



OCTOBER 8, 2015

# ENSURING AN EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE DIPLOMATIC SECURITY TRAINING FACILITY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE DEPARTMENT AND  
USAID MANAGEMENT, INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, AND BILATERAL INTERNATIONAL  
DEVELOPMENT

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

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### MEMBER STATEMENTS:

**Sen. David Perdue (R-GA)** [*no pdf available, see [13:30 of webcast](#)*]  
Chairman, Subcommittee on State Department and USAID Management, International  
Operations, and Bilateral International Development

**Sen. Tim Kaine (D-VA)** [*no pdf available, see [21:30 of webcast](#)*]  
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on State Department and USAID Management,  
International Operations, and Bilateral International Development

### WITNESSES:

**Mr. Gregory Starr** [[view pdf](#)]  
Assistant Secretary  
Bureau of Diplomatic Security  
Department of State

**Mr. Michael Courts** [[view pdf](#)]  
Director  
International Affairs and Trade Team

U.S. Government Accountability Office

**Ms. Connie L. Patrick** [\[view pdf\]](#)

Director

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

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TESTIMONY OF

Gregory B. Starr  
Assistant Secretary  
Bureau of Diplomatic Security  
Department of State

BEFORE

Committee on Foreign Relations  
Subcommittee on State Department and USAID Management, International  
Operations, and Bilateral International Development  
United States Senate

Chairman Perdue, Ranking Member Kaine, and distinguished members of the committee – good afternoon. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Department’s plan for a Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC) at Fort Pickett, Virginia.

Improved training was a key finding of the Benghazi Accountability Review Board (ARB) in December 2012. The Diplomatic Security Organization and Management Review Panel and Best Practices Panel, both convened as a result of the ARB, recommended that the Department establish a consolidated training facility in close proximity to Washington, D.C.

Since that time, attacks on State Department facilities and personnel in Herat, Afghanistan; Erbil, Iraq; and Ankara, Turkey – plus the need for evacuations from Libya and Yemen – have highlighted the danger our employees face while fulfilling our diplomatic responsibilities abroad. We have learned from these events and continue to modify our training as needed.

The Department had initiated efforts to combine numerous hard skills training venues into one consolidated site even prior to the Benghazi-related recommendations. In 2009-2010, the Department and the General Services Administration (GSA) reviewed over 70 properties before selecting Fort Pickett in Blackstone, Virginia. In 2013, we reduced the scope of the project to focus solely on the consolidation of hard skills training, cutting the project’s cost from over

\$900 million to \$413 million, an estimate which has been verified by two engineering firms.

In searching for a consolidated training center, proximity to Washington, D.C. has been a priority for two primary reasons. First, Washington is the hub for Department of State and other federal agency personnel preparing to go overseas. Having a closer training facility will cut travel costs, provide more training opportunities to family members, and improve logistics. Second, staying in the mid-Atlantic region allows us to continue to train with our critical security partners, especially the Marine Corps. This collaboration is essential, as we have seen in Yemen, Libya, and Burundi. According to the recently released Government Accountability Office (GAO) study, Marine units stationed in Quantico, Virginia, have already determined that their budget will not support travel to facilities located outside of the Washington region.

Consolidation is critical because it increases the effectiveness of the training itself by allowing students to seamlessly transfer from one real world scenario to another. Threats often emerge quickly and require immediate action to counter. Having a dedicated and consolidated training center will provide the flexibility necessary to immediately train for emerging threats and major events.

Our specialized training for high threat environments includes heavy weapons, explosives demonstrations, armored vehicle driving, helicopter landings,

and extensive night training. Finding a single site that can accommodate all of these elements without disrupting the surrounding area has been challenging. A low population density region is critical to ensuring that current and foreseeable real-world training requirements can be met 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) has its strong core competencies in training federal law enforcement agencies, which is why we send our own agents there for basic investigative training. But with FASTC, we are not training solely for law enforcement. We are preparing Diplomatic Security agents for service at critical threat overseas posts, which requires an extremely specific skill set, working with our DoD partners, rather than our domestic law enforcement partners.

In April 2013, the Department was asked to suspend project efforts for Fort Pickett and re-evaluate the feasibility of locating FASTC at FLETC in Glynco, Georgia. Over the next year, the Department worked collaboratively with FLETC through multiple site visits and the exchange of information to further evaluate this possibility. After an extensive review, the Administration supports the State Department's decision to locate FASTC at Fort Pickett, as reflected by the Administration's request for \$99 million in FASTC funding for FY 2016.

