Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief

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Summary

The FY2015 continuing appropriations resolution (P.L. 113-164, H.J.Res. 124, FY2015 CR), enacted on September 19, 2014, authorized the Department of Defense (DOD) through December 11, 2014, or until the passage of a FY2015 national defense authorization act (NDAA), to provide overt assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, and sustainment, to vetted members of the Syrian opposition and other vetted Syrians for select purposes. The FY2015 NDAA (P.L. 113-291, H.R. 3979) and the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235, H.R. 83) provide further authority and funding for the program. Congress acted in response to President Obama’s request for authority to begin such a program as part of U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria and to set the conditions for a negotiated settlement to Syria’s civil war.

The FY2015 measures authorize DOD to submit reprogramming requests to the four congressional defense committees to transfer available funds. DOD submitted the first such reprogramming request in November 2014 under authorities provided by P.L. 113-164, and, in December, Congress approved $220 million in requested funds to begin program activities. H.R. 83 states that up to $500 million of $1.3 billion made available by the act for a new Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) may be used to support the Syria train and equip program. Additional funds could be available for this program if DOD chose to transfer funds from other DOD accounts or received contributions from other countries.

Compared with the authority first adopted in the September 2014 CR, the FY2015 NDAA and its accompanying explanatory statement further specify the types of assistance to be provided, expand reporting requirements, include human rights and rule of law commitments, set vetting requirements, authorize the provision of assistance to third countries for the purposes of the program, and create a broad waiver authority for the President to implementing a train and equip program for Syria subject to approval of a reprogramming to transfer the funds. The authority provided in the NDAA expires after December 31, 2016; the authority related to this assistance provided in the FY2015 appropriations act expires on September 30, 2015.

This report reviews the authorities and funds granted by Congress for the Syria train and equip program to date and explores similarities and differences among them and the President’s requests.


For analysis of proposals related to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force relative to the Islamic State, see CRS Report R43760, A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: Comparison of Proposals in Brief, by Matthew C. Weed.
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Introduction

Congress and the President have debated proposals for the provision of U.S. assistance to the Syrian opposition since the outbreak of the Syrian uprising in 2011. Members of Congress have articulated varying views on the potential purposes, scope, risks, and rewards of such assistance. The executive branch, with the support of Congress, has provided overt non-lethal assistance to unarmed and armed groups in Syria, in addition to providing humanitarian assistance in Syria and in neighboring countries. U.S. assistance and weaponry also reportedly has been provided to select Syrian opposition groups under covert action authorities.1 Until mid-2014, President Obama and some Members of Congress were opposed to the overt provision of U.S. military training or equipment to opposition forces reportedly in part because of concerns about its effectiveness.

The President’s stance was altered by the failure in early 2014 of United Nations-backed negotiations aimed at ending the Syrian civil war and the mid-2014 offensive in Iraq by the extremist group known as the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL or ISIS). In the Administration’s June 2014 amended request for war funding, President Obama requested authority and funding from Congress to begin an overt “train and equip” program for vetted Syrians for the following purposes:

- defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Syrian regime, facilitating the provision of essential services, and stabilizing territory controlled by the opposition;
- defending the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from the threats posed by terrorists in Syria; and,
- promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.

The President amended the request in September to reflect additional goals for combatting the Islamic State.

H.J.Res. 124 (P.L. 113-164, “the CR”) contained a temporary authorization for the training and equipping of vetted Syrians that differed from the Administration’s June and September requests. The CR’s provisions expired on December 11, 2014.

The FY2015 NDAA (Sections 1209, 1510, and 1534 of H.R. 3979, P.L. 113-291) and the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (‘Counterterrorism Partnership Fund’ and Section 9016 of H.R. 83, P.L. 113-235) provide further authority and funding for the program. Like the CR, H.R. 3979 and H.R. 83 authorize the provision of U.S. assistance to vetted Syrians by the Department of Defense (DOD) in coordination with the State Department for the following purposes:

1) Defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and securing territory controlled by the Syrian opposition.

