

The Foundations of Anglo-American Intelligence Sharing

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If there was one constant to any account of postwar British foreign policy, it is the centrality of the United States. In the past 20 years, the importance and role of the intelligence relationship that underpins this factor have become more prevalent.¹ Yet, attention is often focused on specific aspects. The 1946 UK-USA Agreement, for instance, which provided the backbone to the sharing of signals intelligence to this day, is often cited as the central pillar of the special intelligence relationship.² Similarly, in episodic instances the covert relationship is cited, with notable examples including the restoration to power of the shah of Iran in 1953 and the running of agents like Oleg Penkovksy.³

The analytical intelligence relationship, however, has received far less attention. This article seeks to fill this lacuna by concentrating on the origins and early evolution of the relationship that developed between the two preeminent analytical bodies in both countries, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the United States and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in the United Kingdom.

Wartime Origins

To understand the nature of the postwar relationship, it is first necessary to understand its origins. The prewar US intelligence effort was a very limited endeavor. Small, dedicated components of the US military worked on intelligence, but there was no civilian intelligence function or coordinating outfit. The UK community, such as it was, was slightly larger and better evolved, but there was little collaboration among its constituents.

In the summer of 1936, as the potential for conflict with Germany was steadily increasing, the decision was taken in London to create the JIC, a subcommittee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Its function was two-fold: to ensure the community was better joined up to remove duplication of effort and, in turn, to ensure that those making military plans were provided with the best intelligence appreciations possible.⁴

The United Kingdom and the United States had first discussed military equipment and plans in 1937.⁵ There had been relatively little mention of intelligence, however. What there had been was confined to dialogue between the two navies. In

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the first months of 1940, intelligence relations were extended with the creation of British Security Coordination (the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) office in New York responsible for liaison with the Americans) and by the visit of several FBI officers to London.⁶

In June 1940, US Army Gen. Raymond Lee was sent to London as military attaché and head of intelligence. Lee had been the military attaché in London from 1935 to 1939, but he had been brought back to Washington at the outbreak of war to “whip American peacetime soldiers into shape.” As the early months of the war proceeded and the German army advanced, “his superiors decided that once again he was the man America needed in London.”⁷

In July 1940, at the insistence of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, WW I hero Col. William Donovan was despatched to London as the president's special envoy. He had spent most of the interwar period as an attorney in New York before becoming one of Roosevelt's trusted aides.⁸ Colonel Donovan's primary role was to assess Britain's chances—both in terms of its ability and its will—to withstand a German invasion, and while in London in July 1940, he met Churchill and the various British intelligence chiefs.^{a, 9}

a. Lee, who discussed Donovan's findings with him before his return to brief Roosevelt, noted that Donovan felt Britain's chances of “beating off” the Germans were 60–40, whereas Lee was more confident, arguing 2 to 1, “barring some magical secret weapon.”

Perhaps as a response, the JIC was instructed in August to prepare a memorandum on how Washington, in organizational terms, was approaching the war.¹⁰ The same month it was decided that the *Dominion Wire*, a regular product based on the JIC's daily summary, should be forwarded to the US ambassador in London, with Lord Lothian, the British ambassador in Washington, instructed to show it to Roosevelt.¹¹ These would be the first stirrings in the serious exchange of analyzed intelligence.

In late August 1940, a meeting was held in London between the British Chiefs of Staff and Brig. Gen. George Strong, the assistant chief of staff for the US Army. At the meeting, Strong disclosed the fact that the Americans were reading Japanese codes and that “considerable progress” had been made in reading Italian ones. Strong proposed that the time was ripe for the free exchange of intelligence.¹² The Chiefs of Staff agreed, and a few weeks later Roosevelt approved the dissemination of all relevant information to the British. In early 1941, a succession of further meetings strengthened this new alliance at a time when the United States had not yet entered the war.¹³

On a further fact-finding mission in March 1941, Colonel Donovan attended a JIC meeting.¹⁴ At the same time, the JIC was also involved in discussions about the means by which American information would be transmitted back to the UK.¹⁵ The timing was opportune: in March 1941, the United States had approved the Lend-Lease Act, which allowed US defense and other supplies to be passed across the Atlantic.

Donovan's appointment as Roosevelt's coordinator of information was welcomed by the British, although a report on the appointment called him the “Coordinator of Intelligence.”^{b16} At the same time though, British officials remained skeptical of the intelligence benefits the Americans could offer. Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, the JIC's Foreign Office chairman, for instance, wrote: “We must bear in mind that Washington is far worse informed than ourselves (odd as this may seem to those who complain of our intelligence)... I believe that their intelligence departments are primitive and rather inexperienced... there is little contact or collaboration between American Government Departments.”¹⁷

Cavendish-Bentinck's last point, about the lack of coordination in the American machinery, was increasingly vexing the British. In June 1941, Rear Adm. John Godfrey, the director of naval intelligence (DNI), had visited the United States.¹⁸ In reporting back to the JIC he referred to the problems and wrote about the need to create “a joint intelligence machinery at Washington.”¹⁹ At the same time General Lee, the US representative in London, wrote to Washington emphasizing the “necessity for a Joint Intelligence Committee in Washington.” The justification was a strong endorsement of what Lee had encountered in London: “We cannot get along much longer without something like this. The Joint Committees here are so numerous and so effective that nothing that comes to the atten-

b. The Foreign Office note of the appointment, dated 26 June 1941, predates the US officially given date of the assignment, which was in July.

