

ABERDEEN COMMUNITY CSEPP EXERCISE 2001 (Aberdeen CSEPP EX 01)



APRIL 18, 2001



TEAM LEADER BINDER

Patrick O'Connor

**CHEMICAL STOCKPILE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
PROGRAM (CSEPP)**

**ABERDEEN COMMUNITY CSEPP EXERCISE 2001
(Aberdeen Community CSEPP EX 01)**

April 18, 2001

EXERCISE REPORT

Report Date:

INSTALLATION:

Aberdeen Proving Ground/Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland

RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS:

**Aberdeen Proving Ground/Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland
State of Maryland
Harford County, Maryland
Baltimore County, Maryland
Kent County, Maryland
United States Coast Guard
Near Site Media Center**

APPROVED BY:

Landton Malone
FEMA Exercise Co-Director
FEMA Region III

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Army Exercise Co-Director
SBCCOM CSEPP Office

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**ABERDEEN COMMUNITY CSEPP EXERCISE 2001
(Aberdeen Community CSEPP EX 01)**

EXERCISE REPORT

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**ABERDEEN COMMUNITY CSEPP EXERCISE 2001
(Aberdeen Community CSEPP EX 01)**

EXERCISE REPORT

INTRODUCTION

The Aberdeen Community CSEPP Exercise 2001 (Aberdeen Community CSEPP EX 01) was conducted on April 18, 2001 to demonstrate the emergency response capabilities of the Aberdeen CSEPP Community and to validate correction of findings identified during past CSEPP exercises.

The requirement for conducting Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) exercises was established in the August 1988 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. Army. Exercise design, planning, evaluation, and reporting guidance is contained in the *Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program Exercises* document dated March 19, 1999.

EXERCISE PLAY OVERVIEW

Exercise design and planning for Aberdeen Community CSEPP EX 01 was accomplished for the Army by the Army Exercise Planning Co-Chair and representatives from the Edgewood Chemical Activity (ECA) and the Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG). The FEMA Exercise Planning Co-Chair and representatives from the State of Maryland, the Counties of Harford, Baltimore, and Kent accomplished design and planning for off-post play.

Table 1 summarizes the CSEPP exercise objectives that were demonstrated in the exercise. For off-post play, only specified evaluation elements and Points of Review (PORs) of an objective were selected and agreed-upon for demonstration. The scope and substance of play for the Army and off-post jurisdictions are described in individual Extent of Play Agreements contained in the Exercise Plan.

Table 1. Summary of Aberdeen Community CSEPP EX 01 Objectives

Jurisdiction	Objectives
APG/EA	1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 5.2, 6.1, 6.2, 8.1, 9.1, 9.2, 10.1, 11.1, 12.1, 12.2, 13.1, 13.2, 13.3, 13.4
State of Maryland	1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 5.2, 6.1, 6.2, 9.1
Baltimore County	1.2, 1.3, 2.3, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2, 6.1, 6.2, 9.1, 9.2
Harford County	1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 5.2, 6.1, 6.2, 7.1, 7.2, 9.1, 9.2, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3
Kent County	1.2, 1.3, 2, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 5.2, 6.1, 6.2, 9.1, 9.2, 12.1, 12.2, 14.1, 14.2, 14.3
Coast Guard	4.1, and 5.2
NSMC	9.1

Exercise Scenario

The chemical stockpile at APG consists of the mustard blister agent HD. The agent is stored in ton containers (TC). There are no munitions in the Chemical Agent Storage Yard (CAS Y). Miniature Continuous Air Monitoring Systems (MINICAMs) are located around the perimeter of the CAS Y.

The weather for the two weeks before the exercise date was simulated to have been unseasonably warm with high temperatures in the upper 70's to lower 80's and overnight lows ranging from the upper 50's to the mid 60's.

The simulated weather forecast for April 18 was clear and warm with morning temperatures in the low 70's and highs in the low 80's.

On April 18, at approximately 0630, first entry monitoring (FEM) of the CAS Y was started by personnel from Edgewood Chemical Activity (ECA). FEM was completed by 0730.

After the personnel conducting first entry monitoring left CAS Y, a catastrophic leak occurred in two one-ton containers as a result of a valve failure. MINICAM # 6 and # 7 alarmed at 0842, about 30 minutes after the plug fails. The MINICAMs were actually activated at this point in the exercise. This was the signal for Aberdeen Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ABCDF) personnel to initiate their portion of the exercise play. Bechtel construction workers evacuated the work area and worker accountability procedures were initiated.

There were two simulated injuries included in the scenario design. One Bechtel Corporation worker experienced chest pains. One security guard tripped, fell, and suffered a fractured tibia.

Actors and exercise controllers portrayed other events (including boater reception and screening in Kent County) throughout the exercise.

Community Profile

Benchmark/Capability Review For Aberdeen CSEPP Community

Alert and Notification Systems

Areas to consider, but not limited to, are:

- Initial Alert and Activation
- Protective Action Recommendations and Decision Making
- Public Notification, Instruction, and Emergency Information
- Communications Systems, Facilities, Equipment and Displays

Individual Item Status:

- (C) 15 outdoor warning sirens installed, 14 operational, silent tested daily, live test monthly
- (C) CANTS prompt notification call-down system operational, tested daily
- (C) Harford EOC link to EAS master station and Harford cable TV channel-3 EAS capability
- (C) Harford County uses a variety of communication methods to notify special populations
- (C) APG on-post cable TV channel-3 EAS capability
- (PC) APG non-duty hours procedures in place, but not evaluated during a CSEPP exercise

Community Self Assessment Rating – C

Automated Data Processing

Areas to consider, but not limited to, are:

- Hazard Assessment
- Protective Action Recommendations and Decision Making
- Public Notification, Instruction, and Emergency Information
- Communications Systems, Facilities, Equipment and Displays

Individual Item Status:

- (C) System operational - All EOCs have data transfer capability
- (C) FEMIS installation complete at APG, MEMA, Baltimore, Harford and Kent Counties
- (C) EMIS installed and used by APG, MEMA, Baltimore, Harford and Kent Counties
- (C) Coordinated “Protective Action Decision Matrix”

Community Self Assessment Rating – C

Communications

Areas to consider, but not limited to, are:

- Communications Systems, Facilities, Equipment and Displays

Individual Item Status:

- (C) CANTS prompt notification call-down system operational, tested daily
- (C) Automated telephone ring down systems at MEMA, Baltimore, Harford and Kent Counties
- (C) Harford County school busses operating in the EPZ are equipped with cellular phones
- (C) HF radios and Direct telephone lines between Harford EOC and Schools in EPZ
- (C) NAWAS operational at MEMA, Baltimore, Harford and Kent Counties
- (C) Marine channel-16 available for USCG, APG and DNR marine vessel communication
- (C) Commercial telephone back-up with community procedures published
- (C) APG Fire and Police have radio communication with Harford County Fire and Police

Community Self Assessment Rating – C

Coordinated Plans

This should include cross walking or integrating effective Emergency Operations Plans from the Army installations, all local jurisdictions, the States, and Federal levels:

Individual Item Status:

- (C) CSEPP-specific plans in place at all levels

Community Self Assessment Rating – C

Decontamination

Areas to consider, but not limited to, are:

- Medical Services - Medical Facilities
- Field Response
- Screening, Decontamination, Registration, and Congregate Care of Evacuees

General Status:

- (C) APG - appropriate plans, procedures and equipment
- (C) Baltimore County – appropriate plans, procedures and equipment
- (C) Harford County - appropriate plans, procedures and equipment
- (C) Kent County - appropriate plans, procedures and equipment
- (C) State - appropriate plans, procedures and equipment

Community Self Assessment Rating – C

Emergency Operations Center

Areas to consider, but not limited to, are:

- Command and Control
- Communications Systems, Facilities, Equipment, and Displays
- 24-Hour Operations

Individual Item Status:

- (C) State construction completed 7/99 and fully operational 12/99
- (C) Baltimore renovation completed 1996; fully operational 911 center
- (C) Harford construction completed 6/97; Fire/EMS/911 center occupied 10/97; fully operational 911 center
- (C) Kent new facility completed 1990; fully operational 911 center
- (C) APG new facility completed 1995; fully operational 911 center at fire department
- (C) Communications systems in place to operate 24 hours

Community Self Assessment Rating - C

Exercises

This will be consistent with current exercise policy:

Individual Item Status:

- (C) Last CSEPP Community FME conducted April 12, 2000
- (C) Off-post community participates in APG quarterly CAIRA exercises to test Alert & Notification
- (C) Next CSEPP Community exercise (FME) scheduled for April 18, 2001

Community Self Assessment Rating – C

Personnel

This will address personnel issues:

Individual Item Status:

- (C) Required CSEPP staff in position at State and County level
- (C) Required CSEPP staff in place at APG/ECA

Community Self Assessment Rating – C

Personal Protective Equipment

Areas to consider, but not limited to, are:

- Traffic and Access Control
- Medical Services - First Response
- Medical Services – Transportation
- Medical Services - Medical Facilities
- Field Response
- Screening, Decontamination, Registration, and Congregate Care of Evacuees

General Status:

- (C) All equipment operational and issued
- (C) Spares on hand
- (C) Refresher training ongoing

Community Self Assessment Rating – C

Training

This will be consistent with the Federal (FEMA/Army), State and local training plans:

Individual Item Status:

- (C) Initial response training complete
- (C) Refresher training ongoing

Community Self Assessment Rating – C

Medical

Areas to consider, but not limited to, are:

- Communications Systems, Facilities, Equipment, and Displays
- Medical Services - First Response
- Medical Services – Transportation
- Medical Services - Medical Facilities
- Screening, Decontamination, Registration, and Congregate Care of Evacuees

Individual Item Status:

- (C) Selected PPE (Kappler suit, Army boots and gloves, approved PAPR and hood) on-hand
- (C) Emergency medical staff at participating hospitals trained (CSEPP curriculums)

Community Self Assessment Rating – C

Public Awareness

Areas to consider, but not limited to, are:

- Public Notification, Instructions, and Emergency Information
- Communications Systems, Facilities, Equipment, and Displays
- Protective Action Implementation for Special Populations and Facilities
- Public Affairs

Individual Item Status:

- (C) Outreach Center in EPZ County staffed and operational
- (C) Annual “All-Hazards” calendar distributed to Harford County residents
- (C) Near Site Media Center (NSMC) activated during CSEPP exercises
- (C) Governor’s Citizen’s Advisory Commission (CAC) active
- (C) Ongoing public education programs
- (C) Boater Brochures available at all Kent County Marinas
- (C) APG’s All-Hazard Emergency Brochure
- (C) Community Public Awareness Plan in draft

Community Self Assessment Rating - C

Regulatory Compliance

Areas to consider, but not limited to, are:

- Hazard Assessment
- Protective Action Recommendations and Decision Making
- Public Notification, Instructions, and Emergency Information

Individual Item Status:

- (C) Complied with Federal/State OSHA guidance on PPE ensemble

Community Self Assessment Rating – C

Annual Exercise Recaps

Annual Exercise Recap for 2000

April 12, 2000 Exercise:

- **SUMMARY:** All Aberdeen Community jurisdictions participated in the exercise conducted on April 12, 2000. The Exercise was conducted in accordance with the Emergency Operations Plans/Procedures (EOPs) of the respective jurisdiction, as they would respond to an actual chemical accident at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Response included treatment at the Kent-Queen Annes' Hospital of moulaged personnel (simulating injured boaters) transferred from Worton Creek and Tolchester Marinas.

The MINICAMs were activated for the exercise. This was the signal for Aberdeen Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ABCDF) personnel to initiate their portion of the exercise play.

Off-post field play focused on boater evacuation procedures. Kent County established boater reception centers at the Tolchester and Worton Creek Marinas. Actors simulating boaters were screened and decontaminated at the marina reception centers. Actors, representing both boaters and other routine patients, were screened and treated at the Kent and Queen Anne's Hospital Emergency Department. Kent County also conducted a news conference.

An evaluation team was stationed at each player location to record actions.

- **Other CSEPP Highlights:** There were three simulated injuries included in the scenario design. Two SciTech government contractor workers (MINICAM operators) were potentially exposed to agent vapors. They were treated and released. One Technical Escort Unit (TEU) initial responder with the Initial Entry Party (IEP) tripped, fell, and suffered head trauma. The injured IEP worker was evacuated to the Edgewood Area Health Clinic.

