NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
TACMEMO 3-07.6-06

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE/DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS PLANNING

MAY 2006

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.

PRIMARY REVIEW AUTHORITY:
COMMANDER, NAVY WARFARE
DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

URGENT CHANGE/ERRATUM RECORD		
NUMBER	DATE	ENTERED BY

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

NAVWARDEVCOM
TM 3-07.6-06

Title:

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operations Planning

Originator:

Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC)

Purpose:

The purpose of this tactical memorandum (TACMEMO) is to provide guidance to strike group commanders, squadron commanders, their staffs, ships, and expeditionary shore units for planning and executing foreign humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (FHA/DR) operations.

This TACMEMO addresses issues specific to FHA/DR operations. The intent is to guide a commander and staff in the thought process, planning, and course of action development needed to prepare for and conduct foreign disaster relief operations. It is not an all-encompassing guide, but it does present actions and options to be considered. It does not prescribe activities that are better addressed in other publications.

This TACMEMO is intended for use by strike group commanders, squadron commanders, their staffs, commanding officers, shipboard and expeditionary shore unit personnel, and other individuals tasked with planning and executing FHA/DR operations.

Recommended changes, additions, or deletions are encouraged and should be sent to:

Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command
Attn: N5
686 Cushing Road (Sims Hall)
Newport, RI 02841-1207

Or via the NWDC Doctrine Discussion Group at
http://www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil/

Promulgation Date: 15 MAY 2006

Review Date: MAY 2008

JOHN M. KELLY
Commander,
Navy Warfare Development Command

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 7 — LOGISTICS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 PURPOSE

To assist Navy strike group staffs, squadron staffs, ships, and expeditionary shore units tasked with providing foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) support in disaster relief (DR) operations. This tactical memorandum (TACMEMO) is a revision of Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) TACMEMO 3-07.6-05.

1.2 SCOPE

The intent of this TACMEMO is to guide a Navy commander and staff in the commander's estimate needed to prepare for and conduct foreign disaster relief operations. Each disaster and associated response operation will be unique due to differences in scale, environmental factors, geography, host nation (HN) relationships, etc. The basic planning considerations and thought processes, however, will remain the same. While some considerations and resources discussed reflect a worst-case scenario response to a major regional catastrophe, they should be considered for scaled down applicability in other cases. NWDC TM 3-07.7-06 addresses disaster relief operations in the United States (U.S.) and its territories.

1.3 ORGANIZATION

This TACMEMO incorporates lessons learned and observations recorded during disaster relief operations, including those from the 2005 tsunami relief effort Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE and those associated with the 2005 hurricanes Katrina and Rita along the U.S. Gulf Coast. Chapters 2 and 3 contain general initial planning considerations and outline the operational commander's principal concerns and decisions. Subsequent chapters and appendixes provide more detail. This TACMEMO was not created to provide an all-inclusive checklist, but rather a bulleted guide to assist a commander and staff in planning FHA/DR operations.

1.4 DISCUSSION

1.4.1 Advantages of Sea-Based Support

Speed to execution is key to saving lives and reducing suffering in the early stages of an FHA/DR relief operation. Unique Navy capabilities (primarily robust command and control (C2), lift, reconnaissance, and use of sea lines of communication) provide an important bridge in FHA/DR efforts until the HN and civilian agencies can organize, establish themselves in the disaster area, and take over the operation. Naval forces are ideally suited to cover the gap by establishing a sea base as close to the operation as possible. They are able to arrive with critical mass quickly, commence relief support immediately, and sustain those operations indefinitely.

Additionally, naval forces:

1. Are not reliant on shore infrastructure, much of which is likely damaged or destroyed in the relief area

2. Arrive with a robust C2 capability that does not need to be replicated ashore

3. Alleviate HN concerns that may be raised by a large footprint ashore

4. Reduce force protection concerns by minimizing presence ashore

5. Bring significant capabilities for initial relief efforts, including but not limited to harbor and marine clearance, aircraft and watercraft operations, aid delivery, search and rescue (SAR) operations, air and water traffic control, medical assistance, and various support for first responders.

1.4.2 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Response Models

Foreign HA/DR operations have complex response models that are broadly addressed below and discussed further later in this publication. The joint, Navy, Department of Defense (DOD), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) publications in the reference section of this TACMEMO provide a comprehensive discussion of these responses. Paramount in all models is that the HN drives requirements and their prioritization. In a **unilateral response,** the U.S. Department of State's (DOS) USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is the lead U.S. Federal agency. The U.S. ambassador is the principal representative of the President of the U.S. (POTUS). The ambassador has veto authority over all U.S. agencies and must be kept informed. Requests for DOD support initiate in DOS channels and, once approved by the DOD, are passed through the regional combatant command (COCOM) and joint task force (JTF) commander when assigned. The United States will likely be part of a **multinational response** in which two or more countries respond to assist in a coalition or alliance structure. In a United Nations (UN)–led response, the UN plays a key coordination and organizational role, especially for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that add UN–designed supporting organizations.

CHAPTER 2

Initial Planning Considerations in Foreign Disaster Operations

Note

This chapter is derived from initial planning considerations that are common to any operation. Amplification is provided in subsequent chapters and appendixes. Consult NWP 5-01, NWDC TM 3-32-03, JP 3-0, JP 5-0, JP 5-00.2, and JP 2-01.3 for comprehensive guidance on the maritime planning process. Appendix J in JP 3-07.6 lists planning factors for FHA operations, and Appendix D in JP 3-07.5 contains planning considerations for noncombatant evacuation operations, many of which have applicability in FHA/DR operations. Additionally, USAID's "Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response" is a good reference document in understanding U.S. Government response to disasters abroad.

2.1 COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE

The commander's estimate is the first and most critical phase in the operation planning process. It is conducted at all command echelons: tactical, operational, and strategic theater. The commander's estimate of the situation encompasses the assigned area of operations and the commander's area of interest.

2.2 CONDUCT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION

- Define the operational environment and disaster impacts.

  - Identify area geography/topography (natural and manmade features, such as terrain, roads, ports, airfields, cities/villages, displaced persons' camps, reservoirs, power grids, environmental waste/pollution, navigation aids, etc.).

  - Identify environmental conditions and other factors affecting operational planning, establishment of C2, and employment of forces in the area of operations.

    - Determine meteorological (climate, weather, atmospheric conditions, etc.) and oceanographic/hydrographic (water depth, currents, temperature, etc.) conditions.

    - Identify factors affecting area access, including the supply and resupply of material to the right place at the right time (e.g., positioning of the sea base to maximize air and water routes, etc.). See Section A.1 for examples of specific application to disaster relief operations.

  - Determine communications connectivity and communications capabilities within the area of operations.

- Identify capabilities and limitations of other participants.

- Identify Federal, State, and local limitations on activities driven by national policy, public affairs (PA) guidance, or legal restrictions.

- Identify cultural environment factors affecting the situation (including socioeconomic conditions, local history, traditions, customs, crime, intergroup tensions, etc.).

- Identify existing restrictions on force employment and the rules for the use of force (types of operations prohibited, forces or platforms that may not be used, allowable force protection measures, etc.).

- Conduct health situation estimate.

  - Health status of the population.

  - Determine the force health protection requirements (force immunization requirements, etc.).

  - Determine the availability of primary and emergent medical care.

  - Identify the remaining healthcare infrastructure and its capability.

See Section 9.2 for further discussion.

2.3 MISSION ANALYSIS

- Identify source(s) of the mission.

- Determine supported and supporting commanders.

- Analyze the higher commander's mission.

- **State the higher commander's intent.**

- Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks.

- Identify externally imposed limitations.

- Identify planning assumptions.

- Identify steps to mitigate and manage risks.

  See OPNAVINST 3500.39B and NTTP 5-03.5 for a full discussion on operational risk management (ORM), including associated processes and tools.

- Restate the mission as assigned by the commander.

- Determine essential tasks in support of the mission.

See Appendix B for a draft list of essential tasks to accomplish the mission. As discussed in NTTP 1-01, such lists enable a commander to quantify both the level and scope of effort needed to achieve mission objectives. Section B-2 provides examples of tasking assigned to Navy commanders in recent DR operations.

2.4 REVIEW LESSONS LEARNED

- Review operational lessons/observations recorded in the Navy Lessons Learned System (NLLS) database and after action reports (AARs).

- Review exercise lessons/observations recorded in the NLLS database and AARs.

- Review applicable lessons/observations from other Services, recorded in their lessons learned databases and AARs, and from other nations, if available.

See Appendix A for examples of lessons or observations contained in the NLLS or recent AARs.

2.5 DETERMINE BATTLE RHYTHM INDICATORS

- Identify key readiness factors.

- Identify operational and training requirements.

- Identify higher and supported headquarters' requirements for reports, meetings, video teleconferencing (VTCs), etc.

- Determine the decision-making processes of higher and supported headquarters.

- Identify other recurring requirements for coordination with subordinates, the country team, HN, and other agencies/organizations.

See sections 3.4 and 6.1.2 for further discussion.

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

CHAPTER 3

Commander's Principal Concerns and Decisions

Note

Key considerations from the commander's perspective are discussed below. Amplification is provided in subsequent appendixes and chapters. Consult the regional combatant command's functional plan (FUNCPLAN) or concept plan (CONPLAN), JP 3-57, and JP 3-07.6 for more comprehensive guidance.

3.1 MISSION CLARITY, COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, AND POLICIES

From the outset, the commander must have a clear understanding of the mission and how the military, HN, and other participants in the FHA/DR operation will interact in accomplishing the mission. The key considerations listed below relate to mission clarity, command relationships, and policies.

- **Determine and clearly publicize mission requirements.**

- **Publicize the end state**, including the intended scope and duration of military aid, to all participants early in order to avoid unreasonable expectations and mission growth.

- **Assess relationships to (or impact on) other operations, policies in effect, preplanned responses (to possible events), and the operational command structure** (e.g., headquarters, command centers, and other C2 nodes, task organization, direct liaison authorizations, etc). Issues to consider include:

  - **On-Scene Versus Distant Headquarters**

    - A natural tension may occur between the commander on the scene and distant headquarters as warfighting command structures adapt to meet unique requirements under nonwarfighting crisis conditions. Those at the scene have a great need for agility in addressing rapidly changing conditions and local working relationships that may not be apparent to those at the distant headquarters. Those at headquarters focus on different issues than does the commander on the scene, including moving the "bigger blocks" in the operation.

    - It takes a considerable amount of time and information to stand up a headquarters, and those at the scene are likely fully tasked while meeting daily FHA/DR operational requirements.

    - It is incumbent upon the on-scene commander to assist the headquarters in developing its situational awareness and to speak emphatically, when necessary, to advise superiors if

decisions run contrary to what is needed on scene to accomplish the mission or if assets on scene are insufficient to meet the requirements levied by higher headquarters. See Section A.2 for an illustration.

- **The Command's Relationship With Civilian And Other Military Participants**

  - This includes U.S., HN, and coalition partners, as well as nongovernmental and other international entities.

  - See joint doctrine publications JP 0-2 and JP 3-0 for a discussion on command relationships.

- **Supported/supporting subordinate unit relationships:** In some cases, subordinate units will require considerable logistical, planning, or operational support from their parent command, and a supported/supporting relationship between commanders may be more effective and appropriate than shifting operational or tactical control of subordinate units.

- **Perspective:** It is easy to get too close to the problem. There is a need to occasionally detach oneself from the situation and ask such questions as, "Why are we here and what are our objectives?"

3.2 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

Good situational awareness is critical to properly focus the force's efforts. Key considerations related to the maintenance of good situational awareness are listed below.

- **Ensure that sufficient forces are assigned and/or tasked** to develop and maintain a robust awareness of the situation. First responder units based in the affected area should assess the potential impact of the disaster on personnel and their families and develop a plan to meet their additional needs for information and other assistance.

- **Get as much information as possible**, as early as possible, from as many sources as possible. See sections 5.1 through 5.4 for additional suggestions.

- **Determine safety concerns,** including safety of navigation, air traffic control, environmental hazards, and force protection issues.

- **Employ subject matter experts (SMEs).**

  - Include SMEs from recent operations or exercises, the COCOM country/region desks, or fleet headquarters as part of the force's extended network.

  - Additional sources of SMEs include the U.S. DOS, academic institutions, the retired joint flag officer community, UN sources, and industry. Fleet and COCOM staffs may be able to assist in accessing these groups.

  - Request that SMEs be attached for duty in theater, if possible.

  - Recent direct experience in FHA/DR is the essential criterion (see Section 8.3.2 for further discussion).

- **Determine other agencies' missions, requirements, relationships, and expectations** and assist their situational awareness by communicating the military role and transition plan.

3.3 FORCES AND MATERIAL

Ensure that required forces and material are on board or en route and available for tasking at the initial indication that FHA/DR operations may be imminent. Having the right forces in the right place at the right time is the challenge that the commander must meet. Recommended actions related to forces and material include the following:

- **Logistics: Meet the Demand Signal**

  - **Get the logistics train moving as soon as possible.** It does no good to arrive on station without the needed supplies, equipment, and skills or the capacity to deliver or apply them.

  - **Ensure proper management of the demand signal** that the crisis generates in order to avoid excess capacity as well as shortages (see Section 7.1 for more on this dynamic).

    - **Reflect HN desires and emergent needs in aid prioritization.** One way to accomplish this is to establish a procedure in which the HN provides a daily list of requirements, which may be expanded to reflect situational awareness gained while meeting those requirements. Alternatively, the HN may prioritize a list drawn up by local officials and other responders at the scene or provide broad guidance for their use in prioritization and meeting emergent needs.

    - **Maintain a continuous chain of command dialogue.** Forward recommendations on support, relief supplies, etc. up the chain of command as soon as possible and maintain a continuous dialogue to effect changes as conditions evolve.

    - **Ensure that an efficient, well-planned distribution plan is in place.** It does no good to create a mountain of supplies and material on the beach, with associated protection and shelf-life concerns, if they can't be delivered where they are needed.

  - **Preserve availability of air assets** and flexibility in their tasking from the sea base. Short notice requirements for assessment or delivery are common in FHA/DR operations.

  - **Track costs from the start**. Typically, relief efforts commence before funding is identified. Documentation will likely be required for reimbursement. Seek guidance on reimbursement procedures if not provided by higher headquarters.

  - **Provide logistics assistance to other agencies.** Other participants, such as NGOs, may not give logistics matters due consideration, and the military may be called upon to assist them.

- **Establish Procedures for Force Protection and Security of Material.** Depending on HN sensitivities, such as the size of the footprint ashore and the arming of personnel, this may entail significant risk. Reporting procedures for incidents of lawlessness or noncompliance with evacuation orders should be established prior to placing military personnel ashore.

  - **Presence ashore versus personnel security:** Commanders may decide to keep the footprint ashore small as a security measure. Whether such a decision is made for that purpose, or due to another reason (e.g., HN desire), there is an associated overhead or

opportunity cost (i.e., a tradeoff in airlift and sealift used for this purpose, as opposed to delivering aid) in building and collapsing a presence ashore each day.

- **Risk assessment:** Risk (to mission and/or personnel) is inherent in any operation. Identification and mitigation or management of risk is a key element in joint and maritime planning processes that must be addressed in course of action development. OPNAVINST 3500.39B and NTTP 5-03.5 contain a comprehensive discussion on risk management (RM) processes and tools. The mission execute order (EXORD) and CJCSI 3121.01B discuss procedures for requesting supplemental rules of engagement (ROE).

- **Personnel Issues**

  - **Combat efficiency:** Develop a plan to maintain/regain combat efficiency and advise higher headquarters of expected deficiencies. Maintaining combat readiness can be difficult, particularly in extended operations or if deck space, policy, or HN restrictions preclude certain activities (see Section 7.10.4 for an example). Identify and leverage special capabilities and skills that exist within the force. These can be force multipliers and gap fillers (see Section 8.1.3 for an example).

  - **Stress:** Establish a stress management program and monitor personnel for signs of stress. Extensive relief efforts may stress the physical, spiritual, and emotional capabilities of personnel directly participating in a relief effort. Additionally, there are stresses on families at home. Ombudsmen and public affairs officers (PAOs) can assist in providing information and reassurance.

  - **Affected military personnel and their families:** First responder units based in the affected area should assess the potential impact of the disaster on personnel and their families and develop a plan to meet their additional needs for information and other assistance.

- **Redeployment of U.S. Military Assets**

  - Redeploy U.S. military assets or have their emergency deployments cancelled as the HN and civilian agencies gain control of the situation. These forces may be needed elsewhere.

  - There are also morale and logistic reasons for avoiding situations in which forces are underemployed.

3.4 BATTLE RHYTHM

Events must be synchronized at the earliest opportunity for effective coordination. Establish a battle rhythm to include meetings, reports, key events, etc., to support higher and supported headquarters' requirements and to provide effective coordination between own force and other agencies.

Establishing and maintaining a battle rhythm poses a significant challenge, particularly in the earliest stages of an operation. Numerous entities, operating in different time zones and possibly on opposite sides of the International Date Line, place demands on the commander and staff around the clock.

Weekend and holiday routines can affect availability of key personnel in some organizations, posing coordination challenges or an impetus to accelerate or delay timelines. This can be

especially challenging in Islamic countries, where there may not be anyone available because of religious proscriptions on holidays. The commander should be prepared to address what the staff can reasonably do to accommodate the requirements, desires, and battle rhythms of outside agencies. See Section 6.1.6 for additional discussion.

3.5 COMMUNICATIONS

Effective communications are essential to coordination. Key considerations should include:

- **Determine the primary C2 medium.** Consider using unclassified e-mail to facilitate participation by all agencies. Lack of terminals and bandwidth aboard ship will be a limiting factor.

- **Identify and, if necessary, obtain required communications assets**. Minimum required capabilities include radios, telephones (preferably satellite), secure and nonsecure Internet, and video teleconferencing. The media will likely desire streaming video capability and may not have the necessary assets with them.

- **Prioritize establishment of ship-to-shore communications** between the sea base and logistic sites (e.g., airheads and ports).

- **Manage expectations of what communications support will be available or provided to the media** by clearly articulating capabilities at first contact and as media personnel arrive.

- **Leverage use of civilian media assets,** where possible.

3.6 FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE/DISASTER RELIEF AND JOINT TASK FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

Naval forces are well suited to FHA/DR operations and will often be the first to respond, possibly arriving prior to establishment of FHA/DR and JTF infrastructure. **Speed to execution is essential, not only to save lives and mitigate human suffering, but also to provide an effective supply bridge until others can take over the operation**. Recommended FHA/DR and Joint Task Force (JTF) infrastructure-related actions include:

- **Establish the sea base as close to the disaster relief site(s) as practical** in order to speed delivery of supplies. Use the sea for maneuver space, and leverage force mobility to focus efforts where they are needed most.

- **Establish the command element at the most robust C2 node** in the sea base. This will facilitate integration with the JTF and other agencies and command of the JTF, if a JTF is established, and provide the most reachback capability to facilitate transition to the JTF or other command structure as it is established. See sections 6.2.1 and A.2 for additional discussion.

- **Consider distributed staff options** for optimal placement of key personnel for assessment and response. Communications capabilities, impact on infrastructure, force protection concerns, and HN desires may prohibit placing elements of the staff ashore in the affected area. Consider placing liaison officers (LNOs) or staff elements at alternative locations, such as the U.S. embassy or the logistics heads. See Section 3.7 for further discussion.

- **Obtain HN permission to operate watercraft and rotary wing aircraft at the earliest opportunity**. These assets can access surviving population concentrations, requiring little infrastructure to deliver needed supplies or to conduct SAR in the austere environment resulting from the disaster.

- **Commence operations to minimize additional loss of life, if arriving before joint or interagency C2 has been established,** and keep superiors informed. Be prepared to take the lead in coordinating arriving U.S. forces. United States military assets initially may be the sole capability for delivery of relief supplies.

- **Focus subsequent actions on transition of C2 functions** to the appropriate authority (e.g., JTF commander) if a military organizational structure is established.

3.7 LIAISON OFFICER, DETACHMENT, AND TEAM DEPLOYMENT

Liaison officers, detachments (DETs), and teams are force multipliers, facilitating access to key individuals and other agencies and promoting effective coordination. They should be fully aware of sea-based capabilities and be ready for deployment under expeditionary field conditions.

- **Designate and deploy LNOs as early as possible** to get "eyes on target" and to coordinate efforts with other agencies. Consider stationing SME LNOs with other U.S. forces, U.S. Government officials, and other Navy elements. It is particularly important to station an LNO with the U.S. embassy or country team base of operations, as well as with the JTF headquarters and forward elements, to advise decision makers on sea based capabilities and contributions.

- **Consider LNO seniority,** particularly in higher headquarters.

- **Establish beach detachments** to supervise flight operations and coordinate logistic matters, as required.

