



OCTOBER 21, 2015

EXAMINING DOD SECURITY COOPERATION: WHEN IT WORKS AND WHEN IT DOESN'T

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FULL COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

HEARING CONTENTS:

MEMBER STATEMENTS:

Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-TX) [*pdf unavailable, see [2:05 of webcast](#)*]
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services

Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA) [*view pdf*]
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services

WITNESSES:

Gen Douglas Fraser, USAF (Ret.) [*view pdf*]
Principal, Doug Fraser LLC

Dr. Christopher Paul [*view pdf*]
Senior Social Scientist, RAND Corporation

Dr. Derek Reveron [*view pdf*]
Professor of National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval War College

AVAILABLE WEBCAST(S)*:

Full Hearing:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2pMLnMgaYhY&index=4&list=PLY57mF79hbBZ94w0W2EIP546fEAMcopKj>

COMPILED FROM:

http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings-display?ContentRecord_id=4163FB92-713B-41D6-97D4-519F56816475&ContentType_id=14F995B9-DFA5-407A-9D35-56CC7152A7ED&Group_id=64562e79-731a-4ac6-aab0-7bd8d1b7e890&MonthDisplay=10&YearDisplay=2015

** Please note: Any external links included in this compilation were functional at its creation but are not maintained thereafter.*

Oct 21 2015

[Ranking Member Smith Statement for DOD Security Cooperation Hearing](#)

Washington D.C.— House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith released the following statement for today’s committee hearing examining the Department of Defense security cooperation:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to join you in thanking our witnesses for appearing here today.

Whether we call it “Building Partner Capacity” (BPC) or “security assistance,” bolstering the ability of other nations to provide for their own security and to assist in providing regional security is a key component in American security strategy. This is not a new concept—at various times during the Cold War we helped build the militaries of other countries, including Iran under the Shah, so they could act as regional proxies in the struggle against communism.

Following the 9/11 attacks, however, the concept has become even more key as the United States has realized that ungoverned territory has provided the safe havens terrorists require from which to launch attacks against us and our allies. To push back on these groups and to begin to shrink the ungoverned space, we have created a variety of new authorities and provided hundreds of millions of dollars per year that the Department of Defense uses to build the capacity of foreign security forces. I have very much supported these measures.

In some cases, our efforts to help others provide security has met with some remarkable results—many proponents point to the Philippines or Colombia as great successes, but we should also look to Somalia and our assistance to the countries participating in AMISOM. In other cases, Yemen and Mali most notably, our assistance to other countries did not help with regional security over time. We need to understand why both successes and failures happen, and what we can do to make the former more likely while risking fewer failures.

Understanding what makes success more likely is extremely important. I don’t believe that we can ever guarantee success—as the name “Building Partner Capacity” implies, it requires us to act through other nations whose interests may not perfectly align with ours. But I do believe there are conditions that improve our chances, and I hope the panel can help us outline those.

I also hope the panel can think through any needed changes to how we do business. Security assistance, in the past, was mostly led by the State Department. That started to change after 9/11, with the creation of authorities like the 1206 program that was intended to help nations address immediate and short-term counterterrorism needs. That and other programs evolved over time, particularly with the creation of the Counter Terrorism Partnership, to the point that DOD is thinking about longer-term programs and support. Assuming everyone in the Administration and Congress agrees with this evolution, we should consider if there are

legislative or administrative changes that we need to make to improve our chances of success. For example, DOD has gotten much better over time about looking at a country's ability to sustain the assistance we provided, but this is hardly perfect. How do we do use our national security apparatus better?

Again, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank our witnesses for appearing here today and for their assistance in helping us think through these questions. I yield back.

###

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE

STATEMENT

OF

GENERAL DOUGLAS M. FRASER, USAF (RETIRED)
PRINCIPAL, DOUG FRASER, LLC
PENSACOLA, FLORIDA
AND
FORMER COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

SECURITY COOPERATION

21 OCTOBER 2015

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL
RELEASED BY THE HOUSE ARMED
SERVICES COMMITTEE

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the House Armed Services Committee, it has been over three years since I last had the opportunity to appear before the distinguished members of this committee. I am honored to speak with you again and share my perspective of the value of security cooperation programs for the Department of Defense and our nation.

The Value of Security Cooperation

I am a proponent of continuing robust U.S. government and Department of Defense investment in security cooperation programs. I find that security cooperation programs are most successful when they are planned, funded, coordinated, executed, and evaluated in conjunction with Department of State security assistance and foreign assistance programs funded by the Congress. A coordinated interagency approach in foreign assistance enhances the security of the United States through a focused approach, approved by our friends and allies, helping them defend their sovereignty and maintain the security of their nations.

My comments today are based on my experience planning and executing security cooperation programs in two separate geographic combatant commands – United States Pacific Command and United States Southern Command. My comments also reflect my experience working with U.S Embassies, U.S. federal agencies, and our regional partners to build relations and improve their capacity to address national security concerns and our combined capacity to address international security

concerns. Finally, my comments focus on security cooperation programs conducted outside of combat zones.

Using this framework, I think security cooperation programs build enduring relationships, build trust through familiarity and awareness with one another's armed forces, foster cooperation for working together in crisis, help build the capacity of the armed forces of friendly nations, and help strengthen the positions of the armed forces within society. I found that Department of Defense security cooperation training, education, and exercise programs are good investments for the United States government.

What Security Cooperation Can Do

I think security cooperation programs provide three valuable contributions for the Department of Defense. They build understanding and relationships between the members of the armed forces of the U.S. and our partner nations. In conjunction with Department of State security assistance programs, they help build the capacity of partner nation armed forces to maintain security within their borders. And third, they grow the professional understanding of partner armed forces for adhering to international standards, including respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the role of elected civilian authorities. Let me expand on each of these points.

