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Summary

World events since late 2013 have led some observers to conclude that the international security environment has undergone a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era of the last 20-25 years, also sometimes known as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different strategic situation that features, among other things, renewed great power competition and challenges to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II.

A previous shift in the international security environment—from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era—prompted a broad reassessment by the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress of defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that led to numerous changes in DOD plans and programs. A new shift in the international security environment could similarly have a number of implications for U.S. defense plans and programs. Of perhaps the greatest potential significance, such a shift could lead to a change in the current overall terms of debate over U.S. defense plans and programs. Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea, as well as subsequent Russian actions in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, have already led to a renewed focus among policymakers on U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe, and on how to counter Russia’s so-called hybrid warfare tactics. China’s actions in the East and South China Seas have prompted a focus among policymakers on how to counter China’s so-called salami-slicing tactics in those areas. A shift in the international security environment may also be generating implications for areas such as nuclear weapons, submarines and antisubmarine warfare, and DOD reliance on Russian-made components.

Policy and oversight issues for Congress include the following:

- **Shift in strategic situations.** Has there been a shift in the international security environment, and if so, what features characterize the new environment?

- **Reassessment of U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, and missions.** Should there be a reassessment of U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, and missions?

- **Congressional role in reassessment.** If there is to be such a reassessment, how should it be done, and what role should Congress play?

- **Potential effect on plans and programs.** How might such a reassessment affect the current terms of debate on U.S. defense? What might be the potential implications for U.S. defense plans and programs?
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Introduction

World events since late 2013 have led some observers to conclude that the international security environment has undergone a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era of the last 20-25 years to a new and different strategic situation that features, among other things, renewed great power competition and challenges to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II.  

A previous shift in the international security environment—from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era—prompted a broad reassessment by the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress of defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that led to numerous changes in DOD plans and programs. A new shift in the international security environment could similarly have a number of implications for U.S. defense plans and programs.

The issue for Congress is whether a shift in the international security environment has occurred, and if so, how to respond to that shift. This report briefly describes the shift in the international security environment that some observers believe has occurred, and identifies some defense-related issues for Congress that could arise from it. Congress’s decisions on these issues could have significant implications for U.S. defense capabilities and funding requirements.

This report focuses on defense-related issues and does not discuss potential implications of a shift in the international security environment for other policy areas, such as foreign policy and diplomacy, trade and finance, energy, and foreign assistance. Future CRS reports may address the potential implications of a shift in the international security environment for these other policy areas or address the U.S. role in the international security environment from other analytical perspectives.

Background

Shift in International Security Environment

Overview

World events since late 2013—including Chinese actions in the East and South China Seas since November 2013 and Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea in March 2014—have led some
observers to conclude that the international security environment has undergone a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era of the last 20-25 years, also known as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different strategic situation that features, among other things, renewed great power competition and challenges to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II.\(^4\)

In August 2014, outgoing Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel referred to “the dangerous unpredictability of a world that is I think trying to define a new world order... We are seeing a new world order being built in the early 21\(^{st}\) Century.”\(^5\) In October 2014, Hagel stated: “I think we are living through one of these historic, defining times... We are seeing a new world order—post-World War II, post-Soviet implosion—being built.”\(^6\)

\(^3\) For discussion Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea, see CRS Report RL33460, *Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, by Steven Woehrel.


\(^6\) As quoted in David A. Graham, “Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel: Get Used to Endless War,” *The Atlantic*, October 29, 2014. In September 2014, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work stated:

> I think there’s two things happening, both with Russia and China. First, they clearly are staking out their position in their near abroads. And this is one of the things that we’re going to have to work out over the course of the next several years on what they consider to be areas of their vital interest, and what we have to do is find a means by which to make sure that those desires do not resort to the use of force and would require an overt response militarily from us. We have to work these out and make sure that Russia and China feel secure in their near abroads. But both of those countries definitely believe that the current world order, as established over the last 70 years, they would like to change certain aspects of it. So that’s going to be a constant point of attention. So at the strategic level, it is, how are we going to work with two very strong powers, regional powers right now? And how will we be able to work out ways in which we engage with each other over time? (Department of Defense news transcript, “Deputy Secretary of Defense Work Delivers Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations,” September 30, 2014, accessed October 31, 2014, at http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5509.)
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense

Cold War Era

The Cold War, which is generally viewed as lasting from the late 1940s until the late 1980s/early 1990s, was generally viewed as a strongly bipolar situation featuring two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—engaged in a political, ideological, and military competition for influence across multiple regions. The military component of that competition was often most acutely visible in Europe, where the U.S.-led NATO alliance and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact alliance faced off against one another with large numbers of conventional forces and theater nuclear weapons, backed by longer-ranged strategic nuclear weapons.

Post-Cold War Era

The post-Cold War era, which is generally viewed as having begun in the early 1990s, tended toward a unipolar situation, with the United States as the world’s sole superpower. The Warsaw Pact had disbanded, the Soviet Union had dissolved into Russia and the former Soviet republics, and neither Russia, China, nor any other country was viewed as posing a significant challenge to either the United States’ status as the world’s sole superpower or the U.S.-led international order. Compared to the Cold War, the post-Cold War era generally featured reduced levels of overt political, ideological, and military competition among major states. Following 9/11, the post-Cold War era was additionally characterized by a strong focus (at least from a U.S. perspective) on countering transnational terrorist organizations that had emerged as significant non-state actors, particularly Al Qaeda.

The New Situation

Some Emerging Features

Observers who conclude that the international security environment has shifted to a new strategic situation generally view the new period not as a bipolar situation (like the Cold War) or a unipolar situation (like the post-Cold War era), but as a multipolar situation characterized by renewed competition among three major world powers—the United States, China, and Russia. Other emerging characteristics of the new international security situation as viewed by these observers include the following:

- renewed ideological competition, this time against 21st-century forms of authoritarianism in Russia, China, and other countries;7

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the promotion in China and Russia through their state-controlled media of nationalistic historical narratives emphasizing assertions of prior humiliation or victimization by Western powers, and the use of those narratives to support revanchist or irredentist foreign policy aims;

the use by Russia and China of new forms of aggressive or assertive military and paramilitary operations—called hybrid warfare or ambiguous warfare, among other terms, in the case of Russia’s actions, and called salami-slicing tactics or gray-zone warfare, among other terms, in the case of China’s actions—to gain greater degrees of control of areas on their peripheries;

challenges by Russia and China to key elements of the U.S.-led international order, including the principle that force or threat of force should not be used as a routine or first-resort measure for settling disputes between countries, and the principle that the world’s oceans are to be treated as an international commons; and

alongside the above features, continued regional security challenges from countries such as Iran and North Korea, and a continuation of the post-Cold War era’s focus (at least from a U.S. perspective) on countering transnational terrorist organizations that have emerged as significant non-state actors (now including the Islamic State organization, among other groups).

The June 2015 National Military Strategy released by the Department of Defense (DOD) states:

Since the last National Military Strategy was published in 2011, global disorder has significantly increased while some of our comparative military advantage has begun to erode. We now face multiple, simultaneous security challenges from traditional state actors and transregional networks of sub-state groups—all taking advantage of rapid technological change. Future conflicts will come more rapidly, last longer, and take place on a much more technically challenging battlefield. They will have increasing implications to the U.S. homeland....

Complexity and rapid change characterize today’s strategic environment, driven by globalization, the diffusion of technology, and demographic shifts....

Despite these changes, states remain the international system’s dominant actors. They are preeminent in their capability to harness power, focus human endeavors, and provide security. Most states today — led by the United States, its allies, and partners — support the established institutions and processes dedicated to preventing conflict, respecting sovereignty, and furthering human rights. Some states, however, are attempting to revise key aspects of the international order and are acting in a manner that threatens our national security interests.

While Russia has contributed in select security areas, such as counternarcotics and counterterrorism, it also has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not respect the sovereignty

(...continued)

of its neighbors and it is willing to use force to achieve its goals. Russia’s military actions are undermining regional security directly and through proxy forces. These actions violate numerous agreements that Russia has signed in which it committed to act in accordance with international norms, including the UN Charter, Helsinki Accords, Russia-NATO Founding Act, Budapest Memorandum, and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

Iran also poses strategic challenges to the international community. It is pursuing nuclear and missile delivery technologies despite repeated United Nations Security Council resolutions demanding that it cease such efforts. It is a state-sponsor of terrorism that has undermined stability in many nations, including Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Iran’s actions have destabilized the region and brought misery to countless people while denying the Iranian people the prospect of a prosperous future.

North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies also contradicts repeated demands by the international community to cease such efforts. These capabilities directly threaten its neighbors, especially the Republic of Korea and Japan. In time, they will threaten the U.S. homeland as well. North Korea also has conducted cyber attacks, including causing major damage to a U.S. corporation.