3.8 TRANSITION/TRANSFER POINTS AND STRATEGY

Military support in FHA/DR operations is intended to be of short duration and to minimize human suffering and stabilize the situation (i.e., support during the crisis stage, such as SAR and recovery efforts). Once the situation has stabilized, the UN, NGOs, and HN should assume those functions that the military initially performed. Key actions related to transition/transfer points and strategy include:

- **Plan for transition**. JP 3-57 contains joint doctrine for civil-military operations, including a discussion on **transition metrics and sample checklists for transition and termination planning**. JP 3-07.6 provides joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for FHA/DR, including a four-phased transition model.

- **Address the transition to civilian performance of tasks** at the initial meeting(s) with other participants and keep the military-civilian team focused on this critical path. Update all concerned on the status of transition as often as possible.

- **Identify key niche functions that must be provided by other means early and ensure there is a plan to transfer them to the HN or appropriate international organization.** Essential functions, such as air control, are critical to transition.

- **Focus on attaining transition decision points.** Higher authority and the commander should focus on transferring new requirements to civilian organizations later in the response unless continued military support is absolutely necessary.

- **Require civilian agencies to contribute to the operation with all available assets as they arrive** in the operating area, rather than being allowed to wait until all of their assets are on station and their normal support architecture is fully in place. Other agencies' readiness and willingness to assume FHA/DR functions are key to effective transition.

- **Determine, analyze, and report appropriate metrics.** Metrics are important in assessing progress toward transition/transfer of activities to another agency or in terminating those activities no longer necessary. See Section 3.9.

- **Keep the chain of command informed** in order to adjust resource allocation and deployment.

3.9 METRICS AND TERMINOLOGY

Commonality in measures and terms is essential to coordinating and assessing participant performance in an operation. Additionally, some terms can hamper coordination with the HN(s) and NGOs or international organizations because of cultural sensitivities (see Section A.3 for an example). See sections A.5 and 6.1.6, and JP 3-57 and NWP 3-07 for more on metrics and measures of effectiveness (MOEs).

- **Use of terms.** The media and other entities may use certain terms (e.g., "refugees" as opposed to the more correct "displaced persons" or "evacuees") loosely. Such terms may have legal connotations, and incorrect use should be avoided.

  - Every effort should be made to use commonly understood terminology, such as that found in Federal agency (particularly DOD) directives and joint doctrine, to avoid confusion.

3.10 STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

It may be necessary to develop procedures for effective and efficient unit level execution of certain functions. Develop standing operating procedures (SOPs) (e.g., ship's instructions and/or notices) to address specific unit level procedures for receiving and processing evacuees and other activities associated with FHA/DR. Similar commands (or platforms) may be able to provide the guidance they used during recent operations to assist in developing command SOPs.

3.11 LESSONS LEARNED COLLECTION AND EVENTS RECONSTRUCTION

It is essential that the Navy learn from its experience in order to continue to improve performance. A sample data collection plan is provided at Appendix C.

- **Establish and follow a plan to collect data** to meet specified and anticipated reporting requirements, reconstruct events, and provide lessons learned for those who will conduct this type of operation in the future.

- **Dedicate personnel to collect this data.** Consider using analysts, if embarked, and requesting a Navy lessons learned (NLL) collection team for assistance in large operations.

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

CHAPTER 4

Coordination

Note

The intent of this chapter is to provide the commander with a general appreciation of considerations in coordinating FHA/DR activities with other participants. Subsequent chapters provide amplification.

4.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

4.1.1 Civil-Military Operations Center

The JTF commander or military commanders at other echelons may establish a civil-military operations center (CMOC) to facilitate coordination of civilian and military activities. JP 3-57 contains joint doctrine on CMOCs and related COCOM, interagency, or international coordination centers, such as humanitarian assistance coordination centers (HACCs) and humanitarian operations centers (HOCs). JP 3-07.6 provides joint TTP.

4.1.2 Transition or Transfer of Responsibility

The plan to transition functions from military to civilian agencies must be decided early and addressed throughout the operation. Involving other agencies in developing transfer criteria can be helpful, particularly in developing easily understandable (i.e., stop-light style red, yellow, and green) measures that lead to decision points.

There will likely be a tendency among other agencies to wait until all assets are available before accepting responsibility from the military. This is counterproductive; anticipate and take preparative action to integrate outside agencies in the operation as soon as their assets start to arrive. Their involvement in the operation will promote the necessary thought process to plan and execute transfer of functions as soon as the conditions can support it. Military forces are well suited to facilitate the necessary interaction among the various agencies in the operation. The sooner this occurs, the sooner the desired end state will occur.

4.1.3 Requirements Process

Failure to understand or adhere to the accepted process that drives requirements and prioritization may cause operational and logistical problems. Generally, it is the HN that drives both the requirements determination and the prioritization processes. Failing that, it is a UN or other appropriate international organization's responsibility. For the United States, USAID's OFDA is the lead agency, supporting the U.S. ambassador, or the assistant secretary of state for the region in the case of countries where no U.S. ambassador is posted. In the latter, the USAID's OFDA deploys disaster assistance response teams (DARTs). JP 3-08 contains an additional discussion on the interagency process in these types of operations.

4.1.4 Professional Contacts

Professional relationships established during regional forums and exercises (e.g., medical conferences or exercises) may be leveraged to facilitate external relations. Similarly, relationships built by allies and partners may be helpful in this regard.

4.1.5 Seniority

Rank equivalency can be important in gaining and maintaining access to counterparts in other agencies. Where this is not possible, a senior officer of commensurate rank or position (e.g., a flag officer or commanding officer, as appropriate) may need to occasionally "open the door" for a more junior official.

4.2 MILITARY

4.2.1 Higher Authority

Develop a means to keep higher authority informed of all activities. That authority will have a strong desire for information, and this must be fulfilled as a matter of routine.

- Understand that C2 in the early stages will provide several avenues for higher authority to request information.

- Establish and educate subordinates on procedures for handling requests, centralizing the flow as early as possible.

4.2.2 Other U.S. Navy, Services, and Joint Service

The Service and joint doctrine noted in the references delineate command and working relationships with other military participants (e.g., functional component commands, area commanders, planning agents, etc.). However, these relationships vary with the type, size, and scale of the operation and must be clearly understood in order to coordinate effectively (e.g., how to best coordinate activities in adjacent areas or within each other's assigned areas).

4.2.3 International

Key leaders, including those in the beach DET, should seek out the local military and civilian leadership to gain their trust and approval to operate in the area, as well as their cooperation. Invite them to meetings and be sensitive to how they must be perceived by the local population. It is better for the HN and local government to be in control. Share information within the classification permitted, additionally providing information to the NGOs for coordination of participant efforts. Initially, this type of coordination will work and support the structure of the CMOC. Ultimately, performance of all functions will transition to the HN.

Military organizations will likely support the effort through their national channels. Determine communication paths to facilitate coordination. JP 3-57 contains a list of planning factors for multinational forces in civil-military operations. Combined force operations, especially those in which the United States is not a lead support element, will have unique relationships and procedures.

4.3 CIVILIAN

4.3.1 U.S. Government

The U.S. ambassador (0-10 rank equivalent) is charged by the POTUS to manage all aspects of the U.S. relationship with the country he or she is posted to. **The ambassador has veto power over all U.S. agencies and must be kept informed of plans and progress.** The commander should meet and develop communications paths to the ambassador and country team as early as possible. If possible, station an LNO in the defense attaché office to assist.

The DOS (often USAID's OFDA) personnel are typically in charge of prioritizing U.S. efforts, coordinating with the JTF commander (when assigned) and other elements, and taking care to avoid internal conflict between competing HN political, religious, or ethnic groups.

4.3.2 Host Nation

Host nation politics, culture, and local rules drive the conduct of an FHA/DR operation. This can be particularly challenging when a country has not had a positive relationship with the United States for a significant period of time. In such cases, planners may have very limited data on infrastructure, the government, etc., and working relationships will have to be built.

- Earn access rights through goodwill. The United States has no access rights in a foreign country, except those granted by the HN. Often access can best be established by FHA/DR participants and others who have interacted with the HN in the past.

- Minimize changes to coordinating personnel to avoid rebuilding established relationships. Daily senior officer presence at meetings is essential to establishing and maintaining a rapport with HN officials. These officers should be empowered to make decisions or be able to communicate quickly with decision makers.

4.3.3 Nongovernment

There will likely be numerous NGOs involved in an FHA/DR operation. For example, approximately three weeks after the 26 December 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, there were over 109 NGOs operating in Indonesia, 84 in Sri Lanka, and 35 in Thailand. Coordination with NGOs poses a unique challenge. While grouped under one heading, these organizations vary widely in numerous dimensions (size, orientation, organization, funding sources, etc.), and it is difficult to establish efficient coordination among them. Each will be primarily concerned with fulfilling its own purpose and will desire visibility or recognition for its efforts. While this may not appear congruent with being an organization providing relief in a humanitarian crisis, it reflects the reality that NGOs have a charter, and they must show results to their constituencies.

- Develop a relationship as a trusted agent to assist in developing efficiencies and synergies among the various participants. In the event that an organization-centric bias cannot be overcome, it must be factored into planning.

- Factor into planning the NGO tendencies to rely on ad hoc procedures and networks, including personal networks, as opposed to the formalized procedures and relationships that military organizations favor.

- Cooperatively verify NGO requirements in order to establish priority for distribution of their materials.

- Determine the lead agency that is acting or can act as single point of contact for matters related to NGOs, and provide coordination between them and other participants. In some cases, the UN may activate a HOC for this purpose.

The media are important in disseminating information, including the role the Navy is playing in the relief effort, to facilitate coordination. They are also a key source of information in developing and maintaining situational awareness and facilitating perception management.

- Coordinate the media's requirements and/or desires and the capabilities available to meet them so that all parties understand information dissemination. The media will have unique requirements in fulfilling their role. Deploy PAOs as early as possible to facilitate this coordination.

Private security organizations and other contractor personnel may be operating in the area. Seek clarification on their role, authority, and accountability from HN officials.

CHAPTER 5

Situational Awareness

Note

The intent of this chapter is to provide the commander with a general appreciation of considerations in gaining and maintaining situational awareness and managing perceptions and expectations in FHA/DR operations. Subsequent chapters provide amplification.

5.1 INTELLIGENCE

Obtain as much information on the situation as possible as early as possible. Consult the intelligence community (fleet/COCOM regional desk officers, Office of Naval Intelligence, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), etc.) for photographs, news reports, analysis, etc. Review U.S. and foreign media reports.

- Monitor popular foreign media for each country in the region to obtain valuable insight on local perception of U.S. activities. Combatant commands and other theater centers should be able to provide a list of these sources.

- Consult the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) ReliefWeb website (www.reliefweb.int) for information (e.g., maps, policy and issue reference materials, organizations involved in each sector, contacts, etc.) on current and past humanitarian emergencies and disasters. The site is updated around the clock.

- Determine which agencies or organizations are operating in-country and review their websites for background information.

- Conduct a health estimate of the situation. See Section 9.2 for a discussion on health and healthcare information requirements (IRs).

- Review NGO websites (e.g., www.sphereproject.org) for information on minimum humanitarian standards for water supply, sanitation, hygiene promotion, food security, nutrition, food aid, shelter, settlement, non-food items, and health services. The handbook provided at The Sphere Project site, along with USAID's field operation guide, are useful in assessing the situation in a disaster area.

- Review the findings of the Naval Oceanographic Office fleet survey team, which generally conducts an assessment including a hydrographic survey. Charts may be inadequate (e.g., inaccurate soundings, landmark/navigation aid features, etc.), or participants may be using different charts, navigation aids may be out of position, and new underwater obstructions may exist as a result of the disaster. Disseminate findings to other participants in the operation after getting HN permission for release of information that may be sensitive to the HN. These teams

are rapidly deployable, small units with air-transportable equipment that may be embarked in a destroyer-sized ship. Request this assistance early, if needed, to avoid delays in delivery of supplies by ships or small craft.

- Work through the country team to obtain an HN engineer assessment of the infrastructure, including utility systems. This is critical to planning and resourcing restoration to minimize mobility restrictions and dependence on externally provided utilities.

- Request on-scene meteorological support, with organic power and communications capability and reachback, if normal paths of weather observation/forecast and communication are not sufficient.

- Request access to daily briefings to the combatant commander and others on the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) or nonsecure Internet protocol network (NIPRNET), as appropriate, in order to understand what is being presented and to maintain alignment with the commander's intent. Submit any needed corrections to their data or tasking orders.

5.2 REPORTS, MEDIA, AND BRIEFINGS

Information flow to the right place in the right time frame will maintain situational awareness. The following suggestions are drawn from experience during recent disaster support operations.

- Submit a "joining report" to higher headquarters upon assignment to the JTF or operation. Often overlooked at first, it identifies and verifies unit capabilities and available berthing.

- Plan to submit situation reports to higher headquarters every six hours, or as directed, to keep it apprised and minimize requests for additional information.

- Determine or establish a reliable source for numbers of displaced persons in the camps. International organization assessment teams tend to overestimate these numbers.

- Consider sending a photographer on the first sortie to capture the historical first images, to help tell the Navy story from the start, and to start information flow back through the PAO to the media.

- Conduct VTC briefings when possible. These briefings are helpful in establishing and maintaining a common situational awareness for internal and external audiences. Maximizing the number of participants speeds the process and promotes general understanding of decisions and the decision process in use.

- Identify measures of unit productivity (e.g., number of flights, flight hours, number/weight of pallets delivered, etc.) in convertible units of measure where possible, and keep such records from the start of the operation. This data may prove useful when outside activities ask for such statistics or in developing measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and will emphatically state the Navy's role.

5.3 IMAGERY AND OTHER DETAILED INFORMATION

Commercial imagery (e.g., Google Earth) is generally of sufficient quality/granularity for use, and it carries few restrictions, if any, on distribution. It is also useful as a broad survey tool that

can assist in determining where national or tactical assets may be used to best effect. Note that commercial imagery databases may not reflect current conditions, infrastructure, etc. Also keep in mind that imagery transmissions require a very large amount of bandwidth.

- Request anti-surface warfare improvement program (AIP)-equipped maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) assets to obtain updated, good quality imagery to help define and prioritize relief needs. The improved electro-optic capabilities of this aircraft are well suited to this type of mission. Unmanned sensor platforms, if available, and helicopters may also be used for this purpose.

- Collect detailed information on landing zones (LZs) in the relief area. Intelligence officers can assist in developing a library of LZ information by collecting photographs and other debriefing materials from returning aircrews and imagery from AIP MPA assets. It also may be helpful to send an interpreter on selected flights to assist aircrews in assessing current and future requirements in the area.

- Obtain detailed maps of existing infrastructure, critical facilities (e.g., hospitals, airfields, etc.), and utility systems, annotated to reflect the extent of known or suspected degradation, from HN officials.

- Consult local area street maps, particularly for SAR in flooded or isolated areas. Commercial software (e.g., Microsoft Streets) may be helpful.

- Consider granting unrestricted Internet access to key individuals to avoid restrictions that may block receipt of imagery. Be aware of the effect on bandwidth availability.

- Consider posting information on non-password-protected sites, keeping operations security (OPSEC) and potential exploitation of unclassified sensitive information by criminal elements in mind. If this is not practical, disseminate access procedures to enable key personnel to obtain passwords at the earliest opportunity.

- Sea-air-land team (SEAL) reconnaissance, if available, may also prove useful in obtaining detailed information.

5.4 LESSONS LEARNED AND RECORDS

Search the lessons learned databases for relevant information (Navy, joint, other Services). Not all lessons learned are in the remedial action program, but they can create an understanding of the situation and outline appropriate courses of action. Databases and points of contact for assistance are accessible through the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) websites (www.nwdc.navy.mil and www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil).

- Review applicable guidance in Appendix D of this publication.

- Solicit and collect the lessons learned from this operation.

- Maintain a detailed diary of events, including flights conducted, where they went, what they carried, etc. This type of information will be requested at the end of the operation for historical documentation, and it will be difficult to create without such a record. Strike group(s)'s embarked analysts have been employed effectively in this capacity in past operations.

- Consider requesting an active collection team via the chain of command if the operation is of significant size.

5.5 CULTURAL AWARENESS

5.5.1 Culture

Develop an awareness of regional culture.

- Meet with the ambassador and his or her country team, if possible. Otherwise, fleet or COCOM regional desk officers may provide assistance.

- Request deployment of the desk officer(s), if possible, as advisors for the duration of the operation. Assign them to the liaison team(s) and have them brief watch teams and other key personnel.

- Consult units such as the U.S. Army 4th Psychological Operations Battalion for assistance in reviewing materials for religious, political, and other cultural considerations prior to distribution to the local population.

- Seek assistance from unit chaplains in assessing the religious environment and the impact of religion upon the local culture. Since many cultures hold religious leaders in high esteem, chaplains may be perceived with inherent credibility and may serve particularly well as liaisons to indigenous religious leaders.

See Section A.3 for examples of cultural issues.

5.5.2 Language

- Develop and maintain situational awareness through the language skills provided by linguists. See Section 8.3.1 for further discussion.

- Use pictures, color, and other graphics in information products as the primary means to communicate a message, where practical, to overcome language and literacy obstacles.

5.6 PERCEPTION AND EXPECTATION MANAGEMENT

5.6.1 Perceptions

One key element of situational awareness is understanding how the HN and other participants perceive the Navy's actions and those of the United States in general. Leaders must be attuned to all sources (i.e., media, LNOs, etc.), make necessary changes, and develop an information campaign, including PA and LNO efforts, to promote and sustain trust. Look for opportunities to show goodwill (e.g., distributing candy and cookies, providing basic dental care or primary medical care, or in some cases, minor corrective surgery, etc.).

5.6.2 Expectations

Host nations, international organizations, and NGOs may have incorrect understandings and unrealistic expectations regarding the military's role in the operation. Determine and communicate the military role, termination/transfer criteria, and transition plan at the outset and

continue to address expectations. It may also be helpful to provide a handout or pamphlet that gives these officials contact information for the ships and the capabilities that are available to support requirements (e.g., general description of ship, air and sea lift assets embarked, DR supplies carried, etc.). Providing a contact relief for units and individuals participating in the operation until the functions have transferred to another agency can assist in maintaining the expectation that the HN will not be abandoned, a key to maintaining trust.

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

CHAPTER 6

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence

Note

The commander must keep security requirements in mind at all times. As policy and practice continue to evolve to meet emerging vulnerabilities and threats, some of the recommendations listed in this chapter or elsewhere related to command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) may no longer be practicable. Consult policy directives for guidance.

6.1 COMMAND AND CONTROL

- Establish and publish the organizational chart and battle rhythm as soon as possible. The sooner this is done, the quicker C2 will be established and situational awareness will be developed.

  - Appoint a continuously manned crisis action team (CAT) watch to serve as a single point of contact for information, tasking, and coordination.

  - Perform/transition C2, especially when JTF is activated, using traditional shipboard watch structures rather than adding another watch team, due to manning constraints.

  - Clearly delineate responsibilities if using a CAT. Multiple watch teams may also be a source of confusion.

  - Review current applicable C4I doctrine, JP 3-32, NWDC TACMEMO 3-32-03, NWP 3-62, and NWP 5-01, all currently in final draft, for discussions about C2 in joint maritime operations and seabasing.

6.1.1 Command Structure

Seams or disconnects can occur as wartime command structures attempt to adapt to DR operations. Staffs must identify and manage these seams. Service component (e.g., Navy forces (NAVFOR)) or geographical command designation may be more appropriate than functional componency (e.g., joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC)) in tailoring the command structure to the mission, reflecting the differences between DR and warfighting.

6.1.2 Battle Rhythm

Battle rhythm refers to events that a unit conducts on a recurring basis and that facilitate setting conditions for success. Among the most important of these events are regular meetings between the commander and subordinate commanders and key staff. Many factors help determine and

establish a unit's battle rhythm. Some of these are the unit's state of training, battle rhythm of higher headquarters, and the current mission. Some missions require much more time than others to prepare and, therefore, the battle rhythm must remain flexible. Units must be able to react to changing conditions and targets of opportunity as they present themselves.

- Set normal working hours for key staff based on higher headquarters' need for reports, meetings, visits, VTC, etc. These events will also drive the activities of the watch teams to a large extent.

- Deconflict important communications events, such as VTC, from various higher authorities to develop an effective battle rhythm. Critical communications must be received and disseminated. If time conflicts are unavoidable, senior, credible representation must take place with comprehensive debriefing and immediate relay back to the commander.

- Accommodate or include where practical the activities of other participants (i.e., local officials, NGOs, etc.).

- Review NWDC TACMEMO 3-32-03 and its draft revision, concerning JFMCC planning and execution, for an extensive discussion on battle rhythm and operational planning considerations.

