A Look at Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) 10 Years After Katrina
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US Navy Chief Aviation Warfare Systems Operator Scott Pierce, a search and rescue swimmer assigned to the “Emerald Knights” of Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Seven Five (HS-75), looks out from the cabin of an SH-60 Seahawk helicopter at the flooded New Orleans streets caused by Hurricane Katrina on September 7, 2005. (Photo by PH3 Class Kristopher Wilson, USN)
Over the past two years it has been my pleasure to serve as the Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSA) Deputy and Director. As I prepare for my next assignment, I thank all the Services for providing the most current lessons learned and expertise to ensure our products are relevant and useful. Thanks to your continued support, ALSA has provided timely and compelling tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to meet the immediate needs of the Warfighter for over 40 years.

Defense of the United States (US) homeland is our primary mission. We hope this takes place far from our shores. At times, this defense starts right here, at home, and is not always against a human enemy. Occasionally, nature, itself, can be our adversary. This Air Land Sea Bulletin (ALSB) addresses our responses to natural disasters.

The theme of this ALSB is “A Look at Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) 10 Years After Katrina”. Much of the early DSCA TTP was based on lessons learned from the responses to Hurricane Katrina. ALSA produced the multi-Service TTP for DSCA in response to the Service doctrine gaps identified during the Katrina response. Ten years removed from the most costly natural disaster in US history, the DSCA Enterprise provides clear national guidance and directs deliberate planning and interagency coordination for domestic disaster response. This ALSB focuses on new developments in DSCA command and control (C2) structures, multi-Service training, and current DSCA operations.

The first article is a look back at lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. Using an excerpt from an article submitted in 2005 by Lt Col Jim Zietlow (USAF) and Mr. Tim Sutleif, ALSA presents the major recommendations and actions taken by United States Northern Command, the National Guard Bureau, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The lessons applied from this article make up the framework for the current DSCA Enterprise.

The second article, “The Coin of the Realm”, by LTC Michael A. Ladd (USA), emphasizes the importance of collective exercises in the DSCA Enterprise. It stresses the impacts of realistic training on readiness and the Defense Department’s ability to respond to domestic events.

The third article, “A Proposal for Title 10 Command and Control for Complex Catastrophes,” by retired Lt Col Gary R. Hanson (USAF), recommends a permanent joint task force DSCA headquarters. This article proposes a new, clear, and flexible C2 construct that defines a dual status commander’s role during multi-state catastrophes.

The fourth article, “Improving Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Defense Support to Civil Law Enforcement Authorities through Interoperability Training”, by retired LCDR Ken Martin (USN), uses the backdrop of Raven’s Challenge 2014 to present the benefits and possibilities of realistic EOD DSCA training.

The fifth article, “Naval Services and Maritime DSCA are Operationally Relevant and Ready”, by Mr. Rich DeForest and Maj Scott Welborne (USMC), discusses the significant capabilities the US Navy and Marine Corps provide during DSCA operations. It highlights the ongoing maritime DSCA stakeholder planning and coordination to increase responsiveness and preparedness.

The sixth article, “Developing Future Incident Commanders and Defense Coordinating Officers”, by COL Paul Olsen (USA), discusses his three tenets of developing effective DSCA leaders by highlighting lessons learned during 25 years of disaster relief operations.

As we continue to tackle the challenges ahead, your participation in joint working groups matters now more than ever. I encourage you to seize opportunities to represent your Service and share your ideas in future ALSBs. Your perspective can spark innovation. Go to http://www.alsa.mil and be part of the solution.

Thank you for reading and I wish you all the best in your endeavors.

John L. Smith, Colonel, USA
Director
Although it was a heroic effort by all involved, there is room to improve effectiveness and efficiency by further integrating operations.

More than 1,800 people died and $108 billion worth of property was lost 10 years ago when Hurricane Katrina devastated the United States (US) gulf coast. In response to doctrine gaps and best practices identified during the 2005 storm recovery efforts, the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center developed the multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures for defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) and released the “Homeland Defense” Air Land Sea Bulletin (ALSB) in 2006.

The following is an excerpt from an ALSB article titled, “Improved Search and Rescue Operations for the Hurricane Season”, co-authored by Lt Col Jim Zietlow (United States Air Force) and Mr. Tim Sutleif. Although the article was based on search and rescue (SAR) lessons learned, it describes the major actions of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the National Guard Bureau (NGB), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) during disaster relief operations. Additionally, the US Senate’s recommendations and USNORTHCOM’s actions reviewed in the article have shaped DSCA command and control, planning, training, and doctrine.

Everyone remembers helicopters over New Orleans last September conducting SAR in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Just like 9/11, we have these images firmly ingrained in our minds as US Coast Guard (USCG), National Guard, and USNORTHCOM assigned helicopters accomplished the largest response to a natural disaster in American history. Although it was a heroic effort by all involved, there is room to improve effectiveness and efficiency by further integrating operations.
USNORTHCOM, NGB, and the Mass Rescue Working Group (MRWG) (under the National SAR Committee) wasted no time gathering lessons learned and recommendations for implementation for this year’s [2006’s] hurricane season. After-action review meetings were held in October 2005 at USNORTHCOM and in November 2005 at the NGB, National Guard Aviation Conference, USCG, and MRWG.

In February 2006, the White House and Congress released after-action reports (AARs) on the response to Hurricane Katrina. USNORTHCOM was already well ahead in planning and coordinating pre-scripted mission assignments for [Department of Defense] DOD resource requirements to support FEMA this hurricane season. Based upon these AARs, lessons learned, and recommendations, USNORTHCOM took the initiative to hold a key interagency catastrophic conference to integrate operational planning.

THE USNORTHCOM TEAM

The USNORTHCOM planning team sent to support FEMA-led planning in Baton Rouge, Louisiana consisted of the core cross-sectional joint plans team from the Standing Joint Force Headquarters-North (SJFHQ-N) at Headquarters (HQ), USNORTHCOM. Assisting the SJFHQ-N core planners were United States Transportation Command USTRANSCOM, joint regional medical, and USNORTHCOM component planners from Army North (ARNORTH) and Air Force North AFNORTH.

PARTNERSHIP

The Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF); Louisiana National Guard (LANG); New Orleans, Louisiana police, fire, emergency medical services; and Emergency Support Function 9 were key in SAR planning and working integrated SAR solutions at the state and local levels.

The USCG played a significant role in SAR planning and developing the SAR standard operating procedures. HQ USCG, USCG District 8, Sector New Orleans, Air Station New Orleans provided many key SAR experts, facilities, and personnel to contribute to the SAR planning.

