



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**HOMELAND SECURITY: WHAT ARE THE
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF DIFFERENT
LOCAL HOMELAND SECURITY ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURES?**

by

William Mark Fitzpatrick

June 2015

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Paul Jonathan Smith
Lauren Fernandez

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

| REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE | | | <i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i> | |
|---|---|--|--|--|
| Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. | | | | |
| 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) | | 2. REPORT DATE June 2015 | 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis | |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE HOMELAND SECURITY: WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF DIFFERENT LOCAL HOMELAND SECURITY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES? | | | 5. FUNDING NUMBERS | |
| 6. AUTHOR(S) William Mark Fitzpatrick | | | | |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000 | | | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER | |
| 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A | | | 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER | |
| 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ___N/A___. | | | | |
| 12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited | | | 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A | |
| 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>After the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the creation of the federal Department of Homeland Security in 2002, many local agencies formed their own homeland security entity. Since that time, significant economic downturns have resulted in reductions in the amount of homeland security funding available to local jurisdictions. Another issue involves the lack of a common definition of homeland security and what it entails and how daily operations are conducted to forward the mission. A jurisdiction wishing to continue to support a homeland security entity needs to make sound decisions as it pertains to these issues in an effort to provide the greatest service to its communities.</p> <p>This thesis analyzed three homeland security organizational structures located within the Metro Atlanta, GA, area to find their advantages and disadvantages using a case study method. The analysis for these structures was based on the mission of each structure, as evaluated based on the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Report, or the mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or both if applicable, their operational functions as they pertain to the mission, and an inspection of each jurisdiction's financial records relating to the overall department budget, homeland security budget, and grant monies.</p> <p>Advantages were noted for all structures along with recommendations that included the addition of mission-specific experts, the improvement of information sharing, jurisdictional relationships, cyber protection, and the proper development of a mission statement.</p> | | | | |
| 14. SUBJECT TERMS homeland security, emergency management, advantages, disadvantages, all-hazards, terrorism, natural disasters, organizational structures, mission, budget, operations | | | 15. NUMBER OF PAGES 117 | |
| | | | 16. PRICE CODE | |
| 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified | 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified | 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified | 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU | |

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

**HOMELAND SECURITY: WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES OF DIFFERENT LOCAL HOMELAND SECURITY
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES?**

William Mark Fitzpatrick
Lieutenant, Gwinnett County Police Department, Lawrenceville, Georgia
B.B.A., Georgia State University, 1990

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2015**

Author: William Mark Fitzpatrick

Approved by: Paul Jonathan Smith
Thesis Co-Advisor

Lauren Fernandez
Thesis Co-Advisor

Mohammed Hafez
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the creation of the federal Department of Homeland Security in 2002, many local agencies formed their own homeland security entity. Since that time, significant economic downturns have resulted in reductions in the amount of homeland security funding available to local jurisdictions. Another issue involves the lack of a common definition of homeland security and what it entails and how daily operations are conducted to forward the mission. A jurisdiction wishing to continue to support a homeland security entity needs to make sound decisions as it pertains to these issues in an effort to provide the greatest service to its communities.

This thesis analyzed three homeland security organizational structures located within the Metro Atlanta, GA, area to find their advantages and disadvantages using a case study method. The analysis for these structures was based on the mission of each structure, as evaluated based on the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Report, or the mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or both if applicable, their operational functions as they pertain to the mission, and an inspection of each jurisdiction's financial records relating to the overall department budget, homeland security budget, and grant monies.

Advantages were noted for all structures along with recommendations that included the addition of mission-specific experts, the improvement of information sharing, jurisdictional relationships, cyber protection, and the proper development of a mission statement.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | | |
|-------------|--|-----------|
| I. | INTRODUCTION..... | 1 |
| | A. PROBLEM STATEMENT | 1 |
| | B. RESEARCH QUESTION | 6 |
| | C. METHOD | 6 |
| | D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW | 9 |
| II. | LITERATURE REVIEW | 11 |
| | A. THE IMPORTANCE OF A CLEARLY DEFINED HOMELAND SECURITY MISSION..... | 11 |
| | B. THE COST/BENEFIT OF DIFFERENT HOMELAND SECURITY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES..... | 16 |
| | C. HOMELAND SECURITY VERSUS ALL-HAZARDS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT | 17 |
| | D. SUMMARY | 20 |
| III. | FACTORS IMPACTING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS .. | 23 |
| | A. TERRORISM VERSUS NATURAL DISASTERS | 23 |
| | B. ROLES OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT | 27 |
| | C. HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT FUNDING..... | 28 |
| | D. SUMMARY | 30 |
| IV. | CASE STUDY A: LAW ENFORCEMENT HOMELAND SECURITY ENTITY | 31 |
| | A. BACKGROUND | 31 |
| | B. MISSION | 33 |
| | C. OPERATIONS | 35 |
| | D. BUDGETARY INFORMATION | 37 |
| | E. ANALYSIS | 40 |
| V. | CASE STUDY B: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT HOMELAND SECURITY | 45 |
| | A. BACKGROUND | 45 |
| | B. MISSION | 47 |
| | C. OPERATIONS | 50 |
| | D. BUDGETARY INFORMATION | 53 |
| | E. ANALYSIS | 55 |
| VI. | CASE STUDY C: INTEGRATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT HOMELAND SECURITY | 61 |
| | A. BACKGROUND | 61 |
| | B. MISSION | 64 |
| | 1. Dekalb Office of Homeland Security..... | 65 |
| | 2. Dekalb Emergency Management Agency | 68 |

| | | |
|-------------|--|-----------|
| C. | OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES | 68 |
| 1. | Dekalb Office of Homeland Security..... | 68 |
| 2. | Dekalb Emergency Management Agency | 70 |
| D. | BUDGETARY INFORMATION | 71 |
| E. | ANALYSIS | 73 |
| VII. | RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION..... | 79 |
| A. | ALIGNMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL MISSION TO THE FEDERAL MISSION | 79 |
| 1. | Operational Characteristics..... | 80 |
| 2. | Budget Considerations..... | 80 |
| B. | RECOMMENDATIONS..... | 81 |
| 1. | Provide Experts for All Five Missions of the QHSR As Part of Homeland Security Personnel..... | 81 |
| 2. | Improve Information Sharing | 82 |
| 3. | Closer Relationships between Local, State, and Federal Authorities | 82 |
| 4. | Improve Protection for Cyber Infrastructure..... | 83 |
| 5. | Development of a Mission Statement | 84 |
| C. | LIMITATIONS AND NEED FOR FUTURE RESEARCH | 84 |
| D. | CONCLUSION | 86 |
| | LIST OF REFERENCES..... | 89 |
| | INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST | 95 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| | | |
|------------|---|----|
| Figure 1. | Atlanta Police Department Organizational Chart | 32 |
| Figure 2. | Atlanta Police Overall Budget and the Homeland Security Budget (in Million Dollars/Year)..... | 39 |
| Figure 3. | Atlanta Police Homeland Security Grant Funding (in Million Dollars/Year)..... | 40 |
| Figure 4. | Hall County Fire Department Organizational Chart..... | 46 |
| Figure 5. | Overall Fire Budget versus EMA/Homeland Security Budget..... | 54 |
| Figure 6. | EMA/Homeland Security Grant Funding | 55 |
| Figure 7. | Dekalb County Police Department Organizational Chart..... | 62 |
| Figure 8. | Dekalb County Fire Rescue Organizational Chart..... | 63 |
| Figure 9. | Dekalb Emergency Management Organizational Chart | 64 |
| Figure 10. | Dekalb Overall Police/Fire Budget versus Homeland Security Budget | 72 |
| Figure 11. | Dekalb Homeland Security Grant Funding..... | 73 |

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF TABLES

| | | |
|----------|--|----|
| Table 1. | Summary of Homeland Security Definitions..... | 13 |
| Table 2. | Atlanta Police Homeland Security Compliance with QHSR..... | 35 |
| Table 3. | Advantages and Disadvantages of the Law Enforcement Homeland Security Entity | 43 |
| Table 4. | Alignment of HCEMA Missions to the QHSR Missions | 50 |
| Table 5. | Advantages and Disadvantages of the HCEMA Model | 58 |
| Table 6. | Dekalb Office of Homeland Security Compliance with QHSR | 67 |
| Table 7. | Advantages and Disadvantages of the Integrated Law Enforcement and Emergency Management Homeland Security Entity..... | 78 |

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------|---|
| 9/11 | September 11, 2001 |
| AFCEMA | Atlanta Fulton County Emergency Management Agency |
| APD | Atlanta Police Department |
| CBRN | chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear |
| CCS | Cyber Crime Squad |
| CEM | Certified Emergency Manager |
| CHDS | Center for Homeland Defense and Security |
| CI | critical infrastructure |
| CID | Criminal Investigations Division |
| CIKR | critical infrastructure and key resources |
| COOP | continuity of operations plan |
| DEMA | DeKalb Emergency Management Agency |
| DHS | Department of Homeland Security |
| DOHS | Dekalb County Office of Homeland Security |
| EMPG | Emergency Management Performance Grant |
| EOC | emergency operations center |
| EOD | Explosive Ordinance Disposal |
| ESF | emergency support function |
| FBI | Federal Bureau of Investigation |
| FEMA | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| FOUO | For Official Use Only |
| GBI | Georgia Bureau of Investigation |
| GISAC | Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center |
| GTD | global terrorism database |
| HCEMA | Hall County Emergency Management Agency |
| HCFD | Hall County Fire Department |
| HCSO | Hall County Sheriff's Office |
| HMGP | Hazard Mitigation Grant Program |
| HSGP | Homeland Security Grant Program |
| HSPD-5 | Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 |
| HSPD-7 | Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 |
| HSPD-8 | Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 |
| HUMINT | human intelligence |

| | |
|-------|---|
| ICE | Immigration and Customs Enforcement |
| ISE | information sharing environment |
| IT | information technology |
| IUSSD | integrated United States security database |
| JTTF | Joint Terrorism Task Force |
| KR | key resources |
| NCTC | National Counterterrorism Center |
| NIMS | National Response Plan, the National Incident Management System |
| OEM | office of emergency management |
| POD | point of distribution |
| QHSR | Quadrennial Homeland Security Review |
| SAR | suspicious activity report |
| SES | Special Enforcement Section |
| SNS | strategic national stockpile |
| SWAT | Special Weapons and Tactics |
| U.S. | United States |
| UASI | Urban Area Security Initiative |

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis examines three different types of homeland security organizational structures currently being used in the Metro Atlanta, GA, area and shows the advantages and disadvantages of each structure. The first structure is the law enforcement homeland security entity. This structure is based within a police department, with most personnel consisting of police officers and is mainly centered on the prevention and response to terrorism. The second structure is the emergency management homeland security entity. The emphasis is on prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery to both natural and man-made incidents. The personnel in this structure are primarily civilians with an emergency management background whose main concern is the development of plans. Law enforcement is used in this structure on an as-needed basis for their input and expertise. The third and final structure is the integrated law enforcement/emergency management homeland security entity. As the name suggests, this entity contains personnel from both the law enforcement and emergency management disciplines; however, they both work under the same leadership.

To answer the research question “what are the advantages and disadvantages of different local homeland security organizational structures?” the following areas were analyzed:

- The alignment of the organizational mission as compared to the federal mission for homeland security and emergency management. The federal mission for homeland security was based on the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Report. The federal mission for emergency management was based on the mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
- The operational characteristics of each structure to include the duties, responsibilities, and functions executed by each entity.
- Budget concerns and their effects on continuing to fund homeland security initiatives on the local level and the amount of federal grant funding used in this regard.

The method of this analysis revolves around case studies completed for each homeland security entity. Each case study looked at the mission of the entity, the operational duties of the entity and its budget as it pertains to the overall departmental

budget along with the monies allocated to homeland security and grant funding. As to the homeland security mission, the missions of each homeland security entity were compared with the core missions of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), which consist of 1) prevent terrorism and enhance security, 2) secure and manage this nation's borders, 3) enforce and administer immigration laws, 4) safeguard and secure cyberspace, and 5) ensure resilience to disasters.¹

For jurisdictions with an emergency management entity, their mission was compared to the mission statement of the FEMA, which states, “Emergency Management protects communities by coordinating and integrating all activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the capability to mitigate against, prepare for, respond to, and recover from threatened or actual natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other man-made disasters.”²

Operations were studied for each homeland security entity through their written policy and procedure documents, as well as information obtained from leaders and managers. The day-to-day operations of the entity are important to ensure the operational characteristics are in alignment with the federal mission so funding can be received through federal grants. Grant guidance can play a factor in whether a jurisdiction receives federal funding for its homeland security entity.

Lastly, the budgets for each homeland security entity were analyzed to ascertain the amount of money allocated to the overall departmental budget, the homeland security budget, and funds obtained from federal grants. The information was taken from available annual budget documents for the earliest year after 9/11 until the latest year available at the time of this analysis.

After looking at each homeland security organizational structure, a number of recommendations were made that could benefit each entity. These recommendations

¹ Department of Homeland Security, *Quadrennial Homeland Security Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 76–79.

² Wayne Blanchard, *Guide to Emergency Management and Related Terms, Definitions, Concepts, Acronyms, Organizations, Programs, Guidance, Executive Orders, and Legislation, A Tutorial on Emergency Management, Broadly Defined, Past and Present* (Washington, DC: FEMA, 2008), 344.

include: 1) provide experts for all five missions of the QHSR as part of homeland security personnel, 2) improve information sharing, 3) acquire closer relationships between local, state, and federal authorities, 4) improve protection for cyber infrastructure, and 5) develop a mission statement.

It is vitally important for each local jurisdiction to devise a homeland security structure that best fits its jurisdictions needs. The purpose of this thesis is to give local homeland security leaders and elected officials a better understanding of differing homeland security organizational structures so they can make an educated decision as to what may work best for their community.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my Lord and Savior Jesus Christ who allowed me to be accepted to this very prestigious institution and for giving me the wherewithal to complete the requirements for my master's degree. I would also like to thank my late wife, Kelly, who through her unconditional love, selflessness, and devotion, encouraged me to apply to the program knowing the amount of time and dedication it would take to complete.

To Linda Ashworth, a very special person in my life, for her love and support throughout this incredible experience. The encouragement and understanding she offered during the difficult times were heartfelt and will never be forgotten.

To my aunt, Gayle Greavu-Comely, a college English professor, who completed many hours of proofreading my initial application essays even though she had a tremendous amount of her own work to do. My acceptance into the program shows how great she is at her profession.

Thank you to my Mom, Dad, and sister, Melissa, for the support and confidence they have in me. This challenge could have never been completed without them. To the rest of my family, including Jay and Jean Tredway, for putting me at ease knowing things at home were being taken care of during my trips to Monterey. Most importantly, thank you for taking care of my dog, Reo.

To Mr. Charlie English, former director of the Georgia Emergency Management Agency, and Mr. Greg Swanson, director of the Gwinnett County Office of Emergency Management, for having enough confidence in me to pen a recommendation letter on my behalf for admission to the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS). Also, to Jonna West, an alum of the Naval Postgraduate School, who helped and encouraged me through the application process.

I would like to thank the members of Cohorts 1301 and 1302 who have been such a blessing to me. It was great to know we could count on each other for anything, whether it was assistance on assignments, encouragement, or solving life's problems in

the Trident room. I am honored and humbled to be part of such a brilliant group of homeland security practitioners.

I would like to thank my thesis advisors, Dr. Lauren Fernandez and Mr. Paul Jonathan Smith, for having the patience, support, and superb expertise to get me to the finish line. I would also like to thank the CHDS faculty and staff for their ability to challenge our thoughts and beliefs on many homeland security issues. I would be remiss if I did not recognize those from CHDS who kept our travel itineraries straight and our computers up and running throughout this journey.

And finally, to the former Gwinnett County Police Department Chief of Police, Charles Walters, and my command staff, thank you for your continuous support during the last 18 months. Without your support, this tremendous educational opportunity could not have happened.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002, many local jurisdictions enacted policy creating a homeland security entity. These jurisdictions have spent large amounts of money to support homeland security on the local level and comply with federal mandates.¹ Since that time, the amount of homeland security funding available to local jurisdictions has been reduced, as well as a loss of revenue for many departments due to the downturn in the economy. A jurisdiction wishing to continue to support a homeland security entity needs to make sound decisions as to what type of organizational structure would provide the most benefit. This thesis offers a comparative analysis for three organizational structures to assist local jurisdictions in this decision. The three organizational structures discussed are a law enforcement homeland security entity, an emergency management homeland security entity, and an integrated law enforcement and emergency management homeland security entity.

The first structure, a law enforcement homeland security entity, is under the control of law enforcement and is centered on terrorism and other local criminal matters. The second, an emergency management homeland security entity, is an emergency management entity dealing with all hazards, but instead of emergency managers and law enforcement working hand in hand with each other on a daily basis, law enforcement is used more often in working groups when needed for their expertise on certain projects. The third, an integrated law enforcement and emergency management homeland security entity, involves law enforcement and civilian emergency managers working together under the same leadership on a daily basis and planning for all possible contingencies.

Local jurisdictions wishing to continue a homeland security program face several challenges that must be addressed for their programs to be successful. The challenges addressed in this thesis are the lack of a common definition for homeland security that

¹ Kiki Caruson and Susan A. MacManus, "Mandates and Management Challenges in the Trenches: An Intergovernmental Perspective on Homeland Security," *Public Administration Review* 66, no. 4 (2006): 528.

can lead to mission confusion, funding considerations due to the downturn of the economy in recent years, and deciding if the focus of the homeland security entity should be on terrorism or concentrate on all hazards emergency management. The focus chosen will affect not only the operations that are executed by the entity, but also the organizational structure. Regardless of the concept chosen, the importance of proper communication between each discipline is vital. Intelligence information must also be properly disseminated between both disciplines so planning and mitigation can be conducted accurately.