6.1.3   Air Traffic Control

Disaster relief operations entail the operation of numerous types of helicopters from disparate military and civilian organizations. High density will likely make identification and control of aircraft difficult. Local and wide area air traffic control procedures are needed to provide guidance for safe routing of helicopter traffic within the relief area, including LZs and fixed wing airports. These rules should additionally specify standard communication procedures and frequencies, checkpoints, altitude guidance, and air routes.

- Plan all aspects of air control early.

- Integrate helicopter operations and other military/relief agency flight operations into the existing air traffic control rules and routes in the affected area. Establish rules if none are in effect or if the disaster rendered them ineffective.

- Conduct training on these rules for helicopter pilots who will be using the airport, and ensure that local military, police, and NGO pilots are included in the classes. It is important to gain the support of local senior leadership (e.g., HN military or civil aviation authorities) in enforcing these rules. The complexity of air control/safety of flight issues will increase rapidly without compliance, particularly as the number of fixed wing flights increases.

- Consider equipment capabilities at the airport, as it may be necessary for a ship to close within territorial waters to assist FHA/DR aircraft in collision avoidance and navigation in bad weather. Shipboard radars may be hampered by land-sea interface and other terrain factors.

See NWP 3-56-1 (Rev. A) and NTTP 3-02.1.3 for further discussion on air control processes and procedures.

6.1.4   Air Tasking Order and Assignment of Aircraft

The air tasking order (ATO) and special instructions (SPINS) provide necessary coordination among the various military and civilian entities involved in air delivery of material and passengers.

- Assign highest priority to HN requests and brief HN representatives on the plan daily to obtain endorsement for planned operations.

- Maintain flexibility in application of the ATO process. Operational requirements will likely lack the specificity available in other types of operations, where events may be planned 24 to 72 hours in advance. This is particularly the case in the earliest stages of FHA/DR.

- Maintain tactical control of organic rotary wing air assets in the sea base, rather than with the joint force air component commander (JFACC), if a JFACC is established. This facilitates flexibility to deliver supplies as needed. Frequent, short notice changes are inherent in support to relief operations and may in fact be dictated by the HN military. See Section A.2 for further discussion.

- Ensure that sufficient airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets (e.g., MPA) are assigned to support the surveillance/reconnaissance needs of the theater. Those assets that are intended to be in direct support of the relief operation should be specifically assigned to avoid confusion in mission priorities.

- Be careful that the number and types of aircraft provided do not exceed the capability to effectively employ them (e.g., consider air space control capability, airport/LZ capacity, support requirements, etc.).

While experience has shown that non-U.S. or non-DOD elements generally coordinate with the ATO process, they are not required to do so and may not. It may not be possible to produce a single ATO to cover all participants; however, coordination is still essential and may be accomplished by making the ATO available to other participants. Also, be aware that other agencies may attempt to task U.S. military aircraft once inland, requiring them to fly much longer than anticipated.

NWDC TACMEMO 3-32-03 and its draft revision address the coordination process for surface vessels.

6.1.5   Rescue Coordination Center

A shipboard tactical air coordination center (TACC) and associated spaces have sufficient communications and display capabilities to host the rescue coordination center (RCC), which will likely be a joint Service RCC, coordinating SAR and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) efforts. Formally establishing effective C2 in the local area is essential for efficient employment of such assets. Additionally, tactical air coordination skills are transferable to SAR operations.

- Employ necessary skill sets and experience in the RCC. These include medical personnel and personnel from other Services and NGOs familiar with maritime, overland, and urban SAR and legal issues and restrictions.

- Support assigning sectors to each Service, which has proven effective in previous DR efforts.

- Ensure that the RCC maintains the overall search plan to optimize assets and search efficiency. All military and civilian search and rescue assets should be part of a single RCC structure. Search and rescue assets (i.e., watercraft and aircraft) should be part of this structure, and specific capabilities (e.g., hoist capability) should be considered in the tasking of assets, particularly when such capabilities are in short supply.

Procedures are defined in the U.S. National SAR Supplement to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual.

6.1.6 Measures and Terminology

Measures (or metrics) refer to quantitative information collected by a unit. These can be statistical data, used to provide a description of activities conducted, or they may be MOEs, an analytical tool used by decision makers. Metrics reported outside the chain of command tend to be general in nature (e.g., to provide information to the public), while those reported within the organization are more focused and detailed for use in such activities as collecting cost data or assisting in performance assessment. See Section A.4 for examples.

- Focus on outcome indicators that reflect the impact of support provided. Military personnel frequently use performance or achievement indicators (e.g., number of people treated, pounds of medical supplies delivered, quantity of utilities and resources provided, number of sorties conducted, etc.). International organizations and NGOs use outcome indicators, such as mortality or morbidity numbers and infant mortality rates. While both types of measures are useful, the latter is often more relevant in assessing a situation.

- Consider alternatives to military terminology. Some terms commonly used in military operations may have connotations that can hamper coordination with the HN(s), NGOs, and international organizations, particularly in cases of HN sensitivity to foreign military presence or with individuals who have a distrust of civil-military organizations. See Section A.3 for examples.

- Develop a common set of metrics and terms and train personnel in their use. Standardization provides obvious benefits in coordination along with commonality of purpose.

- Minimize changes to reporting requirements to support tactical unit concentration on DR activities. Higher echelons should analyze data provided by subordinate units where possible to extract the desired measures.

6.2 COMMUNICATIONS

Identify and mitigate single points of failure, developing multiple paths and redundancy in equipment where needed and preplanned responses. This is particularly important with respect to communications with nonmilitary agencies using commercial equipment and in the early stages of disaster situations.

6.2.1 Interim Support to Joint Task Force Commander

If a JTF is established, determine the best C2 node in the force and offer it to the JTF commander as an interim location for key staff while a more permanent command center is being set up ashore. See Section A.2 for additional discussion.

6.2.2 Communications Protocol

The number of ad hoc procedures and information sources developed by DR participants can quickly become overwhelming.

- Establish the communications protocol via record message traffic, Flash precedence, upon assuming command of the operation. Communications protocol should:

  - Offer guidance on message traffic and e-mail, including designation of contact lists (e.g., message plain language address designations, e-mail addresses, and international maritime satellite (INMARSAT)/Iridium and cellular phone numbers).

  - Include computer chat groups to be monitored and protocol to be followed.

  - Designate official NIPRNET and SIPRNET websites and establish an unclassified website for general dissemination of reports.

- Consider using e-mail as a vehicle for official tasking. E-mail has proven preferable to message traffic in previous DR operations, producing quicker response times. Use of unclassified e-mail for C2 allows partners to rapidly gain situational awareness, facilitates their participation, and speeds transition of functions to other agencies.

- Consider increasing the allowed attachment size for selected users to avoid problems where messages are not sent or received due to size restrictions.

- Consider using websites and daily summaries to assist in getting the word out to the wider audience. Keep in mind that some people who need to know information discussed via e-mail may not be on the distribution list. The same applies to telephone calls, chat groups, and meetings in general during crisis response.

- Specify collaborative tools, if any, that will be used. Use of an unclassified collaboration at sea (UCAS) system may assist in information sharing.

- Use chat for coordination of link troubleshooting and maintenance.

- Work with the local naval computer and telecommunications area master station (NCTAMS) to resolve difficulties. The message address directory may not accept nontraditional force structure entries as valid for entry into the directory database. Include a database plain-language-address verification system (DPVS) check on all outgoing message traffic to minimize nondeliveries.

6.2.3 Telecommunications and Teleconferencing

- Consider that although cellular telephones and wireless handheld e-mail devices are critical elements of the communications network, they have limitations (coverage area, reliance on infrastructure, handling of attachments, etc.).

- Train personnel in INMARSAT operating procedures. Shipboard INMARSAT leases may not permit international telephone calls. Cellular telephones have been used for this purpose in past DR operations. INMARSAT problems may be procedural (e.g., use of "leading zeroes" in the phone number).

- Plan on communications workarounds like using satellite telephones, ship-to-shore radio, relay, temporary installation of cellular phone antennas, etc. In the likely event of damage to the communications infrastructure, workarounds will be necessary. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or manned aircraft (e.g., E2C HAWKEYE), if available and permitted, may be scheduled for communications relay during anticipated critical periods.

- Utilize VTC when available, as it serves as a valuable tool for coordinating efforts of geographically separated units.

    - Be prepared to travel to the nearest VTC location (afloat or ashore) if embarked in a ship that does not have this capability.

    - Ensure that VTC organizers disseminate detailed notes and graphics from these events as soon as possible after the completion of each video teleconference to provide the information to those unable to attend.

6.2.4   Streaming Video

Embedded media will likely desire streaming video capability and may lack the required assets. A nonmaterial workaround is to break the media file into numerous smaller files (approximately 12) and then e-mail them to the studio for reconstruction. Installation of fast file transfer software is also helpful.

- Maintain liaison with the media to ensure that their requirements and desires are known and that they understand the limitations of the capabilities available for their use to avoid unrealistic expectations.

6.2.5   Equipment Portability and Distribution

Portability of communications equipment (i.e., radios, computers, etc.) is key to effective coordination in a dynamic, distributed environment. Additionally, personnel sent ashore may need to return to the sea base with their communications equipment at the end of their workday.

- Identify availability of portable communications assets within the force (e.g., in the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) detachment and Marine expeditionary unit (MEU)) and place them where they are most needed in the DET and with the LNOs.

6.2.6   Information Dissemination and Coordination

Obtain classification and releasability guidance from higher headquarters prior to commencing operations, if possible, to minimize staffing delays on normally classified information that participants may need for effective coordination (e.g., ship's position, etc.).

- Assign two officers to one or more UN/NGO coordination team(s) to serve as trusted agents and perform clearinghouse functions. This will facilitate the transfer of duties to civilian organizations, as the credibility and trust they have established carries over to that phase. These personnel are particularly critical in the early stages of the operation when the various agencies involved have not yet established an effective coordination mechanism. They can reduce the number of duplicate requests for helicopter flights to assess the situation, freeing those assets for delivery of critical supplies. See Section A.2 for additional discussion.

- Maximize employment of PAOs to disseminate information consistently and accurately.

- Fully integrate information operations (IO) into DR efforts. This is a key element in gaining and maintaining awareness of the operational environment, as well as shaping it (e.g., deterring violence, looting, and other illegal activity). See NWP 3-13 for a discussion on Navy IO. Developing IO themes, determining and focusing on the intended audience, and distributing information to the audience are of utmost importance.

- Consider implications prior to the release of information, and minimize the use of identifying marks on potentially sensitive or exploitable material, as it is difficult to control or manage what happens to information after it has been provided to others. Pictures and reports may be used or altered to serve the purpose of a group or faction. Have PAOs review materials prior to release.

6.3 COMPUTERS AND BANDWIDTH

Nongovernmental organizations will use the Internet to pass information. Unless dynamic, prioritized bandwidth software is in use, it may be helpful to disconnect all but a few computers from NIPRNET in order to preserve available bandwidth. Alternatively, it may be necessary to download data to a universal serial bus (USB) flash drive (thumb drive) for transfer to/from NGO computers. If a local hotel or Internet café has high-speed Internet access, it may be useful to station a DET there. Similarly, Iridium satellite telephones can be used for this purpose.

The use of freeware (software downloaded from the Internet) by NGOs poses a collaboration problem for military networks that require accredited software applications and protection from viruses inherent in free software. Flyaway kits of commercially based communications systems and web-based collaboration tools may be available to facilitate this in the future. Establishment of an information clearinghouse and common webpage to disseminate information can help if participants are willing to commit to using them for collaboration.

Collaborative tool set development efforts are currently underway. Consult higher headquarters' information management/knowledge management (IM/KM) plan(s) for details on hardware, software, and training requirements (if applicable).

Database access problems may exist, even between DOD networks (e.g., deployable joint C2 (DJC2) and Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI)), if the networks do not trust each other's domain or authentication. Web mail may allow access to e-mail; however, some websites and files located on servers may not be accessible by all components in the operation.

Available memory may be a problem with some NMCI computers, particularly for the JFMCC staff. Deployable joint C2 system computers may be preferable. Manage file size by compression techniques, minimizing the use of graphics, etc.

Bandwidth will be a particular concern in transmission of imagery via the Internet. Transmission to the ship from an air operations center is preferable. SIPRNET bandwidth is less saturated than NIPRNET and may also be used for this purpose. Establish the protocol to transfer appropriate unclassified imagery to the NIPRNET for further dissemination to users that don't have SIPRNET access (e.g., NGOs). See Section A.2 for further discussion.

6.4 INTELLIGENCE

- Clearly identify priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and essential elements of information (EEIs).

- Determine foreign disclosure rules, particularly for P-3 AIP imagery and classified or sensitive navigational charts. In most cases, FHA/DR operations will be conducted in a coalition or multinational environment. There may be classification markings from other countries or U.S. agencies that personnel are not familiar with, such as the DOS marking, "sensitive, but unclassified." Have embarked intelligence professionals anticipate the coalition composition and work the details on handling and disclosure guidelines with fleet and COCOM foreign disclosure offices.

- Emphasize the value of human intelligence (HUMINT) from multiple sources, especially advance and shore parties. Human intelligence is a valuable source of information in prioritization of relief efforts. All participants (air crews, beach DETs, etc.) should be trained in casual observation skills and briefed/debriefed prior to and after each mission. Medical personnel have training in these skills that may easily be leveraged.

- Deploy aviation staffs with sufficient intelligence support, to include personnel skilled in time-critical data collection and fusion, briefing, and mission planning.

See sections 5.1 through 5.3 for additional discussion. NTTP 3-13-1-16 provides an extensive discussion of topics addressed in this section.

CHAPTER 7

Logistics

7.1 DEMAND SIGNAL RESPONSE

Monitor and attempt to manage the demand signal. Events unfold rapidly, and the tendency will be for outside agencies to send more than is needed or can effectively be employed, in type and amount of assistance, and to send it as soon as possible. Conversely, some requirements may have been overlooked, and it will take time to generate and deliver those forces or material items. Early and continuous dialog is needed to ensure the right type of support arrives in a timely fashion.

As discussed in Chapter 1, speed of deployment is particularly critical. Assets not arriving in the first three weeks will quickly become excess capacity as the HN and other agencies ramp up their operations. See Section A.4 for an example.

7.2 LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

There are numerous legal considerations associated with FHA/DR operations (e.g., use of operating funds, foreign claims issues; status-of-forces agreements (SOFA); use of facilities, supplies, or equipment; licensing requirements for health care providers; type and location of care provided; commercial offers of assistance; contractor personnel issues, etc.). See JP 3-57 for a list of potential legal issues and Appendix A to JP 3-07.6 for additional discussion. Consult a Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) to ensure that legal implications are considered.

7.3 COORDINATION

Senior officer presence is important at scheduled daily meetings at the airfield or coordination site (e.g., CMOC). It is also important to have a representative available ashore to attend evening meetings. The senior logistician (N-4) or designated representative should attend the daily JFMCC (or equivalent) operations brief.

- Consider establishing a logistics readiness center (LRC) or equivalent in the sea base, where principal U.S. Navy logistics personnel (i.e., supply, medical, dental, civil engineering, etc.) can meet to share information or to access information on current activities and coordinate their efforts. The LRC should prepare a daily logistics readiness update for the commander. The LRC also coordinates with the joint force commander (JFC) senior logistician (J-4), the joint logistics readiness center (JLRC), assigned logistics task force commanders (CTF X3), other Service components, and other responders as required.

- Coordinate with other responders to minimize duplication of effort that results in competition for the same resources, redundancy, etc., and maximize the use of limited storage capacity.

- Consider assigning personnel to points of embarkation and debarkation to facilitate delivery of material into the operating area.

- Ensure the material unit of issue supports transportability at the delivery site (e.g., 40-pound sacks of rice are preferable to 200-pound sacks).

- Anticipate and manage high usage of computer and bandwidth assets to coordinate logistics.

7.4 ARRIVAL PRIOR TO ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE/DISASTER RELIEF INFRASTRUCTURE

Commence operations within the provisions of immediate response upon arrival to minimize additional loss of life. Keep superiors informed. Subsequent actions should focus on the transition of C2 functions to the appropriate authority (e.g., JTF commander) and the transfer of relief operations to the appropriate nonmilitary agencies (e.g., HN, UN, or NGOs). The flow of personnel and equipment for advanced logistic support site/ forward logistic site (ALSS/FLS) operations may require time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) or request for forces (RFF) action. Host nation coordination, via the U.S. embassy, will likely be required prior to establishment of an ALSS/FLS.

- Assess the environmental risk to military assets. Damaged navigation aids, debris in the water, and other changes caused by natural disaster may impact effectiveness and affect selection of assets and platforms.

- Identify such routes as early as possible and conduct survey and clearance activities. Water routes may be the only means of delivering critical supplies to first responders until aircraft landing areas and land routes are cleared.

- Conduct site surveys of proposed advanced logistic support sites (ALSSs) and forward logistic sites (FLSs) to determine optimal location, and establish these sites as soon as possible to prevent a backlog of supplies and equipment outside the operating area. Advanced support logistic sites and FLSs may have to be relocated as DR operations develop in order to support operational changes, relocation of forces, etc.

  - Coordination with the Navy regional commander will likely be required prior to establishment of an ALSS/FLS.

  - Materials handling equipment (MHE) to offload aircraft, communications equipment, and life/habitability support (e.g., messing/berthing) must all be considered for ALSS/FLS operations.

  - Advanced logistic support site/forward logistic site operations may require personnel augmentation via the naval expeditionary logistics support force (NELSF) or other personnel assigned by the component commander (CCDR) or NAVFOR.

  Additional information on ALSS/FLS operations can be found in NTTP 4-01.1.

7.5 PREPOSITIONING AND ENABLING STOCKS

Do not plan on the availability of prepositioned stocks. Contingency blocks of FHA/DR equipment and supplies are no longer maintained in-theater. Check the COCOM's FUNCPLAN for the location of relief supplies for onload prior to departure for the disaster area or while en route. Identify sources of those items (e.g., pallets, tri-wall containers, packaging and banding materials, shrink wrap, cargo nets, etc.) that enable ship-to-shore movement of material.

7.6 FORWARD/ADVANCE TEAM(S)

Support the placement of a forward logistics team advance party (AP) or survey, liaison, and reconnaissance party (SLRP) if at all feasible prior to the arrival of the support from the sea base. Establishing such teams ashore, ready to receive support materials and prioritize delivery, supports speed to execution by establishing a working relationship with local officials, conducting required hydrographic and beach surveys, and enhancing situational awareness on critical needs and restoration priorities. Work with the area logistics group to deploy the team(s) in a timely manner.

- Develop a prioritization scheme for daily use by team loadmasters.

- Coordinate with the HN to determine procedures for the use of local distribution capabilities.

- Assign a medical planner to this team to validate health service support and force protection requirements prior to sending medical teams ashore.

7.7 SUPPORT TO OTHER AGENCIES

- Plan to provide support to the HN, other foreign government and military agencies, and NGOs. In the earliest stages, NGOs, the HN, and other foreign government and military agencies operating in the area may have materials but lack the means to deliver them. Offer manpower and lift assets to assist during this critical period.

- Offer to assist the HN in distributing supplies transported. This provides an indication of where and how the material is being used and may help minimize delays of additional supplies en route.

- Consider the support (e.g., shipboard billeting) that NGOs, media, and other agencies may request and seek policy guidance from higher headquarters. Determine security requirements and costs.

7.8 CONTRACTING

Develop a means to provide contracting support expeditiously. Contracts will be required for equipment, material, and services. The local fleet and industrial supply center (FISC) or regional naval facility's (NAVFAC) facilities engineering center (FEC) can provide streamlined, single-point contracting service. The center also has a good working relationship with local husbanding agents, as well as access to contingency construction capabilities (CONCAP) contract assets.

- Establish clear lines of contracting authority to prevent duplication of effort and ensure adherence to contracting regulations. When required, the JFC or JTF commander should request augmentation of contracting support via contingency contracting officers for assignment to the JTF staff and supporting commands. Contingency contracting officers provide the commander the flexibility of deployment throughout the joint operations area (JOA).

- Coordinate requests for funding augmentation for contracted equipment, material, and services via the appropriate Service component chain of command. Funding for contracted services is typically a Service component responsibility unless otherwise specified in the COCOM's operation order (OPORD).

7.9 SECURITY AND FORCE PROTECTION

The HN may need to provide security at LZs. Warning handbills may not be sufficient to warn uncontrolled crowds of the dangers of helicopter rotors, etc. The preferred location for LZs and temporary runways is within vehicle range but beyond easy walking range of devastated areas for security and crowd control purposes.

- Consider safety when delivering relief supplies to crowded areas or LZs; it may be necessary to deliver only to places where crowds are controlled.

See Section 8.3.11 for a discussion on possible NCIS support.

- Determine if there is a necessity to arm personnel in the event the HN cannot provide safe places for supply delivery. Consider the local perception of the use of armed personnel. Use alternate, less convenient delivery locations to minimize crowd control issues if required.

