is an open-source database, which include information on terrorist events around the world from 1970 through 2014. Unlike many other event databases, the GTD includes systematic data on domestic as well as transnational and international terrorist incidents that have occurred during this time period, and now includes more than 140,000 cases. For each GTD incident, information is available on the date and location of the incident, the weapons used, the nature of the target, the number of casualties, and—when identifiable—the group or individual responsible. Statistical information contained in the Global Terrorism Database is based on reports from a variety of open media sources. Information is not added to the GTD unless and until the sources are determined to be credible.
II. KENYA

A. INTRODUCTION

David Shinn writes, “There are three kinds of terrorism in East Africa… These are acts perpetrated by organizations based outside the region, those by an organization within the region but aimed at a neighboring country, and those instigated by an internal insurgent group against authority in a single country.” Currently, Kenya is facing all three types of terrorism. What follows is a review of four events involving militant Islam in Kenya with a focus on the impact by external actors and by a Muslim youth bulge within the context of each case. The first event is the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing which highlights the first real penetration of Kenya by a militant Islamist group: al-Qaeda. The second event centers on the Westgate Mall attack. It highlights a diverse set of external factors affecting militant Islam in Kenya including AMISOM, al-Shabaab, and U.S. policies. The third event takes us back to the Garissa University attack presented in the thesis’s introduction. Finally, we consider the role of the Mombasa Republic Council to highlight how domestic policies have affected the growth of militant Islam in Kenya. Our aim in each instance is to draw attention to how external actors exploit conditions among an ever-growing Muslim population.


a. Event

The 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi is often cited as the first attack in Kenya by an externally based, modern-era Islamic terrorist group. On the morning of August 7, 1998, a Nissan Atlas truck carrying two Saudi members of al-Qaeda in East Africa, Mohammed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali and Jihad Mohammed Ali, drove into the U.S. Embassy parking lot in downtown Nairobi. The truck was packed with a vehicle-

23 See Appendix C for full details on age distribution in Kenya and Appendix B for Pew research projection of Muslim population growth in Kenya.
borne explosive device that was detonated by the driver, Ali. Upon initiation of the trigger, an enormous explosion shattered much of the U.S. Embassy and collapsed a neighboring building (see Figure 1). Overall, the bombings in Kenya claimed more than 213 lives and injured an estimated 4,000 people.25

Figure 1. 1998 U.S. Embassy Bombing, Nairobi, Kenya

Responsibility for this attack and a nearly simultaneous bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania was immediately claimed by al-Qaeda in East Africa. The Nairobi attack was planned and executed by more than seventeen terrorists from throughout East Africa and the Middle East. Accessories hailed from countries such as Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Tanzania. This bombing was complex in nature, and consisted of in-depth planning efforts originating in Nairobi. The Nairobi cell coordinated with other terrorist cells in Tanzania in order to synchronize their efforts. Al-Qaeda had been operating in Kenya for quite some time, with some reports indicating it

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was active as early as 1993. Additionally, the Embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania were specifically planned to be executed on the eighth anniversary of the U.S. military’s arrival in Saudi Arabia for Operation Desert Storm.

b. **Background**

Al-Qaeda’s original interest in Kenya was to establish safe houses while using the country as a “jumping-off point” for terrorist activities in the region. The U.S. Embassy in Nairobi then became a target. Central to the selection of the U.S. Embassy was the desire by Osama Bin Laden to attack Western countries, specifically the United States, as part of his greater jihad. Bin Laden considered the United States an adversary based on its military intervention in the Middle East and Somalia.

In 1991, the United States’ central role in Operation Desert Storm placed it squarely in al-Qaeda’s crosshairs. This event and the resulting occupation of Muslim lands by American forces have provided a rallying cry for Islamist terrorists to this day. In 1992, Bin Laden relocated to Sudan following his exile from Saudi Arabia for his dissension from the Saudi government. Bin Laden’s presence in Sudan was critical to the rise of al-Qaeda’s presence in Africa and underscored the importance of the region to the greater-global jihad from the earliest years of the organization’s existence. It was during this time in Sudan that Bin Laden was able to partner Al-Qaeda in East Africa (AQEA) with existing radical Islamist militants in the region. This specifically included the Somalia-based groups, al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) and later the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and its militant wing, al-Shabaab.

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28 Ibid.

Also in 1992, the United States deployed military forces to Somalia in support of the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM).30 This Western intervention further cemented Bin Laden’s hatred of the United States, and ultimately led to his decision to send al-Qaeda trainers to Somalia to strengthen local militias opposed to these external forces.31 It was during the infamous Battle of Mogadishu, better known as Blackhawk Down, that al-Qaeda personnel are said to have engaged in direct combat against United States military forces for the first time.32 This event, and the resulting death of 18 elite U.S. Soldiers, solidified AQEA’s presence in Somalia.

AQEA continued to thrive in Somalia and soon expanded its operations into Kenya, where it found favorable conditions. Following the 1998 Embassy bombing, more than 350 additional terrorist attacks were executed in Kenya, with the preponderance of them being attributed to terrorism perpetrated by Islamic militants.33 Even though select Kenyan Muslims played a supporting role in the 1998 Embassy bombing, this was clearly a terrorist attack sponsored by an external actor. Al-Qaeda was able to use this event as propaganda to attract attention to its cause, laying the foundation for future terrorist events.

The 1998 Embassy bombing does raise the question of how such a significant number of al-Qaeda personnel established a foothold in Kenya. During its post-attack inquiry, the United States’ Federal Bureau of Investigation found that many of the

30 In November 1992, the United States offered to support UNOSOM in its delivery of humanitarian assistance. The United Nations Security Council accepted the offer and developed the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), which was made up of 37,000 forces from 24 countries. This task force was authorized the use of “all necessary means” to establish a secure environment for the relief effort. In March of 1993, the United Nations Security Council transitioned UNITAF operations to a new peacekeeping operation, UNOSOM II. For more details see: “Somalia – UNOSOM I: Background,” United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unsom1backgr1.html.


32 Smith, “Inside the Terror Network: Al Qaeda—Background.”

members had arrived in Kenya under the pretense of working for Kenya-based NGOs.\textsuperscript{34} In actuality, these organizations were created by al-Qaeda and were only a front for smuggling in resources to be used to execute terrorism.

The importance of NGOs that has contributed to the spread of militant Islam is yet another external factor in Kenya and East Africa writ large. Multiple examples exist of NGOs being used as conduits to influence the environment in Kenya. For instance, the Saudi Arabian government used this method of deploying NGOs to introduce a stricter, more Wahhabist, interpretation of Islam.\textsuperscript{35} David McCormack found that Saudi Arabia’s methods include “the funding of mosques, Islamic centers and madrassas; the facilitation of travel to the Kingdom for purposes of the hajj and educational exchanges; the contribution of humanitarian aid and other charitable work; and the provision of support for “indigenous” Wahhabi organizations.”\textsuperscript{36} Two such organizations are the Muslim World League and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, which, according to the Pew Research Center, “remain rooted in a very particular religious worldview—Saudi Wahhabism.”\textsuperscript{37} These are only two of a number of intentionally camouflaged organizations operating in Kenya.

Al-Qaeda’s decision to use Kenya as a location from which to launch a terrorist attack was not random. Kenya was picked for explicit reasons; one of the more important is its proximity to Somalia. Jeffrey Haynes points to Somalia as the entry point for militant Islam in East Africa.\textsuperscript{38} The collapse of Somalia in the early 1990s created a

\textsuperscript{34} “The Trail of Evidence: FBI Executive Summary,” Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), November 18, 1998, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/bombings/summary.html. This is a declassified executive summary of the findings of the FBI investigation into the embassy bombings as of November 18, 1998. The report was distributed to law enforcement agencies in Kenya, Tanzania, and other countries to assist in their investigations and includes identifying information about the suspects. The full report remains classified.


\textsuperscript{38} Haynes, “Islamic Militancy in East Africa,” 1322.
lawless safe haven for terrorist actors who were then able to use the country for recruitment, training, and planning of terrorist activities. Extremists then exported their radical ideology into Kenya through a porous border inhabited by ethnic Somalis and other practicing Muslims. Existing social, religious, and clan ties coupled with poverty, unemployment, and rapid population growth allowed the militant ideology developed in Somalia to quickly expand south into Kenya.\textsuperscript{39} Not surprisingly, Samuel Huntington identifies the area from Somalia southward along the Swahili Coast as a potential fault line for violence (see Figure 2). According to Huntington, “Adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilization struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and each other … and [to] competitively promote their particular political and religious values.”\textsuperscript{40} We would content that this is precisely what allowed AQEA to gain access to the East Africa region. This fault line remains active today, especially as violence spills over from Somalia, and trickles down the Swahili coastline, and taking root in Kenya.


\textsuperscript{40} Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, (Summer 1993): 29.
c. **Analysis**

One key insight to glean from the Embassy bombing is al-Qaeda’s growing interest in Kenya. It is important to recognize that Osama Bin Laden’s resentment of Western powers can be traced back to the events in the Middle East in 1991. However, the collapse of Somalia provided al-Qaeda the opportunity to establish a foothold in an ungoverned area. Somalia also provided the opportunity for al-Qaeda to actively attack Western military forces during UNOSOM. This foothold and resulting expansion from Somalia down the Swahili coast into Kenya should have been anticipated. Another factor noticeable in the 1998 bombings is the increase in external Islamist actors. These actors were able to take advantage of existing social, political, and religious divides.

2. September 21, 2013: Westgate Mall, Nairobi, Kenya

   a. Event

   In 2013, al-Shabaab executed its most calamitous attack outside of Somalia when it assaulted a major shopping center in Nairobi. The attack was launched by at least four Muslim youths originating from Sudan, Kenya, and Somalia. The assailants began by throwing hand grenades into a crowded outdoor food court and then assaulting the parking deck and interior shopping areas with automatic rifles. Upon entering the expansive mall, the militants systematically worked their way back into a crowded grocery store where many shoppers had fled upon hearing the initial gunfire. Approximately ninety-six hours later, the siege ended as the Kenyan military and police forces finally cleared the charred remains of the building (see Figure 3). The attack killed close to seventy patrons and attracted global attention. The media coverage was exactly what al-Shabaab was seeking in order to bring increased awareness to their opposition to Kenyan troops in Somalia as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The perpetrators of the attack were all members of al-Shabaab.
b. Background

Al-Shabaab, translated as “The Youth” in Arabic, has existed since at least 2007. This specific use of the Arabic language was adopted by its founders to directly appeal to young Muslim Somalis who were tired of traditional clan-based politics and clan warfare. The origins of al-Shabaab can be traced back to a more politically focused movement, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which formed in 2000 in an attempt to bring order to Somalia following the collapse of the government in 1991 and the ensuing civil war.
during the mid-1990s. The ICU offered clan-based governance under Sharia.\textsuperscript{41} In 2006, it proved able to wrest control of Mogadishu away from local warlords who were backed by the United States.\textsuperscript{42} Following a U.S.-supported invasion by Ethiopian military forces in December 2006, the ICU surrendered control of Mogadishu to the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Following this surrender, the ICU’s militant wing, al-Shabaab, splintered off to continue fighting Ethiopian forces.