First, Department of Defense security cooperation programs build understanding and strengthen the relations between the members of two or more armed forces. These relationships are formed through the shared experience gained by participating together in training and education programs, either in the U.S. or their country. These shared experiences test the participants physically, mentally, and show them the importance of working together.

The following example illustrates my point. In the mid 1980s, a U.S. Army officer, Major Ken Keen, and a Brazilian Army Officer, Major Floriano Peixoto, attended parachute training together in the U.S., and later attended the Brazilian Army Command and Staff College. Years later, when an earthquake demolished parts of Haiti in 2010, Lieutenant General Keen and Major General Peixoto found themselves in Haiti commanding the two key military organizations supporting relief efforts in Haiti, Joint Task Force Haiti (commanded by Lieutenant General Keen) and the United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH)(commanded by Major General Peixoto). (Background -- While I served as the Commander of United States Southern Command, Lieutenant General Keen served as my Deputy Commander. He and his staff were visiting Haiti on January 12, 2010 when a magnitude 7.7 earthquake struck near Port au Prince. Following the earthquake, I put Lieutenant General Keen in charge of Joint Task Force Haiti, the DOD effort to provide relief assistance in Haiti. Major General Peixoto was in Haiti commanding MINUSTAH). In this time of crisis, because of the relationship they had formed twenty years prior and the trust they had build, the two generals quickly cemented a

plan for how their forces would work together to speed the recovery of the Haitian people from this devastating earthquake. The shared training and education experience of these two officers built a common understanding that benefited the United States, Brazil, Haiti, and the United Nations. Strong, trusting relationships require investment. DOD security cooperation programs help foster these relationships. The success of international efforts to respond to the earthquake in Haiti, the largest humanitarian crisis in the Western Hemisphere, serves as a good example of the value of these relationships.

Second, along with building relations between military personnel, security cooperation programs help build the capacity of our partner nations armed forces to defend their national sovereignty. Security cooperation programs provide training in small arms, small force tactics, intelligence cooperation, logistics, command and control, military assistance to law enforcement, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and command and control of multi-national forces, enhancing the armed forces ability to plan and conduct operations and command and control their forces. In addition, through Defense Institution Building (DIB), the Department of Defense provides assistance for improving ministerial, general and joint staff, and military service headquarters management practices and processes. Strong defense institutions build and sustain capable, professional defense forces who are better able to meet national defense requirements.

Combined with Department of State security assistance programs, security cooperation programs enhance the capability of armed forces to defend their nation. These programs also build a common understanding of the language and procedures used by different armed forces to speed their ability to work together in times of crisis.

For example, the international military response to the Government of Haiti's request for support following the 2010 earthquake was fast and came from nations around the world. Because many of the responding international military personnel had trained with U.S. military forces or attended education programs with U.S. military personnel at some point in their career, the coordination, cooperation, and focus of the international forces deployed to Haiti quickly formed an effective operating force. The speed and facility with which this cooperation happened was facilitated through U.S. security cooperation programs conducted around the globe.

Finally, Department of Defense security cooperation programs help grow the professional capacity of partner militaries to respect international standards – respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the role of elected civilian authority over the military. The Geographic Combatant Commands and the Services all conduct courses on these topics in their training and education programs. They discuss how strong adherence to international humanitarian standards is critical for responsible military forces to maintain the trust and confidence of their societies.

While not perfect, the overwhelming majority of U.S. military men and women

exemplify these standards and demonstrate them in their interaction with other international military personnel.

What Security Cooperation Cannot Do

I also want to discuss what Department of Defense security cooperation programs CANNOT do. First, by themselves, security cooperation programs cannot prevent political change. As stated earlier, security cooperation programs teach respect for the democratic process and the rule of law. They also teach that the role of the armed forces of a nation is to defend the rights of their citizens to decide their political future.

From my viewpoint, over the past three decades, Department of Defense security cooperation programs helped foster stronger standards of conduct within our partner militaries in Latin America. Despite a history of military coups in the region, many militaries witnessed significant political change occur in their country and did not get involved. So, while U.S. security cooperation programs may have influenced militaries to stay out of politics, the political change in these countries has not always been favorable to U.S. interests.

Just as security cooperation programs cannot prevent political change, they cannot change the cultural and social norms in a country. They also will not address poverty, income inequality, nor enhance poor social infrastructure. While these

problems impact the success of security cooperation, other U.S. federal agencies are tasked to help countries address these problems. Therefore, security cooperation programs must work hand in hand with U.S. foreign assistance programs in a “whole of government” approach to help countries address their problems.

Close Relationship Between Security Cooperation and Security Assistance

Mr. Chairman, while this hearing is focused on security cooperation, from my experience, I think it is important to acknowledge the close relationship between Department of Defense security cooperation programs and Department of State security assistance programs. During my time in U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Southern Command, both commands worked closely with the Department of State and the respective U.S. Embassies to coordinate security cooperation and security assistance programs. Training and exercise programs conducted through security cooperation meshed closely with the education and equipping programs conducted through security assistance programs. In fact, in many cases, more funding assistance to a country was provided through Department of State programs to enhance the capability of a nation’s armed forces, like Foreign Military Financing, than came from Department of Defense programs.

Improving Security Cooperation and Security Assistance Programs

I see two significant ways to improve security cooperation and security assistance programs. These recommendations are specifically based on my experience in U.S. Southern Command, a command with limited resources supporting poorly resourced partner nation armed forces.