tion of any department fails to reach all the others in a very short time.”²⁰

In the meantime, Admiral Godfrey informed the London JIC that, indeed, two groups had been created in Washington to manage intelligence-related issues with the Americans. Both were called JIC (Washington) and were set up along the lines of the London JIC: the “senior” JIC (W) was only to meet on matters of major policy; the “junior” JIC (W) met every day and was tasked with collating all information from the US government and producing reports that were dispatched daily to London. The latter was also responsible for liaising with relevant American authorities and distributing London JIC assessments as necessary. Finally, it was at the beck and call of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), “for such purposes as they see fit.”²¹

Although the JIC in London had been involved in the creation of overseas intelligence structures before, JIC (W) was novel.²² Here, for the first time, was a body designed specifically to manage the intelligence relations of the two countries.²³ Although there were bilateral links between various components of British intelligence and their American counterparts, until the creation of JIC (W) there was no unified attempt to ensure that material was not duplicated.

Intelligence exchange between the London and Washington JICs was not always straightforward, and there were occasions when JIC (W) complained about the lack of information it was receiving from London. Yet this should not overshadow its main contribution at this time: It provided a direct line of communication

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between London and Washington.²⁴ This would prove to be invaluable as the United States was propelled into war.

The British hoped JIC (W) might “induce” the Americans to set up their own coordinating body.²⁵ Initially, at least, US officials in Washington did not look favorably on the idea—despite Lee’s impassioned pleas from London. It would be some time before an American equivalent to the JIC was created. In his memoir of service in London, Lee reproduced the objections Col. Hayes Kroner—soon to become the head of the War Department’s Military Intelligence Service—said he had heard from members of the War Department:

We are not going to copy British organization and procedure.

We are not convinced that such a central clearing house and assimilating center are needed here.

It is far more difficult to put into effect than Lee imagines.

The “high ups” still don’t feel the danger of incompleteness in their information.

The fact that Beaumont-Nesbitt, Godfrey, and Noel Hall are here and that they serve in the [British] Joint Intelligence Committee and recommended it, is having an unfavorable effect.

The British have not been successful, so far, in the war: why should they advise us?

*Many other alarmingly ignorant and prejudiced reactions.*²⁶

Eventually the Americans began to change their minds, assisted largely by Donovan’s appointment and the fact that he had gained Roosevelt’s confidence.²⁷ In early 1942, a US JIC was finally created, comprising the directors of intelligence from the Army and Navy, representatives from the State Department, and the Board of Economic Warfare, and Donovan.²⁸ Both the American JIC and JIC (W), would work closely with the main JIC in London. Following its creation in 1942, its members would also work closely with the Anglo-American “Combined Intelligence Committee,” which reported to the Combined Staff Planners, who were responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.²⁹

Allies at Last

British intelligence had played an important role in the creation and establishment of an American analytical intelligence community.³⁰ By late 1942, however, there was a feeling in London that relations were not as close as they should be and that JIC (W) needed “improvement.” This was despite the fact that steps had been taken not long before to ensure that the “special intelligence,” the sobriquet given to ULTRA intelligence, was transmitted to Washington.³¹

Many British intelligence officers saw themselves as the elder statesmen in the partnership and were keen to offer their thoughts and advice whenever possible. In considering an American JIC paper on Japanese capabilities, for instance, the deputy director of military intelligence com-

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mented that although the paper was to have dealt with “capabilities,”

*the conclusions in paragraph 5 refer to intentions. We have previously noticed this tendency on the part of American intelligence papers. They confuse capabilities and intentions, and are apt to assume that, because Japan is capable of a certain course of action, she intends to take that course. We feel that this paper provides a good opportunity to tactfully raise this point with America.*³²

The response was to send Denis Capel-Dunn, the JIC’s influential secretary, over to Washington to gauge progress, offer advice, and report back to the JIC upon his return to London.³³ One of Capel-Dunn’s main tasks, as he saw it, was to ensure that the intelligence setup was optimized given that “the Americans are right into the war in the West” and that “a good deal may depend on the ‘I’ [Intelligence] party in Washington.”³⁴

Capel-Dunn submitted the report on his visit at the end of January 1943. His impression was not one of an overly developed system. He took note of the parallels in the US structure—including the existence of both senior and junior JICs—with London’s, but the American JIC had never, as far as he could tell, met either the US JCS or the planners. Furthermore, the British JIC in Washington had no direct contact with the US JIC. While in the United States, Capel-Dunn had been “embarrassed” to be asked to address a combined meeting of the JIC (W)

and US “working committee,” where he had commented on the closeness of intelligence and planning in the UK, and how “we lived together and worked together.”³⁵

Capel-Dunn’s proposed solution—an interchange of British and American officers—was greeted with muted enthusiasm in the JIC, with the Air Ministry and Admiralty wanting time to consider how this might work in practice.³⁶ Relations between both nations’ intelligence communities in London had not been quite so inhibited, with weekly meetings being held between the US intelligence representative and the “junior” JIC, the deputy director’s level of the committee.