In 2008, al-Shabaab successfully expelled the Ethiopian forces from Somalia, bringing much credit to its cause.\textsuperscript{43} However, since 2008, al-Shabaab’s conventional military capabilities have been severely degraded thanks to a surge in military operations carried out by members of AMISOM. Even so, in 2010, the U.S. Department of State warned that, “Al Shabaab poses serious terrorist threats to the United States and U.S. interests in the region,” and that, “Evidence of linkages between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, across the Gulf of Aden in Yemen, highlight another regional dimension of the threat posed by violent extremists in the area.”\textsuperscript{44} In 2012, this linkage was formalized when al-Shabaab formally pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. The announcement of this relationship instantly increased al-Shabaab’s status and legitimacy as a terrorist organization. Since the union, al-Shabaab’s objectives have expanded from Somalia, and recent activities highlight its regional reach.

Currently, AMISOM is combating al-Shabaab inside Somalia. AMISOM is a regional force consisting of military forces from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Uganda.\textsuperscript{45} Small contingents of Western military forces are advising both AMISOM and Somalia’s security forces. Continued pressure from AMISOM forces


\textsuperscript{42}Rabasa, \textit{Radical Islam in East Africa}, 8.


have pushed al-Shabaab out of urban areas and into the Somali countryside. The loss of urban strongholds, such as Baraawe and Kismayo in southern Somalia, has eliminated al-Shabaab’s ability to carry out large-scale military offensives. As such, it has reverted to guerilla-style hit-and-run tactics as its *modus operandi*. Additionally, this has forced al-Shabaab to look elsewhere to conduct terrorist operations. As early as 2007, but particularly since 2011, Kenya has felt the brunt of al-Shabaab’s new tactics. This can be seen not only in the increased number of attacks within Coast and North East Provinces, but in attacks against Kenyan military forces deployed to Jubaland in southern Somalia as well (See Figure 4).  

Figure 4. Al-Shabaab Terrorist Attacks, 2012–2014

Source: Amy Pate, Michael Jensen and Erin Miller, *Al-Shabaab Attack on Garissa University in Kenya* (University of Maryland, Maryland: The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START], April 2015).

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Drilling further down into Kenya, it can be seen that there was a sharp increase in attacks following the 2011 intervention of Kenyan military forces in Somalia (See Figure 5). The majority of these terrorist incidents can be linked to militant Islamic movements, most often al-Shabaab. The effects of these attacks have been felt across the country at both local and state levels. Additionally, there have been regional and international impacts from these militant attacks. Events such as the 2002 attacks in Mombasa* and the siege of the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in 2013 have specifically targeted either Westerners or Western-owned businesses and have had a profoundly detrimental impact on the tourism industry in Kenya. This was evident during our recent travel to Kenya, where the local security posture has been greatly increased at all major tourist locations. This is visible in more armed security forces, additional checkpoints, and roving security patrols.

47 According to the Global Terrorism Database, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania have all had significant increases in terrorist attacks that are directly attributed to militant Islam. These attacks numbers by perpetrator reveal the vast majority having been conducted by al-Shabaab. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2013). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.

*The 2002 attack in Mombasa was synchronized at multiple locations and claimed the lives of 13 people, while wounding 80. The initial attack was launched at the Kikambala Hotel where the terrorist group used small arms, grenades, and a car bomb to attack Israeli tourists who had just checked into the hotel. Almost simultaneously, two SA-7 shoulder fired rockets were fired at a departing Boeing 757 airliner as it took off from Moi International Airport.

Inside Kenya, al-Shabaab has joined with an Eastleigh organization called the Muslim Youth Center (MYC). In 2008, the MYC was founded in the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque in the Nairobi suburb of Eastleigh. Eastleigh, sometimes known as “Little Mogadishu,” is a part of town that has been predominantly ethnic Somali for decades. The MYC provided Kenyan Muslims with the opportunity to informally engage with local religious leaders to discuss social and economic grievances. However, overtime, the organization adopted a more radical ideology as it increased its support of al-Shabaab. West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center determined that as early as 2009, the MYC provided al-Shabaab “with a large potential pool of recruits.” In 2012, the more radical elements of the MYC changed their name to al-Hijra and reportedly became the Kenyan wing of al-Shabaab. According to the United Nations Monitoring Group, al-Hijra

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50 Ibid.
continues to support al-Shabaab through recruitment and fund raising. It is apparently also actively seeking to expand its presence in Kenya, specifically along the Swahili coastline. As mentioned previously, local mosques are being used to spread al-Hijra’s radical version of Islam. Many of these mosques are established and/or funded by external NGOs or others with interests in the region.

The ability for MYC and al-Hijra to recruit is enhanced by bringing in guest speakers from al-Shabaab as well as religious leaders who have local credibility. One well-known cleric is Sheikh Aboud Rogo, who supported the MYC, from the Masjid Musa Mosque in Mombasa until his 2012 assassination by the Kenyan police. Sheik Rogo had clear ties to al-Shabaab and was reported to have spent time in Somalia as a guest of the terrorist organization. Following his death, the MYC issued a statement that Sheik Rogo should be considered, “a shining example of a true and pious Muslim, unwavering and steadfast in his determination to fight injustices against Muslims all over the world.”

In the eyes of some, Kenya’s invasion of Somalia represents one such injustice. In 2007, the Transitional Federal Government, now the Somali Federal Government, and AMISOM forged a status of mission agreement. Initially, AMISOM was constrained to operating only in Mogadishu. However, following Kenya’s invasion of Somalia in 2011, AMISOM was able to expand its area of operations well beyond the capital city. Following Kenya’s official joining of AMISOM in 2012, Kenyan forces successfully expelled al-Shabaab from the southern port town of Kismayo. This city was of considerable importance to al-Shabaab, which used the port to export illegal charcoal, which, in turn, generated a substantial profit.

52 Haynes, “Islamic Militancy in East Africa.”
53 Nzes, “Al-Hijra: Al-Shabab’s Affiliate In Kenya.”
55 Anzalone, “Kenya’s Muslim Youth Center and Al-Shabaab’s East African Recruitment.”
Once in control of Kismayo, Kenya began collecting taxes at the Port of Kismayo and checkpoints around the city.\textsuperscript{56} The Kenyan government has also been quite overt about its desire for a Jubaland buffer state and the relocation of Somali refugee camps in North Eastern Province back into Somalia.\textsuperscript{57} Local Somalis have begun to view the Kenyan military forces as occupiers.\textsuperscript{58} Al-Shabaab then uses this to attract support for attacks against Kenyan forces in Somalia, as well as to legitimize terrorist attacks within Kenya proper, such as the Westgate and Garissa attacks.

c. Analysis

Al-Shabaab did not achieve its current level of prevalence in Kenya overnight; the organization adapted to the existing environment in order to ensure its relevance and permanence. Worth noting is that al-Shabaab has transitioned from engaging in conventional battles with Ethiopia, Kenya, and AMISOM forces in Somalia to more asymmetrical and devastating terrorist attacks, many focused inside Kenya. Kenya, like the other troop-contributing countries to AMISOM, is viewed as an outside entity with self-serving interests in Somalia.\textsuperscript{59} The involvement of the Kenyan government in internal Somalia politics has not gone unremarked by al-Shabaab, and numerous al-Shabaab spokesmen have cited Kenya’s military occupation as the reason for the Westgate Mall attack.

3. April 2, 2015: Garissa University College, Garissa, Kenya

a. Event

In April 2015, at least four members of al-Shabaab assaulted a local college in the northeastern city of Garissa. Three of the attackers were identified as Somali-Kenyans and one was Tanzanian-born. The attack started in the early morning as students were preparing for morning prayer. The assailants went from dormitory to dormitory (see

\textsuperscript{56} Haynes, “Islamic Militancy in East Africa.”
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
Figure 6) seeking Christian students, who were subsequently executed. The perpetrators initially took over 700 people captive, finally killing 147 people identified as Christians.\(^\text{60}\) This horrific attack and the resulting number of casualties make it the most deadly attack in Kenya since the 1998 Embassy bombing.

![Garissa University College Attack Diagram](image)


The separation of Muslims from non-Muslims is an interesting development since most terrorist attacks are indiscriminant. Of particular note is that in the Westgate and Garissa attacks, it was reported that the militants asked that all Muslims present

themselves.61 These individuals were either let go outright or quizzed about Islamic knowledge before being set free. Attention to religion in the midst of the attack sheds light on its purpose and focus.

b. Background

The Garissa attack highlights and exacerbates the growing tension and increased social hostilities among Kenyans. As seen in other places with diverse religious beliefs, Kenya has always experienced some level of hostility based on the practice of various religions. However, the Westgate and Garissa attacks are on a much larger scale than anything seen previously. According to a Pew Research report,

The number of people killed in religion-related terrorist attacks in Kenya has dramatically increased in recent years. According to reports analyzed by the Pew Research Center as part of our ongoing global study of religious restrictions and hostilities, more than 300 people were killed, injured or displaced as a result of religion-related terrorist attacks in Kenya in 2012, more than twice as many as in 2011 and more than a five-fold increase from 2010.62

Pew defines social hostilities as “concrete acts of religious violence ranging from hate crimes to religion-related terrorism and war,” but also includes sectarian and mob violence where the killings are motivated by religion.63 As shown in Figure 7, Kenya is currently seeing almost four times the level of social hostility as is found in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (a total of 48 other countries). This disparity has led more than half of the Kenyan population to view Islamic extremism as a major threat to the country.64 Another, more nuanced indicator that religiously-based violence is increasing is that

63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
some non-Muslims in Kenya are learning the basics of Islam as a method of protection, should they find themselves caught in an event such as Westgate or Garissa.65

Figure 7. Rate of Social Hostilities High in Kenya

The North Eastern Province has experienced the greatest number of terrorist-based attacks, the most significant of which was the Garissa University College incident (See Figure 8). However, instability in this Province can be traced back to Kenya’s

independence in 1963 and to efforts by ethnic Somalis living in the Northern Frontier District to rejoin greater Somalia. The unsuccessful secessionist movement became known as the Shifta War and lasted from 1963 to 1968. This conflict was quite complex in nature and pulled on the strings of existing social and economic ties in both Kenya and Somalia. Decision made in Nairobi to shoot presumed Shifta rebels on sight and to confiscate all Somali-owned cattle exacerbated the situation between Kenya’s ethnic Somalis and the government. The Shifta War also forced the relocation of ethnic Somalis into government owned camps, known as mantayyas. The government’s reactions to unrest in North Eastern Province reverberate today.