We support China’s rise and encourage it to become a partner for greater international security. However, China’s actions are adding tension to the Asia-Pacific region. For example, its claims to nearly the entire South China Sea are inconsistent with international law. The international community continues to call on China to settle such issues cooperatively and without coercion. China has responded with aggressive land reclamation efforts that will allow it to position military forces astride vital international sea lanes.

None of these nations are believed to be seeking direct military conflict with the United States or our allies. Nonetheless, they each pose serious security concerns which the international community is working to collectively address by way of common policies, shared messages, and coordinated action....

For the past decade, our military campaigns primarily have consisted of operations against violent extremist networks. But today, and into the foreseeable future, we must pay greater attention to challenges posed by state actors. They increasingly have the capability to contest regional freedom of movement and threaten our homeland. Of particular concern are the proliferation of ballistic missiles, precision strike technologies, unmanned systems, space and cyber capabilities, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – technologies designed to counter U.S. military advantages and curtail access to the global commons....

Today, the probability of U.S. involvement in interstate war with a major power is assessed to be low but growing. Should one occur, however, the consequences would be immense. VEOs [violent extremist organizations], in contrast, pose an immediate threat to transregional security by coupling readily available technologies with extremist ideologies. Overlapping state and non-state violence, there exists an area of conflict where actors blend techniques, capabilities, and resources to achieve their objectives. Such “hybrid” conflicts may consist of military forces assuming a non-state identity, as Russia did in the Crimea, or involve a VEO fielding rudimentary combined arms capabilities, as ISIL has demonstrated in Iraq and Syria. Hybrid conflicts also may be comprised of state and non-state actors working together toward shared objectives, employing a wide range of weapons such as we have witnessed in eastern Ukraine. Hybrid conflicts serve to increase ambiguity, complicate
decision-making, and slow the coordination of effective responses. Due to these advantages to the aggressor, it is likely that this form of conflict will persist well into the future.8

**Markers of the Shift to the New Situation**

For observers who conclude that the international security environment has shifted to a new strategic situation, the sharpest single marker of the shift arguably was Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea in March 2014, which represented the first forcible seizure and annexation of one country’s territory by another country in Europe since World War II. Other markers of the shift, such as Russia’s actions in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe since March 2014, China’s economic growth and military modernization over the last several years, and China’s actions in the East and South China Seas over the last several years, have been more gradual and cumulative.

Some observers trace the beginnings of the argued shift in strategic situations back to 2008. In that year, Russia invaded and occupied part of the former Soviet republic of Georgia without provoking a strong cost-imposing response from the United States and its allies. Also in that year, the financial crisis and resulting deep recessions in the United States and Europe, combined with China’s ability to weather that crisis and its successful staging of the 2008 Summer Olympics, are seen by observers as having contributed to a perception in China of the United States as a declining power, and to a Chinese sense of self-confidence or triumphalism.9 China’s assertive actions in the East and South China Seas can be viewed as having begun (or accelerated) soon thereafter.10

**Comparisons to Earlier Periods**

Each strategic situation features a unique combination of major actors, dimensions of competition and cooperation among those actors, and military and other technologies available to them. A new strategic situation can have some similarities to previous ones, but it will also have differences, including, potentially, one or more features not present in any previous strategic situation. In the early years of a new strategic situation, some of its features may be unclear, in dispute, or not yet apparent. In attempting to understand a new strategic situation, comparisons to earlier ones are potentially helpful in identifying avenues of investigation. If applied too rigidly, however, such comparisons can act as intellectual straightjackets, making it more difficult to achieve a full understanding of a new strategic situation’s characteristic features, particularly those that differentiate it from previous ones.

Some observers have stated that the world is entering a new Cold War. That term may have some utility in referring specifically to U.S.-Russian relations, because the new strategic situation that some observers have identified features competition and tension with Russia. Considered more broadly, however, the Cold War was a bipolar situation, while the new environment appears to be a multipolar situation that also includes China as a major competing power. The bipolarity of the

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Cold War, moreover, was reinforced by the opposing NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, whereas in contrast, Russia today does not lead an equivalent of the Warsaw Pact. And while terrorists were a concern during the Cold War, the U.S. focus on countering transnational terrorist groups was not nearly as significant during the Cold War as it has been since 9/11.

Other observers, viewing the emerging multipolar situation, have drawn comparisons to the multipolar situation that existed in the 19th century and the years prior to World War I. Still others, observing both multipolarity and the promotion in China and Russia of nationalistic historical narratives supporting revanchist or irredentist foreign policy aims, have drawn comparisons to the 1930s. Those two earlier situations, however, did not feature a strong focus on countering globally significant transnational terrorist groups, and the military and other technologies available then differ vastly from those available today. The new strategic situation that some observers have identified may be similar in some respects to previous strategic situations, but it also differs from previous situations in certain respects, and might be best understood by direct observation and identification of its key features.

Renewed Emphasis on Grand Strategy and Geopolitics

The discussion of the shift in the international security environment that some observers have identified has led to a renewed emphasis in discussions of U.S. security and foreign policy on grand strategy and geopolitics. From a U.S. perspective, grand strategy can be understood as strategy considered at a global or interregional level, as opposed to strategies for specific countries, regions, or issues. Geopolitics refers to the influence on international relations and strategy of basic world geographic features such as the size and location of continents, oceans, and individual countries.

From a U.S. perspective on grand strategy and geopolitics, it can be noted that most of the world’s people, resources, and economic activity are located not in the Western Hemisphere, but in the other hemisphere, particularly Eurasia. In response to this basic feature of world geography, U.S. policymakers for the last several decades have chosen to pursue, as a key element of U.S. policy, the promotion of U.S. influence and influence in world affairs, including the promotion of democratic institutions and the rule of law.

national strategy, a goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another, on the grounds that such a hegemon could represent a concentration of power strong enough to threaten core U.S. interests by, for example, denying the United States access to some of the other hemisphere’s resources and economic activity. Although U.S. policymakers have not often stated this key national strategic goal explicitly in public, U.S. military (and diplomatic) operations in recent decades—both wartime operations and day-to-day operations—can be viewed as having been carried out in no small part in support of this key goal.

The U.S. goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another is a major reason why the U.S. military is structured with force elements that enable it to cross broad expanses of ocean and air space and then conduct sustained, large-scale military operations upon arrival. Force elements associated with this goal include, among other things, an Air Force with significant numbers of long-range bombers, long-range surveillance aircraft, long-range airlift aircraft, and aerial refueling tankers, and a Navy with significant numbers of aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered attack submarines, large surface combatants, large amphibious ships, and underway replenishment ships.

### Congressional Participation in Reassessment of U.S. Defense During Previous Shift

A previous shift in the international security environment—from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era—prompted a broad reassessment of defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that led to numerous changes in DOD plans and programs. Many of these changes were articulated in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR), a reassessment of U.S. defense plans and programs whose very name conveyed the fundamental nature of the reassessment that had occurred. In general, the BUR reshaped the U.S. military into a force that was smaller than the Cold War U.S. military, and oriented toward a planning scenario being able to conduct two major regional contingencies (MRCs) rather than the Cold War planning scenario of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.

Through both committee activities and the efforts of individual Members, Congress played a significant role in the reassessment of defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that was prompted by the end of the Cold War. In terms of committee activities, the question of how to change U.S. defense plans and programs in response to the end of the Cold War was, for example,

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13 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s introduction to DOD’s report on the 1993 BUR states:

In March 1993, I initiated a comprehensive review of the nation’s defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and foundations. I felt that a department-wide review needed to be conducted “from the bottom up” because of the dramatic changes that have occurred in the world as a result of the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. These changes in the international security environment have fundamentally altered America’s security needs. Thus, the underlying premise of the Bottom-Up Review was that we needed to reassess all of our defense concepts, plans, and programs from the ground up.


a major focus for the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in holding hearings and marking up annual national defense authorization acts in the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{15}

In terms of efforts by individual Members, some Members put forth their own proposals for how much to reduce defense spending from the levels of the final years of the Cold War,\textsuperscript{16} while others put forth detailed proposals for future U.S. defense strategy, plans, programs, and spending. Senator John McCain, for example, issued a detailed, 32-page policy paper in November 1991 presenting his proposals for defense spending, missions, force structure, and weapon acquisition programs.\textsuperscript{17}

Perhaps the most extensive individual effort by a Member to participate in the reassessment of U.S. defense following the end of the Cold War was the one carried out by Representative Les Aspin, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. In early 1992, Aspin, supported by members of the committee’s staff, devised a force-sizing construct and potential force levels and associated defense spending levels U.S. defense for the new post-Cold War era. A principal aim of Aspin’s effort was to create an alternative to the “Base Force” plan for U.S. defense in the post-Cold War era that had been developed by the George H. W. Bush Administration.\textsuperscript{18} Aspin’s effort

\textsuperscript{15} See, for example:
- the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1993 National Defense Authorization Act (S.Rept. 102-352 of July 31 (legislative day, July 23), 1992, on S. 3114), pp. 7-12;
- the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1995 National Defense Authorization Act (S.Rept. 103-282 of June 14 (legislative day, June 7), 1994, on S. 2182), pp. 8-9; and


included a series of policy papers in January and February 1992\textsuperscript{19} that were augmented by press releases and speeches. Aspin’s policy paper of February 25, 1992, served as the basis for his testimony that same day at a hearing on future defense spending before the House Budget Committee. Although DOD and some other observers (including some Members of Congress) criticized Aspin’s analysis and proposals on various grounds,\textsuperscript{20} the effort arguably proved consequential the following year, when Aspin became Secretary of Defense in the new Clinton Administration. Aspin’s 1992 effort helped inform his participation in DOD’s 1993 BUR. The 1993 BUR in turn created a precedent for the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process that remains in place today.

