

Caribbean Mass Rescue Operation 07 Exercise

After Action Report

August 9 , 2007

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Caribbean Mass Rescue Operation 07 Executive Summary

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Executive Summary

The Caribbean Mass Rescue Operation 07 Full Scale Exercise was conducted to challenge the new USCG Sector Mass Rescue Operation plan, Norwegian Cruise Line Safety Management System and cruise line virtual command center (Incident Response Center and support teams), US Customs and Border Protection processing system, and the US Virgin Islands St. Thomas' Homeland Security and emergency agencies response plans. The exercise was conducted in the spirit of the Coast Guard Commandant Thad W. Allen statements "We must be ready today' while preparing for tomorrow." and "we will prepare for the unexpected by investing in the best training and support for our people, and equipping them with the most capable tools and technology to perform our missions successfully".

The exercise was a mechanism through which stakeholders improved the preparedness for Mass Rescue or Mass Casualty as part of the Plan-Train-Exercise-Evaluate-Document preparedness cycle. The stakeholders included major Cruise Lines, maritime communities, the US Coast Guard, and other federal and local Partners.



A Passenger Vessel Exercise program and working group was established in 2003 with the Cruise Line International Association industry members and the US Coast Guard Passenger Vessel Safety Specialists. The concept that was to establish the expectations and standards of care related to a passenger vessel incident that would involve rescuing a large number of passengers and crew, accounting for them from the vessel's main decks to shore, providing the frame work and interoperability guidelines between the rescue agencies, cruise lines, and shore based emergency management agencies based on the National Incident Management System processes, i.e. Incident Command System. Constructing a standard exercise program that will foster the lessons learned from each exercise industry wide and applies them to improve internationally the mitigation of a catastrophic mass rescue operation incident. This exercise was the first of a series of exercises with the cruise lines to establish a starting point based on plans that were either being newly developed and or existing plans that have been in effect for many years.

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The Caribbean Mass Rescue Operation 2007 exercise was a no-fault exercise. The scope of play for the exercise required the establishment of a passenger disembarkation area and responders in the field to perform those actions usually associated with an initial response to an incident that required accountability of passengers, medical triage, transportation needs, and credentialing, as well as, physical security for the landing area and safe haven reception facilities.

The focus for this exercise was on the process needed during a mass rescue operation that could happen with any cruise line or mass transit provider and its impact on the community and other agencies. Such an event would pose a significant challenge. This type of event would involve the need for significant personnel accountability, search and rescue efforts; massive demands on the healthcare system and pre-hospital emergency medical resources. This exercise strengthened the preparedness for public safety responses to incidents involving passenger vessels or any incident involving a catastrophic mass rescue incident.

A. Exercise Objectives.

- Enable the industry and response stakeholders to mitigate and respond to a passenger vessel emergency using all available resources.
- Coordinate with the entire response community to garner consensus of contingency plans.
- Activate the HF/MF radio Digital Selective Calling and Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRB) processes of the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) notification system.
- Exercise the response management system (National Incident Management System, Incident Command System) identified in the response plan and vessel plan and, to the extent possible, the unified command with the appropriate participants for the exercise scenario.
- Assess the accountability of crew and passengers through a unified process to the extent that they can return home or are adequately cared for.
- Communications: Testing the communications to the Department's of Health in Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands alerting them of a potential problem with a cruise ship, and testing the communications between (and within) the Territory and Commonwealth.
- Security: As requested and required from public health and medical assets in the field.

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- Triage: Pre-staging victims at Crown Bay dock in St Thomas, to simulate Cruise Ship evacuees, for triage and transport using the local infrastructure.



- Volunteers: Utilization of the Medical Reserve Corps to provide surge staffing on St Thomas.
- Human Health Service Incident Response Coordination Team: Sending U. S. Public Health Service officers to serve as Liaison Officer's in Emergency Operations Center situations to provide situational awareness to Federal ESF 8 lead for advance planning purposes.
- Test the internal plans, based on the scenario, for Schneider Regional Medical Center in St Thomas and the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico Departments of Health.

All Exercise Objectives were met.

B. Major Strengths:

The exercise brought out many good issues to be discussed and improved upon, i.e. implementing a family assistance type program with the cruise line industry in conjunction with the local communities, response go-teams expectations, improving common expectations for port agents and the expected support that can be provided, and coordinating with the ship board personnel in assisting the communities with the accountably processing of passengers and crew ashore.

1. The continuity established by having the US Coast Guard Passenger Vessel Safety Specialist participate in the exercise, i.e. building lessons learned that will be shared by the cruise industry through Cruise Line International Association (CLIA) and establishing a nationally scheduled Mass Rescue Operation tier three exercise program.
2. Additional validation exercises will be needed to confirm the capability to detect, identify, and respond to a marine distress notification through the established Global Maritime Distress and Safety System.
3. Exercise Planning was exceptional. Nearly everyone in the exercise community knows that planning an exercise takes time and thought – this exercise was no exception. This exercise proved that a successful exercise is dependent on the planning that is done beforehand to clearly establish all the elements of the exercise.

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4. Norwegian Cruise Line vessel (Norwegian Spirit) was prepared with critical equipment that enabled the movement of injured personnel and enhanced crowd control. They brought wheel chairs, muster station signs, crowd control tape, megaphones and radios to communicate with their own personnel.



5. Norwegian Cruise Line vessel (Norwegian Spirit) advance team consisted of 17 people from the ship. This advance team simulated the initial deployment of ship personnel to help with the shore side management of passengers. This team was directed by the ship's security officer and medical officer. Excellent team organization, procedures, professionalism, and follow through.
6. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) redundant setup with multiple computer systems enabled quick processing of the passengers through customs. During set up they did experience some formatting problems with the passenger checking systems which would have delayed the check in processes, but it was quickly resolved by the on scene Information Technician (IT) support personnel. It is recommended that an IT personnel continue to be involved in the response to support electronic systems.
7. The ability of the agencies involved in the medical triage system to fully understand and utilize the principles for medical triage procedures was outstanding. The utilization of triage tagging was key and essential to the exercise.



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C. Primary Areas for Improvement:

A Mass Rescue contingency plan should include processes for “standards of care and guidelines” and a unified management (Incident Command System) for incidents that will involve a large stakeholder community response. Throughout the exercise several opportunities for improvement in Mass Rescue Operations were observed. Re-establishing the Passenger Vessel Safety Working Group with the cruise line and passenger vessel associations can provide the necessary recommendations and guidance as to “how” these improvements can be implemented. The primary areas for improvement, including recommendations, are as follows:

1. Incident Management- Continue to build the necessary infrastructure, training and stakeholder teamwork to maintain functional management and communications with all stakeholders. The Incident Command Post was unable to maintain a direct line between the cruise line “Incident Response Center” to support discussions with incident objectives, vessel plans, and passenger and crew accountability.