In the current realm of local homeland security, as on the federal level, mission confusion occurs because no common definition of homeland security has been proffered. Shawn Reece states that strategic documents and mission statements have varying missions developed from different homeland security definitions.² According to Brian Gerber et al., in their 2005 article titled, “On the Front Line American Cities and the Challenge of Homeland Security Preparedness,” clearly articulated missions, goals, and strategies are critical to effective policy.³

Most jurisdictions have an office of emergency management whose job is to prepare, mitigate, respond to, and recover from a variety of disasters, including terrorist attacks; therefore, could homeland security be integrated under the all-hazards comprehensive emergency management concept? Homeland security being absorbed under this auspice may relieve the challenges of mission confusion, cost/funding issues, and duplication of services regarding grant administration; however, it could also lead to other challenges. Since most emergency management positions are occupied by civilians, these challenges could be allowing the investigation of terrorism on the local level to diminish or be severely reduced, operational challenges, such as coordinating communication between emergency management and law enforcement personnel, and gaining intelligence necessary to manage terrorist threats properly.

² Shawn Reese, *Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional Considerations* (CRS Report No. R42462) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 1.

³ Brian J. Gerber et al., “On the Front Line American Cities and the Challenge of Homeland Security Preparedness,” *Urban Affairs Review* 41, no. 2 (2005): 185.

A clearly defined homeland security mission is important, but may be difficult to obtain due to the lack of a consistent definition of what constitutes homeland security. The mission and goals of a local jurisdiction could affect the eligibility for federal grants if it does not fall under what the federal government deems a homeland security function. The annual Homeland Security Grant Program Guidance requires urban areas to describe their homeland security objectives and goals along with other information in the grant application process.⁴ A clear mission would also help focus, direct, and prioritize homeland security activities.⁵

Federal homeland security grants have offered both homeland security and emergency management funding for equipment, communications, and training; however, these benefits also caused challenges for local governments. Compliance with federal mandates is one of these challenges that affect both disciplines. As with other levels of government, the local level is experiencing budget constraints that make it difficult to comply with federal mandates. Heavy financial burdens are placed on local governments to meet these standards. These mandates also cause an increase in administrative duties used to oversee the implementation and policy changes needed to conform to the mandates set forth.⁶

Federal mandates are placed on local governments through legislation to be eligible to receive grant funding. The objective of these mandates is to standardize and encourage preparedness at the local level and to improve intergovernmental coordination. The goal of *the National Response Plan*, *the National Incident Management System* (NIMS), and the *National Preparedness Goal*, are to assist with this standardization.⁷

The financial challenges to local governments through the federal mandates along with other budget constraints may cause some jurisdictions to consider the elimination of an independent homeland security entity. The expenses associated with an independent

⁴ Shawn Reese, *Homeland Security Grants: Evolution of Program Guidance and Grant Allocation Methods* (Order Code RL33583) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), CRS-2.

⁵ Reese, *Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional Considerations*, 2.

⁶ Caruson and MacManus, "Mandates and Management Challenges in the Trenches," 528.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 524.

entity could entail the cost of maintaining office equipment, the expense of budgeting for separate personnel and administrative tasks, and the possibility of duplication of services between the two disciplines.

Intelligence is an important factor in both homeland security and emergency management. Some personnel in both disciplines may have access to intelligence information and others may not. For each jurisdiction, the question of who has clearance within homeland security and emergency management regarding classified and For Official Use Only (FOUO) documents was explored. Intelligence information including the vulnerabilities and any potential targets within the jurisdiction is important to understand when producing mitigation plans. Without this information, planning would suffer because the focus could be on the wrong targets, and also, not knowing the vulnerabilities of the targets makes mitigation difficult. How intelligence information is received and shared within the organizational structure, as well as how it is shared with outside jurisdictions, was analyzed.

Communication is important between emergency managers and homeland security. During an emergency event, communication can be enhanced through the emergency operations center (EOC). All disciplines are in one room and are receiving the same information; however, keeping this line of communication open is also important during every day operations. Planning for all types of scenarios from natural and man-made disasters to terrorism requires an information flow between these two disciplines. William Waugh, a professor of public affairs at Georgia State University, stated, "Collaboration is a necessary foundation for dealing with both natural and technological hazards and disasters and the consequences of terrorism."⁸ Communication was examined in the three organizational structures to determine the strengths and weaknesses of each structure.

These challenges faced by local governments could possibly be rectified to some extent by maintaining an all-hazards emergency management approach without the need for a separate homeland security entity. Also, due to the budgetary limits, it is important

⁸ William L. Waugh and Gregory Streib, "Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency Management," *Public Administration Review* 66, no. s1 (2006): 131.

to ascertain how local governments can continue to meet the obligation of protecting its citizens from all hazards without unnecessarily increasing spending or expanding government. Increased spending and expansion of government occurred when homeland security was implemented on the local level,⁹ and it may not be sustainable.

The question may be asked, “If homeland security was eliminated on a local level, could emergency management take on its role?” This concept is a possibility; however, associated challenges occur as well, such as having access to the same information requiring the same security clearance law enforcement has. Without this clearance, investigating and gathering intelligence on terrorist groups that may pose a threat would be difficult to obtain. Emergency managers need to be provided appropriate security clearances to have the information needed to prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from terrorist events. Two years after September 11, 2001 (9/11), only half the state and local offices of emergency management (OEM) received guidance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) concerning the types of information regarding terrorism activity.¹⁰ Also, only six percent local OEMs applied for security clearances after 9/11.¹¹ Law enforcement and emergency management must also have a close working relationship for this model to be a success.

After 9/11, the question of “Do we need a department of homeland security?” became a controversy. The Bush administration did not want to create the department, but bowed to political pressure.¹² Thomas Birkland of North Carolina State University stated, “From an emergency management perspective, there was little about the September 11 attacks that suggested major problems with emergency management in the United States that would require the inclusion of FEMA into DHS.”¹³ These statements

⁹ Donald F. Kettl, “Contingent Coordination Practical and Theoretical Puzzles for Homeland Security,” *The American Review of Public Administration* 33, no. 3 (2003): 253–277.

¹⁰ Lois M. Davis et al., *Combating Terrorism: How Prepared Are State and Local Response Organizations?* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 11.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 12, Table 2.2.

¹² Thomas A. Birkland, “Disasters, Catastrophes, and Policy Failure in the Homeland Security Era,” *Review of Policy Research* 26, no. 4 (2009): 424.

¹³ *Ibid.*

questioned the need for a homeland security entity at the federal level, but could also have meaning on the local level. This thesis directly addressed homeland security issues for local jurisdictions.

B. RESEARCH QUESTION

The research question posed for this thesis is, “Homeland Security: What are the advantages and disadvantages of different local homeland security organizational structures?” It is important to look at all three structures and determine what makes the most sense based on the mission of the jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions may want to focus on terrorism, whereas others may want a more all-hazards approach. Funding as it pertains to the operating budget and grant monies awarded could also influence the structure utilized. Each structure possesses advantages and disadvantages that could affect the direction the jurisdiction decides to take; therefore, it is important to realize these benefits and detriments.

C. METHOD

A case study of each organization type was conducted to answer the research question. The Metro Atlanta region was chosen for the cases because of the commonality of natural disaster and man-made threats, as well as having jurisdictions that represent each of the structures to be analyzed. The importance of this study is that it allows jurisdictions in the Metro Atlanta area to choose which structure would best benefit them from a mission and budgetary standpoint.

The case studies focus on the mission of homeland security and emergency management on the local level. This study looked at the following issues to assist jurisdictions in finding the best solution on how to conduct homeland security on the local level.

- The alignment of the organizational mission versus the federal mission for homeland security and emergency management. The more closely aligned the mission statement and the listed responsibilities are to the federal mission will determine if the jurisdiction is eligible for federal grant funding.

- The operational characteristics of each structure to include the duties, responsibilities, and functions executed by each entity. Although each structure's concern is with homeland security issues, each approached its way of achieving its goals based on the type of structure utilized. While each structure studied is different, similarities also occur.
- Budget concerns and its effects on continuing to fund homeland security initiatives on the local level and the amount of federal grant funding used in this regard. If the jurisdiction cannot receive enough funding through its operating budget and cannot supplement it with grant funding, then it would be difficult to support homeland security functions.

The first step was to compare the local organizational missions to federal ones to ascertain how closely they align. This alignment is important because it can affect the awarding of federal grants and can give the local jurisdiction guidance for tasks to be performed in its operational plan.

For each jurisdiction containing a homeland security entity, its written mission statement was compared against the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), which defines the missions of the federal DHS.¹⁴ The core missions listed in the QHSR are: 1) prevent terrorism and enhance security, 2) secure and manage this nation's borders, 3) enforce and administer immigration laws, 4) safeguard and secure cyberspace, and 5) ensure resilience to disasters.¹⁵

In regard to the mission of preventing terrorism and enhancing security, the QHSR objectives are to:

- understand, deter, and protect against terrorist attacks and stop the spread of violent extremism, as well as engage communities and protect government leaders,
- anticipate, control, and protect against hostile uses of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) attacks, and
- manage risks to critical infrastructure.¹⁶

For jurisdictions with an emergency management entity, their mission was compared to the mission statement of the FEMA, which states, "Emergency Management

¹⁴ "Our Mission," accessed May 2014, <http://www.dhs.gov/our-mission>.

¹⁵ Department of Homeland Security, *Quadrennial Homeland Security Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 76–79.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

protects communities by coordinating and integrating all activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the capability to mitigate against, prepare for, respond to, and recover from threatened or actual natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other man-made disasters.”¹⁷

A budget comparison was conducted on each of the jurisdictions within the different organizational structures to examine funding for homeland security and emergency management. The comparison began with the earliest year possible after 9/11 and continued to the latest year available. The subject matter for this analysis consisted of an inspection of the budgets allocated to homeland security and emergency management.

The operational aspect of each jurisdiction was also examined. While the mission was compared to the QHSR, the actual tasks performed within the jurisdiction’s homeland security and emergency management entity were studied to see how closely these tasks compare to the mission statement.

Lastly, a comparative analysis of the three types of organizational structures was conducted to include possible advantages and disadvantages of each structure.

The information contained in this study was obtained through both written documentation and information obtained from leaders and decision makers in each of the three jurisdictions representing each organizational structure. Literature, and policy and procedure documents, were acquired along with financial records and grant money allocation records from the chosen jurisdictions. Organizational charts along with the operations as they relate to the duties performed by personnel for these jurisdictions may be analyzed to examine possible duplication of services between homeland security and other areas in the jurisdiction with similar responsibilities. When information was not available in written form, information was given by leaders and decision makers including homeland security directors, emergency management directors, and chiefs of fire or police services or their designees.

¹⁷ Wayne Blanchard, *Guide to Emergency Management and Related Terms, Definitions, Concepts, Acronyms, Organizations, Programs, Guidance, Executive Orders, and Legislation, A Tutorial on Emergency Management, Broadly Defined, Past and Present* (Washington, DC: FEMA, 2008), 344.

D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

This chapter introduced concerns that local jurisdictions are experiencing regarding how they incorporate homeland security. These problems include defining a homeland security mission, budget constraints, and determining the best organizational structure that fits their needs with intelligence, and communication between disciplines being an important factor for consideration. It is acknowledged that an organizational structure that works for some jurisdictions may not work for others. This analysis gives local jurisdictions information to be considered when deciding on an organizational structure.

Chapter II is the literature review. The review included literature written by both practitioners and academics that addressed mission definition, budgeting, and the differences between homeland security and the all-hazards concept of emergency management.

Chapter III covers the debate over the significance given to terrorism incidents versus natural disasters, determines if differences in the definition and missions in homeland security and the all-hazards emergency management concept exist, and introduces common sources of funding for homeland security and emergency management and the resulting challenges. Both practitioners and academics have produced literature that discusses these topics. Each topic plays a role in the decision of which organizational structure should be chosen by a jurisdiction based on its mission and responsibilities.

Chapters IV, V, and VI reviewed each organizational structure: law enforcement homeland security, emergency management homeland security, and integrated law enforcement/emergency management homeland security, respectively. For each structure the following is presented.

- The missions of the QHSR and the mission of FEMA were compared to the jurisdiction's mission
- The operations of each structure were studied to determine if they coincide more to terrorism, natural disasters, or all hazards

- The budget for each structure was examined for total funding versus that allotted for homeland security and emergency management along with grant funding

Chapter VII concludes this thesis with the evaluation of information from each of the organizational structures and makes recommendations based on the information learned from the case studies. This chapter also shows the limitations of this study along with the need for future research into this subject matter.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review explores research that is important in discovering theories and thoughts on a national and local level regarding problems arising from the lack of a definitive mission for homeland security, budgeting issues as they relate to local jurisdictions, and homeland security as a separate entity or as a part of the all-hazards emergency management concept. Through the study of this literature, local jurisdictions could gain knowledge in determining smart practices as it relates to organizational structure for homeland security. Although some of the literature is dated, it still offers information that needs to be considered.

An abundance of literature and research encompasses the all-hazards concept, grant allocation, funding for homeland security, and the mission confusion associated with no proper definition of homeland security. However, much research does not seem to have been conducted on how these issues affect homeland security on the local level. The categories examined in this literature review include the following.

- The importance of a clearly defined homeland security mission
- Budget comparisons of homeland security organizational structures
- Homeland security versus all-hazard emergency management

A. THE IMPORTANCE OF A CLEARLY DEFINED HOMELAND SECURITY MISSION

The definition of homeland security is unclear on the federal level, causing confusion on the local levels as well. The entity responsible for homeland security on the local level, whether it be a standalone homeland security, all-hazards emergency management, or an integration of the two, needs a clear homeland security definition to determine its mission properly. Federal homeland security is still lacking in foundational principles and has left state and local governments with the problem of how to implement homeland security missions.¹⁸

¹⁸ Deanne B. Criswell, "Homeland Security: Developing National Doctrine to Guide State Strategy Development" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012).

The local jurisdictions must comply with federal mandates so that they may qualify for homeland security grants that help to offset some of the expenses incurred on the local level. According to a 2005 study by Veronique De Rugy titled “What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy?” one reason the mission seems unclear is because some of the activities associated with the DHS are not actually homeland security related.¹⁹

Another concurring view is expressed by Shawn Reese, an analyst in emergency management and homeland security policy for the Congressional Research Service, when he stated,

There is no evidence in the existing homeland security strategic documents that supports the aligning and prioritization of the varied missions, nor do any of the documents convey how national, state, or local resources are to be allocated to achieve these missions. Arguably, without prioritized resource allocation to aligned missions, the nation’s homeland security activities and operations may be haphazard and inconsistent.²⁰

The problem of not having a clearly defined mission can also lead back to the fact that no agreement exists in the definition of the discipline itself, which is evident when government documents, such as the *2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security*, the *2010 National Security Strategy*, and the *2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, are examined.

According to another statement made by Shawn Reece in 2012 presented to the Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations & Management House of Representatives,

The debate over the varied definitions persists as the federal government continues to issue and implement homeland security strategy. All of the strategic documents discussed in this written testimony define homeland security as security efforts; however, each one defines these efforts in different terms. Examples of these documents include the *2007* and *2010 National Security Strategy*, the *Strategic Plan—One Team, One Mission*,

¹⁹ Veronique De Rugy, “What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy?” *American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research* (2005): 8.

²⁰ Reese, *Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional Considerations*, 3.

*Securing Our Homeland; the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review; and the Bottom-Up Review.*²¹

Table 1 shows the varying definitions of homeland security as it relates to the aforementioned documents.

Table 1. Summary of Homeland Security Definitions²²

| Document | Definition |
|---|--|
| 2010 <i>National Security Strategy</i> | A seamless coordination among federal, state, and local governments to prevent, protect against and respond to threats and natural disasters ²³ |
| 2007 <i>National Strategy for Homeland Security</i> | A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. ²⁴ |
| 2010 <i>Quadrennial Homeland Security Review</i> | A concerted national effort to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards where American interests, aspirations, and ways of life can thrive ²⁵ |
| 2007 <i>U.S. Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2008–2013</i> | A unified national effort to prevent and deter terrorist attacks, protect and respond to hazards, and to secure the national borders ²⁶ |
| 2011 <i>National Strategy For Counterterrorism</i> | Defensive efforts to counter terrorist threats ²⁷ |
| 2010 <i>Bottom-Up Review</i> | Preventing terrorism, responding to and recovering from natural disasters, customs enforcement and collection of customs revenue, administration of legal immigration services, safety and stewardship of the nation’s waterways and marine transportation system, as well as other legacy missions of the various components of DHS ²⁸ |

²¹ Reese, *Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional Considerations*, 8–9.

²² Shawn Reese, “Is DHS Effectively Implementing a Strategy to Counter Emerging Threats,” U.S. House of Representatives, Committee of Homeland Security, February 2012, 4, <http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-dhs-effectively-implementing-strategy-counter-emerging-threats>.

²³ Office of the President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: Office of the President, 2010), 2.

²⁴ Homeland Security Council, *The National Homeland Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: Office of the President, 2007), 1.

²⁵ Department of Homeland Security, *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2010), 13.

²⁶ Department of Homeland Security, *One Team, One Mission, Securing the Homeland: U.S. Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2008–2013* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 3.

²⁷ Office of the President, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* (Washington, DC: Office of the President, 2011), 11.

²⁸ Department of Homeland Security, *Bottom-Up Review* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2010), 3.

Each definition has a common theme of preventing or securing the United States (U.S.) from different types of threats; however, some definitions list missions not even mentioned in the others.

Additionally, in 2013, Jerome H. Kahan, an analyst at the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute located in Arlington, VA, shows many missions associated with homeland security are not even related to the discipline. His article for the *Journal of Homeland Security Education* stated, “When DHS was formed, the Department was given a significant array of explicitly designated *non*-homeland security responsibilities in addition to its primary homeland security missions.”²⁹ Some of these non-homeland security responsibilities include transnational criminal threats, administering and enforcing U.S. immigration laws, ensuring that appropriate customs fees are paid, preventing successful money laundering, keeping U.S. waterways safe, intercepting smuggling over the border of drugs, arms, humans, and illegal flora and fauna, and enforcing customs regulations.³⁰

Confusion in the mission is also seen where local law enforcement is involved. William Pelfrey, a writer for the *Criminal Justice Policy Review*, asserts that the federal government directed local law enforcement agencies to take steps toward terrorism preparedness and prevention, but the objectives were ambiguous and provided limited guidance.³¹

Several presidential directives establish guidelines that help to support the mission of homeland security. The 2011 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) states,

This directive is aimed at strengthening the security and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters. Our national

²⁹ Jerome H. Kahan, “What’s in a Name? The Meaning of Homeland Security,” *Journal of Homeland Security Education* 2 (2013): 4.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ William V. Pelfrey, “An Exploratory Study of Local Homeland Security Preparedness Findings and Implications for Future Assessments,” *Criminal Justice Policy Review* 20, no. 3 (2009): 263–264.

preparedness is the shared responsibility of all levels of government, the private and nonprofit sectors, and individual citizens.³²

The 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) has the objective of ensuring that all levels of government across the nation have the capability to work efficiently and effectively together by developing an incident management system to improve crisis management.³³ Coordination between agencies was seen as a major problem during the attacks of 9/11. This directive was put in place to attempt to rectify this problem.