**Potential or Emerging Implications for Defense**

The shift in strategic situations that some observers have identified could have a number of implications for U.S. defense plans and programs, including those discussed briefly below.

**Terms of Debate over U.S. Defense**

Of perhaps the greatest potential significance, a shift from the post-Cold War era to a new strategic situation could lead to a change in the current overall terms of debate over U.S. defense plans and programs. The current terms of debate are shaped by things such as the limits on defense spending established under the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 (S. 365/P.L. 112-25 of August 2, 2011) as amended, the defense strategic guidance document of January 2012,\textsuperscript{21} and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review.\textsuperscript{22} If the current terms of debate largely reflect the features of the post-Cold War era, they may not be responsive to features of the new strategic situation that some observers have identified.\textsuperscript{23}

Some observers, citing recent world events, have raised the question of whether defense spending should be increased above levels set forth in the BCA, and consequently whether the BCA should

\textsuperscript{19} These policy papers included the following:


be amended or repealed.\textsuperscript{24} If policymakers judge that a shift in strategic situations of the kind discussed here is occurring, the nature of the U.S. response to that shift could lead to defense spending levels that are higher than, lower than, or about the same as those in the BCA.

U.S. and NATO Military Capabilities in Europe

Russia’s seizure and annexation of Ukraine and Russia’s subsequent actions in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe have led to a renewed focus among policymakers on U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe.\textsuperscript{25} In July 2014, the Administration, as part of its FY2015 funding request for the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) part of DOD’s budget, requested $1 billion for a European Reassurance Initiative, of which $925 million would be for DOD to carry out several force deployments and operations in Europe.\textsuperscript{26} At the September 4-5, 2014, NATO summit in Wales, NATO leaders announced a series of initiatives for refocusing NATO away from “out of area” (i.e., beyond-Europe) operations, and back toward a focus on territorial defense and deterrence in Europe itself.\textsuperscript{27} In December 2014, Russia issued a new


\textsuperscript{26} Prepared Statement of the Honorable Robert O. Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr, USN, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY2015 Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Request for the Department of Defense, Wednesday, July 16, 2014, pp. 2, 4-5.

\textsuperscript{27} For additional discussion, see CRS Report R43698, \textit{NATO’s Wales Summit: Outcomes and Key Challenges}, by Paul Belkin.
military doctrine that, among other things, calls for a more assertive approach toward NATO. In June 2015, Russia stated that it would respond to the placement of additional U.S. military equipment in Eastern Europe by deploying additional forces along its own western border.

The increased attention that U.S. policymakers are paying to the security situation in Europe, combined with U.S. military operations in the Middle East against the Islamic State organization and similar groups, has intensified preexisting questions among some observers about whether the United States will be able to fully implement the military component of the U.S. strategic rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region that was formally announced in the January 2012 defense strategic guidance document.

**New Forms of Aggression and Assertiveness**

Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea, as well as subsequent Russian actions in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, have already led to a renewed focus among policymakers on how to counter Russia’s hybrid warfare or ambiguous warfare tactics. China’s actions in the East and South China Seas have prompted a focus among policymakers on how to counter China’s so-called salami-slicing tactics in those areas.

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31 Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Beefs Up Military Options for china as Obama Reassures Allies in Asia,” (continued...)
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence

Russia’s reassertion of its status as a major world power has included, among other things, references by Russian officials to nuclear weapons and Russia’s status as a major nuclear weapon power.32 This has led to an increased emphasis in discussions of U.S. defense and security on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence33—a development that comes at a time when DOD is in the early stages of a multi-year plan to spend scores of billions of dollars to modernize U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent forces.34 DOD, for example, currently has plans to acquire a new class of ballistic missile submarines35 and a new long-range bomber.36

(...continued)


35 CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

Submarines and Antisubmarine Warfare

The growing capabilities and operations of China’s submarine fleet, combined with a stated intention by Russia to rebuild its navy (including its submarine force) and renewed Russian submarine operations (including suspected Russian submarine operations in Swedish and Finnish waters and near Scotland), have led to a renewed focus in discussions of U.S. defense and security on the value of the U.S. attack submarine force for preserving U.S. command of the seas on a global basis, and on U.S. and allied antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. This could lead to an increased focus on the procurement of Virginia-class submarines and ASW platforms and equipment, including (to cite just two examples), P-8 Poseidon multi-mission aircraft and ASW equipment for Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs).

Reliance on Russian-Made Components

Increased tensions with Russia have led to an interest in eliminating instances of being dependent on Russian-made military systems and components for U.S. military systems. A current case in point concerns the Russian-made RD-180 rocket engine, which is incorporated into U.S. space launch rockets, including rockets used by DOD to put military payloads into orbit.

Issues for Congress

Potential policy and oversight issues for Congress include the following:

- **Shift in strategic situation.** Has there been a shift in the international security environment, and if so, what features characterize the new environment?

- **Reassessment of U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, and missions.** Should there be a reassessment of U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, and missions?

37 For a discussion of China’s submarine fleet, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.


39 For a discussion of the Virginia-class program, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

40 For a discussion of the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

- **Congressional role in reassessment.** If there is to be such a reassessment, how should it be done, and what role should Congress play? Should Congress conduct the reassessment itself, through committee activities? Should Congress establish the terms of reference for a reassessment to be conducted by the executive branch or by an independent, third-party entity (such as a blue ribbon panel)? Should some combination of these approaches be employed?

- **Potential effect on plans and programs.** How might such a reassessment affect the current terms of debate on U.S. defense? What might be the potential implications for U.S. defense plans and programs?

- **U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe.** Are the United States and its NATO allies taking appropriate steps regarding U.S. and NATO military capabilities and operations in Europe? What potential impacts would a strengthened U.S. military presence in Europe have on total U.S. military force structure requirements? What impact would it have on DOD’s ability to implement the military component of the U.S. strategic rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region?

- **New forms of aggression and assertiveness.** Do the United States and its allies and partners have an adequate strategy for countering Russia’s so-called hybrid warfare in eastern Ukraine and China’s so-called salami-slicing tactics in the East and South China Seas?

- **Nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence.** Are current DOD plans for modernizing U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, and for numbers and basing of non-strategic (i.e., theater-range) nuclear weapons aligned with the needs of the new strategic situation?

- **Submarines and antisubmarine warfare.** Are current Navy plans for numbers and capabilities of attack submarines, and ASW capabilities, aligned with the needs of the new strategic situation?

- **Reliance on Russian-made components.** Aside from the Russian-made RD-180 rocket engine, what other Russian-made components, if any, are incorporated into DOD equipment? What are DOD’s plans regarding reliance on Russian-made components for DOD equipment?

### Legislative Activity in 2015

The Administration’s proposed FY2016 defense budget was submitted to Congress on February 2, 2015.


**House (Committee Report)**

Section 1088 of H.R. 1735 as reported by the House Armed Services Committee (H.Rept. 114-102 of May 5, 2015) states:

(a) Strategy required.—The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the President and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall develop a strategy for the Department of Defense to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors.

(b) Elements.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include each of the following:

(1) An articulation of the activities that constitute unconventional warfare being waged upon the United States and allies.

(2) A clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense in providing indications and warning of, and protection against, acts of unconventional warfare.

(3) The current status of authorities and command structures related to countering unconventional warfare.

(4) An articulation of the goals and objectives of the Department of Defense with respect to countering unconventional warfare threats.

(5) An articulation of related or required interagency capabilities and whole-of-Government activities required by the Department of Defense to support a counter-unconventional warfare strategy.

(6) Recommendations for improving the counter-unconventional warfare capabilities, authorities, and command structures of the Department of Defense.

(7) Recommendations for improving interagency coordination and support mechanisms with respect to countering unconventional warfare threats.

(8) Recommendations for the establishment of joint doctrine to support counter-unconventional warfare capabilities within the Department of Defense.