- Conduct regular threat assessments and utilize a well-defined force protection C2 structure/system when carrying out relief supply functions.

- Review procedures for requesting supplemental ROE or rules for the use of force (RUOF) and the use of nonlethal weapons.

See the mission EXORD and CJCSI 3121.01B for details.

- Be aware that long-range acoustic devices (LRADs) have been used effectively for force protection in other types of operations and could be useful in crowd control, SAR, and information operations.

- Consider the potential risks associated with bringing personnel aboard for medical treatment or billeting (e.g., spread of contagious disease, intelligence gathering, etc.) and take appropriate measures.

- Consider minimizing the group of personnel sent ashore to reduce personnel exposure to risk. This decision could have morale implications, as people tend to want to contribute in emergencies.

- Consider the requirement for fleet antiterrorism security team (FAST) platoons and/or mobile security squadrons (MSSs), which are normally assigned by the numbered fleet commander to provide force protection for military staff command assets.

JP 3-57 contains examples of force protection and security MOEs. NTTP 5-03.5 discusses force protection and other RM processes and tools.

7.10 SPECIFIC LOGISTICS SUPPORT ASSETS AND ISSUES

7.10.1 Harbor and Marine Channel Clearance

Harbor and marine channel clearance operations may involve clearance or salvage of ships, aircraft, piers, marine railway, bridges, or other damaged structures blocking a harbor and/or marine shipping channel. Depending upon the magnitude of the disaster and other factors, a single ship or item could block a strategic access point, or hundreds of wrecks and other marine debris could affect a substantial geographic area.

Units tasked in these operations could include Navy salvage assets, such as mobile diving and salvage units, salvage ships (i.e., T-ARSs and T-ATFs), U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage, and associated commercial salvage contractors. Prior to performing clearance or salvage operations, hydrographic survey operations may be required in the area of operations. Hydrographic surveys provide the commander with a detailed understanding and visualization of the underwater area of concern and provide the salvor with information about the bathymetry, bottom type, position, size, and disposition of the underwater obstruction.

7.10.2 Military Sealift Command

- Consider deep draft requirements in channel survey and clearance prioritization and vendor and fuel support arrangements. Barges are required to support operations from anchorage.

- Do not assume that the maritime prepositioning ships squadron (MPSRON) is fully authorized because it is on-scene. These ships require an additional Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) authorization in order to utilize their assets. If necessary, check with higher headquarters on the status of this second authorization.

- Determine the need for explosive safety quantity distance (ESQD) event waivers that can cause delays for MPSRON ships. Check with the Atlantic or Pacific Fleet explosive safety officer for the status of these waivers.

- Determine where potable water demand exceeds damaged infrastructure capacity. This can be a critical factor in the early aftermath of a disaster. Maritime prepositioning ships squadron ships have the capability to purify water and transfer it ashore from anchorage.

- Determine the need for dock space to configure relief supply offloads. Maritime prepositioning ships squadron ships are not configured for selective offload. With the exception of bulk fuel or water provision, they require a port with dock space to reconfigure. Combat logistics force (CLF) ships are capable of selective offload; they require approximately 24 hours notice to reconfigure material in the hold.

- Embark an air detachment to assist CLF ships in supporting other ships. Alternatively, nonorganic air assets or alongside replenishment is required, diverting air and surface assets from the relief effort. However, not all CLF ships are assigned organic air detachments. Stores and cargo ships such as T-AOEs, T-AFSs, and T-AKEs will likely have an air detachment, while oilers and ammunition ships such as T-AOs and T-AEs will not. Air detachments significantly increase DR logistics throughput and flexibility.

- Consider the use of salvage ships (currently in the process of being transferred to the Military Sealift Command (MSC)), such as T-ARSs and T-ATFs, to conduct surveys, provide diving services, conduct oil pollution abatement, and clear key waterways.

- Consider the lack of a robust communications capability in plans for MSC vessels and especially current hospital ships. Hospital ships generally are not used as first responders due to the long lead time required to arrive on-scene. They have routinely been used in the later phases of major DR efforts, focusing more on public and environmental health support than trauma care, and serving as a military/civilian agency C2 platform.

7.10.3 Amphibious Ships and Other Surface Vessels

Well-deck ships and associated landing craft, such as landing craft, utility (LCUs), and landing craft, air cushion (LCACs), also provide significant heavy lift capability from the sea base. Landing craft, air cushion, and LCUs can deliver up to 72 and 180 tons of DR supplies respectively. Landing craft, air cushion, equipped with a personnel transport module (PTM) can transport 180 personnel as opposed to 23. Additionally, lighter, amphibious resupply, cargo (LARC); landing craft, mechanized (LCM); and amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs) have played a vital part in SAR and seaborne support in DR operations. Large-deck vessels can serve as receiving, assembly, and staging areas to break bulk shipments of DR supplies and build them into deliverable (e.g., palletized) sets. Large-deck vessels can also host aviation mine countermeasures (MCM) assets, anchoring in the immediate vicinity of survey areas to maximize on-station time.

- Consider personnel transport module suitability for extended transits when high heat and humidity conditions are expected because of limited air conditioning capacity. Landing crafts, utility, and LCMs may be most suitable under these conditions.

- Leverage speed and personnel and cargo carrying capabilities of the various landing craft through carefully planning sea echelon assignments.

- Determine requirements for organic fendering capability based on port service availability. Fenders or camels are required for amphibious transport dock (LPD) ballasting operations pier-side due to the ship's configuration (e.g., catwalks and other obstructions that may be damaged or cause damage).

- Deploy landing craft with a repair parts kit if possible, particularly if the craft will be operating away from assigned ships for extended periods.

- Coordinate amphibious ship on-loads with the ship's combat cargo officer at the earliest opportunity. Use the integrated computerized deployment system (ICODES) software to assist in this process.

- Consider trade-offs with naval lighterage on-loads. Naval lighterage on-load impacts a ship's capabilities, precluding landing craft launch and recovery and vehicle and cargo off-load; therefore, it should be the last item brought aboard.

- Reflect standard cargo restrictions, such as weight and height restrictions for each aircraft type, in pallet sizing.

Combat rubber-raiding craft (CRRC), requiring only two to three feet of water to operate, have been used effectively for SAR, survey, and delivery of supplies in flooded areas. An LPD may serve as a host platform, utilizing its internal motor gas system to fuel these craft.

Large capacity high-speed vessels (HSVs), such as the Navy's experimental HSV, those of foreign navies, and commercial vessels can transport large numbers of people and large amounts of material quickly when operating in an austere environment. While normal troop carrying capacity is 250, the Navy's HSV can transport up to 500 personnel if reconfigured with LCAC PTMs, or by driving school buses up the vehicle ramp for passengers to ride in. If passenger

module or buses are not available, passengers can be accommodated in the vehicle deck without seating.

High-speed vessels operate at a high operational tempo for in-theater lift and can be managed best under a 72-hour tasking order process. Shallow draft and speed of response also make HSVs an effective operating platform for hydrographic survey teams. High-speed vessels can support helicopter operations, and they have C2 facilities suitable to support an embarked squadron or company-sized ground force. The maneuverability of an HSV enables it to moor without tugs, and its vehicle ramp enables vehicles to be driven on and off to and from a pier. The high speed of an HSV makes it an effective in-theater lift platform.

- Consider using HSVs for initial survey and delivery of material to damaged or unimproved ports. An HSV can be quickly reconfigured to meet additional requirements, including personnel evacuation. Installation of refrigerated container express (CONEX) boxes enables it to carry frozen and chill foods while retaining the ability to carry a large volume of dry stores.

Mine countermeasures ships have been employed effectively in waterway surveys. Effective sonar ranges are significantly higher than for mine detection due to the size of the obstructions. This allows higher search speeds (e.g., five or six knots) and the ability to cover large areas relatively quickly. Increased sonar search width and the ability to maintain around the clock survey operations are advantages over MCM helicopters.

- Use aviation assets for initial visual searches.

- Top off fuel and provisions before beginning survey operations to maximize time on-station and compensate for storage limitations.

7.10.4 Rotary Wing Aircraft

Extensive dedicated helicopter support will likely be required. Schedulers must constantly work to maximize use of these assets and keep things moving.

- Consider maximizing deck landing spots for rotary wing operations. This may entail additional certifications (e.g., for aircraft elevators to be used as landing spots).

- Anticipate requirements for Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) Program waivers and additional manning to maximize flight operations.

- Maximize the capacity for material and personnel transfer, while minimizing the risk of collateral damage through the removal of selected mission equipment (e.g., sonobuoy launchers, magnetic anomaly detector, etc.).

- Consider that tasking for distinguished visitors (DVs) and media transport may increase dramatically as the operation progresses, particularly for large-scale relief operations. Often an additional aircraft will need to be maintained in backup status, further reducing the availability of assets for FHA/DR supply delivery.

- Train helicopter crews that normally do not operate in unprepared LZs in handling these sites.

- Be aware that if foreign aircraft (military or civilian) are participating in the operation, customs and border protection waivers may be required.

7.10.5 Fixed Wing Aircraft

Coordinate with the HN and military engineers (e.g., Seabees) on the locations of runways or temporary runways and establish the scheduled theater airlift route (STAR) at the beginning of operations. This will facilitate planning for equipment and personnel transfers. Fixed wing flight operations (e.g., for carrier on-board delivery or maintaining proficiency) may affect the availability and scheduling of rotary wing assets and the staging of supplies.

- Consider flying selected aircraft and crews off to maintain some level of proficiency ashore, and develop a plan to quickly regain full operational readiness status. Proficiency in tactical aircraft night operations and basic fighter maneuvering may suffer in extended operations. Staging aircraft off-ship can also assist in maximizing available deck space.

- Consider that the use of Navy organic airlift (Navy-unique fleet essential aircraft (NUFEA)), as opposed to airlift assigned/coordinated by the JFACC or the JFC's joint movement center (JMC), must be planned and coordinated by the senior logistician and the logistics task force commander.

7.10.6 Disaster Relief Supplies

- Ask for deployment of survival packs to the area immediately. These should include:

  1. Empty water containers (collapsible ten-gallon size, preferably)

  2. Blankets (if low temperatures are expected)

  3. Lumber and plastic sheeting (for shelters and palletizing supplies)

  4. Meals, ready to eat (MREs) or other food

  5. Water bladders or potable water pillow tanks (PWPTs)

  6. Reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPUs), pumps (for removal of contaminated well water)

  7. Other needed items based on assessments from a review of intelligence, media reports, etc.

Many of these items may not be required in large quantities if another agency (e.g., HN or NGOs) is providing them for sustainment of the operation (i.e., it may only be necessary to obtain quantities sufficient to support the first responders). Replenish these supplies and add additional types of supplies as needs are defined.

- Be prepared to purchase these supplies in the region if they cannot otherwise be delivered in time. Combatant command funds may be available for this purpose, and it may be possible to get a line of credit or permission to use operating target (OPTAR) funds until appropriate funding is received.

- Use bottled water as a stopgap until a potable water production, storage, and distribution system is restored, and capacity is sufficient to meet local needs. Water is the most critical of FHA/DR supplies. It is more essential to survival than food or anything else. Accordingly, imaginative or innovative efforts may be required to distribute it to those in need. See Section A.4 for examples.

- Send an advance team, if possible, to work with the local FISC contracting office (formerly Navy regional contracting center (NRCC)) and/or the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to assist in filling requirements expeditiously.

- Prioritize delivery based on HN desires and situational awareness. These initial deliveries may mean the difference between life and death for many victims of the disaster.

- Identify requirements for ROWPU as early as possible. These units and water bladders may require heavy lift resources.

7.10.7 Urban Search and Rescue

Door-to-door SAR teams require material support that may include the following items:

1. Water and food (preferably MREs)

2. Portable pumps

3. Generators and compressors with air and water hoses

4. Personal protective equipment like disposable coveralls, dust masks, respirators, chemical goggles and gloves, waders, and clothing disinfectant

5. Chain saws, hand saws, hammers, sledge hammers, axes, pry bars, camel backs, portable lights, batteries, and spray paint

6. Scrub brushes, buckets, tarps or tenting material, and sleeping gear.

7.10.8 Fuel

The lack of existing contracts, credit arrangements, or availability may make it difficult to buy fuel in some locations. Manage fuel to avoid the need to refuel in the HN until adequate fuel supplies and payment processes are established.

- Position helicopter refueling assets to facilitate delivery to a wide area, and support safety considerations in the event of a mechanical failure. It may be advisable to request stationing of some helicopter capable platforms within territorial waters to support helicopter operations/safety of flight. Due to the flexible nature of FHA/DR operations, refueling support may require frequent adjustment.

- Consider the requirement for motor gasoline or other fuels (e.g., diesel) that may be required for fueling CRRCs and equipment ashore, such as tractors used in disaster site clearance and debris removal. Special storage and handling requirements may be required. Units equipped to carry motor gasoline (MOGAS) (e.g., LPD and, to a lesser extent, landing ship, dock (LSD)) should be filled to capacity.

- Determine and provide clear authority and procedures for transfer to other agencies that will likely also need MOGAS or diesel fuel.

7.10.9 Communications Support

The communications infrastructure will likely be inadequate in the aftermath of the disaster. Purchase Iridium satellite telephones and portable radios in sufficient quantity based on the size and scope of the operation and other telecommunications assets available. In the event the communications infrastructure is intact and adequate, purchase cellular telephones and wireless laptop computers that operate on the local system.

- Provide digital cameras for flight crew use in taking pictures for transmission to the ship and/or headquarters. These pictures help keep the chain of command and crew/staff informed. Digital camera cellular telephones, with e-mail or text messaging capability, are particularly well suited to this.

- Purchase universal serial bus (USB) flash drives (thumb drives) to facilitate file transfer and sharing. Blank compact disks may also be useful if data is on a laptop computer that has a compact disk read-write (CDRW) drive.

- Consider purchasing a few non-NMCI computers for use in the event access to the NMCI wide-area network (WAN) is lost or use of non-NMCI software applications is required.

- Be prepared to purchase or develop a workaround if the streaming video capability is not available. Embedded media will desire streaming video capability and may lack the required assets. If directed to provide this support, request this equipment (i.e., a flyaway kit, if available) early.

7.10.10 Beach Detachment Support

Ensure sufficient support for the beach DET (e.g., lodging, meals, electric power, fuel, radios, personal protective equipment, and supplies, etc.). Depending on the size of the group being sent ashore via helicopter, additional cranial helmets, life vests (float coats), and immunization stocks may be required. The beach DET also should have mobile communications (i.e., cellular/satellite telephone or radio) and radio frequency identification (RFID) capability, such as the inventory tagging and interrogation devices provided in early entry deployable support kits (EEDSKs).

7.10.11 Technical or Maintenance Support

Technical or maintenance support may be required for nonorganic assets (e.g., CRRCs, tractors, etc.).

7.10.12 Animal Control

If pets are being evacuated, arrangements may be required with the Army or another agency for veterinary care and possible kenneling. An evacuation package should include material for the care and transport of animals, such as canned food, portable kennels, leashes, flea and tick control detergent, and materials to support kenneling. See Section A.4 for additional information.

See NWP 3-62, currently in final draft, for a more detailed discussion on sea-based logistics considerations.

CHAPTER 8

Personnel

8.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

8.1.1 Augmentee Assignment and Tracking

- Establish a means to determine if un-needed forces are en route and arrange to return or divert them. Forces are often sent in anticipation of a need, or they are no longer needed due to changing conditions, and the number of personnel in the area may exceed the capacity to effectively employ them.

- Develop a means to identify the skills provided by augmentees and track their location so that they may be moved where needed most. Tracking of individual augmentees can be difficult once they arrive in the operating area and are moved from one location to another.

8.1.2 Passports

- Determine requirements and obtain no-fee, government passports for key personnel, if necessary, and develop alternatives (e.g., use of official orders and government identification card) if time constraints prevent this. Even during disasters, some countries may insist upon passports for entry.

8.1.3 Training and Familiarization

Foreign humanitarian assistance/disaster relief is not a primary or frequently executed military mission. Most naval forces receive little training in this area. Assess own force training and expertise in the requirements of this nontraditional activity (e.g., helicopter unprepared for confined area training, urban SAR, etc.). Expeditionary strike groups (ESGs) do receive FHA/DR training, which may be leveraged in preparing other elements of the force.

- Conduct remedial training using experienced personnel to mitigate risk associated with a nontraditional mission.

- Key planners and watch standers should be briefed on missions, capabilities, and limitations of medical and other staff forces available for tasking or assignment in order to optimize use of these assets. Similarly, planners may not be aware of organic assets that may be used, such as an EOD DET's skills and its portable radio equipment.

8.2 LIAISON OFFICERS AND DETACHMENTS

8.2.1   Liaison Officers

- Determine the major centers or participants in the operation and recognize the value of exchanging LNOs, as available. For a large-scale operation, the following are recommended LNO assignments:

  1. Two or three officers to one or more host nation/UN/NGO coordination teams. The nature of the operation should determine preferred background for these individuals (e.g., a medical planner might be appropriate in a medically intensive FHA/DR effort).

  2. Exchange one officer between the carrier strike group (CSG) and ESG, especially if the two staffs have not had an opportunity to work together previously.

  3. Exchange one officer with select foreign navies, particularly if the other military is in a lead role and the U.S. is supporting it in that effort.

  4. Exchange one officer with higher headquarters (e.g., JTF headquarters), even if connectivity and coordination via VTC and other means are effective.

  5. One officer at the JFACC naval and amphibious liaison element (NALE).

  6. One officer at the U.S. embassy, if needed, to keep the ambassador informed and coordinate with the country team.

See JP 3-07.6 and NTTP 5-02 for a comprehensive discussion on LNO and sending/receiving unit responsibilities and considerations.

8.2.2   Detachments

Beach DETs may be established for a variety of purposes, such as providing a manpower pool to prepare or improve LZs, supervising flight operations and other logistics matters, and coordinating activities with the HN and other agencies.

- Establish a naval support element or naval beach group (BEACHGRU) detachment at the beach-landing site (BLS) to coordinate the offload of relief supplies and assets and, augmented by the manpower pool aboard the ships, provide skilled and unskilled labor. A BEACHGRU DET is self-sustaining and provides its own force protection.

- Assign a PAO if possible to the detachment to facilitate meeting a requirement for a PAO to accompany media on Navy helicopters.

- Assign a supply corps officer, if possible, to the detachment to facilitate material tracking and movement, as well as assist in contracting matters.

8.3 SPECIFIC SKILLS

8.3.1   Linguists

Linguists provide a critical language and cultural awareness capability, particularly for liaison teams operating ashore. Request the deployment of linguists as early as possible, if applicable.

- Collocate linguists where possible, to be available to liaison officers and DETs.

- Seek assistance from local first responders or other participants from the region who may be able to help with dialects, particularly in remote areas.

- Draw on the language skills and familiarity with the local area of personnel attached to the naval force regardless of their normal jobs. Poll subordinate commands to determine the availability of personnel with appropriate skills and background early in the planning process.

8.3.2 Subject Matter Experts

Participants from recent Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), COCOM, or Service-sponsored FHA/DR exercises are valuable sources of information, and they may facilitate coordination through experience and personal contacts.

- Request assignment and deployment of individuals with experience relevant to the situation. Some personnel offered (or pushed forward) as SMEs, in a well-intended effort to help, may lack current or relevant experience. Ask to review SME credentials (e.g., biography or resume) to avoid this situation.

8.3.3 Engineers

Construction battalion personnel (Seabees) can assist with infrastructure inspection, damage assessment, and repairs to facilities and utility systems. Seabees and ship's force/embarked Marine Corps engineers have been called upon in previous DR operations to repair generators ashore, while local public utilities personnel worked to restore electrical grids. It may be helpful to embark an amphibious construction battalion engineer/operational planner to assist in coordination of engineering projects listed below.

- Assess and repair runways, airfields, and supply routes, or develop expeditionary airfields to facilitate logistics mobility. Seabees can also operate and maintain public utility systems.

- Perform underwater and hydrographic inspections, repair port and pier facilities and utilities, and install offshore petroleum discharge systems with an underwater construction team (UCT).

- Provide off-load support to maritime prepositioning ships (MPSs), in stream or pier side, with their organic lighterage equipment.

- Establish expeditionary shore infrastructure (e.g., tent camps) with an amphibious construction battalion (ACB).

- Provide contingency and real estate contracting services as well as environmental service support with Navy civil engineering corps (CEC) officers.

- Provide temporary power generation equipment with mobile utilities support equipment (MUSE) units.

See JP 3-34 for additional discussion on engineer support.

8.3.4 Cargo Handlers

A Navy Reserve cargo handling and port group (CHAPGRU) element from the naval expeditionary logistics support force (NAVELSF) of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) can be activated to perform cargo handling operations to include beach DETs, logistics airheads, and port support. Minimally manned craft, such as an HSV, involved in cargo transport require augmentation of cargo handling personnel to reach their maximum throughput.