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1 Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said in a September 2013 hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Administration was taking steps to provide arms to some Syrian rebels under covert action authorities. Secretary Hagel described lethal assistance program and said, “This is, as you know, a covert action. And, as Secretary Kerry noted, probably to [go] into much more detail would—would require a closed or classified hearing.”
(2) Protecting the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from the threats posed by terrorists in Syria.

(3) Promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.

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**Chronology of “Train and Equip” Proposals**

- In 2013, legislation was introduced in both houses of Congress (H.R. 1327, S. 617, and S. 960) and considered by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (S. 960) that would have provided authority to provide training and assistance to armed elements of the Syrian opposition, subject to certain conditions.

- In June 2014, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported its version of the FY2015 defense authorization bill, S. 2410, which would have provided a comparable, conditional authority, and, later that month, the Obama Administration requested related so-called “train and equip” authority and funding as part of its Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request to Congress for FY2015.

- Senate Appropriations Committee Members debated and approved a version of “train and equip” authority for Syrians in July 2014 in their reported version of the FY2015 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 4870 RS). The Senate Appropriations Committee considered and rejected a proposed amendment to strip the authority and related funding from the bill. The House-enacted version of the bill does not include such authority.

- In September, the Obama Administration submitted an informal revision of its OCO request to Congress to reflect its new goal of “degrading and defeating” the “Islamic State” organization in Iraq and Syria.

- On September 15, Representative Howard “Buck” McKeon, who is Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, introduced an amendment (hereinafter the McKeon Amendment) to the FY2015 continuing resolution (H.J.Res. 124) that represented a counterproposal to the President’s informal revision. The House adopted the amendment (H.Amdt. 1141) by a vote of 273 to 156 on September 17, and the Senate passed the amended bill by a vote of 78 to 22 on September 18. The amendment text is included as Section 149 of H.J.Res. 124/P.L. 113-164.

- FY2015 Department of Defense appropriations, which included funds and authorities for the Department of Defense to train and equip vetted Syrians, were enacted in H.R. 83. On December 11, the House agreed to the final version of H.R. 83 by a vote 219-206. This version was agreed to by the Senate two days later, by a vote of 56-40. President Obama signed H.R. 83 into law (P.L.113-235) on December 16, 2014.

- The FY2015 NDAA (H.R.3979) also included authorities for the Department of Defense to train and equip vetted Syrians. On December 4, the House adopted the final version of the NDAA by a vote of 300-119. The Senate agreed to the House version on December 12, 2014, by a vote of 89-11. President Obama signed the bill into law (P.L. 113-291) on December 19, 2014.

Relative to the authority enacted in the CR, the FY2015 appropriations and NDAA:

- Expand the types of assistance to be provided from training and equipment to include stipends and construction of training and other facilities.

- Add vetting requirements for program participants to include commitment to human rights, rule of law, and “a peaceful and democratic Syria.”

- Require 15-day advance notifications of a detailed plan before funds can be obligated, and continue to require approval by the four congressional defense committees of individual reprogramming requests.

- Add criteria to notification and progress reporting requirements to provide further metrics for program evaluation.

- Authorize assistance to third countries for program-related purposes.
While the Syrian program could draw on FY2015 CTPF funds that are available for two years, during execution, these funds would be transferred to individual Operation and Maintenance (O&M) accounts that are available for one-year.

End (“sunset”) the authority on December 31, 2016, and limit related funds to FY2015 monies and reprogramming requests to OCO-designated Defense funds available from October 1, 2014, through September 30, 2016.

Permit the President to waive any other provisions of law that would otherwise restrict the provision of assistance authorized for the Syria program, provided that the President notifies Congress 30-days in advance.