Federal departments and agencies have labeled some infrastructure around the nation as being critical. According to the 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) “The term “Federal departments and agencies” means those executive departments enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, and the Department of Homeland Security; independent establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1); Government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C. 103(1); and the United States Postal Service.”³⁴

Under the 2003 Homeland Security Act, which references the definition in the PATRIOT Act, the term “critical infrastructure” (CI) means “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”³⁵ The term “key resources” (KR) means “publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy and government.”³⁶ HSPD-7 “establishes a national policy for Federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize United

³² Barack Obama, *National Preparedness*, Presidential Policy Directive PPD-8, Washington, DC: Barack Obama, 2011, Appendix B, 1.

³³ George W. Bush, *Management of Domestic Incidents*, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, Washington, DC: George W. Bush, 2003, 1.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 1817.

³⁵ *Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001*, Sec. 1016, Critical Infrastructures Protection (e) Critical Infrastructure Defined, H.R. 3162–130.

³⁶ George W. Bush, *Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection*, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, Washington, DC: George W. Bush, 2003, Attachment B.

States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist attacks.”³⁷

B. THE COST/BENEFIT OF DIFFERENT HOMELAND SECURITY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

The uncertainty of funding for local jurisdictions after 9/11 has led most local jurisdictions to look for ways to save money and to budget more wisely. The United States General Accounting Office released a 2002 study titled, *National Preparedness*, which stated,

Since September 11th, many state and local governments have faced declining revenues and increased security costs. A survey of about 400 conducted by the National League of Cities reported that since September 11th, one in three American cities saw their local economies, revenues, and public confidence decline while public-safety is up. Further, the National Governors Association estimates year 2002 state budget shortfalls of between \$40 billion and \$50 billion, making it increasingly difficult for the states to take on expensive, new homeland security initiatives without federal assistance.³⁸

Although this study is dated, many local jurisdictions are still experiencing budget shortfalls.

According to a 2008 study titled, “Financing Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness: Use of Interlocal Cost-Sharing,” homeland security, natural disaster preparedness, and emergency management in general, often require major capital expenditures. The study also stated that the capital budgets of most local jurisdictions are underfunded.³⁹

³⁷ Bush, *Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection*, Attachment B.

³⁸ Randall A. Yim, *National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security* (GAO-02-621T) (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002), 17.

³⁹ Susan A. MacManus and Kiki Caruson, “Financing Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness: Use of Interlocal Cost-Sharing,” *Public Budgeting & Finance* (Summer 2008): 53.

Another 2009 study titled, “Local Emergency Management Funding: An Evaluation of County Budgets” stated that jurisdictions over 100,000 people found the most pronounced homeland security concern to be lack of funding.⁴⁰

The cost of operating an independent homeland security department could be a concern, and also, a large part of the overall budget; however, it is the local jurisdiction’s duty to protect its citizens in the best way possible. The decision to eliminate homeland security from local jurisdictions may be a consideration, but may not be the best answer to saving money. The cost/benefit of a local operation could be improved by looking at different options and organizational structures of how homeland security could be executed .

Federal grants are often used by local jurisdictions to offset costs based on homeland security initiatives. A common theme seen in most literature concerning federal grants is that local agencies have to conform to federal mandates to receive them. Federal grants have been provided to local jurisdictions to assist with the costs associated with preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery to both terrorism and natural disasters. The problem with this solution is that the local governments are required to conform to mandates to receive these funds; thereby, costing the agency more money to get funding. Susan E. Clarke and Erica Chenoweth composed a paper titled, “The Politics of Vulnerability: Constructing Local Performance Regimes for Homeland Security,” which stated that the lack of reimbursement for security expenses incurred in response to federal mandates is a local problem.⁴¹

C. HOMELAND SECURITY VERSUS ALL-HAZARDS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

A majority of recent literature seems to show homeland security moving to an all-hazards concept; however, some literature illustrates that others tend to believe otherwise.

⁴⁰ Skip Krueger, Eliot Jennings, and James M. Kendra, “Local Emergency Management Funding: An Evaluation of County Budgets,” *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management* 6, no. 1 (2009): 4.

⁴¹ Susan E. Clarke and Erica Chenoweth, “The Politics of Vulnerability: Constructing Local Performance Regimes for Homeland Security,” *Review of Policy Research* 23, no. 1 (2006): 102.

In the spring of 2005, George Haddow and Jane Bullock wrote a paper titled “The Future of Emergency Management” that stated,

While professing to adopt an all-hazards approach, in reality DHS/FEMA has become focused almost exclusively on the terrorist threat to the near exclusion of traditional natural and technological hazards. Existing funding and staff resources have been reprogrammed at DHS/FEMA to terrorism-based activities and new resources are being applied almost exclusively to this threat. FEMA’s attention has been effectively diverted from any hazard beyond terrorism.⁴²

This position can also be seen in the *2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security*, which states, “Today, homeland security is narrowly defined as dealing predominantly with acts of terrorism.”⁴³

An argument for moving to an all-hazards concept is made by Dr. William Waugh, a professor at Georgia State University, in his paper titled, “Terrorism and the All-Hazards Model,” in which he states, “All-hazards planning does encourage a broader perspective on risks and how to deal with them and a broader foundation on which to build effective programs to manage hazards and disasters.”⁴⁴

Another argument for the all-hazards concept is given by Thomas A. Birkland, a professor at North Carolina State University, who suggests that prior to 9/11, FEMA was in a decline as preparing for natural hazards took a back seat to terrorism. Natural disaster mitigation was declining and FEMA became more concerned with response rather than comprehensive emergency management based on the all-hazard concept. After 9/11, the response course was emphasized even further as attention to natural disasters decreased; however, after Hurricane Katrina, moving to the all-hazards approach seemed necessary.⁴⁵

⁴² George Haddow and Jane Bullock, “The Future of Emergency Management,” paper presented at the Academic Emergency Management and Related Courses (AEMRC) for the Higher Education Program The Future of Emergency Management—Papers From The 2005 FEMA Emergency Management Higher Education Conference, 2005, ch. 4, 13.

⁴³ Homeland Security Council, *The National Strategy for Homeland*.

⁴⁴ William L. Waugh, “Terrorism and the All-hazards Model,” *Journal of Emergency Management* 2, no. 1 (2005): 8–10.

⁴⁵ Birkland, “Disasters, Catastrophes, and Policy Failure in the Homeland Security Era,” 423–438.

An area that may be lacking in an all-hazards emergency management concept is intelligence. Are emergency managers in a jurisdiction privy to the same intelligence as those in law enforcement homeland security? Although emergency managers may not need to know all classified intelligence, it may be necessary for them to know and understand the possible threats and targets to plan and mitigate for them properly. According to Valerie Lucas-McEwen in her journal article titled, “Recalibrating Emergency Management: Information Is Not the Same As Intelligence,” the emergency manager is primarily a planner and public relations expert. That manager may also be considered the expert authority during times of an emergency for decision makers.⁴⁶ Being able to plan properly means having access to what may be considered classified information, such as access to critical infrastructure plans or knowing what the potential terrorist targets are inside of their jurisdiction.

The information sharing environment (ISE) of the Terrorist Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 is also concerned about getting intelligence to those that need it and states,

The ISE, with a very small staff, is not focused solely on intelligence agencies, but works to establish consistent policy guidelines and technologies across five major communities—defense, intelligence, homeland security, foreign affairs, and law enforcement. It also reaches out to other agencies in the Federal Government and to state, local and tribal entities that are concerned with security issues.⁴⁷

The importance of a local homeland security entity is shown in arguments that have been made for changes in law enforcement organizations to deal with homeland security matters.⁴⁸ Aallan Y. Jiao and Harry M. Rhea stated in an article titled,

⁴⁶ Valerie Lucas-McEwen, “Recalibrating Emergency Management: Information Is Not the Same as Intelligence,” *Emergency Management Magazine*, December 29, 2010, <http://www.emergencymgmt.com/emergency-blogs/campus/Recalibrate-Emergency-Management-Information-Intelligence-122910.html>.

⁴⁷ Richard A. Best Jr., *Intelligence Information: Need-to-Know vs. Need-to-Share* (CRS Report No. R41848) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 6.

⁴⁸ Erica Chenoweth and Susan E. Clarke, “All Terrorism is Local: Resources, Nested Institutions, and Governance for Urban Homeland Security in the American Federal System,” *Political Research Quarterly* 63, no. 3 (2010): 495–507; George W. Burruss, Matthew J. Giblin, and Joseph A. Schafer, “Threatened Globally, Acting Locally: Modeling Law Enforcement Homeland Security Practices,” *Justice Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (2010): 79.

“Integration of Police in the United States: Changes and Development after 9/11,” that the reorganization of a police department is to “address potential terrorist attacks more effectively.”⁴⁹ The way the reorganization is executed depends on the size of the jurisdiction along with its needs and the needs of the community it serves.

Although much of the research deals with the federal government, as it relates to all hazards, the same implications are true on the local level. An abundance of literature on the all-hazards concept of emergency management is available, most of which is positive regarding the future path that should be taken by homeland security. It is, however, difficult to find literature that goes against this proposal.

D. SUMMARY

Issues explored in this literature review included the mission of homeland security, the budgetary concerns involving local jurisdictions, and the importance of distinguishing the difference between homeland security and all-hazards emergency management.

Without a solid homeland security mission, it would be difficult for a local jurisdiction to implement a homeland security strategy. The objectives and responsibilities given to a local entity must agree with its mission, or confusion and ambiguity could occur from both a strategic and operational standpoint.

In the years after 9/11, local agencies saw declining budgets. Although some budgets may have improved somewhat, funding is still a concern for homeland security on the local level. Federal grants are often used by local jurisdictions to offset budget reductions; however, the requirement of complying with federal mandates to be approved for the grants can cause financial hardship. Budgetary concerns, along with obtaining grant funding to offset expenses for homeland security, factor into which organizational structure would work best.

⁴⁹ Allan Y. Jiao and Harry M. Rhea, “Integration of Police in the United States: Changes and Development After 9/11,” *Policing & Society* 17, no. 4 (2007): 389.

Literature in this review included journal articles, policy documents, books, and theses that examined if a terrorism-focused homeland security organization neglects natural disasters and other hazards. Although literature suggests that homeland security is moving to an all-hazards concept, other literature states that funding is still geared toward terrorism. A threat assessment of the local area would assist in the type of structure that would be best for a jurisdiction.

Chapter III reviews matters relating to terrorism and natural disasters, the roles of homeland security and emergency management, as well as some of the funding areas associated with the two disciplines and their uses.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. FACTORS IMPACTING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to show the debate over the significance given to terrorism incidents versus natural disasters, to determine if differences exist in the definition and missions in homeland security and the all-hazards emergency management concept, and to introduce common sources of funding for law enforcement homeland security and emergency management homeland security and the resulting challenges.

This chapter assists local law enforcement homeland security and emergency management homeland security directors in their decision to implement one of the organizational structures featured in this study. The literature review in the previous chapter revealed that no guidance exists as to the most efficient organizational structure for these disciplines; therefore, it is incumbent on the decision makers within the local jurisdictions to be educated on factors that play an important role in their evaluation.

A. TERRORISM VERSUS NATURAL DISASTERS

The global terrorism database (GTD) defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation.”⁵⁰ According to the GTD, a total of 207 terrorist attacks occurred in the United States between 2001 and 2011,⁵¹ as compared to 693 disaster declarations that did not involve terrorism;⁵² however, much emphasis is still placed on planning and preparing for terrorist attacks at the expense of neglecting natural disasters, which can be seen in grant funding allocation for each issue. As an example, funding available for hazards other than terrorism, such as the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), has been reduced and the match

⁵⁰ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, *Integrated United States Security Database (IUSSD): Data on the Terrorist Attacks in the United States Homeland, 1970 to 2011, Final Report to Resilient Systems Division, DHS Science and Technology Directorate* (College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2012), 6.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁵² “Disaster Declarations by Year,” accessed April 2014, <http://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/year>.

requirements for local governments has increased.⁵³ Prior to the attacks of 9/11, the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) received funding of approximately \$250 million. After 9/11, the EMPG grant dipped to just under \$200 million and the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) steadily increased from approximately \$200 million in 2002 to over \$1.6 billion in 2004.⁵⁴ Fiscal year 2013 still showed a substantial difference in the two grants with the HSGP totaling \$968 million and the EMPG totaling \$332 million.⁵⁵

Some argue that the neglect of natural disasters was shown in the inept response to Hurricane Katrina. In a 2005 *Washington Post* article, the statement was made that homeland security almost consisted entirely of protection against terrorism and questioned the decision at the time that FEMA would no longer be responsible for disaster preparedness. The article continued to state that this decision did not make sense given the country's long record of natural disasters.⁵⁶ Local governments are pressured through both political and public means to prepare themselves for a terrorist attack. At times, this preparation for terrorism could lead to focus being taken off any other existing hazards, even if they pose a more significant threat to the jurisdiction.

In a 2005 policy review, Patrick S. Roberts shows that Congress has funded counterterrorism initiatives without a proper risk analysis and reduced its commitment to emergency preparedness and response to natural disasters.⁵⁷ This imbalance is expressed in the reduction of funding for natural disasters and increased funding for counterterrorism grants after 2001. In 2004, state homeland security grants increased 10 times over the 2001 amounts while emergency preparedness programs lost funding.⁵⁸

⁵³ Haddow and Bullock, "The Future of Emergency Management," 13.

⁵⁴ Patrick S. Roberts, "Shifting Priorities: Congressional Incentives and the Homeland Security Granting Process." *Review of Policy Research* 22, no. 4 (2005): 440.

⁵⁵ "DHS Announces Grant Allocation for Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 Preparedness Grants," Department of Homeland Security, August 23, 2013, <http://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/08/23/dhs-announces-grant-allocation-fiscal-year-fy-2013-preparedness-grants>.

⁵⁶ Eric Holdeman, "Destroying FEMA," *Washington Post*, August 30, 2005, sec. 30, A17.

⁵⁷ Roberts, "Shifting Priorities: Congressional Incentives and the Homeland Security Granting Process," 437.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 439.

During the years of 1970 to 2005, the most costly catastrophes in the world as judged by lives lost and cost in dollars were natural disasters with the exception of 9/11.⁵⁹

Since natural disasters occur more frequently than incidents of terrorism, it may benefit local jurisdictions to abstain from spending a large amount of limited funds on homeland security issues, such as terrorism, and instead concentrate on an emergency management all-hazards approach. The all-hazards approach to emergency management includes terrorism along with other possible hazards, but as with other hazards, emphasizes the terrorism risk based on a jurisdictional threat assessment. The shift to all-hazards from a primarily all terrorism approach is reminiscent of FEMA's change from concentrating on civil defense during the Cold War and moving to a program that recognizes the need for overall disaster relief, recovery, and mitigation.⁶⁰ However, if homeland security was eliminated to emphasize the all-hazards approach, some negative consequences could result. One important aspect would be the possible loss of intelligence gathering and investigations related to terrorism based on the intelligence gathered.

Both differences and similarities arise in natural disasters and terrorism in regard to how they are handled. Some of the similarities lie in the way local agencies prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from each type of incident. Regardless of the reason for the situation, many of the first responders will react in a similar way. As an example, whether it is a toxic chemical spill caused by a train derailment or a terrorist attack using the same toxic chemical, the response and recovery will be almost identical from an operational standpoint. Some differences when taking response and recovery into account during a terrorist event are that the first responders must consider that the affected area is a crime scene and must be examined for evidence and the potential also exists for secondary attacks including chemical, biological, explosive, or nuclear weapons.

⁵⁹ Howard C. Kunreuther and Erwann O. Michel-Kerjen "Assessing, Managing, and Benefiting from Global Interdependent Risks: The Case of Terrorism and Natural Disasters," *Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania* (August 11, 2007): 2.

⁶⁰ Jibum Chung, "Counter Terrorism and Emergency Management: Keeping a Proper Balance," Brookings Institute, May 2013, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/05/07-counter-terrorism-emergency-management-chung#>.

A major difference between natural disasters and terrorism is that some natural disasters can be predicted and give those persons who could be affected time to prepare or leave the area. Natural disasters are more predictable than terrorism because of historical data that has been accumulated regarding floods, earthquakes, and hurricanes.⁶¹ Planning for natural disasters is also more simplistic because it is easier to protect life and property when a good idea of what the threat looks like and where it may occur does exist. Terrorism, although not entirely unpredictable, is more difficult to forecast or predict because terrorists could strike anywhere at any time without notice. Terrorists could change the nature of their attacks very quickly if they learn of protective measures that have been implemented that would lessen the likelihood of their success. This strategy is called the substitution effect.⁶² In an effort to predict terrorism, a calculation of risk could be conducted. In 2003, an insurance firm surveyed intelligence experts and applied risk ratings to a database of potential targets to price terrorism insurance rates. The formula consisted of population density, critical infrastructure, and credible threats.⁶³

Intelligence gathering is important in the prediction or forecast of terrorist events. Also, intelligence can provide the most information possible to assist with the preparedness and mitigation phases regarding terrorist attacks. Regardless of the reliability of intelligence, all potential targets cannot be protected from terrorism. Bruce Hoffman, in his 2002 article titled, "Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11," emphasizes that the sheer number of vulnerable locations makes this impossible; therefore, political leaders and civilians must have realistic expectations of what can and cannot be accomplished at all levels of government regarding the fight against terrorism.⁶⁴

⁶¹ Roberts, "Shifting Priorities: Congressional Incentives and the Homeland Security Granting Process," 437.