AFNORTH, USNORTHCOM’s air component, played a key role in developing the Louisiana SAR plan. AFNORTH coordinated with the LDWF (as Louisiana State lead for SAR operations) and LANG to ensure incorporation of airborne command and control (C2) and airspace coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration. Integrated AFNORTH SAR planning with USCG, LDWF and the LANG will likely preclude the challenges of integrated air, maritime, and land rescue observed during the Hurricane Katrina response.

ARNORTH, USNORTHCOM’s Army Component, assisted in planning evacuation and SAR coordination with local and state agencies, including the LANG. Should USNORTHCOM forces be required to execute [missions], ARNORTH is ready to stand up a joint task force to execute operational missions in support of the State of Louisiana. NGB provided key senior planners at the joint field office (JFO), Baton Rouge and provided key planning input concerning SAR operations, forces, and emergency management agreement compact plans.

LESSONS APPLIED

USNORTHCOM is applying the Senate’s Recommendation 15 (Interagency Coordination—DOD and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should improve their coordination) on integrated federal response to incidents from their recent “Report of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, May 2006.” This recommendation includes but is not limited to the following:

1. **Recommendation:** DOD should continue to provide experienced officers to assist DHS officials in incident response.
**Action:** DOD has provided planners to support FEMA for this [2006] hurricane season at the JFO Baton Rouge.

2. **Recommendation:** DOD should streamline its existing, cumbersome process for mission assignments (MAs), particularly as applied in the event of a catastrophe.

**Action:** USNORTHCOM drafted 18 MAs to support FEMA in a hurricane response and Joint Staff J-3 (Operations) has pre-approved 16 of those MAs. Additionally, Louisiana planners have drafted 14 unique MAs to support FEMA, state, and local parishes; these are still being staffed. Four SAR-specific MAs as have been identified.

3. **Recommendation:** Key DOD personnel who may be called to participate in DOD’s response efforts should receive training on the National Response Plan (NRP), the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and the Incident Command System (ICS).

**Action:** SJFHQ personnel are trained in the NRP, NIMS and ICS in order to support civil agencies. SJFHQ-N has hurricane response experience from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

4. **Recommendation:** DOD and DHS should coordinate to expand the presence of DHS officials at USNORTHCOM, and as appropriate to US Pacific Command (PACOM), and integrate DHS officials into USNORTHCOM’s and PACOM’s planning, training, and exercising, and respond to incidents.

**Action:** USNORTHCOM has drafted a DSCA contingency plan, received an approved Standing Execution Order for DSCA, and incorporated a hurricane scenario into Ardent Sentry ’06 (May 06) to be better prepared for this [2006] season.

5. **Recommendation:** DOD and DHS should develop an inventory of assets under DOD’s control that are most likely to be needed in response to a disaster in order to enable expeditious deployment, should they be required.

**Action:** USNORTHCOM, in coordination with DHS, has developed several force packages for future requests for forces including helicopters, SAR-related and communications equipment, and medical gear that can be assigned to USNORTHCOM to support FEMA in coordination with the National Guard operations.

**CHALLENGES**

Work continues on two challenges: C2 and communications. Large-scale and catastrophic planning has ensured C2 and communications architectures are sound. Testing, through interagency exercises, continues to fine tune C2 and communications planning and has resulted in notable progress. Evacuation and SAR planning is way ahead of last year’s [2005’s] actual response. That is good news for Louisiana residents.

**CONCLUSION**

USNORTHCOM and FEMA planners continue to refine and exercise their planning products. They have established a baseline evacuation and SAR plan that should be exported for other states to consider. DOD and DHS have made significant progress in preparedness for this hurricane season. Future incidents will have a more fully integrated and timely response to save lives and care for our citizens. While focused on hurricane incidents, the catastrophic SAR principles can and will be used for other incidents. Tremendous progress has been made in Louisiana and the Interagency All-Hazards Emergency Response SOP can be used as a catastrophic SAR national template.
INTRODUCTION

Collective exercises have always been staples of the military experience—whether that is an Army training and evaluation program, operational readiness exercise, emergency deployment readiness exercise, or any other collection of evaluations that add metrics to readiness. Common sense dictates, we cannot expect to run before we can walk; master a task we have not practiced; and form teams in the assembly area. Nowhere is this dynamic more true or relevant than in the DSCA arena.

DSCA collective exercises are truly the “coin of the realm” because they validate plans, form teams and partnerships, demonstrate proficiency, identify capability gaps and overlaps, and discover opportunities for integration that cross organizational and agency boundaries. Unlike a military unit’s basic warfighting skill set, the DSCA community largely shapes doctrine by using collective exercises with sporadic real-world deployments to prove or disprove a set of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The collective exercise, now more than ever, provides the biggest impact on readiness and ensures we are prepared to respond to a myriad of domestic events.

The critical components of the most successful DSCA exercises include a plausible scenario supported by well-coordinated injections; properly resourced player units and controllers; and a realistic, yet inherently safe, venue. With this foundation, the operational tempo of an exercise is vital in making sure we do not spend valuable resources to “hurry up and wait”. As DSCA exercise planners, we must reinforce those practices that challenge our participants’ tactical skill sets but also encourage an environment of learning with freedom to challenge the accepted paradigm.

We have a responsibility to exercise realistically. Unlike the active component and the business of warfighting (or the National Guard’s federal mission of warfighting), the DSCA enterprise must use the collective exercise to practice plans and, concurrently, act as the laboratory for TTP development to shape emerging doctrine. We must reach across agencies, components, and organizations; vet plans; and train to realistic scenarios. Previously, failure to conduct relevant exercises or demonstrate proficiency in our support missions placed our perceived readiness in question and generated a strong message of accountability.

THE SUPPORT TO CIVILIAN AUTHORITY EXERCISE CONSTRUCT

We must reinforce the fundamentals of DSCA during collective exercises and expand on the support “of” civilian authority role. Rather than performing our specific tasks to our specific standards, we must always keep in mind we are in support—not in command or in control. We need to embrace concepts that assist in integrating the Department of Defense (DOD) into the DSCA workspace rather than create obstacles. For example, by labeling our capabilities in terms of resource type coding (e.g., a Type I, Debris Removal Unit versus an engineer battalion), we put our capability in the vernacular of the supported agency. This prevents the struggle of first educating authorities on the military syntax and increases the chance of “being called forward” to support them. We have to make our capabilities easier to access and understand, whenever possible.
Every event starts and finishes as a local event. At first, this concept seems counterintuitive but once understood, it helps frame the very essence of successful DSCA operations. Local authorities may lack response resources but do not lack familiarity with the area, responsibility to remain in charge, and accountability for all actions. When a DSCA event occurs, barring a complex catastrophic event, the response is a local, county, state, and then federal resources problem. Citizens will look to their mayors, governors, and other elected officials to lead the response effort. Our DSCA task is to enable their efforts when requested and authorized. This is a mantra and must drive our exercise constructs.