These discussions must have been useful because by April 1943 some improvements were being noted. The director of military intelligence (DMI), Maj. Gen. Francis Davidson, noted how JIC (W) had been “regularly” called upon by the senior American JIC to discuss and comment on papers. Furthermore, US JIC papers were increasingly taken more seriously by the US joint chiefs.³⁷

This improvement in both internal and external relations continued throughout 1943. In late April, the JIC noted that the different American factions were now in regular communication, both with one another and with their British counterparts, and that where there were differences in opinion they were reasonably and sensibly debated.³⁸

Discussions between British and American military planners contin-

ued to take place to define the future conduct of the war. The following month, Edward Mason of the newly created Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—with Donovan in charge—visited London and was invited to attend a JIC meeting. Discussions appear to have been cordial, with topics including the improved intelligence relationship, and a comparison of some UK and US assessments. This was followed by a visit in October of Stanley Hornbeck of the American senior JIC.³⁹ A further Anglo-American conference in December described UK-US intelligence relations as “very good.”⁴⁰ The Anglo-American intelligence communities had, therefore, become allies at last.

PostWar Liaison

Aside from the production of assessments, the JIC had a number of other functions. Perhaps primary among these was establishing and maintaining Allied and foreign liaison. This took several forms: monitoring regional outposts of British intelligence; maintaining liaison with Commonwealth and other Allied countries; but perhaps above all, it was concerned with cementing the foundations developed with the United States during the war.

Liaison was a crucial aspect of the JIC’s role. It included: sharing intelligence assessments; contributing to and commenting upon other countries’ papers; allowing other nations to participate in the British JIC system; helping establish Allied intelligence organizations, often based on tried and tested British models; maintaining a window on distant parts of the world; and, finally, ensuring that

British intelligence forecasts could have a greater impact on Cold War policymaking beyond the confines of Whitehall. It is difficult to measure the importance of the relationships that were created at this formative stage of the Cold War, although the longevity of many of them certainly shows how valuable they must have been, both in London and elsewhere.

What is clear is that the members of the JIC, by the end of war, saw themselves as the senior statesmen of the intelligence world. While this might seem a blasé, even arrogant, stance now, it is important to remember that Britain had one of the longest traditions of intelligence and, in the form of the JIC, had a unique, central system for the production of assessments and the management of the intelligence community. It is no surprise, then, that the JIC model was copied and exported to many other countries.

What is perhaps more unexpected though, is how frequently this system would flounder. Indeed, it was destined to survive only in Britain, British colonial possessions, or other Commonwealth members: in other words, in systems modeled on the Whitehall cabinet system of government, where officials, from the head of the organization down, maintained a strict political neutrality.

The most important relationship was the Atlantic Alliance. In early 1946, the British JIC in Washington, JIC (W), wrote a detailed report to its counterpart in London outlining how Anglo-American intelligence collaboration had progressed since the end of the war. The report covered military and economic intelligence, deliberately excluding political top-

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ics. Of these, naval and military intelligence relations were strong, though air force collaboration had suffered because of the changing personnel involved and the lack of any constant RAF presence in the United States. Economic intelligence, a much newer field for collaboration, was less established but good foundations had been laid.⁴¹

As to civilian intelligence agencies, the war had left something of a void in the United States. President Truman had disbanded the OSS in September 1945 despite having no clear proposals for what should follow. The counterintelligence and foreign intelligence collection and some subordinated support components had been sent to the War Department as the Strategic Services Unit to preserve at least some of the capabilities developed during the war. The analytic component, Research and Analysis, was dispatched to the Department of State, where it began to lose people and struggled for stature. As leaders in Washington debated the nature and role of a postwar national security apparatus, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), created by presidential order, served as a stopgap measure to ensure some central coordination of government intelligence.⁴²

In the meantime, in late 1945 a review of the British intelligence system was completed by William H. Jackson on behalf of General Donovan. Jackson, a future deputy director of central intelligence and a noted Anglophile, produced a report that focused specifically on whether elements of the British system could be used to create an American cen-

tralized system. In turn this led, via several other studies, to the creation of the US estimative process.⁴³

In April 1946, Lt. Cmdr. W. M. Scott, the chief of mission for the SSU/CIG at the US embassy in London, wrote to its head in Washington on the difficulties faced by the uncertainty over US intelligence:

For months we have been "hanging on" with an indefinite status, changing our organization's name and generally lacking a fixed place in the intelligence picture...our friends here have been exceedingly patient and we, by dodging issues and slightly "coloring" our status, have been able to hold our own in practically all phases of liaison with the British...in all conversations with British intelligence personnel they have repeatedly stressed the need for more coordination of our intelligence services...for the good of the American government the question of the status of our organization must soon be settled one way or the other; relations which are of extreme importance to American intelligence are not going to be possible to maintain unless we have a definite status soon.⁴⁴

In August 1946, Col. William Quinn, the head of SSU, visited London. Reporting on his trip, Quinn said he had emphasized to British counterparts his desire for the SSU to stand on its two feet and for liaison on "secret" and "special operations" to be limited; nonetheless, he continued, "I personally feel that if at all

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possible, such liaison as is effected with the British should be maintained in London.”⁴⁵

Back in London, the JIC took a keen interest in developments on the other side of the Atlantic. It requested and was given regular updates from its British counterparts in the United States, who described and analyzed progress.⁴⁶ Despite the history of wartime closeness, there were still some in the United Kingdom who questioned how much information should be shared with the Americans. At the service level intelligence exchange was extensive, yet at the more strategic level—the realm at which the JIC operated—collaboration had largely dropped off after the war, with reports generally only being passed between the British COS and American JCS.