That said, the Department recognizes the concerns Congress has raised about this plan. To that end, we have temporarily put this project on hold again and

arranged for an independent Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) comparing FASTC at Fort Pickett, FLETC at Glynco, and the Interim Training Facility (ITF) at Summit Point, West Virginia. The CBA is being conducted by Deloitte under contract to GSA and is slated for completion by mid-December.

While we look forward to receiving the CBA, the Department remains confident that Fort Pickett is the best option for an effective and cost efficient consolidated training facility. We appreciate the time and effort on the part of Director Courts and his team at GAO in examining this issue.

As for the current status and timeline for future development of FASTC at Fort Pickett, we are hoping to move forward with construction after the completion of the CBA so that we are on track to be fully operational in early 2019.

Thank you again for this opportunity. I look forward to answering any questions you have.



Testimony before the Subcommittee on  
State Department and USAID Management,  
International Operations, and Bilateral  
International Development, Committee on  
Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate

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For Release on Delivery  
Expected at 2:30 p.m., ET  
Thursday, October 8, 2015

## DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

# Options for Locating a Consolidated Training Facility

Statement of Michael J. Courts, Director,  
International Affairs and Trade

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Chairman Perdue, Ranking Member Kaine, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on the Department of State (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security's (DS) efforts to locate a consolidated training facility. State has been in the process of looking for a site suitable for its DS training facility for more than a decade. In 2011, we reported that the lack of a consolidated training facility was a significant challenge to carrying out DS's mission.<sup>1</sup> DS currently provides training at 12 contracted and leased sites in seven states, which DS officials believe is inefficient and more costly than a consolidated facility would be.

In 2011, State and the General Services Administration (GSA) identified Fort Pickett near Blackstone, Virginia, as the preferred site for a DS training facility, known as the Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC). The initial 2012 master plan for FASTC would have consolidated training in hard skills (e.g., firearms, driving, and explosives) and soft skills (e.g., classroom-based training in counterintelligence, cybersecurity, and law) at Fort Pickett for an estimated cost of \$925 million. In 2013, State reduced the scope of FASTC to exclude facilities for soft-skills training and life support functions, such as dormitories and a cafeteria, ultimately decreasing the estimated cost of the current proposal to \$413 million. Also in 2013, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed State to work with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to assess the viability of using the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia, to accommodate DS's training. In November 2013, FLETC submitted a business case to OMB indicating that it could meet DS's requirements, including soft-skills training, for an estimated cost of \$272 million. Following this assessment, DS, FLETC, and OMB could not agree on a path forward.

Ultimately, OMB deferred to State on the decision of where to locate its training facility. In April 2014, the Administration reaffirmed the selection of Fort Pickett for FASTC. To date, State and GSA have obligated about \$71 million of the estimated \$413 million in capital costs toward FASTC at Fort Pickett, including for the purchase of land in May 2015.

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<sup>1</sup>GAO, *Diplomatic Security: Expanded Missions and Inadequate Facilities Pose Critical Challenges to Training Efforts*, [GAO-11-460](#) (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2011).

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My testimony summarizes our September 2015 report on the FASTC and FLETC proposals for accommodating DS training.<sup>2</sup> Like that report, this testimony discusses (1) key site requirements critical to providing DS training and the extent to which the FASTC and FLETC proposals meet these requirements and (2) the estimated capital and recurring costs of these proposals and the extent to which the capital cost estimates conform to leading practices for reliable cost estimates.