2. Establish a process to provide the “lifeboat’s” manifest from the disembarkation site to the Incident Command Center. The manifests were not able to be communicated efficiently from the landing site to the Incident Command Post. The Incident Command Post was not able to fax or email the manifests to the Incident Response Center (corporate office). Additionally contingency plans should include other options to allow the manifests to be accessed by any stakeholder, i.e. Incident Command Post to the Incident Response Center (corporate office).
3. Continue to standardize a communication processes that would efficiently mitigate any incident involving passenger vessels, mass transit organizations, search and rescue agencies, the incident command post, and shore based emergency response centers. The goal would be to eliminate any informational disconnects between the stakeholders, support teams, and the incident command post.

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4. Continue establishing an international standard communications plan (ICS 205 process) for Mass Rescue Operations based on the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual. There are presently limited provisions provided for on scene communications between the cruise line personnel, go-teams, the ship, and the Incident Response Center, i.e. designated VHF frequencies for shore side support, Satellite cell phones, pre-paid cell phones, and fax lines.
5. Establish a national three (3) year cycle exercise program to conduct full scale Mass Rescue Operation exercises with the international and domestic passenger vessels and mass transit/port authorities, i.e. airports, railways. Include a common process to sharing the lessons learned, training stakeholders, conducting orientations of plans, i.e. All Hazards incident management, roles and expectations, notification and validation of distress communication processes, mass personnel accountability process standards, and interoperability of responding agencies for the standards of care of passengers and crew.

D. Exercise Design.

1. The exercise was challenging to design due to the geographic separation of the stakeholders and some what difficult to have all players and agencies fully represented at all exercises planning meetings.
2. The focus of the design also provided for all agencies to use the results of this exercise and revise their plans to ensure that their mass rescue operation or mass casualty plans are up to date.
3. Subsequent exercises should test specific improvements recommended as a result of this exercise and should include a focus on incident command and the sharing of information between agencies both horizontal and vertical.
4. The design focus was to test multiple contingency plans and that they are integrated with community plans using the all hazards approach. In some cases this was evident and in others it was not.
5. This exercise did not test the Logistical support that would be required with a Mass Rescue Operation and would recommend that in subsequent exercises test the Logistics sections to see if they can adequately support a complex response of this size.
6. The design focused on areas of notification systems that were issues from previous incidents and exercises and for current needs and improvement for future responses. Prior to the exercise date two notification drills were conducted to validate the process and it will be tested again the day of the exercise.
7. The evaluation process adequately collected the information necessary. All agencies participating in any exercise must be required to bring their internal disaster/emergency operations plans to the exercise design meeting, so that the

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evaluation process could be fully evaluated against the plans. Had the evaluation team had prior access to those plans, then a more detailed evaluation of the objectives could have been conducted, reviewed, and critiqued.

8. The exercise highlighted the many areas of improvements at all levels of the response. The development and sharing of plans may help to facilitate the data collection and coordination processes in the future.
9. A accountability process was developed using a card system to represent passengers and crew. It was used to process the passengers and crew and has the capability of involving role players while conducting Mass Rescue Operations with all stakeholders. This is a good resource and will save a ton of work. In future exercises the card system should be included and refined for processing large numbers of passengers using the “passenger” cards. A steady stream of cards, better card accountability, and player brief may improve the realism factor. Develop a training guide for the role player to understand the objectives of accountability and the medical triage process.

E. Limitations and Casualties:


While planning this exercise the Joint Design Team attempted to maintain realism for the event while also maximizing training opportunities for the participants. In instances where the two conflicted, realism was sacrificed to maximize training. The following exercise artificialities were agreed upon by the design team. Potential implications of these artificialities should be considered when responding to or planning for future events:

- There was no “Real” Cruise Line affiliation to the vessel simulated in this exercise. Norwegian Cruise Line “Role Played” certain aspects in this exercise.

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F. Conclusion.

The Caribbean Mass Rescue Operation 07 exercise was conducted to unify an emergency response and management process to effectively mitigate a catastrophic Mass Rescue Operation incident that requires immediate assistance and accountability to large numbers of persons in distress that exceeds the capabilities available. This exercise engaged all stakeholders in a proactive manner that fosters a safer passenger vessel and mass transit industry and a shore based emergency management response for incidents that involves thousands of lives.



The success of this exercise will be the establishment and implementation of a national exercise program that builds guidelines and procedures internationally and nationally not only with the cruise industry but with all mass transit and port authority operators. The Mass Rescue Operation Exercise program will prepare for the unexpected by investing in the best training and support for our people, stakeholders, and equipping them with capable tools, processes, and technology to proactively mitigate any incident successfully.

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- I. Exercise Overview.**
- A. Exercise Name** Caribbean Mass Rescue Operation 07.
- B. Type of Exercise** Full Scale
- C. Exercise Start Date** August 9, 2007
- D. Exercise End Date** August 9, 2007
- E. Duration** 1 day (5 a.m. to 5 p.m.)
- F. Location** St. Thomas, VI, San Juan, PR, and Miami, FL
- G. Sponsors** U.S. Coast Guard District Seven, Norwegian Cruise Line, St. Thomas, VI Emergency management (VITEMA) and Homeland Security, and Cruise Line International Association (CLIA)
- H. Program** U.S. Coast Guard Mass Rescue Operation, National Search and Rescue (SAR) program, International Safety Management System for passenger vessels
- I. Funding Recipient** U.S. Coast Guard District Seven, U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Juan, PR, and St. Thomas, VI Emergency Management (VITEMA), and St. Thomas, VI Homeland Security department
- J. Mission** Response and accountability of passengers
- K. Capabilities** Interoperability of the major stakeholders fielded under the Sector San Juan Mass Rescue Operation plan, Customs and Border Protection accountability for processing rescued passengers entering into the U.S., Health and Human Services Mass Casualty plan, and St. Thomas, VI Emergency Management and Homeland Security departments.
- L. Scenario** Mass Rescue and accountability of passengers and crew.
- M. Exercise Planning Team:** The follow agencies provided organizational members of the design team; however there may be others who may have been unintentionally left off of this list and who have contributed to the exercise design. To those who have been left off we

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appreciate your assistance and apologize for the omission.

Federal

United States Coast Guard – District 7

United States Coast Guard – Sector San Juan

United States Coast Guard – MSD ST Thomas

United States Coast Guard – Air Station Borinquen

United States Coast Guard – Marine Safety Center

United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

United States Department of Human Health Services

United States Transportation Security Administration

United States Department of Homeland Security

United States Public Health Service

Virgin Islands

Virgin Islands Office of Homeland Security

Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management Agency

Virgin Islands Port Authority

Virgin Islands Human Services Department

Virgin Islands Health Department

Virgin Islands Emergency Medical Services

Virgin Islands Law Enforcement

Virgin Islands Education Department

Virgin Islands Police Department

Virgin Island Fire Service

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Industry

Norwegian Cruise Line

Cruise Line International Association

Schneider Medical Hospital

Cooperating Agencies

American Red Cross

N. Participating Agencies:

The follow agencies participated in the Caribbean Mass Rescue Operation 07 exercise. While there were also many sub-groups of some of these major agencies that participated, in the interest of space and due to the potential for overlooking specific sub-groups, Due to the significant size and complexity of this exercise in both scope and geography, it was difficult to determine all individual players and agencies that were represented either locally (within the region) or who were monitoring/participating from outside of the region. To those who have been left off we appreciate your assistance and apologize for the omission.

