TRANSITIONS FROM VIOLENCE TO POLITICS: CONDITIONS FOR THE POLITICIZATION OF VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS

by

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December 2015

Thesis Advisor: Glenn E. Robinson
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Naval Postgraduate School
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**Abstract**

It is imperative for a nation to understand the most effective way to combat threats to its national security, and at times the best reaction to a violent atrocity could be diplomatic. This thesis examines the politicization process of violent non-state actors and the five statistical factors that contribute to the likelihood of a successful transition from violence to politics. These five salient factors include the occurrence of negotiations, the ideology of the organization, the motivations of the organization, the types of targets it selects to attack, and the longevity of the group. These factors are identified through a statistical analysis, and tested in successive chapters examining case studies of violent actors that have successfully politicized, are currently transitioning, or have failed. The objective of this thesis is to determine if the factors examined can be used to predict the likelihood of other violent non-state actors successfully transitioning to politics. Additionally, the case is made that “politicization” significantly reduces violence. The conclusion suggests how legitimate state actors that are combating violent non-state actors can gauge ripeness for politicization and suggests how to focus a state’s efforts in order to support either a political transition or facilitate a group’s collapse.
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It is imperative for a nation to understand the most effective way to combat threats to its national security, and at times the best reaction to a violent atrocity could be diplomatic. This thesis examines the politicization process of violent non-state actors and the five statistical factors that contribute to the likelihood of a successful transition from violence to politics. These five salient factors include the occurrence of negotiations, the ideology of the organization, the motivations of the organization, the types of targets it selects to attack, and the longevity of the group. These factors are identified through a statistical analysis, and tested in successive chapters examining case studies of violent actors that have successfully politicized, are currently transitioning, or have failed. The objective of this thesis is to determine if the factors examined can be used to predict the likelihood of other violent non-state actors successfully transitioning to politics. Additionally, the case is made that “politicization” significantly reduces violence. The conclusion suggests how legitimate state actors that are combating violent non-state actors can gauge ripeness for politicization and suggests how to focus a state’s efforts in order to support either a political transition or facilitate a group’s collapse.
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<td>AIC</td>
<td>Akaike Information Criterion</td>
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<td>AUC</td>
<td>Area under Curve</td>
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<td>BDP</td>
<td>Peace and Democracy Party (Turkey)</td>
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<td>DTP</td>
<td>Democratic Society Party (Turkey)</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
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<td>FJP</td>
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<td>FTO</td>
<td>Foreign Terrorist Organization</td>
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<td>HADEP</td>
<td>People’s Democracy Party (Turkey)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDP</td>
<td>Peoples’ Democratic Party (Turkey)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria; aka Islamic State, Islamic State of the Levant</td>
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<td>KADEK</td>
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<td>MIPT</td>
<td>National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism</td>
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<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Turkey)</td>
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<td>PIRA</td>
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<td>PJAK</td>
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<td>PUK</td>
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<td>PYD</td>
<td>Democratic Union Party (Syria)</td>
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<td>RAND</td>
<td>Research and Development Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>R computer programming language</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Receiver Operating Characteristic</td>
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<td>SFA</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance</td>
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<td>START</td>
<td>National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism And Responses to Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations International Force in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States Army</td>
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<td>United States Navy</td>
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special operations community. Professor Arquilla was not only the first hurdle that we had to overcome to begin our research on this topic, but was also the last as the final safeguard for any research to be published that has affiliation with the distinguished Defense Analysis Department. Professor Warren built upon the foundation laid by Colonel Burks by painstakingly teaching us to use and employ the invaluable tool R \textit{Studio} during our analysis. This greatly eased our burden of combining and analyzing multiple existing databases as one data set, and allowed us to run a regression analysis with a single string of code that would have been very troubling for us to conduct in a standard spreadsheet program otherwise.

Last, we hope that this thesis provides an incentive for those leaders within legitimate state governments and militaries, specifically the United States of America, to consider the array of options at their disposal and not to automatically default to military action when faced with the threats posed by violent organizations. It is our hope that they evaluate the potential second- and third-order effects of combating these threats with force, and compare them to the effects of the potentially more peaceful option of recognizing a grievance and supporting a transition from violence to politics.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

There has been an abundance of analysis devoted to how violent non-state groups are formed, what motivates them, and how counterinsurgencies or state actors can succeed against them. There has not been as thorough an examination conducted, though, regarding what motivates groups to act politically rather than violently. Specifically, research is sparse regarding how violent organizations are encouraged or coerced to move toward politics in lieu of violence as the method to achieve their aims. Scholars have used the term “politicization” to describe the move of a violence-centric group toward political action; this term is used in the same manner throughout this paper.1 By examining violent organizations’ underlying motivations, the trends regarding how violent groups transition to politics, commonalities regarding the environments in which they exist, and the likelihood of politicization can be ascertained. The conditions that favor a violent non-state actor’s transition to political action could, and should, be considered and utilized to the United States’ advantage when determining how to deal with such a group.

Over the last century, there has been an increase in the success rate of extremist organizations and terrorism as a way of achieving political ends.2 At its core, terrorism is an attempt to gain power and exert influence over legitimate governments in an effort to achieve objectives.3 Put a different way, “the central question” this analysis deals with is what “is the relation[ship] between terrorism and political legitimacy?”4 By combating terrorism via military action, democracies often legitimize the violent non-state actors through conflict. Acts of terror serve as a method to achieve short-term aims, but often do not set the conditions to fulfill long-term political interests. If an organization’s ultimate goal is “legitimation,” more study needs to be devoted to why violent extremist

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organizations politicize in lieu of violent means of recognition. More specifically, this analysis addresses a research gap regarding how states may create conditions to encourage, coerce, or incentivize violent non-state actors to move toward politics, or “politicize,” in lieu of violence in order to achieve their aims. The act of terrorism against a state is, at its heart, a desperate attempt to communicate a political message. It is an attempt to gain power, and terrorists are ultimately engaged in a “search for legitimization, an attempt to move up the ladder.” The study of how and why violent non-state actors politicize is an important topic, but its conditions are rarely covered. Further insight into the trends associated with a violent non-state actor’s ending will be valuable in determining U.S. policy and future relations with these organizations.

There are several historical examples of violent non-state actors that have achieved legitimacy and realized enduring goals through a transition from terror to political representation. Significantly, organizations that politicize tend to either fail or become moderate in order to gain a wider base of support. This analysis compares violent organizations that have successfully politicized to those that have failed to transition, and determines commonalities and differences that could influence current violent non-state actors to quell violence in an effort to gain political legitimacy. In addition, regardless of a group’s overall propensity to politicize, the factors that contribute to politicization are worthy of additional research because they may also indicate the likelihood of a group ending via other means as well. This illuminates ways to transition violent non-state organizations peacefully.

This analysis examined eight factors with respect to an organization’s ending and found that five were relevant to politicization: negotiations, ideology, motivations, target selection, and longevity. This shows that the decision to engage in politics in lieu of violent insurgency is most likely to occur when certain factors are present. The factors found to influence politicization the most drastically are negotiations occurring, and attacking government-related targets more than civilian-related ones. Although, not significant, a violent non-state actor being right- or left-wing ideologically inspired;

5 Horowitz, “The Routinization of Terrorism,” 46.
territorially, policy, or regime-change motivated; and having demonstrated longevity are also found to contribute to successful political transitions. Additionally, this analysis examined four case studies, one successful transition to politics, two in transition, and one failure. These case studies validate the statistical findings and demonstrate that there is a reduction in violence following an organization’s politicization. A group’s politicization is defined by this analysis as the first time an organization actively participates in the political apparatus of its host nation. While a violent non-state actor’s shift from violence to politics often takes years to fully materialize, the moment of “politicization” marks a significant point in that transition. By examining violence levels before politicization and after, this analysis reveals a critical shift in focus and activity within a violent non-state actor organization. This further validates the importance of evaluating organizations based upon the factors that influence a group’s transition to politics; there is a notable reduction in violence following politicization.

There are two things that a democratic people will always find very difficult, to begin a war and to end it.

—Alexis de Tocqueville, 1840

In 2003, United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked, “Are we winning or losing the Global War on Terror?” He continued, “Does the U.S. need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The U.S. is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists.”6 His questions and assertions reflect the amount of study that has been dedicated to finding ways to fight terrorism, as opposed to the amount of study applied to preventing terrorism through non-violent means.

Scholars predominantly agree that violence-oriented organizations begin with political objectives and, this analysis contends, with proper negotiations, can end in the

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same manner.\footnote{Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” *Comparative Politics* 13, no. 4 (July 1981): 385; Leonard Weinberg, “Turning to Terror: The Conditions under Which Political Parties Turn to Terrorist Activities,” *Comparative Politics* 23, no. 4 (July 1990): 423; Michael Stohl, *The Politics of Terrorism*, 3rd ed., (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1988), 3; Audrey Kurth Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 7.} Despite the negative connotations associated with the term “terrorism,” it is centrally a means of political expression by those without other means. Martha Crenshaw, an internationally renowned terrorism expert, specifically argues that “terrorism [is] a form of political behavior resulting from the deliberate choice of a basically rational actor, the terrorist organization.”\footnote{Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 380.} Campaigns of violence rely on rational political choice and influence.\footnote{Ibid., 385.} To the extent that an organization is logical, “terrorism is the result of that organization’s decision that it is a politically useful means to oppose a government…[and a] logical means to advance desired ends.”\footnote{Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 385; Weinberg, “Turning to Terror,” 423; Stohl, *The Politics of Terrorism*, 3; Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*, 7.} This assertion regarding a violent organization’s political aspirations at their inception is an important one with regard to how they may end. Violent activity is therefore the logical means of gaining recognition when the power ratio is lopsided; it has potentially high rewards with relatively inexpensive and simple means.\footnote{Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 387.} These widely acknowledged political beginnings suggest the potential for political endings.

This analysis examined the internal and external factors that affect politicization’s outcome. Statistically, certain combinations of internal and external factors yield similar results and could be used to predict or influence the outcome of a violent non-state actor. Different scholars have addressed these contributing conditions and the trends associated with violent non-state actors’ politicization in different ways. Some have examined the currents trends, such as the rise of religious violent non-state actors.\footnote{David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” *Anthropoetics* (University of California Los Angeles) 8, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2002); Nijab Ghadbian, “Political Islam and Violence,” *New Political Science* 22, no. 1 (2000), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713687889#.VITF3UttEds.} Others have
focused on the internal factors related to violent non-state actors.\textsuperscript{13} Lastly, some scholars have concentrated on external factors.\textsuperscript{14} This analysis demonstrates trends associated with both internal and external factors as they relate to violence-centric organizations moving toward politics.

For example, the data surrounding the external factor of negotiations is extremely revealing; it indicates that after five or six years of a violent actor’s existence, entering into talks often facilitates decline.\textsuperscript{15} Audrey Cronin explains that, “there is a direct correlation between the age of groups and the probability of talks, but…only about one in five groups of any age have entered into talks on strategic issues.”\textsuperscript{16} The majority of the time negotiations alone will not yield resolution or a complete end to violence. Additionally, roughly half of terrorist groups that enter into talks do not cease violence during negotiations.\textsuperscript{17} Concessions do not cause increases in violence either. In fact, quite the opposite occurs; the levels of violence tend to decline once negotiations begin.\textsuperscript{18} Only one in ten of these talks fail once they have started.\textsuperscript{19} So, if a state is able to bring a terrorist organization to the negotiating table, there is a high likelihood of being able to encourage a move toward political action. Therefore, from a government’s perspective, it becomes beneficial to negotiate with a violent group when they have demonstrated longevity and are “gaining popular support or legitimacy either through the actions of the group or clumsy counteractions by the government.”\textsuperscript{20} These “negotiations” can take place either directly or indirectly. For example, negotiations sometimes take place via


\textsuperscript{15} Cronin, \textit{How Terrorism Ends}, 35.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 36.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 39.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 41.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 39.
mass media announcements or through the state or terrorist actions.21 This leaves the
body of knowledge regarding negotiation’s impact on politicization somewhat
ambiguous.

A RAND Corporation study in 2008 examined both internal and external factors
associated with violent groups’ endings. Utilizing the National Memorial Institute for the
Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) database, which began noting all terrorist activity
starting in 1968, the study covered all active and formerly active terrorist groups and
determined the different methods of a violent group’s termination. They found that of the
648 groups examined, approximately 43 percent of those no longer active ended through
politicization.22 Of the four different results (military force, victory, policing, and
politicization), politicization was the largest percentile (Figure 1). When taken as an
aggregate, however, the numbers seem much less impressive. Using the same data,
George Mason University’s International Security Program director Audrey Kurth Cronin
asserts that since 1968 only about 18 percent of terrorist groups have negotiated, let alone
ended via politicization.23

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21 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 37.
22 Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End, 19.
23 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 40.
Similarly, Max Abrams, a political science professor at Northeastern University, identifies a significant internal factor that illuminates an organization’s propensity to politicize. By classifying terrorist groups by target selection, a notable trend emerges: terrorists who attack “military” and “diplomatic” targets more than “civilian” ones account for all the successful cases of political coercion. This is a remarkably significant trend that warrants further examination. This one internal target discrimination factor may indicate that a group is ripe for transition to political action.

Notably, the “trend” of terrorism as a method of coercion seems to be on the rise. The perception of terrorism has been different at different points in history. Cronin asserts that during the, “twentieth century there developed a conviction that terrorism was

a promising method of popular resistance to the nation state and a valid means of rectifying injustice.”25 Although democracies claim to not deal with terrorists, all democratic states have negotiated with terrorists at different times.26 The current shift toward terrorism as a means to an end, along with the necessity for legitimate states to deal with violent non-state actors indicate that this issue will expand in the coming years. The rise of the information age and mass media has had a significant impact on violent non-state groups’ politicization and the evolution of their means and goals. Contemporary terror tactics are able to exert more leverage than ever before. This suggests that restraint will be less likely in the future, as sensationalized terrorist attacks continue to gain influence.27

Violent non-state actors recognize that they can demonstrate their political objectives, show their power, and potentially gain recruits through media coverage of attacks. The media and terrorists, therefore, have a somewhat symbiotic relationship. Richard Salant, former president of the CBS network, conceded this point by stating, “terrorism may be encouraged by broadcast coverage.”28 Grant Wardlaw advocates media self-regulation to prevent this conundrum. In a business-driven media environment, however, this seems an unlikely solution. Although his views are obviously politically motivated, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu contends that this is one of the major ways modern terrorism differs from classical terrorism.29 The intended objective of today’s terrorism is to gain publicity across the world, as opposed to military victory or demoralization of a specific opponent.30 The head of the United States State Department Counterterrorism division acknowledged that the rise in casualties in terrorist attacks was a direct result of a desire to ensure media attention.31 Terrorism has become

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25 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 3.
26 Ibid.
27 Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, 57.
28 Ibid., 81.
30 Netanyahu, Terrorism, 108.
31 Ibid., 114.
more than a means of political expression; with the advent of mass media and proliferation of information, it is now a “form of political advertising.” This external factor has had an impact on the longevity of violent actors and the techniques they utilize.