For our September 2015 report, we reviewed documents on the requirements for DS's training facility and proposals to meet these requirements from State, DHS, and GSA. We also reviewed the Benghazi Accountability Review Board (ARB) report and reports by two panels established as a result of recommendations by the ARB, including the Independent Panel on Best Practices. We conducted site visits to Fort Pickett, FLETC, and three of DS's current training venues, interviewed officials at State, FLETC, GSA, and OMB about the proposals, and spoke with officials from agencies that DS identified as its training partners, including the Marine Security Guards, Naval Special Warfare Command, U.S. Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Central Intelligence Agency. We focused on four requirements of the center that our analysis indicated were critical to providing basic and advanced DS training courses. While we assessed the need for these site requirements to accommodate DS's existing and planned training, we did not assess whether specific DS training courses are necessary to accomplish DS's mission of providing a safe and secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. We did, however, confirm that DS currently conducts and plans to continue to conduct training that includes elements such as nighttime training, long-range firearms, and heavy explosives. We identified the number of courses and students that use these elements, as well as the projected number of such courses at the future training center. We observed a training exercise that involved several of these elements. We also asked DS officials to explain why the elements were necessary and, to the extent possible, reviewed actual examples of incidents overseas that supported DS's identified need for specific training elements. In some cases, we discussed these elements with DS's identified training partners as well as with FLETC.

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<sup>2</sup>GAO, *Diplomatic Security: Options for Locating a Consolidated Training Facility*, [GAO-15-808R](#) (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2015).

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To assess the cost estimates for each proposal, we reviewed the September 2014 capital cost estimate for FASTC and the November 2013 capital cost estimate for FLETC. We evaluated whether each cost estimate was generated according to best practices outlined in GAO's *Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide*.<sup>3</sup> We reviewed data provided by State, GSA, and FLETC regarding their cost estimation practices. We also interviewed State, GSA, FLETC, and contractor staff responsible for preparing the FASTC and FLETC cost estimates. We reviewed cost data provided by State, FLETC, and GSA to determine the recurring operations and maintenance, recapitalization investment, and staffing and associated costs for each proposal. We also developed three scenarios to estimate the costs of sending students to each location, including costs for travel, lodging, meals and incidental expenses, and compensatory time for travel. We discussed assumptions regarding these costs with State, FLETC, and OMB officials and subsequently developed our own assumptions using several data sources. We provided our assumptions to State and FLETC for review and confirmation, and we revised our assumptions based on their comments where appropriate. Additional details on our scope and methodology can be found in our September 2015 report.

We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

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## Background

DS currently provides training in hard skills to a diverse student population. DS provides security familiarization training for Foreign Service and other civilian personnel and their families. It also provides advanced courses for DS agents, such as the High Threat Operations Course, an intensive 10-week course designed to provide agents with specialized training in a variety of tasks, including leadership, weapons, small unit tactics, air operations, and movement security procedures

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<sup>3</sup>GAO, *GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs*, [GAO-09-3SP](#) (Washington, D.C.: March 2009).

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needed to operate in high-threat, high-risk posts. In addition, through the Antiterrorism Assistance program, DS provides training to foreign security personnel in areas such as crisis response, explosive incident countermeasures, post-blast investigations, and armored vehicle driving. DS has expanded its training over the last decade, and following the 2012 attack on the U.S. Special Mission compound in Benghazi, Libya, the independent ARB recommended further security training for DS agents and all other Foreign Service personnel.

In June 2015, DS projected that it would train nearly 6,300 students in hard skills in fiscal year 2015, compared to 3,500 students in 2007. DS estimates that it will provide more than 9,000 students with over 20,000 weeks of training per year once its training facility is fully operational.

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## Fort Pickett Fully Meets DS's Requirements While FLETC Does Not

For our September 2015 report, we analyzed four of DS's requirements that we determined were critical in the selection of a site for DS's training facility and found that Fort Pickett fully met all four while FLETC did not fully meet any.

- **Consolidation.** Building FASTC at Fort Pickett would enable DS to consolidate at one location 10 of the 12 widely scattered hard-skills training venues it is currently using.<sup>4</sup> FLETC can accommodate many of these venues on its Glynco campus but would have to conduct some exercises, such as training in long-range weapons and heavy explosives, as well as some nighttime exercises, at the Townsend Bombing Range, a Marine Corps training facility about 30 miles from Glynco. FLETC did not include costs for using this facility in its 2013 proposal.
- **Proximity to Washington, D.C.** The Independent Panel on Best Practices, established as a result of the Benghazi ARB, recommended a consolidated training center, located in proximity to State's Washington, D.C., headquarters, given State's reliance on military units and other government agencies located nearby. Fort Pickett is located about 160 miles from Washington, D.C., or nearly 3

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<sup>4</sup>State indicated that DS would continue to use a FLETC facility in Cheltenham, Maryland, for weapons requalifications for agents assigned to the Washington, D.C., area. In addition, State officials said that they will continue to use the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' National Canine Center in Front Royal, Virginia, for canine training.