In April 1946, the question was raised within the JIC of whether a series of reports on Russia should be released to the Americans, not because of their sensitivity (though some were codeword documents), but because they would “reveal to the Americans the extent of our concentration in that particular field.”⁴⁷ In turn, Brig. Arthur Cornwall-Jones (the secretary of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington and of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and who had been a prewar secretary of the JIC) gave his opinion: “We have a feeling that it would pay us to try to develop our association with the Americans.... The present time, when Russian activities are causing us much concern in the world, would

appear to be an appropriate moment to start off.”⁴⁸

The JIC was evidently persuaded by this. It was nevertheless decreed that papers should be “topped and tailed” so that anyone reading them in the United States would not know that they were British JIC reports. The rationale behind the decision was clear: “The Sub-Committee [i.e. JIC] fervently hope that an exchange of appreciations on such matters will result.”⁴⁹ To the British, the great originator and purveyor of modern intelligence, this was not a purely altruistic move, for it was felt by the service’s directors of intelligence that “it was desirable to educate United States departments in our views.”⁵⁰

An ongoing, specific concern in passing information to the Americans was security in the State Department, the new home for the veterans of the OSS Research and Analysis department. Many within the JIC system, particularly those in the committee in Washington, had grave doubts about circulating assessments to people there. Fortunately, it was reported that within the new Central Intelligence Group structure, there were only two State Department officials, both junior and neither privy to JIC papers. Thus satisfied, the JIC approved and the matter was passed to the Chiefs of Staff, who also agreed, and it was decided to start transmitting JIC papers on the Soviet Union to the Americans.⁵¹

This was not, however, the full extent of the JIC’s dealings with the United States. In considering how

collaboration might be increased, the JIC produced a brief report on what it considered to be an optimum system, whereby British officers would be in “direct working contact” with US intelligence officers.⁵²

By the end of 1946 then, the backbone of the Anglo-American intelligence partnership had been forged. Bilateral links that had been created during the war between the services’ intelligence departments were extended and further strengthened through the UK-USA Agreement, which had been formalized in March 1946.⁵³

At the committee level, British assessments were making their way across the Atlantic and, in return, US views on them and separate American appreciations were being received. In addition, on the rare occasions they visited London, senior US intelligence officers attended the JIC, though only for specific items on the agenda.

Enter the CIA

The creation of the CIA in the late summer of 1947 presented a new opportunity for the British, one that they were keen to grasp. Anglo-American dealings were not always straightforward and cordial. Relations, albeit strong at the departmental level, were often undermined by differing views at the political level. A classic example of this is the difference of opinion between Washington and London over the recognition of the communist government that came to power in China in 1949. The different points of view had a direct impact on the exchange

of intelligence before the outbreak of the Korean War.⁵⁴

Another difficulty was gauging the reactions of American politicians who, from a British perspective, were exhibiting an increasingly introspective view of the world. In British minds there was a risk that this would have an impact on how much information the Americans might be prepared to share.

A further complicating factor was the American reluctance to have their information communicated to Commonwealth countries, or indeed to Commonwealth officers working with their British counterparts. This was no trivial matter. The JIC's view was rational, stating that "there is no need to inform the Americans officially" when this might happen. Although this sounds underhanded, it reflected the British belief that relations with US intelligence agencies at the working level were cordial and considered to be important, whereas at a more senior, political level doubts persisted and so there was no reason to discuss the technicalities of the relationship.⁵⁵

US politics were integral to these British thoughts. In early discussions about US-UK relations, the Americans had informed the JIC that one of the arguments used to persuade Congress to pass the 1947 National Security Act had been the necessity before the war to rely on the British for intelligence. Congress had, consequently, wanted an assurance that the CIA would be able to rely on its own sources of intelligence and not depend too much on foreign assistance. As such, although collaboration was desirable, the British presumed that the Americans would withhold certain information from Congress.

By early 1950, it was calculated that 90 percent of JIC reports were being passed to the Americans. However, problems remained in getting reciprocation, with no US JIC papers being sent to London, and with only very few US comments received on British JIC papers.