The ABCDF construction site personnel and Bechtel government contract personnel were evacuated from the construction site adjacent to the CASY.

On May 9, 2000, a hospital preparedness drill was conducted in Harford County that was based on a simulated release of chemical agent from CASY. A summary of the drill was provided without finding.

- **Finding Resolution:** There were four unresolved findings from the 1999 community exercise.
- **Accomplishments:** Joint activities included the exchange of information among the participating jurisdictions, the activation and operation of a Near Site Media Center, and shared communication and automation systems. Joint (on-post and off-post) coordination and interface matters noted by the evaluation team were commendable. Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) successfully demonstrated its CAIRA mission capability during the exercise. Completion of the Aberdeen EX 00 satisfies the annual Initial Response Force Exercise (IRFE) requirement for APG.

- **Demonstrated Needs:** None.
- **Lessons Learned:** The published number for the Public Information Officer at MEMA did not roll over but went directly to voice mail with no message containing additional numbers to call for emergency information.

Annual Exercise Recap for 1999

April 14, 1999 Exercise:

- **SUMMARY:** All Aberdeen Community jurisdictions participated in the exercise conducted on April 14, 1999. The Exercise was conducted in accordance with the Emergency Operations Plans/Procedures (EOPs) of the respective jurisdiction, as they would respond to an actual chemical accident at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Response included treatment at the Kent-Queen Annes' Hospital of moulaged personnel (simulating injured boaters) transferred from Worton Creek and Tolchester Marinas.

Harford County pre-negotiated with FEMA Region III most of the objectives reported. This was due to their demonstrated performance during the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise, November 17, 1998.

Field-play focused on the evacuation of boaters portrayed by the U. S. Coast Guard Auxiliary members. Kent County established reception centers at Tolchester and Worton Creek Marinas to receive the boaters. Kent County Health Department staff deployed to the marinas and provided a detailed description of their procedures to the Evaluators. A second set of actors, representing boaters who would have been processed through the marina Reception Centers, were sent to the Kent and Queen Anne's Hospital Emergency Department.

An evaluation team was stationed at each player location to record actions.

- **Other CSEPP Highlights:** The State EOC was activated at 0905 after notification of a community emergency from APG. Because of prepositioning of staff, the EOC was activated and functional immediately after receipt of notification from APG. Even though crowded conditions existed, the EOC was able to perform duties as required.

In traffic and access control, the Aberdeen Community established a pre-coordinated Incident Command System for the APG Marine Police, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Maryland Department of Natural Resources Police service boats. The APG Marine Police, On-Scene Commander, contacted all marine assets via U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Channel 81 and made assignments to pre-coordinated positions in controlling the boat traffic.

RACES provided valuable communications links for Kent county marinas and the hospital.

Kent & Queen Anne's hospital medical and administrative staffs were very knowledgeable of their duties as defined in their EOP. Attending physicians from all hospital patient care units

were rapidly mobilized to the Emergency Department and assigned to incoming casualties. Triage of incoming patients was performed rapidly and effectively. The tracking of incoming patients and collection of patient data was effectively demonstrated.

- **Finding Resolution:** There were four unresolved findings from the 1998 community exercise
- **Accomplishments:** APG successfully demonstrated its CAIRA mission capability during the exercise. Completion of the Aberdeen CSEPP EX 99 satisfied the annual Initial Response Force Exercise (IRFX) requirement for APG.
- **Demonstrated Needs:** New State EOC. Install a marine band radio in the Kent County EOC to enhance communications.
- **Lessons Learned:** The community public affairs staff should establish a formal schedule of meetings to facilitate in the coordination of the JIC and develop a formal plan for operation of the Joint Information System.

On-Post Activity

The ECA is a tenant on the Aberdeen Proving Ground – Edgewood Area. The Deputy Installation Commander served as the Initial Response Force (IRF) Commander during the chemical accident response. Roles, responsibilities, and procedures to be followed by the Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) during a chemical response are described in Annex C (Chemical Accident/Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Plan) to the APG Disaster Control Plan.

MINICAMs indicating the possible presence of chemical agent HD vapors alarmed at the CASY and were verified by Monitoring Branch personnel. Monitoring Branch personnel notified Fire Department personnel, who subsequently notified the APG Emergency Operations Center (EOC) of a chemical accident/incident. A Field Command Post (FCP) was established near the Post 12 entrance to the Bush River area and the CAIRA plan was initiated.

The SBCCOM Operations Center and the APG EOC were activated. The EMIS hazard plot was run and a Community Emergency was declared. CSEPP Alert and Notification Telephone System (CANTS) notifications were completed to local community EOCs.

The ABCDF construction site personnel and Bechtel government contract personnel were evacuated from the construction site adjacent to the CASY.

EOC staff members provided initial chemical event reports to the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the Army Operations Center (AOC).

At the accident site, an injured security guard was evacuated to the Edgewood Area Health Clinic. The Initial Entry Party (IEP) and Work Party (WP) personnel eliminated the source of the agent leak (by plugging the TCs), decontaminated the TCs, and covered the spill area with plastic sheets. A Personnel Decontamination Station (PDS) was established within the Bush River Area. The activities of the PDS, FCP and the mitigation activities within the CASY were directed by the Field Command Post Officer (FCPO) and the Director of Operations (ECA Commanding Officer) in the SBCCOM Operations Center.

Press releases were disseminated to local media. The IRF Commander and his staff conducted a press conference at the Near Site Media Center (NSMC). The Emergency Management Information System (EMIS) was utilized to maintain a log of all significant actions, project event status boards, and to assess the hazard.

Coordination with local civilian officials was made by EMIS plume broadcasts, FAX broadcasts, telephone and by dispatch of a liaison to the Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) and the Harford County EOC.

Field play was suspended for the exercise at approximately 1300 with the TC decontaminated and the spill site covered with plastic sheets.

This exercise also satisfied the annual IRF exercise requirement (AR 50-6) for Aberdeen Proving Ground. No further reporting will be required.

Joint Activity

Joint activities included the exchange of information among the participating jurisdictions, the activation and operation of a NSMC, and shared communication and automation systems. Joint (on-post and off-post) coordination and interface matters noted by the evaluation team are included in Tab B, Joint Activities.

Off-Post Activity

Off-post activity included full participation by the State of Maryland, Baltimore County, Harford County, Kent County, United States Coast Guard (USCG), and the NSMC. Initial off-post notification was made via the CANTS and plume hazard information was received via the EMIS.

Field play focused on boater evacuation procedures. Kent County established boater reception centers at the Tolchester and Worton Creek Marinas. Actors simulating boaters were screened and decontaminated at the marina reception centers. Actors, representing both boaters and other routine patients, were screened and treated at the Kent and Queen Anne's Hospital Emergency Department. Kent County also conducted a news conference.

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS TIMELINE

A chronological summary of response activities is provided in Table 2, Significant Events Time Line. This listing was developed from observed player actions at each exercise location, as well as incidents introduced by the Simulation Cell (SIMCELL). (NOTE: The times reflected on the chart are based on a 24-hour clock.)

Table 2. Significant Events Time Line

Time	Location	Activity
0825	APG	Bechtel employee (Patient 1) tells another Bechtel employee that he is experiencing chest pain and needs help. The second employee responds by radioing for the Bechtel nurse. Patient 1 sits down in chair.
0833	APG	Fire Department responded to report of chest pain injury at Bechtel.
0834	APG	Bechtel reports MINICAM in alarm and evacuation of construction personnel – SSCC reported that MINICAMS were not in alarm.
0840	APG	CANTS B – MINICAM reported in alarm in the CASY. Notification received at MEMA, USCG, Harford, Baltimore and Kent Counties.
0840	APG	Ambulance arrives. Nurse transfers history of patient to arriving first responders (2 responders), and they move Patient 1 to gurney.
0843	Harford	County Executive notified of MINICAM alarm.
0846	APG	Security Guard (Patient 2) suffered a compound fracture of the tibia. His partner threw Patient 2’s mask to him for donning, donned his own mask, and then assisted Patient 2 into their vehicle to evacuate the area.
0846	Baltimore	Baltimore County 911 Dispatch notified Baltimore County Office of Emergency Preparedness of incident at APG.
0847	Baltimore	Operations Officer briefed that an emergency event had occurred at APG. Bush River Area of APG was being evacuated.
0847	Harford	Alarm on MINICAM announced in EOC.
0848	APG	Patient 1 routed to Upper Chesapeake Medical Center (simulated) - first responders consult with Edgewood Clinic and University Hospital.
0848	USCG EOC	Internal notification of USCG Operations Response personnel occurred regarding reportable event; standby status.
0901	APG	STARTEX
0901	APG	CAIRA plan activated for leaking TC at CASY.
0901	APG	CAIRA Net determined inoperable. Regular phone lines were used for notification.
0901	APG	Community Level Emergency Declared.
0901	APG	Initial D2PC run at SBCCOM OC.
0901	APG	EOC directed closure of Bush River.
0902	USCG EOC	Liaison officers dispatched to Maryland EOC in Reisterstown.
0903	APG	EOC made CANTS notification-stating CAIRA had been declared. PAR & Plume to local jurisdictions (FAXed). Notification received at MEMA, USCG, Harford, Baltimore and Kent Counties.
0903	MEMA	EOC activated. Call down authorized by EOC.
0903	APG	Patient 2 was stripped completely naked (simulated), deconned (simulated), and loaded on a litter for transport to Edgewood Health Clinic (EHC).

0903	Baltimore	Operations Officer on Hotline; 0901 Community event declared; plume data received.
0903	NSMC	Harford County EOC contacted Harford County PIO at NSMC informing him of alarm in CASY.
0904	APG	Communicator (call down machine) activated to notify all EOC responders to report to EOC.
0905	APG	EOC ordered Bush River Area closed and evacuation of Lauderick Creek and ATC.
0905	MEMA	Started hazard analysis using plume projection model.
0908	APG	Security closed the 3 Edgewood Area gates.
0909	APG	On post sirens activated (simulated). PAD - Shelter in place for Edgewood Area.
0909	APG	APG Marine Police reported Bush River closed.
0909	APG	New D2PC run with increased evaporation time (3 hours).
0909	Kent	Initial plume data run via EMIS.
0910	Baltimore	Operations Officer briefs staff present on plume information and display hazard potential.
0910	Harford	CSEPP lines from dispatch center switched to EOC.
0912	Harford	Notification passed to EOC advising of Community Emergency, MINICAM alarm confirmed.
0912	Kent	MINICAM alarm was confirmed by the APG liaison.
0913	APG	EOC requested Lauderick Creek personnel place DAAMS tubes along the Bush River.
0913	APG	Follow-up notification # 1 to community via CANTS --No PAR or plume FAXed. Notification received at MEMA, USCG, Harford, Baltimore and Kent Counties.
0913	Kent	Dialogic call down of EOC staff.
0914	Harford	PAD: Areas 4/5/6/7 Shelter in Place. Decision made by County Executive.
0915	Harford	DPW Radio center activated.
0916	Baltimore	Operations Officer notified the Baltimore County Police Department that the Bush River is "shut down". Marine Patrol Unit with Police Department is briefed.
0916	MEMA	Call down of MEMA staff began by Dialogic.
0916	USCG EOC	Coordination call to USCG Ship Desk regarding maritime traffic.
0917	APG	Patient 2 arrived at Edgewood Health Clinic (EHC). Fire Department personnel briefed EHC decon personnel regarding Patient 2's status. EHC decon personnel began decon procedures.
0917	APG	Bechtel reported that all employees were accounted for. 290 sheltered-in-place behind E-2194, 121 sheltered-in-place at the JSN Bldg 2305, and 16 inside E-2194.
0917	USCG EOC	Simulated Urgent Marine Information Broadcast (UMIB) issued on closure of Bush River - to be broadcast every 15 minutes.
0918	NSMC	Contacted SBCCOM PAO requesting staff augmentation.
0919	APG	Called PMCD Outreach Office, told of emergency and given available details in case they got calls from the public.
0919	NSMC	Contacts PMCD Outreach Center to inform of incident and provided brief