During our exercises, as in our actual responses, we must use the correct tool for the task. There are missions the Title 32 DOD forces (National Guard) may be able to accomplish in their Title 32 status the Title 10 (active component) personnel cannot perform. As we form and exercise integrated teams, we should embrace the dual-status command construct, reinforce the adjutant generals as the governors’ senior military leader, and retain the ability to use each agency. This cross component construct and reinforcement of the state leadership are vital to the success of any DSCA mission.

When constructing our DSCA exercise construct, we should introduce operational periods as progress metrics and use National Incident Management System (NIMS) planning to drive our battle rhythm. By embracing the NIMS environment, we can understand better the terms of accomplishing operational period objectives (i.e., a progress report), and then more responsibly adjust our level of support footprint.

As the Global War on Terrorism enters into a new asymmetric, potentially homeland defense phase,
the need to vet, nest, and coordinate response plans is critical. We must ensure our exercises are truly collaborative and collective by identifying best practices and disseminating lessons learned across the community.

**A REGIONAL TRAINING APPROACH**

In recent years, different organizations attempted to establish regional DSCA training sites. There are several state installations and private sites but there is not a centrally funded, single proponent for this activity. The creation of a DSCA regional training site as the DSCA training authority would be a defining step in a deliberate move toward taking the DSCA enterprise to full operational capability. The DSCA regional training site, with full integration of Title 32; Title 10; first responders; and local, state, and federal agencies would offer an opportunity for each to have a doctrine and evaluation stake. This would ensure that best practices are tested, proven, and proliferated to the extended audience. Doctrine and TTP, previously stove piped within an organization, would enjoy maximum dissemination and best practices would shape DSCA doctrine in a more timely and effective manner. The effort to establish DSCA training sites should be reenergized to take the DSCA Enterprise to a sustainable, higher state of readiness.

Using the active component’s National Training Center and joint readiness training center as business models, the establishment of at least four, ideally 10 (one per Federal Emergency Management Agency Region) DSCA regional training sites is vital to success in the DSCA environment.

Pictured is a coordination meeting with regional and Department of Defense urban search and rescue teams during a collective training event at Camp Blanding Joint Training Center, Starke, Florida, 2 October 2014. (Photo by MSG Thomas Kielbasa, USA)
Regional DSCA sites make sense strategically; and the cost savings, regional readiness posture, and overall improvement of our support to civilian authority will be realized quickly. Currently, national level exercises (NLEs) are scheduled years in advance with states standing up planning teams and conducting facilities improvements in preparation for them. The NLEs are planned and conducted with teams that may not reside in the region. Upon completion, the use of a newly developed site, largely, is left as an afterthought from a funding and range utilization perspective. Regional training sites would use those unused resources and continually develop more cost effective, adaptable, and growing DSCA training assets.

DSCA sites, complete with a full complement of DSCA equipment available (e.g., vehicles, decontamination and extraction tool sets), would enable a unit to fly in, draw the equipment, conduct an exercise or evaluation, conduct turn in, and fly back to home station. Federal and state agencies would save money from exercise site construction and unit travel costs. Additionally, the DSCA sites would be the standard venues for DSCA exercise rotations and serve as regional caches for immediate response and reinforcement.

A fully operational DSCA training site would host its region’s evaluation exercises, NLEs, and routine training events. A sustained force flow also presents experts the opportunity for research and development activities and provides a platform to develop TTP based on best practices.

THE FUTURE OF DSCA

During a speech to the Reserve Forces Policy Board, United States Army GEN Frank J. Grass, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, mentioned how impacts of the Budget Control Act will have significant impacts on National Guard readiness, recapitalization, and modernization. Faced with these resource constraints, estab-
lished, DSCA certainties must be considered in planning collective exercises designed to combat a changing and well-resourced threat to the homeland. These certainties include the following.

- We must remain smart on how we utilize our limited resources. Joint, collective exercises should seek to transcend organizational and agency boundaries. This includes training as we fight by understanding our role in support to civilian authority and infuse that into our exercises.

- We must remain agile when forming capability to address emerging threats and hazards. We cannot afford to isolate our efforts toward a single, complex catastrophic event vice the other 99% of events that may require a comprehensive support methodology.

- We must stress collaboration across agencies and components versus competition. We must form partnerships based on strengths and capabilities, always considering fiscal sense. Best practices can come from any source and the likelihood of integrating them based on lessons learned is increased with a multi-agency effort.

- We must vet and nest our plans across organizational boundaries. With the introduction of regional DSCA training sites as conduits for this integration, we can be best postured to provide timely support to civil authorities.

CONCLUSION

The DSCA Enterprise is in a preparation phase of an indeterminate duration. Former Vice President Dick Cheney was asked during a radio interview whether he believes the United States could go another decade without another attack on the homeland. His reply was, “I doubt it”. He qualified his answer with, “I think there will be another attack and next time, I think it’s likely to be far deadlier than the last one”. It takes about five minutes on just about any national news channel to appreciate that the former Vice President’s sentiment may not be far off.

We must ensure we are ready to respond, as a collaborative and integrated team that leverages all of its tools to the task, regardless of Service or organization. The collective DSCA exercise is the most effective way we can accomplish this goal, short of learning very costly lessons through real-world events. Central to that effort should be the creation of regional DSCA training sites, where Title 10, Title 32, local, county, state and federal capabilities find true operational synchronicity. We must be ready when called and we cannot surge teams, relationships, or integration. We must “make ready” now.