Federal

United States Coast Guard – Passenger Vessel Safety Specialist

United States Coast Guard – District 7

United States Coast Guard – Sector San Juan

United States Coast Guard – MSD ST Thomas

United States Coast Guard –Air Station Borinquen

United States Coast Guard – Marine Safety Center

United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

United States Mission Control Center (USMCC)

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United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

United States Department of Human Health Services

United States Transportation Security Administration

United States Department of Homeland Security

United States Public Health Service

United States Center for Disease Control (CDC)

Virgin Islands

Virgin Islands Office of Homeland Security

Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management Agency

Virgin Islands Port Authority

Virgin Islands Human Services Department

Virgin Islands Health Department

Virgin Islands Emergency Medical Services

Virgin Islands Law Enforcement

Virgin Islands Education Department

Virgin Islands Police Department

Virgin Island Fire Service

Industry

Norwegian Cruise Line

Cruise Line International Association

Virgin Islands Taxi Alliance

St. Thomas Dial-A-Ride

Inter-Island Boat Service

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West Indian Co.

Schneider Medical Hospital

Cooperating Agencies

American Red Cross

Junior ROTC

Charlotte Amalie High School students

St. Thomas Police Athletic League

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II. Exercise Design Summary

A. Exercise purpose and Design.

1. The Caribbean Mass Rescue 2007 exercise scenario simulated a Cruise Ship losing main propulsion with a resultant grounding approximately 50 yards from the south-eastern face of Cayos Geniqui Island, 17 miles West of St. Thomas. The “Seas Ahoy” is a non-affiliated Cruise Ship with no identified ownership and was played out by the participating Norwegian Cruise Line for the exercise.
2. Norwegian Cruise Line “Spirit” portrayed the ship Seas Ahoy while enroute to St. Thomas, VI and began the exercise by sending out a message through the Global Marine Distress Signaling System (GMDSS) at 0500, August 9, 2007. An exercise message was scripted and uploaded into the HF/MF Digital Selective Calling Transceiver system as well as a coded exercise message relayed through the Emergency Positioning Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) to the Coast Guard and neighboring ships that would respond in an actual emergency.
3. Following the a simulated grounding, the simulated Cruise Ship, “Seas Ahoy” launched her life boats with 2500 passengers and proceeded to St. Thomas, VI. A real 911 call was placed at 0640, August 9, 2007 that notified the local responding agencies of the decision made by the Ship’s Captain, the Captain of the Port (COTP), and the simulated Cruise Ship Owners that the life boats have disembarked from the ship and will be making landfall at the Crown Bay Passenger Terminal in St. Thomas, VI. This provided a 2 hour window where the actual participants in the exercise would start their work at 0900 at the Crown Bay Passenger Terminal. At 0800, August 9, 2007, all controllers and evaluators were in their assigned locations which included: The Unified Command, located at the Virgin Islands Port Authority Administration Building, adjacent to the Airport; the Virgin Island Territories Emergency Management Agency’s Emergency Operations Center; the University of Virgin Islands Reinhold Center; the Schneider Medical Hospital; and the Crown Bay Passenger Terminal at the old Sub-Base. In Miami, the Corporate Office for the Norwegian Cruise Line stood up the Emergency Response Center which was manned and ready.
4. Volunteers from the St. Thomas Police Athletic League Junior ROTC and Charlotte Amalie High School were loaded onto the ferry “Mona Queen” and sent out from the passenger terminal to be called in as a simulated lifeboat from the “Seas Ahoy”. At 0900, August 9, 2007, Representatives from the Norwegian Cruise Ship “Spirit” role playing “Seas Ahoy Away Team” arrived by Coast Guard boats to begin the exercise involving the passengers coming to shore from their distant incident site. The Ferry boat was then summoned to come to the Terminal with the volunteers. Each volunteer had an identity card as well as a possible injury or health condition and they were to be triaged, stabilized, and then transported to Schneider Hospital, or sorted, then cleared by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and transported to the University of the Virgin Islands Reinhold Center for final disposition. In addition to the volunteers playing the passengers, there were additional cards representing a fully loaded lifeboat of a hundred

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fifty people that came in on the ferry. These cards were treated as real individuals along with the role playing volunteers and were processed in the same manner. This process was completed three times to simulate a fraction of the total amount of passengers that would be arriving if this were a real event.

B. Support Data:

The Coast Guard provided the following pre-exercise training opportunities for CG and partner agencies participating in Caribbean Mass Rescue Exercise 2007:

- Multiple NIMS-ICS courses (ICS-100, ICS-200, and ICS-300)

C. Location of Operation:

Simulated Incident Scene

- Norwegian Cruise Line “Spirit” moored at Long Bay Terminal St. Thomas, St. Thomas, VI
- Simulation Cell located at the Law Enforcement and Planning Commission Building, St. Thomas, VI

Norwegian Emergency Response Center

- Norwegian Corporate Office Miami, FL

Norwegian Spirit

- GMDSS notification

Command Post

- Port Authority Administration Building, St. Thomas, VI

Emergency Operations Center

- VITEMA Building, Frenchtown, St. Thomas, VI

Schneider Medical Hospital

Crown Bay Passenger Terminal, St. Thomas, VI

Rescue Coordination Center U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Juan, PR

III. Conclusion

The success of this exercise will be the establishment and implementation of a national exercise program that builds guidelines and procedures internationally and nationally not only with the cruise industry but with all mass transit and port authority operators. The Mass Rescue Operation Exercise program will prepare for the unexpected by investing in the best training and support for our people, stakeholders, and equipping them with capable tools, processes, and technology to proactively mitigate any incident successfully.

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APPENDIX A: IMPROVEMENT PLANNING (IP): AN ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL TASK PERFORMANCE

TASKS

- 1.** Enable the industry and response stakeholders to mitigate and respond to an emergency using all available resources.
- 2.** Coordinate with the entire response community to garner consensus of contingency plans.
- 3.** Activate the HF/MF radio Digital Selective Calling (DSC) and Emergency position indicating radiobeacons (EPIRB) processes of the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) notification system.
- 4.** Exercise the response management system (National Incident Management System, Incident Command System) identified in the response plan and vessel plan and, to the extent possible, the unified command with the appropriate participants for the exercise scenario.
- 5.** Assess the accountability of crew and passengers through a unified process to the extent they can return home or are adequately cared for.
- 6.** Communications: Testing the communications to the Department's of Health in PR and VI alerting them of a potential problem with a cruise ship, and testing the communications between (and within) the Territory and Commonwealth.
- 7.** Security: As requested and required from public health and medical assets in the field.
- 8.** Triage: Pre-staging victims at Crown Bay dock in St. Thomas (STT), to simulate Cruise ship evacuees, for triage and transport using the local infrastructure.
- 9.** Volunteers: Utilization of the Medical Reserve Corps to provide surge staffing on STT.
- 10.** HHS Incident Response Coordination Team: Sending USPHS officers to serve as LNO's in EOC situations to provide situational awareness to Federal ESF 8 lead for advanced planning purposes.