University of California Los Angeles professor emeritus of political science David Rapoport makes a similar case that terrorism has evolved, and though the root causes for violence may remain the same, the motivations for terrorist activities tend to occur in waves. He theorizes that there have been four waves of terrorism: the “Anarchist Wave, the Anti-Colonial Wave, the New Left Wave,” and last the Religious Wave. Examining the active violent extremist organizations throughout the world certainly supports his argument. An examination of the MIPT data on terrorism, and a simple probability determination of politicization, finds that violent groups with religious motivations almost never politicize and tend to remain active longer. So, while the lack of opportunity for political participation is a condition that often motivates terrorism and would seem to indicate political aspirations and therefore a tendency to politicize, the nature of terrorist goals has a substantial impact on politicization (Figure 2). While terrorist goals vary and tend to change over time, most can be categorized in one of six ways: status quo maintenance, “policy change, territorial change, regime change, empire, and social revolution” (Figure 2).

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33 Rapoport, “The Four Waves,” 47.
35 Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 52.
Additionally, the nature of the group’s “grievances matters [sic]; ethnically based terrorist campaigns can be harder to end decisively than politically based ones, because they often enjoy broader support among a population they seek to represent.”

Statistically, organizations with policy, regime, or territorial-based grievances are the most likely to negotiate and eventually politicize. Similarly, the ideology of a group can suggest the manner in which it might end. The religious “wave” of terrorism means that politicizing will become more and more difficult and the survivability of terrorist groups may continue to increase (Figure 3).

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The conditions that precede the rise of violent non-state actors also provide insight toward ways to encourage politicizing and prevent terrorist activities. Through an analysis of RAND’s study one finds that left-wing, policy change-oriented terrorist organizations have the highest proclivity toward politicization.\textsuperscript{38} “Left-wing” is defined as ranging between Marxist-Leninist, environmentalist, anarchical.\textsuperscript{39} Conversely, right-wing and religious movements tend to last longer, are less likely to politicize, and are more resilient. Crenshaw makes the assertion that “social myths, traditions, and habits permit the development of terrorism as an established political custom.”\textsuperscript{40} Traditions or

\textsuperscript{38} Hanrahan and Crowell, “Politicization,” 3.
\textsuperscript{39} Jones and Libicki, \textit{How Terrorist Groups End}, 19.
\textsuperscript{40} Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 382.
cultures of violence in certain areas of the world do not seem predisposed to the rise of violent non-state actors.

Likewise, she asserts that a government’s inability to prevent violent non-state actors is the most salient factor of a group’s longevity and success. This can take form in a variety of ways including everything from incompetent authoritative states to “democratic states whose desire to protect civil liberties constrains security measures.”

This is not a finding in RAND’s study or this analysis, however, as neither regime type nor economic conditions give insight to a terrorist group’s rise or tendency to politicize. Statistically, a violent non-state actor is the least likely to politicize if it exists in a restricting regime. Only 19 percent of groups that politicized have existed in a “not-free” regime. This is expected though, due to a dictatorship’s inclination to destroy opposition swiftly and violently.

There is a danger of oversimplification, however, as the interpretation of the data can differ considerably. Definitions of politicization and interpretations of the data from MIPT display varying results on relevant factors associated with the transition to political action. Cronin explains that the majority of the research on the causes of terrorism are misleading and even counterproductive because when it comes to ending terrorism, there is a weak relationship between beginnings and endings. Motivations of terrorist groups tend to evolve over time, but some factors do remain salient. Specifically with respect to politicization, groups that are hierarchical, with strong leadership, have advantages over those that are decentralized.

An additional factor in many politicization cases is that the group perceives it is losing ground or that a “stalemate” has occurred. William Zartman’s theory of

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42 Hanrahan and Crowell, “Politicalization,” 3.
45 Ibid., 39.
46 Ibid., 40.
“ripeness” is widely accepted as a precursor to successful negotiations, where each side recognizes that continuing the conflict will harm both parties. But ripeness is largely a matter of each side’s perception, and there are additional precursory predicting factors with respect to violent non-state actor organizations. Additional factors considered in this analysis beyond just a “mutually hurting stalemate” and the sense of a way out, indicate whether negotiations tend to succeed or not from the beginning.

The nature of a terrorist group’s attacks also has an effect on the likelihood of negotiations proceeding. For example, the presence of suicide campaigns reduces the chances of politicization because there is often not a readiness to live alongside each other as a result. This is supported by Abrams’ findings regarding types of terrorist attacks and the likelihood of political coercion. For the state, negotiations are a “durable strategic tool for managing violence, splintering the opposition and facilitating its long term decline.”

As famed Harvard professor and former White House National Security Council coordinator Samuel Huntington wrote, “Governments that fail to meet the basic welfare and economic needs of their people and suppress their liberties generate violent opposition to themselves and to Western governments that support them.” While many argue that the key for “reducing violence lies in addressing the political and economic grievances of those who resort to violence,” an examination of terrorist data trends demonstrates that a group’s politicization is related more closely to its evolving goals and certain commonalities in the environment around them. Statistics indicate the most influential factor in politicizing terrorist organizations is beginning negotiations.

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49 Cronin, “Historical Patterns,” 41.


51 Cronin, “Historical Patterns,” 43.


Moreover, there may be a way to exploit certain environmental or goal oriented trends in order to encourage politicization via mass media.

Further exploration of politicization has significant implications on the United States’ budget-constrained and strategically restrained environment. Influencing politicization through negotiations with violent non-state actors that have specific goals and live in certain conditions could reduce violence and prevent future terrorist activities. Through an examination of case studies and identification of internal and external commonalities among violent extremist organizations that politicize, trends can be exploited to bring about a group’s moderation or failure. This would eventually decrease the international proliferation network and provide a non-violent means for dealing with terrorist organizations in certain environments. Democracies often legitimate terrorist organizations by fighting them; if they instead legitimize these groups by nationalizing them and giving them a political voice it would encourage an entirely different type of behavior and path toward political recognition and power.

This research determined salient internal and external conditions that can predict the likelihood of a violent centric group’s potential transition to political action. A combination of certain factors increases the possibility of politicization. Those factors were determined through statistical analysis and tested through case studies. These factors reveal predispositions of violent non-state actors to politicize. The factors of negotiations, ideology, group goals, longevity, target type, regime type, size, and economic conditions were examined in order to develop a deeper understanding of the conditions surrounding politicization. Conducting a statistical analysis to determine factors that influence a transition from violence-centric strategies to political action assists in identifying factors that can predict a group’s likelihood of transition. Conversely, conditions have been identified that indicate a high likelihood of being unable to influence a group to politicize. In both cases, there are legitimate state-actor policy implications with respect to asset allocation, type, and the amount of blood and treasure invested to combat violent non-state actors.

This analysis also examined politicization through case studies. Drawing on previous scholars’ examinations of specific violent non-state actors, this analysis
expounds upon the politicization factors tested through in-depth case study examples. This analysis compared historical examples of successful transition to those currently in transition, as well as to those that have been unsuccessful, and generated additional trends that are useful in predicting the likelihood of future transitions. Equally, groups that are at varying stages of transition between violence and political action may show conditions predictive of their eventual outcome. This specific research is important to the overall study of politicization as a validation and testing of the statistical trends.

Beginning in Chapter II, this analysis presents historic statistical patterns in the conditions of violent non-state actors and their manner of ending. It also narrows the field of factors to those that are statistically significant in predicting politicization. Following the statistical analysis there are four chapters that examine case studies of varying politicization outcomes. Chapter III examines Hizbollah as a case study of a violent non-state actor in transition. The next chapter considers the Irish Republican Army, a case of politicization transition success. Chapter V examines Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, or Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a violent non-state actor in transition whose ultimate politicization success is in question. The last case study chapter examines a politicization failure, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The analysis ends with findings, recommendations, and conclusions.

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II. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF CONDITIONS

The increasing availability of open-source event databases in the field of violent non-state actor attacks has allowed for the growing examination of global trends related to terrorism over the past four decades. By combining three of these databases, this analysis effort furthers the discussion and knowledge of trends correlated with the endings of violent non-state actors. Specifically, this effort statistically examines the internal and external factors that may affect a violent non-state actor’s transition from violent means to politics. Eight factors’ effects on politicization were considered, and five were determined to be significant. The method utilized, which are expounded upon in Section D of this chapter, was binomial regression with the dependent variable of politicization being dichotomous. For the purposes of this analysis, “politicization” is defined as the first time an organization decides to actively participate in a government’s political apparatus.

A. DATASETS

The three databases used in this analysis are the RAND “How Terrorist Groups End” dataset, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Global Terrorism Database, and Audrey Kurth Cronin’s “How Terrorism Ends” negotiation data. Each of these data sets considers different factors. This analysis combines these factors into one data set, “Transitions of Violent Non-state Actors,” to determine trends in what factors lead to a group’s tendency to end through political means. Although primarily focused on politicization, this analysis also considered other endings RAND recorded: splintering, victory, policing, or military force. The 2008 RAND database catalogued and studied the 648 known terrorist groups that existed between 1968 and 2006. During the assessment of these terrorist groups, RAND compared five distinct factors: peak size, strength of the group’s host country


56 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends; Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End; Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland, accessed June 5, 2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.
economy, the host country’s level of freedom, terrorist group type, and the goals of the group. Of those 648 groups, 268 ended variously by way of military force (20), policing (107), finding a political solution (114), or through outright victory (27).\textsuperscript{57} As seen in Figure 1, 43 percent, or 114 of those 268 groups, found a political solution.\textsuperscript{58} The remaining 380 groups had not ended at the time of the study.

B. DATASET FACTORS

Eight factors were analyzed in “Transitions of Violent Non-state Actors:” economy, regime type, peak size of the organization, group ideology, group goals, lifespan, whether negotiations occurred, and a group’s predominant target type. Each factor was considered with respect to ending type with specific attention paid to politicization. The majority of these factors came from the RAND database. RAND’s definitions of these independent factors as defined by each dataset utilized (a–d) are explained in Figure 4. The ending types considered are again listed (e) in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Factor Definitions


\textsuperscript{57} Jones and Libicki, \textit{How Terrorist Groups End}, 19.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid..
Economy—For the factor of economy the World Bank classifications for gross national income per capita were used for the country that each group primarily operated in. This analysis scaled the World Bank classifications from 0 to 3 for low income, lower middle income, upper middle income, and high income respectively. This factor determines if the economic condition of the country a violent non-state actor exists in has bearing upon the way that group may end. The factors c, d, and e were each coded as ordinal factors.

Regime Type—The factor of regime type was coded based upon the Freedom House classifications for the country that each group primarily operated in. The Freedom House scale is based upon political rights and civil liberty ratings. For this analysis, it was coded 0 to 2 for not free, partly free, and free respectively. This factor helped analyze how much impact the type of government has upon the way a group ends.

Peak Size—The peak size of an organization was coded based upon the largest an organization was ever estimated or known to be. For a size of 0 to 99, 10 was used. For a size of 100 to 999, 100 was used. For a size of 1,000 to 9,999, 1,000 was used. Lastly, for an organization estimated at 10,000 personnel or larger, 10,000 was used. This factor indicated if the size of an organization has bearing upon the manner in which it ends.

Ideology—Violent non-state actors were categorized into one of four different ideological groups. Each group was considered religious, nationalist, left-wing, or right-wing. This analysis coded each ideology as a binary factor. Every organization was given either a 0 or 1 for each ideology. The analysis indicated if certain ideologies are more susceptible to certain endings than others.

Goals—Similarly, the factor of goals was also coded as a binary factor. Each group was classified into one of six different goal types: “regime change, territorial change, policy change, empire, social revolution, or status quo.” These group goals are based upon the overall objective the group hopes to achieve. For example, ISIS would be considered an empire-goal-oriented group because they want to establish a Caliphate. Meanwhile the Irish Republican Army would be considered territorial-change-motivated

59 Kydd, and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 52.
because they wanted to unite Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland. This factor indicated how significant a group’s overall motivations are to the way that group ends.

**Lifespan**—Longevity is defined as the total time of activity determined by a group’s first and last attack.\(^{60}\) This factor was taken from Audrey Cronin’s dataset on negotiations. The number of years an organization had existed was then entered into “Transitions of Violent Non-state Actors” to determine the effect a group’s longevity may have upon its ending type.

**Negotiations**—The factor of negotiations was coded as a binary factor as well. Negotiation is defined as *any* participation in negotiations to include whether the violent non-state actor “engaged in any discussions with external agents.”\(^{61}\) Negotiation most commonly occurs with the government of a state in which the violent non-state actor is active, and it is usually over the group’s goals. “Organizations solely engaged in tactical negotiation such as hostage negotiations were not coded as having negotiated.”\(^{62}\) This analysis did not take into account the groups’ negotiations partners, only that negotiations occurred. A more in-depth look at the specifics within the negotiations is considered in the case study analysis.

**Target Type**—This analysis used the START database to examine target selection. For the purposes of this study, targets were categorized as either a government-related or civilian-related target. START categorized each attack’s target as one of 22 different types and recorded targets/victims for each incident. “When a victim was attacked specifically because of his or her relationship to a particular person, such as a prominent figure, the target type classification reflects that motive.”\(^{63}\) In this analysis, numbers 2, 3, 4, and 7 (Table 1) were considered government-related attacks, while


\(^{61}\) Cronin, “Raw Data Downloads.”


\(^{63}\) Cronin, “Raw Data Downloads.”
everything else was deemed a civilian-related target. START’s target distinctions are listed in Table 1.

Table 1. Target Type Distinctions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>government (general)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>abortion related</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>airports &amp; aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>government (diplomatic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>educational institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>food or water supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>journalists &amp; media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>maritime (includes ports and maritime facilities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>private citizens &amp; property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>religious figures/institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>telecommunication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>terrorists/non-state militias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>tourists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>transportation (other than aviation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>utilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>violent political parties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Global Terrorism Database Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables, August 2014, University of Maryland, 31.

C. ASSUMPTIONS

This analysis assumes that the data represented in the collected databases is accurate and complete. This analysis did not attempt to confirm the veracity of the data. The databases used cover organizations from 1968–2008, so there are some organizations either not included or whose information regarding politicization has changed. For this analysis, the data was considered complete regardless of any change in status that may have occurred since 2008. Changes in the factors since the data was collected and the database constructed are taken into account in the case study analysis.
D. METHODS

This analysis uses regression analysis to expand on RAND’s and Audrey Cronin’s previous studies to determine the influence that specific external and internal factors have on a group’s propensity to politicize. Further analysis assesses whether there were specific influences present that shaped the conditions necessary for each success or failure of terrorist transition to political action. Specific influences proved to be a significant factor among violent non-state actors that politicize, and provide some insight into conditions that have a greater bearing on how violent organizations end. A binomial, or “logistic,” regression was used throughout the analysis with the dependent variable of politicization being dichotomous.

The program R was utilized to analyze the datasets and merge the above-mentioned data. The ending type of each violent non-state actor was analyzed as the dependent variable while the previously described factors were analyzed as independent factors. Within R, there are numerous available libraries that allow you to perform any number of functions to analyze your data sets. Additionally, different R functions provide diagrams, tables, and charts that display the results of your analysis. The analysis utilized R to produce tables that provide the coefficients for each independent factors and its level of significance within the model. The R library and command VISREG was utilized to visualize trends in the independent factors. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves were utilized to compare and contrast both independent and dependent variable accuracy and impact upon the model. In a ROC curve, the sensitivity, also known as the true positive rate, is plotted in comparison to the false positive rate. The area under curve (AUC) represents the models predictive accuracy. Similarly, the “Akaike information criterion (AIC) is a measure of the relative quality of a statistical model” and can estimate the quality in comparison to other models.