		details of event.
0920	USCG EOC	Briefed incident to head of USCG Operations Response group.
0922	Kent	Red Cross requested to place shelters on standby.
0923	Harford	Off-post sirens sounded (simulated).
0923	Harford	EAS message #1 sent out directing shelter-in-place in zones 4/5/6/7 and evacuation of boats on Bush River.
0923	Harford	MEMA and APG notified of PAD - precautionary SIP.
0923	Harford	Schools notified to shelter students.
0923	Harford	Operations Officer contacts Amtrak to advise them of incident. Call is for notification only, no action recommended to them at this time.
0926	Harford	State Highways recalling work crews in affected area.
0926	Kent	Hospital staff briefed to expect evacuees.
0926	NSMC	Harford County PIO contacted Harford County EOC for update on alarm.
0928	APG	APG Marine Police report that the Bush River secure - no boats in the area.
0929	USCG EOC	Simulated revision of UMIB to announce closure of Chesapeake Bay from 39.16 North to 39.29 North.
0929	USCG EOC	Coordination call placed to USCG personnel in route to Cecil and Harford County LEPC meetings.
0931	Kent	Operation officer conduct initial EOC staff briefing.
0932	NSMC	NSMC received Harford County EAS message via FAX.
0934	Harford	Notification from APG - Plume is still on APG and is expanding.
0934	Kent	Fire Police dispatched to marinas.
0935	APG	New D2PC projection ran by hazard analyst.
0935	USCG EOC	Coordination call placed to USCG Public Affairs Officer on NSMC.
0935	Kent	EOC operational.
0940	APG	OC directed security to clear Skippers Point Campground and Marina.
0940	APG	Follow-up #3 via CANTS - plume was FAXed. Notification received at MEMA, USCG, Harford, Baltimore and Kent Counties.
0940	APG	SBCCOM OC requested a security sweep of Gunpowder Neck Boat Club and Skippers Point to ensure all evacuations are complete.
0940	Harford	Harford County news release #1 – All Harford county schools and day care centers in zones 4/5/6/7 will shelter in place.
0942	Kent	Hospital decontamination set up initiated.
0942	NSMC	Receipt of first Harford County press release on school and daycare PAD.
0942	APG	Decon completed, Patient 2 was transferred to the clean side and taken to a treatment room for further medical evaluation/care.
0943	APG	APG Maritime Police ordered to detain any boats coming from the Lauderick Creek area.
0943	Harford	SITREP sent to MEMA.
0943	NSMC	NSMC declared operational.
0944	Kent	Hospital air intake systems shut down.
0945	Harford	Notification to Railroads on incident. Operations Officer recommends to Conrail and Amtrak that rail traffic be stopped.
0945	Kent	EAS message from Harford County briefed.
0946	Harford	State Highways assisting Sheriff's Office with road closures.
0946	Kent	Issued first news release.

0947	NSMC	Harford County press release briefed to NSMC staff.
0950	Harford	UC placed Hospitals on Alert. Code Orange Disaster Plan.
0951	NSMC	Harford County press release #2 on NSMC open.
0953	APG	First APG news release.
0953	APG	CANTS follow-up #4 - No PAR or Plume FAXed. Notification received at MEMA, USCG, Harford, Baltimore and Kent Counties.
0955	USCG EOC	Simulated revision of UMIB to direct potentially contaminated boaters to decontamination at Kent County marinas.
0955	Kent	WCM-Medical screening team arrived.
0955	Kent	Hospital update from SYSCOM with up date of medical info and requesting bed status.
0956	Kent	ARC-Shelter opened.
0956	NSMC	NSMC received Kent County press release #1.
0957	Baltimore	Internal SITREP drafted. Operations Officer requests that the state (MEMA) be notified of EOC activation for Baltimore County.
1000	Harford	755/Pine Street closed, 755/Willoughby Beach Rd ACP, 755/Hanson Rd ACP, 755/24 ACP, 755/40 ACP, Abingdon Rd/7 closed, 40/543 ACP, 159/Fords Lane Closed, Bush Rd/7 closed, 755/Rosewood Closed, Michaelsville/Woodley Rd Closed.
1002	NSMC	Garrison commander arrives at SBCCOM OC and is briefed.
1003	Kent	ARC-RACES operational.
1004	Kent	County PIO arrived and briefed.
1005	MEMA	News Release #1 from MEMA regarding closing of Bush River.
1007	Baltimore	Second SITREP sent to the State EOC (MEMA).
1007	MEMA	News Release #2 from MEMA regarding opening of NSMC.
1008	Harford	SITREP sent to MEMA.
1008	Kent	Hospital – decon staff medically screened.
1010	Kent	TOLM-TOL Marina Fire Police secured area.
1010	Kent	WCM-WC Marina boaters arrived.
1013	Harford	Bush Road/7 ACP closed by County. Intersection closed.
1013	Harford	All afternoon Kindergarten classes at Deerfield E.S. and Edgewood E.S. cancelled. Morning kindergarten classes held (sheltered).
1014	Baltimore	Operations Officer requested PIO verify opening Near Site center; remote PIO is near APG, radio contact is being established.
1015	Kent	TOLM-TOL Marina operational.
1019	APG	Patient transported to Upper Chesapeake Medical Center (simulated).
1020	Kent	WCM-WC Marina receives geographical info.
1020	Kent	3 rd news release identifying shelter location.
1024	Kent	Hospital – decon team fully operational, stay time log started, and 1 st patients arrived.
1025	APG	TEU starts setting up PDS.
1025	Kent	Hospital – decon and triage started, patient tracking started.
1030	Kent	TOLM-TOL Marina boaters arrived.
1034	APG	Chemical Event Report FAXed from SBCCOM OC to APG EOC.
1035	Kent	TOLM-Decon begins at TOL marina.
1038	MEMA	MDOT brief regarding MSP Command Post at BWI.

1044	Harford	Request for ambulances at Deerfield ES, 2 6-year-old patients thought to be possibly contaminated. Investigation found no contamination, teacher instructed to wash children's faces.
1045	MEMA	EOC declared operational.
1047	APG	Advised 290 Bechtel employees in the parking lot of Bldg 2194 to shelter in place and move inside.
1048	APG	Follow-up #5 via CANTS – FAXed PAR and Plume. Notification received at MEMA, USCG, Harford, Baltimore and Kent Counties.
1049	Kent	TOLM-TOL Marina received geographical info.
1059	Kent	WCM-WC Marina reception center closed down.
1101	Harford	Spanish speaking assistance requested at Sheriff's Office Southern Precinct. Spanish speaking assistance being dispatched to assist with migrant farm workers.
1102	APG	Tech Escort Unit Initial Entry Party (IEP) arrives in CASY with 3 personnel.
1106	APG	CANTS follow-up #6 – FAXed plume. Notification received at MEMA, USCG, Harford, Baltimore and Kent Counties.
1105	Kent	Shut down decon and triage. Decon team exit physicals.
1106	Harford	Press release #6 announces that Spanish interpreter available and mouth of the Bush River is closed.
1114	APG	Source of leak was discovered on ROW #1, STACK-C, ton containers #14 and #15. Bottom valve on T/C and the top valve on #15 were out.
1114	NSMC	NSMC received revised APG news release regarding press conference at noon.
1117	Kent	TOCM-TOL Marina closed down.
1120	APG	IEP covered puddle, plugged valve holes, and laid initial decon.
1120	APG	D2PC run using actual reported puddle size broadcast.
1120	Baltimore	Third SITREP sent to the State EOC (MEMA).
1120	Kent	Hospital treatment closed down.
1129	APG	CANTS follow up #7 - FAXed plume. Notification received at MEMA, USCG, Harford, Baltimore and Kent Counties.
1130	APG	IEP departs CASY.
1130	APG	3-man IEP processes through hot line.
1130	Kent	Press conference conducted.
1135	APG	CANTS follow-up #8 - No plume FAXed. Notification received at MEMA, USCG, Harford, Baltimore and Kent Counties.
1134	APG	SBCCOM OC requests MINICAMs be checked to see if they are still in alarm.
1140	NSMC	Garrison PAO provides interview to mock media at NSMC.
1145	APG	IEP personnel process through the PDS.
1147	APG	TEU reported MINICAMs still in alarm.
1200	Baltimore	ENDEX.
1201	NSMC	Press conference conducted with mock media. Speakers included: garrison PAO, Garrison CDR, Harford County executive, Harford County PIO, MEMA PIO, ECA PAO, moderated by media liaison.
1210	Kent	ENDEX.
1220	APG	Crew places absorbent pillows at accident site.
1220	NSMC	APG release – mustard release stopped.
1223	APG	Requests RTAP be sent and positioned between MINICAMs #6 and #7.

1224	APG	CANTS follow up #9 - plume FAXed. Notification received at MEMA, USCG, and Harford County.
1240	APG	Spill covered with tarp.
1244	Harford	EOC briefed – EOC manager briefs staff on plan for continued operations. Plan is to get confirmation of extent of contamination from the Army, sound sirens, and issue EAS message advising to end shelter as appropriate. Draft EAS messages are ready for this contingency.
1245	APG	WP departs CASY.
1245	Harford	News release #7 terminating emergency.
1245	Harford	ENDEX.
1250	NSMC	Harford County EAS message – all clear.
1252	APG	WP personnel process through the PDS.
1255	APG	MINICAM stops alarming.
1258	APG	ENDEX.
1258	NSMC	ENDEX.

LISTS OF STRENGTHS, FINDINGS, AND OBSERVATIONS

Lists of strengths, findings and observations identified during Aberdeen Community CSEPP EX 00 are shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5. They are grouped by the Tab in which they can be found. Findings have an assigned identifying number that may be used to identify the finding throughout the report and in completing the action plans. The number is structured as follows: XX01A9.1. The "XX" is a two-letter identification of the response organization to which the finding applied [e.g., AC for Aberdeen Community (two or more jurisdictions), AP for APG/EA, MD for the State of Maryland, BA for Baltimore County, HA for Harford County, and KE for Kent County; "01" represents the year of the exercise; "A" is the Tab designation (A, B, or C) in which the finding is reported; "9" is the objective number (1-15) to which the finding relates; and ".1" is the sequence number of the finding under the objective.

Findings from the previous exercise that were not resolved during this exercise are listed by their previously assigned identifying numbers and are carried forward with an updated number.

Table 3. Tab A Listing

Type	ID Number	Description	Page
Strength	AP (Obj. 1)	SBCCOM-Operations Center (OC)	A-1
Observation	AP (Obj. 2)	Inadequacy of Communicator (Call-Down Machine)	A-1
Observation	AP (Obj. 2)	Hazard Assessment Information	A-2
Strength	AP (Obj. 4)	Field Command Post Officer	A-2
Strength	AP (Obj. 4)	Fire Department Maintained a Positive Attitude	A-2
Observation	AP (Obj. 4)	SBCCOM-OC Staff Updates	A-3
Strength	AP (Obj. 9)	Prompt PAO response to/at OC	A-3
Strength	AP (Obj. 9)	APG Garrison PAO	A-4
Observation	AP (Obj. 9)	APG PAO was understaffed	A-4
Observation	AP (Obj. 9)	Outdated Annex J (PA plan)	A-4
Finding	AP01A10.1	Upon Evacuating the Area No Buddy Aid Was Initiated	A-5
Observation	AP (Obj. 11)	Medical Services – Transportation	A-5
Strength	AP (Obj. 12)	Medical Services – Medical Facilities	A-6
Observation	AP (Obj. 12)	Team Leader Visual ID Device Lacking	A-6
Strength	AP (Obj. 13)	PDS Operations	A-6
Finding	AP01A13.1	Smoking Around Butyl Rubber Clothing	A-7

Table 4. Tab B Listing

Type	ID Number	Description	Page
Strength	AC (Obj. 6)	Sharing of Information	B-1
Observation	AC (Obj. 9)	Operation of NSMC	B-2
Observation	AC (Obj. 9)	Terminology Confusion	B-3
Observation	AC (Obj. 9)	NSMC Plan	B-3

Table 5. Tab C Listing

Type	ID Number	Description	Page
Observation	MD (Obj. 9)	Routing of calls early in event	C-5
Observation	BA (Obj. 2)	Interpretation of Meteorological Information	C-7
Observation	BA (Obj. 9)	News Release Header	C-10
Observation	BA (Obj. 9)	Official Media Release Location for Baltimore County	C-10
Observation	KE (Obj. 9)	Lack of coherent presentation and information	C-19

ORGANIZATION OF REPORT

The remainder of this report is organized as follows:

Tab A	On-Post Activities
Tab B	Joint Activities
Tab C	Off-Post Activities
Appendix 1	Action Plans
Appendix 2	Acronyms
Appendix 3	Distribution

ABERDEEN COMMUNITY CSEPP EXERCISE 2001 EXERCISE REPORT

TAB A: ARMY ACTIVITIES

INTRODUCTION

Tab A documents the specific strengths, findings, and observations noted by the evaluation team concerning the emergency response plans and procedures demonstrated by the Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) during the Aberdeen Community Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) Exercise 2001 (Aberdeen Community CSEPP EX 01). The evaluation team's recommendations are also provided, where appropriate.

