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# IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT FOR U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

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## HEARING CONTENTS:

### MEMBER STATEMENTS:

**Sen. Bob Corker (R-TN)** [\[view pdf\]](#)  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations

**Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD)** *[no pdf available, see 17:52 of [webcast](#)]*  
Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign Relations

### WITNESSES:

**Hon. James Jeffrey** [\[view pdf\]](#)  
Philip Solondz Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy

**Hon. Martin Indyk** [\[view pdf\]](#)  
Executive Vice President, The Brookings Institution

### AVAILABLE WEBCAST(S):

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**United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations****Hearing: Implications Of The Iran Nuclear Agreement For U.S. Policy In The Middle East****June 3, 2015****U.S. Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), Chairman  
Opening Statement**

This hearing is the part of a series of events we are holding this month to prepare members of the committee to evaluate a possible nuclear agreement with Iran.

We are not here today to focus on the specific parameter. Just for edification, last night we met in a classified setting with three of our leaders from our labs from around the country and our secretary of energy, and it was a very technically focused briefing. As a matter of fact, we had tremendous attendance. People were most interested in many of the technical details of the deal. The rest of the month we'll have similar hearings so people are prepared as of June 30, if an agreement is reached, to really be able to assess that and not be starting from cold, if you will.

We appreciate you being here today to help us understand some of the grand regional implications of a deal.

This is intended to highlight some of the concerns that the administration is so focused on reaching an agreement with Iran that some of the U.S. interests and concerns of our regional alliances are not really being looked at or examined.

Against a backdrop of unprecedented turmoil in the Middle East, the administration is negotiating a nuclear agreement with the arch rival of many of our closest allies.

Instead of reassuring our traditional allies that the United States will remain a friend, some would say that the administration has implemented a string of incoherent and self-defeating policies. I know you all will discuss those back and forth.

The administration has threatened to revoke support for Israel at the U.N. while accommodating a nation that is dedicated to the destruction of Israel.

They have rebuked the Emirates for striking ISIS in Libya while asking them to strike ISIS in Syria.

They have withheld military equipment from Egypt, Bahrain, and Qatar while asking them to join in the fight against ISIS.

They have criticized Saudi Arabia for acting in Yemen while providing the Saudis military assistance for the same operation. So, there are a lot of cross-currents here that are difficult for us to string together.

In Iraq, Iraqi leaders are increasingly turning to Iranian-backed militias in the fight against ISIS.

And perhaps most tragically, in Syria, thousands of Syrians continue to die at the hands of Assad and his Iranian backers while the administration implements a strategy consisting of the ineffective use of military force, to be used only against ISIS itself. I think you may have seen a communique came from one of the leaders of the Syrian opposition where they were asked to sign a statement saying that they're being trained and equipped by the United States, but they can only use that potential against ISIS and not against Assad. I know they sent out a communication that they were going to stop the communication and not participate. I understand sometimes that that's a negotiating point, but certainly somewhat alarming.

As Iran deepens its influence in capitals from Baghdad to Damascus to Beirut and Sana'a, the perspective of many in the region is that the United States is Assad's air force in Syria and Iran's air force in Iraq. I will say, I was in Iraq recently and it really did feel like, while I support what we're doing with the 3,100 personnel we have there, it really felt like what we were doing is helping create a better country for Iran in Iraq. Even though, again, I support what is happening there, it feels very much that way with their infiltration into the parliament and their tremendous efforts on the ground.

As we begin to look at how to evaluate a prospective nuclear agreement, we cannot ignore that the lack of coherent American leadership in the region has left a vacuum that will continue to be filled by violence.

Without defined, committed engagement to counter Iranian regional aggression and to support our partners, the need for American involvement will continue to grow as conditions deteriorate.

In your testimony today, I hope you will touch on what I see as some of the puzzling claims from the administration about what an agreement with Iran would mean for the region.

One of those claims is the apparent view of this administration that Iran will become a stabilizing force in the region.

President Obama said in a recent NPR interview that opening up Iran's economy through sanctions relief "in many ways makes it harder for them to engage in behaviors that are contrary to international norms." I know that, again, many of our allies are concerned that, in accessing \$150 billion potentially overtime and having a growing economy will have just the opposite effect and cause them to be even more strident in the region. Do you accept the view that the world's leading sponsor of terrorism, a nation that has directly contributed to the deaths of thousands of Americans would somehow reform their behavior after being enriched and empowered for pursuing an illegal nuclear program?