Figure 8. Terror attacks in Kenya, by province, 1998–2014


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67 Ibid., 112.
Adding to the chronically tense relations in North Eastern Province are the existence of the world’s largest refugee camps located in Dadaab, just outside of the city of Garissa. These refugee camps have existed for close to 20 years and are managed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The camps house approximately 350,000 people, effectively making this location one of Kenya’s largest cities. The camps were established following the collapse of the Somali government in the early 1990s, and have come to serve as permanent residences for the Somalis who are unable, or unwilling, to return to Somalia. Refugee camps along the Somali border, such as those in Dadaab, present a security concern because of the potential to introduce external elements into Kenya. Groups, such as al-Shabaab, have been known to cross over the porous Somali border and enter the camps to recruit and collect support.68

As Human Rights Watch has found, extremist recruitment often relies on:

Deceptive practices, promising exorbitant pay and claiming that the force has United Nations and other international backing. They have urged teenage refugees to lie about their ages and to join without informing their families. Former recruits say that their cell phones were taken from them before they were transported to the training center.69

Moreover, in places such as Dadaab, young people are faced with very few options for their future. The World Bank found that North Eastern Province has the highest level of unemployment in Kenya, with approximately 55% of youth (15-29) unable to find work.70 Based on the population in the camps at Dadaab, this equates to over 15,000 unemployed youth in the 15 to 29-year-old age range. This lack of opportunity along with deceptive recruitment practices used by terrorist organization has the potential to push young people to join al-Shabaab. Meanwhile, as security continues to improve in Somalia, some refugees are returning home. In 2014, Kenya successfully established a

pilot program to aid in the relocation of Dadaab residents back to their home cities in Somalia. As of August 2015, 2,969 Somali refugees have been repatriated.\footnote{United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “116 Somali Refugees from Kenya Land in Mogadishu, Spearheading New Phase of Voluntary Repatriation,” August 5, 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/55c1fadd9.html.}

Similar to overcrowding found at refugee camps, urban areas are also of particular concern. As seen with Dadaab, if densely populated areas are not properly monitored, they offer extremist organizations a large pool of marginalized young people to radicalize and influence. \textit{The Economist} determined that “Half of all Africans are under 20, and are rapidly moving to cities: more than 40\% of Africans now live in urban areas.”\footnote{The Economist Intelligence Unit, “Africa Cities Rising: Forecasting Data and Analysis from the EIU,” \textit{The Economist}, 2012, http://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=africacities2012.} This movement from historically rural, tribally based communities poses numerous challenges. Nairobi faces the greatest increase in urbanization, but other cities are rapidly growing as well.\footnote{National Council for Population and Development, \textit{Kenya Population Situation Analysis} (Nairobi, Kenya: Government of Kenya, 2013), 199.} Smaller regions lack the required resources to support rapid growth in population. Specific problems include a lack of housing, high levels of unemployment, high levels of poverty, and food insecurity.

External actors all too often easily seize on the combination of factors that are present in both refugee camps and quickly growing urban areas, and help explain why Muslims who do not fit the terrorist stereotype of being poor and marginalized are becoming radicalized and turning to militant Islam. One such example is Abdirahim Mohamed Abdullahi, the Kenyan lawyer who joined al-Shabaab and was one of the attackers killed at the Garissa University attack. Abdullahi’s background fails to fit the stereotype often associated with what is typical of militant Islamists in East Africa. Instead of being driven to this attack by a lack of education, economic opportunity, or political representation, it appears that Abdirahim was heavily influenced and radicalized by external actors such as al-Shabaab and the Islamic State. Specifically, media suggested
that the mastermind of the Garissa attack, Mohamed Kuno, was highly influential in Abdullahi’s recruitment and radicalization.\textsuperscript{74} A Kenyan news outlet also reported,

The Daily Nation said a security briefing identifies Mohamed Kuno as a former teacher and principal at Madrasa Najah in Garissa. He worked there from 1997–2000, according to AllAfrica.com. He also worked for the Al Haramain Foundation between 1993 and 1995, when he was known as Sheikh Mahamad Afte, according to the website.\textsuperscript{75}

Kuno is now reported to be the al-Shabaab commander for Jubaland Somalia, and responsible for all al-Shabaab operations carried out in Kenya. His background as a principal, as well as his employment working for an Islamic NGO, supports the premise that targeting youth is a tactic purposely used to spread militant Islam within Kenya.

Finally, the increased level of religiously-based violence has prompted various responses from the Kenyan government. One reaction has been an increase in policing actions based on demographics. Both Kenyan-Somalis and ethnic Somalis living in Kenya have viewed this as profiling. The police response has also often been heavy-handed and, as described by Muhyadin Roble, is “marred by a lack of strategic goals and priorities as well as accusations of harassment, extortion and various other abuses.”\textsuperscript{76} For example, in April 2014, Kenyan local police forces moved into Somali neighborhoods in Nairobi and rounded up ethnic Somalis for questioning following a grenade attack at a Nairobi bus stop on April 2. At one point, over 4,000 ethnic Somalis were moved to the Safaricom football stadium in Nairobi to be questioned about this attack, as well as an explosion that had occurred two months prior.

Although Eastleigh has been in the spotlight following the Westgate attack, the government cracked down again following the Garissa University attack. In this case, a

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\textsuperscript{76} Muhyadin Ahmen Roble, “Al-Shabaab Exploits Kenyan Crackdown to Recruit Muslim Youth,” Jamestown Foundation: \textit{Terrorism Monitor}, 12, no. 11 (May 30, 2014), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42442&cHash=9e01e4f269d3c5a5e26cc0e4ac437be3#.VkpV6oRxtUR.
number of Kenyan-Somalis and ethnic Somalis were arrested, and a local Somali-owned money transfer system was shut down, bringing the financial activities of Somali-owned businesses to a halt.\textsuperscript{77}

c. Analysis

This latest attack in Kenya highlights the ongoing predicaments confronted by the Kenyan government. Unfortunately, its chosen response appears to be to increase profiling of Muslims and ethnic Somalis. Following both the Westgate Mall and Garissa University attacks, the intensity of policing actions increased across Kenya. The unintended effect may be to push more youth to join extremist organizations, rather than the reverse.\textsuperscript{78}

4. October 15, 2012: Kwale, Kenya

a. Event

On October 15, 2012, just hours after a shootout with police and the arrest of Omar Mwamnuadzi, a local government official, Salim Changu, was found hacked to death at his house in Kombani, Kenya. The perpetrators of the attack were believed to be supporters of the Mombasa Republican Council, an organization based in Mombasa just 25 miles to the north of Kombani. Local officials hinted that this was a revenge killing and Changu was targeted because he provided information that led to the arrest of Mwamnuadzi.


\textsuperscript{78} “In October 2012, the Prevention of Terrorism Act was passed. This law prescribes stiff punishments for people engaged in terrorist attacks, planning, recruiting, or other activities…These counterterrorism actions, or the perceptions that they have created, have had the unintended consequence of exacerbating preexisting grievances and social cleavages. They have deepened an attitude of mistrust and have possibly had the opposite of their desired effect by further radicalizing aggrieved segments of the population. The International Crisis Group argues that while the threat posed by groups such as al-Shabaab is real, overreaction and human rights abuses by police and other security actors may be counterproductive.” As presented by Patterson in “Islamic Radicalization in Kenya.”
b. Background

Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are not the only extremist groups operating in Kenya. Other groups with an enduring presence have also conducted religiously-based attacks. One of these is the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) which has existed since 1999. This Coast Province-based group is mainly Muslim. Although not as violent or widespread as al-Shabaab, the MRC has gained traction along the Swahili coast given political and economic grievances. Since 2008, the group has used violent protests to try to achieve its goal of seceding from Kenya. In the summer of 2014 alone, the MRC was accused of killing 87 people. Many of its attacks occurred at Western tourist locations, which have become common targets of terrorist groups in Kenya. In October of the same year, Kenyan police arrested 11 MRC members and its president Omar Mwamnuadzi. Although the MRC has often denied an alliance with al-Shabaab, it has copied some of al-Shabaab’s techniques, such as employing local religious leaders to incite violence, storing weapons in mosques, and conducting religious training in order to radicalize youth.

One common explanation for the increase in violence in Coast Province is based on coastal Muslims’ perception of being politically underrepresented. For example, Kenyan Muslims living along the Swahili coast often feel underrepresented within parliament, and argue that they are ruled by inland elites or that the Muslim members of parliament fail to support Muslim causes. As of 2010, Muslims were said to comprise 7% of the total population of Kenya. Of the 337 members of parliament in 2014, at least 25 in the Senate and National Assembly are Muslim. This means that

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80 McGregor, “Kenya’s Coast Province and the Mombasa Republican Council: Islamists, Separatists or Political Pawns?”
81 Ibid.
approximately 7% of the parliament is Muslim. Consequently, the Muslim population appears to be fairly represented. However, as Kenyan Muslims point out, they are prohibited from forming their own political party. The Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) has been deemed illegal by the Kenyan government, which bans political parties that have a religious affiliation. Muslims often counter that most political parties in Kenya are primarily Christian, and thus Muslim parties are unfairly targeted for being Muslim.

Land ownership is yet another destabilizing factor used to incite violence along the coast and the MRC has used this topic around Mombasa to attract supporters. The decision to establish the entire 1,800 mile-long Swahili coastline as Muslim controlled land can be traced back the pre-colonial period. However, under colonial rule, this 10 mile wide strip of land that extends for 1,800 miles along the Indian Ocean was shortened and then absorbed into Kenya. With independence in 1963, this land remained under the control of a few politically well-placed and often wealthy individuals. This has always rankled residents. But these tensions have also been exacerbated as members of other Kenyan tribes, specifically the Kikuyu, have used their political connections to purchase large sections of Coast Province land. Although these land sales begun under the first president Kenyatta decades ago, disenfranchisement of the local population continues.

In addition to land disputes, a recent survey of Coast Province sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provides insights into other conditions that exist in the region. For instance, the report states, “As is the case across the rest of Kenya (and Africa), the Coast’s population is decidedly youthful: as a

85 Patterson, “Islamic Radicalization in Kenya,” 19.
88 Ibid., 109.
whole, nearly half of the adult population (43%) is under 30 years of age.” Of these youth aged 18 to 29, 41% are Muslim. Additionally, Coast Province has a 28% unemployment rate. Simple math indicates that as many as 83,000 Muslim youth in Coast Province are unemployed. Unfortunately, Coast Province is not unique; the unemployment across the country is about 40%.

c. **Analysis**

While the terrorist incident described was borne of grievances in Coast Province, these grievances are not isolated to Coast Province and can be found in other areas of Kenya. Grievances associated with land ownership, unemployment, and perceived political underrepresentation are fairly common. Meanwhile, the suspicion that the MRC has direct ties to al-Shabaab has never been proven. But both of these groups operate in Coast Province and often compete for the same youth population which increases the likelihood that these two organizations interact.