OBJECTIVES

APG demonstrated applicable Points of Review (PORs) of Objectives 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.1, 12.2, and 13 as they appear in Appendix C of the CSEPP Exercises document, dated March 19, 1999.

Objective 1. Initial Alert and Activation

Strength

Description: SBCCOM-Operations Center (OC)

Discussion: The Operations Specialist, SBCCOM-OC, did an outstanding job recording all messages into the EMIS system. The Operations Specialist accomplished the job in a timely manner, ensuring no loss of data, without formal training on the EMIS system. She is commended for her dedication and desire to ensure the effectiveness of the SBCCOM-OC during emergencies.

Observation

Description: Inadequacy of Communicator (Call-Down Machine)

Discussion: The call down system used to notify EOC personnel of the declared CAIRA was activated at 0909. The EOC received numerous calls from persons not knowing how to handle the information and numerous phone "hang-ups". These "hang-ups" were followed-up by EOC personnel. Some offices had answering machines that answered the call-down machine, further complicating proper notification. At 0945, EOC personnel were still attempting to make certain that designated recipients had received information.

Recommendation: The call-down list appears to include personnel who should report to the EOC, as well as persons who do not normally report in the event of a CAIRA. Recommend those people not reporting to the EOC be contacted by alternate means. If the

Communicator System continues to be used, recommend training for personnel likely to be answering phones in order that they know how to make use of information received.

Objective 2. Hazard Assessment

Observation

Description: Hazard Assessment Information

Discussion: During the course of the exercise, misinformation was received by the SBCCOM-OC that the puddle had been decontaminated and covered with plastic by the Initial Entry Party. Using this information, some SBCCOM-OC personnel immediately began making preparations to update the hazard plume and make decisions based on an assumption that the agent source had been stopped. A controller inject that the MINICAM was still alarming caused them to rethink their decisions. No call was made to the FCPO to verify the information.

Recommendation: In order for continuing chemical event hazard assessment to be effective, a process should be established that ensures essential elements of information are obtained from field sources and provided to key personnel within the OC/EOC. This information should be assessed for accuracy and validity before hazard assessment decisions are made based on this information.

Objective 3. Protective Action Recommendations and Decision-Making

No Strengths, Findings, or Observations were noted.

Objective 4. Command and Control

Strength

Description: Field Command Post Officer

Discussion: The Field Command Post Officer (FCPO) presented an exceptional briefing of the plan for field operations to the SBCCOM-OC at the onset of the exercise. The FCPO made good and specific recommendations to the SBCCOM-OC staff for external support requirements. He pointed the SBCCOM-OC staff in the appropriate direction to support the accomplishment of the mission.

Strength

Description: Fire Department Maintained a Positive Attitude

Discussion: During the exercise the firefighters performed their assigned tasks in a professional manner. Seven firefighters were deployed at the accident site for approximately five hours. During that time they were very attentive to all relevant aspects of exercise play. They did not show any discontent or concern about the length of their deployment.

Observation

Description: SBCCOM-OC Staff Updates

Discussion: The SBCCOM-OC is periodically updated with information received from various on and off post sources. There is no specific written guidance regarding to how often these briefings should take place. Even though the SBCCOM-OC is a small area, with only a few people working there at any given time, these updates should be presented more frequently to ensure everyone is aware of current situations.

Recommendation: Recommend information updates be presented every 30 minutes for the first 2 hours of operation or upon receipt of essential elements of critical information.

Objective 5. Public Notification, Instructions, and Emergency Information

No Strengths, Findings, or Observations were noted.

Objective 6. Communications Systems, Facilities, Equipment, and Displays

No Strengths, Findings, or Observations were noted.

Objective 8. Traffic and Access Control

Status of Previous Findings:

✪ **Previous Finding Number: AP00A08.1**

Description: Entry Control Procedures for Emergency Access

Resolved: Yes

Objective 9. Public Affairs

Strength

Description: Prompt PAO response to/at OC

Discussion: The Edgewood Chemical Activity PA Officer arrived promptly at the SBCCOM-OC, worked quickly to open communications with involved PAOs, secured back-up in the SBCCOM-OC, began preparations to activate the Near Site Media Center, and alerted PMCD Outreach Office that they could anticipate calls from the public.

The SBCCOM RD&A PA Officer also performed well in the SBCCOM-OC, reporting quickly when notified of the event and sharing information with other staff members, the APG augmentee and the NSMC.

Public Affairs success depends upon reacting quickly to avoid falling behind in responding to events as they develop. The quick response of both PA Officers set the tone for successful PA activities throughout the exercise.

Strength

Description: APG Garrison PAO

Discussion: The APG EOC PAO augmentee was familiar with the installation, the responders, and the off-post community. He relayed information as it became available in the EOC to the APG PAO, coordinated and cleared all news releases prepared by the APG PAO, and referred all queries to the APG PAO. There is a wealth of PA expertise on APG that can and should be utilized to augment the APG PAO staff in an emergency.

Observation

Description: APG PAO was understaffed

Discussion: APG PAO was understaffed because the PA Officer was with the APG Commander at the Near-Site Media Center. Only two PA staffers were responding to all queries, preparing news releases, coordinating them with the EOC for clearance, providing copies of all releases to HQDA, plus handling the regular day-to-day operations of the PAO. In addition, they had posted relevant information on the command's web site and the post TV channel.

Recommendation: Adequate augmentation should be arranged in the form of an MOU with tenant organizations with PAOs. This support could be given additional weight through documentation in an updated Annex J to the APG Disaster Control Plan.

Observation

Description: Outdated Annex J (PA plan)

Discussion: Annex J (12 Jan 98) to the APG Disaster Control Plan has not been updated to reflect the transfer of APG from TECOM to SBCCOM in 1999 and other organizational changes at the Garrison. The disaster control plan and annex J are being updated.

Reference: AR 360-5 and Annex J to APG DCP

Recommendation: The APG Disaster Control Plan and Annex J update should be completed expeditiously to institute current operating procedures.

Objective 10. Medical Services - First Response

Finding AP01A10.1

Description: Upon Evacuating the Area No Buddy Aid Was Initiated

Discussion: Upon arrival at Post 12, no buddy care was given to the injured guard. When asked what he would do for his partner, the non-injured guard stated, “ We don’t treat them.” The Medical Evaluator asked him if he were going to let his partner bleed to death. Only after this prompting did the non-injured guard look at Patient 2’s injury to assess the fracture.

Once injured personnel have been evacuated out of immediate danger, their injuries must be promptly evaluated to determine if life- or limb- saving measures can/should be applied. In spite of the fact that the Security vehicle had no first aid supplies, an attempt to control bleeding from the compound leg fracture should have been initiated by Patient 2’s buddy.

Reference: AR 385-61, 28 Feb 97, page 4, paragraph 2-4F/DA PAM 385-61, 31 Mar 97, page 25, paragraph 7-2b.

Recommendation: Improve awareness and training regarding Self Aid/Buddy Aid.

Objective 11. Medical Services - Transportation

Observation

Description: Basic Principles of Splinting

Discussion: The Fire Department provided the first “real” medical treatment for the casualty of this incident. The fracture to the right tibia was identified quickly and measures to control bleeding were accomplished; however, splinting of the leg was inadequate for effective immobilization. Only an ankle splint was applied which still allowed movement of the fracture site. A long leg splint should have been used and was available. In addition, neurovascular status should be checked before and after splint application. This is to ensure that the application of the splint does not compromise circulation (blood vessels) and innervation (nerves) that were present before the splint was applied. Additionally, when another splint was applied in the Health Clinic during decontamination, it also was similarly inadequate, and when a new splint was applied in the treatment room after decontamination, it also was only an ankle splint. Neurovascular status checks were also neglected.

Reference: Emergency Care and Treatment of the Sick and Injured, Brady

Recommendation: Review care and treatment of persons sustaining fractures.

Objective 12. Medical Services - Medical Facilities

Strength

Description: Superior Communication When Staff Handled Patient.

Discussion: The Fire Department personnel's transfer of care of Patient 2 over to Edgewood Health Clinic personnel was very well communicated, i.e., the patient's history, the nature of the injury, care given, and status enroute.

Exceptionally good communication occurred from the moment the patient arrived at the Edgewood Health Clinic. Frequent reminders from the staff for the decontamination team to rinse gloved hands in bleach solutions, coordinating instructions concerning moving the patient as a unit, and directions in handling the patient, were all examples of keeping everybody well informed and "watching out for each other."

Observation

Description: Team Leader Visual ID Device Lacking

Discussion: According to the reference cited below regarding the medical Team Leader in charge of care of the potentially contaminated individual being treated, "The Team Leader...needs to be identified immediately...(and) wears some symbol that identifies him as Team Leader." Although the Team Leader in this situation was well known to all staff present and regarded as such, a situation may arise in which auxiliary staff are utilized, and the lines of authority may not be immediately obvious to all.

Reference: Kirk U.S. Army Health Clinic (KUSAHC) Memo 40-291, 15 Feb 97 (an internal SOP), p. 14, paragraph D.9.(a)

Recommendation: The Team Leader should wear a distinctive emblem, sign or symbol identifying him/her unequivocally as the Team Leader.

Objective 13. Field Response

Strength

Description: Personnel Decontamination Station (PDS) Operations

Discussion: The Technical Escort Unit (TEU) personnel involved in setting up and running the Personnel Decontamination Station (PDS) did an outstanding job. Upon arrival at Control Point 9, the crew quickly established an Emergency PDS (EPDS) and became fully

functional as a PDS within 25 minutes. The teamwork (i.e. such as helping each other dress out in the various levels of protective clothing and providing information to the individuals being decontaminated) demonstrated by the crew members was excellent.

Finding AP01A13.1

Description: Smoking around butyl rubber clothing

Discussion: TEU personnel were observed smoking in the vicinity of butyl rubber clothing. One person was wearing Level A coveralls (up to waist level) and another was by the PDS crew van, where other personnel were holding their Level B aprons and hoods. Smoking is prohibited in the vicinity of or while wearing butyl rubber clothing items. Butyl rubber clothing will burn and does not possess self-extinguishing properties.

Reference: DA Pam 385-61, 31 Mar 97, page 11, paragraph 4-3c

Recommendation: TEU personnel at all levels need to be fully aware of safety issues pertaining to Personnel Protective Clothing and adhere to them.

Status of Previous Findings:

✪ **Previous Finding Number: AP99A13.2**

Description: Response Plan and Standing Operating Procedures (SOP)

Resolved: Yes

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**ABERDEEN COMMUNITY CSEPP EXERCISE 2001
EXERCISE REPORT**

TAB B: JOINT ACTIVITIES

INTRODUCTION

This Tab documents the observations noted by the evaluation team during the Aberdeen Community Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) Exercise 2001 (Aberdeen Community CSEPP EX 01) relative to areas of coordination and interface between the Army and off-post jurisdictions. The evaluation team's recommendations are also provided, where appropriate.

Objective 1: Initial Alert and Activation

Status of Previous Findings:

⊗ **Previous Finding Number: AC00B01.1**

Description: Chemical Event Emergency Notification to the Public

Resolved: Yes

Objective 6: Communication Systems, Facilities, Equipment, and Displays

Strength

Description: Sharing of Information

Discussion: Harford County Situation Reports were FAXed to the APG EOC periodically during the exercise. These reports served two purposes; to confirm that information received from APG was correct and keeping the installation aware of actions taken by the county. The APG EOC Chief kept everyone in the EOC updated on the situation off-post.

Reference: None

Recommendation: None.

Objective 9: Emergency Public Information - Media

Operations at the Near Site Media Center (NSMC) had already begun prior to notification of an incident as agreed upon in the extent of play agreement. Harford County contacted their PIO at 0903 to inform him of an "alarm" sounding in the CASY. Because of the nature of the incident at CASY, information flow into the NSMC began slowly. The Harford County PIO contacted the

County EOC to get additional information on the incident. He then met with his PIO/PAO counterparts to brief them on the situation unfolding. The NSMC Manager then briefed the staff of the events taking place.