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11. Test the internal plans, based on the scenario, for Schneider Regional Medical Center in STT and the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico Department of Health.



Task 1.0	Enable the industry and response stakeholders to mitigate and respond to an emergency using all available resources.
Issue 1.1	Around the country the passenger vessel industry as a whole is being asked to participate in exercises with very little notice.
Recommendation	To assist in familiarizing all stakeholders it is recommended that Coast Guard Headquarters CG-534 and CG-535 to petition the HSEEP committee to include the Mass Rescue Operation as a tier 3 listed exercise in the national exercise program. This will assist the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) and the Passenger Vessels Association (PVA) in scheduling exercises through long range planning and allow all stakeholder partners in familiarizing their personnel with the current contingency plans in effect.
Improvement Actions	Schedule multi-agency/stakeholder meetings to familiarize all stakeholders with current plans and conduct Table Top exercises initially to validate plans. Re-establish the working group to continue improving contingency plans and stakeholder outreach through planed and scheduled exercises. In 2009 a MRO exercise is scheduled with a CLIA member line that will incorporate the lessons learned from this exercise. The Passenger Vessel Association is drafting a national Mass Rescue Operation guideline and template for their members with the assistance from the U.S. Coast Guard Passenger Vessel Safety Specialist.

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Responsible Person/ Organization	Coast Guard Headquarters CG-534 and CG-535 U.S. Coast Guard Passenger Vessel Safety Specialist program, CLIA, and PVA.
Completion Date	August 2009
Issue 1.2	This exercise was based on establishing continuities of responses using the regions Mass Rescue Operation and Mass Casualty plans and the cruise lines Safety Management System procedures. Focusing on accountability and management ashore by the cruise line, federal and local emergency responders. A limited amount of participants were familiar with the plans exercised.
Recommendation	Conduct orientation training and table top exercises for the Unified Command and general staff before a full scale exercise.
Improvement Actions	In preparation for any exercise conduct multi-agency meetings to identify the stakeholders design team members. Design orientations, drills, Table Top, Command Post, and Full scale exercises using an agreed exercise program schedule.
Responsible Person/ Organization	U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Juan will facilitate the process for the region. The Passenger Vessel Safety Specialist program will assist as requested with the stakeholders, i.e. Local response community, CLIA, and PVA members.
Completion Date	August 2008
Issue 1.3	An initial analysis for Video Telephone Teleconference (VTC) to establish a “Virtual Command Post” between participating Federal, State, and Local Stakeholders was conducted. Validation of the ability to establish a “Virtual Command Post” connection through Video Teleconferencing between the stakeholders, i.e. USVI Homeland Security Office St. Thomas, USCG Sector San Juan, USCG District Seven, and Norwegian Cruise Line was unsuccessful to meet immediate operational needs of a mass rescue operation incident.
Recommendation	Short term solution-Establish in the USCG District Seven Command Center a bridge, or a hub to facilitate non-secure VTC communications with stakeholders. A bridge is a set up and all parties call in to a predetermined phone number and VTC is convened in an UNCLAS environment. Verizon has been identified as a facilitator of a VTC bridge and an account should be opened or established as soon as possible. The bridge being the

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	<p>easiest and most effective means to easily and quickly method presently to provide UNCLAS VTC communications within the Seventh Coast Guard District with any stakeholders.</p> <p>Challenges or concerns: This VTC Bridge is dependent on connectivity with Verizon and is not considered reliable during hurricanes if the phone trunks are lost due to the storm.</p> <p>This option is cost effective as only a limited solution that is dependent on the availability of the commercial “HUB”.</p> <p>Long term solution-Establish the actual permanent VTC hub in the US Coast Guard District Seven Intergraded Command Center which would allow the command center to field multiple VTC calls in the IP addresses or a dial in telephone connection. This option proves to be a bit more of a task and costly but would be optimal solution to provide connectivity between multiple stakeholders in the Secure and Non-secure mode.</p> <p>The long term option would be the formation of a HUB permanently in the US Coast Guard District Integrated Command Center. The cost is unknown at this time but the reasoning to have an installed HUB is logical since we are an integrated Command Center.</p>
<p>Improvement Actions</p>	<p>US Coast Guard District Seven (cc) establish a Verizon account to have the ability to connect to multiple stakeholders in a Non-secure connection using either an IP address or phone in connection. This will provide an immediate solution to the identified non-connectivity with the stakeholders exercised in the “Caribbean Mass Rescue Operation 07” exercise. The long term option should be investigated and included in the Command Centers budget proposal to provide the Command Center with a self contained “HUB” that is not dependent on commercial telephone connections that could be lost in a hurricane or other catastrophic incident.</p>
<p>Responsible Person/ Organization</p>	<p>US Coast Guard District Seven (cc)</p>
<p>Completion Date</p>	<p>August 2008</p>
<p>Issue 1.4</p>	<p>The incident “Unified Command” organization was not trained or exercised together prior to the exercise. There was minimum Incident Command System training conducted with the stakeholders for this exercise and the only designed</p>

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	<p>support provided was two (2) mentors for the Situation Unit to provide guidance and support for the assigned personnel. Each on-scene agency was communicating up their individual chain of commands and not a “Unified” reporting mechanism.</p>
Recommendation	<p>Additional Incident Command System training, i.e. ICS 300, 400, 320, 341 courses, should be included and funded in the exercise preparation to familiarize all of the stakeholders with the current Mass Rescue and Mass Casualty plans organizations. Unify the training process through exercises, train just like we operate.</p>
Improvement Actions	<p>The training cost should be included in the predicted cost estimates for the Concept of Exercise to incorporate the training as part of the exercise program. Currently it is not funded through the Concept of Exercise process which results in Incident Management System failure. By incorporating the above minimum training into every national mass rescue operation exercise the stakeholders will then be able to perform as trained and meet the described and adopted National Incident Management System in the United States.</p> <p>This exercise is the beginning of a national Coast Guard and Cruise Line industry Mass Rescue Operation exercise program, the next one scheduled is in 2009 with Holland America Line as the principal participating cruise line, and the focus was not Incident Command System functionality. The lesson learned is to incorporate back into the Concept of Exercise development Incident Command System training not only for the Coast Guard as required by the implementation plan but to also include as many stakeholders as possible list as participants in the Mass Rescue Operation plan. Include as a minimum ICS 300/400 individual training and the team training courses ICS 320 and 341.</p>
Responsible Person/ Organization	<p>U.S Coast Guard Headquarters offices (CG-534) and (CG-535).</p>
Completion Date	<p>August 2008</p>
Task 2.0	<p>Coordinate with the entire response community to garner consensus of contingency plans.</p>