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hours by car one way, compared to FLETC, which is approximately 640 miles from Washington, D.C., or 5 to 6 hours by airplane one way. Over 90 partner organizations conduct training at FLETC; however, DS's primary training partners, including the Marine Corps' Security Augmentation Unit and its Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team, are based in Virginia, and an official responsible for Marine Security Guard training told us that the cost of transporting personnel and equipment to and from FLETC would be prohibitive.

- **Exclusivity of use.** The Independent Panel on Best Practices "strongly endorsed" State's efforts to develop a training facility that it could control, noting that agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Secret Service, and the Drug Enforcement Administration have adopted such a policy as a best practice. At Fort Pickett, DS would control its training venues and have the flexibility to implement scheduling changes to respond to rapidly evolving security situations overseas. FLETC stated that DS would be assured of priority scheduling, but not exclusive use, for those facilities that would be built for DS and provided a detailed plan showing the facilities currently available and those that would be constructed for DS. FLETC officials stated that when DS was not using facilities prioritized for its use, other federal, state, and local agencies would be allowed to train at and benefit from the facilities.
- **24/7 availability.** DS conducts training during hours of darkness on about 190 days per year, including 140 nights that involve loud noises such as gunfire and small explosions. We found that Fort Pickett, which covers about 42,000 acres and is set in a rural area, is available for nighttime training. FLETC, which is adjacent to the town of Brunswick, Georgia, does not conduct certain types of training at night, and FLETC officials told us that exercises there currently end by 10:00 p.m. According to FLETC officials, DS could conduct such nighttime exercises at the Townsend Bombing Range.

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## Capital Cost Estimates for the FASTC and FLETC Proposals Are Unreliable

In our September 2015 report, we found that neither the FASTC nor the FLETC estimate for capital costs fully meets best practices for reliable cost estimates. The FASTC estimate fully or substantially meets three of the four characteristics<sup>5</sup>—comprehensive, well documented, and accurate—and partially meets one characteristic of reliable cost estimates—credible;<sup>6</sup> the FLETC estimate partially or minimally meets all four characteristics (see table 1).<sup>7</sup> FLETC officials noted that their estimate was prepared in a short period of time based on incomplete information regarding State’s requirements; more complete information would have enabled them to develop a more comprehensive estimate. Our assessment of the reliability of these cost estimates focused on the processes used to develop the estimates rather than estimates themselves, enabling us to make a more direct comparison of their reliability.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>The four characteristics are defined as follows: (1) comprehensive—the cost estimate should include both government and contractor costs of the program over its full life cycle; (2) well documented—a good cost estimate, while taking the form of a single number, is supported by detailed documentation that describes how it was derived; (3) accurate—the cost estimate should provide for results that are unbiased, and it should not be overly conservative or optimistic; and (4) credible—the cost estimate should discuss any limitations of the analysis because of uncertainty or biases surrounding data or assumptions.

<sup>6</sup>“Minimally met” means that the agency provided evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion. “Partially met” means that the agency provided evidence that satisfies about half of the criterion. “Substantially met” means that the agency provided evidence that satisfies a large portion of the criterion. “Fully met” means that the agency provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire criterion.

<sup>7</sup>Specifically, the FLETC cost estimate partially meets three characteristics—comprehensive, well documented, and accurate—and minimally meets one characteristic—credible.

<sup>8</sup>More detail on our assessment of each cost estimate is provided in encl. V of [GAO-15-808R](#).

**Table 1: Extent to Which the Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC) and Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) Acquisition and Construction Cost Estimates Meet the Characteristics of Reliable Cost Estimates**

Characteristic	FASTC	FLETC
Comprehensive	Fully met	Partially met
Well documented	Substantially met	Partially met
Accurate	Substantially met	Partially met
Credible	Partially met	Minimally met

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the Department of State, FLETC, and General Services Administration. | GAO-16-139T

Notes: “Minimally met” means that the agency provided evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion. “Partially met” means that the agency provided evidence that satisfies about half of the criterion. “Substantially met” means that the agency provided evidence that satisfies a large portion of the criterion. “Fully met” means that the agency provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire criterion.