First, U.S. government administrative, oversight, and coordination processes are slow and unresponsive for meeting the urgent needs of poorly resourced partner armed forces facing critical internal defense problems. Many of our partner military organizations are relatively small and operate limited numbers of vehicles, naval vessels, and aircraft. They lack of the institutional structure and knowledge to accurately forecast future needs and therefore ask for equipment and training when their need is immediate. As a result, when these militaries cannot get the help they need when they need it, the slow speed of the U.S process reduces the importance of security cooperation programs for these under-resourced militaries, hurts cooperation, and encourages these nations to seek other nations to address their needs.

Let me use the C-130 program to illustrate my point. The majority of countries who operate C-130s in Latin America own small fleets of aircraft. These aircraft fleets range in size from two to eight aircraft, are supported by personnel with limited logistics planning expertise, have a limited capacity to predict when parts will fail,

and have low priority for requisitioning parts in the U.S supply system. When a part breaks, to get a new part, our partner's request a new part from the DOD global logistics system and are often told it will take six to 18 months to receive a new part. But they have a hard time understanding why. The Department of Defense operates hundreds of C-130s, so our partner's don't understand why, with so many aircraft, the U.S. cannot support their immediate need. And when the DOD doesn't, they view the U.S. military logistics system as unresponsive and not interested in supporting their operational success. From my point of view, while U.S. military readiness should remain a high priority, the U.S. government must find a way to respond quickly to address the urgent needs of all our partners. Our partners must routinely see the benefit of partnering with the U.S.

Another challenge DOD security cooperation programs face is declining budgets. Fewer resources supporting the same mission requirements mean fewer people with less money trying to accomplish the same job. The impact on security cooperation is that the DOD will conduct fewer programs, take longer to plan and execute them, be slower at responding to partner nation needs, and leave the impression that the U.S. is not interested in supporting their partner's security. Declining budgets will diminish our partner nation's trust in the DOD as a reliable partner.

An Interagency Foreign Assistance Strategy

I want to add one final point to my statement about DOD security cooperation programs. In the FY16 NDAA, the Committee approved language directing the Department of Defense to develop and deliver to Congress a strategic framework for conducting security cooperation programs. When delivered, this strategy will help the committee understand the DOD approach to security cooperation, but these security cooperation programs are only one part of the overall U.S. foreign assistance program. I think the Congress can do more.

Successful security cooperation strategies support successful foreign assistance programs. For example, Plan Colombia, a foreign assistance strategy to help Colombia defeat the FARC, used coordinated security cooperation, security assistance, and other foreign assistance programs to support the Government of Colombia's strategy to reduce the influence of the FARC and encourage them to come to the peace table. Plan Colombia succeeded because it brought all the ingredients of foreign assistance together to support a committed partner -- a well structured and funded U.S. foreign assistance strategy supporting strong Colombian national leadership, a unified domestic strategy, and the full support of the Colombian people. While the U.S. helped Colombia, the Colombians deserve credit for their success to date.

Therefore, I think that a successful foreign assistance strategy starts here in the Congress. Mr. Chairman, I ask you and the distinguished members of this committee, working with other Congressional committees, consider directing the responsible federal agencies, led by the Department of State, to develop a foreign assistance strategy, involving all appropriate parts of the Federal government, to report the results to a joint session of the responsible committees in Congress. While the U.S. interagency process has matured significantly in recent years, more progress is needed in both the Congress and the federal government.

Mr. Chairman, the Committee's continued investment in Department of Defense security cooperation programs is important to the defense of the United States. They enable the armed forces of the U.S. to build relations, improve the ability to conduct combined military operations, enhance partner military capacity and capability, and build readiness for responding together in crisis. Militaries must train to be ready when called. Security cooperation programs are an important part of investing in the Department's overall readiness.

What Works Best When Conducting Security Cooperation?

Christopher Paul

RAND Office of External Affairs

CT-441

October 2015

Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee on October 21, 2015

This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. RAND® is a registered trademark.



Published 2015 by the RAND Corporation
1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050
4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665
RAND URL: <http://www.rand.org/>
To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact
Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002;
Email: order@rand.org

Christopher Paul¹
The RAND Corporation

***What Works Best When Conducting Security Cooperation?*²**

Before the Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives

October 21, 2015

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the committee thank you for inviting me here to testify today.

When we talk about security cooperation, we generally include a wide range of programs and activities that comprise some combination of working by, with, and through partners in pursuit of national security objectives, as well as helping others to help themselves.³ By working with and helping others to be better able to deal with problems in their countries and regions, the United States seeks to avoid the costs of having to take a greater role in those resolutions or of letting various security or humanitarian problems go unresolved.

When security cooperation efforts are effective, they bolster our partners, contribute to long-term stability, and help resolve problems, crises, and conflicts without heavy investment or involvement by the United States. When these efforts are ineffective, however, security cooperation fails to do these things and appears to be a wasted investment that still leaves unresolved problems and partners unable or unwilling to help solve them. To get the most out of security cooperation in the future, we must understand when and why security cooperation works, and when and why it does not.

My remarks today draw from research on security cooperation that I have led at the RAND Corporation over the past several years.

In one analysis, we used case studies of security cooperation engagements with 29 countries over a span of 20 years to identify which conditions and actions have led to success in security

¹ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

² This testimony is available for free download at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT441.html>.