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Issue 2.1	There was limited access to previous Mass Rescue Operation and Mass Casualty exercises and actual incidents lessons learned to the stakeholders in reviewing their plans and preparing for the exercise.
Recommendation	These lessons learned will be shared through the LLIS. Com system and with the stakeholders of the exercise, i.e. with all Federal, State, Local Government, CLIA, PVA, and Stakeholders. The improvements will be implemented if applicable in the scheduled 2009 west coast MRO exercise that will be hosted in Alaska.
Improvement Actions	It will be posted in the Department of Homeland Security Lessons Learned data base, LLIS.com and distributed electronically to all stakeholders that were involved in the exercise.
Responsible Person/ Organization	U.S. Coast Guard District 7 Passenger Vessel Safety Specialist
Completion Date	January 2008
Task 3.0	Activate the HF/MF radio Digital Selective Calling (DSC) and Emergency position indicating radiobeacons (EPIRB) processes of the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) notification system.
Issue 3.1	The exercise design was to “test” MF/DSC alert transmission and EPIRB using actual equipment aboard a vessel to validate the reception capabilities for the Search and Rescue services in the southern Caribbean Islands. Due to exercise design and “test” simulation technical issues during the exercise the MF/DSC activation was not able to be activated and the EPIRB “test” hexadecimal number was not detected until later in the exercise.
Recommendation	Conduct another “test” activation of MF/DSC and EPIRB in Caribbean area to validate reception of signals in the area. Recommend to IMO to discontinue the use of MF/DSC and A2 sea area and only utilize HF/DSC and A3 areas. There are constant false alerts (DSC), limited receiver propagation coverage in the Caribbean area, IMO minimum training standards as a GMDSS operator, and expensive equipment the current GMDSS system needs to be reviewed.

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Improvement Actions	Continue implementing Rescue 21 to improve the notification communication system for distresses at sea. Additionally, add to the IMO COMSAR committee agenda the issue of reviewing current directives and safety procedures concerning MF/DSC application and effectiveness of reception by land stations.
Responsible Person/ Organization	U.S Coast Guard Headquarters Search and Rescue office (CG-534).
Completion Date	August 2008
Task 4.0	Exercise the response management system (National Incident Management System, Incident Command System) identified in the response plan and vessel plan and, to the extent possible, the unified command with the appropriate participants for the exercise scenario.
Issue 4.1	There is no pre-established Incident Command Post in St. Thomas, VI. The selected site for the exercise was not able to efficiently and effectively provide communications or organizational space during the exercise.
Recommendation	Validate the Incident Command site (i.e. phone lines, fax machines, copiers, internet connections, and long distance calling capabilities) and clearly identify the location of the Unified Command, General Staff, and Section Chiefs spaces within the command site. Establish a standard procedure to provide an open telephone process that involves mitigation of Mass Rescue Operation involving a passenger vessel operator. This would then allow each stakeholder to establish within their contingency plans the ability to standardize their support and command processes by having direct communications with the incident. This standard procedure should be established at a minimum communications level being able to maintain an open telephone connection with any Incident Command Post, i.e. Unified Command, but should also include the protocols and procedures to establish Video Teleconference (VTC), i.e. IP address, phone connection through a multi-user hub, and provide for the advancements in technology. Include this element as a required exercise objective of the Mass Rescue Operation exercise program.
Improvement Actions	Review current contingency plans, i.e. Sector San Juan’s plans for Mass Rescue Operation, Area Contingency and St. Thomas Mass Casualty plan. If not listed, pre select Incident

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	<p>Command Post facilities and sites that would support a complex incident involving multi-agencies and stakeholders.</p> <p>Establish as a standing objective into the Mass Rescue Operation exercise program that test the connectivity of the open direct line between the principal stakeholders, i.e. Incident Command Post (Unified Command), cruise line Incident Response Centers, Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management Agency, US Virgin Island Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard District Seven (cc) and Sector San Juan Sub Region Rescue Coordination Center. This will provide an immediate solution to include as a minimum standard of establishing a direct open line “virtual command” between the cruise line and the Unified Command identified as a critical communication process required, maintain a open direct line into the Unified Command. In all future exercises concerning mass rescue operation contingencies the objective of exercising the “open direct line into the Unified Command must be exercised between the cruise line and the Incident Command Post (Unified Command) location.</p>
<p>Responsible Person/ Organization</p>	<p>U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Juan and St. Thomas, VI Emergency Management (VITEMA) and Homeland Security Departments. U.S. Coast Guard Passenger Vessel Safety Specialist program.</p>
<p>Completion Date</p>	<p>August 2008</p>
<p>Issue 4.2</p>	<p>The regional and local Mass Rescue Operation and Mass Casualty plans do not clearly identify the necessary staffs to mitigate a complex Mass Rescue or Mass Casualty incident.</p>
<p>Recommendation</p>	<p>The Unified Command should have Field Observers at all sites to feed information to the Situation Unit Leader at the command post. In a real scenario, there will be multiple landing sites and reception centers in addition to the hospital so the need for Field Observers is critical.</p>
<p>Improvement Actions</p>	<p>Review current contingency plans and identify the necessary staffs such as “Field Observers” to provide the current situational awareness and progress of achieving the established objectives.</p>
<p>Responsible Person/ Organization</p>	<p>U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Juan and St. Thomas, VI Emergency Management (VITEMA) and Homeland Security Departments.</p>

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Completion Date	August 2008
Task 5.0	Assess the accountability of crew and passengers through a unified process to the extent they can return home or are adequately cared for.
Issue 5.1	There are no local (St. Thomas) guidelines or procedures in the current plans to coordinate rescued passengers and crew (accountability) when they are brought ashore to a port or local community.
Recommendation	Develop written procedures on how to process passengers with emphasis on communications between the cruise ship advance team, the vessel agent and the CBP agents at the site. (See enclosure 1)
Improvement Actions	Establish a working group of peers to make recommendations to the IMO, CLIA, PVA, CBP, transit/port authorities, and Emergency Management agencies.
Responsible Person/ Organization	U.S. Coast Guard CG-534 and Passenger Vessel Safety Specialist program facilitate. International Maritime Organization, Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) members Cruise Line International Association (CLIA) safety committee US Coast Guard Office of Search and Rescue US Coast Guard Passenger Vessel Safety Specialist US Coast Guard Research and Development Office US Customs and Border Protection Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management Agency U.S. Coast Guard Passenger Vessel Safety Specialist program will facilitate the working group.
Completion Date	Aug 2009
Issue 5.2	The cruise line was not aware of the safe shelter/reception center locations. The go-team will need the locations in order to provide support to the passengers and crew housed at these sites.
Recommendation	Recommend that the local communities pre- identify the reception centers in their MRO/Safety Management System plans. At a minimum, once established notify the cruise lines of these locations.