It was therefore occasionally necessary to muddy the waters. For instance, in discussions over the decision to partition Palestine in early 1948, it was agreed not to circulate relevant JIC papers to the CIA because of perceived Jewish sympathies in Washington.⁵⁶ Despite the occasional hiccup, on the whole the system worked well, and the level of trust and collaboration exhibited by the British increased. The "topping and tailing" procedure for JIC papers, for instance, was scrapped in 1948.⁵⁷

Against the backdrop to these and ensuing discussions were the rapidly developing Cold War and a succession of US actions. The August 1946 Atomic Energy Act, better known as the McMahon Act after the senator who sponsored it, ended the technical exchange of atomic information between the United States and the United Kingdom, and this had an immediate effect on intelligence sharing. The 1947 Truman Doctrine and the 1948 Marshall Plan ensured a US commitment to Europe, much to the relief of the British. These were followed by the military guarantees established by the creation of NATO in 1949. The January 1950 Burns-Templer Agreement, designed to ensure the complete exchange of military information between the UK and US governments, was useful in reinforcing relations, and would later be used by the JIC as part of its justification for collaboration with the CIA.⁵⁸

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Participating in the Drafting Process

With the postwar restructuring of US intelligence, the US JIC had become a largely redundant body: The work of the US JIC, a military committee, was meant to be complemented by the nonmilitary assessments produced by the CIA but in practice the agency had assumed much of its work. This was not immediately obvious to the British JIC, though it would rapidly become so. On the US side, the major catalyst for collaboration was the CIA. As far as the JIC was concerned, this was considered particularly crucial, for while relations at the agency-to-agency level were good, a recent UK-US assessment conference had revealed the differences between the two nation's strategic positions.⁶⁰

In mid-1951, Col. Dante Edward Pemberton Hodgson, late of the Welsh Guards, was chosen to represent the

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JIC in Washington. His duties, broadly defined, were to "act in a liaison capacity and represent JIC (London) with any US intelligence agency which may request your services."⁶¹

Located within the CIA was the newly established Office of National Estimates (ONE). The ONE gradually assumed the responsibilities, originally allocated to the US JIC, for preparing assessments. ONE differed from the British JIC in that its members were not representatives of parent departments; indeed, of the eight full-time members in 1951, three were university professors, two were retired military men, and a further two were classed as "professional" intelligence officers. Perhaps as a result of this disparate composition, Hodgson reported a far greater level of debate and argument. Of the members, it is worth mentioning the presence of Sherman Kent, a university history professor, who would write about the theory and practice of strategic intelligence production in the United States and who would come to be seen as the founder of the US intelligence analysis profession.⁶²

The US Intelligence Community, and the CIA in particular, was now much more self-sufficient, and the previous London bias had swung firmly in Washington's favor. From an American perspective, then, the relationship was functioning well. Ray Cline, who had been sent to London to act as a second representative, has written about how his new position provided

*the benefits of seeing how the evidence on common strategic problems looked from the viewpoint of another nation, a close ally with similar but separate interests...my real awakening in London was the discovery of how much we still benefitted from formal liaison exchanges.*⁶³

It is interesting to note here how Cline's attitude altered, once he was in London, from the view prevalent in the United States on liaison. The more senior representative attended relevant JIC meetings, whereas Cline, as the junior member, was primarily involved with the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS), the drafters of the JIC assessments. The JIC noted that Cline's presence was positive, and that he provided "much useful information." The collaboration was, therefore, a two-way street as far as relations in London were concerned.

In Washington, however, Hodgson was still being given only restricted access to papers and personnel. For the JIC back in London this was a result of the "rigidity of the American system and to inter-service and inter-departmental jealousies in Washington." The decidedly lopsided balance of exchange was not lost on the JIC: "The position thus is that for five months [the senior US representative] has been attending at least part of nearly every JIC meeting and Mr. Cline has had something like a free run of our JIS, without our enjoying any comparable treatment in Washington: and that we have been main-

taining in Washington a full Colonel's post which is almost valueless."⁶⁴

The spate of British spy cases, including the identification of Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, and Klaus Fuchs as Soviet agents, certainly reinforced US reluctance to engage in a full exchange of intelligence.⁶⁵ The JIC recognized that the system of governance in the United States meant that regardless of his position as director of central intelligence, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith could not simply decide to increase British access to US intelligence. Shortly after President Eisenhower's inauguration, he installed the deputy director, Allen Dulles, as the new director. Dulles wasted no time, and within a month of his appointment had invited Hodgson to call on him. For the British, his appointment would prove to be immensely important.

By mid-1953, it is clear that committee members felt that while the quality of the shared CIA product was now beginning to match the material the United States was receiving, the quantity of exchanged material was still heavily in America's favour. Briefing Prime Minister Winston Churchill in June 1953 before his talks with Eisenhower in Bermuda, the JIC wrote:

*For some time now we have been concerned at the one-sidedness of our intelligence co-operation with the United States...the best way to improve co-operation is to convince the Americans that they stand to gain by it. Many Americans already appreciate this and are aware that we are not getting our fair share of the bargain. We believe that Mr Allen Dulles...is among them.*⁶⁶

As prophesized, the forces for change were beginning to spread across the Atlantic. In a forthright letter to JIC Chairman Patrick Dean, Dulles himself admitted that relations had been strained but that “the need has become substantially greater, or at least more evident, for close working-level contact.” Following a discussion at the JIC, Dean wrote a remarkably candid reply, emphasizing in very plain language the contrast between the relative access granted in London and Washington. Dean ended by confirming why the British were so intent on pursuing American collaboration: “It is our [the JIC’s] belief that our joint effort in all matters of intelligence is the firmest foundation [on which to base policy]...which is of such value to both our countries particularly in times of emergency.”⁶⁷