³ Building partner capacity and security force assistance both fall under the broader security cooperation umbrella.

cooperation and building partner capacity, and which have not.⁴ In a second study, we conducted additional deep-dive case studies of four cases, chosen because they all lacked certain characteristics identified as beneficial to success in the first study. This second study focused on how efforts might still succeed even when an assistance provider is forced by circumstances to work with partners in a situation not favorable to success.⁵

All this is to say that the findings and recommendations that I share with you today stem from a substantial foundation of empirical evidence.⁶

What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity?

Let me begin with the subset of security cooperation focused on building the capacity and capability of partner nation security forces. Several factors are critical contributors in those efforts.

First, **matching matters**. Efforts to build partner capacity are most effective when what the United States offers aligns well with partner nation security forces' baseline capabilities and their ability to absorb provided training and technology. Such alignment requires an understanding of what training and equipment partner forces already have and what they are ready for. Too often, U.S. training and equipping efforts are predicated on mistaken assumptions and equipment provided is a poor match for the partner nation's environment or for the technological sophistication of their forces; as a result, training misses the mark, being either too basic and remedial or too advanced and rapid to be of much benefit to trainees. For example, in many instances, U.S. providers have painstakingly translated instructional materials into partner languages, only to later discover that partner troops, while literate, did not have sufficient levels of basic education to make any use of the translated manuals. While these sorts of mismatches are often recognized and fixed over time, they lead to wasted initial investments and can sour important relationships.

⁴ Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, Stephanie Young, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Joe Hogler, and Christine Leah, *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?* Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-1253/1-OSD, 2013 (www.rand.org/t/MG1253z1).

⁵ Christopher Paul, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Beth Grill, Colin P. Clarke, Lisa Saum-Manning, Heather Peterson, and Brian Gordon, *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity in Challenging Contexts?* Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-937-OSD, 2015 (www.rand.org/t/RR937).

⁶ Due to sensitivities associated with the data for specific case studies, I offer examples here without revealing names and places. Full details are contained in reports that are not available to the general public.

Second, the point about souring relationships is important because **relationships matter, and they can take time to establish**. Relationships support a necessary level of trust and understanding between the United States and the partner, as well as provide practical experience on how to work together. Personalities can play a significant role. Effective relationships require both the alignment of objectives between the United States and the partner (also a matching issue) and agreement across U.S. and partner nation stakeholders on specific objectives and approaches. Both are important to success.

Alignment of objectives includes both the extent to which the United States and the partner share broader security interests and the extent to which they share the specific security interest that is the object of the capacity-building effort. For example, in the early days of engagement with Colombia, U.S. objectives focused exclusively on counter-narcotics efforts, while Colombia was much more concerned with counterinsurgency and internal security. After 9/11, when U.S. policy shifted focus to include counterterrorism and support for counterinsurgency, the extent of overlap in interests with the Colombians was much higher, and capacity-building efforts became more successful.

Third, **context matters. Certain characteristics or features of partners improve prospects for security cooperation success**. Specifically, partners with relatively robust governance and relatively strong economies have historically been more successful participants in security cooperation. Having a functioning ministry of defense (or equivalent) and having sufficient resources (and willingness) to invest in the sustainment of capacity built are particularly useful.

Fourth, **consistency and sustainment are key**. By *sustainment*, I mean the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to keep something going, including maintenance, spare and replacement parts, and manning in the face of rotations, retirement, or attrition. In historical cases in which the United States provided consistent funding and effort toward capacity building over several years and some kind of sustainment effort was in place (either as part of the U.S. security cooperation effort or from partner investment), capacity was much more likely to be built and maintained. In too many of the historical cases, short-term successes were undermined when delivery of security cooperation was interrupted or dropped off, or because of atrophy of capability either for want of refresher/continuation training or for lack of parts and maintenance.

For example, in one instance, the United States provided small boats for a partner's coast guard that led to a dramatic increase in operating capability and effectiveness. However, the engine compartments for these small boats required a peculiar and distinctive wrench to gain access, and these wrenches were not provided. Even though partner forces were keen to maintain their

craft, they were unable to do so. In other cases, partner forces completely lack a culture of maintenance and treat all equipment, even vehicles, as disposable. In the first instance, provision of unique needed maintenance equipment and spare parts would have been sufficient for sustainment. In the second type of case, a much more robust sustainment process is required, involving either enduring maintenance contracts with a third party or considerable maintenance training for partners.

What Keeps Security Cooperation from Working?

There have been a number of recent instances that appear to be less-than-successful security cooperation efforts, in which the United States has invested a great deal with little to show for it, or partner forces believed to be relatively capable proved to be inadequate to the threats they faced. In light of these instances, I offer two sets of observations from our research. The first concerns the difficulty of defining success for security cooperation efforts, and the second addresses challenges to effective security cooperation.

Success Is Sometimes Difficult to Define

What does it mean to “succeed” in security cooperation? When there are clear national security goals, stakeholders can easily see whether they have succeeded or failed in meeting them. But if the United States is undertaking security cooperation to support broader national security goals and the efforts fail to meet those broader goals, does that mean security cooperation has failed? I would argue that it does not. For example, if broader national security goals seek to prevent a regional conflict from spilling over into a partner country, security cooperation efforts might focus on improving border security forces and internal security forces. Those security cooperation efforts might be entirely successful, with the partner’s border and internal security forces dramatically improving their capability, but the adjacent conflict might still spill over into the partner country, exceeding the capacity of those forces.

Part of the challenge to identifying success stems from the lack of connections between the goals. Often, national security goals are multiple or ambiguous. Equally often, even if the goals and objectives of supporting efforts (like security cooperation) are themselves clear, they are not clearly nested with and connected to the higher-level goals, or they are not sufficient by themselves to achieve the higher-level goals. (In the example begun above, improved border and security forces alone were not enough to prevent conflict spillover.)