Policy Questions and Potential Implications

Members of Congress have considered a number of basic policy questions when considering the creation and extension of “train and equip” authority related to the ongoing conflict in Syria. These questions include:

- For what purposes, if any, should the United States train and equip Syrians? How might the short and long term goals of the United States and those of Syrians align or conflict?
- Who should receive such U.S. training and assistance? Will DOD develop an effective vetting process that complies with the criteria in the law?
- How much and what types of training and equipment will be sufficient to accomplish stated U.S. objectives or achieve the stated purposes of authorizing language? How might the “train and equip” mission expand in size, geographic scope, depending on different scenarios? What risks might such expansion pose? How much might this level of effort cost and how long might it take to reach these goals?
- How should such a program be funded? Through base budget funding or overseas contingency operations funding-designated (OCO) funds not subject to budget caps? How long should authority for such a program be available and on what terms? How might this program affect other defense or foreign assistance priorities? Is there sufficient public support for a potentially long-standing commitment?
- Will DOD exercise its waiver authority to exempt this program from terrorism, human rights, and other constraints in U.S. law? Under what circumstances might waivers of such legislation be necessary? How might the executive branch’s use of any waiver provisions provided affect perceptions of U.S. foreign policy abroad or the effectiveness of U.S. assistance in Syria and in other places?
- What assistance should be provided to third countries in relation to a Syria train and equip program if any?
- How effective have other “train and equip” programs been in other contexts? What lessons learned from those efforts should be applied to a Syria-related effort? How should success be defined and assessed?
Political-Military Context

Current political-military conditions in Syria may pose challenges for U.S. efforts to train and equip vetted Syrians for U.S.-defined purposes. Most armed opposition groups have sought U.S. and other third-party assistance since the outbreak of conflict for the expressed purpose of toppling the government of Bashar al Asad and replacing it with various Islamist or secular alternatives. Legislation enacted by Congress to date would not authorize the provision of U.S. assistance for this purpose and identifies the Islamic State organization rather than the Syrian government as the entity from which Syrians should be trained and equipped to protect themselves. U.S. assistance may aid vetted Syrians in providing for the defense of territory under opposition control, but assistance to support offensive operations by U.S.-trained forces has not been explicitly authorized.

President Obama has suggested that U.S. engagement will remain focused “narrowly” on assisting Syrians in combatting the Islamic State, while continuing “to look for opportunities” to support a political resolution to Syria’s conflict.² In an October 2014 interview with London-based newspaper Al Sharq Al Awsat, U.S. anti-IS coalition leader General (ret.) John Allen reportedly responded to a question about whether Syrian units being trained to fight the Islamic State would be “those who will later fight the regime’s armed forces” by saying:

No. What we would like to see is for the FSA [Free Syrian Army] and the forces that we will ultimately generate, train and equip to become the credible force that the Assad government ultimately has to acknowledge and recognize. There is not going to be a military solution here [in Syria]. We have to create so much credibility within the moderate Syrian opposition at a political level ... that they earn their spot at the table when the time comes for the political solution. Now, there could be FSA elements that ultimately clash with the regime, that may well be the case, as they seek to defend themselves and those areas that they dominate and as they seek to defend their families and their ways of life ... it could be an outcome. But the intent is not to create a field force to liberate Damascus—that is not the intent. The intent is that in the political outcome, they [the moderate Syrian opposition] must be a prominent—perhaps the preeminent voice—at the table to ultimately contribute to the political outcome that we seek.³

In December, General Allen’s deputy, Ambassador Brett McGurk told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the program should begin training efforts in March 2015 and that U.S. trainees “will be organized to fight ISIS, but they’re also going to be able to defend themselves against the [Asad] regime.” Some Syrian political and military opposition forces appear to resent a narrow focus on the Islamic State and some have indicated they may insist on broader support for their anti-Asad goals as a condition of working with a U.S.-backed coalition against the group.