B. **SUMMARY OF KENYA**

In the seventeen years since the U.S. Embassy attack, al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab have rooted themselves in Kenya. These organizations have proven able to successfully navigate social dynamics in Kenya. This includes understanding how to identify susceptible youth as recruits, whether from among marginalized Somali youth in Eastleigh or unemployed Kenyan Muslims along the Swahili coast. Additionally, al-Shabaab has established and maintains a complex network for radicalization, training, and utilization in both Somalia and Kenya. However, not all of Kenya is facing the same level of religiously based attacks. Areas like Coast and North Eastern Provinces appear to be experiencing more violence than are other regions in the country. This is likely due to

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90 Ibid., 19.


their geographic proximity to Somalia and the associated spillover effects from Somalia’s instability. One such spillover effect is the ability for al-Shabaab to expand its operations beyond Somalia and establish al-Hijra as its Kenyan operational wing. Al-Shabaab’s focus on Kenya could be due to Kenya’s role in AMISOM, but there have been problems as far back as the Shifta War. What is certain is that Kenya is seeing a dramatic increase in religiously-based terrorist attacks. The Westgate Mall and Garissa University attacks are only the two most spectacular examples. This new trend has the potential to spill over and affect other East African countries, like Tanzania.
III. TANZANIA

A. INTRODUCTION

As we have seen, the spillage of militant Islam from Somalia and proliferation of more radical forms of Islam from external actors has had a dramatic effect in Kenya. Apart from the 1998 Embassy bombing, the rise of militant Islam within Tanzania has largely escaped notice beyond its borders. This has been deliberate by the Tanzanian government, which seeks to avoid labeling attacks as terrorism or as religiously-based violence perpetrated by militant Islamists, in an effort to maintain peace between its Muslim and Christian populations. However, the spillover effects of the situation in Somalia and the continued influence by other external actors are present and growing in Tanzania. These two factors have converged along with a Muslim youth bulge; militant Islam appears to be spreading in parts of the country as a result.

Tanzania, comprised of Zanzibar (an archipelago) and mainland Tanganyika, is currently experiencing a youth bulge, especially within its Muslim population. The median age in Tanzania is 17.4 years old and the Muslim population is expected to increase by 44.71% from 2010 to 2030, rising from an estimated 13.4 million Muslims to 19.4 million Muslims.\(^\text{93}\) A 2012 study points out that there will be an estimated 900,000 youth coming of working age each year in Tanzania, while the market is only creating an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 new jobs per annum.\(^\text{94}\) Of those 900,000 new working age individuals, fewer than 5% have a secondary education level or higher.\(^\text{95}\) These statistics reveal a pool of young, unemployed, and under-educated Tanzanians who will be an obvious target for radicalization.

The 1998 Embassy bombing in Dar es Salaam signals the first terrorist attack executed by an external actor, al-Qaeda, in Tanzania. However, since 2012, Tanzania has

\(^{93}\) See Appendix D for full details on age distribution in Tanzania and Appendix B for Pew research projection of Muslim population growth in Tanzania.


\(^{95}\) Ibid.
experienced a growing number of militant attacks, which have specifically targeted Western tourists, local Christian leaders, Tanzanian security forces, and even moderate Muslims who speak out against radical forms of Islam. In Zanzibar, an acid attack on two British teens in 2013, as well as bombings of restaurants and bars frequented by Western tourists, and attacks on Christian churches and priests, illustrates the growth of militant Islam on the island. Mainland attacks in Tanzania by militant Islamists have also increased since 2012, often influenced by external actors. In February 2015, al-Shabaab militants engaged in a fierce firefight with Tanzanian police and military forces in the Amboni caves near the Tanga region where they had established a training camp. Also in 2015, Tanzanian Muslim youth began raiding police stations throughout the country to steal weapons and apparently stockpile them for future use.\footnote{Brigadier General S. M. Minja, (Tanzanian People’s Defense Forces National Defense College), in discussion with the authors, September 8, 2015. According to a recent presentation by the Tanzania National Counter Terrorism Center presented to the authors, from January to October of 2015, six of seven incidents classified as terrorism by the Tanzanian authorities were perpetrated by Tanzanian Muslim males, the majority of whom are between the ages of 18 and 30. “Terror Situation in Tanzania from Jan 15 to Oct 15,” Presentation, National Counter Terrorism Center–Tanzania, 2015.} Collectively, these events are beginning to serve as a wake-up call for the Tanzanian government, which is in the early stages of establishing policies to curb religious violence before it leads to a situation akin to that in Kenya.


   \textit{Event}

   In a synchronized attack, al-Qaeda militants bombed both the United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi with vehicle-borne explosive devices. In the case of the attack in Dar es Salaam, an Egyptian al-Qaeda operative, Hamden Khalif Allah Awad, drove the truck containing the bomb. The explosion destroyed the entrance and collapsed an exterior wall of the Embassy. Fortunately, the effect of this bomb was much smaller than anticipated and casualties were lower than those in Nairobi, with 11 people killed and 77 injured. However, the effects of the attack were felt throughout the region and globally.
b. Background

Al-Qaeda quickly claimed responsibility for the attacks in Tanzania and Kenya. The Dar es Salaam attack was planned in an apartment in Nairobi by a team of experts from various parts of the world, including Ali Mohamed, a former Egyptian and U.S. Army soldier who recruited and trained extremists in Brooklyn. The al-Qaeda group formed for the attack was led by Khaled al Fawwaz, who was appointed by Osama Bin Laden and would frequently send surveillance footage of the embassies to Bin Laden in Afghanistan, illustrating the high level of control Bin Laden exercised throughout the operation.

The al-Qaeda operatives in Kenya started planning the Embassy attacks as early as 1995, but were unable to execute them due to difficulties that Bin Laden was facing in Sudan in 1995. His move to Afghanistan in 1996 further delayed the attacks. However, Sudan remained central to the preparations since Bin Laden owned a number of business fronts that operated throughout East Africa, to include a pharmaceutical business in Khartoum that allegedly produced nerve gas.

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan played indirect but supporting roles in the Dar es Salaam Embassy attack. Osama Bin Laden and Khaled al Fawwaz, both Saudis, had retained extensive ties in Saudi Arabia, even after they were exiled. Indeed, once preparations for the Embassy attacks were complete, most of the al-Qaeda planners and support network fled to Pakistan where they continued to support al-Qaeda.

Local Tanzanian youth, radicalized by al-Qaeda, were also integral to the attack. Ahmed Khalfan Ghailan, a young Muslim militant from Zanzibar who joined al-Qaeda


for the Embassy bombings, would later be the first al-Qaeda militant arrested and tried in the United States in connection with the Embassy bombings.\textsuperscript{101} His capture occurred in Pakistan in 2004, when he was arrested following a prolonged firefight. It was later reported by his fellow al-Qaeda operatives that Ghailan was one of the key explosives experts who acquired and assembled many of the bomb parts for both Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.\textsuperscript{102} A 2002 Congressional Research Report on Terrorism in Africa produced by Ted Dagne, an African Affairs specialist, was later used by Jeffery Haynes as he summarized important aspects of the attacks’ success stating:

\begin{quote}
From 1991, when Osama bin Laden was based in Sudan, al-Qaeda has been building a network of Islamist groups in both the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia) and East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda). Dagne believes that, as in South Asia especially Afghanistan and Pakistan-al-Qaeda was able to exploit extant circumstances of widespread poverty, ethnic and religious competition and conflict, poorly policed state borders, and often corrupt and inefficient government officials to create a regional “terror centre” in East Africa.\textsuperscript{103}
\end{quote}

Although external actors perpetrated the embassy bombing, local support that was essential to its execution. This local support was relatively easy to generate given the conditions listed by Haynes, and thanks to a growing group number of radicalized Tanzanian youth.

In Tanzania, there are real fears that more fundamentalist variants of Islam, such as Salafism or Wahabbism, have been spreading throughout the country.\textsuperscript{104} Spreading these radical forms of Islam is a deliberate strategy on the part of terrorist groups, like al-Qaeda; proselytizing is also undertaken by certain Middle Eastern states. This aim is to establish a foothold, and then grow from there. NGOs and Islamic Charities are often utilized to help with the spread.

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\textsuperscript{102} Richey, “Ahmed Ghailani Gets Life Sentence for Al Qaeda Bombing of U.S. Embassies.”
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\textsuperscript{103} Haynes, “Islamic Militancy in East Africa.”
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For instance, NGOs are believed to have provided financial and logistical support to the organizers and executors of the 1998 Embassy bombings; they are thought to have solicited money from the Muslim community on behalf of the al-Qaeda cell in Tanzania. One method they used was to ask for money for community projects, only to then divert the money to terror activities. NGOs are also believed to have helped members of al-Qaeda operating in Kenya and Tanzania acquire bomb-making materials and expertise from abroad.

NGOs are not the only conduits used. Within Tanzania, state sponsors of terrorism have been meddling in local Muslim affairs for quite some time. This is most evident in Zanzibar, where more than 95% of the population is Muslim. Zanzibar has produced at least three mid-level al-Qaeda operatives who fought in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and although neither of these countries directly sponsored these individuals, it is no secret that al-Qaeda received support from the Taliban when the Taliban was in power in Afghanistan, as well as clandestine support from elements within the Pakistani government. As Haynes also notes, “In recent years the U.S. and British governments have expressed concern that external extremist influences—from, inter alia, Sudan and Saudi Arabia—have infiltrated Tanzania, serving to radicalise indigenous Muslim beliefs and undermining Tanzania’s well known political moderation.”


108 In addition to al-Qaeda having recruited Ahmed Khalifan Gailan, both Khalifan Khamis Muhammad and Qaed Sanyan al-Harith are Zanzibari natives who joined al-Qaeda. Khamis Muhammad is currently in U.S. custody for the 1998 Embassy bombings and al-Harith was killed by a U.S. drone strike in Yemen in 2002. “Tanzania: Al Qaeda’s East African Beachhead?” Terrorism Monitor 1, no. 5, November 7, 2003, 1–4, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=18969&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=178&no_cache=1#.VkuqgYRxtUQ.

When it comes to state actors, Saudi Arabia currently has the most influence over Muslims on the mainland while Oman is extremely influential in Zanzibar. Recently, the Jamestown Foundation has found that the Saudi Oil firm, Oilcom, moves over $1 million USD a year into Zanzibar, of which at least some portion is used to bribe government officials to back Wahhabism, and to purchase small arms to support militant Islamist groups.\textsuperscript{110} Qatar has likewise been supporting Salafists financially since the late 1970s and, according to Hussein Solomon, Islamic militancy in sub-Saharan Africa would not be as severe a problem if it were not for these countries’ contributions.\textsuperscript{111} For example, a 2012 article in the \textit{Washington Post} highlights U.S. concerns over Qatar’s support to al-Shabaab, which was brought to the U.S.’s attention by the President of Somalia, Sharif Ahmed, in 2009.\textsuperscript{112} The Somalia president’s assertion was that Qatar had been funneling financial support to al-Shabaab via Eritrea. Qatari individuals and organizations, too have funded al-Shabaab. In 2013, the United States Department of Treasury listed Abdul Rahman al-Nuaimi, a Qatari academic and co-founder of Al Karama, a Swiss-based human rights NGO, as an al-Qaeda financier who had sent an estimated $2 million USD a month to Al-Qaeda in Iraq and $250,000 a month to al-Shabaab in Somalia.\textsuperscript{113}

A new East African terrorist organization focused on attacks within both Kenya and Tanzania has just emerged in early 2015. This new organization, al-Muhajiroun in East Africa, has direct links to al-Shabaab and its Kenyan offshoot al-Hijra.\textsuperscript{114} In the first addition of al-Shabaab’s new magazine, \textit{AMKA}, the organization calls for East Africans to join the jihad, specifically those who are under “the illusion they could endure the

\textsuperscript{110}“Tanzania: Al Qaeda’s East African Beachhead?” \textit{Terrorism Monitor}, 1–4.