In addition, it is worth noting that goals at all levels tend to change over time. We should not be surprised, for example, if the United States initially sets out to help a partner build border security forces and those forces later prove to be ineffective when asked to perform counterterrorism missions.

Besides clarity and nesting in goals, another part of the problem is in defining success itself. In our research on building partner capacity, we used a scale developed by other RAND colleagues to score changes in partner capabilities.⁷ Under that framework, each security area is represented by a number of subordinate factors, each scored from 1 (very low capability) to 5 (very high).

If a security cooperation effort takes a partner's capability in an important security area (say, internal security forces) from 2 to 4 on this scale, this would be an outstanding success at building partner capacity. However, it is by no means a guarantee that those forces will be up to the challenge posed by an insurgency backed by a transnational violent extremist organization, which could mean failure to deal with that threat and thus failure to meet broader U.S. national security objectives.

In our case studies, we defined successful partner capacity-building efforts as those that yielded an overall increase of 0.8 on this scale for the security area in which improvements were sought.⁸ Based on this criterion, 23 of 29 cases we examined realized some kind of success. However, as noted, a modest level of success at capacity building does not necessarily equate to overall policy success. Nor does it guarantee a durable increase in capacity. Too often in our research, we observed evidence of successful capacity built, only to see that capacity atrophy and fall back toward baseline because neither the United States nor the partner took the steps necessary to sustain it.

Finally, even when goals are properly nested from top to bottom and security cooperation unambiguously supports national security objectives and successfully creates formations of trained and equipped forces that should be adequate to the challenges they will face, we can still find surprising security force collapses. Willingness to fight is one of the hardest things to measure prior to actual battle. Further, will to fight can be highly situationally dependent. Some forces will fight one foe but flee before another; some forces will fight if stationed in their home

⁷ Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Lynn E. Davis, Ely Ratner, Molly Dunigan, Jeremiah Goulka, Heather Peterson, and K. Jack Riley, *Developing a Defense Sector Assessment Rating Tool*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, TR-864-OSD, 2010 (www.rand.org/t/TR864).

⁸ See Paul, Clarke, Grill, Young, et al. (2013) for details.

region but desert if called to battle in a different region of their country. Some forces will not fight unless they clearly and completely overmatch their opponent.

Thus, defining success may require setting more-realistic expectations, settling for incremental progress, and recognizing the inherent risks of failure in such complex environments.

Challenges to Security Cooperation Success

Our research also highlights various challenges that can reduce prospects for success in security cooperation. Some of these aspects can be controlled by the assistance provider and can (and should) be improved upon; others are inherent in or under the control of partners and are things the United States needs to keep in mind when managing its expectations for future security cooperation efforts.

First among these challenges relates to a previous section of my testimony today: **partner willingness**. One of the findings of our research is that **you can't want it more than they do**.⁹ Lack of partner willingness can disrupt security cooperation at many levels, any of which can result in delay, diminished success, or outright failure. Examples include partners unwilling to participate in security cooperation (and this can be at the ministerial level, command level, or level of individual troop trainees), partners willing to participate but unwilling to focus their efforts in areas of U.S. strategic interest, partners unwilling to use the capacity built for the intended purpose (often because they would prefer to use it for something else), and partners unwilling to respect human rights while benefiting from and using the capabilities provided by security cooperation.

Many of the challenges to security cooperation success stem from shortcomings in U.S. practices. Because of funding and budgetary cycles and changing priorities, **the United States funds and delivers security cooperation inconsistently, and that decreases effectiveness.** This problem is exacerbated with partners who face significant contextual challenges. *When the United States drops the ball with a robust partner, either that partner picks it up or the ball floats to some extent. When the United States drops the ball with a partner that faces significant contextual challenges, the ball sinks.*

⁹ Paul, Clarke, Grill, Young, et al., 2013, p. 85. See also Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan, *Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-291/1-OSD, 2013 (www.rand.org/t/RR291z1), where partner commitment and motivation was found to be essential to success in expeditionary counterinsurgency, too, independent of the commitment and motivation of the expeditionary force.

Inadequate sustainment planning hurts security cooperation effectiveness, too. As noted, unless they are sustained, forces and capabilities built through partner capacity-building efforts rapidly atrophy. Some partners have resources to dedicate to sustainment, as well as forces with backgrounds and training that support maintenance, and some do not. Even where sustainment support from the partner is possible, it needs to be an integrated part of the overall security cooperation plan. When partners lack the resources necessary for sustainment, sustainment needs to be *provided* as part of the security cooperation package.

Similarly, **a lack of flexibility in security cooperation constrains its effectiveness**. The administrative requirements of security cooperation often prevent executors from wielding necessary flexibility. For example, in one country, the commander of the partner formation designated for security cooperation refused to allow his troops to participate. U.S. personnel located a similar formation in the same municipality whose commander was enthusiastic about the planned activities, but program procedures prevented U.S. personnel from making the needed shift and engaging with the willing formation. In another case, partner stakeholders were delaying participation in planned activities, but materiel and resources were still being delivered to the partner. U.S. personnel were extremely frustrated that they could not control the flow of resources sufficiently to use that as an incentive for better partner participation.

These last three problems stem in part from weaknesses in the authorities. While the patchwork of authorities available to fund and support security cooperation enables a wide range of activities, the authorities rarely support an activity for more than a year or two at a time, resulting in uncertainty about their continuation. Programs under Title 10 authorities are short duration; some Title 22 authorities (such as Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing) can be more enduring but have fairly limited scope and application. There are few authorities that allow for sustainment support, and none that I am aware of can support sustainment of capabilities built as part of some other effort. While needs, objectives, and the situation on the ground can change fairly quickly, once an effort is launched and funded by a program, it is difficult to change important execution details.