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Improvement Actions	St. Thomas, VI Emergency management (VITEMA) and Homeland Security departments /tourism departments, and transit/port authorities should establish list of landing sites and save Shelters/reception centers for the region in conjunction with Sector San Juan.
Responsible Person/ Organization	U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Juan and St. Thomas, VI Emergency Management (VITEMA), Homeland Security, and tourism Departments. U.S. Coast Guard Passenger Vessel Safety Specialist program.
Completion Date	August 2009
Issue 5.3	Outstanding passenger and crew management by the passenger vessel's staff at the landing site.
Recommendation	Cruise lines continuing training program for each lifeboat PIC is successful in crowd management or crowd control.
Improvement Actions	All stakeholders should include this type of training for their personnel to effectively manage passengers and crew in crowd management and crisis situations.
Responsible Person/ Organization	All stakeholders
Completion Date	On going training.
Issue 5.4	The current Mass Rescue Operation and Mass Casualty plans do not list the primary stakeholders in the accountability of passengers and crew and how that information is shared.
Recommendation	Contingency plans should designate the passenger vessels and mass transit authorities as the lead for passenger accountability, and detail general procedures for coordination of information. Planners should ensure this responsibility is funneled down to local MRO/Mass Casualty plans to ensure consistency.
Improvement Actions	All stakeholders and emergency response agencies should review "how" personnel accountability is managed.
Responsible Person/ Organization	U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Juan and St. Thomas, VI Emergency Management (VITEMA) and Homeland Security Departments. U.S. Coast Guard Passenger Vessel Safety Specialist program.
Completion Date	August 2009

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Issue 5.5	The current Mass Rescue Operation and Mass Casualty plans do not anticipate the need for multiple safe shelters/reception centers. Due to the high capacity of passengers on today’s modern passenger vessel, 6000 or more, additional facilities and sites should be identified and included into the Mass Rescue Operation or Mass Casualty plans.
Recommendation	MRO Plans should address the need for multiple reception centers to meet the demands of the larger cruise ships. Temporary portable shelters may be required.
Improvement Actions	Designate the USVI fitness center and Rheinhold center as the primary safe shelter/reception center involving any incident of Mass Rescue Operation or Mass Casualty.
Responsible Person/ Organization	U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Juan and St. Thomas, VI Emergency Management (VITEMA) and Homeland Security Departments. U.S. Coast Guard Passenger Vessel Safety Specialist program.
Completion Date	Aug 2008
Issue 5.6	The International Maritime Organization MSC/Circ. 1079 Search and Rescue Services and Passenger Vessels only addresses MEDEVACs and helicopter sites on the vessels. A standardized process that addresses all facets of Mass Rescue Operations and Mass Casualty plans needs to be implemented.
Recommendation	<p>Establish a standardized accountability process the includes MEDEVACs, evacuee rescue and transportation, landing sites and triage, safe shelters/reception centers, consolidated passenger and crew accountability, and the personnel remaining on site continuing a response effort.</p> <p>Establish some International protocols/guidelines and processes to communicate the actual manifest of passengers to all concerned stakeholders. This could be as simple as building into each Mass Rescue Operation (contingencies) plan the logistical support to provide portable communication devices, i.e. Satellite phones, pre-paid cell phones.</p> <p>a. Develop a Manifest format, i.e. Excel sheet version 2003 or 2007, should be developed to provide all stakeholders with a current accountability process that can be up dated and shared. Each lifeboat or survival craft may or may not have the same initial documented passengers or crew when disembarking the vessel during an ordered evacuation. This actual manifest should be provided to the stakeholders to account for the passengers and crew, provide the support teams the names to commence family assistance programs, situation unit up dates, and family notification with the status of their loved ones.</p>

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	<p>b. Develop a process for sharing/up dating to allow the survival craft manifest names to be transmitted and shared between the ship, responders, and even to each survival craft to up date exactly “who” is aboard each survival craft.</p> <p>c. Initiate a discussion to develop and institute a common interagency web based process to allow continuous situational up dates and up dating of the on going accountability process to allow the on scene coordinator to adjust resources and tactics to achieve total accountability and to allow the Incident management to ability to provide mitigation support using real time information to reduce loss of life, notification of family, further property damage, and overall strategic success.</p>
<p>Improvement Actions</p>	<p>Provide the International Maritime Organization Maritime Safety Committee with the six (6) step process for consideration into the MSC/Circ. 1079. Incorporate the process into the PVA Mass Rescue Operation guidelines that is being drafted for their members.</p> <p>Establish a working group comprised of the organizations listed below to develop the standard protocols that provide the ability to communicate an electronic passenger vessel manifest that can be continuously up dated, integrated for processing by all stakeholders, and developing exercise protocols to evaluate and test the standards in international and national mass rescue operation exercises. Provide an amendment recommendation to the International Maritime Organization maritime Safety Committee (MSC) for review and inclusion into the MSC/Circ.1079, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING PLANS FOR CO-OPERATION BETWEEN SEARCH AND RESCUE SERVICES AND PASSENGER SHIPS</p>
<p>Responsible Person/ Organization</p>	<p>U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters CG-534 and Passenger Vessel Safety Specialist program facilitate. International Maritime Organization, Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) members Cruise Line International Association (CLIA) safety committee US Coast Guard Office of Search and Rescue US Coast Guard Passenger Vessel Safety Specialist US Coast Guard Research and Development Office US Customs and Border Protection Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management Agency</p>

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Completion Date	August 2008
Task 6.0	Communications: Testing the communications to the Department's of Health in PR and VI alerting them of a potential problem with a cruise ship, and testing the communications between (and within) the Territory and Commonwealth.
Issue 6.1	Previous exercises did not reveal the need for long distance capabilities. The cruise line Unified Command could not establish a continuous open line with the “Incident Response Center” throughout the response.
Recommendation	Establish a standard communication process that includes an open continuous telephone or visual teleconference line between a passenger vessels corporate office “Incident Response Center” to the Unified Command location. This will eliminate any communication information disconnects between the “Incident Response Center” room and the support teams at the cruise line headquarters.
Improvement Actions	Establish a Caribbean Island working group of peers (Passenger Vessel Safety Specialist will facilitate) that includes members from emergency management/homeland security/tourism departments, and transit/port authorities to establish guidelines for implementing a standard process of a continuous open telephone or visual teleconference line for Mass Rescue and Mass Casualty incidents.
Responsible Person/ Organization	U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Juan and St. Thomas, VI Emergency Management (VITEMA) and Homeland Security Departments. U.S. Coast Guard Passenger Vessel Safety Specialist program.
Completion Date	August 2009
Issue 6.2	The current Mass Casualty plan did not provide any communication system guidance that connected the on scene responders, single mutual aid frequency, and the safe shelter/reception center (Rheinhold Center). It took approximately two (2) hours to establish interoperable communications using the ACU1000 system.
Recommendation	Establish an effective communication process to relay the accountability to all stakeholders to efficiently to terminate the SAR rescue efforts after all passengers and crew are accounted for and determined to be safe. One comms vehicle was on-scene, there