⁶² Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjen "Assessing, Managing, and Benefiting from Global Interdependent Risks: The Case of Terrorism and Natural Disasters," 2.

⁶³ Roberts, "Shifting Priorities: Congressional Incentives and the Homeland Security Granting Process," 444.

⁶⁴ Bruce Hoffman, "Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism since 9/11," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 25, no. 5 (2002): 314.

B. ROLES OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

After 9/11, policymakers decided that a new approach was needed to handle large-scale terrorist attacks; therefore, presidential directives were issued on this matter in the name of homeland security. Homeland security is a combination of law enforcement, disaster, immigration, and terrorism issues.⁶⁵ Although homeland security includes all these areas, jurisdictions can choose to handle each of them in different ways. Some jurisdictions choose to allow an independent homeland security entity staffed by law enforcement to manage terrorism while others choose to use the all-hazards emergency management concept or a combination of the two.

FEMA defines emergency management as, “the managerial function charged with creating the framework within which communities reduce vulnerability to hazards and cope with disasters.”⁶⁶ The mission of emergency management as stated by FEMA is, “Emergency Management protects communities by coordinating and integrating all activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the capability to mitigate against, prepare for, respond to, and recover from threatened or actual natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other man-made disasters.”⁶⁷

Regarding the all-hazards concept, a DHS report titled, “FEMA’s Progress in All-Hazards Mitigation,” states,

Hazards typically fall into three broad categories: natural, technological, and manmade. Natural hazards are generally associated with weather and geological events, such as a flood, hurricane, tornado, or earthquake. Technological hazards refer to human activities such as dam and levee construction or the manufacture, transportation, storage, and use of hazardous materials. Manmade hazards are typically associated with a criminal or terrorist attack using weapons such as an explosive, biological, or chemical agent. However, natural disasters can also be compounded by

⁶⁵ Reese, *Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional Considerations*, 2.

⁶⁶ “Emergency Management: Definition, Vision, Mission, Principles,” accessed April 2014, [http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/docs/emprinciples/0907_176%20EM%20Principles12x18v2f%20Johnson%20\(w-o%20draft\).pdf](http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/docs/emprinciples/0907_176%20EM%20Principles12x18v2f%20Johnson%20(w-o%20draft).pdf).

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

manmade and technological hazards to the extent that disaster losses could be prevented through mitigation.⁶⁸

A definition of all-hazards given by Kimberly Nagal, a Certified Emergency Manager (CEM) from Wright State University, states, “An all-hazards approach to emergency preparedness encourages effective and consistent response to any disaster or emergency, regardless of the cause.”⁶⁹ All hazards not only takes into account the hazards themselves, but also the concept considers the steps that increase the level of preparedness for all hazards.⁷⁰

Emergency management from a local/county standpoint is responsible in part for coordinating and supporting emergency response activities, maintaining the EOC, developing a county comprehensive emergency management plan, designing and implementing emergency preparedness and response training and exercises, and conducting regular hazard and threat analyses.⁷¹

C. HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT FUNDING

After the attacks of 9/11, federal dollars through grants were used to enhance the homeland security capabilities of local jurisdictions. Several years later, the U.S. economy weakened, which also affected local homeland security and emergency management budgets. Jurisdictions had the challenge of homeland security despite fiscal constraints.⁷² Police departments are struggling to maintain routine levels of police services much less having the ability to expand their missions.⁷³ Homeland security preparedness efforts by state and local governments are suffering due to budgetary

⁶⁸ Office of Inspector General, *FEMA's Progress in All-Hazards Mitigation* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security 2009), 2.

⁶⁹ Kimberly Nagal, “All Hazards Planning,” Wright State University, accessed April 24, 2014, <http://www.wright.edu/emergency-management/all-hazards-planning>.

⁷⁰ “Preparedness for All Hazards,” accessed April 24, 2014, <http://emergency.cdc.gov/hazards-all.asp>.

⁷¹ “Local Role in Emergency Management,” FEMA, 2006, <http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/docs/hazdem/Session%2018--Local%20Government%20Role.doc>.

⁷² Stephen A. Morreale and David E. Lambert, “Homeland Security and the Police Mission,” *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management* 6, no. 1 (2009): 3.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

constraints.⁷⁴ The federal government offers grants to assist with the costs of maintaining a homeland security entity; however, with the reduced budgets, are the grants enough? The history of funding for homeland security gives insight to the jurisdictions' ability to continue funding homeland security efforts.

Funding for both homeland security and emergency management can come from several different areas. Two of the most common funding sources are through the jurisdictions' budget process and federal grants. Three federal grants target public safety preparedness and are used to supplement local budgets. These grants are the HSGP, the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), and the EMPG.

The funding provided through homeland security grants is to increase local capabilities and supplement the local budget for emergency preparedness.⁷⁵ Homeland security grants, although they are a good source of funding, have not gone without debate or scrutiny. Arguments arise as to whether these grants should be used for terrorism only or for more of an all-hazards approach.⁷⁶ Also, homeland security grants have come under question regarding their use.

It is believed in some circles that homeland security grants are being misused and wasted for unnecessary equipment and other items not needed by a jurisdiction. One argument is that some grant money has been spent based on political objectives, known as pork barrel spending;⁷⁷ the UASI grant program is an example. The UASI is a federal program intended to assist major cities most at risk to a terrorist attack and increase their preparedness and close security gaps. The UASI grants have come under scrutiny due to the danger of the grant program moving from a risk-based program targeting security gaps to one of an entitlement program.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Gerber et al., "On the Front Line: American Cities and the Challenge of Homeland Security Preparedness," 194.

⁷⁵ Charlotte Kirshner, "Estimating the Fiscal Impacts of the Homeland Security Grants on State and Local Public Safety Spending" (PhD diss., The George Washington University, 2012), 2.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁷⁷ Birkland, "Disasters, Catastrophes, and Policy Failure in the Homeland Security Era," 429.

⁷⁸ Tom Coburn, *Safety at Any Price: Assessing the Impact of Homeland Security Spending in U.S. Cities* (Washington, DC: Office of Senator Tom Coburn, 2012), 1.

D. SUMMARY

This chapter focused on three topics as it relates to the organizational structures involved in the following case studies. These topics are terrorism versus natural disasters, the difference between homeland security and the all-hazards concept, and funding for homeland security.

Since its inception, homeland security has been faced with an identity crisis, caused in part to no agreed upon definition for the discipline. Some practitioners and academics are of the belief that homeland security focuses on terrorism too heavily with not enough concern being given to natural disasters and other threats. Others believe homeland security's main responsibility is to protect against terrorism. Decision makers in local jurisdictions must understand what they wish to accomplish based on their mission and then choose the best organizational structure to meet that need. Understanding the difference between terrorism and natural disasters, and how they are handled from both a strategic and operational standpoint, will contribute to accomplishing this task.

An understanding of the all-hazards emergency management concept as it compares to homeland security is imperative. Without this understanding, local leaders would have a difficult challenge in matching their mission to the proper structure that would best compliment what they desire for their community.

The funding process for homeland security is important, because without proper funding, the jurisdiction is left with no way to carry on the discipline regardless of the chosen structure. Applying for grant funding can be confusing especially when federal mandates are applied or the mission does not coincide with what the federal government deems to be acceptable.

Chapter IV begins the case studies for the three organizational structures. This chapter discusses the organizational structure related to the law enforcement homeland security entity. The study begins with analyzing the mission statement and compares it to the federal mission. Next, the operational procedures and budget information is discussed for the chosen jurisdiction in this case study.

IV. CASE STUDY A: LAW ENFORCEMENT HOMELAND SECURITY ENTITY

The local law enforcement homeland security entity is centered on the prevention and response to terrorism. Most organizational structures with this type of homeland security entity place it under the local police department. Within this type of organizational structure, homeland security works with the local emergency management agency on planning for terrorism-related events and other activities that may need law enforcement intervention; however, they are a totally separate entity.

A. BACKGROUND

The jurisdiction chosen for this organizational structure is the City of Atlanta, Georgia. The City of Atlanta is located in the north central Georgia area and has a population of just under 450,000 residents.⁷⁹

The City of Atlanta police department (APD) falls under the Office of the Mayor and the police chief reports to the mayor. The homeland security unit is attached to the Special Enforcement Section (SES), which is a component of the Criminal Investigations Division (CID).⁸⁰ SES not only contains the homeland security unit, but also a gang unit, vice unit, and narcotics unit. SES is commanded by a major who reports to the assistant chief over CID. The assistant chief reports to the chief of police. Figure 1 depicts the APD organizational chart.

⁷⁹ United States Census Bureau, *Atlanta (City), Georgia* (Suitland, MD: United States Census Bureau).

⁸⁰ "Criminal Investigations, Special Enforcement," accessed July 2014, <http://www.atlantapd.org/>.




Figure 1. Atlanta Police Department Organizational Chart⁸³

⁸³ Claude Moore (City of Atlanta Police Department Planning Research and Accreditation Unit), email message to the author, August 4, 2014

The homeland security unit consists of five investigators supervised by a lieutenant. Neither the special enforcement section nor the homeland security unit has a separate organizational chart.

B. MISSION

The APD homeland security unit does not have an official mission statement, but the unit lists its responsibilities in the 2011–2012 annual report as gathering, collating, analyzing, and disseminating information relating to criminal activity, to include domestic and international terrorism, that presents a threat to the community.⁸⁴

When comparing these responsibilities to the missions set forth in the QHSR, they meet many of the missions; however, some are not addressed. When looking at the responsibilities of the homeland security unit, most of the tasks are intelligence related; however, the tasks do conform to some goals of Mission #1 in the QHSR, which is stated as “prevent terrorism and enhance security.”

The QHSR states that one of the goals in Mission #1 includes analyzing, fusing, and disseminating terrorism information.⁸⁵ The APD policy manual for the special enforcement section, which contains the homeland security unit, lists tasks associated with this mission. These tasks include maintaining intelligence files on major criminals and criminal activity rings within the Metro Atlanta area, gathering and analyzing criminal intelligence information, and disseminating this information to the proper authorities.⁸⁶

Goals under Mission #1 listed in the QHSR and not listed in the homeland security unit’s responsibilities is the prevention of CBRN threats, critical infrastructure, border security, and immigration laws. While CBRN is not listed under the

⁸⁴ “Atlanta Police Department 2011–2012 Annual Report,” 16, accessed July 2014, <http://www.atlantapd.org/pdf/crime-data-downloads/627E3107-9936-4C07-881C-65251D68EDCB.pdf>.

⁸⁵ Department of Homeland Security, *Quadrennial Homeland Security Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland*, 76.

⁸⁶ “Atlanta Police Department Policy Manual, Section 4.1.2,” Atlanta Police Department, May 2012, <https://ia601203.us.archive.org/29/items/AtlantaPoliceDepartmentPolicyManualHTML/Chapter5/APDSOP5030SpecialEnforcementSection.htm>.

responsibilities of the Homeland Security Unit, these incidents are investigated by the unit. Responding to these types of incidents is carried out through the Special Operations Section, which includes Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) and Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) and is under the Field Operations Division.⁸⁷ The Homeland Security Unit also conducts site assessments and buffer protection plans for critical infrastructure within its jurisdiction to allow the unit to comply with the goal under Mission #1 of the QHSR of reducing the risk to critical infrastructure.

The QHSR Mission #2, securing and managing U.S. borders, as well as Mission #3, enforcing and administering U.S. immigration laws, are not conducted directly by the Atlanta Police Homeland Security Unit. The APD Homeland Security Unit assigns a representative to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and works with the state fusion center to obtain information on these topics.⁸⁸

Mission #4, safeguarding and securing cyberspace, is a component of the Homeland Security Unit. The Cyber Crime Squad (CCS) assists in the investigation of any crime that involves the use of computers to include technology theft.⁸⁹ The squad assists the Federal Cyber Crimes Taskforce by supporting investigations through an initial review of electronic media in situations that cannot be completed by the case investigator. These duties correlate to Mission #4 in the QHSR of safeguarding and securing cyberspace.

The comparison of the tasks of the Homeland Security Unit and those of Mission #5, strengthening national preparedness and resilience, show some correlation exists in enhancing national preparedness and mitigating hazards and vulnerabilities. The investigation of cyber crimes and collecting and disseminating intelligence information falls under these goals; however, all hazards are not represented. The preparedness,

⁸⁷ "Special Operations Section," accessed July 2014, <http://www.atlantapd.org/specialoperationssection.aspx>.

⁸⁸ Patrice Jackson (Detective, Atlanta Police Department Homeland Security Unit), in discussion with the author, June 28, 2014.

⁸⁹ "Atlanta Police Department Policy Manual, APD SOP 5050, Section 3.1," Atlanta Police Department, May 2012, <https://ia601203.us.archive.org/29/items/AtlantaPoliceDepartmentPolicyManualHTML/Chapter5/APDSOP5030SpecialEnforcementSection.htm>.

mitigation, and recovery from natural disasters are carried out through the Atlanta Fulton County Emergency Management Agency (AFCEMA) with input from the APD when needed. AFCEMA is a totally separate entity. Table 2 shows APD’s Homeland Security Unit’s compliance with the missions of the QHSR.

Table 2. Atlanta Police Homeland Security Compliance with QHSR

| QHSR Missions | Does Atlanta Police Align with QHSR? |
|---|---|
| Mission #1: Prevent terrorism and enhance security | YES |
| Mission #2: Secure and manage our borders | NO* |
| Mission #3: Enforce and administer immigration laws | NO* |
| Mission #4: Safeguard and secure cyberspace | YES |
| Mission #5: Strengthen national preparedness and resilience | PARTIALLY** |

*indicates the mission is managed on federal or state level and information related to jurisdiction is received from these entities.

**includes terrorism but not all hazards to include natural disasters

C. OPERATIONS

Officers assigned to the Homeland Security Unit perform intelligence gathering activities, respond to the scene of any criminal activity deemed important to homeland security, and assist in joint investigations and intelligence gathering activities with outside agencies at the discretion of the Chief of Police or his designee.⁹⁰ The Homeland Security Unit also operates the Atlanta Criminal Information Network that is used for information exchange both outside and inside the police department.⁹¹

The types of information used in intelligence gathering are divided into four categories as follows.

⁹⁰ “Atlanta Police Department Policy Manual, Section 4.8.4,” Atlanta Police Department, May 2012, <https://ia601203.us.archive.org/29/items/AtlantaPoliceDepartmentPolicyManualHTML/Chapter5/APDSOP5030SpecialEnforcementSection.htm>.

⁹¹ Ibid., Section 4.3.2.

- Raw data: information that may be fragmentary or unsubstantiated, but may provide an indication of possible criminal activity
- Significant information: has obvious value and may justify further inquiry or the initiation of a criminal investigation
- Strategic intelligence: information about existing patterns or trends of criminal activity collected over time
- Tactical intelligence: information about a specific event or situation that can be put to use immediately⁹²

The Homeland Security Unit responds to criminal incidents deemed important to homeland security as listed in the Atlanta Police policy/standard operating procedure manual. These incidents include terrorism, organized crime, money laundering, trafficking, and other criminal activities of a serious nature.⁹³

As stated previously, a considerable emphasis is placed on intelligence in the Homeland Security Unit. The collection of intelligence is based on criminal conduct or activities that pose a threat to the community. The information collected on potential threats or criminal conduct includes the following.

- Organized crime and gang activity
- Terrorism or subversive activity involving the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain political, religious, or ideological goals by instilling fear, using intimidation, or coercion
- Vice activity relating to prostitution, bookmaking, gambling, child pornography, or obscenity
- White collar incidents relating to computer crimes
- Controlled substance activity
- Civil disturbance activities⁹⁴

Terrorism is listed as a potential threat in this list along with other activities that may not seem terrorism related, but funding for terrorism-related activities can come from a variety of information contained in the other listed crimes.

The Homeland Security Unit investigators receive intelligence information from other departmental units via suspicious activity reports (SARs), email communication, or

⁹² “Atlanta Police Department Policy Manual, Section 4.8.3 (2),” Atlanta Police Department, May 2012, <https://ia601203.us.archive.org/29/items/AtlantaPoliceDepartmentPolicyManualHTML/Chapter5/APDSOP5030SpecialEnforcementSection.htm>.

⁹³ Ibid., Section 4.8.4 (2).

⁹⁴ Ibid.

by telephone conversations. The unit also has a close working relationship with the JTTF and the state fusion center that provides intelligence information. When intelligence information is received or a threat is made, the Homeland Security Unit attempts to verify it through secondary sources. Using a collation and analytical process, those assigned to the Homeland Security Unit recommends further action. The investigators also complete intelligence reports and review other incoming reports. Any report not reviewed by an investigator is turned over to an analyst for review.⁹⁵

Most of the intelligence information in the Homeland Security Unit is considered FOUO. Active records are not disseminated without the approval of the Special Enforcement Section commander. Some reports are classified as “sensitive” and have more stringent controls. Incoming intelligence information is considered raw data and is not disseminated without the approval from the Chief of Police.⁹⁶ The Homeland Security Unit also works closely with the JTTF and the state fusion center for intelligence information gathering, analysis, and dissemination.⁹⁷

D. BUDGETARY INFORMATION

The budget information was received from the City of Atlanta Department of Finance and the APD business manager. A review of the total APD budget was conducted for the years 2002 through 2013. The same time frame could not be provided for the Homeland Security Unit’s budget or for the grant information. The homeland security budget reviewed was for the years 2008 through 2013, and the grant information was for the years 2003 through 2007. Monies allocated for homeland security are a category within the APD budget; however, it is a separate fund not included in the overall operating budget. The limited homeland security budget and grant information made it difficult to provide a true comparison; however the information provided still showed some trends.

⁹⁵ “Atlanta Police Department Policy Manual, Section 4.10.1 (3), Section 4.11.1,” Atlanta Police Department, May 2012, <https://ia601203.us.archive.org/29/items/AtlantaPoliceDepartmentPolicyManualHTML/Chapter5/APDSOP5030SpecialEnforcementSection.htm>.

⁹⁶ Ibid., Section 4.11.2.

⁹⁷ Jackson, in discussion with the author.