- Consider placing augmentees on the ships or ashore at forward logistic and disaster sites.

8.3.5 Air Traffic Controllers

The military will likely need to provide air traffic controllers at the airport(s) for some time. This is a significant safety issue in the initial stages and a critical niche that must be transferred to the HN or another appropriate agency as military support for the operation ends.

- Consider the use of tactical air control squadrons (TACRONs), which can rapidly deploy a general purpose air control detachment, including air traffic controllers, operational specialists, and the necessary equipment to conduct temporary airfield, LZ, and forward operating base air traffic control. The U.S. Air Force also has such assets and may be tasked to perform the mission.

- Consider that military air traffic control support will likely be conducted in a joint Service/inter-agency effort, and coordination with the HN authorities is essential.

8.3.6 Distinguished Visitor and Media Liaison

Large numbers of media personnel can be expected in larger scale DR operations, and schedulers will need to plan for transport of large quantities of bulky equipment and other needs.

- Assign a project officer and escort, if appropriate, to coordinate scheduling and transportation for a DV or group of DVs to ensure that details are covered.

- Consider PAO staff augmentation. For larger operations, a PAO cell or combined information bureau (CIB) may be established.

- Dedicate personnel to primary duty as members of a media liaison team if possible. This can help ensure that requirements are met effectively and efficiently. The number of personnel assigned to such duties depends on the size and scope of the operation and the number of Navy units participating.

- Be prepared to adjust support for the media to meet the demand. Media interest will vary with the scope, location, and type of disaster.

- Clearly articulate available capabilities and capacity to support the media to avoid creating unrealistic expectations.

8.3.7 Analysts

Analysts can help determine measures of performance and MOEs and take the burden off operational watch standers in compiling, reporting, and briefing this data and other reports requested by higher headquarters. Carrier and ESGs have deployed with an embarked analyst

from the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) in the past. In such operations, research analysts, with their associated specialized software and reach-back capabilities, can be of great assistance in assessing performance and forecasting requirements.

- Consider requesting specialists, such as those from CNA who have deployed in previous DR operations.

8.3.8 Public Health

The Navy Environmental Health Center's (NEHC) regional Navy environmental and preventive medicine units (NEPMUs) have extensive expertise in public health and can assist in assessment. In addition to environmental surveys, preventive medical units can assist in the establishment of camps. See Chapter 9 for a discussion on the assessment of the health situation.

8.3.9 Mass Fatality/Mortuary Assistance

In cases where the number of fatalities overwhelms the HN and other participants, U.S. military mortuary assistance may be requested. Forward such requirements for identification and processing of remains to higher headquarters as soon as possible in order to assist the COCOM in submitting a timely request for forces.

8.3.10 Religious Ministry

Religious ministry teams (RMTs), consisting of at least one chaplain and one religious program specialist, provide for the free exercise of religion, impart ethical guidance, advise commanders on religious issues affecting military operations, and provide religious ministry to and promote the spiritual, physical, and emotional well-being of DOD personnel, their families, and other authorized personnel.

As appropriate, RMTs coordinate with higher and lower echelon RMTs and with other Service, Reserve, and National Guard chaplains in order to provide the best possible specific faith coverage and specialized chaplain skills. **While chaplains may participate in command authorized humanitarian projects related to FHA/DR projects, it is highly inadvisable for commanders to authorize chaplains to provide spiritual care to locals due to the perception of proselytizing, the area communities' image of the command, specific religious and cultural norms, and the availability of local clergy.**

Religious ministry teams may assist the commander in briefing military relief teams prior to missions concerning stress related to constant exposure of working in exigent circumstances and witnessing the impact of human suffering. Working in proximity to relief workers, RMTs are able to respond immediately to signs of stress, spiritual anxiety, and fatigue.

After relief missions, RMTs may facilitate critical incident stress defusing or other forms of stress management to minimize possible impact of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) upon relief workers. Commanders may also direct chaplains to serve as their representatives to foreign religious leaders and NGOs in order to assist in identifying disaster relief projects.

See SECNAVINST 1730.7C and OPNAVINST 1730.1D for policy guidance for religious ministry and NWP 1-05, JP 1-05, and JP 3-07.6 for doctrinal guidance.

8.3.11 Law Enforcement and Criminal Investigation

As the federal law enforcement agency for the Department of the Navy (DON), NCIS maintains relationships with law enforcement agencies in many countries that predate any disaster, and its personnel can enter a DR situation as a known entity. Aircraft carriers generally have an NCIS agent embarked, and large amphibious ships, regional commands, and U.S. embassies may have one.

- Consider requesting NCIS augmentation from NCIS headquarters to:

  - Advise the commander.

  - Liaise at emergency operations centers (EOCs), working with local police on force protection-related issues and providing force protection.

  - Interact with port officials on ship security and conduct port or airfield assessments, etc.

8.3.12 Other Augmentees

Personnel augmentation may also be required to meet increased demands for skills that are available in the unit. This is particularly the case when forward elements must be established or when the tempo or scope of operations exceeds established manning requirements. In addition to those areas addressed above, it may be necessary to augment the command with additional staff (e.g., communications officers, information technology specialists, medical planners, etc.) or, for ships that are not manned to support flight operations around the clock, such as amphibious assault ships (LHAs and LHDs), with tactical air control center and flight deck personnel.

- Redistribute available manpower to perform certain functions (e.g., increase the number of food service attendants if the ship will be feeding large numbers of additional people).

- Identify and publish available skill sets in the force in order for joint commanders to make full use of available assets. This includes individual skills, qualifications, and areas of knowledge beyond those associated with shipboard or expeditionary shore command occupational specialties (e.g., bus or truck driver, foreign languages, familiarity with local area, etc.).

CHAPTER 9

Health Service Support

9.1 SCOPE OF ASSISTANCE

The scope of health service support (HSS) will vary with the type and scale of the emergency, as well as the level of national or regional development. Generally, HSS will entail initial emergent care, basic primary care, and preventive medicine support. Dental support and minor surgery may also be provided as a gesture of goodwill. A clear focus must remain on transition to other medical support organizations (e.g., HN or NGOs) from the outset, particularly if taking a lead role during the initial stages of the response.

- Alleviate deteriorating health conditions and avert epidemics.

- Consider that HSS provides a strong, credible statement of U.S. humanitarian interests.

- Focus support in an interagency approach to restore essential health services in collaboration with the HN and/or international organizations.

9.2 HEALTH SITUATION ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATE

Required HSS capabilities in FHA/DR emergencies can vary widely. Requirements depend on population health issues and the impact on indigenous health service capabilities. Figure 9-1 provides a generic matrix that illustrates how USAID's OFDA and many NGOs estimate HSS requirements. Because there are so many variables that affect the need for HSS, commanders should conduct an analysis of the health situation as soon as possible, including medical representation on advance parties and early shore detachments. The purpose of the health situation estimate is twofold, force health protection (i.e., manage force health risk) and HSS mission requirements determination (i.e., what HSS assets are needed). The list below provides several actions that commanders need to take in order to accomplish a thorough health estimate.

- Identify the level of development of the health care infrastructure.

- Identify the health status of the population.

- Identify critical health risk factors in the environment, in particular short-term primary and emergent care.

- Understand the magnitude of the disaster's impact and potential health consequences for military forces and the population.

- Determine the level of involvement of the other organizations.

- Identify MEDEVAC sites to include temporary or undamaged health infrastructure in the local area and those areas not damaged by the disaster.

Likely Effects	Earthquakes	High Winds w/o Flooding	Hurricanes /Floods	Flash Floods/ Tsunami
Deaths	Varies	Few	Few	Many
Severe Injuries	Many	Moderate	Few	Few
Risk of Communicable Disease Outbreaks	Small	Small	Varies	High
Food Scarcity	Rare	Rare	Varies	Varies
Population Displacements	Rare	Rare	Common	Varies
(Adapted from Pan American Health Organization, Emergency Health Management After Natural Disaster. Office of Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Relief Coordination: Scientific Publication No. 47, Washington, D.C., Pan American Health Organization, 1981).				

Figure 9-1. Public Health Effects by Type of Disaster

- Conduct an up-front analysis of multiple sources of intelligence or information, including HUMINT gathered by trained medical personnel on scene.

- Evaluate the safety and vulnerability of local food and water sources and local medical capabilities.

- Perform an epidemiological risk assessment and a vector-pest risk assessment.

- Determine the adequacy of hygiene in local billeting and public facilities.

- Perform an environmental risk assessment (coordinated with any environmental surveys conducted by civil engineers).

Medical, environmental, disease intelligence, and countermeasures information on compact disks may be obtained through regional NEPMUs.

9.3 HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT MISSION REQUIREMENTS

The highest priority health services include the most appropriate and effective interventions to reduce morbidity and mortality (e.g., providing clean drinking water, vaccinations, malaria prophylaxis, wound cleaning, antibiotics, counseling, public health information, etc.), as determined by the health situation analysis. The same groups that are most vulnerable in normal times are usually at most risk during emergencies and disasters. Common FHA/DR health concerns include people with the following:

- Preexisting illness, serious chronic diseases, malnutrition, children under five years old, adolescents, pregnant or lactating women, and the elderly

- Traumatic injury, acute respiratory infections, diarrheal diseases such as cholera and dysentery, malaria, tuberculosis, human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), sexually transmitted diseases, meningitis, and psychosocial impact

The level of development in the area affects the amount of HSS needed. Developed areas require broader access to a robust capability of care. Because of a lack of public health infrastructure, and therefore public health information, less developed areas and areas with large numbers of displaced persons require broad access to more basic health services, with an additional emphasis

on preventive medicine services (e.g., control of infectious or communicable diseases) and robust evacuation capabilities. See NWP 4-02 for a discussion on capabilities (formerly known as levels) of care.

- Ensure water quality and sanitation, hygiene promotion, vector control, and secure food supplies.

- Provide health education messages on how to prevent common communicable diseases and how to access relevant services.

- Conduct vaccination/immunization campaigns to the extent practical.

- Consider the availability of female health care providers due to cultural considerations, especially in Muslim countries/cultures.

In situations where injuries are high, the elimination of on-scene health hazards along with SAR and emergent surgical services may be the highest priority. This type of support is generally short in duration due to patient survivability time and the ability to rapidly build appropriate force levels for these tasks. In addition to determining medical priorities, the commander should:

- Standardize triage procedures and treatment timelines to guide health care providers on patient assessment, prioritization, basic resuscitation, and referral.

- Standardize protocols for advanced care referral of injured patients (e.g., surgery), and make arrangements for suitable patient transportation to the referral facility.

- Standardize patient reporting and tracking.

Additional information on HSS is available on the Navy operational medical lessons learned website (https://www.mccll.usmc.mil/nomi/index.cfm).

9.4 FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

Often FHA/DR environments are contaminated and have high-risk disease vectors present. Force protection measures will include appropriate vaccination and prophylaxis treatment of forces. The enroute commander should take the necessary measures to carry out the mission. Some of the suggested measures are listed below.

- Initiate preventive medical treatments (e.g., vaccinations and malaria pills) for beach DETs and other personnel going ashore at the earliest opportunity. It takes 30 days to reach the required therapy level for malaria prophylaxis.

- Collect, monitor, and share information with other participants on the local prevalence of gastroenteritis, effectiveness of antibiotics, etc.

- Ensure that forces going ashore have access to proper personal protective equipment (e.g., insect repellents with *N,N-diethyl-meta-toluamide* (DEET) or Picaridin, permethrin spray, mosquito netting, battle dress utility uniforms, gloves, respirators, etc.).

- Take necessary precautions for personnel involved in physical labor to prevent sun exposure and heat-related illnesses or excessive exposure in cold environments.

- Ensure that proper sanitation measures (e.g., latrine construction and maintenance) and trash/medical waste disposal procedures are followed in facilities established ashore.

- Consider embarking mental health teams to prepare personnel for the conditions they will likely be exposed to and to provide counseling afterwards. Send medical teams ashore to monitor personnel for signs of illness and stress.

- Consider rotating personnel to the sea base occasionally for morale purposes (e.g., rest, hot meal, shower, recreation, etc.) if they will be ashore for extended periods.

- Consult the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) website (www.afmic.detrick.army.mil) for specific force health protection measures for the area. The numbered fleet surgeon may also provide this information on the fleet website.

9.5 DEPLOYMENT

There is a strong tendency for higher headquarters to push medical capabilities into a disaster area.

- Communicate needs and capacity to employ medical capabilities early, and update these requirements frequently to

    1. Prioritize what is sent

    2. Avoid getting more than can be employed

    3. Free lift for higher priority cargo, material, and personnel

    4. Employ medical capabilities early

    5. Set up a mechanism to remove medical capabilities as needed.

No standard FHA/DR load out currently exists. Unless specific guidance is provided by higher headquarters, units rely on their assessment of the situation to determine supplies needed.

Previous FHA/DR operations have shown the limitations of fleet medical equipment in a field environment.

- Consider the need for medical personnel to be fitted with field grade medical equipment and personnel protective equipment if health care forces will be sent ashore.

- Anticipate requests for medical supplies from other agencies operating without logistics lines fully in place, and order additional supplies as appropriate.

See sections 3.3, 7.1, and 8.1 for further discussion on the deployment of forces.

9.6 COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Medical communications capabilities and appropriate links to the command element are often overlooked or under-resourced in the deployment of health assessment teams. Ensure that an effective means (e.g., satellite telephone, e-mail, etc.) is established for communication between

these teams and the command element. Imagery from unclassified sources should be in convertible file formats to conform to bandwidth limitations.

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

APPENDIX A

Examples from Recent Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operations

The NLL database, distributed to the fleet on classified and unclassified compact disks semiannually and available at the classified NWDC website www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil (and soon at www.nwdc.navy.mil for unclassified lessons), contains operator-identified problem areas, issues, or requirements that have not been adequately addressed in material (e.g., equipment, facilities, etc.) or non-material (e.g., doctrine, training, etc.) solutions. Consult this database, and the linked joint/other Service databases, for current and historical (i.e., archived) information on how others have accomplished similar missions. Examples of fleet observations/lessons are provided below.

A.1 FACTORS AFFECTING EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES

- The following are examples of factors affecting employment of forces and aspects of HA/DR operations they may affect:

- Geography/topography (natural and manmade features, such as terrain, roads, ports, etc.) can affect how and where relief supplies can be brought ashore and distributed over land and can affect communications in mountainous regions.

- Meteorology (climate, weather, atmospheric conditions, etc.) may impact sea base location, operating tempo (OPTEMPO), flight operations, and the ability to conduct reconnaissance to assess the situation.

- Oceanography/hydrography (water depth, currents, etc.) may impact sea base location and water borne delivery of supplies. For example, in the 2005 tsunami relief effort in Southeast Asia, the characteristic heavy swells off Sumatra in early February hindered delivery of supplies.

- Culture (religious beliefs/taboos, political system, diet, language, etc.) may affect interaction with the population and other participants. For example, country of origin and color of body bags were issues in the 2005 tsunami relief effort in Southeast Asia, and pet safety was a concern for Hurricane Katrina victims. See Sections A.3 and A.4 for further discussion.

- Communications capabilities are determined by an appropriate mix of compatible military and commercial systems, which are vital to coordination of own force and cooperative efforts with other participants.

- Host nation restrictions may affect the location of the sea base, routes to shore, and locations where relief supplies may be landed, or otherwise impede delivery of aid (e.g., in a recent foreign HA/DR effort, a HN required that aircraft carriers remain outside territorial waters

while conducting fixed wing flight operations, and in a domestic relief effort, foreign military helicopters were required to reprocess through U.S. Customs every time their transit originated aboard a foreign vessel).

A.2 COMMAND AND CONTROL COORDINATION

- During Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, establishment of a distant JTF organization, distant JFACC (called CFACC, or combined force air component commander, to reflect the multinational nature of the operation), and multiple headquarters (one for each country) presented a complex management structure and complicated C2 for forward forces executing the HA/DR mission. These functions could have been performed more efficiently from the sea base.

   - The capabilities inherent in a strike group make it a JTF enabler. This capacity could have been used better had the JTF been established in the sea base until the infrastructure ashore was ready to accept the function.

- An example of the natural tension between those on scene and at a distant higher headquarters was reflected in a naval commander's refusal to relinquish TACON of helicopters to the CFAAC. As the commander on scene, the naval commander understood that control from a distant headquarters in Hawaii would not allow the necessary responsiveness.

- Similarly, higher headquarters and the naval commander differed on how to deal with NGOs and HNs. The commander on the scene could not take the more collegial approach with NGOs that higher headquarters desired; and he was in the better position to know what was acceptable to the HN.

   - Nongovernmental organizations desired their own dedicated flights and imagery in the initial assessment surveys, which would have diverted helicopters used for delivery of aid to conduct redundant surveys. The naval commander had to develop a workable solution in which both needs could be met. Essentially, his decision was to establish a process in which the lead agency (i.e., host nation military), lift providers (e.g., U.S. Navy), and those agencies desiring helicopter assets (e.g., NGOs) came together every evening to determine the next day's requirements and priorities. The NGOs were not satisfied since their desires were not fully met, and some objected to the HN military lead for a variety of reasons (e.g., NGO charter restrictions or organizational bias/preferences), but they had to accept the established process if they wanted access to military lift.

- Initial imagery from MPA AIP assets was transmitted to the carrier strike group (CSG) and ESG via SIPRNET. When the MPA assets were shifted to JFACC control, imagery was placed on a NIPR website in order to facilitate distribution to the HN, UN, and NGOs. This created problems for afloat users due to bandwidth limitations, severely degrading their ability to get imagery. Transmission via multiple paths, as appropriate considering security classification, would have met the needs of both groups.

- The establishment of a coordination team by a naval commander to act as a clearinghouse for information available to the HN, UN, and NGOs not only assisted in information sharing and reducing redundant requests for military support, but helped to overcome collaboration difficulties posed by differences in hardware, software, and bandwidth capabilities between military and civilian participants.

- Host nation sensitivities that foreign militaries would be seen by the population as invading and occupying forces were reflected in prohibitions on fixed wing, tactical aircraft flights, impacting operations and readiness.

- In the Hurricane Katrina/Rita relief efforts on the U.S. Gulf Coast in August and September 2005, there was little appreciation at the higher civilian and JTF headquarters levels regarding the capability to access land and influence the situation in the littoral from the sea base, as well as to contributions made by sea-based forces. Well-placed LNOs and SMEs are valuable information conduits to assist in creating awareness of the advantages of such capabilities and contributions from the sea base.

    - Many land routes were disrupted by the hurricanes, while sea lines of communication allowed unimpeded access to population centers.

A.3 CULTURAL AWARENESS

- Numerous unexpected culture-related issues are likely to arise in a HA/DR operation. Past examples have included color of human remains pouches (body bags) and food product country of origin. Some countries would not accept the standard issue olive or black pouches, preferring white or clear, and some would not accept rice grown in a certain country. Country team, or other area expert involvement, can help minimize such difficulties.

- Some terms commonly used in military operations may have connotations that can offend HN sensitivities or individuals in international organizations and NGOs who distrust civil-military or military organizations. Examine the intended employment of the organization or forces and potential negative implications of terms. Examples include:

    - "Joint task force" is a single nation warfighting organization. Similarly, "coalition" has a warfighting connotation and "civil-military operations center" may carry negative connotations for some participants in this type of operation. Consider "combined support force" and "combined coordination center."

    - "Disengagement" implies withdrawal of assistance, while "transition" implies a hand off to another agency or the HN.

    - "Special operations" may arouse suspicions of an ulterior motive. Introduction of special forces should be coordinated with the country team and HN and accompanied by appropriate communications (PA).

A.4 LOGISTICS

- In one of the most complex relief operations ever attempted, the tsunami relief operation in Southeast Asia from late December 2004 through early 2005 (Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE), naval forces were delivering critical, life sustaining supplies five days after the earthquake. U.S. military assistance was only needed for the first six weeks. Forces that arrived after three weeks were largely irrelevant or excess, as HA/DR operations developed rapidly and civilian agencies ramped up to meet the requirements.

- Shipboard personnel were proactive and resourceful in delivery and distribution of essential supplies such as water. In at least two cases, they designed and constructed a manifold to quickly

fill water bottles. In another, they contacted a commercial source for water bladders, explained the dire need, and received the material free of charge.

- During the Hurricane Katrina relief effort, some people would not evacuate the disaster area without their pets. Promising to evacuate pets to a kennel facilitated human evacuation efforts. A kennel was built ashore, using materials found at a local Navy facility.

A.5 STATISTICAL DATA/MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

- The following are examples of statistics reported in previous HA/DR operations: numbers of air and boat sorties, people evacuated, pets evacuated, rescues conducted, people treated for medical conditions, cases of specified diseases, repairs to infrastructure, obstacles cleared, meals served, berths available, passenger transfers, personnel ashore, pounds of food and water delivered, gallons of fuel delivered, etc.