(9) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff determine necessary.

(c) Submittal to Congress.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees the strategy required by subsection (a). The strategy shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d) Definition of unconventional warfare.—In this section, the term “unconventional warfare” means activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.

Section 1531 of H.R. 1735 as reported by the committee states:

SEC. 1531. Statement of policy regarding European Reassurance Initiative.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) In February 2015, Lieutenant General James Clapper (retired), Director of National Intelligence, testified to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that “Russian dominance over the former Soviet space is Russia’s highest foreign policy goal”.
(2) Russia, under the direction of President Vladimir Putin, has demonstrated its intent to expand its sphere of influence beyond its borders and limit Western influence in the region.

(3) The Russian military is aggressively postured on the Ukrainian border and continues its buildup of military personnel and material. These aggressive and unwarranted actions serve to intimidate, with a show of force, the Ukrainian people as well as the other nations in the region including Georgia, the Baltic States, and the Balkan States.

(4) In December 2014, Congress enacted the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (Public Law 113–272), which gives the President the authority to expand assistance to Ukraine, increase economic sanctions on Russia, and provide equipment to counter offensive weapons.

(5) In February 2015, the Atlantic Council, the Brookings Institute, and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs published a report entitled “Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do” advocating for increased United States assistance to Ukraine with nonlethal and lethal defensive equipment.

(6) Despite Russia signing the February 2015 Minsk Agreement, it has continued to violate the terms of the agreement, as noted by Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Victoria Nuland, at the German Marshall Fund Brussels Forum in March 2015: “We’ve seen month on month, more lethal weaponry of a higher caliber...poured into Ukraine by the separatist Russian allies...the number one thing is for Russia to stop sending arms over the border so we can have real politics.”

(7) The military of the Russian Federation continues to increase their show of force globally, including frequent international military flights, frequent snap exercises of thousands of Russian troops, increased global naval presence, and the threat of the use of nuclear weapons in defense of the annexation of Crimea in March 2014.

(8) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to exert and increase undue influence on the free will of sovereign nations and people with intimidation tactics, covert operations, cyber warfare, and other unconventional methods.

(9) In testimony to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives in February 2015, Commander of European Command, General Philip Breedlove, United States Air Force, stated that “Russia has employed ‘hybrid warfare’...to illegally seize Crimea, foment separatist fever in several sovereign nations, and maintain frozen conflicts within its so-called ‘sphere of influence’ or ‘near abroad’”.

(10) The use of unconventional methods of warfare by Russia presents challenges to the United States and its partners and allies in addressing the threat.

(11) An enhanced United States military presence and readiness posture and the provision of security assistance in Europe are key elements to deterring further Russian aggression and reassuring United States allies and partners.


(13) The European Reassurance Initiative expands United States military presence in Europe, through—

(A) bolstered and continual United States military presence;
(B) bilateral and multilateral exercises with partners and allies;

(C) improved infrastructure;

(D) increased prepositioning of United States equipment throughout Europe; and

(E) building partnership capacity for allies and partners.

(14) The European Reassurance Initiative has served as a valuable tool in strengthening the partnerships with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as partnerships with non-member allies in the region.

(15) As a result of the NATO 2014 Summit in Wales, NATO has initiated a Readiness Action Plan to increase partner nation funding and resourcing to combat Russian aggression. NATO’s efforts with the Readiness Action Plan and United States investment in regional security through the European Reassurance Initiative will serve to continue and reinforce the strength and fortitude of the alliance against nefarious actors.

(16) The President’s Budget Request for fiscal year 2016 includes $789.3 million to continue the European Reassurance Initiative focus on increased United States military troop rotations in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve, maintaining and further expanding increasing regional exercises, and building partnership capacity.

(b) Statement of policy.—It is the policy of the United States to continue and expand its efforts in Europe to reassure United States allies and partners and deter further aggression and intimidation by the Russian Government, in order to enhance security and stability in the region. This policy shall include—

(1) continued use of conventional methods, including increased United States military presence in Europe, exercises and training with allies and partners, increasing infrastructure, prepositioning of United States military equipment in Europe, and building partnership capacity;

(2) increased emphasis on countering unconventional warfare methods in areas such as cyber warfare, economic warfare, information operations, and intelligence operations, including increased efforts in the development of strategy, operational concepts, capabilities, and technologies; and

(3) increased security assistance to allies and partners in Europe, including the provision of both non-lethal equipment and lethal equipment of a defensive nature to Ukraine.

Section 1610 of H.R. 1735 as reported by the committee states:

SEC. 1610. Prohibition on reliance on China and Russia for space-based weather data.

(a) Prohibition.—The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the Department of Defense does not rely on, or in the future plan to rely on, space-based weather data provided by the Government of China, the Government of Russia, or an entity owned or controlled by the Government of China or the Government of Russia for national security purposes.

(b) Certification.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a certification that the Secretary is in compliance with the prohibition under subsection (a).
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense

H.Rept. 114-102 states:

**Russian Unconventional Warfare**

Tactics employed by the Russian Federation in its aggression against Ukraine are not unique. However, Russia has combined them in new, effective, and troubling ways. It has fomented and taken advantage of ethnic disputes to train, build, and equip a separatist army in Ukraine under Russian direction. It has combined this line of effort with propaganda, diplomatic, and economic measures to try to reduce the effectiveness of Ukraine’s response, as well as the response of the United States and Europe, and to preserve and extend its perceived sphere of influence.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most successful military alliance in history, defending the security interests of its members against external threats for over 60 years. The committee supports the NATO alliance and believes that it can successfully continue to serve as a bedrock for U.S. and European security. However, the committee notes that the methods currently being used by Russia in Ukraine pose a challenge to the NATO system.

The core of the NATO alliance is provided by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which enshrines the principle of collective self-defense: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all…” In the wake of Russian actions in Ukraine, both the United States, in a series of bilateral actions referred to as the European Reassurance Initiative, and NATO collectively, in the Readiness Action Plan, have taken steps to ensure that all parties are postured to respond to any new aggression. The committee is concerned, however, that these steps may not sufficiently address the challenges posed by Russian tactics.

At its core, collective self-defense requires that the parties to the treaty agree that one of the members is under attack. This implies that such aggression can be correctly attributed to some actor outside the alliance. Russia’s actions have been designed to be deniable and difficult to attribute directly to Russian government activity. Should similar tactics, or even more covert methods, be applied to NATO member states that border Russia, it may be difficult to attribute them to Russian activity and therefore difficult to trigger a collective NATO response. It is likely that some NATO members will have different views on the degree of Russian involvement. In addition, it is possible that Russia would perceive NATO may have difficulty in coming to an agreement about a collective response, which could undermine NATO’s ability to deter Russia from engaging in attempts to intervene in sovereign issues of NATO members.

The committee believes that the Department of Defense, and NATO, should fully explore how the United States, NATO, and member states can, as necessary, establish deterrence mechanisms against activities such as those undertaken by the Russian government in Ukraine. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Office of Net Assessment or other such organization as the Secretary considers appropriate, to undertake a study exploring various strategies for deterring external efforts to interfere with the internal workings of NATO member states by Russia, or any other actor utilizing tactics such as propaganda in media, economic warfare, cyber warfare, criminal acts, and intelligence operations, similar to those being used by Russia in Ukraine. The committee expects the Secretary to deliver a report to the congressional defense committees containing the findings of such study not later than March 31, 2016.

This study would complement a provision contained elsewhere in this Act requiring the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy for the Department of Defense to counter
unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors. (Pages 257-258)

H.Rept. 114-102 also states:

Funding and Support for the European Reassurance Initiative

The budget request included $789.3 million for the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). The committee supports the policy and activities contained in the ERI, which was originally proposed as part of the budget request for fiscal year 2015. However, the committee observes that these initiatives are largely focused on conventional reassurance and deterrence activities. The committee also recognizes that the Russian Federation has employed unconventional warfare methods in areas such as cyber warfare, economic warfare, information operations, and intelligence operations, and believes the Department of Defense should increase its focus on countering such methods.

The committee believes that ERI funds for fiscal year 2016 should be allocated for continued conventional reassurance and deterrence activities, as outlined in section 1535 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291), as well as countering unconventional threats. Therefore, elsewhere in this Act, the committee includes a provision that would: (1) lay out a statement of policy regarding ERI; (2) require a Department of Defense strategy to address unconventional warfare methods; and (3) authorize increased funding for U.S. intelligence and warning capabilities related to the European theater, technologies supporting U.S. information operations and strategic communications activities, the Javelin weapon system, and Stryker combat vehicle upgrades to meet U.S. Army Europe operational needs.

The committee further believes that, as part of the U.S. effort to increase security assistance to allies and partners in Europe, ERI funds should be allocated to provide both nonlethal equipment and lethal equipment of a defensive nature to Ukraine. Therefore, elsewhere in this Act, the committee includes a provision that would authorize appropriations to provide sustainment and assistance to the military and national security forces of Ukraine.