In 2002, the overall police department budget was approximately \$119 million. It increased gradually through 2005 to approximately \$159 million. In 2006, a slight decrease occurred that dropped the budget to just under \$133 million. In 2007, it remained steady at \$138 million. The year 2008 saw an increase to over \$169 million with the following years through 2013 remaining fairly steady with a peak in 2009 of approximately \$172 million and approximately \$167 million in 2013.⁹⁸

The budget allocated to homeland security could only be evaluated for the years of 2008 through 2013. The jurisdiction could not provide information prior to 2013. In 2008, the homeland security operating budget was the lowest of all the amounts provided at \$6,765. The budget more than doubled in 2009 to \$17,362. After 2009, the homeland security budget made drastic increases compared to the previous two years with 2010 increasing to \$212,271, and continued to increase to \$233,812 in 2011 before taking a slight decrease in 2012 to \$217, 838. The budget declined significantly in 2013 to \$86,782.⁹⁹ (See Figure 2.)

⁹⁸ City of Atlanta Police Department departmental budget, years 2002–2013.

⁹⁹ Spreadsheet of City of Atlanta Police Department, Homeland Security Operating Budget 2008–2013. Tracy Woodard (City of Atlanta Police Department Business Manager), email message to the author, August 4, 2014.




Figure 2. Atlanta Police Overall Budget and the Homeland Security Budget (in Million Dollars/Year)

Grant funding was utilized by the Homeland Security Unit. However, information could only be provided for the years 2003 through 2007; therefore, it is impossible to see the trends of grant funding for future years. The homeland security grants ranged from \$1.2 million in 2003 to approximately \$440,000 in 2007. Through the years provided, after 2003, grant funding was sporadic with \$580,000 in 2004, \$950,000 in 2005, and \$120,000 in 2006. (See Figure 3.)




Figure 3. Atlanta Police Homeland Security Grant Funding (in Million Dollars/Year)

E. ANALYSIS

Many of the tasks performed by the APD Homeland Security Unit revolve around intelligence gathering, analysis, and preparing intelligence reports for dissemination both inside and outside the department. The unit has a close working relationship with the JTTF and the state fusion center, which allows for a more expedient flow of information. The advantage of concentrating on intelligence operations is the ability potentially to prevent acts of terrorism and enhance the security of the jurisdiction, which meets the goals of Mission #1 of the QHSR. Being a law enforcement entity allows better access to information due to its ability to obtain clearances. Another advantage to this entity is that it can take enforcement action if necessary. The ability to make arrests and conduct criminal investigations gives the jurisdiction an advantage because it can expedite the process of locating criminals and terrorists, and make an arrest; thereby, improving its ability to prevent possible attacks or criminal wrongdoing.

The APD Homeland Security Unit operates an intelligence center named the Atlanta Criminal Information Network. This network is similar to a fusion center on the

local level. The network allows for the exchange of intelligence information or any other information that may affect the city of Atlanta or the surrounding Metro Atlanta area. The analysis and dissemination of intelligence information conforms to the goal of preventing terrorist attacks listed under Mission #1 of the QHSR.

Although providing intelligence information to members of their own department and to outside agencies is an advantage, some intelligence cannot be disseminated without prior approval of either the special enforcement section commander or the Chief of Police. This procedure could hinder the release of important actionable intelligence or other information from being released in a timely manner.

Another area involving intelligence information that involves a duplication of services is that both investigators and intelligence analysts are tasked with the same duties.

Although the intelligence aspect of this entity is strong, a duplication of services is based on the investigators and intelligence analysts both conducting information analysis and reviewing information for authenticity. Due to the investigators also being involved in the analysis aspect of intelligence, the investigation of possible criminal activity could suffer. This duplication of services could be rectified by allowing the intelligence analysts exclusively to scrutinize the information coming in and remove this task from the investigators, which would free up the investigators to look further into the legitimate information without having to take the time to decipher less beneficial data. Also, approval through the chain of command is needed before the dissemination of information can occur, which lessens the timely release of actionable intelligence.

Regarding Mission #2 of the QHSR, managing U.S. borders, and Mission #3, enforcement of immigration laws, the Homeland Security Unit relies on information from its representative with the JTTF. The unit does not have a representative from a federal agency assigned as a liaison to assist with these issues.

The cyber crimes squad under the Homeland Security Unit allows for investigators attached to this squad to concentrate solely on crimes involving cyberspace. Its affiliation with the Federal Cyber Crimes Taskforce allows the unit to remain up-to-

date on all current intelligence information involving cyber security, as well as conduct investigations in this area with the assistance of federal authorities. Mission #4, safeguard and secure cyberspace, is fulfilled with the cyber crimes squad.

Although the responsibilities of disseminating intelligence information fall within the QHSR of maturing and strengthening homeland security, the Homeland Security Unit is focused entirely on terrorism-related subjects. Their mission or operations does not include all hazards, such as natural disasters. Preparing and planning for these types of events are handled through the AFCEMA. By not conducting any operations based on natural disasters, the ability to mitigate, respond, and recover effectively from these types of disasters is limited; therefore, the Homeland Security Unit's compliance with Mission #5 of the QHSR is weakened.

The APD overall budget steadily increased from 2002 through 2009 and remained fairly consistent up to 2013. The homeland security budget more than doubled from 2008 to 2009, then drastically increased in 2010, and remained steady through 2012. The significant increase of the homeland security budget in 2010 did not coincide with an increase in the total APD budget nor did it include grant funding. This increase shows the importance placed on homeland security within the APD during these years. The limited information available regarding the homeland security operating budget made it impossible to analyze during the years of 2002 through 2007.

The only years available for analysis concerning the homeland security grants awarded to APD were 2003 through 2007. The year 2003 had the largest grant award at \$1.2 million. The overall APD operating budget had increased in 2003 from 2002; therefore, the grants were not used to supplement a budget shortfall. The overall budget from 2003 to 2007 remained consistent with little fluctuation as the grant funds were sporadic after 2003 ranging from slightly under \$1.0 million in 2005 to approximately \$120,000 in 2006.

The law enforcement homeland security entity has the advantage of maintaining a single budget consisting of only the police department, whereas the other entities studied in this thesis, are concerned with more than one budget that could consist of a

combination from the police department, the fire department, and emergency management depending on the type of structure utilized. This simpler budget process permits the funding to go to one department without the concerns of separating the funding between more than one.

A disadvantage of having a simple budget for this particular organizational structure is that a law enforcement only homeland security organization is limited in the types of grants that can fund its operations. Homeland security grants are utilized in this instance, but grants within the emergency management discipline, such as the EMPG, are not used.

Table 3 shows both the advantages and disadvantages to the law enforcement homeland security entity in the form of a table.

Table 3. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Law Enforcement Homeland Security Entity

| ADVANTAGES |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong compliance with Missions #1 and #4 of the QHSR through intelligence and cyber security • Ability to take enforcement action if necessary • Budget does not have to be separated between two disciplines (homeland security and emergency management) |
| DISADVANTAGES |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weakened compliance with QHSR Mission #5 due to focus on terrorism only with no responsibilities toward natural disasters or all hazards • Duplication of services between investigators and intelligence analysts • Release of possible actionable intelligence hindered due to prior approval needed through chain of command • Limitation on grant funds due to a one discipline focus |

The law enforcement homeland security entity is concerned with both criminal and terrorist activities. Much less emphasis is placed on natural disasters, which are handled primarily by the jurisdiction’s emergency management agency. Intelligence gathering and analysis encompass the majority of the operational tasks for this entity. Due to the main component of this entity being intelligence as it relates to criminal

activity and terrorism, preparing for natural disasters is left to the jurisdiction's emergency management agency. The next chapter analyzes an emergency management homeland security structure.

V. CASE STUDY B: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT HOMELAND SECURITY

The emergency management homeland security entity handles all types of hazards including both natural and man-made disasters, as well as terrorism. This type of structure is normally managed by civilians with law enforcement participating on an as needed basis, such as in a working group for a project requiring their expertise.

A. BACKGROUND

The jurisdiction chosen for this organizational structure is Hall County, GA. Hall County is located approximately 50 miles north of Atlanta. The population of Hall County is estimated at approximately 188,000 residents.¹⁰⁰

The Hall County Emergency Management Agency falls under the Hall County Fire Department and the fire chief also acts as the emergency management director. (See Figure 4) The fire chief/emergency management director reports to the Hall County Board of Commissioners. No organizational chart exists specifically for emergency management.

¹⁰⁰ "Hall County, GA," accessed August 2014, <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/13/13139.html>.




Figure 4. Hall County Fire Department Organizational Chart¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ Rhonda Smith (Hall County Fire Services, Administrative Coordinator), email message to the author, August 5, 2014.

B. MISSION

The mission of the Hall County Emergency Management Agency (HCEMA) is stated as follows.

To provide a comprehensive and aggressive all-hazards approach to homeland security and disaster initiatives, mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery and special events. The purpose of our mission is to protect life and property and to prevent and/or reduce the negative impact of natural and man-made events in Hall County.¹⁰²

This mission statement closely resembles that of FEMA by stating its initiatives of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery; however, the HCEMA's statement mentions all hazards and homeland security whereas FEMA breaks the mission down further into natural disasters, terrorism, and other man-made disasters.

Regarding the correlation to FEMA's mission statement, the main concern of HCEMA is the development of plans that protect the community from all hazards. These plans include a hazard mitigation plan, a continuity of operations plan, and a winter weather plan.¹⁰³

The hazard mitigation plan lists the known hazards that affect the area of Hall County based on the history of past events. The plan then ranks these hazards or threats as the most likely and the least likely to occur. The plan then sets out steps to best handle each particular hazard/threat.

The continuity of operations plan is a contingency plan that allows Hall County to maintain its normal business practices should critical infrastructure or technology be damaged or destroyed due to natural or man-made events including terrorism.

Each of the aforementioned plans includes the response and recovery that would be required to handle the particular event. Through this planning process under HCEMA, its mission corresponds to the mission of FEMA by protecting its community through

¹⁰² "Emergency Management Agency," accessed August 2014, http://www.hallcounty.org/fire_services/fire_ema.asp.

¹⁰³ David Kimbrell (Director, Hall County Emergency Management), in discussion with the author, July 23, 2014.

preparing, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from the hazards/threats that are congruent to its jurisdiction.

Since HCEMA's mission statement specifically included homeland security, its mission and operations were compared to the missions of the QHSR to determine how closely they are related.

Under QHSR Mission #1, preventing terrorism and enhancing security, HCEMA is involved in both CBRNE and critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) operations, but primarily through response versus prevention. The goal referencing CBRNE under Mission #1 is concerned with anticipating threats, identifying unlawful acquisition and movement of CBRNE materials, and the detection and hostile use of these weapons.¹⁰⁴ When a CBRNE event occurs within the jurisdiction, HCEMA coordinates the response from the Hall County Fire Department (HCFD). The HCFD's operational tasks do not include those listed under the CBRNE goals of the QHSR. The Hall County Sheriff's Office (HCSO) also responds to these events due having a CBRNE response team. The HCFD is responsible for decontamination procedures while the HCSO conducts the investigation.¹⁰⁵ The investigation performed by the HCSO after an incident could include the goals listed for CBRNE under the QHSR, but the HCFD and the emergency management homeland security entity do not participate in accomplishing these goals.

HCEMA participates in CIKR operations by assisting with threat assessments and developing a continuity of operations plan that would be used in response to a piece of critical infrastructure being disabled. HCEMA also works closely with the HCSO in conducting threat assessments and security planning involving the critical infrastructure within the jurisdiction.¹⁰⁶ This task does meet one of the goals under Mission #1 of the

¹⁰⁴ Department of Homeland Security, *2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 76, <http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014-qhsr-final-508.pdf>.

¹⁰⁵ Kimbrell, in discussion with the author.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

QHSR by enhancing security for critical infrastructure against terrorism and criminal activity.

HCEMA does not conduct any business as it relates to Mission #2, securing and managing U.S. borders, and Mission #3, enforcing and administering U.S. immigration laws. The HCSO does have a partnership with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) through the Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act. This act delegates authority for immigration enforcement within the HCSO's jurisdiction.¹⁰⁷

In regard to Mission #4, safeguarding and securing cyberspace, as it pertains to the Hall County government, it is not controlled by HCEMA. The security and protection of cyberspace within Hall County is the responsibility of the jurisdiction's information technology (IT) section. HCEMA does, however, develop redundancy plans along with the City of Gainesville, which is located in Hall County, to prepare for the possible loss of computer services.¹⁰⁸ As the IT section is responsible for cyber security, if the computer systems fail, HCEMA would not know what threats exist that could cause this situation.

Mission #5, mature and strengthen homeland security, is covered under HCEMA through its partnerships with the HCSO and the IT section. It is also implemented with HCEMA's development of plans that create innovative approaches and effective solutions for a variety of hazards/threats through its hazard mitigation plan and emergency operations plan.

¹⁰⁷ "Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act," accessed September 2014, <http://www.ice.gov/287g/>.

¹⁰⁸ Kimbrell, in discussion with the author.

Table 4. Alignment of HCEMA Missions to the QHSR Missions

| QHSR Missions | Does Hall County Align with QHSR? |
|---|-----------------------------------|
| Mission #1: Prevent terrorism and Enhance Security | Partially* |
| Mission #2: Secure and Manage our Borders | No |
| Mission #3: Enforce and Administer Immigration Laws | No |
| Mission #4: Safeguard and Secure Cyberspace | Partially** |
| Mission #5: Strengthen National Preparedness and Resilience | Yes |

*HCEMA meets one of the goals under Mission #1 of the QHSR “Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security” regarding CIKR

**HCEMA does not safeguard and secure cyberspace; however, the agency does develop redundancy plans

C. OPERATIONS

The Hall County job class specification for the position of emergency management specialist states that a comprehensive knowledge of emergency management, homeland security, emergency operations planning, hazard mitigation planning, and EOC readiness is needed. These tasks are performed under the direction of the emergency management director.¹⁰⁹

The job class specification provides a description of the major duties and responsibilities of the emergency management specialist position. Those duties and responsibilities for the position are listed as follows.

- Prepare monthly and annual reports, as well as emergency management communications on a daily basis for distribution to various departments and coordinate activities with state and federal agencies
- Assist with the development of operational budget
- Assist in the development of strategic plans
- Participate in the Hall County disaster management team
- Investigate and maintain grant programs
- Assist in the maintenance of hazard mitigation and emergency operation plans

¹⁰⁹ Hall County Class Specification, Emergency Management Specialist, Job Code 9425, February 2005.

In preparedness and mitigation, HCEMA assists the community by analyzing the hazards that may affect the latter, and then developing mitigation strategies and emergency operations plans to combat those hazards.¹¹⁰ HCEMA is also responsible for getting resources to the areas within its jurisdiction affected by a natural or man-made disaster up to and including asking the governor of the State of Georgia to declare a state of emergency to receive state resources when needed.¹¹¹ In the recovery effort, HCEMA coordinates clean-up efforts, educates victims about available relief programs, distributes disaster relief funds, and provides tools to identify public structures in areas at risk of damage.¹¹² HCEMA also maintains and staffs the jurisdiction's EOC when the need arises.

Relating to security clearances or intelligence within HCEMA, personnel assigned to the agency have no clearance to obtain information of a sensitive nature. HCEMA does work with a representative from the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC); however, that person only receives FOUO information and does not have access to any information requiring a clearance.¹¹³ Most of the FOUO information HCEMA receives is from a threat awareness standpoint. As an example, the agency receives information concerning security issues that may include any number of threats made from radical groups in the area. Although the agency receives these reports, they are "dummied down;" in other words, no detail is made available, such as the who, what, when, and where, but only very general information that a threat is possible.

Most of the threat awareness information HCEMA receives is related to the fire services or issues dealing with hazardous materials. The HCSO receives more detailed information about threats involving terrorism due to having the proper clearances, but

¹¹⁰ "Emergency Management Agency, Preparedness and Mitigation," accessed August 2014, http://www.hallcounty.org/fireservices/fire_ema.asp.

¹¹¹ "Emergency Management Agency, Response," accessed August 2014, http://www.hallcounty.org/fireservices/fire_ema.asp.

¹¹² "Emergency Management Agency, Recovery," accessed August 2014, http://www.hallcounty.org/fireservices/fire_ema.asp.

¹¹³ Kimbrell, in discussion with the author.

due to no one in HCEMA having the proper clearances; they are not privy to this information that requires a clearance or is of a law enforcement sensitive nature.

In determining the role of the HCSO relating to homeland security, it was ascertained that the HCSO did not have a unit designated only to homeland security operations. The commander of the specialized units, such as SWAT, EOD, Search and Rescue, Marine Patrol, and crime suppression, handles the duties of terrorism prevention and homeland security within the department.¹¹⁴

The HCSO gathers intelligence on potential threats to Hall County or surrounding jurisdictions through bulletins from the JTTF or GISAC. Although HCEMA receives information from GISAC as well, the HCSO receives sensitive law enforcement information that HCEMA is not cleared to see. This information includes “law enforcement sensitive” and also information requiring a security clearance, such as possible targets and the reasons terrorists may be interested in these targets.¹¹⁵ Other ways information is received is through collaboration with state agencies, such as the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI), the local satellite office of the FBI, reports from the general public that may be recorded on a SAR, and tips through the HCSO website under the “See Something Say Something” campaign.¹¹⁶

The HCSO and HCEMA works closely with one another on a daily basis for planning purposes. The HCSO and HCEMA consult one another on critical infrastructure security plans and collaborate on the jurisdiction’s emergency operations and hazard mitigation plans. Much of the intelligence information received is passed along to HCEMA unless it is restricted by the label of “law enforcement sensitive” or any other restrictions that would limit information sharing.¹¹⁷ The HCSO also works closely with the HCFD on hazardous material and CBRNE incidents.

¹¹⁴ Joe Carter (Captain, Hall County Sheriff’s Office), in discussion with the author, August 7, 2014.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

D. BUDGETARY INFORMATION

The budget information was obtained from the HCFD budget reports from 2003 through 2013.¹¹⁸ The overall fire department budget was compared to the total amount of funding allocated to emergency management. The amount of federal grant monies was also obtained and inspected for significant increases or decreases during the same time period. The grant monies examined include both emergency management and homeland security grants received by the jurisdiction.