Kuffar’s humiliation in places like Kenya and Tanzania.” Increased focus within East Africa by al-Shabaab can be viewed as an expansion of its area of operation from Somalia.

c. Analysis

External actor influence, by terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, as well as by Islamic NGOs and states such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Qatar, have helped proliferate the spread of militant Islam within Tanzania. The 1998 Embassy bombings illustrate the networked nature of these entities, which operated freely in the area until 2001, when the U.S. and Tanzanian governments took steps to target businesses and charities associated with al-Qaeda. For a period following the 1998 bombings, Tanzania was relatively free of attacks associated with militant Islam, and only since 2012 have such events begun to increase at a higher rate.

2. August 7, 2013: Stone Town, Zanzibar Island

a. Event

On the evening of August 7, 2013, two British citizens, Katie Gee and Kristie Trup, were walking down a crowded avenue in Stone Town, Zanzibar. These young girls had just finished a month of volunteer teaching service at a local school on the island and were preparing to head back to England. Suddenly, a motorbike approached and two males threw acid in the faces of the women. Katie Gee suffered the most, with chemical burns across more than 30% of her body. This attack was not the first time Westerners on the island or Christians who inhabit Zanzibar have been target. Between 2012 and 2014, at least nine attacks occurred; all were perpetrated by Muslims who seek the institution of Sharia law and autonomy for Zanzibar. Figure 9 depicts the increase of attacks over

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116 The networked nature of al-Qaeda in East Africa is important in illustrating the different entities which combined to form the network needed to execute the 1998 Embassy bombings, and is highlighted in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, RAND Corporation, 2001; Rabasa, Radical Islam in East Africa.

time in Tanzania. Not depicted are the figures from 2015, when at least eight attacks have occurred that are directly attributable to militant Islamists.118

Figure 9. Tanzania Terrorist Attacks, 1998–2014

Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Global Terrorism Database [Data file].

b. Background

While the one-party state of Tanzania forbade religiously-based political parties beginning at independence, Muslim associations run by the state were created. These associations were tasked with overseeing social, religious, and educational matters, while also acting as brokers between the government and Muslim communities. Subsequently, the National Muslim Council of Tanzania (BAKWATA), which is the overarching body

118 Presented to the authors by the Tanzanian National Counterterrorism Center on November 2, 2015.
sanctioned by the government, plays an important role.\textsuperscript{119} Although the government does not collect statistics relating to religion, it is estimated that Muslims comprise between 30% and 40% of Tanzania’s population. The government routinely goes out of its way to not marginalize any one’s religion. Worth noting is that it is also official policy for the presidency to rotate between Christians and Muslims. However, even with this alternation of power, Zanzibar continues to be at odds with mainland Tanganyika. This has been so since the Republic of Tanzania joined Zanzibar with Tanganyika in 1964.

Zanzibar is an archipelago off the eastern coast of present day Tanzania; its two largest islands, Unguja and Pemba, are also most populated. The island of Unguja was first used as a port by slave and spice traders during their long trips between the Middle East and India, to mainland Africa. One of the first mosques in the southern hemisphere was built on this island in 1107.\textsuperscript{120} Following a long period of local rule, Oman absorbed Zanzibar in 1698 along with substantial portions of the Swahili coast.\textsuperscript{121} The Sultan of Zanzibar continued to rule under Omani suzerainty until 1890 when it transferred to the British Empire.

Britain assumed a prominent role in administering Zanzibar and governed until its independence in 1963.\textsuperscript{122} During this time, Arab elites continued to play prominent roles in the islands’ administration and economy where they had been entrenched for centuries. Shortly following independence, Zanzibar underwent a brief but violent revolution in January 1964. The Sultan of Zanzibar and the recently elected government were overthrown. During the revolution, non-Africans—predominantly those of Arab and Indian descent—were murdered; as many as 20,000 may have been killed (estimates vary between 5–20,000). An estimated 100,000 were exiled. Many fled back to Oman or

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\textsuperscript{119} The Council has branch offices all over Tanzania, with 22 regional and 113 district offices served by over 700 sheikhs. National Muslim Council of Tanzania’s, “Long-term Plan on the Environment-Summary” paper presented at the ARC’s Many Heavens, One Earth celebration, Nairobi, Kenya, September 2012.
\textsuperscript{121} LeSage, “The Rising Terrorist Threat in Tanzania: Domestic Islamist Militancy and Regional Threats,” 3.
\textsuperscript{122} Royer, “Zanzibar History: The Zanzibar Revolution.”
\end{flushright}
India. Once the revolution was over, the new government signed an agreement of confederation with mainland Tanganyika to form the present-day United Republic of Tanzania. This agreement has been a point of consternation between the island’s largely Muslim population and the predominantly Christian mainland.

Beyond its storied history, we also have to consider Zanzibar’s present day demographics within its population. According to a 2013 UN report which uses Tanzanian census data, over 35% of Zanzibar’s 1.3 million inhabitants are between the ages of 15 and 35. Further, an estimated 43.8% of the population is below the age of 15. This puts 78% of Zanzibar’s population under the age of 35. While, this statistic may not be terribly alarming on its own, couple this with the fact that the male unemployment rate for 15 to 35 year olds is 43%, while for women it is 57% in Zanzibar, and this creates certain exploitable vulnerabilities. Doing the math, approximately 148,000 to 224,000 Muslim youth in Zanzibar are unemployed.

Politically, Zanzibar attempted to join the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), formerly known as the Organization of Islamic Conference, to further distance itself from the mainland. It did so in 1993, but then quickly withdrew under pressure from the mainland that, as a secular country, joining of a religious international organization was unconstitutional. This issue still upsets many Zanzibaris who saw economic as well as religious benefits from joining the organization. The Tanzanian government is also seen as infringing on Zanzibar’s autonomy in contravention of the 1964 union.

125 Ibid.
126 Ibid., 4.
128 Ibid.
Much as in Mombasa, Kenya, political violence in Zanzibar has a heavy religious tone. A group known as Uamsho, which is Swahili for “The Awakening,” has become the main group to voice concerns over both political and economic inequality, territorial disputes, and religious suppression. The Zanzibar government contributed to the formation of Uamsho by allowing it to register in 2001 as an NGO under the Society Act of 1995.129 Ironically, Uamsho seeks Zanzibari independence. In addition to independence, Uamsho wants Zanzibar to be governed in accordance with Sharia law.130 Not surprisingly, given Zanzibar’s predominant Muslim population, Uamsho enjoys a large base of support.131

Zanzibar has also experienced continued meddling by external actors. Given Oman historical role in Zanzibar, ties between Uamsho and Omani patrons shouldn’t be surprising. A large number of Omani Arab-Africans left the island’s following the 1963 revolution. Their need to suddenly depart their homes had a profound effect on many. At least some members of the “forgotten generation” of Arab Zanzibaris’ desire to return to Zanzibar.132 This group’s influence on Zanzibar politics and economics has remained substantial. In fact, according to Daniel Howden, “Much of the political establishment on Zanzibar insist in private that wealthy outsiders from the Gulf States or Iran are suspected of backing Uamsho.”133 Furthermore, Uamsho’s leader Shaykh Farid frequently travels to Oman and allegations have been made that he previously served in the Omani infantry before becoming Uamsho’s leader.134

131 Ibid.
Although Saudi Arabia does not have the same historical ties with Zanzibar, it has recently emerged as another Uamsho donor and likewise contributes to other Sunni organizations in Zanzibar. Katrina Manson reports that, “Academics estimate that Saudi Arabia—where Wahhabi Islam is practiced—alone spends one million USD a year on Islamic institutions in Zanzibar.”\textsuperscript{135} She quotes a local Sufi Muslim teacher, Idrissa Ahmad Khamis who claims, “Wahhabi madrasas are just starting—they are now many and Saudi funds are spreading their work—they have nice buildings, they are well off and well organised; they preach and convince the parents to come there, so the effect of the madrassa is very powerful.”\textsuperscript{136}

The association of Wahhabism with militant Islam is well documented, and its proliferation on Zanzibar at the very least seems to correlate with the rise in religious violence there.\textsuperscript{137} Through 2013, this violence had in large part stayed contained to Zanzibar. Only recently has it begun to present a growing threat to the Tanzania mainland just a short distance away.\textsuperscript{138}

c. Analysis

Zanzibar’s predominantly Muslim population is strikingly young and is plagued by unemployment. Political discontent between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar further alienates many Zanzibaris. External actors, who have long played a role in Zanzibar continue to do so. Together, these factors help account for the growth of radical Islam—which has at times turned militant, as seen in attacks on Christian Tanzanians and Western tourists.


\textsuperscript{136} Manson, “Extremism on the Rise in Zanzibar.”

\textsuperscript{137} At least nine violent incidents have occurred in Zanzibar associated with militant Islam since 2012. LeSage, “The Rising Terrorist Threat in Tanzania: Domestic Islamist Militancy and Regional Threats,” 6.

3. February 16, 2015: Amboni Caves near Tanga, Tanzania

a. Event

In February 2015, local police forces attempted to arrest what were thought to be bandits hiding deep in the Amboni Caves near the city of Tanga in northern Tanzania. Following an intense twenty-minute gunfight, the local police were forced to call for military backup from the Tanzania People’s Defense Forces. During the initial exchange of gunfire, a Tanzanian police officer was killed and five were wounded. The militants eventually escaped by using a complex system of ladders and ropes. Shortly following the event, a video was posted online by al-Shabaab claiming responsibility for the attack.

b. Background

Two years before the Tanga cave raid; al-Shabaab was already operating in the region. In October 2013, 69 people were arrested in the area for running an al-Shabaab indoctrination camp, where over 50 children between ages four and thirteen were being trained. Reportedly, many of the 69 people arrested were from Kenya and Somalia and included radical preachers. The camp had been operating since early 2008 and had already sent militants to Somalia to fight for al-Shabaab.

Additional incidents involving al-Shabaab in Tanzania have occurred. Also in October 2013, eleven al-Shabaab militants were arrested while performing what were said to be military drills in a forested part of southern Mtwara Region. During the arrest, authorities found a compact disk (CD) labeled “New Mogadishu Sniper - Al Shabaab.” In March 2014, another al-Shabaab CD containing propaganda was

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140 Ibid.
144 Mwita, “Tanzania: Al Shabaab Gunmen Should be Kept at Bay.”
recovered following a militant attack on a moderate Sheikh and his son; the Sheikh refused to preach about jihad at his mosque. As LeSage summarizes what has been happening, “As part of its guerrilla strategy, al Shabab has increased its rate of external attacks across East Africa.”