Legislation enacted by Congress envisions the use of U.S. training and equipment to promote undefined “conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.” Most parties assume such a settlement would include some changes to the leadership or structure of the Syrian government. Administration officials have not publicly described mechanisms under

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² The President said, “our attitude towards Asad continues to be that you know, through his actions, through using chemical weapons on his own people, dropping barrel bombs that killed innocent children that he—he has foregone legitimacy. But when it comes to our policy and the coalition that we’re putting together, our focus specifically is on ISIL. It’s narrowly on ISIL.” President Obama interview with NBC News Meet the Press, September 6, 2014.

consideration for ensuring that U.S. training and assistance is used for congressionally defined purposes and not for others. It is not clear how the Administration intends to direct types and amounts of assistance in order to achieve discrete security-related goals along with the inherently political goal of promoting conditions conducive to a negotiated conflict settlement. Insofar as this political goal may be dependent on variables outside of U.S. control, it may be more difficult to assess whether given levels and types of assistance are “enough” to achieve it.

While the Department of Defense is currently planning to train 5,400 Syrian program participants in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar over the coming year that mission could expand.

Measuring “Effectiveness”

As in past cases involving the provision of U.S. security assistance, different observers may define “success” and “effectiveness” differently based on their perspectives and priorities about the proper purposes and scope of assistance. For example, in the current Syria case, observers differ over whether a training program should train and equip vetted fighters to offensively attack Islamic State forces or pro-Asad forces or whether it should focus on enabling Syrians to better defend against Islamic State or government attacks.

There are no direct recent analogues to the type of overt and broadly defined “train and equip” program for vetted Syrians recently authorized by Congress. Most current “train and equip” authorities are far more limited in scope and funding, and targeted to government security forces. Independent evaluations of some recent U.S. security assistance programs suggest that even when measured against broadly stated purposes and objectives, these types of programs can face significant difficulties in implementation or show questionable results including the far larger and longer-lasting efforts to train Iraq and Afghan security forces over the past decade.

Programs with some partial similarities in context and content to the Syria program include the following:

- Congress debated and imposed limits on the purposes and scope of covert U.S. assistance programs to so-called resistance movements in Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Nicaragua during the 1980s and early 1990s. While these efforts occurred in similarly complex conflict settings, they were perceived to be part of a global U.S.-Soviet confrontation of the Cold War. Their relative successes and failures remain the subject of ongoing study and debate.

- In 1998, Congress authorized the drawdown of Department of Defense goods and services for Iraqi opposition groups, but did not authorize sustained or direct U.S. training or the transfer of weaponry. A subsequent Department of Defense

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4 See the work of the Special Inspectors General for Afghanistan and Iraq Reconstruction on respective efforts to train and equip security forces in those countries. See also, RAND, “How Successful Are U.S. Efforts to Build Capacity in Developing Countries? A Framework to Assess the Global Train and Equip ‘1206’ Program,” Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Beth Grill, Joe Hogler, Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, Christopher Paul, Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2011. See also discussion in CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco


6 The Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998) gave President Clinton the authority to provide up to $97 (continued...)
training program for so-called Free Iraqi Forces in early 2003 trained a small number of recruits to facilitate U.S. civil-military operations in Iraq.7

- The Sudan Peace Act (P.L. 107-245, October 21, 2002) authorized President George W. Bush “to provide increased assistance to the areas of Sudan that are not controlled by the Government of Sudan to prepare the population for peace and democratic governance, including support for civil administration, communications infrastructure, education, health, and agriculture.” In support of these purposes, the act authorized to be appropriated $100 million in fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005 “to remain available until expended.” Some recipients of U.S. assistance authorized by the act held both civilian and military leadership positions in the South Sudanese opposition.

- The U.S. government has provided overt training and equipment to Palestinian security forces for strictly defined purposes using foreign affairs authorities and funds, but participants in those programs are members of official Palestinian Authority security bodies rather than individuals unaffiliated or not currently affiliated with official government institutions.8

- The Obama Administration notified Congress of a drawdown of up to $25 million in U.S. government goods and services for Libyan forces in 2011, but Congress did not act to expressly authorize U.S. military engagement in a “train and equip” program for Libyan opposition members.