The NSMC was declared “operational” at 0942. APG, MEMA, and Harford County each issued press releases indicating that the NSMC was operational and provided contact and logistical information for media use. Represented at the NSMC were the following: APG-Garrison, APG ECA, Harford County, Baltimore County and Maryland Emergency Management Agency.

While the NSMC did not generate any press releases during the exercise, information dissemination to individuals in the NSMC was timely and accurate. Staff reviewed all incoming information for accuracy and immediately notified the NSMC Manager when discrepancies were found.

The facility utilized for the NSMC was adequate to support operations. There are 24 phone lines available for staff use with additional phones for media located in the briefing room. Access control to NSMC work space provided for a safe, comfortable atmosphere. Additional equipment includes two portable copiers, two facsimile machines (one for incoming and the other for outgoing traffic), several computer stations with printers, a media monitoring and analysis area with TVs, adequate work space and supplies for staff including “smartbooks” which contain position checklists and a variety of information pertinent to the Maryland community. The Telephone Team Leader assured an even distribution of calls so as not to overburden any of the team members. Team members were knowledgeable of the community and the events that were taking place and fielded questions in an efficient manner. Event logs and dedicated staff continuously updated status boards.

A press briefing was held at 1200 hours with mock media present. Speakers included the APG Garrison Commander/Deputy Installation Commander, the Harford County Executive, the Harford County PIO, the APG Garrison PAO, and the APG ECA PAO. A room in the NSMC is dedicated to media reception and briefings. There is adequate workspace available for working media within the conference area.

Observation

Description: Operation of NSMC

Discussion: The staff demonstrated the ability to receive, evaluate, and retransmit news releases from several communities in a very timely manner. Every functional area was adequately staffed, was well prepared, and trained to accomplish their tasks. PAO/PIO representatives consulted frequently and ensured that information released was not in conflict. Communication within the NSMC was excellent easing all coordination between areas. However, the missing feature of a good Joint Information Center (JIC) is the ability to provide rumor control and response to the citizen inquires. Public information is critical in an emergency situation and is accomplished through EAS, press releases, media briefings, and telephonic response.

Reference: None

Recommendation: Expand NSMC to include the additional feature of managing citizen inquires.

Observation

Description: Terminology Confusion

Discussion: The “NSMC” was referred to as the “JIC” throughout exercise play. PIOs published several press releases announcing the opening of the “NSMC”/”JIC” and identified two separate buildings as the activated facility. At the NSMC, the Telephone Team Leader quickly identified one of the discrepancies and notified the appropriate PIO representatives to facilitate resolution.

As the exercise progressed, it was confusing for staff members when the State published a release with information about the “NSMC” and the “JIC” as locations for the media to seek additional information. The State utilizes the title “JIC” for the public information operation in their EOC.

Reference: None

Recommendation: Additional training for public information staff. Additionally, review plans and procedures for consistency and update as necessary. The Community needs to decide which title they will utilize for the off-site media center operations and then use it.

Observation

Description: NSMC Plan

Discussion: The “NSMC” is working under a draft plan dated April 2000. While the staff supporting the operation was obviously well trained and enthusiastic, further delineation of functions and duties associated with operation of the NSMC would clearly facilitate the work

Reference: Near Site Media Center Operations Plan, dated April 2000.

Recommendation: Revise, finalize, and publish the Plan.

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**ABERDEEN COMMUNITY CSEPP EX 01
EXERCISE REPORT**

TAB C: OFF-POST ACTIVITIES

INTRODUCTION

Tab C documents the specific strengths, findings, and observations noted by the evaluation team concerning the emergency response plans and procedures demonstrated by the State of Maryland, and the Counties of Baltimore, Harford, and Kent during the Aberdeen Community CSEPP Exercise 2001 (Aberdeen Community CSEPP EX 01). The evaluation team's recommendations are provided, where appropriate.

This Tab indicates for each jurisdiction the status of correction of findings for applicable objectives from previous exercises.

OBJECTIVES

The objectives selected by the Aberdeen Community CSEPP EX 01 Planning Team for demonstration and evaluation by the civil jurisdictions are listed in Table 1, Page 1 of this report. Definitions are contained in Appendix C of the *Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program Exercises* document, dated 19 March 1999. Any exceptions to full demonstration of an objective were previously agreed to and documented in the Extent of Play Agreements.

EVALUATIONS

Individual evaluations may be found on the following pages:

STATE OF MARYLAND.....	C-3
BALTIMORE COUNTY	C-7
HARFORD COUNTY	C-11
KENT COUNTY.....	C-17
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD.....	C-23

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STATE OF MARYLAND

Objective 1. Initial Alert and Notification

At 0843, MEMA received notification of a reportable event at Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) over the Chemical Accident Notification Telephone System (CANTS). At this time, the only information available was that a MINICAM was activated.

At 0901, MEMA received a call over CANTS from APG declaring a community emergency with a possible release of mustard agent. There was no confirmation of a spill.

The information included the name of the communicator at APG, brief description of information known at the time, the number of containers, wind direction, temperature.

MEMA EOC Director authorized the call-down of personnel at 0901. The call-down began at 0916 using the Dialogic automated call-down system.

At 0901, the Director of MEMA authorized activation of the EOC after a CANTS call declaring a community event. The EOC was declared fully operational at 1045. There was sufficient staff to effectively carry out the necessary emergency response.

Objective 2. Hazard Assessment

MEMA received and verified appropriate information from APG. Using appropriate models, MEMA plotted plume projections. As updates were provided by APG, the D2PC model was updated and displayed

The Maryland Department of Environment (MDE) has the capability to deploy field teams to monitor for mustard contamination and dispersion.

The EOC received D2PC information of the plume, threat and risk area resulting from the incident at APG. The information was projected on the screen, and was visible to the entire staff.

Objective 3. Protective Action Recommendations and Decision-Making

Based upon the scenario, MEMA was not required to make Protective Action Recommendations or Protective Action Decisions.

Objective 4. Command and Control

The Director of MEMA coordinated the overall State response. MEMA's Operations Chief directed EOC operations. The leadership empowered personnel to make appropriate decisions and

facilitate operations. The use of the Assistant Operations Chief allowed the Operations Chief to concentrate on pertinent matters. Timely and concise briefings were conducted with all EOC staff members.

MEMA made no requests for external assistance from any federal or outside organization.

Objective 5. Public Notification, Instructions, and Emergency Information

MEMA was notified of a community event over the CANTS line at 0901. After the Director authorized the activation of the EOC, the public information staff was called in to answer public and media telephone inquiries until the Public Affairs Officer was in place at the Near Site Media Center (NSMC).

The Joint Information Center (JIC) at MEMA was informed of alert and notification methods and EAS messages that were released to the public and coordinated information with other jurisdictions.

The JIC at MEMA developed and sent out two news releases before the NSMC was operational. The first release was at 1005 regarding the Bush River. The second release was at 1007 regarding the opening of the NSMC. After the NSMC was operational, all media calls were referred there unless it was an inquiry that specifically dealt with the operations at MEMA.

Objective 6. Communications Systems, Facilities, Equipment, and Displays

MEMA's external communications systems consisted of commercial telephone and dedicated telephone systems. Available for use were fax machines and email. Radio systems included the Maryland State Police net, High Frequency radio net and the RACES system. There are dedicated alert and warning telephones in the EOC, and these were used for initial notification. All systems operated with no deficiencies.

MEMA's EOC possesses sufficient space to maintain sustained operations. The EOC is well lit and comfortable. Each workstation has a networked computer terminal and telephone. A variety of display equipment such as computer projection, televisions, etc is available. The use of a wireless public address system facilitates briefings. All participants have access to a computerized message board system that tracks progress throughout the incident.

There was sufficient space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, etc to support emergency operations. The State utilized D2PC, the EIS "GEM" system, and a significant events board to disseminate emergency information to EOC staff. The displays were all updated in a timely manner. The displays were adequate to support emergency operations.

Objective 9. Public Affairs

The MEMA Public Affairs staff provided accurate and timely information to the public and media. The information that was received in the EOC was confirmed and coordinated before being released.

The public information staff demonstrated the ability to monitor and respond to inquiries and promptly followed up on erroneous, inconsistent or conflicting information.

Once the NSMC was established and operational, the MEMA EOC monitored the information coming in and coordinated any information going out. MEMA had a public information officer positioned at the NSMC to act as a liaison for the State.

There were two news releases sent out by MEMA before the NSMC was operational. Two live interviews were given at MEMA to the mock media. The Public Affairs Officer was interviewed and then later the State Director was interviewed about the operation at MEMA.

There were six staff members working in the JIC of the MEMA EOC. There was adequate space for all to carry out their individual responsibilities but still keep each other informed of the overall status of the event. The group was cohesive and was proactive in getting information to make sure that all information was current.

Observation

Description: Routing of calls early in event

Discussion: Before the EOC was fully operational, there were calls coming in that were routed to a workstation that was not yet staffed. This resulted in the caller waiting several minutes for someone to take the call. The caller would either have to wait for the call to ring back to the operator or get voice mail. When receiving the call back, the operator would route the caller to the public affairs area for further assistance.

Recommendation: It would provide the caller with better service if the initial call taker were given a roster of personnel that are present and updated as EOC staff arrives so that calls can be directed in a timely manner.

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BALTIMORE COUNTY

Objective 1. Initial Alert and Notification

The Baltimore County EOC started from a “warm start”. New staff from the Baltimore County Police and Fire Departments were present for an orientation and participated in the exercise. Other staff included representatives from the Baltimore County Office of Emergency Preparedness.

EOC security is provided at the main entrance to the building that houses the Baltimore County Emergency Operations Center. The staff demonstrated the ability to activate the facility for emergency operations.

Plans and procedures were followed in activating the facility.

This objective was successfully demonstrated.

Objective 2. Hazard Assessment

The Baltimore County 911 Dispatch Center received notification from Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) that a Community Emergency had been declared at 0901. The initial notification form indicated one container was involved, wind direction was 200 degrees, wind speed at 1 meter per second, temperature at 72 degrees and a stability class of “D”. Projected plume downwind distance of 871 meters, .57 mile was provided. Information was updated through the CANTS or the Emergency Management Information System (EMIS).

At 1125 the Operations Officer called APG on the CANTS to secure an update of the event. Information indicated that one container leaked and was plugged. The spill size reported was 24 meters by 4 meters, the site was decontaminated and the spill area was covered.

EMIS was utilized to project plume information and was updated as new information became available. The initial display of information utilized incorrect meteorological information and was immediately corrected. Sufficient information was provided by APG to enable the staff at the Baltimore County EOC to assess and update the situation.

This objective was successfully demonstrated.

Observation

Description: Interpretation of Meteorological Information

Discussion: Information may have been confused or misinterpreted during the initial notification of the chemical event. This could have contributed to incorrect plume data displayed in the Baltimore County EOC. The exercise event wind direction was from 200 degrees and the stability class was “D” as confirmed in the initial notification form received

at the Baltimore County 911 Dispatch Center. The information initially displayed and calculated in D2PC was a wind direction of 280 degrees with a stability class of “C”. Prompt action by the Operations Officer verified the correct meteorological conditions for the event.

Reference: Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, 8.4.1, 4-5.

Recommendation: Modify internal EOC procedures to verify meteorological conditions with the initial notification form or APG prior to displaying plume information data and direction.

Objective 3. Protective Action Recommendations and Decision-Making

At 0847 the Operations Officer received information that an emergency event had occurred at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds. The preliminary information indicated that the Bush River Area of APG was being evacuated. At 0900 the Operations Officer spoke with Harford County and received information that the wind direction is from the west and the direction of the plume was moving east away from Baltimore County. The Operations Officer determined that Baltimore County is not at risk.

Information was confirmed during a CANTS call at 0903 that a Community Level emergency had been declared.

The staff at the Baltimore County EOC demonstrated the ability to make appropriate and timely protective action recommendations.

This objective was successfully demonstrated.

Objective 4. Command and Control

The staff at the Baltimore County EOC demonstrated the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities during the exercise event.

The Operations Officer was clearly in charge of the emergency response. He issued instructions to staff, provided leadership in decision-making, authorized the correct protective action decision and directed coordination with the Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), Harford and Kent counties.

The Traffic Resource Unit of the Baltimore County Police Department was adequately briefed and monitored traffic flow. The Baltimore County Police Department Marine Unit was placed on standby to support the US Coast Guard and Harford County. The Operations Officer prepared staff to quickly mobilize other resources should Harford County request assistance.