The overall fire department budget for 2003 was approximately \$16,000,000. The budget amounts continued to increase through 2008 to approximately \$23,000,000. After 2008, slight declines occurred the following two years of 2009 and 2010 to \$22,400,000 and \$21,800,000, respectfully. In the following years through 2013, the budget remained fairly steady between \$22 million and \$23 million.¹¹⁹

Budgetary funding for emergency management in 2003 and 2004 was just under \$12,000 and \$11,000, respectively. Beginning in 2005, the emergency management budget began to increase steadily to a maximum of just over \$251,000. In 2009, the budget began to decline and lowered to approximately \$99,000 in 2013. The only slight increase after 2009 was in 2011 when it reached approximately \$181,000 from approximately \$149,000 in 2010.¹²⁰ (See Figure 5.)

¹¹⁸ Tim Sims (Hall County Purchasing Manager), email message to the author, August 7, 2014.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.



In Millions of Dollars

Figure 5. Overall Fire Budget versus EMA/Homeland Security Budget

The federal grant monies for the year 2003 were much lower than the following two years of 2004 and 2005. In 2003, funding was approximately \$80,000. In 2004, a very large increase to approximately \$1.5 and \$1.4 million occurred in 2005. After 2005, funding decreased substantially, as it dropped to approximately \$342,000 and fluctuated considerably through 2013.¹²¹ (See Figure 6.)

¹²¹ Hall County Georgia Schedule of Expenditures of Federal Awards, 2003–2013.




Figure 6. EMA/Homeland Security Grant Funding

E. ANALYSIS

HCEMA concentrates the majority of its time on the development of plans that assist with the preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery from both natural disasters and man-made events. The agency does very little in the realm of intelligence or investigations of terrorism.

Through the development of these aforementioned plans, HCEMA does align itself with FEMA’s mission and certain missions within the QHSR. By maintaining and updating the jurisdiction’s hazard mitigation, the continuity of operations, and the winter weather plans, HCEMA does meet the mission objective of protecting life and property and reducing the negative impact from natural or man-made disasters.

The alignment of HCEMA’s mission and operations to the missions of the QHSR is lacking in most areas. As to Mission #1 of the QHSR titled, “Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security,” HCEMA is involved in CBRNE and CIKR events, which relate to two of the goals under this mission, but at a minimal level. Under the goal referencing CBRNE, this organization coordinates the response of the fire department to CBRNE

incidents and is responsible for decontamination efforts. HCEMA also anticipates threats involving these events by maintaining and keeping up-to-date on its hazard mitigation plan and threat assessments. HCEMA does not interdict unlawful acquisition of CBRNE materials or prevent its hostile use as is directed in the QHSR. These responsibilities are those of the HCSO. HCEMA is also not involved in the investigation and possible prevention of such incidents. Not being involved more closely with the investigation and prevention efforts causes HCEMA to be lacking in the acquisition of information related to these events; therefore, it may be difficult for it to prevent future attacks in these areas.

Also, under Mission #1, the Emergency Management Homeland Security entity has a level of participation in CIKR operations. Participation includes the development of redundancy plans by coordinating with the private sector in case of a critical infrastructure failure. Also, this entity works closely with law enforcement in conducting threat assessments and security planning.

Mission #2 (Securing and Managing Our Borders) and Mission #3 (Enforcement and Administering of Immigration Laws) of the QHSR are not handled by HCEMA, nor does it receive any information regarding these missions. This lack of information sharing occurs because the HCEMA staff does not possess any type of security clearance. Also, due to the Emergency Management Homeland Security entity being all civilian with no law enforcement component, it does not participate in securing or managing U.S. borders through investigations of illegal immigrants or criminal organizations within its jurisdiction, nor does it enforce or become involved in immigration laws.

The QHSR Mission #4 of securing cyberspace is not directly the responsibility of HCEMA. Any information concerning the security or protection of the jurisdiction's computer systems is given to the IT section. This lack of knowledge is a disadvantage to HCEMA and makes it difficult to mitigate against these threats. HCEMA is involved with providing redundancy plans should the systems fail, but it cannot be certain of what threats may exist that could cause these systems to fail.

Mission #5 of the QHSR titled, "Strengthen National Preparedness and Resilience" and the FEMA mission of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery is

handled nicely by HCEMA through its planning efforts that include coordination with the HCSO, the IT section, and the private sector through critical infrastructure assessments. Alignment with this mission is also seen by HCEMA's participation in a disaster management team, the local emergency planning committee, and planning for drills and exercises.

The main emphasis of the Emergency Management Homeland Security entity is placed on the development of plans, the coordination needed for the development of these plans, and training. This entity develops plans as they relate to mitigating the hazards that frequently occur in the jurisdiction based on the history of past incidents. This organization also develops continuity of operations plans and ensures each plan includes response and recovery initiatives. To complete these plans, strong coordination is required between departments within the jurisdiction. This emphasis placed on coordination assists with the planning for both natural disasters and acts of terrorism. By working closely with law enforcement and other departments, the Emergency Management Homeland Security entity strengthens and sustains preparedness. Through the development of these plans, this organizational structure meets all of the goals set forth in Mission #5 of the QHSR.

One area in which HCEMA appears lacking is in intelligence and information sharing. HCEMA does work with GISAC, but only receives limited information regarding threats to the jurisdiction, such as radical groups active in the area, blast email bulletins, and information designated FOUO regarding general threat awareness updates. Nothing is received as it relates to possible targets located in or around the jurisdiction. The inability of the HCEMA staff to obtain security clearances that provide this information causes problems when trying to plan for the prevention of certain threats, particularly man-made or terrorism. Although HCEMA does work with a representative at GISAC, it is not given "law enforcement sensitive" information that could assist with developing more complete plans for any threat or hazard. This sensitive information is received by the HCSO. No detailed information is received that answers the questions of who, what, when, where, and how the threat may be carried out. This hindrance makes it difficult to include certain threats in the formulation of plans. The Emergency

Management Homeland Security entity and law enforcement do work together on occasion for planning purposes, but law enforcement cannot share certain sensitive information.

The annual budgets for both the HCFD and HCEMA remained fairly steady during the period observed. The fluctuation in grant monies during the years between 2003 and 2005 were significant. In 2003, grant expenditures were related to hazard mitigation planning. In 2004 and 2005, the increase in funds was used for capital expenditures involving equipment for the fire department, emergency medical services, and 911 communications. The Emergency Management Homeland Security entity’s budget only consists of one department and discipline, which thus allows the budget to be simplified because monies do not have to be distributed between two separate departments or disciplines.

Disadvantages of having only one department and discipline involved is limited grant funding. Emergency management grants, such as the EMPG, can be utilized in this instance, but the limitation comes from restrictions placed on some homeland security grants by the federal government; thereby, not allowing for the grants to be used as needed for this entity’s goals. Table 5 shows the advantages and disadvantages of the HCEMA model.

Table 5. Advantages and Disadvantages of the HCEMA Model

| ADVANTAGES |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alignment of HCEMA mission statement to FEMA mission statement • Alignment with QHSR Mission #5 involving strengthening preparedness and resilience • Coordination with other entities for planning purposes • Budget does not have to be separated between two disciplines |
| DISADVANTAGES |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minimal alignment with QHSR Mission #1 involving prevention of terrorism and enhancing security • No alignment with QHSR Mission #2 involving border security • No alignment with QHSR Mission #3 involving immigration laws (HCSO handles) • Only a minor alignment with QHSR Missions #4 involving cyberspace • Lack of information and intelligence sharing |

The Emergency Management Homeland Security entity is designed for jurisdictions that require more emphasis on preparing, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from both natural and man-made disasters. This particular structure places less prominence on the investigation of terrorism, criminal organizations that could be a part of terrorism, or illegal immigration. Due to this structure including a civilian only staff, these types of functions cannot be carried out, but instead are handled by law enforcement. The next chapter examines an integrated structure that includes both emergency management and law enforcement.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

VI. CASE STUDY C: INTEGRATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT HOMELAND SECURITY

The integration of homeland security and emergency management is an organizational structure that includes both disciplines working together under the same leadership. Each may have a different director; however, they are within the same unit, division, etc., and have the same goals.

A. BACKGROUND

The jurisdiction chosen for this organizational structure is Dekalb County, Georgia. Dekalb County is located approximately 15 miles north of the city of Atlanta. The population of Dekalb County is just over 700,000 residents.

Dekalb County public safety falls under a Public Safety Director who answers to a Chief Executive Officer and a Board of Commissioners. Both the police chief and the fire chief report to the Public Safety Director. (See Figures 7 and 8) The Dekalb County Emergency Management Division is supervised by both the Emergency Management Director and the Chief of Police. The Emergency Management Division also houses the Homeland Security Unit. (See Figure 7) Homeland security is also recognized in the Dekalb County Police Department organizational structure under the chief's office.



Figure 7. DeKalb County Police Department Organizational Chart¹²²

¹²² J. F. Rich (DeKalb County Police Department Office of Homeland Security/DEMA), email message to the author, May 14, 2014




Figure 8. Dekalb County Fire Rescue Organizational Chart¹²³

¹²³ Rich, email message to the author.

A total of 12 employees are assigned to the Emergency Management/Homeland Security division, which includes civilian administrative assistants, fire personnel and police officers. Of these 12 employees, one is an assistant fire chief who is the director of emergency management and the other is the Chief of Police who is the director of homeland security. (See Figure 9.)




Figure 9. Dekalb Emergency Management Organizational Chart¹²⁴

B. MISSION

According to the organizational charts, homeland security is represented under both the police department and the emergency management division. This representation shows that the police are responsible for homeland security in both areas; however, emergency management is not represented under the fire department. This omission could cause confusion because the fire chief is responsible for emergency management within the county. The fire department not listing emergency management as one of its areas of responsibility on the organizational chart could make it difficult to decipher if funding within the fire department is allocated toward emergency management. Also, the

¹²⁴ Rich, email message to the author.

organizational charts make it difficult to understand if the emergency management division is a division under the police department or the fire department.

The following sections describe the mission of both the Dekalb Office of Homeland Security (DOHS) and the Dekalb Emergency Management Agency (DEMA).

1. Dekalb Office of Homeland Security

The mission of the DOHS is stated as follows.

The Dekalb County Office of Homeland Security is staffed by Dekalb police detectives specially trained and equipped to investigate all suspicious substances, suspicious packages, bomb threats, suspected terrorist activity, lone wolves, and threats to law enforcement and public officials. Additionally, the homeland detectives identify, prioritize and conduct assessments on all Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR) in the county as required under (Homeland Security Presidential Directives) HSPD-5, 7, & 8 to proactively plan and prepare for possible terrorist attacks. The homeland detectives regularly liaise with local, state, and federal partners as well as private industry and non-government entities to assist in investigations, provide and receive training, and build mutual working relationships. The Office of Homeland Security also functions to assist the DeKalb Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) with activation and operation of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), facilitation of the Strategic National Stockpile Plan, the testing, maintenance, operation, and deployment of county emergency equipment, and provide assistance and leadership for all high impact incidents in the county.¹²⁵

According to the mission statement of the DOHS, Mission #1 of the QHSR, preventing terrorism and enhancing security, is carried out by understanding, deterring, and protecting against terrorist attacks. The DOHS demonstrates this prevention and enhancement through investigating all suspicious substance and package calls, bomb threats, and suspected terrorist activity calls. Adhering to this mission is also shown through the analysis of important documents and reports for trends and vulnerabilities by investigators in the DOHS. These documents are comprised of reports from the state

¹²⁵ Dekalb County Office of Homeland Security, *Dekalb County Police Department Office of Homeland Security Overview* (Dekalb, GA: Dekalb County Office of Homeland Security, 2014).

fusion center, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Department of Justice intelligence bulletins, and FBI situational awareness reports.¹²⁶

The DOHS also identifies, prioritizes, and conducts assessments on all critical infrastructure and key resources located in the county.¹²⁷ It correlates to the objective in the QHSR that states, “Manage Risks to Critical Infrastructure.” The DOHS complies with HSPD-5, HSPD-7, and HSPD-8 to plan and prepare for possible terrorist attacks on these facilities.¹²⁸

Stopping the spread of violent extremism is also a priority in the DOHS due to its investigations of “lone wolf” radicals. The DOHS mission is similar to the goals listed in Mission #1 in the QHSR through the prioritization of protecting public officials and engaging in community outreach programs, as is shown in its mission statement.

The DOHS prevents and protects against the use of CBRN, which is a goal listed under Mission #1 of the QHSR. The Dekalb County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management investigates any threat or unauthorized use of these materials when the information is acquired through any means of intelligence.¹²⁹ Also, if an attack does occur involving CBRN, the police department’s EOD unit handles the situation from an operational standpoint.

QHSR Mission #2 referring to border security, and Mission #3 referring to immigration laws, the DOHS does house ICE agents in its office so it can obtain information critical to its jurisdiction in a timely manner.¹³⁰ Also, regarding Mission #4, which refers to cyber security, it is not managed by the DOHS on the local level. This particular mission is managed by the jurisdiction’s IT unit and also on the federal level.

¹²⁶ Archer Company comprehensive position questionnaire, DOHS, May 2014, 5.

¹²⁷ Dekalb County Office of Homeland Security, *Dekalb County Police Department Office of Homeland Security Overview*, 1. 2014

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Rich, email message to the author.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

Any information of importance to the DOHS regarding cyber security is issued through its representatives assigned to the JTTF or received through the state fusion center.¹³¹

In conforming with Mission #5 in the QHSR, the DOHS ensures the resilience to disasters within Dekalb County, and assists the Dekalb Emergency Management Agency in a variety of different ways. First, the DOHS assists DEMA in the activation and operation of the EOC during times of critical incidents and represents law enforcement under the emergency support function (ESF) #13. The DOHS also coordinates the county’s WebEOC system, which is an Internet-based incident management software program in use by the county. The DOHS ensures emergency equipment used by DEMA is operational and functional through testing and maintenance.¹³² Members of the DOHS also participate in the emergency management planning process when needed to include the strategic national stockpile (SNS).

Conforming to Mission #1, Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security and Mission #5, Strengthening National Preparedness and Resilience, the DOHS may qualify for federal grants needed to sustain these missions within the jurisdiction. Table 6 lists the five missions in the 2014 QHSR along with the DOHS compliance.

Table 6. Dekalb Office of Homeland Security Compliance with QHSR

| QHSR Missions | Does Dekalb County Align with QHSR? |
|---|--|
| Mission #1: Prevent terrorism and enhance security | YES |
| Mission #2: Secure and manage our borders | NO* |
| Mission #3: Enforce and administer immigration laws | Partially** |
| Mission #4: Safeguard and secure cyberspace | NO*** |
| Mission #5: Strengthen national preparedness and resilience | YES |

*indicates the mission is managed on federal or state level and information related to jurisdiction is received from these entities.

**DOHS does work with ICE regarding immigration concerns

***Handled by another agency within the county

¹³¹ Rich, email message to the author.

¹³² Dekalb County Office of Homeland Security, *Dekalb County Police Department Office of Homeland Security Overview*, 1.

2. Dekalb Emergency Management Agency

The mission of the DEMA is defined as follows.

The Dekalb County Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) will provide countywide emergency management and coordination through prevention, protection, and mitigation against natural and man-made disasters. Furthermore, DEMA will be a primary responder to acts of terrorism and other emergencies that threaten the citizens and the county of Dekalb.

According to information from Dekalb County,

DEMA coordinates the response of local agencies ensuring the most appropriate resources are dispatched to the impacted areas in a time of a disaster. Through various programs DEMA works with local governments, volunteer organizations and the private sector throughout DeKalb County to develop and teach disaster preparedness plans, mitigation activities and provide training and exercise evaluations.¹³³

As can be seen, the mission of DEMA closely mirrors the definition established by FEMA. In an effort to prepare and mitigate for both natural and man-made disasters, DEMA developed and maintains a hazard mitigation plan for the county. This plan not only incorporates hazard considerations, but also considers geographic and demographic characteristics, roles, and responsibilities of key partners in local, state, and federal government, as well as the private sector.

The DEMA participates in regional plans that could affect the entire Metro Atlanta region. These plans include an evacuation and reentry plan, mass care, volunteer management, and a long-term recovery plan. By participating in these plans, the coordination aspect of the FEMA mission is recognized.

C. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

1. Dekalb Office of Homeland Security

The Dekalb Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management does not have an official operational procedure manual; therefore, the operational information for the Homeland Security Unit was taken from a comprehensive position questionnaire for

¹³³ "About DEMA," accessed August 2014, http://web.co.dekalb.ga.us/dk_police/pol-dema.html.

an Office of Homeland Security position in Dekalb County. The questionnaire discusses the purpose of the position, which closely resembles the unit's mission statement. The questionnaire then breaks down the specific functions carried out by the position and the percentage of time allocated to these functions. Next, the duties and responsibilities are listed that are needed to be performed to execute the listed functions. Other items included in the questionnaire are lists of reports and documents received and reviewed by the DOHS along with those reports and documents prepared by members of the DOHS and the purposes for both. Lastly, education and training requirements are listed for a typical officer assigned to the DOHS.

The DOHS has six essential functions. The first of these functions is assessing CIKR. This function takes up the majority of the homeland security officer's job. Conducting these assessments includes an initial site visit to gather information in regard to policies and procedures about the infrastructure and to speak with key personnel at the facility. Research is completed on each site and information concerning historical threats, known vulnerabilities, and any exposed knowledge of a critical nature, is collected. A tour of the facility is completed to determine critical nodes or places of most importance at the facility. A threat assessment is then developed for the site based on this open source and FOUO information.

Function #2 is listed as investigating suspected terrorist activity, such as suspicious substances and packages, bomb threats, lone wolf activity, and any threats levied toward law enforcement or public officials. When these types of incidents occur, investigators respond to the scene if an actual event occurred. These investigators will gather on-scene information, interview and interrogate individuals if necessary, provide operational support, and work closely with both state and federal partners. Those assigned to the Homeland Security Unit will also conduct surveillance, develop and follow up on leads, document the facts of the case, and make arrests if a suspect is identified.

Function #3 is described as assisting the emergency management section with the activation and operation of the EOC during critical events. A critical event could be any terrorist event previously described or any other man-made or natural occurring event.

The main duties under this function for the homeland security personnel are to coordinate with adjacent county and state agencies as needed and assist local cities located within the boundaries of the county. Homeland security personnel will also filter any information received through various outlets and report them to the director of emergency management and assist the director with any other tasks that may need to be completed.