The provision of overt assistance to non-governmental groups poses particular challenges. Members of Congress may want to consider some of the policy questions that were debated during consideration of these efforts when conducting oversight of the new “train and equip” assistance program for vetted Syrians. In particular, Members of Congress may wish to consider:

- the net effects of the introduction of outside arms and training in previous cases on the prospects for conflict settlement, the duration and intensity of violence, U.S. national security goals, and humanitarian conditions;

- the potential tradeoffs and dilemmas associated with the pursuit of specific short-term security or counterterrorism objectives alongside longer term political goals and the promotion of human rights and democratic governance;

- the relative roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense and the Department of State in carrying out this program;

(continued)

million worth of defense articles and services to designated Iraqi opposition groups. A designation procedure and criteria for identifying eligible groups was also prescribed by the act in Section 5, stating that only those organizations that (1) include a broad spectrum of Iraqi individuals, groups, or both, opposed to the Saddam Hussein regime; and (2) are committed to democratic values, to respect for human rights, to peaceful relations with Iraq’s neighbors, to maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity, and to fostering cooperation among democratic opponents of the Saddam Hussein regime” would be eligible for such assistance.

8 See CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti.
9 For a fuller discussion of similar thematic questions that can be applied to Syria and other cases where the United States may seek to partner with non-state entities, see Larry Hanauer and Stephanie Pezard, Security Cooperation Amidst Political Uncertainty: An Agenda for Future Research, RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, WR-1052-IRD, July 2014.
• the challenges U.S. policy makers have faced in ensuring the reliability and integrity of recipients of U.S. assistance in past cases and the implications of those challenges for efforts to design vetting and oversight measures;

• the contributions of past cases to debates about the roles and responsibilities of the executive branch and Congress in defining the purposes, terms, scope, and duration of U.S. security assistance abroad; and,

• the regional security and global strategic implications of the provision, modulation, and termination of U.S. training and equipment in analogous cases.

Enacted Provisions and Related Debate

Table 1 below reproduces the language enacted in the FY2015 NDAA (H.R. 3979, P.L.113-291) and the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (H.R. 83, P.L.113-235) alongside the President’s 2014 requests.

What authority has Congress provided to the President for the Syria “train and equip” program?

The “train and equip” authorities granted in H.R. 3979 and H.R. 83 are unique because, in the view of the Obama Administration and some in Congress, there are no other existing legal authorities that allow such overt “train and equip” assistance to be provided to non-government actors in Syria in the current context. Pre-existing Department of Defense (DOD) authorities to provide overt security assistance to U.S. partners abroad require that such assistance be provided on a government-to-government basis. U.S. sanctions on Syria and restrictions on U.S. engagement with terrorist-designated entities fighting in Syria also limit the executive branch’s ability to provide assistance.

The Administration requested authority from Congress in September 2014 “to provide assistance, including the provision of defense articles and defense services, to, appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups or individuals.” As enacted, H.R. 3979 and H.R. 83 authorize DOD in coordination with the State Department to provide “assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, stipends, construction of training and

10 Prior to the passage of H.J.Res. 124, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel told the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 16, 2014 that the Department of Defense did not have the authority to conduct a “train and equip” mission for vetted Syrians. On September 15, Representative Mac Thornberry presented a statement from House Armed Services Committee Chairman Howard “Buck” McKeon, the author of the McKeon Amendment, before the House Rules Committee. Thornberry said that, according to McKeon, the provision of specific authority in response to the President’s request was necessary, because “none of the existing Department of Defense authorities in law fit the conditions requested by the President—to “train and equip” non-government entities fighting in non-U.S. led operations.”

11 Exceptions include activities authorized by Section 1208 of the FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-375) as amended, which authorizes the provision of up to $50 million in U.S. assistance to “foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals” that assist or facilitate U.S.-led counterterrorism-related special operations. An existing authority such as Section 1208 would require U.S. leadership of operations and would not have provided corresponding funding authority sufficient to support the scope of activities envisioned under the Administration’s request for the Syria program. The Administration’s stated purposes for the requested Syria authority also extend beyond strict counterterrorism purposes.
associated facilities, and sustainment, to appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups and individuals.”