Sources


2. GEN Frank J. Grass’s testimony to the Reserve Forces Policy Board, dated 10 Sep 2014.

LTC Mike Ladd is a Florida National Guardsman currently on a Title 10 tour in support of United States Special Operations Command. He holds a Master’s Degree in Environmental Management and is a graduate of the Resident Command and General Staff College. He was the National Guard Bureau’s lead exercise planner for Vigilant Guard 2007 and Florida’s Field Training Exercise Planner for Vigilant Guard 2013. He has commanded a Civil Support Team, a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) enhanced response force package, and the joint task force CBRN in support of the 2012 Republican National Convention.
I propose a durable, clear, and flexible Title 10 C2 construct. This construct centers on a permanent joint task force (JTF)-DSCA headquarters and establishes C2 arrangements with dual-status commanders (DSCs) for a multistate complex catastrophe. These Title 10 C2 arrangements also will work in single- or multistate environments with a mixture of states with and without a DSC. This proposal focuses on Title 10 command relationships among JFCs involved in continental United States (CONUS) DSCA.

**STANDING JTF-DSCA**

United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) should establish a standing JTF-DSCA to command and control Title 10 DSCA forces in the CONUS to set conditions to respond...
As a standing headquarters, JTF-DSCA would have the opportunity to plan, exercise, and coordinate with interorganizational partners in preparation for DSCA operations. DSCA planning prepares the JTF-DSCA headquarters, defense coordinating officers (DCOs), DSCs, state officials, and interagency partners for the Title 10 command structure they can expect for real-world DSCA operations.

During a DSCA response, the JTF-DSCA C2 element would be collocated with the joint field office (JFO) and work closely with the DCO in the request for assistance (RFA) process. The DCO would focus on the primary mission of validating RFAs at the JFO. JTF-DSCA is ideally positioned to have the best understanding of Title 10 force requirements based on the type and quantity of RFAs validated; simultaneously, understanding how allocated forces are being utilized. JTF-DSCA also would be in the best position to understand Title 10 capability shortfalls to generate the necessary global force management request for forces.

When a Title 10 DSCA response is authorized, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) allocates forces to CDRUSNORTHCOM. Under this proposal, CDRUSNORTHCOM would attach necessary forces to CJTF-DCSA to execute the missions identified in the approved RFA. CJTF-DSCA should exercise operational control over attached forces for a DSCA response consistent with the command relationship SecDef specifies when forces are transferred to CDRUSNORTHCOM. When DSCA response forces are attached, CJTF-DSCA organizes and employs forces based on the missions assigned by USNORTHCOM. The objective is for CJTF-DSCA to command Title 10 CONUS DSCA responses, eliminating the need for a DCO to command and control DSCA missions. The advantage of this model is the JTF-DCSA C2 construct adapts to an environment when DSCs are established in response to a multistate complex catastrophe.

DSCS AND TITLE 10 C2

DSCs are commissioned Army National Guard, Air National Guard, or active duty Army or Air Force officers appointed by agreement between a state governor and the President or SecDef to exercise command of state forces and Title 10 federal forces in two distinct chains of command. DSC-led JTFs are the standard C2 arrangement for DSCA operations that involve simultaneous state and Title 10 military responses. Under this proposed C2 construct the DSC reports directly to CDRUSNORTHCOM. It is important that the DSC and CJTF-DSCA report to the same JFC. This allows CDRUSNORTHCOM to designate the DSC as the supported commander and CJTF-DSCA as the supporting commander for DSCA operations.

During a multistate, complex catastrophe, the JTF-DSCA C2 element (collocated with the JFO) is in the best position to understand the scale and scope of resource requests and recommend force allocation to CDRUSNORTHCOM. The DSCs, in
their Title 10 roles, are in a position to advocate for resources directly to CDRUSNORTHCOM. Based on CJTF-DSCA and DSC recommendations, CDRUSNORTHCOM makes Title 10 force allocation decisions with due consideration for the priorities set by the primary agency.\textsuperscript{16} Figure 1 shows the proposed Title 10 C2 structure.

CDRUSNORTHCOM would allocate forces among Title 10 commanders using the following process. CDRUSNORTHCOM attaches Title 10 DSCA response forces to CJTF-DSCA as the first step. A DSC receives tactical control of Title 10 forces from CJTF-DSCA to fulfill RFAs by order of CDRUSNORTHCOM. When a RFA is complete, Title 10 forces are returned to CJTF-DSCA, on the direction of CDRUSNORTHCOM, for reallocation to another mission or the forces are returned to home station (if appropriate).

Some state governors will choose not to establish a DSC during a complex catastrophe. In this case, CJTF-DSCA is positioned to command and control Title 10 DSCA forces utilizing...
For USNORTHCOM, an operational headquarters dedicated to DSCA fills an identified C2 gap for an essential mission.

CJTF-DSCA will have a challenging task in a multistate, complex catastrophe working with JFOs, DCOs, and supporting DSCs while commanding and controlling forces in states where a DSC is not established. Despite these challenges, the authorities of a JFC and the JTF headquarters provide the JTF commander the tools to succeed. For USNORTHCOM, an operational headquarters dedicated to DSCA fills an identified C2 gap for an essential mission.

CONCLUSION

A permanent JTF-DSCA headquarters establishes a Title 10 DSCA C2 structure that is predictable, understandable, and adaptable. This C2 construct incorporates the DSC and establishes procedures to transfer Title 10 forces while creating a structure to command and control Title 10 forces in states where a DSC is not established. This proposal will resolve past confusion over Title 10 DSCA C2 during a multistate, complex catastrophe.

END NOTES

1 JP 3-28, II-1.
2 GAO-13-763, page 21, Table 1.
3 JP 3-28, II-15 to II-16.
4 Ibid., II-12.
5 Ibid., II-11 to II-12.
6 JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011, Appendix H. CJTF-DSCA initiates the request for forces. CDRUSNORTHCOM validates and approves subordinate JFC requests.
7 Ibid., II-11.
8 JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 March 2013, V-11. If SecDef only grants [tactical control] TACON to CDRUSNORTHCOM then TACON is the limit of command and control authority that can be delegated from CDRUSNORTHCOM to CJTF-DSCA.
9 Ibid., II-11.
10 Ibid., II-12.
11 Ibid., II-12.
12 JP 3-28, C-1.
13 Ibid., II-10.
14 JP 1, V-8.
16 JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, 30 July 2012, Appendix E. Command and control structure adopted to account for the dual-status commander. This chart was simplified to focus on the relationships among the joint force commanders in their federal, state, and dual-status chains of command. Services and Service component commands were excluded for brevity. The chart also illustrates the Title 10 or state forces attached to their joint force commanders.
17 Ibid., II-11.
18 Ibid., IV-11.
19 Ibid., IV-10.