Throughout the exercise event, the Operations Officer emphasized that the emergency was in Harford County and Baltimore County was in a support role to the other jurisdictions.

This objective was successfully demonstrated.

Objective 6. Communications Systems, Facilities, Equipment, and Displays

Primary communication systems utilized during the exercise in the Baltimore County EOC were a commercial telephone system, a dedicated telephone system, an intercom system, a two-way radio system, facsimile machines, cellular telephones, pagers, and computer links. RACES/ARES was available if existing systems became overloaded. The communication systems operated without delay or malfunction. The dedicated telephone system is a secure system to prevent false information.

Suitable and appropriate equipment were available in the Baltimore County EOC to manage emergency operations. Grease-marker event logs and maps were available in the operations room as a back-up to electronic displays. Electronic displays could be varied as needed. During this exercise, one electronic display was dedicated to the Emergency Management Information System, the D2PC plume plot. The other displayed a news channel. Computers were available to log information and prepare news releases. Electronic mail was available. Hard copies and electronic copies of maps identifying the protective action zones surrounding the Aberdeen Proving Grounds were also available.

Sufficient space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, and backup power were available to support the Baltimore County EOC.

Personnel followed organizational protocols and procedures regarding communication systems and the EOC facility.

This objective was successfully demonstrated.

Objective 9. Public Affairs

The Baltimore County EOC staff included a Public Information Officer who demonstrated the ability to develop and coordinate the dissemination of clear, accurate, complete and timely information to the news media. The Public Information Staff had access to prompt and complete information about the response of Baltimore County to this event. The Baltimore County Police Department assisted with handling news media inquiries.

A representative from the Baltimore County EOC staff was dispatched to the Near Site Media Center (NSMC). Communication with this representative and the EOC Public Information Officer was by two-way radio. The MEMA notified the Baltimore EOC that the NSMC was fully staffed at 0950.

At 1028 the Public Information Officer verbally began notifying the Baltimore area media by telephone that the incident at the APG posed no threat to the citizens of Baltimore County. A second press release was prepared and sent to the NSMC at 1155. This release contained emergency information helpful to boaters on the Bush River who may be experiencing symptoms of mustard agent exposure.

This objective was successfully demonstrated.

Observation

Description: News Release Header

Discussion: A news release identified as a “Mock Media Story” generated by the Public Information Staff did not include a “Header” identifying the jurisdiction of origin and contact information including address, telephone number, facsimile number, point of contact and e-mail address if available.

Reference: JICsaw III Training Course

Recommendation: Create and use a “Media Release” template for the Office of Emergency Preparedness, Baltimore County, Maryland.

Observation

Description: Official Media Release Location for Baltimore County

Discussion: A news release identified as a “Mock Media Story” generated by the Public Information staff at the EOC was sent to the Baltimore County Public Information representative at the NSMC as a memo. The intent of the memo was to finalize a news release for distribution. This memo was mistakenly distributed as a news release or story by the administrative staff receiving “incoming faxes” at the NSMC.

Reference: Near Site Media Center Procedures

Recommendation: Modify procedures to identify physical location where media releases are distributed to the media, the NSMC or the Baltimore County EOC.

HARFORD COUNTY

INTRODUCTION

Harford County activity involved providing support to the overall exercise play by responding to other player calls and actions with limited EOC staff activation. In addition, Harford County made Protective Action Decisions and issued Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages based on inputs received by other players. Harford County also fully participated in the activities and in support of the NSMC.

Objective 1. Initial Alert and Notification

At 0843, Harford County Emergency Communications Center (ECC) received notification of an incident at the Edgewood area of Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG). Data received from the APG Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at this time indicated only that detectors around the Chemical Agent Storage Yard (CASY) had activated; no level of emergency was declared and no further information was immediately available. Harford County ECC personnel notified Harford County Division of Emergency Operations management and the Harford County Executive immediately following the call from APG EOC. Information received from APG EOC was announced in the EOC at 0847. At 0904, a further call from APG EOC to Harford ECC advised that the detector alarm had been confirmed and that one container of product (HD) was believed to be involved. At 0912, information received was passed to the Harford County EOC and CSEPP telephone lines were transferred to the EOC for further operations. In each case, ECC personnel recorded information on the standardized notification form and used detailed checklists to ensure that accurate information was obtained, all necessary actions were taken, and all required notifications were made.

For the purposes of the exercise, the Harford County EOC was fully staffed and immediately activated (a “hot start”); however, had the EOC not been staffed, dispatch center staff estimate that necessary personnel can be notified in approximately ten minutes. For events requiring immediate action, existing plans and agreements allow APG to activate Harford County sirens and initiate protective actions; existing plans and agreements also allow the ECC supervisor to activate APG and Harford County sirens and initiate protective actions¹.

Objective 2. Hazard Assessment

During the exercise period, Harford County EOC personnel continually assessed the potential hazard to their populace and infrastructure. Using information provided by APG by telephone, by EMIS, and through the APG liaison at the EOC, the EOC staff determined the potential threat and determined what actions would be necessary to provide maximum protection to the public. The potential impact of the incident on infrastructure, including essential public utilities, roads, and rail

¹ Harford County Emergency Operations Plan, Appendix 2

lines, was assessed throughout the incident. EOC management ensured that hazard information received was correct by verifying it through the APG liaison as necessary. EOC personnel frequently re-evaluated the situation to ensure the continued accuracy of their assessment. Plume models and a consolidated incident timeline were projected on large screens, allowing representatives of each functional area to assess how the incident might impact their areas of responsibility.

The Harford County Hazardous Materials Team was alerted at 0950; this provided Harford County with detection and monitoring capability if needed. The Harford County Hazardous Materials Team was also an asset able to respond to APG if requested.

Objective 3. Protective Action Recommendations and Decision-Making

At 0903, Harford County ECC received a call from the APG EOC. At 0912, this information was relayed to the Harford County EOC. Existing plans and memoranda of understanding between APG and Harford County allow APG to automatically implement predetermined protective action decisions based on the potential severity of the incident.² This scenario did not meet the criteria for automatic implementation, and Harford County authorities therefore made the protective action decision.

Based on the initial notification call and EMIS information received from APG, the Harford County Executive decided to order residents of zones 4, 5, 6, and 7 to shelter-in-place. While the plume was not expected to immediately impact Harford County, the County Executive and Division of Emergency Operations staff elected to implement this action as a precaution to ensure protection of the community. Supporting detailed decisions necessary to protect infrastructure and facilities were not neglected. Appropriate protective action recommendations were provided to Amtrak and Conrail operations center to protect traffic on a rail corridor passing through the potential hazard area.

Computer modeling information was the chief source of potential hazard information, although the Harford County Hazardous Materials Team was on alert had field monitoring in Harford County been necessary. As the incident progressed, new data was reviewed, re-plotted, and displayed to allow decision-makers to determine if further action was needed. Decision-makers actively sought needed information through the APG liaison at the EOC.

The APG liaison was also used to ensure that information received from other sources reflected the true situation at the accident site. At the termination of exercise play, the EOC was awaiting confirmation that the spill of product had been mitigated. A plan to terminate protective actions was in place and an EAS message had been prepared for immediate use on receipt of confirmation from APG.

² Harford County Emergency Operations Plan, Appendix 2.

Objective 4. Command and Control

The Harford County Executive and Harford County Division of Emergency Operations management smoothly coordinated and managed their jurisdiction's response to the simulated incident. Representatives of different agencies worked closely together in the EOC to ensure a complete and coordinated response. Operation of the EOC and coordination of staff was managed by the CSEPP program manager. Frequent updates were provided to EOC staff as they worked, and formal briefings were conducted approximately every hour. The EOC responded quickly to changes as they occurred. The level of coordination between all agencies present was exemplary. Operations were conducted according to Harford County's comprehensive emergency operations plan. Functional area representatives each had detailed checklists to ensure that needed functions were carried out.

While Harford County did not issue a disaster declaration and no outside resources were required during the incident, the EOC maintained contact with state authorities through EOC liaisons. Regular updates were provided to the Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA). County agencies were kept advised of the incident as it progressed; EOC personnel contacted their counterparts in other jurisdictions to ensure availability of mutual aid resources, tracked hospital readiness, and had resources available to assist APG if required. An APG liaison was present for the entire incident and was consulted frequently. County agencies were prepared to support each other if required.

It should be noted that pastoral care services were integrated into Harford County's operations to support the community and the responders. A chaplain in the EOC coordinated availability and allocation of pastoral care resources. Harford County has ensured that all denominations within the community have been included in planning for emergency pastoral care.

Objective 5. Public Notification, Instructions, and Emergency Information

The Harford County 911 dispatch was notified by APG at 0843 of an incident. The initial data received from APG indicated only that detectors around the CASY had activated; no level of emergency was declared and no further information was immediately available. An EOC operations staff call down was not required due to the county's "Hot Start" (all staff and agencies were present at the start of the incident).

The county management present in the EOC at the time of the initial notification began doing "contingency planning" and talked through several possible courses of action. They were notified at 0904 from APG that a Community Emergency was being declared.

Upon the notification of the chemical event at APG, the County Management in the EOC evaluated the information, received recommendations from the County Departments and Agencies and declared their PAD to shelter in place sub areas 4, 5, 6, and 7, all overpressure schools and day care centers in those sub areas. They also decided to sound the off-post sirens. This information was disseminated through an EAS message released at 0923. The release was sent to the local EAS

stations, MEMA, APG, the NSMC and Baltimore and Harford County EOCs. As the incident continued there were six additional news releases disseminated to keep the public informed.

The County successfully demonstrated that they could tell the public how to respond to the emergency. However, there seemed to be some disconnect in what they did and what their plan calls for. The first difference was in the county plan calling for the County Public Information Officer to collect the incident information and send it to the State Joint Information Center or the NSMC for release. Instead the County PIO staff did all the press releases from the EOC. The second item deals with the possible confusion of the terms JIC and NSMC. The terms were used interchangeably in several of the news releases and were somewhat confusing.

During this event the County Rumor Control Staff demonstrated that they could receive the emergency information and keep the public well informed in response to local calls.

Objective 6. Communications Systems, Facilities, Equipment, and Displays

Harford County EOC is located in the Harford County Emergency Center and is a modern, well-equipped, organized facility. The EOC has sufficient space, furnishings, equipment and lighting for its intended purpose. It is located within the lower level of the Harford County Emergency Center, which also houses the county 911 center. The EOC has restrooms with showers and a kitchen. The center has redundant telephone and power systems to take care of any emergency that may arise.

The EOC personnel demonstrated during this event that they could effectively use all their equipment, displays and materials to conduct such an emergency operations.

Objective 7. Protective Action Implementation for Special Populations and Facilities

Harford County successfully demonstrated the ability to make and implement the appropriate protective actions for their special populations during this chemical incident. The county had pre-plans and lists of all Special Populations such as schools, day-care centers, pre-school facilities and people with unique medical problems. Actions were taken to identify requirements for sheltering, transportation needs and utility interruptions.

Objective 8. Traffic and Access Control

Harford County has been granted credit for having demonstrated this Objective during a Radiological Emergency Preparedness exercise.

Objective 9. Public Affairs

Harford County clearly demonstrated that they had the ability to disseminate accurate information to the news media and process inquiries from the public during this event. There were seven news

releases prepared and sent out via FAX in a timely and accurate manner. News releases were distributed to the MEMA, Baltimore and Kent Counties, and APG.

The Harford County PIO team received several news releases from various sources during this event. They reviewed for information and keep the EOC management well informed. The PIO team also kept the rumor control team up to date so they could manage the public inquiries.

Objective 10. Medical Services – First Response

Harford County has been granted credit for having demonstrated this Objective during a Radiological Emergency Preparedness exercise.

Objective 11. Medical Services – Transportation

Harford County has been granted credit for having demonstrated this Objective during a Radiological Emergency Preparedness exercise.

Objective 12. Medical Services – Facilities

This Objective will be evaluated by the Maryland Institute for Emergency Services System (MIEMSS) during out of sequence play.

Objective 13. Field Response

Harford County has been granted credit for having demonstrated this Objective during a Radiological Emergency Preparedness exercise.

Objective 14. Screening, Decontamination, Registration & Congregate Care of Evacuees

Harford County has been granted credit for having demonstrated this Objective during a Radiological Emergency Preparedness exercise.