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E. RESULTS

This analysis found that some of the factors tested are more relevant to politicization than others. This section explains each factor’s significance in regard to politicization and the overall model’s results with respect to ending type.

In regard to size, regime type, and economy, there is not enough statistical evidence to infer a strong relationship between those factors and an organization politicizing. The organization goals and ideology, however, did have a strong relationship when a group ended via politics. Politicization with respect to ideology and goals was shown to have the strongest relationship (Figure 5). Additionally, there is a positive trend associated with politicization and negotiations and lifespan. This positive trend in lifespan is not significant due to its variance, however (Figure 9).

Figure 5. Politicization ROC Curve

![Politicization ROC Curve](image.png)
The first factor that this analysis determined warrants further case study analysis was negotiations. Negotiations relationship to politicization was shown to have a strong-positive linear relationship (Figure 6). Therefore, if an organization is offered negotiations by its adversary, the path to politicization is often accepted.

Figure 6. Politicization and Negotiations

Ideology was also shown to have a strong relationship with politicization. Religious ideological-motivated groups have an extremely low chance of moving to political action, whereas right-wing ideological groups have the highest propensity to politicize; this was found to be slightly higher than left-wing ideological groups (Figure 7). Nationalist ideological groups tend to have a low propensity to politicize.
The factor of goals highlights a few issues that should be considered when attempting to negotiate a political settlement with a violent non-state actor. When considering a violent non-state actor’s goals, the analysis determined that groups concerned with policy change and territorial change have the highest likelihood of politicizing (Figure 8). With respect to an organization’s goals, if its desired end-state is to establish an empire, historically there is less than a one percent chance that politicization will work. If the group desires policy, regime, or territorial change, however, there is a reasonable chance of being able to negotiate a political end to the violence.
With respect to the lifespan of an organization, the longer one exists, the more likely it is to politicize; however, there is a wide confidence band as groups achieve longevity. Although it shows a trend, lifespan is not shown as a significant predicting factor (Figure 9).
In the case of regime type, the majority of terrorist organizations that politicize did so in a free democratic regime. This is understandable given the democratic process of election by majority vote. Hence, if an organization has enough support from the community, they are more likely to be elected and address their grievances from within the existing political framework. This factor was, however, shown to have a wide range-band in politicization.

Lastly, with respect to economic conditions, the percentages demonstrate that the economy of the state in which the terrorists operate does not have bearing on a predisposition to politicize.

Table 2 reports the results from modifying the politics model into 8 separate models. Each model utilized a single or grouping of independent factors. The first 6 models utilized a single independent factor, where models 7 through 9 utilized groups of like independent factors. For example, each type of goal (“regime change, territorial change, policy change, regime change, and social revolution”) was grouped together.66

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66 Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 52.
Interestingly, size (only at the 100 range) is shown to be significant along with negotiations, regime type, ideology, and goals (Table 2). This provides evidence that further supports the significance of ideology and goal type. They produced AIC scores of 551 and 568 respectively.

Table 2. Regression—Politics (Analysis of Politics as Dependent Variable)
Table 3 reports the results from the original model in regard to ending type. The different endings were the dependent variables: politics, policing, splintering, victory and military force. Each model contains the same independent factors: peak size (Peak.Size), lifespan (Lifespan..0.recoded.to.1), negotiation (Negotiate), attacks on government or military (govmil), economy (Economy), freedom scale (FreeScale), right-wing (Right.Wing), nationalist (Nationalist), religious ideologies (Religion), regime change (Regime.Change), territorial change (Territorial.Change), policy change (Policy.Change), empire (Empire), and social revolution (Social.Revolution). The results of this analysis demonstrate more predictability in the model with respect to victory and military force. This is based on their AIC scores of 118 for victory and 149 for military force.

The model, intended to predict and determine conditions for politicization, actually had a lower AIC for victory and military force and predicts the outcomes of those ending types better than it does for politicization. Looking at all ending types, though, one can confirm across almost all types that goals and ideology are the most important factors (Table 3). Additionally, negotiations and size seem to have significance across different ending types (Table 3).

Conducting a ROC curve analysis for all ending types, the previous results were confirmed. Models 4 and 5 had the most predictive accuracy (Figure 10). This indicates that the factors this analysis studies for politicization are also significant, in fact even more so, for predicting an organization ending via military force or victory.
Table 3.  Regression—Endings (Analysis by “Ending” Dependent Variables)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Policing</th>
<th>Splintering</th>
<th>Victory</th>
<th>Military Force</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>(1.072)</td>
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<td>(0.018)</td>
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<td>(0.026)</td>
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<td>(0.954)</td>
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<td>(0.494)</td>
<td>(2.545,376)</td>
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<td>(0.863)</td>
<td>(0.767)</td>
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<td>(2.154,038)</td>
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F. IMPLICATIONS

Given the factors considered, the likelihood that current or future terrorist groups will end through politicization can be assessed. Policy makers may use this information to determine the type and level of support necessary to combat emerging terrorist threats around the world. If the probability of finding a political solution is high, then the United States could support and advise the host country appropriately. Likewise, if the probability is low or non-existent, the United States could look at other solutions such as supporting policing or military efforts through Security Force Assistance (SFA) and Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Ultimately, by examining the conditions and motivations of those organizations that did politicize in the past, a probability of finding a similar peaceful solution for future violent organizations may be found.

Like all models, this one is not perfect, but it can support basic analysis for evaluating end game solutions of violent non-state actors. Based upon mathematical and
historical data, the probability for success of politicization, policing, military, splintering, or terrorist victory can be speculated. The results of the regression analysis suggest that additional factors may prove salient in determining the outcome, and future research should be focused on finding more statistically relevant factors. For example, the involvement of foreign governments on a group’s politicization was not taken into account; a surrogate war, financed or supported by an outside actor, changes the dynamics of a terrorist organization and can unduly influence it.

The analysis continues with case studies chosen to represent successful, transitioning, or failed attempts at politicization. The following case studies validated the statistical findings above and provided insight into further factors that should be considered.
III. HIZBOLLAH: CURRENTLY TRANSITIONING

Founded in 1982, following the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, Hizbollah’s name means Party of God.67 The original goal of Hizbollah “was to fight the Israeli occupation and create a Shi’a state in Lebanon, modeled on Iran.”68 As such, the organization was originally supported by Iran and remains so today. The origins of the organization and the external influences on it will be discussed more in depth later. Although not deemed “politicized” by most databases and still labeled a foreign terrorist organization by many countries, Hizbollah did enter the political arena in 1992. Hizbollah-backed politicians won eight of 128 parliamentary seats that year in the Lebanese election and ever since have maintained roughly 10 percent representation in parliament.69 In the year prior they had refused to participate in favor of continuing to criticize governmental mistakes and claimed that the system was corrupt.70 Hizbollah had not been willing to shoulder responsibility or recognize the government as legitimate.

That position has slowly changed, however. Over the last two decades, Hizbollah has evolved from a violent non-state actor that “rejects participation in politics to a legitimate political party” with considerable influence, popular support, and autonomy within Lebanon.71 The organization’s transition from a violent extremist actor to a powerful political party was examined in order to analyze the internal and external factors that contributed to its evolution. Or conversely, perhaps determine factors that retarded that transition. Additionally, the reduction in violence that coincides with Hizbollah candidates running for political office demonstrates the importance of influencing other organizations to politicize and encourage further political action. Lastly, the transition from violence to political legitimacy corresponds with an increase in

67 Norton, Hezbollah, 34.
69 Phillips, From Bullets to Ballots, 45.
70 Norton, Hezbollah, 100.
71 Ibid., xi.
Hizbollah’s autonomy from Iranian influence and a reduction in the organization’s transnational proliferation network ties. This demonstrates both the nationally stabilizing effects of politicization and the international benefits.

A. BACKGROUND

In many ways, Hizbollah’s inception and support is derived from Israeli policies. When Israel invaded southern Lebanon in 1982 and stayed, Hizbollah was formed. Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak explained in 2006 “when we entered Lebanon… there was no Hezbollah. We were accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shi’a in the south. It was our presence there that created Hezbollah.” Iran saw an opportunity to advance its own interests in the region when Israel invaded and actively assisted with the organization and construction of Hizbollah. The organization first gained notoriety and international attention in 1983 by bombing the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. In 1988–89 fighting erupted between Amal, who was at the time the premier Shi’a militant organization in Lebanon, and the then fledgling Hizbollah over the kidnapping of U.S. Marine LTC Higgins. An Amal affiliated group sympathetic to the more militant Hizbollah kidnapped Higgins threatening Amal’s cooperative relationship with United Nations International Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL). Although Amal remains popular in southern Lebanon, Hizbollah eroded their power and military influence in Beirut during this conflict. Similarly, Iranian material and religious backing has allowed Hizbollah to supplant Amal over the years.

The 2006 war, when Israel retaliated to Hizbollah’s capture of two Israeli soldiers by invading southern Lebanon, catapulted the national and international perception of the Hizbollah as a military force to be reckoned with. While the war ended in a stalemate, it also solidified Hizbollah’s role as a powerful political player and military player in the

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72 Norton, Hezbollah, 33.
73 Ibid., 6.
74 Ibid., 43.
75 Ibid., 44.
76 Ibid., 72.
state, as the “regional exemplar for opposition minded Muslims.” Importantly, in the war with Israel, although there was no clear declared victor, Hizbollah’s perceived strength and resiliency gained it significant popular support. The organization won the information war, in part, through sustained fighting and rocket attacks. In fact, Hizbollah fired more rockets on the last day of the conflict than it did on the first. This indicated to the world the organization’s might and evolution into a viable and formidable fighting force. It also allowed Hizbollah to publically claim victory.

B. CONDITIONS

The conditions that lead to politicization have statistically been analyzed in a number of studies. This chapter will specifically analyze: negotiations occurring, the ideology of the organization, motivations, target selection, and the longevity of Hizbollah to determine if its conditions are consistent with previously calculated probabilities. This may provide valuable insight into the direction Hizbollah is heading as an organization.

The data associated with negotiations indicates that entering into talks greatly increases the probability of politicizing. Hizbollah has negotiated extensively with the Lebanese government over disarming and its position within the political apparatus. Statistical examination indicates that after five or six years of a violent actors existence, entering into talks will often facilitate their decline or transition to politics. “There is a direct correlation between the age of groups and the probability of talks, but…only about one in five groups of any age have entered into talks on strategic issues.” Although roughly half of terrorist groups that enter into talks do not cease violence during negotiations, the levels of violence do tend to decline once negotiations begin. Only one

81 Ibid., 36.
82 Ibid., 36–39.
in ten of these talks fail once they have started.\textsuperscript{83} So, once Lebanon brought Hizbollah to the negotiation table, there was already a high likelihood of being able to encourage a move toward political action.

In 2008, after nearly 18 months of sit-in protests, Hizbollah received concession from the majority government alliance. An outside actor, Qatar, mediated the negotiations. In return for “promising not to use armed force within Lebanon to solve internal political problems,” Hizbollah gained veto power in the cabinet.\textsuperscript{84} Importantly, they did not agree to disarm, which was the crux of the negotiation. More recently, the debate of disarmament has evolved. The national defense strategic debate in Lebanon is considering maintaining Hizbollah’s militant wing as an asymmetric counter to external threats.\textsuperscript{85} The debate centers on incorporating Hizbollah’s militant wing into the national defense plan, instead of disarming them. This would align the group with the Lebanese military while maintaining a degree of its autonomy. While maintaining a violent non-state actor’s militant force sounds alarming, stipulating oversight from the Lebanese military would decrease potential international threats from the organization.

Hizbollah is an ideologically religious organization. Its leaders and followers are motivated by Shi’a solidarity. In order to win elections or gain majority voting, though, their party often aligns with other minority groups, which demonstrates a degree of pragmatism and tolerance not typical to religiously motivated violent non-state actors. Statistically, religiously motivated groups are extremely unlikely to politicize, evidenced by only one ever moving toward political action according to RAND’s definition and database. This trend may be on the verge of changing, however, as religiously motivated groups continue to become more widespread.\textsuperscript{86} As the “wave” of religiously motivated organizations continues violent non-state actors are likely to continue to become more

\textsuperscript{83} Cronin, \textit{How Terrorism Ends}, 41.


\textsuperscript{86} Rapoport, “The Four Waves,” 66.
resilient and last longer. Hizbollah’s demonstrated practicality indicates that their ideology may not be as limiting to their politicization as past trends have shown.

Hizbollah is a regime-change motivated group; meaning in its original charter the organization wanted to replace the Lebanese government by “freeing the people from internal and external domination.”

The open letter that Hizbollah released in 1985 justified its use of violence to free the Lebanese people but did not address its own political design for Lebanon. Statistically speaking, groups with regime-change grievances are one of the most likely to negotiate and eventually politicize. So, while Hizbollah’s ideological underpinnings implicate a resistance to political action, their overall goals show the opposite. Additionally, although Hizbollah has never renounced the harsh language or declarations in their open letter, their goals have continued to evolve as they have begun to participate in the Lebanese political process.

Hizbollah’s target selection is consistent with a group that politicizes. In all the successful cases of violent non-state actor politicization the group has attacked “military” and “diplomatic” targets more than “civilian” ones. Hizbollah maintains this trend with a total of 176 government and military attack incidents (Figure 11) and 108 civilian attack incidents (Figure 12).

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Additionally, it is worth noting that Hizbollah’s attacks on civilian targets dropped below eight per year in 1987 and has remained that way through the present.\textsuperscript{91} Not only is their aggregate “target type” ratio congruent with groups that politicize, their trend toward government and military targets clearly indicated a propensity to politicize after 1987.

\textsuperscript{91} Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland, accessed June 5, 2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&perpetrator=407&target=6&target=1&target=8&target=10&target=12&target=14&target=15&target=18&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=.
Hizbollah has existed for over three decades, statistically the longer a group exists the more likely it is to politicize. Therefore, the longevity of Hizbollah indicates a positive relationship with the probability of further and continued politicization. Furthermore, Hizbollah is hierarchical in its organization. This creates conditions favorable to politicization because Hizbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, provides centralized guidance and direction that followers are expected to adhere to. Dissent is not tolerated in hierarchical organizations therefore politicization is more probable. As opposed to cellular structured groups lacking strong centralized leadership. So, because it is a hierarchical organization that has demonstrated resiliency and longevity further politicization of Hizbollah seems probable.

93 Ibid., 39.
94 Shapiro, *The Terrorist’s Dilemma*, 12.
95 Cronin, “Historical Patterns,” 39.
C. VIOLENCE LEVELS

By analyzing violence levels before and after politicization, with politicization defined as the first time Hizbollah ran for a political office, the effects of transitioning to politics can be determined. Specifically within Lebanon, Hizbollah has conducted a total of 302 incidents (Figure 13). Taking into account its entry into politics in 1992, though, one can quickly see that the number of incidents drops significantly following political action. There is a sharp rise in incidents in 2006 due to the war with Israel.

Figure 13. Hizbollah Lebanon Violence Level


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When adjusted to account for both national and international incidents, Hizbollah has conducted 384 total incidents over the organization’s lifespan (Figure 14). The more recent increase illustrated below is largely due to Hizbollah’s current operations in Syria against Sunni extremist.