And finally, I hope you will touch on what the administration portrays as a choice between war and a deal. I think that's a false choice, and I look forward to your testimony today.

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## Implications of the Iran Nuclear Agreement for U.S. Policy in the Middle East

Ambassador James F. Jeffrey  
Philip Solondz Distinguished Visiting Fellow,  
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Testimony submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
June 3, 2015

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Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, it is an honor to be here today.

The question of Iran, in the related contexts of a possible nuclear agreement with it, and its worrisome role in the region, is one of the most important in Middle East affairs. But it is not the only one, as the region is shaken by crises, threats to stability, popular unrest, and ideological and theological turbulence not seen since the end of the Ottoman Empire. All these developments are linked. Separately, and even more together, they threaten American core national interests laid out by President Obama in September 2013: supporting our allies and partners, protecting the free flow of hydrocarbons to the world's economy, and combating terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The action of the U.S. Congress in passing the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act is an important step in coping with these threats, ensuring that the American people will have a say in developments affecting their security.

As we do not know at this point what an eventual nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran will look like, it is not possible to make any detailed judgment on the final package. If we arrive at that point, an agreement will have to be judged based on its specifics on issues such as verification, disposition of unauthorized enriched uranium, and sanctions status, to ensure a long-term check on Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions and possible covert programs. Furthermore, in reviewing any nuclear agreement with Iran, I urge the U.S. Congress to consider the following:

First, the agreement cannot be considered outside the context of Iran's record of destabilization in the region. Two Middle Eastern states either have acknowledged, or are widely believed to have, possession of nuclear weapons. But the region's leaders do not lose sleep over these weapons, nor does the UN Security Council pass multiple Chapter VII resolutions about them, as with Iran. The reason is that Iran's behavior in the region is profoundly troubling to many states. Either an Iranian nuclear weapons capability, or an Iran politically empowered by an agreement that stops it just short of such a capability, would pose extraordinary new threats to a region already under stress, and undermine the above U.S. vital interests.

Second, in reviewing Iran's behavior in the region, we all must bear in mind that Iran is not a status quo power. As my two Washington Institute colleagues, Mehdi Khalaji and Soner Cagaptay, and I [wrote in the \*New York Times\* April 26](#), "Iran is a revolutionary power with hegemonic aspirations. In other words, it is a country

seeking to assert its dominance in the region and it will not play by the rules...Iran, however, has brazenly defied (the) international order and continues to expand its reach." In short, we concluded, "Do not expect Iran to compromise its principles any time soon." Any decision on the Iran nuclear deal must bear this sobering fact in mind, and must not read Iranian willingness to sign an agreement as a change of heart about its ultimate hegemonic goals.

Third, in particular given Iran's role in the region, no nuclear agreement is better than one that might push back by some months Iran's ability to break out to a weapons capability, if such an agreement were to undercut the current huge international coalition against an Iranian nuclear weapon, enhance Iran's prestige, and undermine the credibility of U.S. containment both of Iran's nuclear ambitions and its wider regional agenda.

Fourth, the administration's argument that there is no alternative to approving an agreement is incorrect, and tantamount to advocating an "any agreement is better than none" position. It is not beyond the skill of U.S. diplomacy, were Iran to walk away from the deal struck in early April, to persuade other countries to keep the current oil and other international sanctions in place. Additional international sanctions would however be difficult to impose in all but an egregious case of Iranian provocation, but retaining the current sanctions would be a heavy price for Iran to bear. If the United States did not, but Iran did, accept a final deal similar to that laid out in the White House April 2 paper, increasing or even maintaining the current international oil import sanctions under the NDAA and the EU's separate boycott would be most difficult. That does not rule out the U.S. opting out of an agreement, but in that case the tools to pressure Iran would be more limited. The U.S. would still have its direct sanctions, UN sanctions (as lifting them is subject to U.S. veto), banking and commercial pressure points, and perhaps some residual third country limits on importing of Iranian oil. Between these two variants -- Iran refusing anything like the April outline, or the U.S. not accepting it -- there are various scenarios, each with more or less difficulty in maintaining sanctions and other international pressure on Iran.