The Benefits of Assessment and the Need for SMART Objectives

Many of the available benefits from matching and context can be realized and many of the challenges avoided or overcome with better planning and assessment. To begin with, objectives in both security cooperation and broader national defense strategy development (which security cooperation is intended to support) need to be specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and

time-bound (SMART).¹⁰ With SMART objectives in place, assessment of prospects, process, and outcomes becomes possible. A thoughtful assessment framework can then support important inquiries at three points in the broader security cooperation process that could help improve ongoing and future efforts.¹¹

- Prior to execution, ask: What could go wrong with the planned effort?
- During execution, ask: Is everything going according to plan? If not, why not? What can be done about it?
- After execution ask: Were all objectives achieved? If not, why not? What could be done about it in the future (either in this context or elsewhere)?

Recommendations

To support progress in this area, this research suggests six recommendations.¹²

First, **reform legislative authorities to improve flexibility, and simplify procedures.** Currently, many authorities are inflexible. In addition, while there are a wide range of authorities with diverse application, using this patchwork of authorities requires considerable experience and bureaucratic expertise.¹³

Second, **revise (or add new) authorities to support a wider range of activities over longer periods of time, and sustain them.** This may need to entail new authorities specifically to add a sustainment “tail” to existing authorities.

Third, consider (and insist that U.S. security cooperation stakeholders consider) whether **partners have the attributes, characteristics, or behaviors that are associated with effective security cooperation.** Manage expectations accordingly.

¹⁰ See Christopher Paul, Brian Gordon, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Lisa Saum-Manning, Beth Grill, Colin P. Clarke, and Heather Peterson, *A Building Partner Capacity Assessment Framework: Tracking Inputs, Outputs, Outcomes, Disruptors, and Workarounds*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-935-OSD, 2015 (www.rand.org/t/RR935), and Christopher Paul, Jessica Yeats, Colin P. Clarke, Miriam Matthews, and Lauren Skrabala, *Assessing and Evaluating Department of Defense Efforts to Inform, Influence, and Persuade: Handbook for Practitioners*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-809/2-OSD, 2015 (www.rand.org/t/RR809z2).

¹¹ For an example of such a framework, see Paul, Gordon, et al., 2015.

¹² Recommendations are all drawn from Paul, Clarke, Grill, Young, et al., 2013, and Paul, Moroney, et al., 2015.

¹³ See Jennifer D. P. Moroney, David E. Thaler, and Joe Hogler, *Review of Security Cooperation Mechanisms Combatant Commands Utilize to Build Partner Capacity*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-413-OSD, 2013 (www.rand.org/t/RR413).

Fourth, regardless of the partner or context, review how well **security cooperation goals and activities correspond with what the partner wants or needs and what it is capable of using and absorbing**. We have summarized this recommendation elsewhere as “find the right ladder, find the right rung,” and it remains good advice for security cooperation planners.¹⁴

Fifth, review the extent to which security cooperation plans **identify possible challenges within the context and plan accordingly, and include assessment**. Theater security cooperation plans should include measurable (SMART) objectives, and plans for executing security cooperation should include plans to collect assessment data not only on objective attainment but also on process inputs and outputs and possible disrupters.

Sixth, **emphasize sustainment when reviewing security cooperation programs**, and ask whether Department of State and Department of Defense planners have identified means at the outset for the sustainment and maintenance of any capabilities to be built.

¹⁴ Paul, Clarke, Grill, Young, et al., 2013.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL
RELEASED BY THE HOUSE ARMED
SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT

OF

DR. DEREK S. REVERON¹
PROFESSOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RI

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

SECURITY COOPERATION

21 OCTOBER 2015

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL
RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

It is my honor to speak to this Committee today about security cooperation. The ideas here are my own and largely drawn from my book *Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military*.

Foreign policy of the 2010s was supposed to be different: there would be no great power tensions, the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan would be strong enough to confront their own security challengers, and the US could pivot away from Middle East turmoil to do nation building at home. Yet the United States has confronted a very different world. Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed parts of Crimea, and launched military operations in Syria; China violated Vietnam's sovereignty drilling for hydrocarbons in its Exclusive Economic Zone, established an air defense identification zone conflicting with Japan, and created "islands" in the disputed South China Sea, exacerbating tensions with the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia; Iraq struggled against the group ISIS, ceding a significant portion of its territory; Afghanistan failed to parlay a decade of international investment, leading to a Taliban resurgence; and intrastate conflict caused closure of U.S. embassies in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Graham Allison and Dmitri Simes summed it well "peace seems increasingly out of reach as threats to U.S. security and prosperity multiply both at the systemic level, where dissatisfied major powers are increasingly challenging the international order, and at the state and substate level, where dissatisfied ethnic, tribal, religious and other groups are destabilizing key countries and even entire regions."²

In an effort to reach for peace, the United States responds to foreign policy crises like these not by sending combat forces to confront aggression, but instead by sending weapons, trainers, and advisors to tackle security deficits.³ The United States aspires to create true partners that can confront their own threats to internal stability (e.g. terrorism) or alleviate security dilemmas (e.g. the rise of China). Thus, strengthening weak states and supporting developed partners through security cooperation remain a national security priority. Not new, this approach continues a long-term tradition of U.S. foreign policy that seeks to empower its partners to confront their own security challenges rather than attempt to solve them through American force alone. To be sure, the U.S. military remains a potent combat force and regularly conducts counterterrorism strikes in the Middle East, leads maritime coalitions in the Indian Ocean, and maintains a capacity to wage major war in Asia. In addition to this warfighting capacity, successive administrations have sought to prevent conflict by helping regimes through security cooperation, which includes all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments.⁴

Since coalition operations are a norm, security cooperation also ensures partners are interoperable with US forces. For example, in Afghanistan, we operated with 50 partners who often could provide capabilities that the United States could not, such as police training. In Bahrain, a U.S. officer directs three naval task forces composed of 30 partners who collectively protect vital trade routes. And in Key West, Joint Interagency Task Force South serves as a fusion center supporting international efforts to eliminate illicit trafficking in the Caribbean and Latin America. Security cooperation enables these coalitions to work; the programs ensure partners have access to the U.S. defense industrial base, and U.S.-sponsored military exercises promote interoperability.