Figure 14. Hizbollah Total Violence Level

![Hizbollah Total Violence Level](source)

Although Hizbollah continues to have a militant wing despite becoming a political party in Lebanon, from the figures it is clear that there has been a decrease in violence following the 1992 elections. In the first decade of its existence, Hizbollah conducted a total of 177 attacks (17.7 per year). In the twenty-two years since it entered

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97 Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland, accessed June 5, 2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&country=110&perpetrator=407&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=.

98 Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland, accessed June 5, 2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&country=110&perpetrator=407&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=.
Lebanese politics, the total number of attacks is 207 (9.4 per year).\textsuperscript{99} This shows a 47 percent decline in Hizbollah’s attack rate since politicization.

D. PROLIFERATION

Iranian nuclear weapon aspirations continue to remain evident and the likelihood of that goal being achieved is becoming more probable, so it is increasingly important to prevent proliferation to violent non-state actors associated with Iran. The nuclear deal’s limitations and the Iranian position with respect to the deal were clearly explained by Iran’s deputy foreign minister following the P5+1 agreement. He stated that the deal “didn’t include limitations on Iran’s weapons capabilities or missile power and that Tehran would keep arming its regional allies.”\textsuperscript{100} Abbas Araqchi went on to explain on Iranian state television, “we have told [the P5+1 world powers] in the negotiations that we will supply arms to anyone and anywhere necessary and will import weapons from anywhere we want and we have clarified this during the negotiations.”\textsuperscript{101} So, while Iranian nuclear aspirations have been stymied by the agreement and it is doubtful that Iran would ever use nuclear weapons beyond a strategy of deterrence and influence within their region, it is not improbable for proliferation to occur to a violent non-state actor for an attack to be conducted by a proxy force. This is where further politicization of Hizbollah becomes extremely important. As Hizbollah enters further into the political arena in Lebanon, and becomes a more powerful political party within the governmental system, their level of violence and influence from outside actors has decreased. While Iran does still have influence, they no longer have “veto” power, and they increasingly do not have operational or planning input in Hizbollah’s militant acts or political

\textsuperscript{99} Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland, accessed June 5, 2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&country=110&perpetrator=407&dt p2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=.

\textsuperscript{100} Times of Israel Staff and AFP, “Iran’s deputy FM: We told world powers we’ll keep arming our allies,” \textit{Times of Israel}, July 22, 2015, http://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-s-deputy-fm-we-told-world-powers-well-keep-arming-our-allies/.

\textsuperscript{101} Times of Israel Staff and AFP, “Iran’s deputy FM.”
decisions. This is significant when one considers the possibilities of proliferation in a potentially nuclear-armed Iranian world. As Hizbollah becomes more politically powerful on a national scale they also become more independent from Iranian influence, reduce their levels of violence, and are therefore less likely to participate in transnational proliferation due to its potential degradation of their political legitimacy.

E. CONCLUSION

Hizbollah is perhaps a somewhat unique “terrorist organization” in that its primary goal and focus was always to fight an outside state entity, Israel. In this respect the organization garnered significant popular support from the Lebanese people when the Lebanese government and military were unable to adequately provide material support and protection from Israeli incursions into Lebanon. It has evolved into a powerful political party, though, and encouraging further politicization will lead to more oversight from the Lebanese government, which will, in turn, lead to less violence and external influence on the organization. Further national politicization of Hizbollah will, over time, alienate the group from its state sponsor of Iran and continue its reduction of national and international violence. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, as Hizbollah continues to become more intimately entwined with governmental politics within Lebanon, the likelihood of it proliferating via the transnational violent non-state actor network becomes less and less probable. Instead of alienating Hizbollah, the international community would be well advised to instead attempt to influence their further politicization. The conditions expounded upon in the preceding section indicate that further politicization is probable. Advancing that transition will decrease the potential threat of Hizbollah to the international community.

IV. IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY: TRANSITION SUCCESS

The increasing number and frequency of radical movements throughout the world over the past century has brought to light the inadequacies and pitfalls of many states’ abilities to suppress or control these movements. Due to this growing concern it may prove useful to more adequately examine how and why a specific former violent extremist group decided to moderate. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was once one of the most violent and effective terrorist organizations in the world. As a point of clarity, in order to remain succinct, this chapter will not delineate between or devote time to describing the different splinter groups of the republican movement, but will instead refer to all militant republican factions broadly as the IRA. Today, the IRA has demilitarized and been completely subsumed by the republican movement’s political wing, Sinn Fein. So, why did the IRA decide to give up their arms and work toward their aims politically rather than violently and what conditions encouraged them to do so? The answer to this question has implications far beyond Ireland and Great Britain.

A. BACKGROUND

The relationship between the IRA and Sinn Fein, as most people think of it today, began after the Irish Volunteer’s staged the Easter Rebellion in 1916. While the Feinians trace their roots much further back to the Irish Republican Brotherhood founded in 1858, it wasn’t until after 1916 that the IRA organization began to emerge.103 The Easter Rebellion brought the issue of Home Rule, or self-determination, to the forefront of the Irish politics. This was mostly due to Great Britain’s handling of the Irish rebels after they retook Dublin. Interestingly, the initial reaction of most Dubliners was decidedly against the rebellion. Due to the hardships it had caused the majority of citizens, when the rebellion leaders were initially captured and marched through the city they were jeered and had vegetables thrown at them.104 The subsequent execution of sixteen of the rebellion’s leaders, however, created a public relations fiasco across Ireland for Great

103 Feeney, Sinn Fein, 23.
Britain.\textsuperscript{105} It effectively martyred the leaders of the rebellion, increasing grassroots support for their cause. To this day, there is still a memorial in the former Arbour Hill prison where fourteen of the men were executed by firing squad. The Easter Rebellion soldiers that were not killed spent time in a Wales prison, where they perfected their trade and adjusted their strategic methods. Michael Collins, a foot soldier captured during the Easter Rebellion, emerged as a new leader of the republican movement with a different strategy for winning Irish independence.\textsuperscript{106} Sinn Fein, with the new political clout garnered from the rebellion, began to work in concert with the IRA insurgency strategy toward achieving an independent and self-determined Ireland.

This connection was initially precarious and throughout the years there were numerous violent rifts in the IRA over the amount of force necessary and its relationship to republican politics. There were divergent views and conflict about gaining independence and uniting Ireland via military force or via political means. Throughout most of the 20th century the militant wing dominated that discussion. After the 1922 partitioning of Ireland, the IRA garnered popular support in Northern Ireland by protecting Catholic neighborhoods from loyalist paramilitary sectarian groups. But in the early 1980s, when IRA activists in the H-block of the prison, started a hunger strike over their living conditions and treatment as common criminals instead of political prisoners, a number of IRA leaders realized the potential of emphasizing politics more than violence. The hunger strikers drew national and international attention to Sinn Fein and the IRA’s cause. Bobby Sands, the leader of the strike, died in prison along with ten other hunger strike prisoners.\textsuperscript{107} Significantly, during the strike Sands was elected as a Member of Parliament and many of his fellow prisoners were also elected to lesser political positions throughout Northern Ireland. The grass roots support and outrage the hunger strike generated drove the republican movement toward political mobilization in a way not seen since “the troubles” in 1969.\textsuperscript{108} During that previous period, the IRA had split over the

\textsuperscript{105} Coogan, 1916, 143.


\textsuperscript{107} Feeney, Sinn Fein, 289.

policy of abstentionism, whereby republicans would run for political office but if elected would refuse to sit or participate in any assembly because that would acknowledge the legitimacy of the British system. While Sinn Fein had always been closely connected with the IRA, it had never been the more powerful organization. After “the troubles” when sectarian violence between the republicans and loyalist killed over 2,000 people in Northern Ireland, and beginning with the H-block hunger strikes, that began to change.\footnote{Feeney, \textit{Sinn Fein}, 251.}

Danny Morrison, a Sinn Fein spokesman and IRA member, explained in 1981 the shifting mindset by stating, “Who here really believes we can win a war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in one hand and an Armalite in the other, we take power in Ireland?”\footnote{Ibid., Introduction.} Initially, this shift was due to a realization that Sinn Fein had more widespread popular support because of Britain’s reaction to the hunger strike. The same shift had happened after 1916. To a lesser degree, it also happened in Northern Ireland whenever British forces, or loyalist paramilitary units, used brutality for enforcement and accidentally, or intentionally in some cases, killed Catholic citizens. The British perpetuated a classic counterinsurgency mishap by pushing the populace into the arms of the militants through alienating and minimizing their grievances, thereby making them voiceless and disenfranchised with the acting government. Britain’s tacit allowance of sectarian violence only served to bolster the IRA, in the same way the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon necessitated armed protection forces in the eyes of many Shia locals.\footnote{Norton, \textit{Hezbollah}, 77.} The IRA had always been skilled at taking advantage of Great Britain’s mistakes, but the shift toward politicization and renewed power of Sinn Fein was triggered by more than just a recognized opportunity. By the 1980s, the IRA was losing material and personnel support at an alarming rate. Twenty-six militant members died violently between 1987 and 1988.\footnote{Richard English, \textit{Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA}, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 260.} Even more significantly, the victims of the IRA’s politically motivated violence were not always military opposition forces, and the IRA recognized that it was risking political
catastrophe if the pattern continued.\textsuperscript{113} The leadership of the republican movement endeavored to alter the strategy, using the IRA’s violence as a tightly controlled tactic in order to gain strategic political advances.\textsuperscript{114} In 1986, the majority of Sinn Fein decided to end abstentionism and begin to participate in the political apparatus that they did not recognize as legitimate.\textsuperscript{115} It was an important step toward a peaceful resolution influenced by the ascension of a younger generation of IRA leaders.

The process of legitimate political talks began with the rise and empowerment of the Sinn Fein party. This was an important step in finding a middle ground for further negotiations with the IRA. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, it was a step toward further politicization of the IRA and legitimization of the hardline republican political entity. Significantly, portions of Great Britain political elite seem to have finally begun to realize the pathway to peace was through politics and not through military means. The IRA strategy, however, publically remained the same as stated in 1989 that, “at some point in the future, due to the pressure of the continuing and sustained armed struggle, the will of the British government to remain in this country will be broken. That is the objective of the armed struggle…we can state confidently today that there will be no ceasefire and no truces until Britain declares its intent to withdraw and leave our people in peace.”\textsuperscript{116} Privately within the organization the tides were changing as Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, legitimate and credible militant leaders began to urge further politicization.

While the British certainly made numerous mistakes during the IRA’s move from violence to politics, it is important to point out the ways they did encourage politicization. In 1994, multi-party negotiations began after the IRA agreed to a ceasefire.\textsuperscript{117} Tony Blair allowed talks to begin despite British initial insistence for the IRA to decommission all arms prior to talks. These talks eventually led to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{113} Shanahan, \textit{The Provisional Irish Republican Army}, 136; Feeney, \textit{Sinn Fein}, 341.
  \item \textsuperscript{114} Feeney, \textit{Sinn Fein}, 342.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 334.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} English, \textit{Armed Struggle}, 263.
  \item \textsuperscript{117} Feeney, \textit{Sinn Fein}, 408.
\end{itemize}
the decommissioning of IRA arms beginning in 2001. The Good Friday settlement set up an “inclusive devolved government in the North, and altered the Southern government’s constitutional claim to the whole island” in the Constitution of Ireland. Through negotiations both sides were able to achieve victories they had been fighting for decades. Because of the Good Friday Agreement, “after 27 years of direct rule from London, authority over local affairs was transferred to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive on December 1, 1999. London, however, retained control over ‘reserved’ matters including policing, prisons, and the criminal justice system.” Difficulties remained however, and the devolution did not take effect until a power sharing agreement was made between the Ulster Democratic Unionist Party, a loyalist political party, and Sinn Fein later in 2007. But the significance of the compromise and resulting sustained impact of Sinn Fein’s power over the militant movement was vital. Sinn Fein formally and publically called on the IRA to completely demilitarize on April 6, 2005, when Gerry Adams asked the IRA “to abandon violence and [engage in] politics as an alternative to armed struggle.” Shortly after, on July 28, 2005, the IRA directed an end to its armed campaign instructing all members to “pursue aims through exclusively peaceful means” and to “not engage in any other activities whatsoever.” IRA units were instructed to “dump arms.” By encouraging politicization through sincere and equitable negotiations Great Britain was able discourage legitimacy through violence and instead support legitimacy through politics.

B. CONDITIONS

Due to the fact that the IRA is a group that has politicized, an analysis of the conditions this transition occurred under is essential. Considering the same previous

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118 Feeney, Sinn Fein, 422.
120 Archick, “Northern Ireland,” 3.
121 Ibid., 7.
122 Ibid., 5.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
factors may demonstrate similarities that encouraged a move toward politics over violence. The conditions that allowed that movement are significant in determining how violent-centric organizations can be urged toward non-violent means.

Initially, the British repeatedly promoted IRA violence through their own brutality and marginalization of the Catholic communities, first in Ireland and later in Northern Ireland. By not adequately enforcing the rule of law and allowing indiscriminate sectarian violence between loyalist and republicans, the Catholic communities were pushed into the open arms of the IRA for protection. Without the popular support gained from that protection the IRA likely would have been hard pressed to remain as relevant as it did for so long. The prolonged existence and adapting nature of the IRA and Sinn Fein have made it impracticable to examine every aspect of the conflict and the associated conditions. Thus, this analysis focuses mainly on the conditions and timeframe leading up to politicization.

From the IRA and Sinn Fein’s position, numerous factors stimulated their participation in negotiations. As their own popular support ebbed and flowed, they became more or less interested in politics, and as such negotiating a political settlement. At different times throughout the history of the conflict the republicans believed they held a majority backing in Ireland. When this was the case they moved toward political means. Likewise, when the militant republicans were hard pressed by material and/or personnel losses they moved toward politics as a means of negotiating their end-state. They did not want to risk destruction by directly confronting governmental forces and needed to attempt to maintain effective protection and control of the populace.125 Today, Sinn Fein is the second largest party in the Northern Ireland Assembly, and a legitimate peaceful political party.126 It is the fourth largest party in the Republic of Ireland. Meanwhile the IRA, minus small separatist paramilitary splinter units, has completely demilitarized. While there are numerous examples of negotiations occurring, most failed. They did often prompt lulls in violence, though.