Function #4 consists of researching open source and FOUO material regarding terrorism intelligence. This information is received from federal fusion centers and other daily and weekly intelligence reports. Function #4 is closely related to Function #6 in that Function #6 is attending meetings with both state and federal partners to gain information and intelligence and then brief other investigators in the homeland security unit. Investigators in the DOHS have security clearances, whereas civilians working under DEMA do not.

Function #5 is attending training and instructing various classes. Training for a homeland security officer includes specialization in personnel security, gathering and analyzing human intelligence (HUMINT), and imagery and geospatial intelligence. Certain clearances are also required.

The close examination of these functions within the DOHS is necessary to be compared to the operational responsibilities of the DEMA to see if any duplication of services occurs or if funds can be reduced in certain areas.

2. DeKalb Emergency Management Agency

DEMA does not list separate functions in its operational concept. Instead, the overview of the agency lists several operational responsibilities of emergency management. The operational responsibilities of DEMA include the following.

- Maintaining and developing all local emergency management programs, projects, and plans required by state and federal government
- Maintaining the EOC for DeKalb County and other municipalities located inside the jurisdiction of DeKalb
- Act as a liaison with local, state, and federal authorities during major emergencies and disasters

- Provide 24-hour coordination of resources for emergencies and disasters¹³⁴

One obvious responsibility is to maintain and activate the EOC and ensure it functions properly when needed.¹³⁵ As stated previously, DEMA prepares and mitigates for natural and man-made disasters including terrorism through the development of numerous plans geared toward these objectives.

If at any point in time the SNS is needed, DEMA facilitates points of distribution (PODs) along with the board of health. DEMA also works with the DOHS in planning for and activating the SNS system and protocols.¹³⁶

In the case of a disaster affecting Dekalb County government, DEMA developed and maintains a continuity of operations plan (COOP).¹³⁷ A COOP plan is used to establish policy and guidance to ensure the essential functions of the government are carried out in case a disaster, either natural or man-made, causes daily operations to be threatened.

D. BUDGETARY INFORMATION

The budget information was taken from the Dekalb County budget reports for the years 2002 through 2013.¹³⁸ The overall police and homeland security budgets were compared to see the percentage of funding allocated toward homeland security. A separate emergency management budget was not reported in either the police or fire budgets; therefore, a similar comparison could not be performed for emergency management.

The overall police and fire budget in 2002 was approximately \$131 million with no funding allocated to homeland security due to the unit being created later that year. In

¹³⁴ “Responsibilities,” accessed August 2014, http://web.co.dekalb.ga.us/dk_police/pol-dema.html.

¹³⁵ Dekalb County Office of Homeland Security, *Dekalb County Police Department Office of Homeland Security Overview*, 3.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ “Dekalb County Budget Information,” accessed July 2014, http://www.dekalbcountyga.gov/finance/fin_budget.html.

2003, the first full year of the unit’s existence, approximately \$890,000 was allocated toward homeland security funding. As the years progressed, the overall police/fire budget steadily increased to a maximum of approximately \$200 million in 2009. The homeland security budget followed the same path of steadily increasing to almost \$3 million in 2009. After 2009, the overall police/fire budget began a continuous decrease to just over \$156 million in 2013. The only exception was in 2011 when the budget remained about the same. Again, the homeland security unit followed suit and decreased to just over \$886,000 in 2013. (See Figure 10)




Figure 10. DeKalb Overall Police/Fire Budget versus Homeland Security Budget

Some of the budget reduction for the Homeland Security Unit was replenished with grant funds. The major grant funds utilized were the HSPG, the UASI grant, and the EMPG. According to the DeKalb County budget reports, the years of 2004–2013, with the exception of 2007, were the only years subsidized with a homeland security or

emergency management grant. Figure 11 shows a breakdown of the total amounts of grant monies by year.




Figure 11. Dekalb Homeland Security Grant Funding

E. ANALYSIS

The integrated Law Enforcement and Emergency Management Homeland Security involves itself in aspects of both law enforcement and emergency management. The combination of the two disciplines allows two mission statements; one for each discipline. Since both entities work under the same organizational structure, the concentration of the operations can include preparing, mitigating, responding, and recovering from natural disasters, man-made disasters, and terrorism under the same organization. Due to each discipline having a close working relationship with the other, improvement in planning for both terrorism and natural disasters does occur. It is also possible to cross train personnel in certain aspects of each discipline. As an example, the law enforcement side is familiar with EOC protocol, planning for critical health concerns

that involve the strategic national stockpile, and the capability to operate software used within the emergency management realm. The emergency management side has a better understanding of crime scene integrity and other aspects important to law enforcement when it comes to planning for man-made incidents. This single entity cannot only develop plans, but it can also conduct investigations and thwart terrorism activities through enforcement.

The missions of the DOHS closely correlate to those listed in the QHSR. Goals listed under Mission #1 are satisfied due to the DOHS attempting to prevent terrorist attacks through the analysis of intelligence documents received through the JTTF, the state fusion center, or from internally generated intelligence documents. The DOHS deters and disrupts terrorism operations by investigating all suspected terrorist activity, such as suspicious packages and substances, violent extremism (lone wolves) and bomb threats. The DOHS meets another goal under Mission #1 by reducing risk to critical infrastructure through conducting assessments on these facilities. One goal under Mission #1 not expressed in the mission statement for the DOHS is preventing and protecting against CBRN. Although this activity is not listed, these events are investigated by the Homeland Security Unit. CBRN should be added to the mission statement of the DOHS to show its compliance with this part of Mission #1.

Mission #1 also includes the goal of protecting critical infrastructure. The DOHS devotes a significant amount of time to this responsibility, which also carries over into the fourth mission of the QHSR, safeguarding and securing cyberspace. An advantage of the DOHS conducting critical infrastructure assessments is that it can complete two goals within two different missions of the QHSR. These goals are strengthening the security and resilience of critical infrastructure in Mission #4 and also reducing the risk to critical infrastructure, which is a goal under Mission #1.

QHSR Missions #2 (border security) and # 3 (immigration laws) are not directly handled by the DOHS; however, information is received through the JTTF or the state fusion center if applicable to the jurisdiction. Securing and managing the borders, along with investigating immigration laws, although important, is not focused on by the DOHS, but is instead handled by ICE agents who are on loan and work inside the DOHS. It is an

advantage to this type of organizational structure because this coordinated effort is made possible due to the law enforcement element in place.

In one area under Mission #4 of the QHSR (safeguard and secure cyberspace) the DOHS does not have the responsibility of securing its government's IT enterprise. This task is left up to the jurisdiction's IT department; however, if a breach occurs, then DOHS investigators would conduct the criminal investigation. This procedure could be considered a duplication of services being that tasks associated with IT security are handled in two different areas. A representative from IT should be included in the DOHS.

Mission #5 (strengthening preparedness and resilience) is a joint effort between both the DOHS and DEMA. The DOHS assists DEMA in the preparation of emergency plans, such as delivery of the strategic national stockpile, and with the coordination of WebEOC, an emergency management communication system. An advantage of this organizational structure is the close working relationship between the DOHS and DEMA for the purposes of planning for both natural disasters and man-made or terrorist events. The emergency management section conducts missions listed in its mission statement that closely resembles FEMA's missions. These missions include preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. This section also contributes to regional plans that include evacuation and reentry, mass care, volunteer management, and long-term recovery.

An additional advantage to this particular entity includes the availability of more manpower since the employees include police officers, firefighters, and civilians, and therefore, do not have to rely on only one department for staffing needs. When looking at the organizational charts for this organization, personnel from both the police department and the fire department are utilized. The police department handles the law enforcement aspect, as it relates to crime and terrorism and also assists the emergency management section with planning, etc. The emergency management section maintains and develops all local preparedness programs and the development and maintenance of all projects and plans required by state and federal government. The integration of both law enforcement and emergency management allows each entity to work together under the same roof; therefore, the problem of each performing the same tasks to develop a plan or apply for

grant funding is reduced. Administrative services are also consolidated because each discipline uses the same asset instead of several individuals completing the same tasks for each discipline separately. No evidence of duplication of services is apparent with the integrated structure.

Although the integrated structure does have advantages, a disadvantage is confusion in the chain of command due to positions falling under three organizational charts. This particular organization deals with three separate organizational charts because personnel are assigned from the police department, the fire department, and then personnel from each are incorporated under the combined law enforcement/emergency management homeland security entity. The director of emergency management is a fire chief; however, the fire department organizational chart does not list this chief as holding this position. The police department organizational chart shows homeland security under the office of the police chief. The emergency management division organizational chart also shows homeland security under the chief of police.

Most of this confusion could be rectified by rewriting the organizational chart for the integrated entity; however, at times, depending on the type of incident, conflicts could exist between the law enforcement and emergency management sides. A solution to this problem could be to develop guidelines in advance for the command structure depending on the type of incident. For example, if the incident is a natural disaster, then the emergency management side, which includes the fire department, would take the lead. If the incident resulted from a criminal or terrorist incident, then the law enforcement side would have command.

Another disadvantage to this structure is that the emergency management section has limited access to critical information. Although both emergency management and law enforcement are integrated, law enforcement can receive certain sensitive information that emergency management personnel cannot. Again, as has been discussed in the emergency management homeland security entity chapter, the sharing of critical information or intelligence is important from both a planning and operational standpoint. If certain information is only made known to emergency management personnel during an exigent circumstance, time would not allow for proper preparation or mitigation. This

problem could be avoided if information was allowed to flow freely between the two disciplines at all times.

An analysis of the overall police budget and the homeland security budget for the years available show a steady increase in both from 2002 through 2009. Extensive funding was also obtained from homeland security grants from 2008 and 2011. The amount of funding allotted for public safety and homeland security shows that it does not appear that budget constraints would jeopardize the homeland security unit. No separate budget is reported for emergency management within the jurisdiction. All funds for the DOHS and DEMA are listed under homeland security, which makes it difficult to decipher the amounts going into emergency management.

After 2008, funding in both the overall police/fire budget and the homeland security budget began to decline significantly. The 2009 budget report stated that funding for the foreseeable future would be challenged to provide an expected level of public safety services given the pressures on revenues exerted by generally poor economic conditions.¹³⁹ Grant funding in homeland security also decreased after 2009.

A budgetary advantage to the integrated structure involves the ability to apply for grants under both homeland security and emergency management. Due to grant guidance, some grants are only able to be used under certain circumstances and for certain equipment. For instance, a grant tied to emergency management issues may allow for the purchase of a water tender, but not for an armored vehicle. Through the integration of both disciplines, both emergency management grants and homeland security grants can be used to allow for more diversity to fit the needs of the jurisdiction better.

The importance of grant funding is shown when the DOHS downsized from approximately 20 investigators to five including the deputy director in 2009. Instead of completely dissolving the DOHS, the jurisdiction elected to continue the unit to have a police presence with DEMA and to continue to qualify for homeland security grants.

¹³⁹ "DeKalb County Georgia 2009 Annual Budget," 2009, http://www.co.dekalb.ga.us/finance/pdf/budget/2009/DeKalb_2009_Budget_Book.pdf.

Table 7 lists both the advantages and disadvantages of the integrated law enforcement and emergency management homeland security entity.

Table 7. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Integrated Law Enforcement and Emergency Management Homeland Security Entity

| ADVANTAGES |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Missions correlate to the QHSR and those of FEMA • No significant duplication of services • More manpower available due to the integration of law enforcement and emergency management • Ability to share grant monies • Ability to prepare, mitigate, respond, and recover from all hazards including natural, man-made, and terrorism disasters under the same entity |
| DISADVANTAGES |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confusing organizational charts • DEMA has no security clearance • A separate budget not listed for emergency management under the fire department |

The integrated law enforcement/emergency management homeland security entity should be considered in jurisdictions that place an equal amount of emphasis on terrorism and natural disasters. The integrated entity should also be considered only if a good relationship exists between law enforcement, fire and emergency management personnel. Working together under the same entity would require each discipline to respect one another and understand the tasks that each must accomplish. The final chapter of this thesis include recommendations that should be implemented for each entity previously discussed along with concluding statements.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

This thesis has reviewed three organizational structures used in the Metro Atlanta area that illustrated differing approaches to homeland security. The objective was to illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of each structure. Based on the case study research method, the focus was on the organizational mission, the operational characteristics, and budget considerations of each organizational structure. The ensuing sections summarize each structure followed by recommendations.

A. ALIGNMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL MISSION TO THE FEDERAL MISSION

The missions of each organization were compared to the QHSR and the mission of FEMA if applicable. The daily operations and goals of the organization are influenced by the mission selected. The mission of each organization could also influence the type of grant funding that could be utilized to carry out its mission. Each organizational structure studied complied to some extent with the federal missions, but each was lacking in some areas.

The law enforcement homeland security entity aligned itself more to the intelligence and cyber security missions of the QHSR in the prevention of terrorism, but fell short in the mission of preparing for natural disasters or all hazards.

The emergency management homeland security entity was strong in its alignment with the FEMA mission, but with the exception of strengthening preparedness and resilience to natural disasters, this entity did not align closely with the missions of the QHSR.

The law enforcement/emergency management entity captured the missions of both FEMA and the QHSR better than either of the other organizational structures because it incorporates both disciplines into one entity; therefore, the mission can include the prevention of terrorism, and prepare and mitigate for natural disasters and other man-made incidents.

1. Operational Characteristics

Although each organizational structure possesses similarities in operational characteristics, each structure chose a different area to emphasize. The law enforcement homeland security entity chose to emphasize terrorism through intelligence gathering and investigations, which is very different from the emergency management homeland security entity, but does have similarities to the law enforcement/emergency management homeland security entity.

The emergency management homeland security entity operates on the basis of planning and preparing for natural or man-made disasters. It does work with a local law enforcement organization for planning purposes, but does not have the ability to gather or be privy to certain intelligence or investigate possible terrorist activity.

The organizational structure of law enforcement/emergency management homeland security listed duties, responsibilities, and functions in both terrorism and all hazards including natural disasters and man-made incidents. This particular entity can therefore participate in all areas of emergency management and law enforcement since each discipline has representatives within one organizational structure.

2. Budget Considerations

All three organizations continued to fund their homeland security entities despite economic downturns. Although the dollar amounts allocated to homeland security may have been reduced due to budgeting constraints, the continued funding of the discipline at some level shows its importance to each organization.

A consideration for each jurisdiction is the ability to fund a homeland security entity continually on the local level. The budget information for each organizational structure showed that none relied on grant funding to continue to fund its respective homeland security entities. Some did, however, use grant funding to purchase equipment and supplement other services, but nothing showed positions that relied on grant funding or any other means that would require grant funding to continue homeland security operations.

Grant funding is limited to certain mandates placed on the jurisdiction by the federal government. One mandate that affects this study is the ability to apply for certain homeland security or emergency management grants. As an example, the law enforcement homeland security entity is not able to apply for certain grants pertaining only to emergency management and the emergency management homeland security entity cannot participate in some grants designated for law enforcement. The integrated law enforcement/emergency management homeland security entity is represented by both disciplines; therefore, it can partake in grants that the other entities cannot.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Each of the homeland security entities studied in this thesis showed disadvantages that could be improved upon. All entities, regardless of its organization structure, are not without their problems. The following recommendations are in response to the disadvantages found for all three entities studied to improve their efficiency and operational capabilities.

1. Provide Experts for All Five Missions of the QHSR As Part of Homeland Security Personnel

Each homeland security entity should include as part of its personnel, experts in each of the areas listed under the missions set forth by the QHSR and the mission statement under FEMA. These areas include CBRNE, CIKR, cyber security, border security, immigration, and the ability to plan for and mitigate for natural or man-made events and terrorism. As was seen in the case studies, the law enforcement entity did not include natural disasters, but relied on a separate emergency management entity to manage this area. The emergency management entity placed a high concentration on planning and response, but did not have the ability to prevent acts of terrorism from an enforcement or investigative perspective. As both law enforcement and emergency management were placed together in the integrated entity, it can perform most of these tasks.

2. Improve Information Sharing

Regarding information sharing, the law enforcement homeland security entity and the integrated emergency management/law enforcement homeland security entity have the ability to receive most types of intelligence information due to personnel within these organizations having some level of security clearance. All three entities work with the state fusion center; however, the emergency management homeland security entity is at a disadvantage due to its inability to acquire sensitive information. Emergency management practitioners, although civilian in the three organizations studied, should have the same clearances as law enforcement due to the nature of their duties. Being provided with the most up-to-date information for planning and mitigation purposes would benefit local jurisdictions by permitting these practitioners to have a greater understanding of the threats for which they are planning. This recommendation would also allow for a closer working relationship between law enforcement and emergency management by having different perspectives on how to best handle a situation or threat whether it is a natural, man-made, or a terrorist event. Each discipline can offer many advantages, but combining the knowledge of each by improving information sharing, would provide more alternatives.

3. Closer Relationships between Local, State, and Federal Authorities

Each jurisdiction should have personnel representing its organization assigned to both the JTTF and the state fusion center. These representatives should obtain applicable information and intelligence related to the prevention and investigation of terrorist activity and report to their respective jurisdiction on a scheduled time frame without having to go through a third party. In this scenario, pertinent questions can be asked by the jurisdictions that cannot be asked if the only form of information sharing is through bulletins or blast emails. A closer relationship developed by daily contact could enhance trust among all levels of government.

It is also important to note that information sharing is a two-way street. Local jurisdictions depend on assets like the JTTF, state fusion centers, and other local, state, and federal organizations to provide the information and intelligence needed to prepare,

and possibly, prevent certain actions from occurring. This statement is also true in reverse. State and federal organizations depend on the local jurisdictions for intimate knowledge of possible threats in their respective areas. By developing closer relationships, this two-way information sharing would be enhanced.

4. Improve Protection for Cyber Infrastructure

Improvement in the area of cyber protection is needed by all organizational structures studied. The law enforcement homeland security entity does have a section dedicated to the investigation and enforcement of cyber crimes, but lacks the expertise for the actual protection of the infrastructure itself as it relates to a cyber attack involving a virus, etc.

The emergency management homeland security entity does not conduct investigations or receive intelligence related to cyber crime or the possibility of a cyber attack. This entity does, however, plan for such contingencies by preparing redundancy plans with outside agencies within its jurisdiction. The protection of the cyber infrastructure is carried out by a separate information and technology unit within another part of the local government within that jurisdiction.