Among JIC members there was a feeling that, despite the promises, if matters did not improve then the US representatives in London would have to have their access withdrawn. However, the JIC was able to detect small glimmers of improvement:

*We fear, however, that there is little hope of an early general improvement in UK/US Intelligence Cooperation, and we feel that probably the only real sympathy in America...comes from the CIA, especially its Director, Mr Dulles, who certainly appreciates the value of our contribution.*⁶⁸

The necessary change of views in Washington lay, as the JIC had already realized, with the politicians and not the CIA. In late 1953 the committee was informed that the increased threat posed by the Soviet Union had led to a step change on

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Capitol Hill, where it was now felt necessary to improve any warning that might be given of a Soviet nuclear attack. In practical terms this meant a warmer approach to liaison relations, especially with the British.

These shifts in the political landscape were conveyed to the JIC by a London-based US representative.⁷⁰ The reverberations of the US decision can be inferred from later moves. Foremost among these was the approval of a new JIC liaison officer in Washington, who was to achieve greater access than his predecessor. Upon the completion of his two-year tour in the States, Colonel Hodgson was recalled to the United Kingdom.

His replacement was Dr. Alan Crick, who was to be attached to the deputy director for intelligence in the CIA. This was a novel but calculated move as Hodgson had been attached to ONE, and over lunch one day Sherman Kent had informally told the then-JIC chairman, Patrick Reilly, that the “Hodgson approach would never get us anywhere.” Hodgson had been privy to the debates and discussions within ONE between the different military factions regarding the content of assessments and was aware that the Americans did not want to air their “disputes in the presence of a British representative.” Crick’s attachment to a different part of the CIA was considered beneficial as it would avoid these concerns.

Crick was no newcomer to the secret world. He had served in the army during the Second World War, including a spell as intelligence offi-

cer to SHAEF. After the war he had joined the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), a postwar creation focused on topographical and economic intelligence, becoming its first representative on the JIS in 1946. Following his two-year spell with the JIC, he returned to the JIB. In the summer of 1953, he was sent to Washington, where he remained for three years. Shortly before his departure for the United States, Crick was briefed by the JIC as to his future role. Broadly speaking this included: liaison with the CIA generally and participation in the work of the US Watch Committee and the Office of National Estimates. Crick was instructed to “work tactfully.”^a

In May 1954, JIC Chairman Dean visited the United States and Canada. The “really big item,” as he put it, was meeting Allen Dulles and securing closer cooperation with US intelligence. Discussions went well, helped, no doubt, by Crick’s successful appointment. As Dean subsequently informed the JIC, “Crick seemed to me to have done amazingly well. He is very popular and well known throughout the CIA...the doors are opening for him all round and he has settled down very quickly and expanded his influence just as we hoped.” Dulles reiterated his desire to strengthen relations and, as an incen-

a. Following a further period back at the JIB, he returned to Washington as JIC representative for the years 1963–65, before becoming the chairman of the JIS (1965–68) prior to its conversion into the modern day Assessments Staff.

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tive, Dean suggested that the Americans participate in the deliberations of the theatre JIC (Far East). Thus, it would seem that by late 1953 the JIC had finally secured a substantial line of access into the CIA and the American assessment procedures.

On leaving Washington in late 1956, Crick provided a valedictory note for the JIC, which revealed something of the closeness between the intelligence communities yet, in other respects, the differences in policy: "in recent years there has been a growing exchange of National Estimates and JIC reports and each country now takes fuller and more critical cognizance of the other's appreciations. This has done much to reduce the gaps in Intelligence thinking even if it has not led very appreciably to the reduction of major differences in policy.

The earlier imbalance was still, to an extent, present, for Crick was never allowed the same kind of access as his opposite numbers were granted in London. To Crick the reason behind this was simple, "the sensitiveness of the Americans about revealing to other nationals, even their most trusted collaborators, anything they consider likely to look foolish when received, or any product they consider slipshod or unworthy."⁶⁹

In Sum

The details of the rise and fall in relations are less important than what they tell us about the changing balance of power between the intelligence communities at this time. The earliest discussions clearly show that the JIC saw itself as the senior partner in the relationship. Gradually, and perhaps unnoticed at the time, this began to change.

The moment the relationship reversed is never explicitly recorded, but it is clear from the JIC's unrelenting desire to maintain and improve liaison that it must have been realized that the US intelligence effort had much to offer and that it was no longer simply a case of educating Americans in the finer arts of intelligence analysis. Indeed, even in the face of the decisions by the United States—whereby Americans retained full access while withdrawing a reciprocal arrangement with the British—the JIC, seeming to recognize its lesser standing, never once complained formally. Relations would improve with a new president, a new DCI, and, perhaps most importantly, a new (and pervading) sense of threat. With this came a new emphasis on acting in concert, which called for common intelligence analysis.