As the United States looks ahead, the country is sure to follow the tradition in defense strategy that prioritizes enabling partners through training and equipping their forces. Over the last 15 years, the number of status of forces agreements (SOFAs) increased from 40 to 117 (see

table 1). This is due, in part, to the fact that while administrations may change, fundamental U.S. interests have not. These include: protecting the US homeland from catastrophic attack, sustaining a global system marked by open lines of communication to facilitate commerce, promoting international security, and preventing powers hostile to the United States from being able to dominate important areas of the world.⁵

The United States aspires to create true partners who can confront their own threats to internal stability, which organized crime, violent actors, and regional rivals exploit. Known as the “indirect approach,” the U.S. helps countries fill security deficits that exist when a country cannot independently protect its own national security. American generosity helps explain this, but U.S. national security benefits too. For example, by providing radars and surveillance technology, Central American countries can control their airspace and can interdict drug-filled planes bound for the US; by providing logistic support, Pakistan can lead a maritime coalition promoting maritime security in the Indian Ocean; and by selling AEGIS destroyers, Japan can counter North Korean missiles and provide early warning of missile threats to the United States.

Through security cooperation programs like these, the United States helps other countries meet their immediate national security needs, but there is also an effort to foster independence so states can contribute to global security. This is most visible in a program such as the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative that trains and equips foreign militaries to participate in peacekeeping operations. While the United States does not want to deploy ground forces under the United Nations flag, it does play a key role in peacekeeping by training and equipping over 250,000 peacekeepers since 2005. Programs like GPOI enabled Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda to participate in an African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia. An officer from Chad seemed to capture the rationale for other countries’ efforts to contribute to global security: “When your neighbor’s house is burning, you have to put it out, because if not, yours is next.”⁶ U.S. security cooperation often provides the tools countries need when their national security demands exceed their security capacities.

The preventive and cooperative approach to foreign policy is visible in today’s military, which has undergone dramatic change over the last three decades. Defense strategy embraces the notion that the U.S. military does much more than fight wars. The military trains, equips, and deploys peacekeepers; provides humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and supports other militaries to reduce security deficits throughout the world. With national security focused on weak states and regional challengers, the U.S. military has been evolving from a force of confrontation to one of cooperation.

The rationale for security cooperation has been based on the assumption that instability breeds chaos, which would make it more likely that the US or the international community would face pressure to intervene in the future. Given America’s global foreign policy, many countries have large expectations for assistance from the United States, but the US also derives benefits from security cooperation. Among these are:

- Obtaining base access as a *quid pro quo*
- Augmenting U.S. force structure by providing logistics and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to coalition partners in the Middle East
- Promoting a favorable balance of power by selling weapon systems and training programs to Gulf Cooperation Council countries to balance Iran

- Harmonizing areas of cooperation by working with Japan and Israel on missile defense
- Promoting self-defense through the Georgia Train and Equip program
- Reinforcing sovereignty through programs like Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative with Mexico
- Supporting the US industrial base and creating interoperable air forces through the F-35 program

As these reasons suggest, security cooperation is much bigger than train and equip forces in combat zones. Given the scope of these programs and diversity of the partners, one can develop measurable objectives. These include: the strength of regional security agreements, the types of regional cooperation (e.g. participation in U.S.-led air, maritime, or land operations), willingness of foreign governments to counter threats the U.S. identifies (e.g. terrorism), and the relative receptivity of U.S. forces within the partner country. Internal to countries, one can measure how well partners combat security challenges, the strength of civil–military relations, and the levels of respect for human rights. Measurement can include the extent to which international commerce flows freely, levels of cooperation between military and international relief organizations, and support for international initiatives to combat disease, illicit activity, and weapons proliferation.

Challenges for Security Cooperation

At times security cooperation can be limitless, dissatisfying, and futile. At times partners misinterpret the assistance and do not appreciate the transitory nature of the assistance. To convince partners that Cold War logic no longer governs security cooperation, U.S. military officers promote human rights, encourage military professionalization, and serve as mentors to military officers in developing countries throughout the world. At the Naval War College, for example, over 65 countries send their best and brightest to learn alongside their American peers.

Over the last three decades, the U.S. military has embraced security cooperation, but there are important risks to highlight. First, the non-exclusive nature of these activities will produce more failures than successes, which negatively impacts confidence in security cooperation as a tool. Second, the personnel system is not producing sufficient talent to support these missions. American forces no longer operate in isolation and need an appreciation of the historical, cultural, and political dimensions of its partners. Third, there is a tendency to over-rely on partners thinking they can accomplish U.S. objectives when they either lack the political motivation or the skills to do so. Fourth, U.S. weapons may be protected as sensitive technology and training given to partners can be used against U.S. forces. Finally, other countries will rely on the U.S. to subsidize their own defense budgets creating a “free-rider” problem (see Table 2).