The committee believes that all of these U.S. efforts taken in combination are vital to address regional security and to deter and counter continued Russian aggression. The committee further believes that these efforts should be enduring and must be sustained as core activities of the Department of Defense in Europe. (Pages 281-282)

**House (Floor Action)**

On May 15, 2015, as part of its consideration of H.R. 1735, the House agreed by voice vote to H.Amdt. 229, an en bloc amendment that included, among other things, an amendment that was number 59 in H.Rept. 114-112 of May 13, 2015, on H.Res. 260, providing for the further consideration of H.R. 1735. Amendment number 59 in H.Rept. 115-102 states:

Page 227, after line 19, insert the following new section:

SEC. 569. REPORT ON CIVILIAN AND MILITARY EDUCATION TO RESPOND TO FUTURE THREATS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than June 1, 2016, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report describing both civilian and military education
requirements necessary to meet any threats anticipated in the future security environment as described in the quadrennial defense review. Such report shall include—

(1) an assessment of the learning outcomes required of future members of the Armed Forces and senior military leaders to meet such threats;

(2) an assessment of the shortfalls in current professional military education requirements in meeting such threats;

(3) an assessment of successful professional military education programs that further the ability of the Department of Defense to meet such threats;

(4) recommendations of subjects to be covered by civilian elementary and secondary schools in order to better prepare students for potential military service;

(5) recommendations of subjects to be included in professional military education programs;

(6) recommendations on whether partnerships between the Department of Defense and private institutions of higher education (as defined in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a))) would help meet such threats; and

(7) an identification of opportunities for the United States to strengthen its leadership role in the future security environment and a description of how the recommendations made in this report contribute to capitalizing on such opportunities.

(b) UPDATED REPORTS.—Not later than 10 months after date of the publication of each subsequent quadrennial defense review, the Secretary of Defense shall update the report described under subsection (a) and shall submit such report to the congressional defense committees.

The above section became Section 570 of H.R. 1735 as passed by the House on May 15, 2015.

Also on May 15, 2015, as part of its consideration of H.R. 1735, the House agreed by voice vote to H.Amdt. 236, an en bloc amendment that included, among other things, an amendment that was number 115 in H.Rept. 114-112 of May 13, 2015, on H.Res. 260, providing for the further consideration of H.R. 1735. Amendment number 115 in H.Rept. 115-102 states:

At the end of subtitle G of title XII (page 622, after line 22), add the following:

SEC. 12xx. REPORT ON IMPACT OF ANY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN UNITED STATES TROOP LEVELS OR MATERIEL IN EUROPE ON NATO’S ABILITY TO CREDIBLY ADDRESS EXTERNAL THREATS TO ANY NATO MEMBER STATE.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—(1) in order to demonstrate United States commitment to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, especially those NATO allies under pressure on the Eastern flank of the Alliance, and to enhance the United States deterrent presence and resolve to countering threats to NATO’s collective security, United States Armed Forces stationed and deployed in Europe should be increased in number and combat power; and (2) the “current and foreseeable security environment”, as referenced in paragraph 12 of Section IV on Political-Military Matters of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation (NATO-Russia Founding Act), has changed significantly since the signing of such Act in 1997 and thus such Act should not be read, interpreted, or implemented so as to constrain or in any way limit additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.
anywhere on the territory of any NATO member State in furtherance of NATO’s core mission of collective defense and other missions.

(b) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—In order to ensure that the United States contribution to NATO’s core mission of collective defense remains robust and ready to meet any future challenges, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the impact of any significant reduction in United States troop levels or materiel in Europe on NATO’s ability to credibly deter, resist, and, if necessary, repel external threats to any NATO member State.

(2) DEADLINE.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted not later than 30 days prior to the date on which any significant reduction described in paragraph (1) is scheduled to take place.

(3) FORM.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex if necessary to protect the national security interests of the United States.

(4) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

The above section became Section 1274 of H.R. 1735 as passed by the House on May 15, 2015.

Senate

Section 212 of S. 1376 as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 114-49 of May 19, 2015) states:

SEC. 212. Department of Defense technology offset program to build and maintain the military technological superiority of the United States.

(a) Program established.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall establish a technology offset program to build and maintain the military technological superiority of the United States by—

(A) accelerating the fielding of offset technologies that would help counter technological advantages of potential adversaries of the United States, including directed energy, low-cost, high-speed munitions, autonomous systems, undersea warfare, cyber technology, and intelligence data analytics, developed using Department of Defense research funding and accelerating the commercialization of such technologies; and

(B) developing and implementing new policies and acquisition and business practices.
(2) GUIDELINES.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall issue guidelines for the operation of the program, including—

(A) criteria for an application for funding by a military department, defense agency, or a combatant command;

(B) the purposes for which such a department, agency, or command may apply for funds and appropriate requirements for technology development or commercialization to be supported using program funds;

(C) the priorities, if any, to be provided to field or commercialize offset technologies developed by certain types of Department research funding; and

(D) criteria for evaluation of an application for funding or changes to policies or acquisition and business practices by a department, agency, or command for purposes of the program.

(b) Development of directed energy strategy.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with such officials and third-party experts as the Secretary considers appropriate, shall develop a directed energy strategy to ensure that the United States directed energy technologies are being developed and deployed at an accelerated pace.

(2) COMPONENTS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A technology roadmap for directed energy that can be used to manage and assess investments and policies of the Department in this high priority technology area.

(B) Proposals for legislative and administrative action to improve the ability of the Department to develop and deploy technologies and capabilities consistent with the directed energy strategy.

(C) An approach to program management that is designed to accelerate operational prototyping of directed energy technologies and develop cost-effective, real-world military applications for such technologies.

(3) BIENNIAL REVISIONS.—Not less frequently than once every 2 years, the Secretary shall revise the strategy required by paragraph (1).

(4) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.—(A) Not later than 90 days after the date on which the Secretary completes the development of the strategy required by paragraph (1) and not later than 90 days after the date on which the Secretary completes a revision to such strategy under paragraph (3), the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a copy of such strategy.

(B) The strategy submitted under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(c) Applications for funding.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Under the program, the Secretary shall, not less frequently than annually, solicit from the heads of the military departments, the defense agencies, and the
combatant commands applications for funding to be used to enter into contracts, cooperative agreements, or other transaction agreements entered into pursuant to section 845 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103–160; 10 U.S.C. 2371 note) with appropriate entities for the fielding or commercialization of technologies.

(2) TREATMENT PURSUANT TO CERTAIN CONGRESSIONAL RULES.—Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to require any official of the Department of Defense to provide funding under this section to any earmark as defined pursuant to House Rule XXI, clause 9, or any congressionally directed spending item as defined pursuant to Senate Rule XLIV, paragraph 5.

(d) Funding.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to the availability of appropriations for such purpose, of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for research, development, test, and evaluation, Defense-wide for fiscal year 2016, not more than $400,000,000 may be used for any such fiscal year for the program established under subsection (a).

(2) AMOUNT FOR DIRECTED ENERGY.—Of this amount, not more than $200,000,000 may be used for activities in the field of directed energy.

(e) Transfer authority.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary may transfer funds available for the program to the research, development, test, and evaluation accounts of a military department, defense agency, or a combatant command pursuant to an application, or any part of an application, that the Secretary determines would support the purposes of the program.

(2) SUPPLEMENT NOT SUPPLANT.—The transfer authority provided in this subsection is in addition to any other transfer authority available to the Department of Defense.

(f) Termination.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The authority to carry out a program under this section shall terminate on September 30, 2020.

(2) TRANSFER AFTER TERMINATION.—Any amounts made available for the program that remain available for obligation on the date the program terminates may be transferred under subsection (e) during the 180-day period beginning on the date of the termination of the program.

Regarding Section 212, S.Rept. 114-49 states:

Department of Defense technology offset program to build and maintain the military technological superiority of the United States (sec. 212)

The committee notes with concern that the United States has not faced a more diverse and complex array of crises since the end of World War II, and that taken together, they constitute the greatest challenge in a generation to the integrity of the liberal world order, which has consistently been underwritten by U.S. military technological superiority. At the same time, the committee is alarmed by the apparent erosion in recent years of this technological advantage, which is in danger of disappearing altogether. To prevent such a
scenario and to maintain the country’s global military technological edge, the committee recommends a provision that would establish a new $400.0 million initiative.

In doing so, the committee notes that the Defense Department is facing an emerging innovation gap. Commercial research and development in the United States now represents 80 percent of the national total, and the top four U.S. defense contractors combined spend only one-quarter of what the single biggest internet company does on research and development. Furthermore, global research and development is now more than twice that of the United States. The committee also notes that defense innovation is moving too slowly—in cycles that can last up to 18 years, whereas commercial innovation can be measured in cycles of 18 months or less.