Telling too, and unlike most al-Shabaab’s propaganda, the video released following the Amboni Cave attack was posted in Swahili. It has been thought for some time that Tanzania has served as a rear base area for al-Shabaab providing it a location where it can recruit, and offer fighters rest and recuperation. For instance, 16 al-Shabaab suspects were arrested in May of 2014, in Arusha for allegedly running an underground recruitment and training camp for al-Shabaab. All of the 16 militants arrested were Muslim males between the ages of 25 and 46, some of whom were prominent business Arusha figures. Arusha has been home to a Somali community for generations. But, it is mostly along the coast where Tanzanian officials are concentrating their efforts. This is because of how easy it is for al-Shabaab to move by sea between Kenya, Tanzania, and back to Somalia.

Tanga is a port city on the Indian Ocean with a majority Muslim population. Although actual demographic information, including on religious affiliation, is difficult to find, figures from studies in the 1970s suggest upwards of 71.9% of the population in the city is Muslim. A 2012 census places the current population of the city at approximately 273,000 inhabitants. A recent program designed to address unemployment

145 Mwita, “Tanzania: Al Shabaab Gunmen Should be Kept at Bay.”
147 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 Nkwame, “Tanzania: 16 Arrested over Links with Al-Shabaab in Arusha.”
estimates that 24,000 youth are unemployed.\textsuperscript{152} Alone, these statistics are not overly alarming and resemble the country’s overall 10% unemployment rate. However, external actors have taken advantage of these conditions in Tanga to radicalize Muslim youth who have few prospects elsewhere.

The Ansar Muslim Youth Center (AMYC) is a Muslim youth movement based in Tanga. It has been there since the 1970s and has mosques throughout the country. In 2012 it announced ties to the MYC in Kenya and Somalia.\textsuperscript{153} The AMYC reportedly recruits fighters and provide substantial funding to al-Shabaab. AMYC was confirmed to have provided support to al-Qaeda in East Africa as long ago as the 1998 embassy bombings.\textsuperscript{154} AMYC also maintains lucrative ties to drug trafficking networks that use the Tanga port to move heroin and other drugs, as well as ivory and gems.\textsuperscript{155} Figure 10 below highlights the fact that Tanzania as one of the main hubs used to move opiates from Southwest Asia into the global market and to the United States. Thus, while Tanga might seem to be a forgotten backwater; it is yet another node in the nexus of crime, terrorism and Islamist agitation.

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\textsuperscript{153} Gatsiounis, “After al-Shabaab.”
\end{flushright}
c. Analysis

The spillover effects from Somalia’s decades of unrest appear to have found sympathetic ears in Tanzania, and what was once only a source of tacit support and individual actors operating covertly in the country has begun to turn into a growing threat for mainland Tanzania. Notably, much of al-Shabaab’s influence in Tanzania has a local flavor to it, as most of its supporters are not of Somali descent.156

A critical aspect of raids like the Amboni cave raid is that, authorities have taken preemptive action. Individuals and cells have in large part been discovered by vigilant local Tanzanians. To its credit, Tanzania still maintains a robust 10-cell system. The 10-cell system acts in the manner of a neighborhood watch: a cell leader is elected for every 10 adjacent homes, and that leader is responsible for organizing and watching over his

156 There are only an estimated 54,000 Somali-Tanzanians, mainly living in the northern part of the country according to studies. See Joshua Project, “Joshua Project-Somali in Tanzania,” 2015, http://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/14983/TZ.
cell’s inhabitants and property, as well as serving as an informal administrator and link to local authorities. The system is a legacy program from shortly after Tanzanian’s independence when the one party state used it for security and political control. One by-product of this system has made it very difficult for outsiders to penetrate many rural areas in Tanzania, and has even proven effective in some urban areas. Worth noting is that the system does not exist on Zanzibar, which maintains its own system known as Shehias which performs a similar function. During our research trip to Tanzania, this system was often cited by U.S. and Tanzanian defense and government officials alike, as being essential to successfully identifying potential attackers and preventing attacks.

4. July 12, 2015: Stakishari Police Station in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

a. Event

Late in the evening of July 12, 2015, the Stakishari Police Station in Dar es Salaam was attacked by armed gunmen. The gunmen posed as civilians and made their way into the police station before opening fire. At the conclusion of the attack, four police officers and two civilians were dead and others lay wounded as gunmen made a getaway with an undisclosed amount of guns and ammunition. The perpetrators were apprehended eight days later. This was not the first such attack, and at least four other attacks using similar tactics have occurred since 2014. In 2015 alone, 11 officers have been killed and dozens of guns and cases of ammunitions have been taken during these attacks.


159 During meetings with the Regional Security Officer for the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam as well as meetings at the Tanzanian Defense College, the importance of local involvement with the 10-Cell System was regularly mentioned. Sometimes this system was referred to as “local police” or a more formalized neighborhood watch. For further details on this system, please see Ingle, “The Ten-House Cell System in Tanzania: A Consideration of an Emerging Village Institution.”

b. Background

The Stakishari Police Station attack helped shed light on spate of police station attacks thanks to the apprehension of four suspects. The defendants Omari Abdula Makota, 28; Rajabu Ally Mohamed Ulatule, 22; Ramadhani Hamis Ulatule, 20; and Fadhil Shaban Lukwembe, 23, have all been charged with murder and were initially labeled as “gangsters” by local police and the media.\(^{161}\) However, the Tanzanian government has since changed the charges and all four individuals are now classified as terrorists.\(^{162}\) This is typical; Tanzania has taken a quiet and secretive approach to dealing with violence associated with militant Islam, often deliberately not calling the suspects militants or terrorists, and rarely, if ever, discussing their religious motivations. Interestingly, immediately following the attack, police put out a call to the public to be on the lookout for more suspects and to not allow places of worship to be used as locations in which to hide or from which to plan such incidents.\(^{163}\) This deliberate tactic by the Tanzanian government and security forces of not acknowledging the growing threat posed by militant Islamists while simultaneously singling out places of worship as safe-havens for attackers represents a disturbing contradiction.

The country’s National Counter Terrorism Center in 2015 has made four specific assertions in regard to the growing number of attacks on police stations. First, it says there are no terrorist groups presently based in Tanzania. Second, it acknowledges more individuals are supporting terrorist groups. Third, most of the 2015 attacks were conducted by small bands of criminals who are not tied to one specific group. Fourth, it has classified these attackers as individual jihadists or Islamist militants, not as part of a terrorist group.\(^{164}\)


\(^{163}\) Ibid.

\(^{164}\) “Terror Situation in Tanzania as from Jan 15 to Oct 15,” Presentation, National Counter Terrorism Center–Tanzania, 2015, slide 2.
c. **Analysis**

The fact that the four suspects arrested were young Tanzanian Muslims who are apparently part of a larger cell of militant Islamists proved alarming for Tanzania. Given the rise in number of attacks since 2012 it appears that the attacks in Tanzania have finally been recognized by the government as being associated with militant Islam.

**B. SUMMARY OF TANZANIA**

External influences supporting the spread of militant Islam have been present in Tanzania for some time. In Zanzibar, history has played an important role in regard to Omani influence, as seen in the case of Uamsho. Saudi Arabia has entered the mix as a relatively new player, but has already made an impact in spreading Wahhabi ideology across the island and from there onto the mainland. On both the mainland and Zanzibar, al-Qaeda was able to take advantage of Islamic NGOs and charities to assist it with recruiting, logistics, and attacks. Given Tanzania’s demographics, there are growing numbers of young, unemployed Muslims. They provide external actors with a large pool from which to recruit. Local organizations, like the AMYC, also provide platforms for anyone who wants to advance their Islamist agenda. It is a small wonder that militant Islam is expanding, though fortunately Tanzania is not yet host to as many disenfranchised communities as Kenya, though it has some of the same vulnerabilities.
IV. CASE COMPARISON

The upward trend in attacks caused by militant Islamists in Kenya and Tanzania cannot be attributed to a single set of circumstances or conditions. Instead, a number of factors, to include spillover from Somalia, an increased number of external actors, and a susceptible Muslim youth population are contributing to the rise in violence. However, similarities and differences are worth highlighting between the two cases so that reasons for the spread of militant Islam can be better understood and counteracted.

A. SIMILARITIES

In 1998, both countries were targeted by al-Qaeda. Since al-Qaeda’s early days, Kenya has experienced more religiously-based violence than Tanzania. However, many of the conditions that have allowed the violence to propagate in Kenya also appear to exist in Tanzania. What is also similar to both countries is that the recent domestic terrorist attacks have been rarely carried out by homegrown or self-radicalized organizations, and were almost always influenced by external actors. These external actors provided the funding, training, tactics, and ideology that were used by local and foreign Islamist militants combined. Additionally, the individual militants who conducted these attacks were often foreign nationals who were sent by external actors to conduct specific terrorist actions.

One recent development in both Kenya and Tanzania is that militants specifically seek to isolate victims during the course of their attacks; their violence is focused against non-Muslims. This was blatant in the Westgate Mall and Garissa University attacks, but was also an underlying factor in the 2013 Zanzibar acid attack against two British girls.

Islamists continue to push for more Sharia law to be practiced throughout the Coast and North Eastern Provinces in Kenya.165 External actors are pushing for the same in parts of Tanzania and in Zanzibar. For instance, in Tanzania, the increase in the number of mosques associated with more radical forms of Islam, as opposed to the

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165Haynes, “Islamic Militancy in East Africa.”
traditional Sufism practiced in the area, has been a cause for concern among moderate Muslims.\footnote{LeSage, “The Rising Terrorist Threat in Tanzania: Domestic Islamist Militancy and Regional Threats.”} This influx of external actors attempting to spread a more radical form of Islam presents the potential to further destabilize the balance between religion and politics.

Political representation appears to be more proportional than Muslims in Kenya and Tanzania realize. Muslims currently account for roughly 7% of the population in Kenya, and approximately 7% of the members of Kenya’s parliament are Muslim. Tanzanian Muslims make up approximately 30% of the overall population and the state’s parliament is nearly equally split between Muslim and Christian members. Additional evidence about the religious parity in Tanzania’s government includes the fact that the newly elected president is Christian and his chosen vice president is Muslim. This overall equity in religious representation calls into question the argument that militant Islam spreads thanks to a lack of political representation.