With or without the support of the international community, however, if there is no agreement, then the main restraint on Iranian breakout would have to be U.S. and partner intelligence collection and U.S. readiness, understood by all, to use force if Iran approaches a nuclear weapons capability. While that is stated U.S. policy, albeit expressed indirectly such as "preserve all options," the president has effectively undercut this policy by repeated warnings about inevitable "war" if no agreement is reached. Without an agreement a military confrontation would be more likely, but not inevitable. Of course, a military confrontation with Iran could be costly and risk escalation, but, absent spectacularly bad U.S. decisions, it is unlikely to produce either a U.S. defeat or a "war" in the sense normally used in American political debate -- endless, bloody ground combat by hundreds of thousands of troops as in Iraq or Vietnam. Based on my experience I know how uncertain any resort to force is, but all our security interests are ultimately anchored on willingness to use force, and success doing so.

Fifth, even with an agreement, the ultimate restraint on Iran reaching a nuclear weapons capability resides as well in the capability and intent of the U.S. to stop Iran militarily from reaching a nuclear weapons capability. Thus, the U.S. Congress could usefully support such a deterrence policy by passing in one or another form an advance authorization for the use of military force against an Iran in breakout. The administration for its part should make clear what its redline is for military action against Iran -- what Iranian steps or situation would be considered a "threshold" requiring the U.S. to act on its "prevent a nuclear-armed Iran" policy. Clarity on congressional and thus American public support for military action, and clarity on when that action would be taken, would go far to refurbish American deterrence and make it less likely that we would be tested.

Sixth, in the end, everything related to Iran revolves around its role in the region. If a nuclear accord leads to a new Iran, willing to accept the regional status quo, that is all for the better, however unlikely. But until such an outcome is clear, the U.S. should not bet on it occurring, and in particular should not pull its punches in restraining Iran out of concern that a U.S. response could stymie an alleged budding moderation. Those who hope for such an Iranian change of heart should consider Iran's threat to Israel via weapons to Hezbollah and Hamas, its actions in Iraq, and the attempt by senior Iranian intelligence officials to bomb the Cafe Milano here in Washington.

While the president's Camp David initiative sought to allay the fears of regional states that an Iran "empowered" by the prestige of a nuclear agreement (and eventually over one hundred billion dollars of returned frozen funds) would continue to make mischief, skepticism is called for. The administration's focus at Camp David and in most exchanges with our regional allies is centered on our commitment to their conventional defense, and our assistance to their military forces. But they fear far less an outright Iranian invasion than Iranian infiltration of the weak areas in the Arab world, promoting instability and stresses on the Sunni nation states of the region in a religious, political, and psychological sense. As we wrote in [our \*New York Times\* piece](#), Iran "uses an assortment of terrorism, proliferation, military proxies, and occasionally old-fashioned diplomacy to further its dominance."

What these states need is a commitment by the U.S., backed at this point by action, that Washington will use all the tools in its arsenal, including military, to combat and drive back illicit Iranian efforts to infiltrate and undermine Arab states throughout the region. This includes pushing back on Iran's actions in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Gaza. Supporting the Saudi-led coalition operating in Yemen, threatening to inspect Iranian ships allegedly bringing humanitarian supplies to Yemen, agreeing with the Turks on preliminary plans to train 5,000 Syrian personnel in Turkey, and other recent steps are examples of what the U.S. must be ready to routinely do to regain regional partners' confidence.

In sum, any agreement should be judged not only on the basis of its verifiable, real restraints on Iran, but also by the context within which the agreement would operate: readiness to back it by far more explicit and credible readiness to use force to stop a breakout, and a far more active U.S. program to contain Iran's asymmetrical military, ideological, religious, economic, and diplomatic moves to expand its influence in the region.

**Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee**  
**Hearing on**  
**U.S. Policy in the Middle East after a Nuclear Deal with Iran**

June 3, 2015

by

Martin Indyk

Executive Vice President, the Brookings Institution

In the coming months, Congress is likely to have to make a choice: either to endorse an agreement that removes sanctions on Iran but should ensure that it remains nuclear weapons-free for at least ten-to-fifteen years; or to reject the agreement, which would leave Iran three months from a nuclear weapon under eroding sanctions. In making that choice, Congress will need to take account, among other things, of the regional implications of the deal and what would need to be done to ameliorate the negative fallout. That is what I have endeavored to address in this written testimony.