The integrated law enforcement/emergency management homeland security entity does not manage the protection of critical infrastructure, but instead, like the other two entities, relies on the jurisdiction's information and technology unit to be familiar with the avenues of protection for the cyber infrastructure hardware. This entity also does not dedicate personnel to the investigation or intelligence aspect of cyber security, but receives its information pertaining to this subject through the Joint Terrorism Task Force or the state fusion center.

Each homeland security entity, regardless of the specific structure chosen, should have the ability to receive first-hand intelligence on cyber security and conduct investigations on all cyber-related crimes. Each entity should also have personnel assigned with the knowledge of all facets of the cyber infrastructure and the ability to present ways of protecting the same.

5. Development of a Mission Statement

In regard to homeland security and emergency management, an established federal mission is already in place with the QHSR and FEMA. By maintaining similar goals, the jurisdiction will meet most mandates that would be required to receive federal grant funding. The operations and responsibilities should be closely related to the mission statement chosen so that no confusion occurs as to what the organization is to accomplish.

C. LIMITATIONS AND NEED FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This research was limited in that it chose to only include homeland security structures found in and around the Metro Atlanta area. It is possible other structures may be present in other areas of the country that could provide additional advantages or options for a homeland security entity.

Although many aspects of the three organizational structures were shown, this thesis concentrated on the advantages and disadvantages of each in regard to the chosen mission, the operational aspects, and budget cycle for each structure. In choosing the best structure for a particular jurisdiction, other factors could still influence this decision, such as the expense of taking on a homeland security entity, the local history of the jurisdiction as it relates to probable threats, and the political atmosphere. These areas are considerations for future research and are expanded upon as follows.

The expense of taking on a local homeland security entity is a concern for any jurisdiction. Many local jurisdictions utilize state and federal grants to assist with these expenses. Although these grants assist with the costs of equipment and operations, arguments arise as to whether spending money on homeland security is worth the cost. In other words, do the costs outweigh the benefits? A cost benefit analysis would be a good avenue of approach to determine if it is feasible for a jurisdiction to begin or continue a homeland security entity. It is reasonable not to implement security measures, such as a homeland security entity, not because it would not be beneficial, but because the costs are

too high.¹⁴⁰ The benefit of having a local entity is not possible for all jurisdictions; therefore, they may have to rely on other avenues of obtaining information, such as neighboring jurisdictions, a state fusion center, or federal authorities. Although this reliance on other jurisdictions would not be the best choice due to having to accept what they believe works best for them, it is still a level of obtaining information related to homeland security.

The history and types of threats along with the severity and probability of occurrence are considerations for the type of organizational structure a jurisdiction should implement. Many jurisdictions formulate hazard mitigation plans that include probabilities of certain threats based on historical data. Many factors can play a role in the types of threats a jurisdiction may encounter. Some of these factors include the geographical size of the jurisdiction, the population, important or well-known landmarks, critical infrastructure, types of weather, or natural disasters previously encountered, etc. If the plan shows a higher probability of terrorism or natural disasters, the jurisdiction may elect to choose the law enforcement homeland security entity or the emergency management homeland security entity, respectively. If the threats of both are equal, then the integrated law enforcement/emergency management homeland security entity may be the best choice. It is also important to understand that the probability of occurrence should not be the only consideration. The potential damage to infrastructure and the potential loss of life within the jurisdiction is a significant factor as well.

The political landscape is also of importance when determining the best course to take regarding a jurisdiction's organizational structure. It has been shown through research that some politicians strongly favor a homeland security entity whereas others feel it is a waste of funding. Death due to a terrorist attack or a natural disaster is quite low when compared to other risks of accidental death.¹⁴¹ This statement may influence the decision of local politicians not to fund a separate homeland security entity. Another factor that can influence the opinion of political leaders is public perception. Where the

¹⁴⁰ De Ruyg, "What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy?" 3–4.

¹⁴¹ W. Kip Viscusi, "Valuing Risks of Death from Terrorism and Natural Disasters," *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* 38, no. 3 (2009): 191.

politician's constituents feel homeland security is a vital role in which their local government should participate, they could put pressure on them to fund such an entity. Also, interagency politics between certain departments in the jurisdiction could influence the organizational structure chosen. For example, if a good working relationship does not exist between law enforcement, fire, or emergency management, the integrated law enforcement/emergency management structure would not be the best option.

D. CONCLUSION

After the attacks of 9/11, many local jurisdictions followed the lead of the federal government and made the decision to create a homeland security entity. Due to the reduction in the amount of homeland security funding both locally and through federal grants, local jurisdictions needed to find the most appropriate organizational structure that would allow them to save money and still complete the tasks associated with homeland security and all that it entails. The many definitions and missions relating to homeland security was also a concern when trying to discern what the objective of the local entity should be. Should the mission be related to terrorism only or should it be all hazards involving natural disasters as well?

It is clear through current world events, as well as domestic events, that the threat of terrorism within the United States is increasing. A major concern is the lone wolf or self-radicalizing individuals or groups that form or live in local communities. Due to the fact that local law enforcement is familiar with their particular areas, and the persons living within their jurisdiction, makes them a great tool for terrorism prevention. Having the ability to combat terrorism through an organization with many resources dedicated to that purpose shows the importance of having a local homeland security entity. Natural disasters have also reeked havoc on local communities and will continue to do so. An organization that has the experience and knowledge to best prepare communities for these events is also a benefit to having a form of homeland security and emergency management on a local level.

This thesis shows not only the advantages and disadvantages of each entity, but it also gives law enforcement and emergency management leaders, elected officials, and

other decision makers a basis for better understanding each organizational structure and the ability to compare that to what would be needed in their own jurisdiction. By seeing the differences, such as one entity having a concentration on intelligence and terrorism, whereas another concentrates on natural disasters, leaders can better understand the drawbacks and challenges of each structure so they can decipher how they want their particular organization to operate. Also, an understanding of these differences allows leaders to formulate an organizational structure through the inclusion of what they like and reject what they do not to design a structure that works best for them.

In today's volatile world, it is imperative that the leadership within local jurisdictions understand not only the importance of having a homeland security entity, but also recognize the needs of their community and tailor their specific organizational structure to fit those needs. The prevention of terrorism-related events or the mitigation of natural disasters begins at home. Without a proper homeland security organizational structure in place that includes a defined mission specific to the jurisdiction, operations that meet the goals of that mission and a budget that allows for these objectives, it is almost impossible for a local jurisdiction to plan for, and possibly prevent, such acts from occurring, which leaves the local jurisdiction in a very vulnerable position.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Atlanta Police Department. "Atlanta Police Department 2011–2012 Annual Report." Accessed July 2014. <http://www.atlantapd.org/pdf/crime-data-downloads/627E3107-9936-4C07-881C-65251D68EDCB.pdf>.
- . "Atlanta Police Department Policy Manual, Section 4.1.2." May 2012. <https://ia601203.us.archive.org/29/items/AtlantaPoliceDepartmentPolicyManualHTML/Chapter5/APDSOP5030SpecialEnforcementSection.htm>.
- . "Atlanta Police Department Policy Manual, APD SOP 5050, Section 3.1." May 2012. <https://ia601203.us.archive.org/29/items/AtlantaPoliceDepartmentPolicyManualHTML/Chapter5/APDSOP5030SpecialEnforcementSection.htm>.
- . "Atlanta Police Department Policy Manual, Section 4.8.4." May 2012. <https://ia601203.us.archive.org/29/items/AtlantaPoliceDepartmentPolicyManualHTML/Chapter5/APDSOP5030SpecialEnforcementSection.htm>.
- . "Atlanta Police Department Policy Manual, Section 4.8.3 (2)." May 2012. <https://ia601203.us.archive.org/29/items/AtlantaPoliceDepartmentPolicyManualHTML/Chapter5/APDSOP5030SpecialEnforcementSection.htm>.
- . "Atlanta Police Department Policy Manual, Section 4.10.1 (3), Section 4.11.1." May 2012. <https://ia601203.us.archive.org/29/items/AtlantaPoliceDepartmentPolicyManualHTML/Chapter5/APDSOP5030SpecialEnforcementSection.htm>.
- . "Criminal Investigations, Special Enforcement." Accessed July 2014. <http://www.atlantapd.org/>.
- . "Special Operations Section." Accessed July 2014. <http://www.atlantapd.org/specialoperationssection.aspx>.
- Best, Richard A. Jr. *Intelligence Information: Need-to-Know vs. Need-to-Share* (CRS Report No. R41848). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011.
- Birkland, Thomas A. "Disasters, Catastrophes, and Policy Failure in the Homeland Security Era." *Review of Policy Research* 26, no. 4 (2009): 423–438.
- Blanchard, Wayne. *Guide to Emergency Management and Related Terms, Definitions, Concepts, Acronyms, Organizations, Programs, Guidance, Executive Orders, and Legislation, A Tutorial on Emergency Management, Broadly Defined, Past and Present*. Washington, DC: FEMA, 2008.
- Burruss, George W., Matthew J. Giblin, and Joseph A. Schafer. "Threatened Globally, Acting Locally: Modeling Law Enforcement Homeland Security Practices." *Justice Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (2010): 77–101.

- Bush, George W. *Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection*. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7. Washington, DC: George W. Bush, 2003.
- . *Management of Domestic Incidents*. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5. Washington, DC: George W. Bush, 2003.
- Caruson, Kiki, and Susan A. MacManus. “Mandates and Management Challenges in the Trenches: An Intergovernmental Perspective on Homeland Security.” *Public Administration Review* 66, no. 4 (2006): 522–536.
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “Preparedness for All Hazards.” Accessed April 24, 2014. <http://emergency.cdc.gov/hazards-all.asp>.
- Chenoweth, Erica, and Susan E. Clarke. “All Terrorism is Local: Resources, Nested Institutions, and Governance for Urban Homeland Security in the American Federal System.” *Political Research Quarterly* 63, no. 3 (2010): 495–507.
- Chung, Jibum. “Counter Terrorism and Emergency Management: Keeping a Proper Balance.” Brookings Institute, May 2013. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/05/07-counter-terrorism-emergency-management-chung#>.
- Clarke, Susan E., and Erica Chenoweth. “The Politics of Vulnerability: Constructing Local Performance Regimes for Homeland Security.” *Review of Policy Research* 23, no. 1 (2006): 95–114.
- Coburn, Tom. *Safety at Any Price: Assessing the Impact of Homeland Security Spending in U.S. Cities*. Washington, DC: Office of Senator Tom Coburn, 2012.
- Criswell, Deanne B. “Homeland Security: Developing National Doctrine to Guide State Strategy Development.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012.
- Davis, Lois M., Louis T. Mariano, Jennifer E. Pace, Sarah K. Cotton, and Paul Steinberg. *Combating Terrorism: How Prepared Are State and Local Response Organizations?* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006.
- De Rugy, Veronique. “What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy?” *American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research* (2005): 1–42.
- Dekalb County Office of Homeland Security. *Dekalb County Police Department Office of Homeland Security Overview*. Dekalb, GA: Dekalb County Office of Homeland Security, 2014.
- Dekalb County, GA. “Dekalb County Budget Information.” Accessed July 2014. http://www.dekalbcountyga.gov/finance/fin_budget.html.

- . “DeKalb County Georgia 2009 Annual Budget.” 2009. http://www.co.dekalb.ga.us/finance/pdf/budget/2009/DeKalb_2009_Budget_Book.pdf.
- Dekalb Emergency Management Agency. “About DEMA.” Accessed August 2014. http://web.co.dekalb.ga.us/dk_police/pol-dema.html.
- . “Responsibilities.” Accessed August 2014. http://web.co.dekalb.ga.us/dk_police/pol-dema.html.
- Department of Homeland Security. *2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review*. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014. <http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014-qhsr-final-508.pdf>.
- . *Bottom-Up Review*. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2010.
- . “Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act.” Accessed September 2014. <http://www.ice.gov/287g/>.
- . “DHS Announces Grant Allocation for Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 Preparedness Grants.” August 23, 2013. <http://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/08/23/dhs-announces-grant-allocation-fiscal-year-fy-2013-preparedness-grants>.
- . *One Team, One Mission, Securing the Homeland: U.S. Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2008–2013*. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2008.
- . “Our Mission.” Accessed May 2014. <http://www.dhs.gov/our-mission>.
- . *Quadrennial Homeland Security Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland*. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014.
- . *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review*. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2010.
- FEMA. “Disaster Declarations by Year.” Accessed April 2014. <http://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/year>.
- . “Emergency Management: Definition, Vision, Mission, Principles.” Accessed April 2014. [http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/docs/emprinciples/0907_176%20EM%20Principles12x18v2f%20Johnson%20\(w-o%20draft\).pdf](http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/docs/emprinciples/0907_176%20EM%20Principles12x18v2f%20Johnson%20(w-o%20draft).pdf).
- . “Local Role in Emergency Management.” 2006. <http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/docs/hazdem/Session%2018--Local%20Government%20Role.doc>.
- Gerber, Brian J. et al. “On the Front Line American Cities and the Challenge of Homeland Security Preparedness.” *Urban Affairs Review* 41, no. 2 (2005): 182–210.

- Haddow, George, and Jane Bullock. "The Future of Emergency Management." Paper presented at the Academic Emergency Management and Related Courses (AEMRC) for the Higher Education Program The Future of Emergency Management—Papers From The 2005 FEMA Emergency Management Higher Education Conference, 2005.
- Hall County Fire Services. "Emergency Management Agency." Accessed August 2014. http://www.hallcounty.org/fireservices/fire_ema.asp.
- . "Emergency Management Agency, Preparedness and Mitigation." Accessed August 2014. http://www.hallcounty.org/fireservices/fire_ema.asp.
- . "Emergency Management Agency, Recovery." Accessed August 2014. http://www.hallcounty.org/fireservices/fire_ema.asp.
- . "Emergency Management Agency, Response." Accessed August 2014. http://www.hallcounty.org/fireservices/fire_ema.asp.
- Hoffman, Bruce. "Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism since 9/11." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 25, no. 5 (2002): 303–316.
- Holdeman, Eric. "Destroying FEMA." *Washington Post*, August 30, 2005.
- Homeland Security Council. *The National Homeland Security Strategy*. Washington, DC: Office of the President, 2007.
- Jiao, Allan Y., and Harry M. Rhea. "Integration of Police in the United States: Changes and Development After 9/11." *Policing & Society* 17, no. 4 (2007): 388–408.
- Kahan, Jerome H. "What's in a Name? The Meaning of Homeland Security." *Journal of Homeland Security Education* 2 (2013): 1–18.
- Kettl, Donald F. "Contingent Coordination Practical and Theoretical Puzzles for Homeland Security." *The American Review of Public Administration* 33, no. 3 (2003): 253–277.
- Kirshner, Charlotte. "Estimating the Fiscal Impacts of the Homeland Security Grants on State and Local Public Safety Spending." PhD diss., The George Washington University, 2012.
- Krueger, Skip, Eliot Jennings, and James M. Kendra. "Local Emergency Management Funding: An Evaluation of County Budgets." *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management* 6, no. 1 (2009): 1–21.

- Kunreuther, Howard C., and Erwann O. Michel-Kerjen. "Assessing, Managing, and Benefiting from Global Interdependent Risks: The Case of Terrorism and Natural Disasters." *Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania* (August 11, 2007): 1–26.
- Lucas-McEwen, Valerie. "Recalibrating Emergency Management: Information Is Not the Same as Intelligence." *Emergency Management Magazine*, December 29, 2010. <http://www.emergencymgmt.com/emergency-blogs/campus/Recalibrate-Emergency-Management-Information-Intelligence-122910.html>.
- MacManus, Susan A., and Kiki Caruson. "Financing Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness: Use of Interlocal Cost-Sharing." *Public Budgeting & Finance* (Summer 2008): 24–68.
- Morreale, Stephen A., and David E. Lambert. "Homeland Security and the Police Mission." *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management* 6, no. 1 (2009): 1–19.
- Nagal, Kimberly. "All Hazards Planning." Wright State University. Accessed April 24, 2014. <http://www.wright.edu/emergency-management/all-hazards-planning>.
- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. *Integrated United States Security Database (IUSSD): Data on the Terrorist Attacks in the United States Homeland, 1970 to 2011, Final Report to Resilient Systems Division, DHS Science and Technology Directorate*. College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2012.
- Obama, Barack. *National Preparedness*. Presidential Policy Directive PPD-8. Washington, DC: Barack Obama, 2011.
- Office of Inspector General. *FEMA's Progress in All-Hazards Mitigation*. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security 2009.
- Office of the President. *National Security Strategy*. Washington, DC: Office of the President, 2010.
- . *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*. Washington, DC: Office of the President, 2011.
- Pelfrey, William V. "An Exploratory Study of Local Homeland Security Preparedness Findings and Implications for Future Assessments." *Criminal Justice Policy Review* 20, no. 3 (2009): 261–273.
- Reese, Shawn. "Is DHS Effectively Implementing a Strategy to Counter Emerging Threats." U.S. House of Representatives, Committee of Homeland Security, February 2012. <http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/subcommitte-hearing-dhs-effectively-implementing-strategy-counter-emerging-threats>.

- . *Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional Considerations* (CRS Report No. R42462). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012.
- . *Homeland Security Grants: Evolution of Program Guidance and Grant Allocation Methods* (Order Code RL33583). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006.
- Roberts, Patrick S. “Shifting Priorities: Congressional Incentives and the Homeland Security Granting Process.” *Review of Policy Research* 22, no. 4 (2005): 437–450.
- United States Census Bureau. *Atlanta (City), Georgia*. Suitland, MD: United States Census Bureau.
- . “Hall County, GA.” Accessed August 2014. <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/13/13139.html>.
- Viscusi, W. Kip. “Valuing Risks of Death from Terrorism and Natural Disasters.” *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* 38, no. 3 (2009): 191–213.
- Waugh, William L. “Terrorism and the All-hazards Model.” *Journal of Emergency Management* 2, no. 1 (2005): 8–10.
- Waugh, William L., and Gregory Streib. “Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency Management.” *Public Administration Review* 66, no. s1 (2006): 131–140.
- Yim, Randall A. *National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security*. (GAO-02-621T). Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California