The committee understands that accessing sources of innovation beyond the Defense Department is critical for national security, particularly in the areas of directed energy, low-cost high-speed munitions, cyber capabilities, autonomous systems, undersea warfare, and intelligence data analytics. However, there are currently too many barriers that limit cooperation with U.S. allies and global commercial firms, posing a threat to the country’s future military technological dominance.

For the past several years, U.S. adversaries have been rapidly improving their own military capabilities to counter our unique advantages. Structural trends, such as the diffusion of certain advanced military technologies, pose new operational challenges to U.S. armed forces. As a result, the dominance of the United States military can no longer be taken for granted. Consequently, the Department of Defense must remain focused on the myriad potential threats of the future and thus maintain technological superiority against potential adversaries.

The committee notes that since 1960, the department has invested more than $6.0 billion in directed energy science and technology initiatives. The committee is concerned that, despite this significant investment, the department’s directed energy initiatives are not resourced at levels necessary to transition them to fullscale acquisition programs. The committee is encouraged by the Navy’s demonstration a 100–150 kilowatt prototype laser and by the Air Force’s demonstration of high-powered electromagnetic weapons capabilities. However, the committee is concerned about the future of directed energy technologies as a whole. The committee notes that there is no inter-service entity dedicated to advancing promising directed energy platforms beyond the development point towards acquisition.

The committee is encouraged that the department established a department-wide Defense Innovation Initiative in November 2014 to pursue innovative ways to sustain and advance our military superiority and to improve business operations throughout the department. However, the committee is concerned by the possibility that this initiative is not being implemented in an appropriate and expeditious manner.

In response to these factors, the committee recommends a provision that would establish an initiative within the Department of Defense to maintain and enhance the military technological superiority of the United States. The provision would establish a program to accelerate the fielding of offset technologies, including, but not limited to, directed energy, low-cost high-speed munitions, autonomous systems, undersea warfare, cyber technology, and intelligence data analytics, developed by the department and to accelerate the commercialization of such technologies. As part of this program, the committee expects that the Secretary of Defense would also establish updated policies and new acquisition and management practices that would speed the delivery of offset technologies into operational use.
The provision would authorize $400.0 million for fiscal year 2016 for the initiative, of which $200.0 million would be authorized specifically for directed energy technology. Accordingly, the provision would mandate the Secretary to develop a directed energy strategy to ensure that appropriate technologies are developed and deployed at an accelerated pace, and update it every 2 years. The committee expects that this strategy would include a recommendation on rationalizing the roles and authorities of the Joint Technology Office for High Energy Lasers. The provision would further direct the Secretary to submit this strategy to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee no later than 90 days after completing the strategy, and biennially thereafter.

To speed up the development of these vitally needed national security capabilities, the committee directs that the Secretary of Defense shall consider all appropriate flexible acquisition authorities granted in law and in this Act. These should include the management structure and streamlined procedures for rapid prototyping outlined in section 803 of this Act on the middle tier of acquisition for rapid prototyping and rapid fielding, and the procedures and authorities to be considered under section 805 of this Act on use of alternative acquisition paths to acquire critical national security capabilities to include other transactions, rapid acquisition, and commercial item authorities.

The committee expects that the Secretary of Defense would keep the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the House Committee on Armed Services regularly updated on progress of activities under this technology offsets initiative. (Pages 44-46)

Section 1253 of S. 1376 as reported by the committee states:

SEC. 1253. Increased presence of United States ground forces in Eastern Europe to deter aggression on the border of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the increased presence of United States and allied ground forces in Eastern Europe since April 2014 has provided a level of reassurance to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members in the region and strengthened the capability of the Organization to respond to any potential Russian aggression against Organization members;

(2) at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Wales summit in September 2014 member countries agreed on a Readiness Action Plan which is intended to improve the ability of the Organization to respond quickly and effectively to security threats on the borders of the Organization, including in Eastern Europe, and the challenges posed by hybrid warfare;

(3) the capability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to respond to threats on the eastern border of the Organization would be enhanced by a more sustained presence on the ground of Organization forces on the territories of Organization members in Eastern Europe; and

(4) an increased presence of United States ground forces in Eastern Europe should be matched by an increased force presence of European allies.

(b) Report.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Secretary of State, submit to the congressional defense committees a report setting forth an assessment of options for expanding the presence of United States ground forces of the size of a Brigade Combat Team
in Eastern Europe to respond, along with European allies and partners, to the security challenges posed by Russia and increase the combat capability of forces able to respond to unconventional or hybrid warfare tactics such as those used by the Russian Federation in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The report under this subsection shall include the following:

(A) An evaluation of the optimal location or locations of the enhanced ground force presence described in paragraph (1) that considers such factors as—

(i) proximity, suitability, and availability of maneuver and gunnery training areas;

(ii) transportation capabilities;

(iii) availability of facilities, including for potential equipment storage and prepositioning;

(iv) ability to conduct multinational training and exercises;

(v) a site or sites for prepositioning of equipment, a rotational presence or permanent presence of troops, or a combination of options; and

(vi) costs.

(B) A description of any initiatives by other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or other European allies and partners, for enhancing force presence on a permanent or rotational basis in Eastern Europe to match or exceed the potential increased presence of United States ground forces in the region.

Regarding Section 1253, S.Rept. 114-49 states:

**Increased presence of United States ground forces in Eastern Europe to deter aggression on the border of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (sec. 1253)**

The committee recommends a provision that would require a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, by the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, assessing options for expanding the presence of U.S. ground forces of the size of a brigade combat team in Eastern Europe to respond, along with European allies and partners, to the security challenges posed by Russia and to increase the combat capability of allied forces to respond to unconventional or hybrid warfare tactics like those used by Russia in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The committee believes that any increases in the presence of U.S. ground forces in Eastern Europe should be matched by similar increases in the commitment of ground forces by European allies and partners for these purposes. (Page 233)

**Section 1254** of S. 1376 as reported by the committee states:


(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, at the 2014 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Summit in Wales, pledged to “reverse the trend of declining defense budgets,
to make the most effective use of our funds and to further a more balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities”.

(2) Former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated on May 2, 2014, that “[t]oday, America’s GDP is smaller than the combined GDPs of our 27 NATO allies. But America’s defense spending is three times our Allies’ combined defense spending. Over time, this lopsided burden threatens NATO’s integrity, cohesion, and capability, and ultimately both European and transatlantic security”.

(3) Former North Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated on July 3, 2014, that “[d]uring the last five years, Russia has increased defense spending by 50 percent, while NATO allies on average have decrease their defense spending by 20 percent. That is not sustainable, we need more investment in defense and security”.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) it is in the national security and fiscal interests of the United States that prompt efforts should be undertaken by North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to meet defense budget commitments made in Declaration 14 of the Wales Summit Declaration of September 2014;

(2) the United States Government should continue efforts through the Department of Defense and other agencies to encourage North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies towards meeting the defense spending goals set out at the Wales Summit;

(3) some North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies have already taken positive steps to reverse declines in defense spending and should continue to be supported in those efforts; and

(4) thoughtful and coordinated defense investments by European allies in military capabilities would add deterrence value to the posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization against Russian aggression and terrorist organizations and more appropriately balance the share of Atlantic defense spending.

Section 1255 of S. 1376 as reported by the committee states:


(a) Additional matters.—Subsection (b) of section 1245 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291) is amended—

(1) by redesignating paragraphs (4) through (15) as paragraphs (6) through (17), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraphs (4) and (5):

“(4) An assessment of the force structure and capabilities of Russian military forces stationed in each of the Arctic, Kaliningrad, and Crimea, including a description of any changes to such force structure or capabilities during the one-year period ending on the date of such report and with a particular emphasis on the anti-access and area denial capabilities of such forces.

“(5) An assessment of Russian military strategy and objectives for the Arctic region.”.
(b) Effective date.—The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply with respect to reports submitted under section 1245 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 after that date.

Regarding Section 1255, S.Rept. 114-49 states:

Additional matters in annual report on military and security developments involving the Russian Federation (sec. 1255)

The committee recommends a provision that would add a reporting requirement to section 1245 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291) requiring an assessment of the force structure and capabilities of Russian military forces stationed in the Arctic region, Kaliningrad, and Crimea, as well as an assessment of the Russian military strategy in the Arctic region.

The committee is concerned about increased Russian military activity in the Arctic region and notes that Russian activities and apparent ambitions could present challenges to international law, norms, and agreements relating to the Arctic region. (Page 233)

Section 1256 of S. 1376 as reported by the committee states:

SEC. 1256. Report on alternative capabilities to procure and sustain nonstandard rotary wing aircraft historically procured through Rosoboronexport.