In September 2014, State and GSA estimated that acquisition and construction costs for the reduced-scope plan for FASTC would be \$413 million. FLETC’s November 2013 proposal included a cost estimate comparable to the full-scope plan for FASTC; however, FLETC officials said that because they did not have complete information regarding the reduced-scope plan for FASTC, they were unable to develop a comparable cost estimate. For example, these officials said that State did not tell them which venues had been removed from the plan and that they were unaware of some of DS’s training exercises. These officials said that they subtracted the costs of some facilities from the FLETC full-scope estimate to arrive at a reduced-scope estimate of \$243 million. FLETC has not refined its cost estimate since OMB notified it that the administration had selected the FASTC proposal in April 2014.

In addition to capital costs for acquisition and construction of a DS training center, the analysis in our September 2015 report included projections for recurring costs for operations and maintenance (O&M) and for recapitalization investment—the costs of replacing broken systems and equipment.<sup>9</sup> Our analysis also included recurring staffing and associated costs for each proposal. Using data provided by State, GSA, and FLETC, we projected these costs over 10, 25, and 50 years. We projected the capital and recurring O&M, recapitalization investment, and

<sup>9</sup>Because these recurring costs are based on capital costs that we determined were unreliable, these projections may also be unreliable. Thus, such projections should be used with caution.

staffing costs to be \$201 million more, in net present value, for FASTC over 10 years, \$266 million more for FASTC over 25 years, and \$372 million more for FASTC over 50 years (see table 2).<sup>10</sup>

**Table 2: Projected Capital, Operations and Maintenance, Recapitalization Investment, and Staffing Costs over 10, 25, and 50 Years for the Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC) and Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC)**

	FASTC	FLETC	Difference
Costs over 10 years	\$1.067 billion	\$866 million	\$201 million
Costs over 25 years	\$2.177 billion	\$1.911 billion	\$266 million
Costs over 50 years	\$4.090 billion	\$3.719 billion	\$372 million

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the Department of State, FLETC, and General Services Administration. | GAO-16-139T

Notes: Costs shown in net present value. Figures are rounded.

Finally, the government is expected to incur costs of sending students to training. These recurring student costs include travel, lodging, meals and incidental expenses, and compensation for time spent traveling. We projected these costs over 10, 25, and 50 years in three different scenarios for both the FASTC and FLETC proposals. We estimated that the costs of sending students to FASTC over 10 years would be \$43 million to \$121 million less, in net present value, than sending students to FLETC. The difference in student costs between FASTC and FLETC increases over time, from between \$122 million and \$323 million less for FASTC after 25 years, to between \$309 and \$736 million after 50 years (see table 3).<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup>Net present value shows, in today's dollars, the relative net cash flow of various alternatives over a long period of time.

<sup>11</sup>We determined that these data were reliable for the purposes of developing a range of estimates of student costs. More details on our scope and methodology, including the assumptions we used in each of these scenarios, are provided in encl. III of [GAO-15-808R](#).

**Table 3: GAO’s Estimates of Recurring Student Costs over 10, 25, and 50 Years for the Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC) and Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC)**

	FASTC	FLETC	Difference
<b>Costs over 10 years</b>			
Low scenario	\$184 million	\$227 million	\$43 million
Mid scenario	\$189 million	\$260 million	\$71 million
High scenario	\$200 million	\$322 million	\$121 million
<b>Costs over 25 years</b>			
Low scenario	\$463 million	\$585 million	\$122 million
Mid scenario	\$470 million	\$670 million	\$200 million
High scenario	\$504 million	\$828 million	\$323 million
<b>Costs over 50 years</b>			
Low scenario	\$942 million	\$1.3 billion	\$309 million
Mid scenario	\$954 million	\$1.4 billion	\$471 million
High scenario	\$1.0 billion	\$1.8 billion	\$736 million

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the Department of State, FLETC, and General Services Administration. | GAO-16-139T

Notes: Costs shown in net present value. Figures are rounded.

Chairman Perdue, Ranking Member Kaine, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

## GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact Michael J. Courts, Director, International Affairs and Trade, at (202) 512-8980 or [courtsm@gao.gov](mailto:courtsm@gao.gov). Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Thomas Costa (Assistant Director), Robert Ball (Analyst-in-Charge), Brian Bothwell, Juaná Collymore, David Dayton, Grace Lui, Manuel Valverde, and Nancy Zearfoss.