Underlying these risks are fundamental limits of what an external actor can accomplish through security cooperation; without indigenous political support, programs can only have marginal impact on a country’s security and stability. All of these programs clearly indicate that change in weak states must come primarily from within; external actors are limited in what they can accomplish.⁷ Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter captured this while frustrated with U.S. efforts to enable Iraq to confront its security challenges. “We can give them training, we can give them equipment — we obviously can’t give them the will to fight. But if we give them training,

we give them equipment, and give them support, and give them some time, I hope they will develop the will to fight, because only if they fight can ISIL remain defeated.”⁸

Concluding Thoughts

Security cooperation is not an abstract concept to me, but something I participated in firsthand as an academic and as a naval officer. With a strong background and a deep belief in the importance of good governance, universal human rights, and democracy, I am keenly aware of the dangers of arming repressive regimes, training militaries that are not grounded in civilian control, or upsetting regional balances of power that could lead to war. Given the non-exclusive nature of security cooperation and the large number of participants in U.S. programs, it is an unfortunate reality that the next military coup will be led by a former IMET participant. In spite of this risk, we are a far cry from Cold War programs that did not have the benefit of oversight and there is a strong U.S. commitment to professionalize foreign officers.

In my own experiences, I have yet to witness programs that do not support US interests on promoting security, stability, and good governance. And I have yet to encounter an officer from partner countries who was not grateful for the US attention to their security problems. Furthermore, I have yet to witness military programs that did not have the full endorsement and support of the U.S. ambassadors who see fragile security as a serious roadblock to reform and development efforts.

Given the disappointments in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, there is a potential for the value of security cooperation to be ignored, but these programs are not confined to combat zones alone. When thinking about security cooperation, we should look at how international partners contribute to coalition operations and global security. U.S. budgetary declines will likely reinforce the exporting security imperative, as the U.S. will need more partners and allies to augment its own defense capacities. I hope this hearing can show those inside and outside of government the importance of security deficits, how militaries are changing from forces of confrontation to forces of cooperation, the challenges of the “by, with, and through partners” approach, and why security cooperation is an important pillar of defense strategy.

Appendix:

Table 1: Expanding Security Programs ⁹			
	2000	2009	2015
Status of Force Agreements	40	90	117
NATO Allies	15	28	28
Foreign Military Financing Budget	\$3.6 billion (FY01 est.)	\$5.03billion (FY09 Total)	\$5.8 billion (FY16 Request)
International Military Education and Training Budget	\$58 million (FY01 est.)	\$93 million (FY09 Total)	\$111 million (FY 16 Request)

Country	Average 1985-1989	Average 2005-2009	2015 (est.)
Albania	-	-	1.2
Belgium	2.8	1.1	0.9
Bulgaria	-	2.1	1.2
Canada	2.1	1.2	1.0
Croatia	-	-	1.4
Czech Republic	-	1.5	1.0
Denmark	2.0	1.3	1.2
Estonia	-	1.6	2.0
France	3.7	2.3	1.8
Germany	3.0	1.3	1.2
Greece	4.5	2.8	2.4
Hungary	-	1.3	0.9
Italy	2.2	1.5	1.0
Latvia	-	1.4	1.0
Lithuania	-	1.1	1.1
Luxembourg	0.8	0.5	0.5
Netherlands	2.8	1.4	1.2
Norway	2.9	1.5	1.5
Poland	-	1.7	2.2
Portugal	2.5	1.5	1.4
Romania	-	1.6	1.4
Slovak Republic	-	1.5	1.0
Slovenia	-	1.5	1.0
Spain	2.1	1.1	0.9
Turkey	3.3	2.0	1.7
United Kingdom	4.5	2.4	2.1
United States	6.0	4.4	3.6

Notes

¹ The views expressed here are the author's alone and do not represent the official position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

² Graham T. Allison and Dmitri K. Simes, "Russia and America Stumbling to War," *National Interest*, April 20, 2015. <http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/russia-america-stumbling-war-12662>

³ Presidential Policy Directive 23 (Security Sector Assistance) noted the US must "help partner nations build sustainable capacity to address common security challenges." Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-23: Security Sector Assistance, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2013).

⁴ Security cooperation is defined in military doctrine as "All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation." Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, March 2015. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary

⁵ Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and Mackubin T. Owens, *US Foreign Policy and Defense Strategy: the Evolution of an Incidental Superpower*, (Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2015).

⁶ Quoted in "African Training Exercise Turns Urgent as Threats Grow," *New York Times*, March 8, 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/world/africa/african-training-exercise-turns-urgent-as-threats-grow.html>

⁷ Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007).

⁸ Quoted in Vanessa Williams, "Defense Secretary Carter: Iraq's forces showed 'no will to fight' Islamic State," *Washington Post*, May 24, 2015. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2015/05/24/defense-secretary-carter-iraqs-forces-showed-no-will-to-fight-islamic-state/>

⁹ 2000 budget data from: "All Fund Sources 'Spigot' Report," <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/4018.pdf>; 2009 budget data from: Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 2010," <http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/fy2010cbj/pdf/index.htm>; 2015 budget data from Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 2016," <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236395.pdf>; International Security Advisory Board, *Report on Status of Forces Agreements*, January 16, 2015. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236456.pdf>

¹⁰ *Note*: Countries without data were not NATO members at the time. *Sources*: "Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries, 1995-2015," Table 3. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_06/20150622_PR_CP_2015_093-v2.pdf; "Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries, 1985-2013," Table 3. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20140224_140224-PR2014-028-Defence-exp.pdf