In the end, each Senator will have to make a judgement based on the credibility of the deal itself and on its likely implications for American interests in the Middle East and for the broader global issues that will be impacted. In my view, if the arrangements currently being negotiated for inspection and monitoring, together with the mechanism for the “snap-back” of sanctions, are robust enough to deter and detect Iranian cheating, the deal will be worth upholding. In other words, the likely regional implications of the deal are not sufficiently negative to justify opposing it. Indeed, given the state of turmoil engulfing the Middle East, ensuring a nuclear weapons-free Iran for at least a decade will help remove a primary source of tension and may foster greater cohesion in dealing with the other sources of conflict and instability there.

The completion of the Iran nuclear deal and its endorsement by the Congress would represent a major development for U.S.-Iranian relations and would likely have profound ripple effects across the troubled Middle East region. It will impact the security of our allies from

Egypt, to Israel, Jordan, the Gulf Arab states, and Turkey at a time of heightened insecurity because of the collapse of state institutions and the rise of jihadist forces on all their borders. It might trigger a regional nuclear arms race or a preemptive Israeli strike. And it could give a turbo-boost to Iran's conventional military capabilities and its destabilizing activities in the region.

If these potential consequences are so great, why haven't they been addressed in the nuclear deal itself? There are good reasons. The Iranians were keen to include regional issues in the negotiations because they believed it would be advantageous to them to offer the United States a "grand bargain," exchanging regional cooperation in Syria and Iraq, for example, in return for lowering American requirements for curbs on their nuclear program. The American negotiators wisely rejected this attempt at linkage. In addition, our Gulf Arab allies feared that their regional interests would be sacrificed on the altar of a U.S.-Iran nuclear deal and insisted that the United States had no business discussing regional issues with their strategic adversary when they were not represented in the negotiations. Consequently, there is nothing in the agreement itself that constrains Iran's regional behavior. But by the same token there is nothing in the agreement that constrains the United States and its regional allies from taking steps to contain and roll-back Iran's hegemonic regional ambitions and counter its nefarious activities there. Ten-to-fifteen years of an Iran under intense scrutiny and constrained from acquiring nuclear weapons provides a significant breathing space for its regional opponents, backed by the United States, to build an effective counterweight.

Will our regional allies choose to use that time to build their own nuclear programs, thereby fueling a nuclear arms race that the agreement with Iran was supposed to prevent? To be sure, Prince Turki al-Faisal, the former Saudi Ambassador to Washington and former intelligence chief, has declared, "Whatever comes out of these talks, we will want the same." But it seems unlikely that Saudi Arabia will actually embark on building an enrichment capability, one that would require them to establish or acquire a significant scientific establishment that they currently lack. For thirty years, while Iran developed its ambitious nuclear program unconstrained, its Saudi arch-rival did not feel any need to do the same. Why would it do so now when serious constraints will be placed on Iran's nuclear program?

Moreover, “wanting the same” actually means that Saudi Arabia – and any other regional state that seeks to match Iran’s capabilities – would have to accept the same intrusive inspections and monitoring that the Iranians are in the process of accepting. Some suggest that Saudi Arabia would simply acquire a bomb off the Pakistani shelf. But if this option is a real one – and Pakistan’s refusal to join Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen raises significant doubts – it has existed for decades and does not in itself fuel a nuclear arms race as long as the bomb stays on the Pakistani shelf.

While Egypt is building a nuclear power plant and Jordan is talking about establishing an enrichment capacity, they are both signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and will have to submit to the NPT’s Additional Protocol of intrusive inspections that Iran has accepted if they are to get the nuclear cooperation they will need. The UAE has signed the 123 agreement, which prevents it from ever acquiring enrichment capacity and requires it to sign the Additional Protocol. In any case, these countries have made clear in their statements and behavior that they are far more concerned by Iran’s unconstrained efforts to promote sectarian strife in their neighborhoods than they are about what will become a heavily constrained Iranian nuclear program.