Objective 15. 24-Hour Operations

Harford County has been granted credit for having demonstrated this Objective during a Radiological Emergency Preparedness exercise.

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KENT COUNTY

Objective 1. Initial Alert and Activation

Kent County 911/Dispatch received the initial notification of an event at Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) via the CANTS line at 0903. At 0912, the completed notification form was handed over to the EM staff. After carefully reviewing the information contained on the APG Incident Notification Form the CSEPP Coordinator directed the activation of the EOC and the notification of the appropriate personnel to respond. The EOC Staff notification began at 0913 and was done by an automated call down system. The EOC staff notification was completed at 0918. The CANTS line in the 911 dispatch center was then transferred to the CANTS line in the EOC.

As EOC staff arrived, the CSEPP Coordinator immediately briefed them of the current situation. This allowed them to immediately dispatch response personnel and resources to the boater reception centers at Worton Marina and Tolchester Marina and the American Red Cross Shelter located at the Kent County Board of Education. The EOC was fully staffed and operational by 0935 in a secure orderly manner.

Objective 2. Hazard Assessment

At 0843 the Kent County 911 Center received a notification from APG that MINICAMs were indicating a possible release in the APG Chemical Agent Storage Yard (CASY). The Kent County CSEPP Coordinator quickly reviewed the available information and determined that if a release had occurred, it could impact boaters thus requiring a response from Kent County. At 0903 the initial CANTS notification revealed that MINICAMs indicating the possible presence of chemical agent HD vapors alarmed at APG. The Kent County CSEPP Coordinator and Operations Officer along with the EM Director carefully reviewed the APG CENL information, ran the EMIS D2PC plume projection and determined that indeed this would effect boaters. Based on this information and verification with APG, at 0912 they proceeded to begin EOC activation and notification of the EOC staff..

The EOC Operations Officer and CSEPP Coordinator also determined that the boater reception centers should be opened at the Tolchester and Worton Creek Marinas. After initially making the appropriate decisions based on hazard assessments the Kent County EOC Staff continued monitoring weather conditions and updated information from APG. As information was received it was briefed to the EOC Staff and any changes in conditions were noted. The Kent County EOC Staff demonstrated the ability to conduct hazard assessment during a chemical emergency at APG.

Objective 4. Command and Control

The Kent County EOC command and control structure performed very well in coordinating and directing emergency response and support. The EOC staff handled the situations and tasks that

were presented to them in a knowledgeable, professional manner. The CSEPP Coordinator handled multiple positions until staff positions were filled within the EOC, plus assisting the Operations Officer with managing the EOC. The EM Director filled the position of the Police/Fire representative and assisted with EOC coordination. The CSEPP Coordinator, the Operations Officer, and the EM Director provided leadership and decision-making that dictated a successful operation. Critical information dissemination, public inquiries, questions in the EOC regarding the APG release and Kent County response were all handled quickly and effectively by the command staff.

Objective 5. Public Notification, Instructions, and Emergency Information

Kent County does not generate EAS messages relative to accidents at APG. However, they do exercise the Kent County Boater Reception and Screening Centers in order to medically screen and treat boaters arriving from the vicinity of APG. They have pre-scripted messages to facilitate this notification and they were utilized throughout the exercise.

Upon notification of the chemical accident at APG, the CSEPP Coordinator along with key staff assessed the hazard and determined that residents of Kent County were not at risk. A news release was issued at 0945 stating that there had been an accident at APG and Kent County residents were not at risk. The release was sent to the local EAS station, Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), APG, the Near Site Media Center (NSMC) and the Harford County EOC. A second news release was issued at 0950 notifying the media of a scheduled news conference for 1130. A third news release was issued at 1010 informing the public of the American Red Cross shelter in Chestertown. The fourth news release was issued at 1045 informing the public of Mustard agent signs and symptoms. The fifth and final news release was issued at 1120 reporting the number of boaters screened for possible mustard agent exposure. Verification sheets were printed for each news release to ensure messages were received. Follow-up phone calls were made to all jurisdictions in order to verify receipt of information.

Marine broadcasts were made alerting boaters in the affected areas of the potential danger and informing them to proceed to one of the screening centers established. The screening centers were located at Worton Creek and Tolchester Beach Marinas. All other marinas were notified of the incident and informed to send boaters from the affected area to the screening centers.

Objective 6. Communications Systems, Facilities, Equipment, and Displays

Kent County demonstrated the capability to communicate to the appropriate response agencies and personnel in field locations such as the marina reception centers, the Red Cross shelter, and the hospital. Telephones, FAX machines, VHF radios and RACES/Ham Radios were used to communicate vital information. Cell phones proved to be unreliable at the Tolchester Marina, Reception Center, and only somewhat reliable at the Worton Creek Marina in establishing communications with the Kent County EOC. RACES/ Ham Radio operators once in place, provided dependable communications from both marinas to the EOC for the duration of the exercise. RACES also provided communications for the Red Cross Shelter and back up communications for the

hospital. RACES proved to be an invaluable asset to Kent County for dependable communications. However, sometimes the transmission of important information to the EOC from the reception centers at the marinas and to the Red Cross shelter by ham radio was slow due to the time it takes to write, read and copy the messages, then hand them to the appropriate party. Using packet radio and printing the received information could transmit this information quicker.

Kent County's EOC is a well-equipped, organized, functional facility that has adequate space and furnishings for necessary emergency operations activities. It is located in the basement of the Kent County Detention Center along with the 911 Center. By having restrooms with showers, cooking facilities, backup emergency power, good security and sleeping quarters, it is more than adequate for extended operations. In the EOC there are computers, fax machines, telephones for each workstation, copiers, a ham radio station, an automated notification system, dedicated weather computer, and the CSEPP Alert and Notification Telephone System (CANTS), which is located in the 911 center and in the EOC. Maps and status boards are readily accessible and a TV is positioned for easy viewing of EAS information or for viewing the computer status board.

Objective 9. Public Affairs

There were five new releases prepared and sent out via FAX in a timely and accurate manner. News releases were distributed to the Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), Harford County EMA, APG, Kent and Queen Anne's Hospital and the Near Site Media Center (NSMC).

The Kent County EOC received a news release indicating the release of a "nerve" agent at APG. The EOC staff was knowledgeable of the type of chemical stored at the Chemical Agent Storage Yard (CASY) and preceded to verify the news release for accuracy. Once it was determined to be mustard chemical agent and not a nerve agent, the EOC sent out a news release identifying the correct agent.

The Kent County EMA held a news conference at 1130 in the garage of the Sheriffs Department.. The Public Information Officer was the main spokesperson at the news conference. A health Department spokesperson was made available to answer questions from the media.

Observation

Description: Lack of coherent presentation and information

Discussion: The Public Information Officer was the main spokesperson at the news conference. The news conference lacked a coherent presentation of information. Information skipped from marinas to the EOC to the hospital and back to the marinas and shelter. It was difficult to follow and the presentation contained jargon and acronyms such as CSEPP and plume. Incorrect information was disseminated, i.e., 2000 pounds of mustard agent leaked out of the one ton container.

Recommendation: Spokespeople need to remember that the media will not contain their questions to information specific to that jurisdiction. Many questions that media will ask can be anticipated. Answers to these questions should be prepared in advance so that the agency appears as knowledgeable and credible as possible.

Observation

Description: Facility Problematic for the Media

Discussion: The lighting was poor, telephones kept ringing and an overhead fan kept turning on and off. These distractions caused sound problems for the media that may mean any video coverage may not be useable. This could cause problems getting the county's message out to the public.

Recommendation: Kent County consider changing the location of the press conferences or improve existing facility to correct noted shortcomings.

Objective 12. Medical Services – Medical Facilities

Upon receiving alert of the event, the entire hospital staff was advised via the overhead paging system, administrators and supervisors reported to the ED for information and to discuss preparation. A decontamination area was set up. A Pre-PPE physical of the decontamination teams was obtained. All hospital doors were secured by security and all entry to the hospital was redirected to a single secure door to prevent contamination to the facility.

Communications were established with the marinas and the EOC using the RACES network. A Code Green was announced on the overhead paging system when it was determined that patients were en-route. Upon arrival of patients, the secondary decontamination was adequately performed. Patients were triaged by an RN and assigned to a registration clerk. Patients were transferred to appropriate treatment areas as registration information was being obtained. Decontamination team stay times were monitored and the team was rotated out after 30 minutes

Ten (10) patients were presented to the Emergency Department. All patients were managed appropriately, receiving triage and medical treatment. Once all patients had been processed through triage, appropriate clean up of the decontamination area was initiated by staff in personal protective equipment (PPE). Decontamination teams were given exit physicals. Code Green Clear was announced on the overhead paging system and all activities terminated.

Objective 14. Screening, Decontamination, Registration, & Congregate Care of Evacuees

The American Red Cross supports Kent County CSEPP activities by being available to open and manage a shelter for boaters who have been screened and are deemed “clean” but have no means of transportation to get back across the river.

The Kent County unit of the Upper Chesapeake Chapter of the American Red Cross demonstrated their capability to open, staff, and manage a shelter in accordance with ARC guidelines. Should there be an incident at APG that requires boaters being taken to a shelter, they would be transported from the marinas to the American Red Cross shelter either at the Board of Education facility in Chestertown or to another designated facility.

Upon request by the Kent County Emergency Management Agency, the Red Cross liaison along with other core EOC agencies reported to the EOC. The Red Cross liaison arrived at the EOC at 0916. At 0920 the Red Cross liaison called the Red Cross staff person and requested them to open the office for the RACES staff person. At 0922 the Kent County EOC requested the Red Cross place the shelter on stand-by to receive boaters evacuated from the river.

Due to a blood drive being scheduled in the auditorium of the Board of Education building, the Red Cross established the shelter within their office space. Should this have been an actual evacuation the shelter would have been relocated to the Chestertown Fire station. Present at the shelter were the Red Cross Disaster Chair, one shelter manager, one nurse, one registration person, three feeding personnel, and one RACES operator to support the shelter operation. Signs were placed outside the shelter. Parking was limited, but available. Registration and other needed forms were on hand, and the shelter staff was briefed as to their roles and responsibilities.

The Red Cross had shelter manager kits that contained the needed signs, forms, and procedures.

Tolchester Marina

The Health Department Medical Staff was notified at 0935 and arrived at the Boater Reception Center at the Tolchester Marina at 1002. RACES established a communication link with the Kent County EOC. The Fire Police set up red cones and yellow tape to secure the site at 1010. Yellow tape was used to secure screening areas by the Medical Staff. Screening, decontamination, and registration areas were set up at 1015. Additional supplies were in storage containers to aid in quick response. Screening of evacuees began at 1030. The Medical Staff began decontamination of evacuees at 1030. The Medical Staff had communications with screening areas, the Kent County EOC, and Kent & Queen Anne’s Hospital, by means of commercial and HAM radios. The Medical Staff collected all necessary information from the boater evacuees and filled out the appropriate paperwork. At 1049 the Medical Staff Leader received the geographic information on the plume. RACES notified the hospital that they would be receiving evacuees that continued to have symptoms of mustard chemical agent exposure after decontamination. Those not having symptoms after decontamination were released with family or would be transported to the shelter. Personal property was collected and given to the Fire Police. Decontamination consisted of a soap and water shower. Medical Staff explained

why the people were required to shower, what would happen to their personal property, as well as how to continue to monitor for signs and symptoms of exposure. The staff was knowledgeable and carried out their duties in a professional manner. The Fire Police explained that their duties were to keep anyone from entering the area, secure the contaminated vessels, and supply 24-hour security until the Maryland Department of Environment arrived.

Worton Creek Marina

The Fire Police provided traffic and access control from the onset of the incident, as well as security for the boaters and their personal belongings. The Fire Police established a control zone, which was marked by yellow tape. The control zone provided for traffic flow from the dock to the screening area. Mock media conducted an interview with a member of the Fire Police, who provided a detailed description of his role in this event. The Fire Police also described the procedures for boat decontamination, stating that boats would be secured until the Maryland Department of the Environment could decontaminate them.

Communication was established with the Kent County EOC staff via the RACES operator. Since cell phones were not always capable of transmitting, the RACES operator was the integral link for communications.