- Some of these measures indicate trends in level of effort, task performance, or transition progress and may be useful analytical tools in determining success in overall mission performance (e.g., decrease in mortality or morbidity rates, percentage of tasks transferred to another agency, etc.).

- Measures of effectiveness selected should be related to mission objectives (e.g., save lives and mitigate suffering) and the desired end state (e.g., stable conditions in which other agencies can sustain recovery efforts without U.S. military support).

APPENDIX B

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Tasks

B.1 JOINT/NAVY MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK LIST (GENERIC)

The list below contains the joint operational (OP) and Navy tactical tasks (NTAs) that may be applicable to HA/DR operations. The appropriate Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and Navy Tactical Task List (NTTL) tasks (OP, NTA, etc.) can be used to develop a joint/Navy mission-essential task list (J/NMETL) to identify mission requirements, assist in planning, training, and assessment, as well as in readiness reporting, as these missions are added into the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) and other appropriate readiness reporting systems. Task definitions and references used to transform the list of tasks into a J/NMETL (e.g., sample conditions and standards under and to which the tasks are performed) are contained in the UJTL, CJCSM 3500.04 (series) and the Universal Naval Task List, OPNAVINST 3500.38 (series), as well as the Navy Training Information Management System (NTIMS).

This list contains tasks that might be contained in the HA/DR commander's J/NMETL, but also includes tasks accomplished by others at the same command level or by subordinate elements of the force, and command-linked tasks (i.e., required events or actions that are accomplished outside the HA/DR commander's chain of command). Supporting and command-linked tasks would be included in a supporting commander's mission-essential task list (METL).

OP 5.5 Establish, Organize, and Operate a Joint Force Headquarters

OP 5.7 Coordinate and Integrate Joint/Multinational and Interagency Support

NTA 1.1.2.2 Move Embarked Forces

NTA 1.1.2.3 Move Units

NTA 1.1.2.3.1 Sail ship from Port, Anchorage, or Moorage

NTA 1.1.2.3.3 Conduct Flight Operations

NTA1.1.2.3.3.1 Conduct Aviation Qualifications

NTA 1.1.2.3.6 Control Landing Craft

NTA 1.2.1.2 Conduct Air Space Management and Control

NTA 1.2.1.5 Determine Command Relationships for the Force

NTA 1.2.5 Conduct Terrain Analysis

NTA 1.2.6 Conduct Climatological and Meteorological Analyses

NTA 1.2.8 Conduct Tactical Reconnaissance and Surveillance

NTA 1.5.1.1 Maneuver Naval Forces

NTA 1.5.5.6.2 Conduct Linkup with Other Tactical Forces

NTA 1.5.5.8.5 Provide Refugee and Straggler Control

NTA 1.5.8 Conduct Information Superiority

NTA 2.1.1 Determine and Prioritize Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)

NTA 2.1.2 Determine and Prioritize Intelligence Requirements (IR)

NTA 2.2.3 Perform Tactical Reconnaissance and Surveillance

NTA 2.4.4 Analyze and Synthesize Information

NTA 2.4.5.3 Provide Indications and Warning (I&W) of Threat

NTA 2.4.5.4 Provide Intelligence Support to Force Protection

NTA 4.4.1.4 Perform Casualty Operations and Mortuary Affairs Management

NTA 4.4.2.4 Provide Billeting to Non-Combatant Evacuees

NTA 4.4.5 Provide Religious Spiritual, Moral, and Morale Support

NTA 4.5.1 Load/Offload, Transport, and Store Material

NTA 4.6.1 Provide General Supply Support

NTA 4.7 Perform Civil Military Engineering Support

NTA 4.7.1 Perform Construction Engineer Services

NTA 4.7.3 Perform Rear Area Restoration

NTA 4.7.6 Supply Electric Power

NTA 4.7.7 Provide Water

NTA 4.7.8 Provide Humanitarian Support

NTA 4.7.9 Provide Environmental Disaster Relief Support

NTA 4.7.10 Provide Environmental Remediation (Hazardous Waste Cleanup)

NTA 4.8 Conduct Civil Affairs in Area

NTA 4.8.3 Provide Interagency Coordination

NTA 4.8.4 Coordinate with Non-Governmental Organizations

NTA 4.9.4 Provide/Execute Training for U.S. and Other Nation Units and Individuals

NTA 4.10.2 Manage Contracts and Contract Personnel

NTA 4.11 Provide Operational Legal Advice

NTA 4.11.4 Process Claims

NTA 4.11.5 Provide Legal Assistance

NTA 4.11.6 Interpret International/Operational Law

NTA 4.12 Provide Health Services

NTA 4.12.10 Provide Health Services in Support of Humanitarian and Civic Assistance

NTA 5.1 Acquire, Process, Communicate Information, and Maintain Status

NTA 5.1.3.1 Maintain and Display Tactical Picture

NTA 5.2.1 Analyze Mission and Current Situation

NTA 5.2.1.2 Review and Evaluate Mission Guidance

NTA 5.2.1.5 Determine and Prioritize Commander's Critical Information Requirement (CCIR)

NTA 5.3.1 Develop Concept of Operations

NTA 5.3.1.3 Develop Requirements and Priorities

NTA 5.3.6 Prioritize Subordinate Commander Requirements

NTA 5.3.7 Establish Force Command and Control Policy

NTA 5.3.8 Issue Tactical Commander's Estimate

NTA 5.3.9.2 Develop Contingent Responses

NTA 5.4.1.2 Exercise Tactical Command and Control

NTA 5.4.4 Establish Liaisons

NTA 5.4.5 Report and Analyze Mission Readiness

NTA 5.7.1 Develop a Force Command and Control Structure

NTA 5.7.2 Deploy Force Headquarters Advance Element

NTA 5.8 Provide Public Affairs Services

NTA 6.1.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems

NTA 6.1.1.2 Remove Hazards

NTA 6.1.2.1 Employ Operations Security (OPSEC)

NTA 6.3.1.3 Provide Harbor Defense and Port Security

NTA 6.3.1.5 Establish and Enforce Protection Perimeter

NTA 6.5 Perform Consequence Management

NTA 6.5.1 Provide Disaster Relief

NTA 6.5.3 Provide Emergency Assistance

NTA 6.6 Provide for Operational Safety of Personnel and Equipment

B.2 EXAMPLES OF TASKINGS DURING PREVIOUS DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS

- The activities a unit may be called upon to conduct will vary with the type of disaster and recovery phase. The list below is provided to give commanders and staffs an appreciation for the types of things other Navy units have been tasked to do in recent DR operations.

B.2.1   Time-Critical Lifesaving Actions (First 72 Hours)

- Delivery of water, food, and other humanitarian supplies (medicine, shelter, etc.).

- Conduct SAR operations.

- Provide medical assistance.

B.2.2   Immediate Actions to Protect Lives and Prepare for Recovery

- Establish evacuation sites/shelters and evacuate victims.

- Establish security in the disaster area.

- Provide water supplies and purification.

- Provide firefighting capabilities.

- Establish C2 and logistics sites (beach sites and LZs).

    - Establish and maintain an RCC/joint search and rescue center (JSRC).

    - Establish and maintain surface and air traffic control.

    - Establish and maintain sites to support surface and air ship-to-shore movement.

B.2.3 Recovery Support Actions

- Construct and maintain evacuation facilities/shelters.

- Produce water, electricity, and air conditioning.

- Provide sustained medical and dental care.

- Repair infrastructure (roads, bridges, ports/harbors, power lines/electrical grids, water supplies, sewage facilities, air conditioning plants, etc.).

- Provide firefighting and dewatering capabilities.

- Support first responders/NGOs (messing and berthing, shower facilities, medical and dental care, ship's store and barbershop access, administrative support, e-mail and telephone line access, recreational facilities, etc.).

- Provide sustained C2 and other support to embarked naval/other Service and agency (including foreign military/civilian) staffs, media, etc. (e.g., berthing and work spaces, Internet, telephone, television, and VTC access, administrative support, etc.).

- Provide and coordinate intelligence/information collection, processing, analysis, display, and dissemination.

- Execute sustained aircraft and waterborne craft operations and ship to shore movement.

- Provide security and force protection.

- Coordinate media events and establish/maintain an information bureau.

- Provide religious ministry, services, and pastoral care.

- Manufacture and maintain kennels and other temporary facilities, providing veterinary care for pets/animals.

- Conduct riverine patrols using ship's boats and other waterborne craft.

- Conduct inspections of cities, towns, and rural areas to verify evacuation of population and catalog/mark condition of buildings.

- Conduct medical facility assessments (i.e., local hospitals and clinics) to determine serviceability.

- Conduct population medical/health assessments.

- Assess security for disaster relief supplies and sources of drinking water.

- Provide logistics support to naval and other DOD units/activities.

- Establish and maintain contract vehicles for logistic support.

- Provide facilities and services in support of government officials and other visitors.

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

APPENDIX C

Data Collection Plan (Sample)

The intent of this data collection plan is to collect data and lessons learned to assist in the preparation and execution of future domestic disaster relief operations. Each disaster and associated response operation will be unique due to the differences in type, scale, environmental factors, geography, and regional population demographics. Collecting and examining these lessons learned will assist future response teams by increasing the overall effectiveness of current operations while identifying required support capabilities, doctrine, processes, and procedures needed for improving response in future operations.

Command and Control

1. What were your demand signals? Who tasked you, and what did they tell you to do?

2. What worked in that process? What didn't?

3. How well prepared were you to execute this kind of tasking? How would you have been better prepared?

4. How did the demand signal from higher echelons match what you encountered on the ground? How could this process have worked better?

Planning:

1. How did you conduct concurrent planning with the JTF or equivalent (e.g., combined task or support force, etc.), other components and the interagency process, others?

    a. How did you build intelligence support for the operation/preparation of the "battlespace?"

    b. How were the products of this effort communicated and used?

    c. What worked well? What could have worked better?

2. What information tools and products were particularly valuable while conducting en route planning? What additional tools/capabilities would have been helpful?

3. Who/how were priorities set for the use of organic lift (surface, helo, and ground)?

4. What types of LNOs were provided by your staff to the JTF/other supported commands?

    a. What types of LNOs were provided from the JTF/other commands to your staff?

    b. How did you integrate them into your battle rhythm?

    c. What other types of LNOs would have been helpful?

5. How were the key players (Federal, interagency, state, local, NGOs, and military) identified?

6. Were there missions that only the U.S. Navy (USN) could conduct?

    a. Was USN tasked to conduct missions not normally practiced?

    b. Were there any tasks USN was physically or lawfully unable to do?

7. What demand signal triggered you to start your planning? In hindsight, was that good enough? Could another process have given you more warning or enabled you to better respond/commence planning earlier?

8. What basis/support documents did you use for planning (e.g., existing detailed plans, doctrine, lessons learned from previous operation, personal experience, etc.)? What would you like to have had?

9. Was your staff/unit/team sufficiently warned to handle this response on the timeline required?

10. How did you plan for unknown factors? How did you anticipate potential needs? What did you base that plan on?

Intelligence:

1. How did you task your collective intelligence gathering and analysis capability (Navy/joint/interagency/media) to help build the situational awareness you needed to support: initial planning, actual operations, unexpected events?

    a. How did you knit together available sensors? What worked? What didn't work?

    b. What additional sensor capability did you need?

2. What was your assessment of the collective response team's situational awareness? Did they share a common picture? Could you use that picture to efficiently allocate resources? Did the collective plot based on continued intelligence sources produce actionable results?

3. What intelligence sensors/capabilities and assessment tools/processes performed well? What would you like to have had that you did not?

Communications:

1. What command capabilities supported required coordination with other Federal government agencies/state/local agencies? What inhibited them?

2. How was connectivity established and maintained? With JTF? With CMOC or equivalent? Other civil authorities? With NGOs? With others?

3. How did you know how to communicate/who to call to meet the demand signals placed on your organization/unit? How could this information have been better supplied?

4. Did the communications plan support geographically dispersed staffs? What paths and networks worked well, and what did not?

Other Component Interactions:

1. Did you share capabilities with other components? How did they support you?

2. Who were key Federal, state, local, and NGO leads and how did you interact with them? Were they part of a CMOC/equivalent?

3. How were information and orders disseminated between the JTF and naval forces, between naval forces and other agencies/organizations, and with the population?

Situational Awareness:

1. Was there a common operational picture (COP) or equivalent that was shared among all the participants?

   a. What were the most useful/least useful elements of the COP?

   b. What information should have been part of the COP but wasn't?

2. Was information on natural and manmade infrastructure available? Through what means? How was this local knowledge validated?

3. Were engineering surveys required? Who prioritized these?

Meteorological and Oceanographic (METOC):

1. What standard METOC products were provided to aid fleet customers in anticipatory planning for Hurricane Katrina? Who tasked you to do this? How?

2. What standard or special METOC products were provided to aid fleet customers in planning and executing rescue and recovery operations?

3. How timely, accurate, and specific were METOC products produced to support anticipatory planning and humanitarian assistance efforts by fleet customers? How did fleet customers respond to METOC products relating to Katrina?

4. Collect record forecast and advisory message traffic for Katrina.

5. How can METOC support to fleet anticipatory planning and humanitarian assistance be improved for future disasters? (Generic)

Day versus Night Response:

1. What aspects of operations were driven by day vs. night?

2. What limited your capacity to exploit the full 24 hours to deliver relief? What would you change to enable better use of the full response time?

civil-military operations center (CMOC) (or Equivalent):

1. Was a CMOC/equivalent established? Did you interact with it? If so, with whom and how did you do this?

2. Was this a viable venue to resolve issues of conflicting priorities?

3. Were there any conflicting areas of responsibilities between what CMOC/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (substitute equivalent foreign national organization, if applicable)/JTF/others requested from your unit and the tasks you were assigned by your immediate commander?

4. Was there a FEMA equivalent? How did you interact directly with it?

   a. How long did it take to establish reliable communications?

   b. Which communications means worked best? Others?

5. What was the battle rhythm between you and other military commands? Civilian relief agencies?

6. How were the competing needs of Federal, state, local governments prioritized?

   a. Who synchronized the responses to these priorities?

Logistics

Transportation:

1. How did you plan for distributing relief supplies once delivered to forward staging areas? How was ground transportation to onshore relief supplies coordinated with Army, National Guard, or other agencies?

2. Who coordinated air traffic, maritime movement, and land movement control?

3. Did you transport non-Navy relief personnel/equipment? Who directed and set the priorities?

4. If assigned, how was the HSV used? As a connector between FLS and sea base/advanced base?

5. Did you have adequate lift to move supplies from the sea base to the forward delivery sites?

6. What issues arose concerning the various delivery methods (air, LCAC, LCU, others) to moving supplies/equipment ship-to-shore/shore-to-shore?

Supply/Sustainment:

1. How did you determine what to on-load prior to deployment? While en route?

2. Did you know what relief supplies were already in the area, and who controlled it?

3. How did you track nonstandard items purchased, shipped, and distributed?

4. What supplies/equipment were you short of? In excess? Stock correctly?

5. How were repairs to relief-specific equipment identified, accomplished, prioritized, and paid for?

6. Did you have the equipment required (small boats, pumps, water and fuel bladders, generators, refrigeration units, communications equipment, chain saws, chippers, etc.)?

7. What method was used for air DETs aboard ships to expedite spare part deliveries?

Tools:

1. What capabilities did you have that worked well?

2. What are the highest priority capabilities that you think need to be improved? What are the highest priority capabilities that you think need to be developed?

   a. Hardware/material

   b. Processes/procedures

   c. Doctrine

   d. Training

   e. Organization

Logistics Planning:

1. How did you prioritize and distribute life support (food, water, medical supplies, evacuation centers, berthing, and clothing)? Did you have an adequate supply to meet the needs? What role did the JTF/CMOC/others play in this?

2. How did you build the logistics helo/evacuation helo daily air plan? What role did the JTF, JFACC, CMOC or others play in this?

3. How did you build the logistic/evacuation small boat daily surface plan?

4. Were advanced base and forward logistics sites stood up? Who ran these sites? Describe the C2. Were there any security concerns? If so, describe your security precautions.

5. What was the air logistics channel to both advanced base and sea base, both Air Mobility Command (AMC) and Navy organic?

6. Were there enough maintenance support personnel and spares for repair of systems ashore?

7. How did additional supplies arrive once you were on station?

8. How did you manage the distribution of supplies ashore? Who set the priorities?

Financial:

1. What guidance was provided for procuring materials/supporting operations? What requires clarification? What additional guidance would have been helpful?

2. Were you able to track expenditures or were they overcome by events/pace of operations?

3. How were financial accounts reconciled, and when did that occur?

4. Did current fiscal rules and regulations enable you to effectively execute your portion of this disaster response/relief operation?

5. What other fiscal tools/authorities would have enabled you to do a better, more effective job?

6. What aspects of fiscal management contributed to efficient and responsive operations?

7. What aspects in the end produced insufficient and/or wasteful expenditures of resources?

Engineering

1. How were engineering tasks (afloat and ashore) identified and prioritized?

   a. What forms of support did you provide?

   b. What capabilities, material, and/or personnel did you need but not have? What were in excess? Were there types of material or personnel that were force multipliers?

   c. What were the taskings not accomplished due to material/personnel shortfalls?

2. Did you support restoration of sanitation, electrical, roads, and bridges? Were there adequate supplies to support these missions?

3. Did you build or modify temporary facilities? What types? What worked well? What didn't?

Medical

Planning:

1. Who performed the health estimate of the situation (HES), and how was the information disseminated?

2. Was an appropriate staff mix provided? What were you short of? Excess of?

3. How did you determine what medical supplies to embark? What were you short of? Excess of? Were there appropriate regional medical supplies, i.e., snake anti-venom? Who provided the funding/reimbursement for these supplies?

4. Was there a JFMCC surgeon, and if not, who was the dedicated senior medical representative? What was that person's role?

5. Where were the medical LNOs placed (JTF, CMOC)? Numbers/ranks?

   a. Which ones were force multipliers?

6. How did you interact with joint and CMOC health service support cells? Did you interact with state or local officials outside of the CMOC? If so, how? Was this effective?

7. Was there a pre-/post-deployment health surveillance of Navy personnel?

8. Did data sharing/interaction with other agency, i.e., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), FEMA, occur?

   a. How was it conducted?

   b. What were the limitations?

   c. What went well?

9. How was health service support (HSS) prioritized?

   a. What services were needed first and how were they employed?

   b. Did service requirements change with time?

Preventive Medicine:

1. Did you perform a preventive medicine role?

   a. If so, what was the role?

   b. Characterize how effective it was.

   c. Were there adequate stocks of personnel protective equipment to support personnel operating in potentially contaminated environments (hazardous material (HAZMAT), sewage, etc.)?

Facilities:

1. Was there a need for augmentation of area medical facilities?

2. Was epidemiological surveillance appropriate?

3. Was medical C4 ISR sufficiently robust to support the mission? What were the shortfalls?

Ambulatory Care:

1. What types of procedures did you accomplish?

2. Who tasked you?

3. Where did you perform these procedures (afloat/ashore)?

4. Did tasking differentiate between missions for HSS of indigenous population vs. HSS for relief workers?

5. What role did the embarked Navy fleet surgical team (FST) perform? Who tasked them?

Personnel

1. Was there a specialized skills requirement and/or inventory conducted?

2. Besides engineers, logisticians, and medical personnel, what other groups with unique skill sets were required?

3. How were individual augmentees requested and tracked?

4. Were Reserves used? As units or as individual augmentees? Did they bring their equipment or use active component equipment and material?

Security

Interaction with civil authorities:

1. Were you asked to support local civil authorities?

2. Were tasking/law enforcement limitations clear?

3. Were *posse comitatus/*legal issues of any kind raised (intelligence collection, law enforcement)?

4. What other law enforcement/force protection issues did your team experience?

Planning:

1. Were the RUOF clearly defined?

   a. Did they change?

   b. How were they briefed and disseminated to the crew?

2. How were security forces tasked?

3. Who set the priorities?

4. What was needed for security of logistics inflow, storage, and distribution sites? Did outside agencies or local law enforcement provide security for these sites? If so, how effective were they?

5. What was needed for security of personnel movement centers (air, land, and water)

6. Who provided it, and was it sufficient?

Nongovernmental Organizations

1. Were NGOs embarked? If so, under whose authority?

2. How did you interact? What worked well?

3. Were there limitations in your ability to support them? If so, what was the limiting factor?

4. Were interactions with NGOs different (if so, how) or the same (key areas) as interaction with international NGO organizations?

5. What was important to them? What did they ask you to do, and how able were you to respond to those demand signals?

6. What was your opinion of their capacity to work with you? If they changed key aspects, how could they have helped you do a better job?