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TESTIMONY OF

CONNIE L. PATRICK  
Director

Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

BEFORE

Committee on Foreign Relations  
Subcommittee on State Department and USAID Management, International Operations, and  
Bilateral International Development  
United States Senate

October 8, 2015  
Washington, DC

## **INTRODUCTION**

Good afternoon Chairman Perdue, Ranking Member Kaine, and members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to be with you today to discuss the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers' (FLETC) capabilities and our participation in the Administration's due-diligence of the State Department's overseas security training facility.

## **FLETC OVERVIEW**

I would like to acknowledge and thank Congress for its longstanding support of FLETC's mission to train those who protect the homeland. Congress created FLETC in 1970 under the premise that consolidated federal law enforcement training provides consistency and efficiency in the preparation of law enforcement officers and agents, while enabling agencies to conduct specialized training unique to their missions. I have been privileged to serve as the Director of FLETC since 2002, after completing a 20-year sworn law enforcement career in Florida.

Today, FLETC is the Nation's largest provider of law enforcement training. It delivers basic and advanced training to 96 federal partner organizations and thousands of state, local, tribal, and international law enforcement officers and agents at four domestic training sites in Glynco, Georgia; Charleston, South Carolina; Artesia, New Mexico; and Cheltenham, Maryland; at the International Law Enforcement Academies worldwide, and at export locations throughout the United States and internationally. FLETC also engages in ongoing training review, development, and research in coordination with stakeholders at all levels of law enforcement to ensure its training continues to meet its partners' evolving needs. In Fiscal Year 2014, FLETC trained nearly 60,000 law enforcement officers and agents at all of its sites and export locations. Since 1970, FLETC has trained over one million law enforcement officers and agents.

FLETC's consolidated training model offers quantitative and qualitative benefits to both taxpayers and law enforcement agencies. While FLETC provides training in core areas common to all law enforcement officers, such as firearms, driving, tactics, investigations, and legal issues, partner organizations deliver training specific to their operational needs. Moreover, the consolidated training model avoids unnecessary duplication of infrastructure and resources. Using the FLETC model, one federal agency builds and manages the infrastructure germane to a residential training facility, such as a cafeteria, gymnasium, library, training venues, classrooms, computer laboratories, dormitories, and recreational facilities, which all partners utilize. Moreover, agencies leverage and share existing support infrastructure, such as water, sewage, maintenance, and power services.

Beyond the economic rationale for the consolidated training model, agencies also benefit from enhanced interoperability and high quality training by training together. For example, FLETC's curriculum development and review process brings together experts from across the law enforcement community to share and vet ideas about training content and methodology. Like the peer review process in many professions, the healthy exchange of thoughts and concepts breeds thorough analysis of contemporary law enforcement issues and techniques, and invokes beneficial change. FLETC law enforcement training classes often comprise officers and agents

from a variety of agencies, improving future interoperability in the performance of daily duties and during times of emergency. The consolidated training model thus leverages the significant role that training can play in fostering long-term collaborative mindsets, teamwork, and information-sharing capabilities in law enforcement officers from different agencies.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, underscored the critical need for all law enforcement agencies to work together more effectively; to share intelligence, information, and know-how more seamlessly; and to break down traditional stovepipes that had previously prevented integration of effort. In the increasingly complex law enforcement landscape, the consolidated training model offers consistency in training law enforcement officers and agents in core competencies, combined with the flexibility to enable agencies to prepare personnel to meet their specific operational needs. The Congressional vision that established FLETC forty-five years ago remains as relevant today as it ever was. FLETC continues to build partnerships across the vast law enforcement community to ensure optimal execution of the consolidated law enforcement training model.