One other important feature both countries share is the impact of terrorism on tourism. There has been a drastic loss of tourism revenue due to the specific targeting of Westerners and areas they frequent.\footnote{Both Tanzania and Kenya have seen a notable decline in tourism revenue due to terrorist activities. Elayne Wangalwa, “Kenyan Tourism Faces Negative Impact Due to Domestic Terrorism,” February 12, 2015, http://www.cnbcfrica.com/news/east-africa/2014/05/27/kenyan-tourism-faces-negative-impact-due-to-domestic-terrorism/; Spencer, “Zanzibar, Muslims bomb cathedral and tourist bar.”} This loss in revenue, estimated at $200 million annually in Kenya alone, not only hits business owners, but also the substantial number of workers in the industry.\footnote{Jacob Kushner, “Mall Attack to Cost Kenya $200 Million in Tourism,” USA Today, October 1, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/10/01/kenya-mall-attack-tourism/2903005/} The fact that a large percentage of tourism sites are located in predominately Muslim majority areas exacerbates the situation, because this feeds unemployment. The lack of jobs then impacts those who already feel discriminated against, stoking conditions conductive to radicalization.
B. DIFFERENCES

One key difference between Kenya and Tanzania is Kenya’s involvement in Somalia. Unlike Tanzania, Kenya is a Troop Contributing Country (TCC) to AMISOM, as previously discussed. This by itself has made Kenya a target of al-Shabaab. But its economic and political dabbling within Somalia, especially in Kismayo, has further enraged many Somalis. For example, in July 2015, Somalia brought a legal case to the United Nations International Court of Justice. Somalia is disputing the maritime border it shares with Kenya and claims that Kenya has illegally handed out exploratory contracts to international businesses for potential oil and gas deposits within parts of the Indian Ocean that actually belong to Somalia.169 These types of tensions fuel al-Shabaab’s ire and affect militant Islamists’ attitude toward the Kenyan government.

Kenya’s proximity to Somalia and the spillover effects from Somalia’s internal instability also challenge Kenya in different ways than they do Tanzania. The long border shared by Kenya and Somalia is very porous and often not well patrolled. This provides the opportunity for terrorist groups to seek sanctuary in Somalia and cross the border into Kenya and conduct attacks. This proximity to Somalia has also forced Kenya to manage an ongoing humanitarian disaster, as large numbers of Somalis have moved to Kenya in order to escape the violence inside their home country. Especially alarming is that refugee camps and cities with majority ethnic Somali populations in Kenya have served as safe havens and recruiting grounds for extremist groups. This is evident in both Dadaab and Eastleigh.

Tanzania is more distant from Somalia and does not face these same challenges. And though this geographic separation has provided Tanzania with a buffer from the spillover effects from Somalia’s internal instability, recent events indicate that al-Shabaab may be expanding its operations further south. Unique to Tanzania, meanwhile, are the shared economic and ideological ties that exist along the Swahili coast, and that tie Tanzania to Oman. Thus, while Tanzania’s physical and cultural distance have prevented total ease of movement of Somali-based extremist groups into Tanzania,

Tanzania has other militant Islamic group to contend with that receive assistance from external sources. This can be seen in the number of madrassas constructed and supported by Saudi Arabia.

Tanzania also faces complex challenges of managing the semi-autonomous region of Zanzibar. In principle, Zanzibar is entirely Muslim and has a history of secessionist agitation. As seen in the recent acid attacks, as well as in the killing of Catholic priests, Zanzibar’s political struggle for more autonomy is starting to feed more religiously-based violence. At the same time, the nature of the political divide between Muslims and non-Muslims is much different than in Kenya. Tanzania’s closely balanced religious population has forced its government to take a much more conservative approach, and it carefully monitors how religion is intersecting with politics.

Unlike Kenya, Tanzania also employs a system of community watch. Each leader in the 10-cell system reports any abnormal activity to a higher-level leader and to local police. This system has proved to be a highly efficient and effective mechanism for deterring and monitoring all kinds of external influences, to include militant Islam. For instance, a rickshaw driver recently alerted authorities to a potential terrorist. This single report led to the arrest of a number of al-Shabaab sympathizers in the Kilombero District of Morogoro Region Tanzania.170

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170 Brigadier General S. M. Minja, (Tanzanian People’s Defense Forces National Defense College), in discussion with the authors, September 8, 2015.
V. CONCLUSION

The spread of militant Islam in Kenya and Tanzania has occurred under varied conditions and circumstances. The influences affecting this spread have also changed over time for innumerable reasons; however, some of the most potent recent factors are the spillover of violence from Somalia coupled with the convergence of external actors and a large Muslim youth population.

In the case of Kenya, the spread of militant Islam appears to be increasing. Not only should the growth of militant Islam be a concern to the Kenyan government, but it should also be a concern for Kenya’s East African neighbors and the larger global community. This is especially true for the United States, which has longstanding ties with Kenya and considers Kenya to be the anchor state of East Africa.171 This relationship was highlighted several months ago when in July 2015 President Obama became the first sitting U.S. President to visit Kenya.

In Tanzania, indicators suggest that politically motivated entities are increasingly willing to use violence. Tanzania holds even greater potential for large-scale violence by militant Islamists than Kenya does. We say this based on the history of tension between the mainland and Zanzibar, coupled with the near parity between Muslims and Christians; once large-scale violence takes off it might become extremely difficult to control. That said, the relative parity between Muslims and Christians and their coexistence in the same communities have been driving factors in maintaining political and social stability in the country to date. However, should the balance be tipped by the efforts of an external actor who finds traction among Muslim youth, Tanzania could find itself in peril.

A. WHY IT MATTERS TO KENYA AND TANZANIA

In a soon-to-be published work, Michael Freeman, Katherine Ellena, and Amina Kator-Mubarez suggest that those who spread extremist Islamic ideology deliberately use non-state elements to proliferate their message. Freeman et al. describe Salafi and Wahhabi efforts as the “supply” aspect of Islamism, akin to how a marketing firm would push a product.172 According to LeSage, more mosques and madrassas are being built in East Africa, and that these are directly associated with more radical forms of Islam.173 Also, officials in Tanzania suggest that some of those who travel to the Middle East and Pakistan for religious education return home subscribing to more radical forms of Islam than are traditional in East Africa.174 Equally significant, more and more Arab Muslim professors are now teaching in East African universities, such as at the Muslim University of Morogoro in Tanzania. One thus sees new nodes in networks that have long connected East Africa with the Middle East.

1. Recommendations for East Africa Region

1. Understand the Muslim youth population. This thesis highlights the growing number of pernicious external actors present in the East Africa region. Some of these actors have longstanding ties to Muslim communities, but there are also a growing number of new actors. It may be a truism, but competing groups always need new human capital; the easiest place to find new recruits is among youth. But youth can also provide a powerful resistance front against malign influence, and both Kenya and Tanzania need to embrace the growing Muslim population. Actions should be taken to encourage moderate religious practices and to support moderate religious leaders who have a direct tie-in to at-risk youth. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies has found that “East African Somali populations, especially those in neighborhoods of large cities like Addis Ababa, Dar es Salaam, Kampala, Mombasa, and Nairobi, have experienced the negative

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172 Michael Freeman, Katherine Ellena and Amina Kator-Mubarez, Ideology without Borders: The Global Spread of Islamism and the Consequences for Terrorism (Unpublished).

173 LeSage, “The Rising Terrorist Threat in Tanzania: Domestic Islamist Militancy and Regional Threats.”

174 Augustine Philip Mahiga, (Former Tanzanian Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) and UN Special Representative to Somalia), in discussion with the authors, September 7, 2015.
consequences of al-Shabaab’s activities and often strongly oppose its objectives.”

Populations within these cities are beginning to actively participate in community projects which “serve as powerful counter-narratives that civil society organizations and governments should encourage when possible.” All such endeavors should be encouraged.

2. Engage the youth through social programs. Dynamic social programs can also be created and managed by local leaders. A study in South Korea found that “the country’s youth bulge was converted into a national asset through a blend of educational programs and youth-oriented services that prepared young people for jobs in a modern and globally connected economy.” Similar programs in Kenya and Tanzania could be established. Such programs would ideally provide alternative outlets to help increase ties between youth and their home communities. If youth were employed doing something productive, this would surely undercut the ability of external actors to find recruits.

2. Recommendations for Kenya

1. Get serious about Somalia, but ensure that efforts are legitimate. Somalia’s stability is of key importance to Kenya. Kenya has made a significant investment in its support to AMISOM and continues to host hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees. However, Kenya’s actions inside Somalia, specifically in Kismayo, have proven to be less than altruistic and have lent the perception that Kenya is meddling in Somalia’s affairs. This perceived meddling has been used by al-Shabaab to rally support for its attacks in Kenya.

2. Create an internal counterterrorism force. The Westgate Mall siege exposed serious gaps in the capabilities of the Kenyan police and military to conduct internal counterterrorism operations. Both the police and military are highly trained and capable of conducting unilateral operations; however, their joint response at Westgate was

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175 Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Preventing Youth Radicalization in East Africa (Kigali, Rwanda: National Defense University, January, 2012), 18.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid.
uncoordinated. The Kenyan government should strongly consider a unified command that would be responsible for internal counterterrorism operations.

3. **Recommendations for Tanzania**

1. *Continue the 10-cell system and refocus efforts in urban areas.* Tanzania should put more emphasis on its 10-cell system. This effort is especially important in areas that are known to be penetrated by militant Islamist groups. At ground level, more formalized links should be instituted between local police and the 10-cell leaders. Tanzania should also create an operational level control mechanism that can coordinate counterterrorism efforts among all of its security elements.

2. *Reinstitute government programs and national service.* The Tanzanian government should consider reintroduction of youth league activities for those under the age of 15. This program proved successful in building character and in instilling national pride among this age group in the past. More importantly, however, Tanzanians above the age of 18 should be required to participate in compulsory national service for at least one year. National service could include working with any national level security force or government service, to include holding an official position within the 10-cell system’s militia.

3. *Acknowledge growth of militant Islam in the region and reform the legal code to properly address it.* Legal reforms, specifically within the realm of counterterrorism legislation, must be undertaken. In conjunction with refining the laws for easier application, which means making laws shorter and clearer, the Tanzanian government must come to terms with the growing threat from militant Islamist attacks and discuss the problem more openly. By being more transparent—to include being more transparent about the need for legal reforms—the government will better position itself to properly classify individuals or groups as terrorists, and to charge them accordingly.

4. *Monitor and manage external influence.* The government of Tanzania must also enhance its maritime, air, and land border security posture to prevent ease of transit by militant Islamists or their supporters into and through Tanzania. The Tanzanian government should also establish a system to better account for and track the plethora of
NGOs and other external actors operating within its borders to ensure that none are complicit in the spread of militant Islam in Tanzania.

B. WHY IT MATTERS TO THE UNITED STATES

The 2015 United States National Security Strategy (NSS) covers a broad range of efforts to undertake and promote the security of the United States and to further its national interests. In Africa, the strategy focuses on two important goals. First is the transition of delivering aid to a trade and development approach that will strengthen economic ties between the U.S. and African countries.178 Not surprisingly, the title of the section of the NSS on sub-Saharan Africa is “Invest in Africa’s Future.”