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By LCDR Ken Martin, USN, (Retired)

INTRODUCTION

The deadly Boston Marathon attacks in 2013 emphasized the real and present danger of homegrown violent extremists using improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Concerns over terrorist attacks in the United States (US) have been renewed following the rapid successes of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), whose leadership calls for IED attacks in the US.

The ability to respond to IED attacks has improved considerably since 9/11. Public safety bomb squads (PSBSs) have improved capability and capacity in counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) response through growth, training, and equipment. Despite these improvements, the majority of PSBSs remain full-time law enforcement officers with minimal time for training to maintain bomb squad proficiency.

Military EOD personnel gained unprecedented experience against IEDs in large quantities and complexity from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Currently, the US EOD force is extremely well trained, equipped, and experienced to respond to IEDs. The Department of Defense’s role in homeland defense and civil support is codified in policy and doctrine. However, much work needs to be done to formally enable partnerships and schedule training between military EOD and PSBSs. Military EOD’s and PSBSs’ critical contributions to each other through sharing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), lessons learned, and experience remain largely ad hoc and occur at the local level.
Training between military EOD and PSBS enables knowledge sharing and effective response when EOD is called for operational support. Joint training also imparts and preserves many of the hard-learned lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan. Local-level PSBS and EOD leaders recognize the need for interoperability training and have formed partnerships to regularly conduct collaborative training and exercises. Exercises are particularly valuable because they allow leaders to identify doctrinal, training, and equipment issues. For two years, an interoperability training exercise, Raven’s Challenge, was sponsored by the Army and executed and organized by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). Raven’s Challenge directly contributes to EOD and PSBS interoperability and draws attention to gaps and improvements that need to be addressed for domestic-IED operations on land and in maritime environments.

RAVEN’S CHALLENGE

Raven’s Challenge is a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational C-IED exercise. The exercise uses the National Response Framework and National Incident Management System for planning and executing emergency responses to IED events within the structure of the Incident Command System (ICS). At the tactical level, Raven’s Challenge provides a setting for military EOD and PSBS to explore capability areas through realistic, high-intensity scenarios. Units share TTP and lessons learned and forge relationships that enhance interagency operations during an actual IED response at local, regional, or national levels.

Raven’s Challenge 2014 encompassed four regions across the continental US with training areas in the following places.

- Southwest: Arizona National Guard Base Florence, near Phoenix, Arizona.
- Southeast: National Center for Explosive Training and Research, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.
- Northeast: National Capital Region, Washington, DC.

Participants from more than 79 state and local PSBSs and 17 military EOD Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Army and Air National Guard units, representing 12 states and 5 Federal Emergency Management Agency regions, teamed up for the exercise. International military and law enforcement partners also attended, with participants from Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, Mexico, and the Bahamas. Nearly 1,000 EOD, PSBS, intelligence specialists, and explosive detection K-9 handlers, across multiple departments and agencies at the federal, state, and local levels participated.

The planning team designed the training scenarios to observe various capabilities during military EOD support of civilian law enforcement agencies during an interrelated series of domestic IED attacks throughout the US. The exercise objectives were:

- Determine interoperability among EOD, PSBS, ATF, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
- Provide live fire energetic EOD tools collective unit level training.
- Make post-render-safe and post-blast assessments, carry out weapons technical intelligence operations (EOD), and perform bomb forensics.
- Share technical intelligence and information from incident sites through bomb management centers to the FBI’s Strategic Information and Operation Center (SIOC), across first responder networks at the local, state, and federal levels.
- Execute mass transit and critical infrastructure incident response.
• Execute US Navy EOD and PSBS operations in the maritime environment (above and below waterline).

• Perform EOD and PSBS incident response with electronic countermeasures and counter radio controlled IED electronic warfare.

The exercise scenarios were linked across the four geographic regions through IED components, other materials, and evidence found at the scene. The exercise team established Bomb Management Centers (BMCs) at each training site for the first time. The BMC served as the local incident command and control center as well as a conduit to the local, state, regional, and national levels in the absence of a designated incident commander (IC), to whom the BMC would be subordinate during an actual event. The primary function of the BMC is to manage (operationally) response assets for the IC and request additional resources, if needed. During an event large enough to require a BMC, integrating EOD and PSBS and other responders through the BMC allows for efficient operations.

During Raven’s Challenge, EOD and PSBS teams were dispatched from the BMC and reported the details of their responses that included providing materials and evidence. All response information was entered into a web-based portal. Responses that met certain criteria were relayed to the SIOC at FBI headquarters to be integrated at the national level. Personnel from the National Explosives Task Force manned the SIOC, analyzed all information provided by the BMCs in each region, and provided a daily summary to the BMCs to be further disseminated back to each local area. Combined military EOD and PSBS teams responded to a variety of scenarios including vehicle-borne IEDs, post-blast investigations, a buried cache of weapons, a hostage with a collar IED, a mass transit bombing with mass casualties, and an improvised grenade factory.

The positive outcomes of Raven’s Challenge demonstrate when military EOD and PSBS respond together, they quickly work through organizational and TTP differences to integrate effectively. PSBS and military EOD teams who had working relationships prior to the exercise performed at much higher levels of proficiency than those teams that did not. As in Boston, an existing...
working relationship with local authorities led to immediate and seamless integration for military EOD personnel who supported local authorities.

LESSON LEARNED

Interoperability of military EOD and PSBS communications systems remains a problem usually overcome by PSBS radios being issued to military EOD.

Military EOD units respond in tactical armored vehicles unsuitable for domestic civil support and response. For example, the Air Force Base Support emergency response vehicle (BSERV) provides a more functional platform than other military armored vehicles because it blends into the domestic operational environment. The BSERV is similar to a civil, commercial vehicle used by law enforcement and is large enough to hold all required equipment.

The following are other lessons encountered during Raven’s Challenge.

• Military EOD and PSBS units do not possess a lightweight robotics system. This would provide a remote capability in unique EOD operational environments, such as inside a mass transit vehicle and in areas that are inaccessible by response vehicles.

• Military EOD and PSBS require additional advanced homemade explosives proficiency and interoperability training.

• Military EOD and PSBS require additional proficiency and interoperability training in proper evidence and forensic material collection.

• Interoperability training allows PSBS and military EOD the opportunity to see each other’s equipment; understand differences in tactical approaches to problems; identify strengths and weaknesses; and, most importantly, identify capability areas that need further improvement.