Meanwhile Turkey, as a NATO ally, already enjoys the cover of an American nuclear umbrella under Article Five of the Treaty and therefore has little reason to head down the costly nuclear weapons road itself.

What about Israel? Its leadership is alarmed by the deal-in-the-making; Prime Minister Netanyahu has declared that it represents an existential threat to the Jewish state. Certainly, Israel has good reason to be concerned about the intentions of the Iranian regime since its leaders declare at regular intervals that their objective is to wipe Israel off the map. Israel’s leaders have the duty to take those threats seriously and they have invested a vast fortune, with the considerable assistance of the United States, in ensuring that Israel’s Defense Forces have the ability to deter Iran or, if necessary, preempt it from acquiring nuclear weapons. But since this agreement will turn back the clock on Iran’s nuclear program, placing it at least one year away from a breakout capability for the next ten-to-fifteen years, Israel has no reason to preempt for the time being. If it did, it could only hope to set back Iran’s nuclear program by some two years – far less than provided for in the nuclear deal. And it would in the process free Iran of all its

obligations under the agreement and earn Israel the opprobrium of the other powers that support the deal.

Israel's concern is greatest when it comes to what happens at the end of the fifteen-year period when Iran will have a full-fledged nuclear program rendered legitimate by its compliance with this agreement and therefore not subject to sanctions. But we will also by then have much greater visibility into Iran's nuclear program, much greater ability to detect any attempt to switch from a civil to a military nuclear program, and an American president will have all the current military capabilities and much more by then to deal with an Iranian breakout should they attempt one. Indeed, time is not neutral in this situation. The United States, Israel and Iran's Arab adversaries can do much during this long interval both to encourage Iran to abandon its destabilizing and threatening regional activities, and to contain and deter it if it refuses to do so.

Taking up that challenge will be essential because of the potential impact of sanctions-relief on Iran's regional behavior. Once sanctions are removed, Iran will be the beneficiary of the unfreezing of some \$120 billion of assets; its oil revenues are likely to increase by some \$20-24 billion annually. It is reasonable to assume that a good part of that windfall will be used to rehabilitate Iran's struggling economy and fulfill the expectations of Iran's people for a better life. But it is an equally safe bet that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS), and the Iranian Armed Forces will be beneficiaries too. It's true that punishing sanctions have not prevented these extensions of the Iranian revolution from exploiting the upheavals in the region and the collapse of state institutions to build positions of considerable influence across the Sunni Arab world from Lebanon to Syria to Iraq and now Yemen. Nevertheless, Iran's hegemonic ambitions are likely to be boosted by the availability of more resources. For example, the Assad regime in Syria is struggling to survive economically at the same time as it is losing control of more territory to opposition forces; a timely infusion of cash and arms might help it cling to power. Similarly, Iraq's Shia militias, which are armed and trained by Iran, could be boosted at a time when the United States is struggling under Iraqi government constraints to arm and train Sunni militias and Kurdish forces.

Iran will also have money to procure weapons systems for its armed forces, using the extensive Western arms sales to its Arab adversaries as justification. Iran will still be subject to curbs on its ability to acquire some types of sophisticated military equipment, but with money to

spend it will probably find a way around those sanctions. Russia's high profile announcement that it would proceed with the sale of S-300 long-range surface-to-air missile systems, even before the nuclear deal is signed, represents the harbinger of future sales of sophisticated weapons. Indeed, rather than focusing on a nuclear arms race in the region, we should be more concerned about a conventional arms race.

The nuclear agreement with Iran was never intended to deal with these likely consequences of the sanctions-relief that is the quid-pro-quo for Iran's acceptance of meaningful and extensive curbs on its nuclear program. That puts a particular burden on the United States to develop a regional security strategy to complement the nuclear deal, one that is designed to counter and neutralize these unintended consequences. In doing so, the United States will need to send a clear and consistent message to Iran that if it chooses to abandon its nefarious regional activities and become a responsible partner to the United States and its allies, it will be welcomed into the community of nations in good standing. But if it decides to take advantage of its newly available resources to wreak further regional havoc, the United States will lead a concerted effort to oppose it.