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	are three other units that could have been deployed, perhaps sending the communications vehicles to all of the locations could have improved communications.
Improvement Actions	Implement into the current Mass Rescue Operation or Mass Casualty plan a communications plan (ICS 205) that includes the ST. Thomas, VI- ACU 1000 system to provide interoperability communications between all stakeholders.
Responsible Person/ Organization	St. Thomas, VI Emergency Management (VITEMA) and Homeland Security departments.
Completion Date	August 2008
Issue 6.3	There is only one (1) mutual aid radio channel available in St. Thomas, VI and it was not able to facilitate the necessary communications to mitigate the exercise incident.
Recommendation	Establish an effective communication process to relay the critical response (on scene), incident management (Situation Unit, Field Observers, Command and General staff) communications.
Improvement Actions	Implement into the current Mass Rescue Operation or Mass Casualty plan a communications plan (ICS 205) that includes the ST. Thomas, VI- ACU 1000 system to provide interoperability communications between all stakeholders.
Responsible Person/ Organization	St. Thomas, VI Emergency Management (VITEMA) and Homeland Security departments.
Completion Date	August 2008
Issue 6.4	The dispatch 911 notifications to the Emergency Medical System were delayed. VITEMA notified EMS instead of the 911 system that was up to date with current lists. The fire and EMS units have individual dispatch offices.
Recommendation	A review of the current 911 system should be conducted with all dispatch centers to improve the notification process. Current system has the Police forwarding notification to the Fire and EMS units.
Improvement Actions	ST. Thomas, VI is preparing to replace the current 911 system and establish a central dispatch location. Developing a Quick Response Card (QRC) for dispatchers would assist in efficient notification and early responses to incidents.

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Responsible Person/ Organization	St. Thomas, VI emergency management (VITEMA) and Homeland Security departments.
Completion Date	Aug 2008
Task 7.0	Security: As requested and required from public health and medical assets in the field.
Issue 7.1	The current St. Thomas Mass Rescue Operation and Mass Casualty plans do not provide guidance for traffic control to move passengers and crew to safe shelters/reception centers or site/facility plans for the Crown Bay facility or other safe shelters/reception centers.
Recommendation	When developing local MRO Plans, local police and taxi association officials should be consulted for solutions to moving passengers and crew rapidly to the reception center.
Improvement Actions	The Police and Taxi Association should be included in all MRO planning meetings. They are the main security and transportation providers on the islands, and can provide valuable insight into plans for moving people and keeping the facilities secure.
Responsible Person/ Organization	ST. Thomas, VI Emergency management (VITEMA) and Homeland Security departments.
Completion Date	August 2008
Task 8.0	Triage: Pre-staging victims at Crown Bay dock in St. Thomas (STT), to simulate Cruise ship evacuees, for triage and transport using the local infrastructure.
Issue 8.1	The Triage tags used on scene were not up to date, i.e. 3 care categories verses 5 categories. It does not appear to be a consistency in triage tag usage or a training program to provide a standard regarding triage procedures.
Recommendation	CLIA members and all passenger vessel operators should adapt a “standard” triage tag, and participate in learning about the local EMS and hospitals triage procedures.

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Improvement Actions	Adopt a triage “standard” for processing passengers and crew involved in an emergency situation to provide an improved “standard of care” for passengers and crew. This will provide the response stakeholders with guidelines to provide immediate triage care using the same procedures. Include these procedures and triage “standards” in the Mass Rescue Operation and Mass Casualty plans.
Responsible Person/ Organization	St. Thomas, VI emergency management (VITEMA) and Homeland Security departments, Health and Human services.
Completion Date	August 2008
Issue 8.2	There is no identified Mass Rescue Operation or Mass Casualty landing/triage site or facilities identified on St. Thomas, VI listed in the current contingency plans.
Recommendation	The MRO plan should pre-identify landing areas/triage sites so that local EMS knows where to go ahead of time, thereby minimizing any delays.
Improvement Actions	Review current contingency plans for pre-established sites or facilities that could be used for landing sites for Mass Rescue Operations or Mass Casualty incidents. If no sites or facilities are identified, establish Crown Bay as a pre-designated site/facility and incorporate the specific details and functional group locations into the contingency plans. A similar review should be conducted for St. John and St. Croix Islands.
Responsible Person/ Organization	St. Thomas, VI emergency management (VITEMA) and Homeland Security departments, Health and Human services.
Completion Date	August 2008
Task 9.0	Volunteers: Utilization of the Medical Reserve Corps to provide surge staffing on STT.

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Issue 9.1	The Red Cross did an excellent job bring water to passengers, oranges and assisting the other agencies in setting up the Crown Bay facilities.
Recommendation	A limited amount of personnel attended the exercise but more personnel would be required for a real event to meet the level of passengers and crew coming ashore at Crown Bay docks.
Improvement Actions	As a cooperating agency they are a critical resource that should be involved in Mass Rescue and Mass Casualty planning. This would provide them with the ability to provide “what” and “how many” resources they would need to meet the demands of a Mass Rescue Operation or Mass Casualty incident.
Responsible Person/ Organization	St. Thomas, VI emergency management (VITEMA) and Homeland Security departments, Health and Human services.
Completion Date	August 2008
Issue 9.2	Human Health Service Incident Response Coordination team has portable triage shelters that were to be provided for medical facilities at Crown Bay and Schneider Medical Hospital.
Recommendation	This element was not exercised due to not being able to provide transport from San Juan, PR to St. Thomas, VI
Improvement Actions	Exercise this resource in the near future. This will also allow for exercising the additional medical staffs.
Responsible Person/ Organization	Human Health Service Incident Response Coordination team.
Completion Date	Aug 2008
Task 10.0 & 11.0	<p>HHS Incident Response Coordination Team: Sending USPHS officers to serve as LNO's in EOC situations to provide situational awareness to Federal ESF 8 lead for advanced planning purposes.</p> <p>Test the internal plans, based on the scenario, for Schneider Regional Medical Center in STT and the Virgin Islands and</p>

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	Puerto Rico Department of Health.
Issue 10.1 & 11.1	This portion was contracted to a private contractor for the ST. Thomas, VI emergency management (VITEMA).
Recommendation	The comments will be provided separately by the contractor.
Improvement Actions	See After Action Report provided by the contractor.
Responsible Person/ Organization	Emergency Management (VITEMA) and Homeland Security Departments.
Completion Date	August 2008



Example Process (Caribbean Mass Rescue Operation 07 Exercise)

6-Step Process for Evacuee Accountability, Care, and Processing

A General:

- Master of vessel makes determination and orders evacuation. Master notifies USCG Command Center and industry EOC of evacuation plan. Notification of impending evacuation is passed as required.
- USCG SAR Mission Controller (SMC) designates an On Scene Commander (OSC), if not already assigned. The OSC is responsible to support the vessel master by coordinating all on scene rescue assets, tracking lifeboats and life rafts, and managing empty life boats/rafts. OSC directs the rescue boats to landing site(s) designated by the unified command, and reports departure of each to USCG command center with total count of evacuees. RCC relays information unified command. Rescue boats report their arrival time at landing site to the OSC, and confirm the total number of persons offloaded. OSC provides additional tasking as required to the rescue boat.
- Recommended actions for the Unified Command are listed in Section C of this document.