CONCLUSION

Lessons learned from the terrorist IED attacks during the Boston Marathon of 2013 indicate prior training and exercises for first responders directly contributed to their highly successful level of response (United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, 2013). The importance of participation in interoperability training is especially true for specialized support to ensure a fluid response during an actual, significant event. Large scale, national-level interoperability exercises, such as Raven’s Challenge, provide military EOD and PSBS an opportunity to train side by side, share TTP, and exchange lessons learned. Additionally, interoperability training helps maintain the proficiency of military EOD and PSBS while building formal partnerships that facilitate essential knowledge transfer and sharing.

Increased resourcing and support of interoperability training exercises for PSBS and military EOD will contribute to an even greater response capability within the US and foster increased interoperability when military EOD supports PSBS and other civil law enforcement authorities.

References

United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs.


Ken Martin is an Associate with R3 Strategic Support Group. He retired from the US Navy in 2013 after more than 23 years of service as an explosive ordnance disposal officer and fleet diver. He holds a Master’s in Terrorist Operations and Finance from the Naval Postgraduate School.
THE NAVAL SERVICES AND MARITIME DSCA ARE OPERATIONALLY RELEVANT AND READY

By Richard DeForest and Maj Scott Welborn, USMC

Every year, American citizens are threatened with the loss of life and property subsequent to natural or manmade disasters. Since 2010, there have been 391 major disasters or emergency declarations. These declarations are in response to the devastation of communities and, at times, the tragic loss of life.

OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

While the United States (US) military remains focused on its primary mission of national defense, the Services also stand ready to support a federal response to domestic emergencies through defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). DSCA leverages Department of Defense (DOD) personnel and equipment to mitigate the effects of natural or manmade disasters pursuant to the request for such assistance from local, state, or federal authorities. DOD coordinates its efforts, as part of the federal response, through the National Response Framework (NRF) and must balance DSCA requests and national defense priorities. Resources are committed when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense after making a risk informed decision.

The majority of federal support to supplement and coordinate local and state efforts does not require DOD support. However, those instances that do are often among the most catastrophic. The majority of American citizens and infrastructure is located on the coasts,
in floodplains, and along earthquake faults. Therefore, the DOD’s ability to respond to crises within the homeland will continue to be an essential part of the NRF.

There are 95,471 miles of US shoreline defined as outer coast, offshore islands, sounds and bays, and the tidal portions of rivers and creeks. In 2010, 123.3 million people, or 39 percent of the nation’s population, lived directly on the shoreline. This population is projected to increase by 9 to 10 million by 2020. The opportunity for a maritime DSCA response is even greater with the inclusion of US territories. The unique amphibious capabilities of the Marine Corps and Navy can be leveraged to provide support to civil authorities over the shore.

MARITIME DSCA

Providing disaster assistance from the sea is not a new role for the Marine Corps or Navy as Marines and Sailors demonstrated during Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy. Maritime DSCA is similar to employing amphibious forces in a foreign humanitarian assistance or disaster relief role with critical legal policy restraints and constraints. These include Posse Comitatus; standing rules for the use of force vice rules of engagement; and a supporting vice leading role in the federal response.

The most likely maritime DSCA response scenario is a hurricane hitting the US eastern seaboard. The Atlantic hurricane season averages 10 named storms per year with 5 to 6 becoming hurricanes, and 2 or 3 of those growing into major hurricanes (category 3 or larger). United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), Marine Corps and Navy Service components, and their Services have refined force requirements, response times, and command relationships in addressing many of the lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy.

The most dangerous maritime DSCA response scenario would be a no-notice west coast or Alaska earthquake. In addition to the well-known San Andreas Fault, there is a number of other fault lines along the US west coast (e.g., the Cascadia Subduction Zone with potential impacts from Northern California to Oregon and Washington). Marine Corps and Navy Service components from USNORTHCOM are engaged in regional contingency planning and exercises associated with facilitating a West Coast response.

A maritime DSCA response is well-suited to support relief operations to isolated islands (e.g., coastal communities in the Pacific Northwest or US territories, such as the US Virgin Islands). Additionally, sea basing presents a primary means to deploy forces, equipment, and relief supplies rapidly to the affected area; particularly, when ground lines of communication are fouled.

CHALLENGES AND MITIGATION

Given the short notice of certain DSCA events, such as hurricanes or earthquakes, a key factor driving a maritime response option will remain the availability of ships, forces, and equipment for tasking that are not otherwise committed or deployed abroad. Given their high operational tempo, there may be limited availability of the amphibious ships most suited to project forces and material over the shore by air or ship to shore connectors. Potential mitigation includes use of sea basing vessels, a maritime pre-positioning ship, mobile landing platforms, large roll-on and roll-off ships, or dry-cargo ammunition ships.

A maritime response takes time to marshal, move, and embark forces to deploy. Coordination is ongoing to refine assumptions as to availability and timelines, and synchronize any parallel planning efforts with regard to a civil support response requirement. Geographic collocation of Marine Corps and Navy forces on the West Coast is not replicated on the East Coast (where Marine Corps operational forces are located in North Carolina and amphibious forces have re-
The goal remains to continue to mature relationships between maritime DSCA stakeholders and to create and refine policies ... that enable a rapid response ...

Marines with the 2nd Marine Logistics Group, II Marine Expeditionary Force in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina worked with Sailors from the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command on Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story in Virginia Beach, Virginia. They conducted a loading exercise in August 2014. During the exercise, Marines and Sailors loaded vehicles and equipment onto large barges for movement and loading aboard the USS Whidbey Island (LSD-41). Afterwards, they reversed the process by taking everything back to shore. The exercise was completed in 72 hours.²

These “dual use” force and equipment capabilities have been identified based on historical demand and Federal Emergency Management Agency emergency support function requirements to facilitate deliberate and crisis action planning. The information contained in the USMC DCSA Executive Order, and other planning guidance, is contained in the USMC DSCA EXORD to facilitate scaling and tailoring the Marine Air Ground Task Force to the mission and available shipping.

REMAINING FLEXIBLE, AGILE, AND READY

Planning and coordination between maritime DSCA stakeholders is ongoing to increase responsiveness and preparedness for potential employment. Routine engagement will continue between the Marine Expeditionary Forces, Navy fleets, and Service representatives on both coasts to include participation in regional planning events with interagency partners. The goal remains to continue to mature relationships between maritime DSCA stakeholders and the various ships are located in Norfolk, Virginia). The pre-identification and staging of equipment, along with rehearsals, mitigates the challenges and increases responsiveness for maritime DSCA.