(a) Report on assessment of alternative capabilities.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics shall, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, submit to the congressional defense committees a report setting forth an assessment, obtained by the Under Secretary for purposes of the report, of the feasibility and advisability of using alternative industrial base capabilities to procure and sustain, with parts and service, nonstandard rotary wing aircraft historically acquired through Rosoboronexport, or nonstandard rotary wing aircraft that are in whole or in part reliant upon Rosoboronexport for continued sustainment, in order to benefit United States national security interests.

(b) Independent assessment.—The assessment obtained for purposes of subsection (a) shall be conducted by a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC), or another appropriate independent entity with expertise in the procurement and sustainment of complex weapon systems, selected by the Under Secretary for purposes of the assessment.

(c) Elements.—The assessment obtained for purposes of subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) An identification and assessment of international industrial base capabilities, other than Rosoboronexport, to provide one or more of the following:

(A) Means of procuring nonstandard rotary wing aircraft historically procured through Rosoboronexport.

(B) Reliable and timely supply of required and appropriate parts, spares, and consumables of such aircraft.
(C) Certifiable maintenance of such aircraft, including major periodic overhauls, damage repair, and modifications.

(D) Access to required reference data on such aircraft, including technical manuals and service bulletins.

(E) Credible certification of airworthiness of such aircraft through physical inspection, notwithstanding any current administrative requirements to the contrary.

(2) An assessment (including an assessment of associated costs and risks) of alterations to administrative processes of the United States Government that may be required to procure any of the capabilities specified in paragraph (1), including waivers to Department of Defense or Department of State requirements applicable to foreign military sales or alterations to procedures for approval of airworthiness certificates.

(3) An assessment of the potential economic impact to Rosoboronexport of procuring nonstandard rotary wing aircraft described in paragraph (1)(A) through entities other than Rosoboronexport.

(4) An assessment of the risks and benefits of using the entities identified pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) to procure aircraft described in that paragraph.

(5) Such other matters as the Under Secretary considers appropriate.

(d) Use of previous studies.—The entity conducting the assessment for purposes of subsection (a) may use and incorporate information from previous studies on matters appropriate to the assessment.

(e) Form of report.—The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Regarding Section 1256, S.Rept. 114-49 states:

Report on alternative capabilities to procure and sustain nonstandard rotary wing aircraft historically procured through Rosoboronexport (sec. 1256)

The committee recommends a provision that would require an independent assessment directed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to report on the feasibility and advisability of using alternative industrial base capabilities to procure and sustain nonstandard rotary wing aircraft historically acquired through the Russian state corporation Rosoboronexport. The assessment would include an analysis of the economic impact as well as alterations that would be required for waivers of foreign military sales requirements and procedures for approval of airworthiness certificates.

The committee notes that the use of alternative industrial base capability to divest reliance on Rosoboronexport could benefit United States national security interests, deny financial support to the Russian Federation, and could potentially benefit U.S. and Ukrainian commercial interests. (pages 233-234)

Section 1603 of S. 1376 as reported by the committee states:

SEC. 1603. Exception to the prohibition on contracting with Russian suppliers of rocket engines for the evolved expendable launch vehicle program.

(1) in subsection (a), by striking “subsections (b) and (c)” and inserting “subsections (b), (c), and (d)”;

and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(d) Special rule for phase 1A competitive opportunities.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—For not more than 9 competitive opportunities described in paragraph (2), the Secretary of Defense may award a contract—

“(A) requiring the use of a rocket engine designed or manufactured in the Russian Federation that is eligible for a waiver under subsection (b) or an exception under subsection (c); or

“(B) if a rocket engine described in subparagraph (A) is not available, requiring the use of a rocket engine designed or manufactured in the Russian Federation that is not eligible for such a waiver or exception.

“(2) COMPETITIVE OPPORTUNITIES DESCRIBED.—A competitive opportunity described in this paragraph is—

“(A) an opportunity to compete for a contract for the procurement of property or services for space launch activities under the evolved expendable launch vehicle program; and

“(B) one of the 9 Phase 1A competitive opportunities for fiscal years 2015 through 2017, as specified in the budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of the budget of the President for fiscal year 2016 (as submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code).”.

Regarding Section 1603, S.Rept. 114-49 states:

**Exception to the prohibition on contracting with Russian suppliers of rocket engines for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program (sec. 1603)**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1608 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291; 128 Stat. 3626; 10 U.S.C. 2271 note) by adding a special rule for Phase 1A competitive opportunities. For not more than nine competitive Phase 1A launches, the special rule would allow the Secretary of Defense to award a contract requiring the use of a rocket engine designed or manufactured in the Russian Federation that is eligible for the existing waiver or exception requirements as specified in the existing statute. If a circumstance arises during the Phase 1A period where a launch provider is awarded a competitive contract and requires a rocket engine unable to meet the waiver or exception requirements, the provision would allow for the Secretary to waive the waiver or exception. In order to qualify for the new special rule, all engines that meet the waiver or exception of the existing statute must first be used.

The committee notes that for the Phase 1A competitive period, this could result in as few as zero Russian rocket engines or up to nine, depending upon the outcome of the competitions. The committee believes that the continued use of Russian rocket engines represents a threat
to our national security and that their use should be minimized to the greatest extent practicable.

National Security Presidential Directive 40 states that Assured Access to Space is “a requirement for critical national security, homeland security, and civil missions and is defined as a sufficiently robust, responsive, and resilient capability to allow continued space operations, consistent with risk management and affordability. The Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, as appropriate, are responsible for assuring access to space.” The committee notes that under section 1608, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is not prohibited from procuring launches that utilize rocket engines manufactured or designed in the Russian Federation. The committee also notes that NASA has contracts for numerous launches that rely on Russian rocket engines for the foreseeable future. While the committee does not condone the use of Russian rocket engines for NASA purposes, the committee recognizes that assured access to space can still be met if a national emergency required the use of a NASA procured launch for Department of Defense purposes. (Pages 258-259)

S.Rept. 114-49 also states:

**Committee overview**

For seven decades, the U.S. military has been the most reliable guarantor of the foundations of international order that American statesmen of both parties helped to establish in the aftermath of World War II. The relative security and prosperity that our nation has enjoyed, and made possible for so many others across the world, has been painstakingly maintained through the deterrence of adversaries, the cooperation with allies and partners, the global leadership of the United States, and the credibility and capability of our Armed Forces.

The committee is concerned that growing threats abroad and continued limitations on defense spending at home are increasingly harming the ability of the United States, and its military, to play an effective leadership role in the world. Indeed, military readiness and capabilities have deteriorated to the point where senior military leaders have warned that we are putting at risk the lives of the men and women who serve in our Armed Forces. There is a growing consensus that we must reverse this damage so that we can respond adequately to a host of disturbing challenges to the international order that adversely impact our national security.

These challenges include:

• In Ukraine, Russia has sought to redraw an international border and annex the territory of another sovereign country through the use of military force. It continues aggressively to destabilize Ukraine, with troubling implications for security in Europe.

• A terrorist army with tens of thousands of fighters, many holding Western passports, has taken over a vast swath of territory and declared an Islamic State in the heart of the Middle East. Nearly 3,000 U.S. troops have returned to Iraq to combat this threat, with U.S. aircraft flying hundreds of strike missions a month over Iraq and Syria.

• Amid negotiations over its nuclear program, Iran continues to pursue its ambitions to challenge regional order in the Middle East by increasing its development of ballistic missiles, support for terrorism, training and arming of pro-Iranian militant groups, and other malign activities in places such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Bahrain, and Yemen.

• Yemen has collapsed, as a Shia insurgency with ties to the Iranian regime has toppled the U.S.-backed government in Sanaa, Al-Qaeda continues to use parts of the country to plan
attacks against the West, the U.S. Embassy has been evacuated, and a U.S.-backed coalition of Arab nations has intervened militarily to reverse the gains of the Houthi insurgency and to restore the previous government to power.

- Libya has become a failed state, beset by civil war and a growing presence of transnational terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda and ISIL, similar to Afghanistan in 2001.

- North Korea, while continuing to develop its nuclear arsenal and ever-more capable ballistic missiles, committed the most destructive cyberattack ever on U.S. territory.

- China is increasingly taking coercive actions to assert expansive territorial claims that unilaterally change the status quo in the South and East China Seas and raise tensions with U.S. allies and partners, all while continuing to expand and modernize its military in ways that challenge U.S. access and freedom of movement in the Western Pacific. (Pages 2-3)

S.Rept. 114-49 also states:

**Congressional Defense Review to Prepare for Future Strategic Challenges**

For the past 14 years, the United States has been engaged in a long war against terrorist and violent extremist groups. The committee believes that this conflict will persist, at one level or another, across multiple theaters of operation, for some time to come, and that winning this war must be a top priority of the U.S. military and the Department of Defense (DOD).