What finally brought about successful negotiations was a change in the mindset on both sides of the aisle. The British finally recognized that the grass roots popularity the IRA and Sinn Fein had was largely due to their treatment of their Catholic Northern Irish constituents. During negotiations, the British decided to first grant Home Rule, then later removed British troops from Northern Ireland, and finally devolve the Northern Ireland government. These concessions were, during each instance, negotiated with the republican movement in return for compromises of reduced violence or cessation of hostilities. Successful negotiations were perhaps the single most influential aspect in fostering politicization. As interim goals on both sides of the conflict began to be realized due to political negotiations instead of violence Sinn Fein gained more authority and influence over the IRA’s militant wing.127 Additionally, the sway of a powerful third-party, in the case of the Good Friday Agreement President Clinton and the United States, created an unbiased influential outside actor that further legitimized negotiations and ensured accountability on both sides.128 It was the Good Friday Agreement that finally ended the violence, demilitarized the IRA, and solidified Sinn Fein and politics as the way forward for republicans.129

The IRA’s ideology was nationalist. Statistically only 29 percent of violent non-state actors that ended via politicization were nationalist.130 The IRA example, similar to Hizbollah’s religious-ideology two percent likelihood, challenges this trend.131 Again this may indicate that despite the statistical indication that ideology is a significant factor in a group’s politicization, a more noteworthy gauge is the leadership’s pragmatism. In the case of the IRA, it seems that when the leadership of the organization realized the possibilities of success in the political arena due to rising popular support they shifted the organization’s techniques accordingly.132 When their political power began to overshadow the IRA’s military strength the republican movement’s focus shifted and

128 Feeney, Sinn Féin, 409.
130 Hanrahan and Crowell, “Politicization,” 3.
131 Ibid.
132 English, Armed Struggle, 269.
further politicization became more likely. Similar to Hizbollah, Sinn Fein negotiated and made political alliances with adversaries, such as the Social Democratic and Labour Party, demonstrating the republican movement’s practicality.\textsuperscript{133}

The hierarchical nature of Sinn Fein and the IRA created conditions favorable to politicization.\textsuperscript{134} In order for the movement to disarm and legitimize politically, though, it required leaders with respected militant reputations to acknowledge and push toward politicization. Throughout the IRA’s history when there was a clash between the military and political wings, splinter groups formed. In order to retain the majority of the militant republican movement in a move to politicization, and therefore have legitimacy at the bargaining table that they would be able to enforce disarmament and cease fires, political leaders needed influence within the militant arm. With the rise of Gerry Adams and Martin McGuiness the IRA and Sinn Fein had forward thinking, persuasive, and militarily-authoritative leaders that wanted politicization. This permitted an element of political authority over the military wing previously missing.

The IRA was motivated by unification, which for the purposes of this statistical analysis is categorized as territorial change. This type of goal statistically has one of the highest likelihoods of politicizing. Although the IRA’s territorial goals were not realized, many of their grievances associated with that change were eventually addressed. British troops were removed, IRA members were granted political status in prisons, the Northern Ireland government was devolved, and numerous additional considerations were conceded. Once those grievances were addressed the justification for violence, and popular support for the group to conduct violence on behalf of those grievances, was removed. This created conditions in which politicization was probable. Although territorially motivated violent extremist groups will rarely achieve the full breadth of their goal, by addressing the concerns associated with that goal politicization becomes likely.

The IRA’s target selection was also consistent with a group that politicizes. The IRA attacked a total of 1,487 military and government targets (Figure 15) and 1,091 military and political targets (Figure 16)\textsuperscript{133,134}.

\textsuperscript{133}Feeney, \textit{Sinn Fein}, 350.
\textsuperscript{134}Shapiro, \textit{The Terrorist’s Dilemma}, 12.
civilian ones (Figure 16) over the 44 years of this database.\textsuperscript{135} This translates to roughly 58 percent of the IRA’s targets being focused on strictly military or government entities, which, if used predictively, would have been a clear indication that politicization was probable.\textsuperscript{136} Additionally, almost all targeting ceased after the 1998 Good Friday agreement. It is this analysis’ assertion that if the different splinter groups of the IRA were removed from the targeting statistics, or if the database covered the entirety of the IRA’s existence, the disparity between government-related and civilian-related targets would be even more glaring. At various times in the history of the conflict, more hardline elements of the IRA splintered because of disagreements related to concessions to Great Britain or further politicization. This dataset does not differentiate between the different groups. Splinter organizations, such as the Real IRA or Continuity IRA, tended to be more radical and therefore also less discerning in their target selection. Even the PIRA, when it first formed in 1969, was more militant and less discriminant in targeting.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{135} Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland, accessed June 5, 2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&perpetrator=417&target=7&target=2&target=4&target=3&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=;

\textsuperscript{136} Abrams, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” 55.

\textsuperscript{137} Shanahan, \textit{The Provisional Irish Republican Army}, 137.
Figure 15. IRA Government-related Targets

Source: Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland, accessed June 5, 2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&perpetrator=417&target=7&target=2&target=4&target=3&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=.

Figure 16. IRA Civilian-related Targets

Lastly, the durability of IRA also indicates the prospect of politicizing. The IRA remained in armed conflict with Great Britain for almost a century. Sinn Fein, or at least the precursor to it, has existed for nearly two centuries. The longevity of these organizations and their consistent, although sometimes tumultuous, relationship with each other is evidence of the republican movement’s propensity to move toward politics. The combination of a hierarchical organization, where dissent and splintering is less likely, and the longevity of the republican movement are both indicative plausible politicization. It seems intuitive that if a group has enough popular support to remain militarily relevant for decades it could similarly be a powerful political entity.

C. VIOLENCE LEVELS

By analyzing violence levels before and after politicization the effects of the IRA’s transition to politics can be discerned. In the case of the IRA, politicization is defined as ending the abstentionism policy within the republican movement in Northern Ireland. The IRA and Sinn Fein maintained a policy of abstentionism for decades, whereby members would run for office but then refuse to sit, thereby refusing to acknowledge the authority of the government. There was even a ban on discussing the policy of abstentionism. It was not until after the IRA hunger strikers, in 1981, gained the republican movement considerable political clout, that the ban on that discussion was lifted. At the time Gerry Adams maintained that Sinn Fein was still “an abstentionist party. It is not my intention to advocate change in this situation.”

In 1986, the policy was finally lifted, although it resulted in a split within the republican movement, politically creating the Republican Sinn Fein and later the militaristic Continuity IRA. The spike in attacks indicated in Figures 15 and 16 in the late 1980s can be attributed to ending abstentionism and the resulting dispute within the republican movement. The hardline elements within Sinn Fein and the IRA tried to reassert their control and in the end lost support due to their inability to compromise.

138 Feeney, Sinn Fein, 303.
139 English, Armed Struggle, 244.
The 1998 Good Friday agreement, in simplistic terms, devolved the Northern Ireland government, delegated administration of the country from the United Kingdom, and created institutional links between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in return for decommissioning IRA weapons.\(^{140}\) Analyzing the aggregate attack trend in Figure 17, there is a clear and evident reduction in violence following this agreement. Once Sinn Fein members began to actively participate in the Northern Ireland government, and the radical elements within the republican movement were marginalized, violence levels plummeted. This is not surprising considering that Sinn Fein impressed upon the IRA the terms of the Good Friday agreement which included laying down arms. The political influence needed to end the policy of abstentionism within Sinn Fein and the military authority required to enforce an end in violent opposition within the IRA, however, are inescapably linked. It took over a decade of actually participating in Northern Ireland’s political process to advance to the point where political members of the republican movement had more sway than military leaders.

Figure 17. IRA Violence Level


This alludes to an interesting point; in some cases politicization is just the beginning of ending violence. Due to the degree of radicalization of members within any violent extremist organization, splintering is likely to occur in the politicization process. This will almost always translate into violence continuing for a time once politicization has begun. Nearly every spike in violence in Figure 17 can be attributed to a splintering in the republican movement.

D. CONCLUSION

The IRA example is a case of successful politicization. Given similar circumstances other violent extremist organizations could be encouraged to do the same. In the case of the IRA and Sinn Fein, the significant factors were a belief that they represented a large enough portion of the population to be influential if they were given a political voice. Having hierarchical leadership that brought enough military clout to keep the majority of the organization appeased and on board with the direction the movement was going. Lastly, there was a realization that military victory was not possible and a stalemate had occurred. Equally, Great Britain was willing to negotiate and concede to some of the conditions the republicans demanded while calling for their own stipulations regarding IRA demilitarization. Great Britain was able to establish a dialogue with the opposition to hear their grievances and was consistently adept enough to bring them back to the table when negotiations broke down. Given these conditions the situation was ripe for politicization and resolution via non-violent means. Despite what many would call unlimited war aims on either side, or the nationalistic nature of the IRA’s ideology, politicization was able to occur.

Notably, the implications for politicization extend beyond national borders. The IRA laid down their arms and became a legitimate, moderated representative for their constituents through Sinn Fein. In doing so, national politicization decreased the international proliferation network of violent extremist organizations that is stimulated when they are not urged to legitimize politically. In addition to reducing violence in Northern Ireland, Great Britain, and the Republic of Ireland, by influencing hardline

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141 Zartman, “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond,” 228.
republicans in the IRA to politicize and gain national representation, the international proliferation network was limited. The IRA had previously maintained connections with the Palestine Liberation Organization, Gaddafi, and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, among other groups. A link in that network was destroyed when they politicized. As the IRA’s national movement was legitimized politically it was no longer incentivized to internationalize for support or to use violence to gain legitimacy.

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V. PARTIYA KARKERÊN KURDISTANÊ: TRANSITION IN QUESTION

If the young republic of Turkey had opted for a democratic solution to the Kurdish question, then the course of history would surely have been different.143

—Abdullah Öcalan, 2012

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK), is a Kurdish nationalist organization with socialist roots located in the surrounding border area of southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq.144 As with Hizbollah, the PKK is not considered a “politicized” entity and is still considered a terrorist organization. The organization is currently undergoing a tumultuous negotiation process with the Turkish government. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party is considered to be in a transitioning status. The PKK’s internal and external factors were examined in order to determine whether they are conducive to a successful transition to politics in the near future. Examining the characteristics of a successful transition identified earlier in this analysis, it becomes clear that many of the strides the PKK is making are conducive to a transition to politics. The stance of their ultimate goal, an autonomous Kurdistan, appears to have softened to a more plausible objective of greater representation and self-governance. A successful transition would further demonstrate the effects of national stabilization garnered from a violent non-state actor’s politicization.

A. BACKGROUND

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party was originally formed in 1974 with the aim of creating an independent Kurdish state.145 Although initially just comprised of a group of ethnically-Kurdish students in Turkey, the organization formalized in 1978 and sought to

143 Ocalan, Prison Writings III, 106.
145 Bruno, “Inside the Kurdistan Workers Party.”
incite a revolution that would free the Kurdish people and create a new state. The struggle for Kurdish independence, though, actually first emerged in the late 19th century. Later, in 1920, the Treaty of Sevres did designate an independent Kurdistan, but the plan was never implemented. The PKK traces its roots back to these struggles. In its endeavor to establish a new state, the PKK was supported by more than thirty other Kurdish groups in neighboring states including: the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq, the Party of Free Life (PJAK) in Iran, and a few in Europe. Now the predominant focus of the PKK appears to be seeking autonomy within the established state borders of Turkey in lieu of establishing a Kurdish state partitioned from Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Armenia, and Syria.

In order to build strength early on, the PKK fled Turkey and established training camps in Syrian-controlled Lebanon. This training was supported by Palestinian contacts of the PKK founder, Abdullah Ocalan. Later, during the early 1980s, conditions were favorable for the PKK to relocate their training camps to northern Iraq through support of the KDP where the PKK prepared to mount a campaign against Turkey. By 1984, the PKK had returned to Turkey and began its first armed attacks against both government and non-sympathetic civilian targets in the Anatolia regions. Their targets included “government installations and officials, Turks living in the country’s Kurdish regions, Kurds accused of collaborating with the government, foreigners, and Turkish diplomatic missions abroad.” At its height, the PKK had a force of fifty thousand guerrillas, but it is now estimated to have less than five thousand guerrillas.

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147 Bruno, “Inside the Kurdistan Workers Party.”
148 Ibid.
149 Global Terrorism Database, “Kurdistan Workers’ Party.”
151 “Kurdistan Workers’ Party,” Encyclopedia Britannica.
152 Global Terrorism Database, “Kurdistan Workers’ Party.”
During this timeframe, “some reports claim that the PKK killed over 30,000 civilians within Turkey.” Later, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the PKK ceased targeting Kurdish civilians and adjusted its ideology to accommodate Islamic beliefs. Its focus shifted to strictly targeting elements of the Turkish government.

B. CONDITIONS

Several of the conditions that influence the PKK are consistent with the statistical data that indicates a violent non-state actor as a candidate for politicization. In particular, the data associated with parties entering into negotiations, and the PKK’s change in target selection. The PKK has actively sought out negotiations with Turkey and claims to desire politicization. The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), a legitimate pro-Kurdish political party within Turkey, has been negotiating on behalf of the PKK with Turkey for nearly two years. This greatly increases the probability of politicization for the PKK. The Turkish government appears reluctant to commit and encourage the PKK’s move toward politics, however. Similarly, the PKK has noticeably become more target discriminant over the years.

The PKK’s target selection has drastically changed over the course of its history. Upon initial examination the PKK’s target comparison of government-related and civilian-related attacks look remarkably similar (Figures 18 and 19). The numbers indicate only a slightly larger number of attacks on government-related targets than.

154 Bruno, “Inside the Kurdistan Workers Party.”
155 Global Terrorism Database, “Kurdistan Workers’ Party.”
156 Ibid.
civilians-related targets: 742 compared to 725 respectively.159 Such an extremely small
target discrimination difference would not imply much propensity to politicize.160 There
is a notable drop in violence after 1996 with an overall downward trend in total violence,
though, which will be discussed more in depth in the Violence Levels section. Specific to
target selection, the PKK initially targeted Turkish civilians and Kurdish non-
sympathizers actively in their terror campaign.161 This trend has changed over time,
however. When broken down by civilian target type, the graph reveals that of those 725
peace-related attacks, 428 were on infrastructure whereas only 297 were attacks on
actual civilian personnel (Figure 20).162 This demonstrates that the PKK decreased its
targeting of actual civilians during the late 1990s and has continued to target personnel
far less than government-related or infrastructure targets since.

159 Global Terrorism Database, “Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),” accessed October 12, 2015,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly
=&end_yearonly=&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&perpetrator=449&target=7&target=2&target=4&target=3&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=; Global Terrorism Database, “Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),” accessed October 12, 2015,


161 Rodoplu Ulkumen, Jeffrey Arnold, and Gurkan Ersoy, “Terrorism in Turkey,” Prehospital and
Disaster Medicine 18.02 (2003), 157.

162 Global Terrorism Database, “Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),” accessed October 21, 2015,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&perpetrator=449&target=10&target=14&target=15&target=18&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=. 
Figure 18. PKK Government-related Targets

While the PKK does have socialist, left-wing tendencies, which would indicate likelihood to politicize, ideologically the PKK is categorized as nationalist. This is due to the organization’s over-arching motivation of Kurdish self-governance within Turkey. Similar to this analysis’s other case studies, the PKK is challenging the statistical norm with regards to ideology and successful politicization. This demonstrates that the strong presence of other significant politicization factors can sometimes countermand adverse factors. Additionally, the PKK’s strong left-wing ideas may have more influence on their politicization then their nationalist ideology.