Unidentified Sailors with Beachmaster Unit 2, Naval Beach Group Two, stationed in Virginia Beach, Virginia, guide Sgt. William Anderson, a motor transportation operator with Transport Support, Combat Logistics Battalion 26, stationed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, onto an Improved Navy Lighterage System during a loading exercise on Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, Virginia 27 August 2014. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Scott McAdam, USMC)
## United States Marine Corps (USMC) and United States Navy (USN) Maritime Capabilities

The dual-use capabilities below align with requirements identified in emergency support functions 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8. Capabilities in both Services may differ in specifics and capacity.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>USMC and USN</th>
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<th>USN</th>
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<tr>
<td>Aerial reconnaissance.</td>
<td>In-theater transport and refueling.</td>
<td>Power generation.</td>
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<td>Medium/heavy lift (internal/external).</td>
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<td>Diving and salvage.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct public affairs.</td>
<td>Expeditionary airfield operations.</td>
<td>Search and rescue (air).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat camera.</td>
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<td>Horizontal construction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ground transportation.</td>
<td>Movement control.</td>
<td>Vertical construction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distribution.</td>
<td>Bridging.</td>
<td>Small boat support.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Explosive ordnance disposal.</td>
<td>Military manpower.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medical treatment.</td>
<td>High-water vehicles for flooded areas.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Route clearance.</td>
<td>Water production.</td>
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</table>
By COL Paul B. Olson, USA

Soon after what seemed to be a lightning-fast win against former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s forces during Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, I felt depressed over the role I played in the campaign. Our efforts were magnificent, but as a young officer, I felt distant from the high-tech victory. As a result, I began to harbor the idea of leaving military service.

My view changed dramatically in 1992, when Hurricane Andrew mercilessly battered southern Florida. The Category 5 hurricane crippled and destroyed much of the infrastructure of the Southern Atlantic coast. I was deployed to Florida as one of thousands of emergency responders, and was immersed in an intoxicating realm of military operations; one where a leader’s physical and mental efforts were directly proportional to one’s impact in the disaster zone. I saw how the power of an effective leader could lift communities from rubble and put them on a path to recovery.

I carried those memories through the next 25 years of my military career, which included continuous conflict in the Middle East and numerous natural disasters in the United States (US). The friction between my experiences and my abilities honed my leadership competence like a knife against a sharpening stone. My opportunities, over the years, culminated in the defense support of civil authorities operations in response to Hurricane Sandy. After ensuring the welfare of my current command, the US Army Corps of Engineers Norfolk District, I headed north to assist in New York District and found a remarkable leader, COL Paul Owen. Seeing his leadership in action begged the question: how does our nation develop leaders like him?

From a senior leadership perspective, I posit success can be attributed to an even mixture of three foundational tenets: leadership op-
opportunities, master-apprentice assignments, and funded graduate school.

The first tenet builds on the availability of opportunities for individuals with the propensity to plan and lead, and organize order from chaos. Disaster response is flush with opportunities for emerging leaders because coordination with key federal, state, and local emergency agencies requires strategic communication and planning. This leadership-in-depth type of situation provides a layered structure that strengthens the efficacy of the entire response network and allows fledgling leaders to see where they fit in the national response effort. If leaders truly are forged in fire, they must be sent to disasters early in their careers and as often as possible, for they will ultimately become our nation’s greatest strategic responders. Additionally, we should avoid placing inexperienced leaders into high-level situations and expect acceptable results. They must be mentored. This leads to my second tenant: forging “master-apprentice” relationships.

We learn to be leaders at lower echelons; however, we also learn to be critical thinkers from leaders at higher echelons. My desire is to ensure young leaders serve in high-echelon supporting positions. In doing so, they would experience what the trades call the master-apprentice relationship.

Assigning junior leaders to at least one high-echelon, or master apprentice, assignment provides opportunities for invaluable engagement experiences, such as those received by Coast Guard Capt Christopher Keane after Hurricane Katrina.

Capt Keane served as the attorney to Admiral Thad Allen, who directed the federal response to this Category 5 hurricane.

“The most amazing [opportunity] was watching Admiral Allen work. He used everyone’s strengths to build a coalition,” Capt Keane said. “As a leader, he was able to get people to see his vision and exercise their authorities to achieve [it]. He made people see that his vision was their vision.”

Captain Keane said serving under Admiral Allen was a turning point in his career.

“As a leader, the hardest things to do are to work with people in a crisis, get a collective vision, and use others’ skill sets to lead that collective vision. I learned that, [although] the solution will seem miles away, it’s important to keep the grand vision in your head, but break it down into pieces people can accomplish to keep them motivated.” he added. (Capt Keane currently is the Commander of Coast Guard Sector Hampton Roads.)

Due to the unpredictability of natural disasters, we must build, aggressively, our strategic responders for tomorrow’s disasters. The depth and breadth of knowledge required to adapt to the unpredictable nature of these disasters leads me to my third foundational tenet: make graduate school the norm, not the exception, for mid-level leaders.

We need not wait for the future to reap the dividends of graduate school because skilled leaders, capable of thinking on their feet, are essential during contemporary responses. A military trains for certainty and educates for uncertainty. Disaster relief successes attributed to military leaders, such as those achieved during Hurricane Sandy, are not merely a result of institutional training, but are direct results of the insight gleaned from advanced academic study.

Ultimately, success in the aftermath of a catastrophe will depend on leadership poised for action. Their action is meted out in direct proportion to the disaster, adheres to doctrine, and comes from experience and training. Tomorrow’s leaders must face disasters we do not yet fully understand. We owe it to them, and our nation, to produce a generation that will bring order to chaos.
## CURRENT ALSA MTTP PUBLICATIONS