Media and Distinguished Visitors

1. Did you embark media? If so, under whose authority?

2. How did you meet their needs while conducting operations?

3. Who resolved issues of competing priorities?

4. What worked well?

5. Did the media rely on military assets for communications support? If so, were you able to meet all their requirements? What methods did you use to support them?

6. How did you keep abreast of the chain of command's decisions during operations to resolve emerging PA issues?

7. What issues arose during operations that had not been addressed during planning? How were they addressed?

8. What issues of joint coordination in PA execution were encountered?

9. What suggestions do you have for future disaster contingency PA planning?

10. How was support to the media prioritized relative to the relief mission (lift, communications, berthing, etc)?

Metrics

1. What metrics were you asked to gather data to support? Were they useful? How could they have been made better?

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

APPENDIX D

References

1. AAP 6, "NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions"

2. AAP 15, "NATO Glossary of Abbreviations Used in NATO Documents and Publications"

3. AJP 3, "Allied Joint Operations"

4. AJP 3-1, "Allied Joint Maritime Operations"

5. AJP 9, "NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine"

6. AMedP 15, "Military Medical Support in Humanitarian and Disaster Relief"

7. APP 2(F), "Helicopter Operations from Ships Other Than Aircraft Carriers (HOSTAC)"

8. ATP 1(D), "Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures"

9. **EXTAC 1011, "Naval Humanitarian Assistance Missions"**

10. JP 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms"

11. JP 1-05, "Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations"

12. JP 2-01.3, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace"

13. JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations"

14. JP 3-07, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War"

15. JP 3-07.5, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations"

16. **JP 3-07.6, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance"**

17. JP 3-08 Volumes I & II, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations"

18. JP 3-16, "Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations"

19. **JP 3-32 (Draft), "Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations"**

20. **JP 3-34, "Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations"**

21. **JP 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations"**

22. JP 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations"

23. **JP 4-02, "Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations"**

24. JP 5-0, "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations"

25. **JP 5-00.2, "Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures"**

26. Interim JP 3-90, "Civil Military Co-operation"

27. "Seabasing," Joint Integrating Concept Version 1.0, Pre-decisional draft

28. NAVAIR 00-80T-122, "Helicopter Operating Procedures for Air Capable Ships" NATOPS Manual

29. NDP 1, "Naval Warfare"

30. NDP 2, "Naval Intelligence"

31. NDP 4, "Naval Logistics"

32. NDP 5, "Naval Planning"

33. NDP 6, "Naval Command and Control"

34. NWP 1-02, "Naval Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms"

35. NWP 1-05, "Religious Ministry in the U.S. Navy"

36. NWP 1-14M, "The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations"

37. NWP 3-02.3M, "Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations"

38. **NWP 3-07, "Naval Doctrine for Military Operations Other-Than-War"**

39. NWP 3-07.2 Rev A, "Navy Doctrine for Antiterrorism/Force Protection"

40. NWP 3-13, "Navy Information Operations"

41. NWP 3-56.1 (Rev A), "Naval Air Operations Center Organization and Processes"

42. **NWP 3-62 (Draft), "Seabasing"**

43. NWP 4-02, "Naval Expeditionary Health Service Support/Afloat and Ashore"

44. NWP 4-02.1, "Naval Health Service Support Logistics"

45. NWP 4-04, "Naval Civil Engineering Operations"

46. NWP 4-04.1, "Seabee Operations in the MAGTF"

47. NWP 4-04.2, "Navy Civil Engineer Operations for Component Commanders"

48. NWP 5-01 (Rev A), "Naval Operational Planning"

49. NTTP 1-01, "The Navy Warfare Library"

50. **NTTP 3-02.1.3, "Amphibious/Expeditionary Operations Air Control"**

51. **NTTP 3-13-1-16, "Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Task Force Information Management"**

52. **NTTP 5-02, "Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Task Force (JTF) Liaison Officer Integration"**

53. **NTTP 5-03.5, "Risk Management"**

54. **TM 3-07.7-06 (NWDC), "Domestic Disaster Relief Operations Planning"**

55. **TM 3-32-03 (NWDC), "Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) Planning and Execution"**

56. **TM 5-00.1-03 (NWDC), "Multiple-Carrier Strike Group (CSG) Operations Planning and Employment Guidance"**

57. COMFLTFORCOM 112141Z APR 06, "COMFLTFORCOM Planning Order for Defense Support of Civil Authorities and Foreign Disaster Relief in Both the NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility"

58. CNO/CMC, "Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations"

59. **CDR USPACOM CONPLAN 5070-02**

60. **USCINCACOM FUNCPLAN 2501-97 (currently under revision for promulgation as a CDR USNORTHCOM FUNCPLAN 2501)**

61. CJCSI 3121.01B, "Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces"

62. CJCSM 3500.04D, "Universal Joint Task List"

63. EO 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities"

64. DODD 5100.46, "Foreign Disaster Relief"

65. DODD 5240.1, "DOD Intelligence Activities"

66. DODD 6420.1, "Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC)"

67. SECNAVINST 1730.7C, "Religious Ministry Within the Department of the Navy"

68. OPNAVINST 1730.1D, "Religious Ministry in the Navy"

69. OPNAVINST 3130.6D, "Naval Search and Rescue (SAR) Standardization Program"

70. OPNAVINST 3500.38A/USCGCOMDTINST M3500.1A, "Universal Navy Task List (UNTL)"

71. **OPNAVINST 3500.39B, "Operational Risk Management (ORM)"**

72. DHS "National Response Plan" Dec 2004

73. NGA Imagery Policy Series, Mar 2005

74. Center for Naval Analyses CAB 95-85.10, April 1996, "The Role of Psychological Operations in Humanitarian Assistance Operations"

75. Center for Naval Analyses CRM D0012642.A1/SR, July 2005, "Operation Unified Assistance: Disaster Relief from the Sea"

76. Center for Naval Analyses CRM 93-140, October 1993, "Military Relations with Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations from Restore Hope"

77. Center for Naval Analyses CRM 94-74, March 1995, "Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations: Insights from Seven Case Studies"

78. Center for Naval Analyses CRM 95-151, April 1996, "Planning for Humanitarian Assistance Operations"

79. Center for Naval Analyses CRM 95-152, April 1996, "Logistics and Engineering Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance Operations"

80. Center for Naval Analyses CRM 95-165.10, April 1996, "Command and Coordination in Humanitarian Assistance Operations"

81. Center for Naval Analyses CRM 95-166.10, April 1996, "Measures of Effectiveness for Humanitarian Assistance Operations"

82. Center for Naval Analyses CRM 97-0072, July 1997, "The Process for Determining Military Tasks in Humanitarian Assistance Operations"

83. Center for Naval Analyses CRM 98-176, February 1999, "Peacemaking, Complex Emergencies, and Disaster Response: What Happens, How Do You Respond?"

84. Center for Naval Analyses Miscellaneous Paper 221, December 1997, "Task Development Guide for Humanitarian and Peace Operations"

85. Center for Naval Analyses D0012636.A1/SR, July 2005, "USNS Mercy Deployment for Operation Unified Assistance: Implications for Afloat Disaster Response"

86. Center for Naval Analyses D0012644.A1/SR, July 2005, "Operation Unified Assistance: Perspectives on the Interagency Rapid Health Assessments"

87. National Search and Rescue Committee, May 2000, "United States National Search and Rescue Supplement to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual"

88. Naval Mission-Essential Task List (NMETL) Development Handbook

89. **USAID Primer: "What We Do and How We Do It"**

90. **U.S. Agency for International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, "Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response"**

91. **Sphere Project, "The Sphere Handbook"**

Notes

1. Bold type indicates the most helpful references on humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations.

2. COMFLTFORCOM instructions are available on the COMFLTFORCOM website at http://www.ffc.navy.mil/.

3. USAID publications are available through USAID website www.usaid.gov, and Sphere Project publications are available at www.sphereproject.org.

4. The Universal Navy Task List, NMETL Development Handbook, and Naval Operating Concept are available through the NWDC websites www.nwdc.navy.mil and www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil.

5. Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) studies and reports can be accessed through the search function on the CNA website at www.cna.org, or requested through the contact information provided there.

6. Joint publications (including drafts) may be accessed through the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp or through the Joint Electronic Library website www.dtic.mil/doctrine/s_index.html. Navy publications are available at the NWDC classified website www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil. Draft Navy publications are available through the doctrine discussion group section of that website.

7. Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations instructions are available at http://neds.daps.dla.mil/.

8. NGA policy series documents are available through the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's Office of International Affairs and Policy website at http://policy.nga.smil.mil/.

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAR	after action report
AAV	amphibious assault vehicle
ACB	amphibious construction battalion
AFMIC	Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center
AIDS	acquired immune deficiency syndrome
AIP	anti-surface warfare improvement program
ALSS	advanced logistic support site
ALSS/FLS	advanced logistic support site/forward logistic site
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AP	advance party
ATO	air tasking order
BEACHGRU	(naval) beach group
BLS	beach landing site
C2	command and control
C4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CAT	crisis action team
CCDR	component commander
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
CCO	combat cargo officer
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CDRW	compact disk read-write
CEC	civil engineering corps
CFACC	combined force air component commander
CHAPGRU	(Navy) cargo handling and port group

CIB	combined information bureau
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CLF	combat logistics force
CMOC	civil-military operations center
CNA	Center for Naval Analyses
COCOM	combatant command
COMFLTFORCOM	Commander Fleet Forces Command
CONCAP	construction capabilities
CONEX	container express
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONPLAN	concept plan
COP	common operational picture
CRRC	combat rubber raiding craft
CSG	carrier strike group
DART	disaster assistance response team
DEET	N,N-diethyl-meta-toluamide *or* N,N-diethyl-3-methylbenamide
DET	detachment
DHS	demographic and health survey
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRLAUTH	direct liaison authorized
DJC2	deployable joint command and control
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DON	Department of the Navy
DOS	Department of State
DPVS	database plain-language-address verification system

DR	disaster relief
DRRS	Defense Readiness Reporting System
DV	distinguished visitor
EEDSK	early entry deployable support kit
EEI	essential element of information
EDC	emergency operations center
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
ESG	expeditionary strike group
ESQD	explosive safety quantity distance
EXORD	execute order
FAQs	frequently asked questions
FAST	fleet antiterrorism security team
FEC	facilities engineering center
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FHA/DR	foreign humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
FISC	fleet and industrial supply center
FLS	forward logistic site
FP	force protection
FST	fleet surgical team
FUNCPLAN	functional plan
HACC	humanitarian assistance coordination center
HAZMAT	hazardous material
HES	health estimate of the situation
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
HN	host nation
HOC	humanitarian operations center

HSS	health service support
HSV	high-speed vessel
HUMINT	human intelligence
ICODES	integrated computerized deployment system
I&W	indications and warning
IM/KM	information management/knowledge management
INMARSAT	international maritime battlespace
IO	information operations
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlespace
IR	information requirement
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFMCC	joint force maritime component commander
JLRC	joint logistics readiness center
JMC	joint movement center
J/NMETL	joint/Navy (or naval) mission-essential task list
JOA	joint operations area
JSRC	joint search and rescue center
JTF	joint task force
LARC	lighter amphibious resupply, cargo
LCAC	landing craft, air cushion
LCM	landing craft, mechanized
LCU	landing craft, utility
LEA	law enforcement agency

LHA	amphibious assault ship (general purpose)
LHD	amphibious assault ship (multipurpose)
LNO	liaison officer
LPD	amphibious transport dock
LRAD	long range acoustic device
LRC	logistics readiness center
LSD	landing ship, dock
LZ	landing zone
MCM	mine countermeasures
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
METL	mission-essential task list
METOC	meteorological and oceanographic
MEU	Marine expeditionary unit
MHE	materials handling equipment
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOGAS	motor gasoline
MPA	maritime patrol aircraft
MPS	maritime prepositioning ship
MPSRON	maritime prepositioning ships squadron
MRE	meal, ready to eat
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSS	mobile security squadron
MTF	medical treatment facility
MUSE	mobile utilities support equipment
N-4	Navy component logistics staff officer
NALE	naval and amphibious liaison element

NALSS	naval advanced logistic support site
NATOPS	Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization
NAVELSF	naval expeditionary logistics support force
NAVFAC	naval facility
NAVFOR	Navy forces
NBG	naval beach group
NCIS	Naval Criminal Investigative Service
NCTAMS	naval computer and telecommunications area master station
NECC	Navy Expeditionary Combat Command
NELSF	naval expeditionary logistics support force
NEHC	Navy Environmental Health Center
NEPMU	Navy environmental and preventive medicine unit
NFLS	naval forward logistic site
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NIEHS	National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences
NIPRNET	non-secure internet protocol router network
NLL	Navy lessons learned
NLLS	Navy Lessons Learned System
NMCI	Navy Marine Corps Intranet
NMETL	Navy mission-essential task list
NRCC	Navy regional contracting center
NTA	Navy (or naval) tactical task
NTIMS	Navy Training Information Management System
NTTL	naval tactical task list
NUFEA	Navy-unique fleet essential aircraft

NWDC	Navy Warfare Development Command
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OP	joint operational task
OPDS	offshore petroleum discharge system
OPORD	operation order
OPSEC	operations security
OPTAR	operating target
OPTEMPO	operating tempo
ORM	operational risk management
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs officer
PIR	priority intelligence requirement
POTUS	President of the United States
PTM	personnel transport module
PTSD	post-traumatic stress disorder
PWPT	potable water pillow tank
RCC	rescue coordination center
RFF	request for forces
RFID	radio frequency identification
ROE	rules of engagement
ROWPU	reverse osmosis water purification unit
RM	risk management
RMT	religious ministry team
RUOF	rules for the use of force

SAR	search and rescue
SEAL	sea-air-land team
SIPRNET	SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SLRP	survey, liaison, and reconnaissance party
SME	subject matter expert
SOP	standing operating procedure
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SPINS	special instructions
STAR	scheduled theater airlift route
TACC	tactical air coordination center
TACMEMO	tactical memorandum
TACON	tactical control
TACRON	tactical air control squadron
T-AE	ammunition ship
T-AKE	dry cargo/ammunition ship
T-AO	oiler
T-AOE	fast combat support ship
T-ARS	salvage ship
TASKORD	tasking order
T-ATF	fleet ocean tug
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UCAS	unclassified collaboration at sea
UCT	underwater construction team

UJTL	Universal Joint Task List
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USB	universal serial bus
USDAO	U.S. defense attaché office
VTC	video teleconferencing
WAN	wide-area network
WETP	Worker Education and Training Program
WHO	World Health Organization

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

Glossary

advanced logistic support site (ALSS). See **naval advanced logistics support site**.

airfield. An area prepared for the accommodation (including any buildings, installations, and equipment), landing, and takeoff of aircraft. (JP 1-02)

Air Mobility Command (AMC). The Air Force component command of the US Transportation Command. (JP 1-02)

air tasking order (ATO). A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities, and/or forces to targets and specific missions. Normally provides specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. (JP 3-30)

air traffic controller. An air controller especially trained for and assigned to the duty of airspace management and traffic control of airborne objects. (JP 1-02)

amphibious assault ship (general purpose). A naval ship designed to embark, deploy, and land elements of a landing force in an assault by helicopters, landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and by combinations of these methods. Designated as **"LHA"** or with internal dock as **"LHD."** (JP 1-02)

amphibious assault vehicle (AAV). A fully tracked, amphibious vehicle tasked to land the surface assault elements of the landing force and their equipment in a single lift from assault shipping during amphibious operations to inland objectives, to conduct mechanized operations and related combat support in subsequent operations ashore. The three types of amphibious assault vehicles are command, personnel, and recovery. Also called **assault amphibious vehicle**. (TM 3-07.6-06)

battle rhythm. The sequencing and execution of significant recurring events of the operational command or staff that are regulated by the flow of information and the decision cycle. This schedule allows operational command or staff members to anticipate when information is required and facilitates planning to ensure inputs are available when needed. Also called **daily operations cycle**. (Derived from JP 0-2 and NTTP 3-13.1.1.6.)

beach group. See **naval beach group** (JP 1-02).

beach landing site (BLS). A geographic location selected for across-the-beach infiltration, exfiltration, or resupply operations. (JP 3-05)

cargo handling and port group. A rapid deployment expeditionary combat logistics support unit with the mission of providing technical and related individual training for all Navy cargo handling force personnel and other Department of Defense units on an as available basis. (TM 3-07.6-06)

carrier strike group (CSG). A standing operational naval task force organization which consists generally of an aircraft carrier (CVN), a cruiser (CG), two guided-missile destroyers

(DDGs), an attack submarine (SSN), and a fast combat support ship (T-AOE). (Derived from NOC 2004.)

civil-military operations center (CMOC). An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (COCOM). A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 3-07.1)

combat cargo officer (CCO). An embarkation officer assigned to major amphibious ships or naval staffs, functioning primarily as an adviser to and representative of the naval commander in matters pertaining to embarkation and debarkation of troops and their supplies and equipment. (JP 1-02)

combat logistics force (CLF). Includes both active Navy ships and those operated by the Military Sealift Command within the naval fleet auxiliary force that carry a broad range of stores, including fuel, food, repair parts, ammunition, and other essential materiel to keep naval forces operating at sea for extended periods. (NDP-4)

command and control (C2). The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1-02)

commander's critical information requirements. Commander's critical information requirements comprise information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decision-making process that affect successful mission accomplishment. The two key subcomponents are critical friendly force information and priority intelligence requirements. (JP 2-01)

command-linked tasks. Discrete events or actions designated by a joint force commander that must be performed by commands and agencies outside the command authority of the joint force, if the joint force is to successfully perform its missions. Command-linked tasks are designated by the supported joint force commander, but are normally scheduled for training, evaluated, and assessed by the organization providing the support. (CJCSM 3500.04D)

command relationships. The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the operational authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command; defined further as combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or support. (JP 0-2)

common operational picture (COP). A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command. A common operational picture facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. (JP 3-0)

concept plan (CONPLAN). An operation plan in concept format. (JP 1-02)

construction capability contract force (CONCAP). An extension of the naval construction force. It is a civilian contractor that is used to provide augmentation in the theater of operations. The services can vary from providing a variety of professional civil engineering functions and oversight to that of actual construction activities. Contracts are usually established prior to a contingency and allow for a smaller military footprint in-theater. (NDP-4)

country team. The senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02)

course of action. 1. Any sequence of activities which an individual or unit may follow. 2. A possible plan open to an individual or commander which would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of, his mission. 3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission. (NWP 1-02)

crisis action team (CAT). A headquarters watch team stood up during crises to act as a commander's nexus for information, tasking, and coordination. (TM 3-07.6-06)

criterion. The minimum acceptable level of performance associated with a particular measure of task performance. It is often expressed as hours, days, percent, occurrences, minutes, miles, or some other command-stated measure. (CJCSM 3500.04D)

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). A supply support organization assigned management responsibility and control of items in common use by all military services. About 60 percent of the line items in the integrated Navy Supply System are managed by the Defense Logistics Agency. These items are identified by a 9 in the first position of the cognizance symbol. (NDP-4)

Department of the Navy (DON). The executive part of the Department of the Navy at the seat of government; the headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; the entire operating forces of the United States Navy and of the U.S. Marine Corps, including the Reserve Components of such forces; all field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Secretary of the Navy; and the U.S. Coast Guard when operating as a part of the Navy pursuant to law. (JP 1-02)

demand signal. An impetus, driving force, or stimulus for activity in a system. (TM 3-07.6-06)

detachment (DET). 1. A part of a unit separated from its main organization for duty elsewhere. 2. A temporary military or naval unit formed from other units or parts of units. (JP 1-02)

direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH). That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. Direct liaison authorized is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorized informed. Direct liaison authorized is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. (JP 1-02)

disaster assistance response team (DART). United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance provides this rapidly deployable team in response to international disasters. A disaster assistance response team provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist U.S. embassies and USAID missions with the management of U.S. Government response to disasters. (JP 3-08)

disaster relief. See **foreign disaster relief**.

displaced person. A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country. (JP 1-02)

doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1-02)

essential task. Tasks based on mission analysis and approved by the commander that are absolutely necessary, indispensable, or critical to success of a mission. (CJCSM 3500.04D)

evacuee. A civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation. (JP 1-02)

execute order (EXORD). An order to initiate military operations as directed. (JP 1-02)

expeditionary strike group (ESG). A standing operational amphibious naval task force organization which consists generally of a three ship amphibious ready group (ARG), a cruiser (CG), two guided missile destroyers (DDGs), an attack submarine (SSN) and, in the future, a new generation of destroyer (DD[X]). (NOC 2004)

flag officer. A term applied to an officer holding the rank of general, lieutenant general, major general, or brigadier general in the U.S. Army, Air Force or Marine Corps or admiral, vice admiral, or rear admiral in the U.S. Navy or Coast Guard. (JP 1-02)

fleet and industrial supply center (FISC). Command organizations that furnish supply support to fleet units, shore activities, and overseas bases established in their mission. They are under the management of the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP). (NDP-4)

force health protection. All services performed, provided, or arranged by the Services to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. These services include, but are not limited to, the management of health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the wounded, injured, or sick; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometry, medical food, and medical intelligence services. (JP 4-02)

force multiplier. A capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment. (JP 1-02)

force protection (FP). Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. (JP 3-0)

foreign disaster. An act of nature (such as a flood, drought, hurricane, earthquake, volcanic eruption, or epidemic), or an act of man (such as a riot, violence, civil strife, explosion, fire, or epidemic), which is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant United States foreign disaster relief to a foreign country, foreign persons, or to an intergovernmental organization. (JP 3-08)

foreign disaster relief. Prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Normally it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds, and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical materiel and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services. (JP 3-07.6) See also **foreign disaster**.

foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA). Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. (JP 3-07.6)

foreign national. Any person other than a U.S. citizen, U.S. permanent or temporary legal resident alien, or person in U.S. custody. (JP 1-02)

forward logistic site (FLS). See **naval forward logistic site**.