President Obama has already taken the first step in this effort through the Camp David summit he hosted with our Gulf Arab allies last month. That was an important first step in providing them with the necessary strategic reassurance in the face of the uncertain consequences of the nuclear deal on Iran's behavior in their neighborhood. In the joint communiqué, the President reiterated a U.S. "unequivocal" commitment to "deter and confront external aggression against our allies and partners in the Gulf." The two sides also agreed on a new strategic partnership that would "fast-track" arms transfers, enhance cooperation on counter-terrorism, maritime security, cybersecurity, and ballistic missile defense, and develop rapid response capabilities to regional threats. The communiqué and its annex provide all the understandings necessary for laying the foundations of an effective regional security architecture. However, those words will need to be translated into concrete actions at a time when the regional turmoil is generating competing priorities and interests. The GCC states are not united in their approach to the region's problems and they will continue to fear an American-Iranian rapprochement at their expense no matter how reassuring the President's words. Nevertheless, the combination of the nuclear deal, a potentially more potent Iranian adversary, and rising

instability on their borders, should concentrate their minds and therefore could create the necessary conditions for an effective strategic partnership with the United States that was called forth at Camp David. If they are willing to get their acts together, we should certainly be willing to respond with a determined effort.

Providing strategic reassurance to our Gulf Arab allies is but the first step. The United States will also need to build more effective strategic partnerships with Israel, Egypt, and Turkey, our other traditional regional allies who wield much greater capabilities and influence than most of the GCC states. For a variety of justifiable reasons, the Obama Administration is at loggerheads with each one of these regional powers: with the government of Israel because of its unwillingness seriously to pursue the two state solution or freeze settlement activity; with the Egyptian regime because of the treatment of its own people; and with the Turkish president because of his unwillingness to cooperate with the United States against ISIS. But at this sensitive moment, reassuring each one of them is essential if they are to be enlisted in the effort to lay the groundwork for a regional security framework that begins to reestablish order in this troubled region and prevents Iran from further exploitation of the chaos.

Just having the conversation with Prime Minister Netanyahu is proving exceedingly difficult since he is so determined to scuttle the Iran nuclear deal that he does not want to give any hint that he might be prepared to compromise on his opposition for the sake of strategic reassurances from the United States. Nevertheless, if the deal goes through, it will be important for the United States in the immediate aftermath to take a series of steps to strengthen Israel's ability to defend itself from, and therefore deter, any potential Iranian nuclear threat. Such measures could include completing the negotiations on a new 10-year agreement to provide military assistance to Israel at an increased level (this is something that Congress could initiate in coordination with the Administration). The funding could be used to cover the purchase of additional F-35s and the development and deployment of the full array of air defense systems from Iron Dome to Arrow III to protect Israeli civilians from Hezbollah and Hamas rockets all the way up to Iranian ballistic missiles. Additional funding could also be used to strengthen Israel's deterrent capabilities, including the purchase of additional submarines.

Finally, to take care of the likely increasing nervousness among our regional allies as the nuclear agreement approaches its expiration date ten-to-fifteen years from now, the United States

needs to begin to lay the groundwork for establishing a nuclear umbrella over all of them. This form of extended deterrence will be an important element in an American-sponsored regional security framework. Neither Israel nor our GCC allies are prepared to consider that at the moment, nor is it likely that Congress would approve such a commitment for any regional ally in the Middle East except Israel (ironically, Turkey already has such a commitment through NATO). But if the policy of strategic reassurance is pursued consistently by this president and his successors, it is possible that all sides may come to see the virtue of a nuclear and conventional security guarantee that will effectively deter Iran, render an Israeli preemptive strike unnecessary, and remove any incentive for the Arab states to pursue their own nuclear weapons programs.

Mr. Chairman, a credible nuclear agreement will provide an extended breathing space for the United States and our regional allies free from the threat of a nuclear Iran that should last beyond the next administration and probably the one after that. It will nevertheless raise many concerns in the Middle East about Iran's destabilizing behavior and hegemonic ambitions that the United States cannot address in the agreement itself but will have to address outside the agreement. In my view, that is not a justification for opposing the agreement. It is rather a reason for complementing the agreement with a robust effort to promote a regional security strategy that takes advantage of the respite to begin to rebuild a more stable order in this chaotic but still vital region.