A final word can be left to an unidentified British speaker in an

undated speech delivered to the US Intelligence Advisory Committee, the closest thing in US intelligence to the JIC at that time:

We realise in London that our effort can in many respects not compare with yours. You devote a much larger amount of manpower, money and other resources to the whole field of intelligence and you have developed facilities and resources for collation and research which we admire and envy but cannot expect to emulate...but to set against this we have certain special facilities and advantages, which are of great value in present conditions. The main advantage is that we are so widely dispersed and can maintain a world-wide intelligence organisation.... I should make it plain that we intend to remain deployed in this fashion and the facilities and advantages which it gives us compensate to a great degree for our comparatively smaller organisation in London.⁷¹

The speech acknowledged the balance in the developing Anglo-American intelligence partnership. The United States had the money, the resources, and the technology; Britain had the people, the organization and, perhaps above all else, the global real estate for intelligence access. It would be a beautiful marriage.



Endnotes

1. For instance, see R. J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (John Murray, 2001).
2. R. J. Aldrich. *GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency* (Harper Press, 2010).
3. On the former, see M. J. Gasiorowski, "The CIA's TPBEDAMN Operation and the 1953 Coup in Iran," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 15:4 (Fall 2013): 4–24. On Penkovskiy, see most recently D. Gioe, "Handling HERO: Joint Anglo-American Tradecraft in the Case of Oleg Penkovskiy" in D. Gioe, L. Scott and C. Andrew (eds), *An International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis: A 50 Year Retrospective* (Routledge, 2014), 135–75.
4. For more, see M.S Goodman, *The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Vol. 1: From the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis* (Routledge, 2014).
5. For more see D. Reynolds, *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-41: A Study in Competitive Cooperation* (Europa Publications, 1981).
6. N West (ed.), *British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas, 1940-1945* (Fromm International, 1999); D. M. Charles, "'Before the Colonel Arrived': Hoover, Donovan, Roosevelt and the Origins of American Central Intelligence, 1940-41," in *Intelligence and National Security* 20:2 (June 2005): 225–37.
7. James Leutze's introduction to R. E. Lee, *The London Observer: The Journal of General Raymond E. Lee, 1940–1941* (Hutchinson, 1971), xv.
8. T. F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1981).
9. Lee, *The London Observer*, 27–28. For an interesting earlier American discussion on Britain's survival chances see M. S. Alexander, "Perceptions by US Officials in Washington DC and London of Britain's Readiness for War in 1939," *Contemporary British History* 25:1 (March 2011): 101–24.
10. JIC(40)233, "American War Organisation," 10 August 1940. The National Archives, Kew, UK (hereafter TNA): CAB 81/98.
11. JIC(40)56th Meeting, 27 August 1940. TNA: CAB 81/87.
12. COS(40)289th Meeting, 31 August 1940. TNA: CAB 79/6. The JIC reaction is in JIC(40)263, "Exchange of Information with the United States Authorities," 1 September 1940. TNA: CAB 81/98. The JIC version contains the full text of what Strong said; the version in the COS Committee minutes omits most of the detail.
13. R. L. Benson, "The Origin of US-British Communications Intelligence Cooperation (1940-41)." Available on the National Security Agency's website: www.nsa.gov.
14. JP(41)33rd Meeting, 7 March 1941. TNA: CAB 84/3.
15. JIC(41)12th Meeting, 8 May 1941. TNA: CAB 81/88.
16. A4904/769/45. Handwritten note, 26 June 1941. TNA: FO 371/26231. Unfortunately it is not possible to work out who the signer was from his signature. The date and name cited above are taken from the FO document. Although the report of the appointment called him "Coordinator of Intelligence," American sources, by contrast, state that Donovan was appointed in July 1941 and that his job title was "Coordinator of Information." See M. Warner, *The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency* (CIA, 2000). Available at www.cia.gov
17. A3295/101/45. V. Cavendish-Bentinck, 2 May 1941. TNA: FO 371/26179.
18. For Godfrey's own account see his unpublished memoir in Churchill College Archives, University of Cambridge: John Godfrey papers: GDFY 1/6.
19. JIC(41)17th Meeting, 17 June 1941. TNA: CAB 81/88.
20. Lee, *The London Observer*, 277.
21. JIC(41)253, "A Telegram from Rear Admiral Godfrey," 14 June 1941. TNA: CAB 81/103.
22. For the minutes of the first few of the JIC(W) meetings, see TNA: CAB 122/1584.
23. "Notes on the Organisation and Responsibilities of the British JIC Washington," 8 December 1941. TNA: CAB 122/1584.
24. For instance, F. W. Vogel [British Army Staff, Washington] to War Office, 13 October 1941. TNA: CAB 122/1584.
25. F. Hoyer-Millar [British Embassy, Washington] to V.Cavendish-Bentinck, 4 June 1941. TNA: CAB 122/1584.
26. Lee, *The London Observer*, 319.
27. L. A. Valero, "The American Joint Intelligence Committee and Estimates of the Soviet Union, 1945-1947," in *Studies in Intelligence* (Summer 2000).
28. "Directive by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for Combined Intelligence," 11 February 1942. TNA: CAB 122/1584. See also L. L. Montague, "The Origins of National Intelligence Estimating," *Studies in Intelligence* 16:2 (Spring 1972): 63–70. Montague had been a former Secretary of the US JIC.
29. F. H. Hinsley et al, *British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 2: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations* (London: HMSO, 1981), 42–44.
30. For an American perspective see Montague, "The Origins of National Intelligence Estimating." For a good overview see "History of the Joint Staff Mission," C. P. Warren. TNA: CAB 102/388.