The PKK is motivated by a desire for more autonomy, which for the purposes of this statistical analysis is categorized as territorial change. Statistically this implies a high likelihood of politicizing. Territorial change grievances account for 16 percent of violent non-state actors that politicized; only policy and regime change grievances have higher

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probabilities.\textsuperscript{163} Similar to the IRA, the PKK’s territorial grievances are motivated by a perceived injustice toward the Kurdish people by the Turkish government. The organization’s desire for autonomy and violence against the government are direct results of that viewpoint. This also implies that if those grievances are adequately addressed, though, the PKK will not have the support of the people to commit violence nor the moral high ground to do so. The PKK leader, Ocalan, has already authored a ten-article framework of the PKK’s grievances that the organization believes need to be addressed for peace.\textsuperscript{164}

This framework has been the basis for negotiations between the Turkish government and the PKK. Ocalan has been the driving force behind negotiations, calling for the PKK to lay down arms and negotiate a peaceful resolution.\textsuperscript{165} Ocalan’s continued attempts to successfully complete negotiations, along with his meticulous outline of what concessions need to be made by both parties, demonstrate that a lack of negotiations will not be the PKK’s reason for an unsuccessful politicization. The organization’s continued attempts at negotiating a peaceful resolution with the Turkish government indicate a high probability of successfully politicization.\textsuperscript{166}

Additionally, the PKK’s violence levels while negotiations occur tend to decline (Figures 18 and 19).\textsuperscript{167} Ocalan’s third book while imprisoned entitled, \textit{Prison Writings III: The Road Map to Negotiations}, “was the centerpiece of the secret dialogue process between Abdullah Ocalan and the Turkish state that started in 2009 and was broken off in mid-2011.”\textsuperscript{168} More recently, Ocalan has shown his commitment to the peace process by ordering the withdrawal of several thousand PKK fighters from Turkey, stating, “we have reached the point, where the weapons must fall silent and ideas need to speak. A door has

\textsuperscript{163} Hanrahan and Crowell, “Politicization,” 3.
\textsuperscript{164} Yetkin, “Analysis.”
\textsuperscript{166} Cronin, “Historical Patterns,” 39.
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., 36–39.
\textsuperscript{168} Ocalan, \textit{Prison Writings III}, 5.
been opened that could lead from an armed conflict to a democratic one.”¹⁶⁹ Despite the short breakdown in negotiations and the small spike in violence that followed, in 2012 negotiations began again with the HDP negotiating on behalf of the PKK.¹⁷⁰ Most of the PKK’s demands, such as “recognition of Kurdish identity and reinforcement of the authorities and autonomies of local administrations with constitutional guarantees in a new constitution,” are realistic and attainable.¹⁷¹ Due to the fact that some of Ocalan’s articles would require amending the Turkish constitution, however, the fate of the peace talks remains in the balance.¹⁷² The pro-Kurdish HDP’s recent parliamentary success bodes well for the PKK.¹⁷³ On behalf of the PKK, HDP co-leader Selahattin Demirtas stated that they were, “ready to make a call for disarmament and that a peace process with the militants should soon move forward.”¹⁷⁴

The PKK has existed for over four decades. The longevity of the organization, despite its recent decline in membership, alludes to the grass-roots popularity of the Kurdish cause in Turkey. Due to the PKK’s demonstrated resiliency, it is unlikely the organization will end via continued military or police action. Their longevity indicates a higher probability of politicization and the organization’s leadership is certainly pushing for a political solution.

Despite being incarcerated, Abdullah Ocalan’s influence and leadership within the PKK has not diminished. He was apprehended in 1999 and sentenced to death for treason.¹⁷⁵ In its bid for admittance to the European Union, however, Turkey abolished its death penalty in 2002 and “Ocalan’s sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.”¹⁷⁶


¹⁷⁰ Yetkin, “Analysis.”

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.


¹⁷⁴ “Turkey election,” British Broadcasting Corporation News.

¹⁷⁵ Bruno, “Inside the Kurdistan Workers Party.”

¹⁷⁶ Ulkumen, “Terrorism in Turkey,” 156.
Since imprisonment, Ocalan has taken to writing about Kurdish history, the PKK, and his plans for politicization, making it clear his desired end-state for his organization.

Ocalan’s effectiveness as a leader and his vision for the PKK has guided the group through sixteen years of operating while he is still incarcerated. The strict hierarchical structure of the PKK, along with Ocalan’s persistence in negotiations, hint at resolution to the conflict in the near future. Moreover, after realizing the futility of a violence-centric approach, as well as the difficulty in accomplishing the lofty goal of a Kurdish state, Ocalan has also distanced the PKK’s actions from the other four major Kurdish organizations in neighboring states. Ocalan has done this with an eye toward separating the PKK from violence in order to negotiate politically for Kurdish autonomy within Turkey in lieu of a Kurdish state. This is a critical period for peace negotiations between Turkey and the PKK. The current situation with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has complicated negotiations for a peaceful settlement, though.

The internal and external factors surrounding the PKK are conducive to politicization. The group’s ideology, while not statistically indicative of politicizing, is consistent with each other case study examined. The PKK’s motivation falls in line with those groups who have had previous success moving to political action, and the group has been in existence for over four decades. The PKK’s transition away from attacking civilian personnel, and its decrease in overall attacks since first starting the negotiation process, are also indicative of a group ready to politicize. Lastly, the most significant in this case, the PKK has repeatedly negotiated with Turkey and its leader has begun to openly call for a political solution to the Kurdish issue.

C. VIOLENCE LEVELS

The guerrilla warfare campaign that the PKK started in Turkey was conducted by less than several hundred fighters in its early years, yet still caused the Turkish military much consternation as to how to deal with this new threat. “Military ‘search-and-
destroy’ operations inside Turkey and air raids on supposed PKK base camps in Iran and Iraq failed to paralyse it. The government then recruited ‘loyal’ Kurds into the paramilitary guards, which, it was hoped, would be more effective in fighting the PKK guerrillas.” As noted earlier, the PKK was particularly violent toward civilian-related targets early in its existence, notably against these fellow Kurds. The high level of violence, including a high number of fatalities, against civilian-related targets was mostly against Kurdish people associated with the Turkish state who were not sympathetic to the PKK. These “landlords and petty officials…were assassinated, frequently with their entire families.”

Turkey responded to this violence by sending military and police to quell the violence, but these same forces were ambushed themselves. “At first most Kurds recoiled in horror at the activities of the PKK, but since 1985 the counter-brutality of state forces, particularly the widespread use of arbitrary arrest and torture, has increased the cooperation or neutrality of large numbers of Kurds in eastern Turkey.”

This newfound cooperation with, or at least toleration by, the citizens, coupled with the cessation of targeting Kurdish civilians in the early 1990s, facilitated the major decrease in violence by the PKK beginning in 1996 (Figure 18).

In another effort to commit to non-violence, the PKK altered its name to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) in 2002 and a year later devised a plan to establish Kurdish autonomy. The organization did, however, continue military training and threaten violence. In 2003, the organization announced that it was dissolving and reestablishing itself as the Kurdistan People’s Conference (KHK), which would focus on negotiations with Turkey. Later in 2003, the group again renamed to the Kongra-Gel (KGK, or Kurdistan People’s Congress) in an effort for negotiations to be taken seriously; but the group continued to commit violent attacks, failed to disarm, and

179 Kreyenbroek and Sperl, The Kurds, 59.
180 Ibid., 20.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
183 Global Terrorism Database, “Kurdistan Workers’ Party.”
184 Ibid.
eventually reverted back to its original name in 2005.\textsuperscript{185} Despite the PKK’s efforts to transition to politics, Turkey has done little to assist in transitioning the organization. Without an incentive to maintain peace, when negotiations have broken down the PKK has resumed violence and the cease-fire did not last more than five years.\textsuperscript{186}

Violence continued after the cease-fire, but to a lesser degree than historically seen. In 2007, three years after the cease-fire ended, other parties took notice of the PKK’s decrease in violent attacks and increasing willingness to politicize. Falah Mustafa Bakir, head of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s foreign relations department at the time, stated “Our understanding is that the PKK may be prepared to join the political process in Turkey, and it is left to the Turkish government to seize this opportunity.”\textsuperscript{187} Despite this realization by others, Turkish parliament continues to approve military action against the PKK at home and abroad.\textsuperscript{188} Although there was a spike in PKK attacks in 2010 as a result of negotiations failing, the amount of violence remained below pre-negotiation levels (Figure 21).\textsuperscript{189}

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{185} Global Terrorism Database, “Kurdistan Workers’ Party.”
\item \textsuperscript{186} Bruno, “Inside the Kurdistan Workers Party.”
\item \textsuperscript{187} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{188} “Kurdistan Workers’ Party,” Encyclopedia Britannica.
\item \textsuperscript{189} Global Terrorism Database, “Kurdistan Workers’ Party.”
\end{itemize}
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Now, in 2015, another declared ceasefire has held for almost two years and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party is again at the negotiation table. According to Cernal Bayik, co-founder of the PKK, there is no longer a stated desire to establish a separate state or combine territories with other Kurdish entities in neighboring countries as seen with the “old PKK,” and that “all we want is to live freely with our own identity, culture, and values in democratic conditions.”\textsuperscript{190} In order to ensure this happens, though, Bayik has set one of the conditions for moving forward with peace talks as a U.S.- or European-led arbitration.\textsuperscript{191} This addition of a third-party arbitrator would add legitimacy and weight to the negotiations.

Perhaps most notable with respect to PKK violence levels is the accusation that the HDP and its predecessors are the political wing of the organization. Since the Turkish


\textsuperscript{191}“Turkey’s Kurdish rebels,” *The Economist*. 

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parliament has repeatedly banned pro-Kurdish political parties over the years, Kurdish political representation has had to reinvent itself under different names. The first pro-Kurdish political party was the People’s Labor Party established in 1990. In 1993 the Turkish Constitutional Court disbanded the party. Party supporters then founded the Democracy Party, though, which was similarly closed in 1994 by the Constitutional Court and pro-Kurdish party members lost their parliamentary seats. The political party then reformed and reconstituted as the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) that same year. The HADEP party had its members arrested in 1996 when they lowered the Turkish flag and raised the PKK flag in Congress. The party continued to survive until 2003, though, when it was also banned by the Constitutional Court on grounds of supporting the PKK. The Democratic People’s Party succeeded the HADEP, having been founded in 1997 following the HADEP’s legal troubles. The Democratic People’s Party later merged to form the Democratic Society Party (DTP). The DTP was banned in 2009 and became the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which in 2014 was succeeded by the HDP. All this is to say that it appears the PKK has already made attempts to politicize. Turkish administrators certainly believe so, having banned each subsequent pro-Kurdish political party on grounds of being affiliated with the PKK. Similarly, pro-Kurdish party leaders have alluded to their links to the PKK. The former DTP leader, Aysel Tugluk, responded when asked about links to the organization, “of course these people can influence our policies. You should not see the PKK as composed of 5,000–7,000 fighters but rather as a political entity in Turkey.”

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196 Ibid.

197 Ibid., 148.

198 Ibid.

199 Ibid., 147.
If these accusations are to be believed, then the first time a pro-Kurdish political party affiliated with the PKK ran for political office in Turkey was the 1995 election where the People’s Democracy Party received 4 percent of the vote. This was below the 10 percent required in Turkey to win a Member of Parliament seat, but the coinciding reduction in PKK violence following 1995 is undeniable (Figure 21). This further validates the analysis’s theory that politicization reduces violence significantly.

Since the recent election of Turkish parliament in which the HDP won 80 seats and the increase in Turkish military airstrikes against the PKK under the guise of sorties attacking ISIS, violence levels have begun to rise. Turkish strikes on Kurdish insurgent camps in Iraq were conducted in response to an attack by the PKK where two Turkish soldiers were killed and four were wounded. The opportunity to conduct attacks against its decades-old threat was realized by Turkey after having been “a reluctant member of the U.S.-led coalition against Islamic State,” and making “a dramatic turnaround…by granting the alliance access to its air bases and launching air raids against both the jihadist movement and the PKK.” These reciprocated attacks threaten to once again cause negotiations between the PKK and Turkey to falter, potentially derailing the recent progress that has been made.

D. PROLIFERATION

This convoluted situation causes Turkey to risk impelling the PKK to coordinate with its more violence-oriented neighboring Kurdish organizations. Turkey has alleged that the PKK is colluding with ISIS, but this seems unlikely considering the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a PKK affiliate, is actively fighting ISIS in Syria. Nevertheless, this could potentially be a proliferation issue because the PKK’s influence extends well

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200 Bengio, *Kurdish Awakening*, 144.
202 Cakan and Toksabay, “Turkish jets hit PKK targets.”
203 Ibid.
beyond the borders of Turkey. Turkey has already entangled other countries in its internal struggle against the PKK due to neighboring countries not prosecuting potential PKK collaborators adequately. For example, Turkey attempted to stifle German endeavors to prosecute a “suspected Iranian nuclear smuggler who had been arrested in Turkey…in violation of a United Nations Security Council embargo on assistance to an Iranian reactor that could make weapons-grade plutonium,” because of Germany’s failure to sufficiently prosecute PKK affiliates within its borders.205 Mark Hibbs, a Carnegie columnist, assessed that Turkey did this because of Iranian influence, and lack of German PKK extraditions.206 Regardless of the reason, Turkey’s actions show that even though it is negotiating with the PKK, it still maintains a hardline stance against them and will not hesitate to hold a vendetta for a perceived slight at the detriment of international security.

That said, the likelihood that the PKK would want to obtain a nuclear weapon is low. The mere hint of anything regarding nuclear proliferation and the PKK would set the Kurdistan Workers’ Party back forty years’ worth of work toward their ultimate goal. This in itself is enough of a deterrent for the PKK to even consider obtaining a nuclear weapon as long as negotiations are still going well. If negotiations deteriorate, however, it is not outside the realm of possibility for the PKK to work with either Iran, other violent non-state actors, or one of its affiliates to proliferate weapons of mass destruction. This is an important reason why the United States should attempt to influence a successful PKK disarmament and transition to politics. The PKK continues to make genuine efforts to achieve their goal through peaceful negotiation. Several legitimate states, though, including the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and Turkey among others, have labeled the PKK as a terrorist organization and have supported action against the group for decades. Due to its identification as a terrorist organization, the PKK is not encouraged to act legitimately thus pushing them to interact with other violent non-state actors. Therefore, the subject of PKK counter-proliferation cannot be dismissed.

206 Hibbs, “Proliferation and the PKK.”
Since Turkey is a NATO member and an important U.S. ally in the Middle East region the U.S. government has supported Turkish efforts against the PKK.\textsuperscript{207} Such covert action, though, complicates matters for the United States when dealing with another close ally—the Kurds in northern Iraq. This group is not only ethnically tied to the PKK, but the United States also draws heavily from its ranks to combat the current threat in the region from ISIS. So, it is difficult for the United States to both support its NATO ally Turkey and the Kurds in Iraq. In order to prevent either U.S. ally from feeling alienated it is critically important to encourage the PKK to politicize within Turkey.

E. CONCLUSION

Combatting violent non-state actors that are seeking to politicize perpetuates violence, but completing negotiations and giving these same actors a political voice has been demonstrated to significantly reduce the violence. Influencing these types of organizations through means of diplomacy, and helping them to achieve their goals within their respective countries’ borders, will not only deescalate international involvement in combat operations abroad, but also mitigate the export of their violence. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party is no exception, and in fact, it is currently the world’s foremost candidate for transitioning to political action. Turkey’s incorporation of the PKK into politics would reduce the likelihood of continued violence in a grand, or even potentially WMD, scale. In the case of the PKK, where negotiators are requesting third-party arbitrators, legitimate state actors would be prudent to support a transition by intervening and acting as an authoritative intermediary. Doing so could avert any inclination the PKK may have to stopping the negotiation process and continue to conduct violent attacks or support other international violent non-state actors. It is this analysis’s prediction that the PKK will politicize. Turkey’s continued attacks against the PKK in lieu of fighting ISIS, however, indicate that the government is not yet willing to fully support politicization. With a third-party arbitrator the negotiation process would perhaps be expedited and legitimimized.