At the same time, the committee is deeply concerned by the growth of more traditional security threats posed by powerful states, such as China and Russia, and rogue regimes such as Iran and North Korea. States such as these are modernizing their military capabilities, developing advanced technologies that could undermine U.S. military advantages—from precision-guided munitions and advanced sensors, to undersea-warfare and unmanned systems, to offensive cyber and space capabilities—and pursuing strategies that seek to deter the United States from achieving its national security interests and meeting its commitments to allies and partners.

Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter captured this new military challenge well when he said “for decades, U.S. global power projection has relied on the ships, planes, bases, aircraft carriers, satellite networks, and other advanced capabilities that comprise our military’s unrivaled technological edge. But today that superiority is being challenged in unprecedented ways.” In short, for the first time in three decades, the United States faces a potential turning point where our nation’s long-standing military advantages threaten to be eroded by new shifts in the balance of military power.

Accordingly, over the coming 18 months, the committee plans to conduct a comprehensive review of the roles, capabilities/size of the U.S. Armed Forces and DOD in meeting, and succeeding against, these new security challenges, especially those posed by the growing anti-access/area denial capabilities of U.S. adversaries. This review will utilize open hearings, classified briefings, the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Research Service, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, and consultation with former senior defense and military leaders and other national security experts. Building on the series of strategy-focused hearings that the committee has already conducted, the committee will deepen its oversight of military strategy while also delving deeper into intelligence and threat assessments, contingency planning, force structure and posture, joint concept development, domestic and overseas basing and infrastructure, theater and strategic
lift requirements, munition quality and quantity, and institutional and personnel reforms. The committee will also review civilian personnel policy, DOD infrastructure, and acquisition policies and practices to bring them more into line with the needs of the future.

Ultimately, the committee intends to review each of the major defense acquisition programs and its related industrial base to determine whether they are sufficient and appropriate to meet developing national security challenges. This review will take nothing for granted and will evaluate each program, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in the broader context of the roles, missions, requirements, and other capabilities of the armed services, as well as emerging technologies that could significantly alter previous assumptions underpinning the current programs of record. The committee’s future budgetary decisions will be based on the outcome of this strategic review.

The committee acknowledges that for this review to be successful it will require a sustained commitment of many years and potentially multiple chairmen. The much-heralded “offset strategy” of the 1970s required a tremendous amount of intellectual capital and research and development dollars invested over the course of a decade before capabilities like stealth, precision-guided-munitions, and advanced sensors could be effectively deployed. Nevertheless, it is possible to embark upon a new period of sustained military innovation today if DOD, the military services, and industry can be aligned towards this goal. The committee intends to use all of the resources at its disposal to this end. (Page 214-215)

S.Rept. 114-49 also states:

**Countering Russian propaganda**

The committee has watched with increasing concern the proliferation and expansion of Russian propaganda not only in Eastern Europe, but also throughout Central and Western Europe to levels not seen since the end of the Cold War. Russian-speaking populations in Eastern Europe in former Soviet Union nations, including North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, are especially vulnerable to propaganda that could be used to create more favorable conditions for future Russian aggression. Moreover, the sophistication and pervasiveness of outlets such as the Russia Today (RT) television network that broadcast in multiple languages in Western European democracies is cause for concern.

The committee notes that Russian propaganda has promoted a false narrative on the nature, scope, and cause of the conflict in Crimea and eastern Ukraine and has unfortunately achieved some success with targeted audiences in obscuring attribution for Russian-driven aggression and disregard for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international law.

The committee recognizes that propaganda is a critical element of Russia’s “hybrid warfare” concept. The speed and reach of Russian propaganda and the ambiguity it creates pose a challenge to NATO collective defense and the political consensus upon which it relies.

Therefore, the committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to consult with the Secretary of State with the objective of developing a strategy, including supporting resources, to counter Russian propaganda in Europe. (page 238)

S.Rept. 114-49 also states:

**Report on capability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to respond to unconventional or hybrid warfare tactics such as used by the Russian Federation in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine**
The committee is concerned about the capability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to respond to unconventional or hybrid warfare tactics such as those used by the Russian Federation in Crimea and eastern Ukraine due to the ambiguous nature of those tactics and the resultant challenges of attribution. As such, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report not later than September 1, 2016 to the congressional defense committees on recommendations for improving the alliance’s response options, decision-making processes and implementation timelines for addressing the use of unconventional or hybrid warfare tactics such as those used by the Russian Federation. The report should include:

(1) An identification of the unconventional or hybrid tactics the Russian Federation may employ against NATO nations;

(2) A consolidation of tactics identified pursuant to paragraph (1) into a set of possible scenarios to be used to analyze potential response options by NATO;

(3) An assessment of the response options NATO could potentially pursue for each of the scenarios identified pursuant to paragraph (2);

(4) Recommendations to improve response options, decisionmaking processes, and implementation timelines for the scenarios identified pursuant to paragraph (2);

(5) An assessment of implementation by NATO of commitments made at the Wales Summit regarding the Readiness Action Plan;

(6) Recommendations, if any, for exercises or mechanisms to improve the ability of NATO to consult and reach consensus in scenarios relating to the employment of unconventional or hybrid tactics; and

(7) Such other matters as the Secretary considers appropriate. (page 240)

FY2016 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2685/S. 1558)

House

Section 8105 of H.R. 2685 as reported by the House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 114-139 of June 5, 2015) states:

Sec. 8105. (a) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this or any other Act may be used by the Secretary of Defense, or any other official or officer of the Department of Defense, to enter into a contract, memorandum of understanding, or cooperative agreement with, or make a grant to, or provide a loan or loan guarantee to Rosoboronexport or any subsidiary of Rosoboronexport.

(b) The Secretary of Defense may waive the limitation in subsection (a) if the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, determines that it is in the vital national security interest of the United States to do so, and certifies in writing to the congressional defense committees that, to the best of the Secretary's knowledge:

(1) Rosoboronexport has ceased the transfer of lethal military equipment to, and the maintenance of existing lethal military equipment for, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic;
(2) the armed forces of the Russian Federation have withdrawn from Crimea, other than armed forces present on military bases subject to agreements in force between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine; and

(3) agents of the Russian Federation have ceased taking active measures to destabilize the control of the Government of Ukraine over eastern Ukraine.

c) The Inspector General of the Department of Defense shall conduct a review of any action involving Rosoboronexport with respect to a waiver issued by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to subsection (b), and not later than 90 days after the date on which such a waiver is issued by the Secretary of Defense, the Inspector General shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report containing the results of the review conducted with respect to such waiver.

H.Rept. 114-139 states:

EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE

The Committee supports efforts started in fiscal year 2015 to reassure NATO allies and partners of the continued commitment of the United States to their security and territorial integrity. The Committee recommends $789,300,000 for the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) to support increased capability, presence, readiness, and responsiveness to deter further destabilization in central and eastern Europe. Efforts include an increased U.S. military presence in Europe, additional bilateral and multilateral exercises and training opportunities with allies and partners, improved infrastructure to allow for greater responsiveness, enhanced prepositioning of equipment in Europe, and intensified efforts to build partner capacity for new NATO members and other partners.

This funding is provided as requested in the fiscal year 2016 budget request in the military personnel and operation and maintenance accounts at the budget activity and sub-activity group level of detail. The Committee again directs the Secretary of Defense to request any required fiscal year 2017 funding within the existing military personnel and operation and maintenance accounts as part of the fiscal year 2017 budget request. (Pages 317-318)

Senate

Section 8105 of S. 1558 as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 114-63 of June 11, 2015) states:

Sec. 8105. (a) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this or any other Act may be used by the Secretary of Defense, or any other official or officer of the Department of Defense, to enter into a contract, memorandum of understanding, or cooperative agreement with, or make a grant to, or provide a loan or loan guarantee to Rosoboronexport or any subsidiary of Rosoboronexport.

(b) The Secretary of Defense may waive the limitation in subsection (a) if the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, determines that it is in the vital national security interest of the United States to do so, and certifies in writing to the congressional defense committees that, to the best of the Secretary's knowledge:

(1) Rosoboronexport has ceased the transfer of lethal military equipment to, and the maintenance of existing lethal military equipment for, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic;
(2) The armed forces of the Russian Federation have withdrawn from Crimea, other than armed forces present on military bases subject to agreements in force between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine; and

(3) Agents of the Russian Federation have ceased taking active measures to destabilize the control of the Government of Ukraine over eastern Ukraine.

(c) The Inspector General of the Department of Defense shall conduct a review of any action involving Rosoboronexport with respect to a waiver issued by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to subsection (b), and not later than 90 days after the date on which such a waiver is issued by the Secretary of Defense, the Inspector General shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report containing the results of the review conducted with respect to such waiver.

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