Endnotes (cont.)

31. Correspondence about this is in TNA: CAB 163/6.
32. "MI2 Comments on US(JIC68) JIC(42)510," 22 December 1942. TNA: WO 208/2059A.
33. V. Cavendish-Bentinck to D. Capel-Dunn, 7 November 1942. TNA: CAB 121/230.
34. D. Capel-Dunn to L. Hollis [Secretary, COS], 8 November 1942. TNA: CAB 121/230.
35. "Visit to Washington January 1943," 25 January 1943. TNA: CAB 163/6.
36. JIC(43)6th Meeting, 2 February 1943. TNA: CAB 81/91.
37. F. H. N. Davidson to D. Capel-Dunn, 12 April 1943. TNA: CAB 163/6.
38. JIC(43)21st Meeting, 20 April 1943. TNA: CAB 81/91. For an example see the comparison of British and US JIC papers on German Strategy in 1943. US National Archives and Records Administration II Archive (hereafter NARA II), College Park, MD: RG 319, Box 2143.
39. JIC(43)50th Meeting, 12 October 1943. TNA: CAB 81/91.
40. JIC(43)63rd Meeting, 14 December 1943. TNA: CAB 81/91.
41. JIC(46)18(O), "British Joint Intelligence Committee in Washington: State of Collaboration with the United States," 26 February 1946. TNA: CAB 81/132.
42. M. Warner (ed), *Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution* (CIA History Staff, 2001). Available at www.cia.gov
43. Details of the Jackson's review and of its original location can be found in Valero, "The American Joint Intelligence Committee."
44. W. M. Scott to W.W.Quinn, 30 April 1946. NARA II: RG 263, HS/HC 804, Item 14.
45. W. W. Quinn to Colonel D.Galloway [the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence], 16 August 1946. NARA II: RG 263, HS/HC 804, Item 14.
46. For an example of this see JIC/152/46, "New US Intelligence Organisation," 3 February 1946. TNA: CAB 176/9.
47. JIC/434/46, "Inter-Change of Intelligence with the USA," 6 April 1946. TNA: CAB 176/10.
48. JIC/434/46, "Inter-Change of Intelligence with the USA," 6 April 1946. TNA: CAB 176/10.
49. JIC/458/46, "Interchange of Intelligence with the USA," 11 April 1946. TNA: CAB 176/10.
50. JIC/822/46, "Exchange of Intelligence with the Americans," R.M.Munro [Secretary, JIC(W)] to Secretary, JIC (London), 12 June 1946. TNA: CAB 176/11.
51. JIC/972/46, "Exchange of Intelligence with the Americans," 22 July 1946. TNA: CAB 176/12.
52. JIC/1413/46, "Exchange of Intelligence with the Americans," 16 October 1946. TNA: CAB 176/13.
53. See TNA: HW 80/4 for further information.
54. For more see Goodman, *The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee*, 301–25.
55. This can be inferred from various discussions on the subject. The quote comes from JIC/241/48, "United States Policy for Passing Information to the UK," J. R. Canham [Secretary JIC(W)] to Secretary, JIC London, 29 January 1948. TNA: CAB 176/17.
56. JIC/264/48, "Circulation of JIC Papers to CIA," 7 February 1948. TNA: CAB 176/17.
57. See various papers in TNA: CAB 121/231.
58. For details see TNA: CAB 163/14.
59. For some examples of the type and range of JIC papers sent to the US see NARA II: RG 59, Lot 58D 776, Box 2.
60. JIC(50)106, "Liaison Between UK and US Intelligence Organisations," 5 December 1950. TNA: CAB 158/11.
61. "Charter for Colonel Hodgson," 17 May 1951. TNA: DEFE 11/350.
62. See, for instance, "The Law and Custom of the National Intelligence Estimate." Available on the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence website.
63. R. S. Cline, *Secrets, Spies and Scholars: The Essential CIA* (Acropolis, 1976), 123–25.
64. For more detail see Goodman, *Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee*.
65. For more, see M. S. Goodman. *Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb* (Stanford University Press, 2007).
66. Unless otherwise indicated, material in this and subsequent paragraphs is drawn from Goodman, *Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee*.
67. Cited in Goodman, *Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee*, 213.
68. JIC(53)72, "UK/US Intelligence Co-operation, Liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency," 9 July 1953. CAB 158/16.
69. Cited in Goodman, *Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee*, 214.
70. In a quasi-memoir Williard Matthias recounts the background to this change of atmosphere in Washington in W. C. Matthias, *America's Strategic Blunders: Intelligence Analysis and National Security Policy, 1936–1991* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003).
71. 'Talk to IAC', A. J. P. Crick Papers, LHCMA, King's College London. There is no date for the speech, but given its contents it would probably have been 1955. It would seem likely that the speaker was Major General Kenneth Strong, the Director of the JIB and close wartime ally of General Walter Bedell Smith.