VI. MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD (EGYPT): TRANSITION FAILURE

Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, more commonly known as the Muslim Brotherhood, is considered a failed politicization by this analysis’s definitions. Dealing specifically with Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood began, it started out as a charitable religious organization, became a violent non-state actor, and then became a politically motivated transnational group. The group gained considerable influence throughout the Arab region and Europe, and was eventually elected to the Presidency in Egypt following the “Arab Spring.” Upon the Muslim Brotherhood’s removal from office, the organization in Egypt moved back to violence. This chapter focuses specifically on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood division, where the organization was founded, and where it achieved politicization and then by some accounts moved back to terrorism, becoming outlawed by the new Egyptian government. Having already examined case studies of politicization success, and politicization transition, it is also necessary to assess a case of politicization failure. This organization began as a social program with political aspirations, sought recognition through violence, came to power democratically, and moved back to violence. Equally important as an examination of conditions that influence politicization is a consideration for conditions that may lead to politicization’s eventual failure.

While not designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States, the Muslim Brotherhood is considered a violent non-state actor by Egypt, Saudi Arabia the United Arab Emirates, and Russia among others. Additionally, a bill was recently submitted to the United States Congress to designate the Brotherhood as an FTO. The bill did not receive enough support for ratification, but its proposal and the FTO designation by other nation states indicates the current sentiment toward the primarily socio-political organization. The Brotherhood in Egypt differs in this respect

208 Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood, 7.
from the previous case studies analyzed. While its history demonstrates it is mainly a socio-political entity, the Brotherhood has had violent tendencies at various times during its history. As such, many legitimate states and influential leaders currently consider the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt a violent non-state actor, and the forefather to similar groups throughout the region.

A. BACKGROUND

The Muslim Brotherhood was “founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna.”212 It began as a community service social movement, functioning as a counter to Arab secularism. Its tenets are simple, the Muslim Brotherhood espouses to stand for traditional Sunni Islamic ideals.213 Early on, al-Banna emphasized Egyptian sovereignty, denigrating the moral, economic, and political sway of Western government’s influence.214 The organization desired Shari’a law implemented by way of popular support achieved through a religious revitalization.215

The ideals of the Muslim Brotherhood quickly spread under al-Banna’s charismatic leadership. In 20 years, it grew from just seven people, to over two thousand different branches throughout Egypt, with an estimated 300,000 to 600,000 members.216 It also became transnational, with the Egyptian division being the “mother” organization for similar groups in Kuwait, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Bahrain, and a model emulated in northern African revivalist groups.217 The various branches each had, and still have, different personalities and slightly different views on certain issues. In particular, the balance between politics, social reform, and violence to achieve the organization’s aims varies.

212 Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood, 8.
213 Ibid., 9.
215 Ibid.
217 Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, 20.
In the late 1930s, the first militant wing of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood emerged. Beginning a practice repeated throughout its existence, the organization exported violence through this “special section” sending three battalions to fight in the Palestine War in 1948. The “special section” also conducted weapons and tactics training at home. Later that same year they assassinated a prominent Egyptian judge and the Prime Minister. In retaliation, government agents gunned down al-Banna.

From 1954 to 1970, the Brotherhood, under new leadership, and the Nasser regime remained at odds. President Nasser dissolved the organization in 1954, forcing them underground, and they tried to assassinate him later that year for concessions he made to British security interests. Nasser responded by imprisoning hundreds of Brotherhood leaders and hanging six prominent Society members. While this nearly decimating the Brotherhood for a time, it also influenced a radicalization in thought. Sayyid Qutb, now a famous martyr for the Islamic cause, wrote about the Brotherhood ideology from an Egyptian jail extolling followers to prepare for jihad in an effort to “establish a system based on the laws of God.” While some senior Brotherhood leaders emphasized that it was possible for Muslims “live their lives in conformity with the laws of God even in the absence of an Islamic state,” a radical element of the Brotherhood’s original religious charity intent had developed and gained strength due to Nasser’s suppression. Mustafa Shukri also developed his brand of militant Brotherhood while imprisoned. The splinter group he formed, Jama’at al-Jihad, was behind the assassination of President Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat in 1981.

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218 Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 27.
220 Ibid.
221 Ibid., 27.
After Nasser died in 1970 and was succeeded by Sadat, the regime’s relationship with the Brotherhood seemed to be on the verge of changing. President Sadat courted many of the Islamic ideals the Brotherhood championed in an effort to consolidate his power and counterweight his predecessor’s leftist leanings. Sadat even offered to register the Brotherhood as an association under the Ministry of Social Affairs, however the organization at the time wished to form a legitimate political party. Sadat rejected this idea. In 1976, however, six members of the Brotherhood were elected to parliament, having running un-affiliated. The organization was attempting to “work within the framework of existing laws and institutions in order to transform them.” By 1981 the tacit alliance with Sadat had all but ended. The organization increasingly criticized the regime, particularly Sadat signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, and Sadat’s tolerance for dissent had waned. He arrested over 1,500 civic political leaders, including al-Tilmisani, the Brotherhood Supreme Guide, and many other influential Brothers, saying he would not “tolerate those who try to tamper with the high interest of the state under the guise of religion.” It was during this time period that the Brotherhood was able to revitalize the organization through its affiliation with the Islamic student movement.

Under Hosni Mubarak’s presidency, this new generation of Brotherhood members began to bring the group to politics despite that fact that it was still an illegal organization. When Mubarak succeeded Sadat, his crack down on the Brotherhood forced many radicalized militant members to flee Egypt. This allowed more moderate

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227 Ibid., 31.
228 Ibid.
229 Ibid., 32.
233 Ibid.
members to lead the organization away from violence in the more open political climate established by the Mubarak’s regime. In 1984, the Brotherhood aligned with a secular nationalist party and gained eight parliamentary seats. Aligning with the socialist and liberal parties in 1987, the organization won thirty-six seats making it the largest opposition group in the government. The Brotherhood boycotted the 1990 election, but in 1995 they put forward 170 independent candidates. In response to criticisms of being co-opted into a system that did not uphold Shari’a edicts, al-Tilmisani explained:

> Our goal is not what you would call a political victory but rather what concerns us is achieving a victory for God and the application of his Law, hence if we entered parliament, we don’t consider this a victory according to the criteria of other people; rather we consider it a minbar (pulpit) which is capable of spreading the da’wa of God...our entry into parliament is not a goal in and of itself but rather a means, and if one strategy does not succeed, we will abandon it and seek out another strategy.

Despite the Brotherhood’s moderation and politicization, a major generational rift remained between the rank and file Muslim Brotherhood members and the older leadership. Al-Tilmisani and his successor Hamid Abu Nasr continued to emphasize that the organization favored the gradual application of Shari’a law. But the electoral mandates given by increasing political success emboldened many Brotherhood members. As they learned the governmental system the Brotherhood deputies began to “justify their efforts to secure a larger role in the political system, as well as to expedite the application of Shari’a, by referring to the principles of democracy, citizenship, and the rule of law.” For example, the 1990 electoral “boycott was not a withdrawal from the system, but rather a protest against the government’s attempts to decrease the Brotherhood’s presence in the People’s Assembly.” These middle-generation Brothers, who came to

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234 Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 46.
237 Ibid., 53.
238 Ibid., 56.
be known as the reformist, had become professional syndicate and political leaders entrenching themselves into every aspect of Egyptian public life. This clash of ideas between the old guard and reformist amounted to a belief by the newer generation in “democracy and pluralism of ideas,” at least inasmuch as it advanced the Brotherhood’s influence and agenda.240

The early years of Mubarak’s rule allowed the Brotherhood to become engrained in the system, without technically being recognized as part of the system. For example, the Brotherhood’s quick humanitarian-relief-effort reaction to the 1992 Cairo earthquake prompted the minister of interior to comment, “Do we have a state within a state?”241 This realization also prompted the regime’s efforts to regain control, however. First a law was passed that would “prevent an organized minority from dominating the syndicates for its own political ends.”242 Arrests began to put some of the Brotherhood’s most effective leadership behind bars. Underscoring the regime’s position, President Mubarak remarked in 1994 that, “this whole problem of terrorism throughout the Middle East is a by product of our own illegal Muslim Brotherhood…they say that they renounce violence, by in reality they are responsible for all the violence.”243

In the years before the Egyptian uprising, the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to balance being the largest, most well organized opposition to the regime, with still being an illegal organization that needed to refrain from drawing the administration’s attention.244 They avoided flexing their political might too much in elections to prevent undue attention and they continued to learn the political and socio-economic systems. Nevertheless, they remained the “largest opposition bloc winning 88 seats [in] the 2005

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240 Lynch, “Did We Get the Muslim Brotherhood Wrong;” Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, 71.
242 Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, 78.
244 Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, 93.
parliamentary elections.” As a result, when the uprising occurred on January 25, 2011, the Brotherhood was uniquely positioned as the most powerful, best-organized civilian entity in Egypt.

By February 11th, President Mubarak had offered his resignation. During the eighteen days of protests the Brotherhood had carefully encouraged the movement, knowing if it failed they would be blamed by the regime, while trying to prevent appearing like they were exploiting the situation. A few short months later, on May 18, 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood became a legitimate political party. The political wing they established, called the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), claiming to be non-theocratic, won an astonishing 43 percent of the parliamentary seats. A FJP member was also elected Speaker of the House, and of the nineteen parliament committees, twelve went to FJP leaders. Months later, Muhammad Mursi was inaugurated as Egypt’s first democratically elected president on June 30, 2012.

The Muslim Brotherhood appeared to be firmly established as the new power broker in Egypt. But, a mere year after Mursi’s inauguration protests erupted calling for him to step down as president. On July 3, 2013 the military forcibly removed him from office, and by December the Muslim Brotherhood was again declared “a terrorist organization by the Egyptian government.” The FJP was banned, financial assets were seized, Brotherhood media outlets were shut down, and over three thousand Brotherhood leaders were detained.

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246 Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, 167.
249 Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, 252.
250 “Profile,” British Broadcasting Corporation News; Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, 266.
252 Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, 290.
Following this crackdown, the Brotherhood appears to have rediscovered its violent roots. In 2013 and early 2014 the Brotherhood conducted more attacks than at any point in the Egyptian Brotherhood’s existence since its early inception. It appears that the group fully politicized, was in fact the largest and strongest party in Egypt, and has now regressed back to a violent non-state actor.

B. CONDITIONS

By examining the conditions of the Muslim Brotherhood, there may be some indication of what factors were lacking. This chapter will analyze negotiations, the ideology of the organization, motivations, target selection, and the longevity of the Muslim Brotherhood to determine if its conditions suggested a failure to politicize. Or conversely, that politicization is likely to occur again in the future under more favorable conditions.

Negotiations occurred between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government on numerous occasions. Early in Sadat’s regime al-Tilmisani met with the administration to broach the idea of the Muslim Brotherhood forming a political party. These “negotiations” ended with Sadat refusing to allow the Brotherhood as a political party, but inviting them into the Ministry of Social Affairs where the administration would have control over them. Al-Tilmisani strategically rejected this alternative so that the Brotherhood could continue to increase its base support through both social service activities and political influence without government oversight.

Similarly, the Brotherhood leadership was invited to participate in shaping the country’s future by President Mubarak following the 2011 uprising in an attempt to quell the revolution. These talks occurred under like circumstances, the regime was again looking to consolidate power and attempted to negotiate with the Brotherhood in order to gain popular support.

254 Ibid., 43.
255 Ibid., 169.
In both of these circumstances, however, the Brotherhood was not encouraged to politicize. In fact, quite the opposite, the regime wanted to use the Muslim Brotherhood’s popular support to its advantage without having to deal with the organization as a political entity that might threaten it. So, while negotiations did occur, instead of stimulating politicization or moderation, the Brotherhood was incentivized to remain apart from the regime. By remaining an illegal organization not tied to the administration the Brotherhood was tacitly allowed to continue to grow its capabilities and base support. In sum, the negotiations that occurred did not offer the Muslim Brotherhood any benefits in exchange for politicizing. Instead of attempting to leverage the Brotherhood from a position of power or stalemate, the Egyptian administration negotiated from a position of weakness, whereby all the Brotherhood had to do was wait in order to gain better footing.256

The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology is religious. This means the probability of them politicizing is extremely low.257 Their history implies it may not be as improbable as the numbers would indicate, though. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had an almost 50-year lull in violence where the organization concentrated on politics and socioeconomic programs. It is telling that during this time period the majority of the Brotherhood’s moderation and restructuring occurred. When the group professed liberal leftist ideas of democratization and participated in the administration, whether for its own selfish benefit or because it actually believed the ideology is debated, many Brothers did moderate their views.258 The implementation of Shari’a law was emphasized as a gradual progression that would, in the Brotherhood’s viewpoint, be called for by the people.259 This softening of the organization’s religious stance, as well as the pragmatism indicated by the group’s willingness to form coalitions without regard for religion, imply a less hardline religious stance than initially inferred.

256 Zartman, “Ripeness,” 228.
258 Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, 44.
259 Ibid., 53.
From a motivational or goal standpoint, the Brotherhood desires policy change. Their ultimate goal is to institute Shari’a law and an Islamic revitalization within Egypt.\(^{260}\) Typically policy change oriented violent non-state actors have a high probability of politicizing. Although the Brotherhood’s policy-change goal may seem drastic to some, the Egyptian parliamentary voting following the Arab spring demonstrated widespread support for hardline Islamist. The FJP party and Islamic Alliance, composed of a conglomeration of Salafi candidates, comprised 68 percent of the total votes.\(^{261}\) This indicates that the Brotherhood’s overarching policy goal is consistent with the average Egyptian constituent’s belief system, and their religious ideology is likely a draw rather than a hindrance to politicization due to the country’s overall predisposition. With regard to target selection the data is somewhat incomplete due to the timeframe of the database. The majority of the Muslim Brotherhood’s violence was committed prior to 1968, which this data does not encapsulate. Considering the known targets of the Brotherhood in the 1940s and 1950s, however, it is clear that government-related attacks dominated. This is consistent with a group that politicizes and is also consistent with the organization’s attack ratio following their removal from the administration. Since Mursi was deposed, the Brotherhood has conducted 22 attacks. Of those, 13 have been government-related while only 8 have been civilian-related targets.\(^{262}\) This indicates that the Muslim Brotherhood had a high likelihood of politicizing early on in its existence and has maintained that probability for the majority of its existence. Even following its recent designation as a terrorist organization by the Egyptian government the Muslim Brotherhood’s target selection continues to indicate a likelihood of politicizing.

\(^{260}\) Lynch, “Did We Get the Muslim Brotherhood Wrong.”

\(^{261}\) Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 252.

Figure 22. Muslim Brotherhood Government-related Targets

Source: Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland, accessed June 5, 2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&country=60&asmSelect1=&perpetrator=2155&perpetrator=482&target=7&target=2&target=4&target=3&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=.

Figure 23. Muslim Brotherhood Civilian-related Targets

Considering that the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood is the “mother” branch of a larger transnational organization and has exported a lot of its violence it may prove useful to analyze the group in its entirety. When analyzing the transnational Muslim Brotherhood organization the same trend occurs. The Muslim Brotherhood targeted 66 government-related targets while attacking only 48 civilian-related targets, with the spike in 1979 resulting from the Syrian branch conflict.263

Figure 24. Muslim Brotherhood International Government-related Targets

![Graph showing government-related targets over time]


Last, the Muslim Brotherhood’s longevity is also consistent with a group that politicizes. It has existed since 1928, for over 8 decades. It is also a hierarchical organization that has demonstrated resiliency and longevity through multiple regimes and

multiple countries. Some Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leaders have encouraged politicization more than others, but the longevity of the organization and democratization of its structure indicates that politicization is likely to occur again.