A nursing team from the Kent County Health Department provided registration and medical screening for boaters at the Worton Creek Marina. The medical team received notification to deploy to the marina at 0920 and arrived at the location at 0955. Despite adverse wind conditions the medical team did an excellent job of setting up screening centers prior to receiving the boaters. The marina was fully operational at 1000. A registration center was established at the base of the dock and a nurse's station at the shower area. At 1020 the lead nurse received the plume projection coordinates from the Health Officer at the EOC via cell phone. Boaters were registered and evaluated for exposure through a series of questions.

The boaters were asked from which direction they had come. The geographic location was then plotted on a map to identify whether the boaters had been within the projected plume area. All boaters were directed to the nurse's station. The boaters were required to shower if they were in the projected plume area whether or not they experienced symptoms. The Fire Police bagged and labeled personal belongings with the owner's name, and then stored them for further decontamination. They were provided fresh clothing, re-screened, and transported via ambulance to the hospital for further evaluation. All forms were available and were accurately and completely filled out.

The Worton Creek Marina activities were conducted in accordance with procedures.

U.S COAST GUARD (USCG)

Objective 4 Command and Control

Command and control of response activities at the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) was exercised by the Operations Response group. Based on the scale of events, staffing in the operations center included two watch standers and the designee of the head of Operations Response, who arrived at 0900. Two additional Operations Response personnel were sent to the Maryland Emergency Operations Center in Reisterstown as liaisons at 0902 and effectively remained in contact with Curtis Bay staff throughout the exercise via telephone. In addition, actual coordination of incident data and issues with non-playing personnel was demonstrated with regard to public information requests (through the PA officer), dissemination of protective action decisions (through the Ship Desk), and overall command and control (through the head of Operations Response).

Personnel in the operations center worked together smoothly and efficiently. A clear chain of command, as well as delegation of authority in keeping with regularly assigned duties, was demonstrated. Although lacking technical training in the CSEPP release modeling approach, they were nevertheless able to identify the incident information in each notification necessary to evaluate and implement protective actions for the maritime zone. Issues of particular concern were brought forward for timely resolution through group input regarding available resources and response options, even though the number of “active” issues exceeded the number of staff on several occasions. Personnel followed through on each injected event to an appropriate conclusion, and prioritization of “real-life” emergency calls was displayed without hindering exercise play.

Although information requests received were answered or redirected to the appropriate parties, the primary response actions selected were entirely simulated:

- Closure of the Chesapeake Bay through issuance of an Urgent Marine Information Broadcast (UMIB) on Channel 16 and dispatch of vessels;
- Response coordination through issuance of a Mutual Aid Broadcast in conjunction with the UMIB; and
- Redirection of potentially contaminated vessels to decontamination sites in Kent County.

Objective 5 Public Notification, Instructions, and Emergency Information

Due to the limited extent of play for the exercise, public information activities were considerably restricted at the USCG. No public affairs/information officer was available to staff the Operations Center, although the designated officer at Curtis Bay was kept advised of relevant exercise events. As a result, mock media reports were not reviewed on a regular basis, nor were any press releases prepared. Further, there is currently no formal involvement of the USCG in the Joint Information System or Near Site Media Center. Nevertheless, ongoing communications between the Operations

Center and the two liaison officers sent to the Maryland Emergency Operations Center served to coordinate response activities effectively.

The primary means of disseminating public information demonstrated in the exercise is an Urgent Marine Information Broadcast (UMIB), which is broadcast on an emergency channel regularly monitored by boaters. Three clear and concise messages were prepared by the watch standers during the exercise, but their issuance was simulated. A UMIB was initially issued at 0917 and subsequently revised and reissued at 0926 and 0955. Based on the nature of the emergency, it was set to rebroadcast at 15-minute intervals until cancelled. The content of the UMIBs was determined in a timely manner by the senior officer present based on input from the watch standers and Operations Response personnel. In response to a request at 1109, the text of the UMIB was emailed to their liaisons at the Maryland EOC.

**ABERDEEN COMMUNITY CSEPP EX 01
EXERCISE REPORT**

APPENDIX 1: ACTION PLANS

This Appendix contains the action plans of the Aberdeen Community jurisdictions for findings identified in Aberdeen CSEPP EX 01 and/or the resolution of findings from previous Aberdeen CSEPP exercises.

Aberdeen Proving Ground1-3
Aberdeen Community1-5

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ACTION PLAN FOR ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND
Aberdeen Community CSEPP Exercise 2001
(18 April 2001)

FINDING NUMBER	SHORT TITLE	RESPONSIBLE FOR CORRECTION	COMPLETION DATE								
AP01A10.1	Upon Evacuating the Area No Buddy Aid was Given	APG Directorate for Law Enforcement and Security.	8 May 2001								
<p>CORRECTIVE ACTION/COMMENT: First Aid/Buddy Aid are taught in annual refresher training. Emphasis will be placed on buddy aid during annual training. Emphasis will also be placed on performing during exercises as you would for the real world. For exercises, no one is actually injured, making it hard to play real world. (As stated in finding, when prompted the guard assessed his partners' condition).</p> <p>Areas needing improvement (check all that apply):</p> <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; border: none;">_____ Training</td> <td style="width: 50%; border: none;">_____ Staffing</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">_____ Equipment</td> <td style="border: none;">_____ Plan(s)</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">_____ Facilities</td> <td style="border: none;">_____ Procedures</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">_____ Other (specify) _____</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>				_____ Training	_____ Staffing	_____ Equipment	_____ Plan(s)	_____ Facilities	_____ Procedures	_____ Other (specify) _____	
_____ Training	_____ Staffing										
_____ Equipment	_____ Plan(s)										
_____ Facilities	_____ Procedures										
_____ Other (specify) _____											

FINDING NUMBER	SHORT TITLE	RESPONSIBLE FOR CORRECTION	COMPLETION DATE								
AP01A13.1	Smoking Around Butyl Rubber Clothing	Technical Escort Unit (TEU)	17 May 2001								
<p>CORRECTIVE ACTION/COMMENT: TEU will conduct a safety briefing in the alert room during all responses and conduct refresher training during quarterly CAIRA.</p> <p>Areas needing improvement (check all that apply):</p> <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; border: none;">_____ Training</td> <td style="width: 50%; border: none;">_____ Staffing</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">_____ Equipment</td> <td style="border: none;">_____ Plan(s)</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">_____ Facilities</td> <td style="border: none;">_____ Procedures</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">_____ Other (specify) _____</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>				_____ Training	_____ Staffing	_____ Equipment	_____ Plan(s)	_____ Facilities	_____ Procedures	_____ Other (specify) _____	
_____ Training	_____ Staffing										
_____ Equipment	_____ Plan(s)										
_____ Facilities	_____ Procedures										
_____ Other (specify) _____											

ACTION PLAN FOR ABERDEEN COMMUNITY
Aberdeen Community CSEPP Exercise 2001
(April 18, 2001)

FINDING NUMBER	SHORT TITLE	RESPONSIBLE FOR CORRECTION	COMPLETION DATE																
See: AC00B01.1 AP99A05.1 CLOSED	Chemical Event Emergency Notification to the Public	ECA	April 2001 April 2000																
<p>CORRECTIVE ACTION/COMMENT: The initial alert and notification is under review by both on and off post emergency managers. Procedures will be effected to ensure the off post community is provided accurate and detailed information in a timely manner.</p> <p>Areas needing improvement (check all that apply):</p> <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 25%; border: none;">_____</td> <td style="width: 25%; border: none;">Training</td> <td style="width: 25%; border: none;">_____</td> <td style="width: 25%; border: none;">Staffing</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">_____</td> <td style="border: none;">Equipment</td> <td style="border: none;">_____</td> <td style="border: none;">Plan(s)</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">_____</td> <td style="border: none;">Facilities</td> <td style="border: none;">_____</td> <td style="border: none;">Procedures</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">_____</td> <td colspan="3" style="border: none;">Other (specify) ___x_____</td> </tr> </table>				_____	Training	_____	Staffing	_____	Equipment	_____	Plan(s)	_____	Facilities	_____	Procedures	_____	Other (specify) ___x_____		
_____	Training	_____	Staffing																
_____	Equipment	_____	Plan(s)																
_____	Facilities	_____	Procedures																
_____	Other (specify) ___x_____																		

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**ABERDEEN COMMUNITY CSEPP EXERCISE 2001
(Aberdeen CSEPP EX 01)**

EXERCISE REPORT

APPENDIX 2: ACRONYMS

ABCDF	Aberdeen Chemical Disposal Facility
ACP	Access Control Point
AMC	Army Material Command
AOC	Army Operations Center
APG	Aberdeen Proving Ground
ARC	American Red Cross
BDO	Battle-dress Overgarment
BVO	Black Vinyl Overboots
CAI	Chemical Accident/Incident
CAICO	Chemical Accident/Incident Commanding Officer
CAIRA	Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance
CAM	Chemical Agent Monitor
CANTS	CSEPP Accident Notification Telephone System
CASY	Chemical Agent Storage Yard
CDC	Center for Disease Control
CENL	Chemical Event Notification Level
CER	Chemical Event Report
CSEPP	Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
D2PC	Dispersion & Dissemination For Personal Computers
DAAMS	Deport Area Air Monitoring System
DA PAM	Department of the Army Pamphlet
DCP	Disaster Control Plan
DOD	Department of Defense (US)
EAHC	Edgewood Activity Health Clinic
EAS	Emergency Alert System
ECA	Edgewood Chemical Activity
ECBC	Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
ECC	Emergency Communications Center
ED	Emergency Department
EIS	Emergency Information System
EM	Emergency Management
EMD	Emergency Management Director
EMIS	Emergency Management Information System
EMS	Emergency Medical Service
EMT	Emergency Medical Technician
EMT	Emergency Medical Technician

ENDEX.....	End of Exercise
EOC.....	Emergency Operations Center
EOD.....	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EOP.....	Emergency Operations Plan
EPDS.....	Emergency Personnel Decontamination Station
EPZ.....	Emergency Planning Zone
ER.....	Emergency Room
ESLO.....	Emergency State Liaison Officer
EX.....	Exercise
FAA.....	Federal Aviation Administration
FAX.....	facsimile
FCP.....	Field Command Post
FCPO.....	Field Command Point Officer
FEM.....	First Entry Monitoring
FEMA.....	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FEMIS.....	Federal Emergency Management Information System
GPS.....	Global Positioning System
HD.....	Type of Mustard Agent
HEICS.....	Hospital Emergency Incident Command System
ICS.....	Incident Command System
IEP.....	Initial Entry Party
IOC.....	Industrial Operations Command
IP.....	Implementing Procedures
IRF.....	Initial Response Force
JIC.....	Joint Information Center
JIS.....	Joint Information System
LAN.....	Local Area Network
m/s.....	Meters per second
MCE.....	Maximum Credible Event
MEMA.....	Maryland Emergency Management Agency
MHz.....	Megahertz
MINICAM.....	Miniature Continuous Air Monitoring System
MOU.....	Memorandum of Understanding
MPDT.....	Mobile Personnel Decontamination Trailer
MSDS.....	Material Safety Data Sheets
NAWAS.....	National Alert and Warning System
NRC.....	National Response Center
NSMC.....	Near- Site Media Center
OC.....	Operations Center

OCP..... Operational Control Point
OSHA..... Occupational Safety and Health Administration (US)

PA Public Address (System)
PAD..... Protective Action Decision
PAO..... Public Affairs Officer/Office
PAPR..... Portable Air-Pressurized Respirator
PAR..... Protective Action Recommendation
PDS..... Personnel Decontamination Site
PIC Public Information Center
PIO Public Information Officer
POC..... Point of Contact
PORs Points of Review
PPE..... Personal Protective Equipment

RACES..... Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services
RSP..... Render Safe Procedure
RTAP Real Time Analytical Platform

SBCCOM..... Soldiers, Biological, and Chemical Command
SEOC State Emergency Operations Center
SIMCELL Simulation Cell
SOP Standing Operating Procedures
STARTEX..... Start of Exercise

TARs..... Tone Alert Radios
TCP Traffic Control Points
TEU..... Technical Escort Unit
TWA Time Weighted Average

UHF..... Ultra-High Frequency
USANCA U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency

ABERDEEN COMMUNITY TWO-LETTER IDENTIFIER CODES:

AP	Aberdeen Proving Ground	AC	Aberdeen Community
MD	State of Maryland	BA	Baltimore County
HA	Harford County	KE	Kent County

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**ABERDEEN COMMUNITY CSEPP EXERCISE 2001
(Aberdeen CSEPP EX 01)**

EXERCISE REPORT

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