B. 6 Step Accountability Process:

1. MEDEVAC patients are tracked by SMC and Operations Section of the Unified Command.

- Specific patient information will be gathered at the earliest time not to interfere with the transport or care of patient and reported to Operations Section Chief.
- If information is not available prior to the patient being admitted to the hospital, Operations Section will coordinate with hospital officials for release of patient information necessary for passenger accountability.
- Patient information will be relayed to check-in officials at Reception Center(s) and to responsible industry party EOC.

2. Evacuees board rescue vessels.

- Each tender or rescue vessel/aircraft will report to the SAR On Scene Coordinator (OSC) the total number of evacuees being transported. OSC will direct the rescue vessel to the unified command designated landing site(s).
- An accurate list of passenger names is not vital at this stage because when the rescue vessel reaches the landing site, the group will likely be split up or combined with others for transport to reception center(s). (A tender holds 100+ passengers; a bus holds 45).
- A secure landing site is critical to keep people from walking off prior to accounting.
- The OSC will keep the SMC or Operations Section Chief informed of rescue operations.

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3. Evacuees arrive at landing site and are transported to reception center(s).
 - Landing sites and reception center(s) shall be inspected prior to the arrival of evacuees.
 - Evacuees requiring decontamination or medical attention will be decontaminated /triaged by local response personnel. Evacuees in need of immediate medical treatment will be transported by local EMS to medical facilities. If possible, patient identification will be gathered prior to transport and provided to accountability branch. If information is not available prior to the patient being admitted to the hospital, USCG will coordinate with hospital officials for release of patient information necessary for passenger accountability.
 - Evacuees not requiring decontamination/medical treatment will be loaded onto buses or other vehicles for transport to reception center(s). Ideally, a responsible industry party official, or other designated person, will accompany each transport vehicle. While en route to the reception center, this official will develop an accurate list of full names (required), cabin numbers (required), and other requested information. If not possible to place a dedicated official on each transport vehicle, the driver, or a reception center official, will collect required information as passengers depart the transport vehicle. At the latest, this tracking information must be taken as evacuees depart the bus or vehicle.
 - For ease of data collection and comparison, a standard format for recording information is recommended, but not critical as long as information is legible and accurate.
 - Throughout the process, the importance of accountability in the rescue process will be stressed to passengers.

4. Evacuees arrive at Reception Center(s).
 - Passengers and crew are escorted into the reception center. The list of evacuees from Step 3 is delivered to the reception area check in manager. Evacuee names are checked against the “souls on board” manifest provided by the agents.
 - Passengers are instructed to stay with their group until processed at the reception area. Accountability is again stressed to evacuees so they do not leave the reception area until processed by the accountability team, or as required, by the Customs and Border Protection Service and law enforcement officials.

Note: Cruise lines cannot compel US citizens to stay in one place, as this may be construed as illegally detaining a person. In the past, some passengers have gotten fed up with waiting and gone off on their own. If passengers are required to be detained for security or other law enforcement purposes, the lead law enforcement agency must be prepared to educate passengers on the legal requirements and provide provisions to enforce the detainment. To encourage evacuees to voluntarily remain during the accountability process, an efficient and rapid check-in process is required. The Unified Command must provide adequate resources to make accountability a smooth process.

- As appropriate, Customs/Border Protection may implement emergency arrival and screening processes.
- If evacuees departed the vessel without proper identification, vessel operators, Customs/Border Protection, and the TSA will coordinate on requirements and processes to permit clearance and travel. Vessel operators often maintain copies of passports or other identification documents for passengers and crew.

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- If available, information sheets are handed out to evacuees.
5. Accountability Reporting.
- An agent appointed by the responsible industry party will consolidate accountability reports from all reception centers. The USCG and Customs may provide resources to assist in this process to speed the flow of information.
 - Consolidated passenger and crew accountability information will be transmitted at regular intervals by the most rapid means available to the RCC and responsible industry party EOC. If desired, the RCC and responsible industry party EOC may again compare the information received to their copy of the “souls on board” list.
 - Terminations of rescue efforts will occur only after all passengers and crew are accounted for and determined to be safe.
 - Responsible industry party shall maintain accountability of passengers and crew ashore until travel arrangements are completed.
6. Accounting for personnel remaining on board vessel.
- As required, once all passengers and non-essential crew are evacuated, the master of the vessel will provide the OSC a list of all personnel remaining on board to continue response efforts. This information will be relayed to the USCG (RCC), reception center, and responsible industry party EOC.

C. Unified Command recommended actions:

1. Implements an evacuee accountability process.
2. Determines / designates best landing site(s) for rescue boats, and relays information to RCC, OSC and responsible industry party EOC.
 - Designation of landing sites will depend on weather, travel distance, water depth, transportation support, and ability to safely discharge passengers from rescue boats, and other local concerns or limiting factors for ground transportation.
3. Unified Command activates and secures landing site(s):
 - Unified Command designates a Landing Area Manager for each site. The Landing Area Manager is responsible for overall site management, security, safety, and ensuring protocols are followed.
 - Responsible party , supported by local community resources and USCG, will normally operate the landing sites
 - Local, state, or federal law enforcement will secure site and be responsible for site security, crowd and traffic control.
 - *If terrorist related incident, landing site(s) shall be inspected for harmful devices prior to the arrival of evacuees, and appropriate actions implemented to deter secondary attacks.*

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- Local emergency response services will establish required decontamination and triage areas at landing site.
 - Port department or facility owner will clear docks and landing areas to facilitate operations.
4. If the situation requires evacuees to be cleared by law enforcement prior to final release, the Unified Command shall implement as quickly as possible procedures to contain all evacuees at the landing site, and to process, screen, and as necessary, interview personnel at the reception center.
5. Unified Command designates helicopter-landing pads as required.
- Assign helicopter pad manager for each site.
 - Informs FAA of sites.
6. Responsible industry party and local agents arrange transport from landing site(s) to reception center(s) for evacuees not in need of immediate medical attention.
- *If terrorist related incident, transport vehicles shall be inspected for harmful devices prior to the arrival of evacuees,, and appropriate actions implemented to deter secondary attacks during transport.*
7. Identifies best options for reception center(s) and coordinates with responsible industry party for activation.
- *If terrorist related incident, reception center(s) shall be inspected for harmful devices prior to the arrival of evacuees, and appropriate actions implemented to deter secondary attacks.*
 - Unified Command establishes an Evacuee Accountability Branch at the appropriate command post or reception center to manage passenger and crew tracking. Responsible Industry party and their agents will normally take the lead, but may be assisted with available resources from the USCG, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Red Cross or other local agency.
 - For a foreign flagged vessel or ship arriving from a foreign country, the US Bureau of Customs and Border Protection may require all passengers and crew to be tracked from landing site to reception center. At the reception center, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection may implement emergency arrival and screening process.

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