Second, the NSS seeks to address democracy promotion and the building and strengthening of institutions to promote good governance. In this regard, the NSS notes the importance of changing demographics in Africa and the significance of the youth bulge on the continent.179 The youth bulge is also mentioned in the 2015 Africa Command (AFRICOM) Posture Statement that General Rodriguez briefed to the U.S. Congress. In this report, projections suggest that by 2050, one in four people in the world will live on the continent of Africa.180 The report also estimates that 41% of Africa’s current population is under the age of 15, and it predicts that this number is expected to rise.181 For these reasons, AFRICOM lists “Countering of Violent Extremism and Enhancing Stability in East Africa” as its number one priority.182

Meanwhile, if one looks at U.S. government aid, more goes to East Africa than to any other sub-region of the continent. Excluding Egypt, Kenya is the number one recipient of U.S. foreign aid in Africa, and is slated to receive over $630 million in

179 Ibid.
181 Ibid., 1.
182 Ibid., 8.
Coming in third for U.S. foreign aid in Africa is Tanzania, at nearly $560 million for 2015. Considering these figures, it becomes clear that U.S. interests in East Africa are substantial.

Another way to measure the importance of East Africa to the U.S. is by looking at Washington’s diplomatic commitments. The U.S. diplomatic mission in Kenya started in 1964 and, according to a 2012 United States Department of State Office of Inspector General report, Nairobi is home to the largest U.S. Embassy in Africa. At the time of the report, the embassy employed over 1,300 people across 19 federal agency offices. Of these 1,300 employees, 400 were American. The United States’ bilateral relationship with Tanzania began even earlier—in 1961. According to a 2010 report, the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam is smaller than Nairobi’s, with fewer than 100 American employees and approximately 300 locally employed staff supporting eight federal agencies.

However, despite these sizable embassies there is a gap in the United States’ diplomatic presence in the region. Following the onset of the Somali civil war, the U.S. Department of State closed its embassy in Mogadishu in January 1991. Until recently, the Department of State Somalia Affairs Unit has operated out of Nairobi with a staff of approximately 15 employees, 12 of whom are U.S. personnel. In September 2015, this unit was upgraded to an official U.S. Mission to Somalia with plans to reopen an embassy in Mogadishu. The move back into Somalia is a big step for the State Department. But more importantly, this move signifies the United States’ commitment to the country and region writ large.

184 Ibid.
1. Recommendation for the United States

According to the National Security Strategy, the United States will continue to invest in the future of sub-Saharan Africa. The most prudent form of investment would be via smart power. As first defined by Joseph Nye, smart power reflects “the ability to combine hard and soft power into a successful strategy.”\(^{189}\) It should be noted that this type of approach takes time to mature. This is often difficult for Americans to accept. However, the properly planned and executed use of smart power has the potential to achieve longer lasting and more enduring effects than does the reactive use of hard power alone. The soft elements of smart power allow all of the elements of national power to be applied. In the case of East Africa, this should include:

1. **Invest more in local implementing partners.** Locally supported partners have better on-the-ground awareness of key factors that permit youth to be manipulated. Also, locally run programs provide the opportunity for the U.S. government to help influence areas well outside of the capital city. Perhaps even more importantly, supporting local implementing partners means those partners will help embassy personnel stay informed, and will be well-positioned to help the host nation counter negative influence from external actors.

2. **Understand the environment and pick the right projects.** The United States must be deliberate in where and how it intervenes abroad, and not everywhere or everything can be a priority. A dispersed method prevents U.S.-funded projects from growing too large and from creating dependency issues or inadvertently favoring one community over another. We have seen the problems that can arise from both kinds of situations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, only choosing select projects allows the United States to maintain a small footprint in the host country, preserving the United States’ ability to engage in other regions as necessary.

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3. Increase professionalization of partner-nation forces. Both Kenya and Tanzania have extremely capable military forces. However, given the quickly changing nature of 21st century terrorism, both countries could benefit from additional training and professionalization. Advanced counterinsurgency training, better intelligence-sharing agreements, and training in joint and combined operations would help military units in both countries stay proficient. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Defense should assist Kenya and Tanzania in the development of their own national counterterrorism forces.

4. Increase U.S. Special Operations Forces presence in problem areas. The deployment of select Department of Defense personnel, specifically Special Operations Forces (SOF), to the region would help provide the U.S. government with increased awareness and would prove of assistance to partner forces. These U.S. SOF units should remain small to prevent over-militarizing the situation and should work closely with local partner forces.

5. Get serious in Somalia. Somalia’s collapse and the resulting instability must be remedied if the region hopes to find some level of peace. The establishment of an official diplomatic mission to Somalia is a critical first step; however, much more needs to be done to rebuild such a broken country. One additional step would be for the U.S. to support the training and advising of a dedicated Somali security force that would replace AMISOM. AMISOM should not be relied upon as a permanent solution in Somalia, and the development of Somali security forces would not only enable, but impel the Somali government to take responsibility for its own security situation. Additionally, the U.S. government should work with others to aid Somalia in the establishment of key civil services. This should include standard education, economic, and government services; it should also include infrastructure rebuilding, job training, refugee reintegration, and advancements in information technologies. All of these essential services present the chance for Somalia, and Somalis, to reestablish ownership of the country.
C. FINAL THOUGHTS

If present trends continue, we can expect to see continued influence from external actors and an ever-growing youth bulge. Both will continue to impact the stability of Kenya and Tanzania, as will conditions in Somalia. Somalia’s lack of a functioning government and general lawlessness have proved to be a breeding ground for extremism. This has been the case since the early 1990s, and unless the political and security situation can be changed, violence in Somalia and involving Somalis will continue to have a destabilizing effect throughout the region, but especially in Kenya and Tanzania.

Beyond the effects of spillover violence from Somalia, traditionally tolerant African versions of Islam are also being deliberately targeted, undermined, and replaced by versions that are more radical. Many East Africans Muslims, especially younger Muslims, are seeking to identify their place within global Islam. For those anxious to reject clan or tribal and familial ties, the Umma can be very attractive. But surely there are better ways to capture youths’ attention apart from radicalization. One such option is to actively engage with youth and encourage moderate Islamic practices. Another option would be to work much harder to increase employment opportunities.

The environment in East Africa is quickly changing and radical groups are transforming in order to stay relevant. This can be seen in the emergence of al-Shabaab offshoot organizations, such as al-Hijra in Kenya and Ansar Muslim Youth Center in Tanzania. However, these are just two of a number of extremist organizations. Over the past several decades, both Kenya and Tanzania have made great strides and, as President Obama intoned, steps must continue to be taken to seize the extraordinary potential of the African people. This, too, is why complacency must be fought and proactive measures taken with respect to militant Islam. Otherwise, East Africans will be forced to live with the negative effects brought on by a radical, irresponsible minority.
APPENDIX A. REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MUSLIMS

Regional Distribution of Muslims
Population by region as of 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>3,480,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America-Caribbean</td>
<td>840,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>248,110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East-North Africa</td>
<td>317,070,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>43,490,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>985,530,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of world Muslim population in each region as of 2010

- 15.5% Sub-Saharan Africa
- 19.8% Middle East-North Africa
- 61.7% Asia-Pacific
- 2.7% Europe
- 0.1% Latin America-Caribbean

Population estimates are rounded to the nearest thousand. Percentages are calculated from unrounded numbers. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life • Global Religious Landscape, December 2012

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APPENDIX B. PROJECTED MUSLIM POPULATION GROWTH IN EAST AFRICA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Estimated 1990 Muslim Population</th>
<th>Percentage of 1990 Population that is Muslim</th>
<th>Estimated 2010 Muslim Population</th>
<th>Percentage of 2010 Population that is Muslim</th>
<th>Projected 2030 Muslim Population</th>
<th>Percentage Change of Growing Muslim Population by 2030</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1,406,000</td>
<td>6.00%</td>
<td>2,868,000</td>
<td>7.00%</td>
<td>5,485,000</td>
<td>91.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1,862,000</td>
<td>10.50%</td>
<td>4,060,000</td>
<td>12.00%</td>
<td>6,655,000</td>
<td>63.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>7,637,000</td>
<td>30.00%</td>
<td>13,450,000</td>
<td>29.90%</td>
<td>19,463,000</td>
<td>44.71%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX C. KENYA COUNTRY PROFILE 192

Ethnic groups:
Kikuyu 22%, Luhya 14%, Luo 13%, Kalenjin 12%, Kamba 11%, Kisii 6%, Meru 6%, other African 15%, non-African (Asian, European, and Arab) 1%

Languages:
English (official), Kiswahili (official), numerous indigenous languages

Religions:
Christian 82.5% (Protestant 47.4%, Catholic 23.3%, other 11.8%), Muslim 11.1%, Traditionalists 1.6%, other 1.7%, none 2.4%, unspecified 0.7% (2009 census)

Population:
45,010,056

Country comparison to the world: 31

Age structure:
0-14 years: 42.1% (male 9,494,983/female 9,435,795)
15-24 years: 18.7% (male 4,197,382/female 4,202,399)
25-54 years: 32.8% (male 7,458,665/female 7,302,534)
55-64 years: 3.7% (male 751,296/female 910,523)
65 years and over: 2.8% (male 548,431/female 708,048) (2014 est.)

Median age:
total: 19.1 years
male: 18.9 years
female: 19.2 years (2014 est.)

Population growth rate:
2.11% (2014 est.)
APPENDIX D. TANZANIA COUNTRY PROFILE

Ethnic groups:
mainland - African 99% (of which 95% are Bantu consisting of more than 130 tribes),
other 1% (consisting of Asian, European, and Arab); Zanzibar - Arab, African, mixed
Arab and African

Languages:
Kiswahili or Swahili (official), Kiunguja (name for Swahili in Zanzibar), English
(official, primary language of commerce, administration, and higher education), Arabic
(widely spoken in Zanzibar), many local languages

Religions:
mainland - Christian 30%, Muslim 35%, indigenous beliefs 35%; Zanzibar - more than
99% Muslim

Population:
49,639,138
Country comparison to the world: 26

Age structure:
0-14 years: 44.6% (male 11,173,655/female 10,962,186)
15-24 years: 19.5% (male 4,838,216/female 4,841,338)
25-54 years: 29.5% (male 7,340,129/female 7,289,483)

55-64 years: 3.5% (male 745,214/female 985,524)
65 years and over: 2.9% (male 629,483/female 833,910) (2014 est.)

**Median age:**
- total: 17.4 years
- male: 17.1 years
- female: 17.7 years (2014 est.)

**Population growth rate:**
2.8% (2014 est.)
APPENDIX E. SOMALIA COUNTRY PROFILE

Ethnic groups:
Somali 85%, Bantu and other non-Somali 15% (including 30,000 Arabs)

Languages:
Somali (official), Arabic (official, according to the Transitional Federal Charter), Italian, English

Religions:
Suni Muslim (Islam) (official, according to the Transitional Federal Charter)

Population:
10,428,043
country comparison to the world: 85

Age structure:
0-14 years: 44% (male 2,293,746/female 2,298,442)
15-24 years: 18.9% (male 995,102/female 970,630)
25-54 years: 31.2% (male 1,681,705/female 1,571,586)
55-64 years: 3.6% (male 180,622/female 199,059)

65 years and over: 2.3% (male 92,707/female 144,444) (2014 est.)

Median age:
- total: 17.7 years
- male: 17.9 years
- female: 17.6 years (2014 est.)

Population growth rate:
- 1.75% (2014 est.)
- country comparison to the world: 70
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