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<th>TITLE</th>
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| AIRSPACE CONTROL  
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airspace Control  
Distribution Restricted | 09 APR 15 | FM 3-52.1  
AFTTP 3-2.17 | Description: This MTTP publication is a tactical-level document which synchronizes and integrates airspace C2 functions and serves as a single-source reference for planners and commanders at all levels.  
Status: Current |
| ATCARS  
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Airborne Target Coordination and Attack Radar Systems  
Distribution Restricted | 22 OCT 12 | ATP 3-55.6  
MCRP 2-24A  
NTTP 3-55.13  
AFTTP 3-2.2 | Description: This publication provides procedures for employing ATCARS in dedicated support to the JFC. It describes MTTP for consideration and use during ATCARS planning and employing.  
Status: Revision |
| AVIATION URBAN OPERATIONS  
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations  
Distribution Restricted | 19 APR 13 | ATP 3-06.1  
MCRP 3-35.3A  
NTTP 3-01.04  
AFTTP 3-2.29 | Description: This publication provides MTTP for tactical-level planning and execution of fixed- and rotary-wing aviation urban operations.  
Status: Revision |
| DYNAMIC TARGETING  
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Dynamic Targeting  
Distribution Restricted | 7 MAY 12 | ATP 3-60.1  
MCRP 3-16D  
NTTP 3-60.1  
AFTTP 3-2-3 | Description: This publication provides the JFC, operational staff, and components MTTP to coordinate, de-conflict, synchronize, and prosecute dynamic targets in any AOR. It includes lessons learned, and multinational and other government agency considerations.  
Status: Revision |
| IADS  
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated Air Defense System  
Distribution Restricted | 9 SEP 14 | ATP 3-01.15  
MCRP 3-25E  
NTTP 3-01.18  
AFTTP 3-2.31 | Description: This publication provides joint planners with a consolidated reference on Service air defense systems, processes, and structures to include integration procedures.  
Status: Revision |
| ISR Optimization  
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Optimization  
Distribution Restricted | 14 APR 15 | ATP 3-65.3  
MCRP 3-25.3A  
NTTP 3-01.3  
AFTTP 3-2.29 | Description: This publication provides a comprehensive resource for planning, executing, and assessing surveillance, reconnaissance, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination operations.  
Status: Current |
| JFIRE  
Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower  
Distribution Restricted | 30 NOV 12 | ATP 3-09.32  
MCRP 3-16.6A  
NTTP 3-09.2  
AFTTP 3-2.6 | Description: This is a pocket sized guide of procedures for calls for fire, CAS, and naval gunfire. It provides tactics for joint operations between attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft performing integrated battlefield operations.  
Status: Revision |
| JSEAD  
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses in a Joint Environment  
Classified SECRET | 19 JUL 13 | FM 3-01.4  
MCRP 3-22.2A  
NTTP 3-01.42  
AFTTP 3-2.28 | Description: This publication contributes to Service interoperability by providing the JTF and subordinate commanders, their staffs, and SEAD operators a single reference.  
Status: Revision |
| KILL BOX  
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Employment  
Distribution Restricted | 16 Apr 14 | ATP 3-09.34  
MCRP 3-25H  
NTTP 3-09.2.1  
AFTTP 3-2.59 | Description: This MTTP publication outlines multi-Service kill box planning procedures, coordination requirements, employment methods, and C2 responsibilities.  
Status: Current |
| SCAR  
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance  
Distribution Restricted | 10 JAN 14  
Change 1 incorporated 31 MAR 14 | ATP 3-60.2  
MCRP 3-23C  
NTTP 3-03.4.3  
AFTTP 3-2.72 | Description: This publication provides strike coordination and reconnaissance MTTP to the military Services for conducting air interdiction against targets of opportunity.  
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| SURVIVAL, EVASION, AND RECOVERY  
Multi-Service Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery  
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MCRP 3-02H  
NTTP 3-50.3  
AFTTP 3-2.26 | Description: This is a weather-proof, pocket-sized, quick reference guide of basic information to assist Service members in a survival situation regardless of geographic location.  
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| TAGS  
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System  
Distribution Restricted | 30 JUN 14 | ATP 3-52.2  
NTTP 3-56.2  
AFTTP 3-2.27 | Description: This publication promotes Service awareness regarding the role of airpower in support of the JFC’s campaign plan, increases understanding of the air-ground system, and provides planning considerations for conducting air-ground ops.  
Status: Current |
| UAS  
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems  
Distribution Restricted | 22 JAN 15 | ATP 3-04.15  
MCRP 3-42.1A  
NTTP 3-55.14  
AFTTP 3-2.64 | Description: This publication establishes MTTP for UAS by addressing tactical and operational considerations, system capabilities, payloads, mission planning, logistics, and multi-Service execution.  
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<td>Description: This publication facilitates integrating, synchronizing, planning, and executing MILDEC operations. It is a one-stop reference for service MILDEC planners. Status: Current</td>
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<td>Description: This publication is a single source, descriptive reference guide to ensure effective planning and integration of multi-Service diving operations. It provides combatant command, joint force, joint task force, and operational staffs with a comprehensive resource for planning military diving operations, including considerations for each Service's capabilities, limitations, and employment. Status: Current</td>
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<td>Description: This publication provides commanders and their units guidelines and strategies for operating with UXO threats while minimizing the impact of the threats on friendly operations. Status: Revision</td>
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<td>Description: This publication consolidates Service doctrine, TTP, and lessons-learned from current operations and exercises to maximize the effectiveness of air attacks on enemy surface vessels. Status: Assessment</td>
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<td>Description: This publication describes MTTP for EW reprogramming; the EW reprogramming process, requirements, and procedures for coordinating reprogramming during joint and multi-Service operations, Services' reprogramming processes, organizational points of contact, and reprogramming databases and tools. Status: Current</td>
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<td>14 FEB 14</td>
<td>ATP 3-52.3 MCRP 3-25A NTTP 3-56.3 AFTTP 3-2.23</td>
<td>Description: This is a single source, descriptive reference guide to ensure standard procedures, employment, and Service relationships are used during all phases of ATC operations. It also outlines how to synchronize and integrate JATC capabilities. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACTICAL CHAT Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Internet Tactical Chat in Support of Operations</td>
<td>24 JAN 14</td>
<td>ATP 6-02.73 MCRP 3-40.2B NTTP 6-02.8 AFTTP 3-2.77</td>
<td>Description: This publication provides commanders and their units guidelines to facilitate coordinating and integrating tactical chat when conducting multi-Service and joint force operations. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACTICAL RADIOS Multi-Service Communications Procedures for Tactical Radios in a Joint Environment</td>
<td>26 Nov 13</td>
<td>ATP 6-02.72 MCRP 3-40.3A NTTP 6-02.2 AFTTP 3-2.18</td>
<td>Description: This is a consolidated reference for TTP in employing, configuring, and creating radio nets for voice and data tactical radios. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UHF SATCOM Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Package for Ultra High Frequency Military Satellite Communications</td>
<td>9 AUG 13</td>
<td>ATP 6-02.90 MCRP 3-40.3G NTTP 6-02.9 AFTTP 3-2.53</td>
<td>Description: Operations at the JTF level have demonstrated difficulties in managing a limited number of UHF SATCOM frequencies. This publication documents TTP that will improve efficiency at the planner and user levels. Status: Current</td>
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