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 0-2)

functional plans (FUNCPLAN). Plans involving the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment developed by combatant commanders to address requirements such as disaster relief, nation assistance, logistics, communications, surveillance, protection of U.S. citizens, nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, and continuity of operations or similar discrete tasks. They may be developed in response to requirements of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, at the initiative of the combatant commander, or as tasked by the supported combatant commander, Joint Staff, Service, or Defense agency. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff review of combatant command-initiated plans is not normally required. (JP 1-02)

hazard. A condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation. (JP 5-00.2)

health service support (HSS). All services performed, provided, or arranged by the Services to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. These services include but are not limited to the management of health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the wounded, sick, or injured; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, medical food, and medical intelligence services. (JP 1-02)

hold. A cargo stowage compartment aboard ship. (JP 1-02)

hospital. A medical treatment facility capable of providing inpatient care. It is appropriately staffed and equipped to provide diagnostic and therapeutic services, as well as the necessary supporting services required to perform its assigned mission and functions. A hospital may, in addition, discharge the functions of a clinic. (JP 1-02)

host nation (HN). A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transmit through its territory. (JP 1-02)

human intelligence (HUMINT). A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian assistance. See **foreign humanitarian assistance**.

humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC). A temporary center established by a geographic combatant commander to assist with interagency coordination and planning. A humanitarian assistance coordination center operates during the early planning and coordination stages of foreign humanitarian assistance operations by providing the link between the geographic combatant commander and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international and regional organizations at the strategic level. (JP 3-57)

humanitarian operations center (HOC). An interagency policymaking body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign humanitarian assistance operation. It normally is established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the United Nations, or a United States Government agency during a United States unilateral operation. The humanitarian operations center should consist of representatives from the affected country, the United States Embassy or Consulate, the joint force, the United Nations, nongovernmental and international organizations, and other major players in the operation. (JP 3-57)

hydrography. The science which deals with the measurements and description of the physical features of the oceans, seas, lakes, rivers, and their adjoining coastal areas, with particular reference to their use for navigational purposes. (JP 1-02)

imagery. Collectively, the representations of objects reproduced electronically or by optical means on film, electronic display devices, or other media. (JP 1-02)

indications and warning (I&W). Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United States or allied and/or coalition military, political, or economic interests or to U.S. citizens

abroad. It includes forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities; insurgency; nuclear/nonnuclear attack on the United States, its overseas forces, or allied and/or coalition nations; hostile reactions to US reconnaissance activities; terrorists' attacks; and other similar events. (JP 2-01)

information. 1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2. The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. (JP 1-02)

information operations (IO). Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. (JP 1-02)

intelligence. 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (JP 1-02)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). An analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive database for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. The database is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents itin graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuing process. (JP 2-0)

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. (JP 1-02)

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged U.S. Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (JP 3-57)

internally displaced person. Any person who has left their residence by reason of real or imagined danger but has not left the territory of their own country. (JP 1-02)

Iridium. An international telecommunications company, utilizing a constellation of 66 low-earth orbiting, cross-linked satellites to provide service to government and commercial customers. (TM 3-07.6-05)

joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 1-02)

joint force air component commander (JFACC). The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. (JP 3-0)

joint force commander (JFC). A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. (JP 1-02)

joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC). The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking maritime forces and assets; planning and coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. (JP 3-0)

joint mission-essential task (JMET). A mission task selected by a joint force commander deemed essential to mission accomplishment and defined using the common language of the universal joint task list in terms of a task, condition, and standard. (JP 1-02)

joint mission-essential task list (JMETL). A list of JMETs selected by a commander to accomplish an assigned or anticipated mission that includes associated tasks, conditions, and standards, and requires the identification of command-linked and supporting tasks. (CJCSM 3500.04D)

joint movement center (JMC). The center established to coordinate the employment of all means of transportation (including that provided by allies or host nations) to support the concept of operations. This coordination is accomplished through establishment of transportation policies within the assigned operational area, consistent with relative urgency of need, port and terminal capabilities, transportation asset availability, and priorities set by a joint force commander. (JP 4-0)

joint operations area (JOA). An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. (JP 1-02)

joint search and rescue center (JSRC). A primary search and rescue facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for planning, coordinating, and executing joint search and rescue and combat search and rescue operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force. The facility is operated jointly by personnel from two or more Service or functional components or it may have a multinational staff of personnel from two or more allied or coalition nations (multinational search and rescue center). The joint search and rescue center should be staffed equitably by trained personnel drawn from each joint force component, including U.S. Coast Guard participation where practical. (JP 1-02)

joint task force (JTF). A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (JP 1-02)

landing craft. See **amphibious vehicle**.

landing craft air cushion (LCAC). A high-speed (40+ knots), over-the-beach, ship-to-shore amphibious landing vehicle capable of a 60-ton payload (75-ton overload). It is designed to lift all equipment organic to the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) in an amphibious operation. (NWP 1-02)

landing ship dock (LSD). A ship designed to transport and launch loaded amphibious craft and/or amphibian vehicles with their crews and embarked personnel and/or equipment and to render limited docking and repair services to small ships and craft. (JP 1-02)

landing zone (LZ). Any specified zone used for the landing of aircraft. (JP 1-02)

law enforcement agency (LEA). Any of a number of agencies (outside the Department of Defense) chartered and empowered to enforce US laws in the following jurisdictions: The United States, a state (or political subdivision) of the United States, a territory or possession (or political subdivision) of the United States, or within the borders of a host nation. (JP 1-02)

lead agency. Designated among U.S. government agencies to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. The lead agency is to chair the interagency working group established to coordinate policy related to a particular operation. The lead agency determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among the agencies and is responsible for implementing decisions. (JP 3-08)

lead federal agency (LFA). The federal agency that leads and coordinates the overall federal response to an emergency. Designation and responsibilities of a lead federal agency vary according to the type of emergency and the agency's statutory authority. (JP 1-02)

liaison. That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (JP 1-02)

liaison officer (LNO). A member of the command staff responsible for coordinating with cooperating or assisting agencies. (U.S. National Response Plan)

lighterage. A small craft designed to transport cargo or personnel from ship to shore. Lighterage includes amphibians, landing craft, discharge lighters, causeways, and barges. (JP 3-02)

lighter, amphibious resupply cargo (LARC) LX. A large wheeled, unarmed cargo and personnel carrier. (NWP 1-02)

lighter, amphibious resupply cargo (LARC) V. A lightweight, aluminum hulled, terrained amphibious vehicle having moderate water speed and good surfing ability. (NWP 1-02)

lighter, amphibious resupply cargo (LARC) XV. A medium weight, aluminum hulled, terrained amphibious vehicle with propulsion in water provided by propellers. (NWP 1-02)

logistics. The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations that deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (JP 1-02)

logistics readiness center (LRC). This organization is the logistics staff that supports the combatant commander with command and control of logistics support. This staff will manage common-user and cross-Service logistics, monitor and report logistics operations and capabilities, advise the combatant commander on logistics matters, and represent the command to external logistics organizations. (NDP 4)

logistics train. See **train**.

long range acoustic device (LRAD). Hailing and warning equipment that directs verbal communications or warning tones to influence behavior. The sound is focused in a 15–30 degree beam over ranges in excess of 500 meters. (TM 3-07.6-06)

map. A graphic representation, usually on a plane surface and at an established scale, of natural or artificial features on the surface of a part or the whole of the Earth or other planetary body. The features are positioned relative to a coordinate reference system. (JP 1-02)

master update authority. The single point for message directory database updates, currently Navy Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station (NCTAMS) Pacific. The Atlantic NCTAMS serves as backup. (TM 3-07.6-06)

materials handling equipment (MHE). Mechanical devices for handling of supplies with greater ease and economy. (JP 1-02)

measure. Provides the basis for describing varying levels of task performance. (CJCSM 3500.04D)

measures of effectiveness (MOEs). Tools used to measure results achieved in the overall mission and execution of assigned tasks. Measures of effectiveness are a prerequisite to the performance of combat assessment. (JP 3-60)

medical treatment facility (MTF). A facility established for the purpose of furnishing medical and/or dental care to eligible individuals. (JP 1-02)

meteorological and oceanographic (METOC). A term used to convey all meteorological (weather) and oceanographic (physical oceanography) factors as provided by Service components. These factors include the whole range of atmospheric and oceanographic phenomena, from the sub-bottom of the earth's oceans up to the space environment (space weather). (JP 3-59)

meteorology. The study dealing with the phenomena of the atmosphere including the physics, chemistry, and dynamics extending to the effects of the atmosphere on the earth's surface and the oceans. (JP 3-59)

Military Sealift Command (MSC). A major command of the U.S. Navy reporting to Commander Fleet Forces Command, and the U.S. Transportation Command's component command responsible for designated common-user sealift transportation services to deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy U.S. forces on a global basis. (JP 4-01.2)

mission. 1. The task, taken together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military

units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. (JP 1-02)

multi-Service. Two or more Services in coordination. (NWP 1-02)

naval advanced logistic support site (NALSS or naval ALSS). An overseas location used as the primary transshipment point in the theater of operations for logistic support. A naval advanced logistic support site possesses full capabilities for storage, consolidation, and transfer of supplies and for support of forward-deployed units (including replacement units) during major contingency and wartime periods. Naval advanced logistic support sites, with port and airfield facilities in close proximity, are located within the theater of operations but not near the main battle areas, and must possess the throughput capacity required to accommodate incoming and outgoing intertheater airlift and sealift. When fully activated, the naval advanced logistic support site should consist of facilities and services provided by the host nation, augmented by support personnel located in the theater of operations, or both. (JP 1-02)

naval air training and operating procedures standardization program (NATOPS). An organization and system designed to determine, promulgate, and monitor standard flight doctrine and optimum operating procedures for naval aircraft. (NWP 1-02)

naval beach group (NBG). A permanently organized naval command within an amphibious force comprised of a commander and staff, a beachmaster unit, an amphibious construction battalion, and assault craft units, designed to provide an administrative group from which required naval tactical components may be made available to the attack force commander and to the amphibious landing force commander. (JP 1-02)

naval construction force (NCF). Otherwise known as the Seabees, are deployable naval military construction engineering units whose primary mission is to provide responsive contingency construction support for U.S. military forces in a given theater of operations. (NDP-4)

naval expeditionary logistics support force (NELSF). A Navy Reserve command organized and staffed to provide a wide range of supply and transportation support critical for peacetime support, crisis response, humanitarian, and combat service support missions. (NDP-4)

naval forward logistic site (NFLS or naval FLS). An overseas location, with port and airfield facilities nearby, which provides logistic support to naval forces within the theater of operations during major contingency and wartime periods. Naval forward logistic sites may be located in close proximity to main battle areas to permit forward staging of services, throughput of high priority cargo, advanced maintenance, and battle damage repair. Naval forward logistic sites are linked to in-theater naval advanced logistic support sites by intratheater airlift and sealift, but may also serve as transshipment points for intertheater movement of high-priority cargo into areas of direct combat. In providing fleet logistic support, naval forward logistic site capabilities may range from very austere to near those of a naval advanced logistic support site. (JP 1-02)

Navy Lessons Learned System (NLLS). The Navy's process for the collection and dissemination of all significant lessons learned, summary reports, and port visit reports from maritime operations. This feedback includes lessons that identify problem areas, issues, or requirements and, if known, suggested corrections to those deficiencies. Lessons may contain pertinent information concerning doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures (TTP), and systems, or comment on a general document or process. Lessons may address the creation, update, or

cancellation of existing doctrine, policy, organization, training, education, equipment, or systems. Also called **NLLS**. (Derived from OPNAVINST 3500.37C)

naval mission-essential task list (NMETL). A list of those tasks considered essential to accomplish and support missions assigned by a naval or joint force commander. (NMETL Development Handbook)

noncombatant evacuation. Operations conducted to relocate threatened noncombatants from locations in a foreign country. These operations normally involve U.S. citizens whose lives are in danger, and may also include selected foreign nationals. (NWP 1-02)

nongovernmental organizations (NGO). Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). (JP 3-31)

non-secure internet protocol router network (NIPRNET). Worldwide unclassified level packet switch network that uses high-speed internet protocol routers and high-capacity Defense Information Systems Network circuitry. (Derived from JP 2-01)

oceanography. The study of the sea, embracing and integrating all knowledge pertaining to the sea and its physical boundaries, the chemistry and physics of seawater, and marine biology. (JP 1-02)

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. Part of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Bureau for Humanitarian Response. The office is responsible for the coordination of all U.S. government assistance to foreign countries after a natural or manmade disaster. (USAID Field Operations Guide V3.0)

operating tempo (OPTEMPO). Level of operations and training over time. Common measurements include fleet hours, track hours, ship steaming days, and rounds of ammunition. (NWP 1-02)

operation. 1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, Service, training, or administrative military mission. 2. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (JP 1-02)

operational control (OPCON). Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service

and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. (JP 0-2)

operational risk management (ORM). See **risk management**.

operations security (OPSEC). A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. (JP 3-07.2)

organic. Assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization. Organic parts of a unit are those listed in its table of organization for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and are assigned to the administrative organizations of the operating forces for the Navy. (JP 1-02)

priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in the task of planning and decision making. (JP 1-02)

public affairs (PA). Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. (JP 1-02)

public information. Information of a military nature, the dissemination of which through public news media is not inconsistent with security, and the release of which is considered desirable or nonobjectionable to the responsible releasing agency. (JP 1-02)

refugee. A person who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left their home country or country of their nationality and is unwilling or unable to return. (JP 3-07.6)

religious ministry. The entire spectrum of professional duties performed by Navy chaplains, religious program specialists, and designated personnel, to include providing for and/or facilitating required religious needs and practices. (SECNAVINST 1730.7C)

religious ministry team. A team that is composed of one or more chaplains(s) and one or more religious program specialist(s), and other designated members (e.g., appointed lay leaders and military volunteer personnel) to provide religious ministry. The team works together in designing, implementing, and conducting the command religious programs. (NWP 1-05)

repair. The restoration of an item to serviceable condition through correction of a specific failure or unserviceable condition. (JP 1-02)

rescue coordination center (RCC or RCT (for Navy Component)). A primary search and rescue facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for coordinating and controlling search and rescue and/or combat search and rescue operations. The facility is operated unilaterally by personnel of a single Service or component. For Navy component operations, this

facility may be called a rescue coordination team. (JP 3-50.2) See also **joint search and rescue center**.

Reserve. Members of the Military Services who are not in active service but who are subject to call to active duty. (JP 1-02)

risk. Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. (JP 5-00.2) See also **risk management**.

risk management (RM). The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. (JP 3-0)

rules of engagement (ROE). Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-02)

sea base. An inherently maneuverable, scalable aggregation of distributed, networked platforms that enable the global power projection of offensive and defensive forces from the sea, and includes the ability to assemble, equip, project, support, and sustain those forces without reliance on land bases within the joint operations area. (Derived from Seabasing JIC, V1.0, Draft)

seabasing. In amphibious operations, a technique of basing certain landing force support functions aboard ship which decreases shore-based presence. (JP 3-02)

Seabee team. Specially tailored engineering units independently formed from naval mobile construction battalions to provide engineering and technical construction assistance to foreign nations on both civic action and socio-economic projects. (NWP 1-02)

sea echelon. A portion of the assault shipping which withdraws from or remains out of the transport area during an amphibious landing and operates in designated areas to seaward in an on-call or unscheduled status. (JP 1-02)

search and rescue (SAR). The use of aircraft, surface craft (land or water), submarines, specialized rescue teams, and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea. (JP 1-02)

SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). Worldwide SECRET level packet switch network that uses high-speed Internet protocol routers and high-capacity Defense Information Systems Network circuitry. (JP 1-02)

Selected Reserve. Those units and individuals within the Ready Reserve designated by their respective Services and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as so essential to initial wartime missions that they have priority over all other Reserves. All Selected Reservists are in an active status. The Selected Reserve also includes persons performing initial active duty for training. (JP 1-02)

sensitive. Requiring special protection from disclosure that could cause embarrassment, compromise, or threat to the security of the sponsoring power. May be applied to an agency, installation, person, position, document, material, or activity. (JP 1-02)

specified task. A task explicitly stated and assigned. (CJCSM 3500.04D)

squadron. 1. An organization consisting of two or more divisions of ships, or two or more divisions (Navy) or flights of aircraft. It is normally but not necessarily composed of ships or aircraft of the same type. 2. The basic administrative aviation unit of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. (JP 1-02)

standard. Quantitative or qualitative measures for specifying the levels of performance of a task. (JP 1-02)

standing operating procedure (SOP). A set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise. (JP 1-02)

status-of-forces agreement (SOFA). An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. (JP 1-02)

subject matter expert (SME). An individual who is a technical expert in a specific area or in performing a specialized job, task, or skill. (U.S. National Response Plan)

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 0-2)

supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander's force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (JP 3-0)

supporting task. Specific activities that contribute to the accomplishment of a joint mission-essential task. Supporting tasks associated with a command or agency's mission-essential task list are accomplished by the joint staff or subordinate commands or agencies. (CJCSM 3500.04D)

tactical air control center (Navy TACC). The principal air operations installation (ship-based) from which all aircraft and air warning functions of tactical air operations are controlled. (JP 1-02)

tactical control (TACON). Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces

must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. (JP 0-2)

tactical memorandum (TACMEMO). Developmental tactics published for evaluation. They are issued for a specific period of time (normally 24 months), and incorporated into applicable doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), or reference publications when validated. (NTTP 1-01)

task. An action or activity (derived from an analysis of the mission and concept of operations) assigned to an individual or organization to provide a capability. (JP 1-02)

tasking order (TASKORD). A method used to task and to disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected targets and specific missions. In addition, the tasking order provides specific instructions concerning the mission planning agent, targets, and other control agencies, as well as general instructions for accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System database portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including: a. In-place units; b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation; c. Routing of forces to be deployed; d. Movement data associated with deploying forces; e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces; and f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. (JP 1-02)

train. A service force or group of service elements that provides logistic support, e.g., an organization of naval auxiliary ships or merchant ships or merchant ships attached to a fleet for this purpose; similarly, the vehicles and operating personnel that furnish supply, evacuation, and maintenance services to a land unit. (JP 1-02)

unified command. A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called **unified combatant command**. (JP 3-31)

Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). A menu of capabilities (mission-derived tasks with associated conditions and standards, i.e., the tools) that may be selected by a joint force commander to accomplish the assigned mission. Once identified as essential to mission accomplishment, the tasks are reflected within the command joint mission-essential task list. (JP 3-33)

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. Ballistic or semiballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles. (JP 1-02)

urban search and rescue. Operational activities that include locating, extricating, and providing on-site medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures. (U.S. National Response Plan)

U.S. Agency for International Development. The official U.S. government agency responsible for international assistance and development. (USAID FOG V3.0)

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

Effective Pages	Page Numbers
MAY 2006	1 thru 10
MAY 2006	1-1, 1-2
MAY 2006	2-1 thru 2-4
MAY 2006	3-1 thru 3-8
MAY 2006	4-1 thru 4-4
MAY 2006	5-1 thru 5-6
MAY 2006	6-1 thru 6-8
MAY 2006	7-1 thru 7-10
MAY 2006	8-1 thru 8-6
MAY 2006	9-1 thru 9-6
MAY 2006	A-1 thru A-4
MAY 2006	B-1 thru B-6
MAY 2006	C-1 thru C-10
MAY 2006	D-1 thru D-6
MAY 2006	LOAA-1 thru LOAA-10
MAY 2006	Glossary-1 thru Glossary-18
MAY 2006	LEP-1, LEP-2

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

TACMEMO 3-07.6-06
MAY 2006