C. VIOLENCE LEVELS

For the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, an analysis of its path to politicization is complex. Technically the first time affiliated Muslim Brotherhood members ran for office was after the Arab Spring in 2011. In reality, though, the first time the Muslim Brotherhood allowed unofficially affiliated members to run for political office was in 1976. These members ran for office buoyed by, and touting, their Brotherhood membership. So, despite the organization still being illegal at that time their political representation was tacitly allowed.

Considering this second date as the real date of politicization for the Muslim Brotherhood yields similar results to our statistical analysis and previous case studies. Following their initial violence after inception the Muslim Brotherhood had a long period of non-violence in Egypt. From 1968 to 2014 the organization conducted a total of 27 incidents. One attack was in 1991 and the remaining 26 attacks occurred after the Brotherhood was removed from power and designated a terrorist organization. If Figure 25 depicted the Muslim Brotherhood’s earliest attacks, the trend would be consistent with other politicized organizations. There was an almost complete lack of attack activity following the Brotherhood’s politicization. That non-violent tendency remained throughout the years of the organizations participation in the administration, and then ceased following its removal from the government. The only difference between the Muslim Brotherhood and other politicized violent non-state actors is the resumption

\[^{264}\text{Cronin, “Historical Patterns in Ending Terrorism,” 39.}\]

\[^{265}\text{Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland, accessed June 5, 2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&country=60&asmSelect1=&perpetrator=2155&perpetrator=482&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=.}\]

\[^{266}\text{Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland, accessed June 5, 2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&country=60&asmSelect1=&perpetrator=2155&perpetrator=482&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=.}\]
some of the recent violence attributed to the Brotherhood by the Egyptian government is in dispute. This database only accounts for violence that can directly be connected to the Muslim Brotherhood.

**Figure 25.** Muslim Brotherhood Egyptian Targets

Source: Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland, accessed June 5, 2015, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&country=60&asmSelect1=&perpetrator=2155&perpetrator=482&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=.

**D. CONCLUSION**

The conditions considered in this chapter indicate that it is likely that the Muslim Brotherhood will politicize again. It does seem improbable in the near future, though. The current Egyptian government has destroyed much of the infrastructure and leadership of the Brotherhood. Former President Mursi was given a life sentence in 2015 and “convicted of conspiring to commit terrorist acts with foreign organizations to undermine national security.”267 His sixteen co-defendants were sentenced to death for “leaking state secrets to a foreign state.” Prosecutors accused the Brotherhood of exporting

violence and terrorism by sending members to military training camps run by Hamas, Hizbollah, and Iran. They also blamed the Brotherhood for creating the instability that lead to the 2011 revolution. In the backlash to their short democratic rule, hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood members were killed and the leadership imprisoned.

So, under the current administration it is likely the Muslim Brotherhood will not politicize and may continue to be persecuted and stymied. But if the organization survives, which its transnational ties and influence make probable, it will surely attempt to politicize again in the future under more favorable administrative conditions. In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood issued statements earlier this year explaining that, “the group has remained, and still remains, committed—in word and deed—to peaceful and political civil resistance.” The statement continued, “Those who choose a violent path no longer belong in the Brotherhood, and the group no longer accepts them.” More recently, following the alleged execution of nine Muslim Brotherhood leaders in a raid by the administration, the Brotherhood has called for the people to “Come out in rebellion and in defense of your country…[and] destroy the citadels of his oppression and tyranny and reclaim Egypt once more.” The Muslim Brotherhood statement went on to say the attack was, “a turning point that will have its own repercussions…el-Sissi is initiating a new phase during which it will not be possible to control the anger of the oppressed sectors.” The Egyptian administration continues to target the Muslim Brotherhood, but the Brotherhood’s leadership appears divided on the use of force.


271 “Update,” Mada Masr.


273 Associated Press, “The Latest.”
The case of the Muslim Brotherhood reiterates an important trend. Violent non-state actors that politicize tend to either moderate or fail. In the Muslim Brotherhood’s case Mursi refused to moderate in order to preserve his constituency, so the organization failed and was removed from power. In the case of the Irish Republican Army, they moderated and Sinn Fein remains a powerful political entity in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. In Hizbollah’s case the organization has reduced their violence and also looks to be moderating in order to maintain their political authority. The PKK moderates and minimizes attacks during periodic ceasefires, seeking politicization. Turkey’s continued attacks against the group prompt retaliatory violence, however, as well as jeopardize a successful PKK political transition. The pendulum of moderation and violent action continues to swing. Violent groups typically have hardline stances. When those positions are not adjusted to more accurately reflect mainstream voters upon politicization, organizations fail. With the Muslim Brotherhood being the largest representative party following the 2011 uprising, their failure to adapt quickly from an opposition group mentality to a leader in need of coalition and majority support, resulted in swift condemnation. Democratized but not liberalized in their positions, the Brotherhood was “rightly blamed for much of the social polarization and institutional dysfunction that plagued Egypt’s transition.”

Muslim Brotherhood is transnational, therefore it is unlikely that the organization will simply disappear. They will continue to remain a prominent non-state actor within Egypt and the region. The real question is if the violence perpetuated by the organization will increase or cease, and if they will attempt to politicize again. The Islamic State Sinai affiliate has stepped up attacks recently and the Egyptian administration continues to target both them and the Brotherhood equally blaming many attacks on the Brotherhood. This analysis indicates that politicization is probable, although not under the current administration.

274 Lynch, “Did We Get the Muslim Brotherhood Wrong.”
VII. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS

This analysis combined quantitative and qualitative methods to examine factors that influence a violent non-state actor’s transition from violence to politics. The statistical analysis was able to determine five factors that are significant in regards to politicization. Additionally, through a sampling of case studies, the violence levels following “politicization” were shown to significantly decrease. This demonstrates that certain violent non-state actors are predisposed to politicization and, furthermore, once an organization moves to politics its violence levels decrease. Admittedly, the complete transition of a violent non-state actor from violence to political action can sometimes occur extremely slowly. It is important, however, to recognize that once politicization begins, whether it succeeds or fails, violence decreases. As such, it would behoove legitimate states to closely examine the conditions its violent non-state actors exist in, and whenever possible attempt to encourage politicization. Moreover, violent non-state actors that politicize but do not moderate tend to fail. This alludes to supplementary benefits of encouraging politicization: regardless of the outcome for the violent non-state actor the state will become more secure. Either the violent non-state actor will moderate and reduce violence, or the organization will politically fail, which will result in a decline of its perceived legitimacy among its supporters. This chapter summarizes the analysis’s findings with regard to conditions and violence levels; discusses the implications of those findings; recommends the United States’ role in encouraging politicization; and recommends areas of additional research.

A. CONDITIONS

This analysis quantitatively examined: regime type, economy, size, negotiations, ideology, motivations, target selection, and the longevity of violent non-state actors. It was determined that five of the eight factors had significance with respect to the propensity of an organization to politicize. Negotiations, ideology, motivations, target selection, and a group’s longevity all had varying degrees of impact on a transition to political action.
The commencement of negotiations is one of the most important indicators of politicization. To reiterate, after a violent non-state actor has shown some degree of longevity, entering into negotiations will often facilitate a decline.\textsuperscript{275} Most groups do not enter into talks; in fact, only one in five violent non-state actors negotiate on strategic issues.\textsuperscript{276} Of those that do enter into talks, an astonishing nine out of ten succeed.\textsuperscript{277} This demonstrates that getting a violent non-state actor to the negotiating table is perhaps the most prominent factor in encouraging politicization. This can be enabled and promoted by the state by having a third-party arbiter to add legitimacy and accountability to the negotiations process.

Ideology was shown to be significant, but in the case study analyses every organization studied was a statistical anomaly. This is evidence of, as Rapoport explained, the evolving nature of today’s violent non-state actors.\textsuperscript{278} More and more violent non-state actors are utilizing religious principles as justification for their grievances; so, perhaps a religious ideology is becoming less significant in predicting an organization’s durability or ending type. More overtly, it shows that while each of the five factors are important indicators of politicization, a combination of factors impacts the overall move away from violence more than any one condition.

A violent non-state actor’s actual motivations are not always readily apparent. States must attempt to frame an organization’s grievances into manageable and negotiable parameters. This analysis demonstrates that policy, regime, and territorial change goals are the most likely to politicize. Often a violent non-state actor’s goals are a combination of issues. If the state agrees to discuss certain aspects of a violent non-state actor’s goals via potential policy, regime, or territorial changes the probability of politicization becomes much higher. Additionally, this increases the likelihood of convincing a violent non-state actor to negotiate.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Cronin, \textit{How Terrorism Ends}, 35.
\item Ibid., 36.
\item Ibid., 41.
\item Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror,” 47.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Target selection was also shown to be extremely important when it comes to a group’s propensity to politicize. Every case of successful politicization is a violent non-state actor who attacked “government-related” targets more than “civilian” ones. The case study analysis demonstrates that there is a wide range of variation with respect to target type; however, a group that predominantly targets civilians has never politicized. Analyzing an organization’s target trends displays indications of “politicization ripeness.” An organization may begin its lifespan with primarily civilian-related targets and move to government-related targets later. As government-related targeting increases and civilian-related targeting decreases, a group becomes more discriminatory in its target selection. This is a clear indication that the group is becoming more concerned with public opinion and perception. An organization is ripe for a move toward politics when government-related targeting peak in comparison to civilian attacks.

Longevity was determined to be a significant factor, but because there is a wide variation with respect to politicization it is important not to weigh this factor too heavily. Violent non-state actors that have existed for long periods of time have obviously remained relevant enough to maintain some base of popular support. This likely means the group’s grievances are germane to at least some portion of the state’s population. However, this does not always indicate a likelihood to politicize. Longevity remains an important factor when combined with additional encouraging conditions. Without contributing politicization stimulating conditions, it is not as substantial. Specifically, the longevity of an organization should be considered when contemplating negotiations because there is a direct correlation between longevity and negotiations facilitating a violent non-state actor’s decline.

In summary, the factors of negotiations and target type are critical when it comes to predicting politicization. Longevity and ideology are important in combination with other factors. Similarly, an organization’s goals should attempt to be framed by the state into one of the three categories that yield positive politicization results.

280 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 35.
B. VIOLENCE LEVELS

It is clear that politicization, the first time an organization actively participates in the political apparatus of its host nation, reduces violence. By analyzing violence levels before and after politicization, in just a limited number of case studies, this analysis demonstrated a drastic change in violence following politicization. Even in ongoing conflicts, a violent non-state actor experimenting in politics reduced violence levels. The effect of a transition to politics is either moderation or failure with a corresponding reduction in violence being the end result in either case.

A violent non-state actor’s shift from violence to politics takes time to materialize, but a group’s initial participation in government marks a significant point in that transition. By participating in the very administration a violent non-state actor is fighting they are both acknowledging that government’s legitimacy and beginning to stake a claim in it. It becomes significantly harder for a group to continue to protest and attack a government that it is a member of. This reveals a critical shift in the mindset of a violent non-state actor organization. Furthermore, it validates the necessity to accurately evaluate organizations based upon the factors that influence a group’s transition to politics. Accurate evaluations lead to precise resource allocations and influencing politicization when applicable, which, in turn, creates reduced violence levels. The violence reduction following politicization is the most striking aspect of this analysis’s findings.

C. PREDICTIVITY

This analysis can be used predictively to determine how a country can best invest its blood and treasure. By first determining the likelihood of an organization politicizing, a legitimate state actor can evaluate and gauge the manner in which it interacts with a group. While targeting is certainly always an option, it is also a vastly overused tool. It is this analysis’s position that violent non-state actors are frequently pushed to seek power and legitimacy via aggression, when they could instead be encouraged to move to political action. The same statistical tools utilized to examine politicization can also be used to determine salient factors for the other violent non-state actor ending types:
policing, military, victory, splintering, and victory. Used as a policy tool, this type of statistical analysis can estimate the chances for success before any investment in troops, money, or political capital is made. It can assist in making an informed decision regarding military, police action, or perhaps simply influencing a host nation to negotiate instead. In the United States’ current resource constrained environment, this type of consideration is imperative to maintaining the balance between international involvement and political maneuvering.

D. FURTHER RESEARCH

Further research is needed in a few areas in order to further validate this analysis’s findings. With regard to violence levels, a limited number of case studies were utilized to determine violence before and after politicization. More case studies could either refute those findings or further validate them. Additionally, other factors may also prove salient to politicization. For example, media influence is a likely candidate for a strong relationship to violence levels and politicization.281 Similarly, a location map of politicizations may indicate certain areas of the world that are more likely to politicize than others.

E. UNITED STATES’ ROLE

The factors discussed in this analysis can, and should, be influenced. A legitimate state can sway a violent non-state actor’s propensity to politicize in the same manner it may target them via military action. For example, in today’s highly digitally-connected world, a violent non-state actor’s perception of their degree of popular support can be manipulated. This could be used to convince a violent non-state actor to come to the negotiation table and possibly to politicize based upon a perceived amount of public support. As previously discussed, this leads to an organization either moderating or failing. The United States can assist its allies through material, intelligence, cyber, and/or arbitration support with respect to influencing politicization.

281 Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, 81.
Negotiations can be encouraged and prompted through powerful third-party intervention and adjudication. The United States could have a strong impact in this realm, as President Clinton did in negotiations in Northern Ireland. Because negotiations play such an enormous role in inducing politicization it would behoove the United States to act as an arbitrator when possible. A third-party arbitrator adds a level of legitimacy and accountability to negotiations between a state and a violent non-state actor. An arbitrator that is a world leader sends a message as to the status of such negotiations, and an outside-actor arbitrator is often seen as holding both parties accountable. In cases where United States entanglements with the country or violent non-state actor prohibit direct arbitration involvement, the United States could influence an ally to facilitate talks.

Hierarchical organization can also be encouraged. Persistent targeting forces violent non-state actors to decentralize and encourages a cellular structuring in order to survive.282 Conversely, some degree of monitored freedom of movement and communication, in a violent non-state actor targeted for politicization, will influence a hierarchical structure.283 Similarly, pragmatic leadership can be influenced through discriminant decapitation techniques. This can also be influenced via social media campaigning or other population support influence measures. If the leader of a violent non-state actor in a hierarchical organization is completely opposed to politicization, but other conditions favor a move to political action, steps should be taken to effect a change in leadership.

Even target discrimination could be manipulated via the media emphasizing civilian casualties when they occur from a violent non-state actor’s operations. An emphasis on civilian casualties would potentially make the group more risk adverse and discriminant in their targeting. Target discrimination for a violent non-state actor makes operations more difficult and, as evidenced, more government-related attacks indicate a group is more probable to politicize. There are, however, obviously second- and third-order effects that must be considered in highlighting the effectiveness of an organization’s attacks, regardless if they are civilian or government related. That being

282 Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma, 10.
283 Ibid., 12.
said, manipulating a violent non-state actor’s popular support due to lack of target discrimination could have significant effects on their durability.

The United States should use statistical analyses like this one to evaluate a violent non-state actor prior to determining its method of engagement. Military force and high value targeting seem to have become the United States’ primary method of dealing with violent non-state actors. This analysis demonstrates that a thorough examination of factors surrounding an organization needs to be conducted prior to engagement in order to determine the likelihood of ending violence via political means. If the probability of doing so is high, the United States would be able to save blood and treasure by attempting to influence a transition from violence to politics.
LIST OF REFERENCES


College Park, MD: University of Maryland.


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