### **FLETC'S EXPERIENCE IN MEETING AND ADAPTING TO PARTNERS' CHANGING TRAINING NEEDS**

FLETC has a long, rich history of adapting training programs and facilities to meet emerging threats and associated agency training requirements. As training demands increased and changed in the post-9/11 homeland security environment, FLETC grew to four domestic training sites, and its international mission significantly expanded. The transition into the post-9/11 environment occasioned a refocusing and expansion of many FLETC training programs as well as the creation of new ones to meet emerging needs, such as anti/counter-terrorism, flying armed, intelligence awareness, and critical infrastructure protection. Working with the Transportation Security Administration in the aftermath of the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks, FLETC assisted in the ramp up of the Federal Air Marshal Service by aiding in the design of a formal training program and sustaining an increased tempo for student throughput. Also at that time, FLETC worked with the U.S. Border Patrol to transition its Border Patrol Academy to FLETC's site in Artesia, New Mexico, as the agency doubled in size and had to train thousands of agents to meet increased staffing requirements. FLETC also created the first basic academy of the Office of the Courts for 4,000 federal probation officers, and assisted the U.S. Coast Guard in consolidating its law enforcement training effort at FLETC's site in Charleston, South Carolina.

Additionally, over the past decade and a half, in coordination with its partner organizations, FLETC has built new state-of-the-art facilities to provide realistic training scenarios and exercises for officers and agents confronting a changing world. These new venues include multi-purpose facilities for counterterrorism and complex tactical training. Additionally, FLETC has constructed high speed driving ranges that support armored vehicles such as armored suburbans, where partner organizations train prior to deployments throughout the world. During its history, FLETC has worked with numerous partner organizations to develop training venues based on specific training requirements. For example, FLETC collaborated with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to construct a mock port of entry, with the U.S. Capitol Police to build a replica of the U.S. Capitol complex, and with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives to

develop a bomb range that met their specifications and an arson investigation practical exercise venue.

In the face of unprecedented growth in FLETC's training throughput in the years following the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks, FLETC has consistently met its participating partner organizations' law enforcement training needs. FLETC leverages the numerous avenues it has in place to collaborate on training with its partner organizations, and encourages ongoing dialogue on training and administrative matters.

## **FLETC ENGAGEMENT ON DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S (DOS) TRAINING CONSOLIDATION EFFORTS**

DOS was an original signatory to the FLETC Memorandum of Understanding in 1970, and remains a valued partner. DOS's Bureau of Diplomatic Security Service (DS) criminal investigators attend basic criminal investigator training at FLETC, and DS agents attend various advanced FLETC training programs. In April 2014, OMB asked FLETC to work with DOS to attain certification to deliver DOS's Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT) Training at FLETC's Glynco location. DOS granted FLETC this certification in March 2015. FLETC piloted the FACT Training in Glynco the week of July 27, 2015, and will incorporate this program into its scheduled offerings for Fiscal Year 2016. FLETC fully supports the Administration's decision to consolidate DOS's hard skills training at Fort Pickett, Blackstone, Virginia, in furtherance of best preparing its personnel to serve its critical overseas function, which has been explained in the testimony from my colleague from the Department of State.

In early 2013, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requested that FLETC work with DOS and the General Services Administration to assess the viability of using available capacity at FLETC facilities, and the cost of any additional required construction to meet DOS's training needs. FLETC accordingly developed a rough order of magnitude cost estimate of \$200 million, which OMB asked FLETC to refine in August 2013. In response, in November 2013, FLETC submitted a more detailed cost estimate of \$272 million to OMB.

This estimate and associated business case are based on DOS's original full scope master plan, and account for training that FLETC could conduct immediately, training that would require modification to existing facilities, and training that would require new construction. FLETC's proposal was based on DOS's stated physical plant requirements and guarantee for DOS primacy, but not exclusive, of use of facilities constructed specifically for the needs of DOS. These venues would be available for the use of and benefit to other agencies when not in use by State.

In April 2014, FLETC received notification from OMB that the decision was made to allow DOS to establish the Foreign Affairs Security Training Center at Fort Pickett. Subsequently, the Administration's 2016 budget request included \$99 million for construction of the Foreign Affairs Security Training Center at Fort Pickett and therefore no investment is being made at FLETC for DS training. Since the decision was made to proceed with Fort Pickett construction, FLETC has taken no further action on the issue except for responding to congressional inquiries

on its 2013 cost estimate. FLETC has cooperated with a Government Accountability Office (GAO) engagement on this topic, and GAO recently published its report. Additionally, the General Services Administration recently advised FLETC that Deloitte Consulting LLP would be conducting a cost benefit analysis comparing Fort Pickett, FLETC, and another venue DOS currently uses to conduct training.

FLETC supports the Administration's decision to consolidate State's training at Fort Pickett, stands ready to assist however possible, and looks forward to a strong continued partnership with DOS.

Thank you.