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel told the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 16, 2014, that the Administration seeks to provide a “package of assistance” that would “initially… consist of small arms, vehicles, and basic equipment like communications, as well as tactical and strategic training.” According to Secretary Hagel, “As these forces prove their effectiveness on the battlefield, we would be prepared to provide increasingly sophisticated types of assistance to the most trusted commanders and capable forces.”

The Administration submitted its first reprogramming request for $225 million to support this program on November 10. The requests proposed that the funds would be used for infrastructure and facilities work, leasing cost, construction of firing ranges, force protection, training and support, stipends, transportation, base operations, and life support. A portion of the funds will be used for the acquisition of long lead time supplies, equipment, arms, ammunition, and other support items.

**Restrictions on MANPADs**

H.R. 83 includes a reworded version of an amendment adopted as part of the House-passed version of the FY2015 defense appropriations bill (H.Amdt. 914 to H.R. 4870) that prohibits the use of funds made available in the act for the procurement or transfer of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) as part of the Syria train and equip program. This restriction reflects concerns that these systems could fall into the hands of other parties and threaten civilian aircraft, allied military aircraft, and U.S. aircraft conducting air strikes in support of Syrian opposition groups.

Other proposals introduced and considered in the 113th Congress also sought to define the types of assistance that could be provided and to place conditions or restrictions on the transfer of certain weapons systems to Syrians (S. 960, H.R. 1327).

**Waiver Authority**

It is unclear whether further authorization beyond that enacted may be required for the purposes of the proposed “train and equip” program for Syrians. The inclusion of a broad waiver authority in H.R. 3979 (Section 1209 (j)) suggests that the Administration and some congressional leaders envision instances where such broader authority may be required. The Administration has not publicly commented on what circumstances might require such a waiver provision, what existing legislation might need to be waived, or how the use of such a waiver in the context of the planned Syria program might affect other U.S. programs and priorities overseas.

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12 H.R. 83 does not explicitly authorize the use of appropriated funds for constriction purposes.

13 The Joint Explanatory Statement issued with H.R. 3979 defines sustainment as follows: “at a minimum, includes the provision of logistics, intelligence, communications, and other enabling support necessary to maintain operations in support of the mission; supply of food, fuel, arms, munitions, and equipment; maintenance of equipment; and repair and renovation of facilities.”
State Department Nonlethal Assistance

With regard to the provision of nonlethal assistance, including to armed groups, the State Department has sought and obtained authority notwithstanding other provisions of law restricting the provision of U.S. assistance in Syria and to Syrians.

- Section 7041(i) of Division K of the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 3547/P.L. 113-76) significantly expanded the Administration’s authority to provide nonlethal assistance in Syria for certain purposes using the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account. Such assistance had been restricted by a series of preexisting provisions of law (including some terrorism-related provisions) that required the President to assert emergency and contingency authorities to provide such assistance to the Syrian opposition and communities in Syria.

- The Administration sought a broad expansion of this notwithstanding authority as part of its amended November 2014 request for OCO funds to combat the Islamic State organization. That request was not granted, although Section 7041(h) of Division J of H.R. 83 extends the notwithstanding authority for ESF funds granted in FY2014, subject to an update of a required strategy document.

Stated Purposes of U.S. Assistance

Programs designed for different purposes may present different potential risks and rewards. An assistance program explicitly intended not only to defend Syrians from attack, but also to assist in the stabilization of and provision of essential services in territory under opposition control may be of much broader scope, cost, or duration than a program intended to defend Syrians from attack by one specified group and/or securing territory under opposition control. Moreover, the scope of opposition-held territory may conceivably expand or contract to include more or less of Syria than at present, with follow-on effects for potential costs to the United States.

In the wake of the enactment of the Syria train and equip authorities by Congress, some Syrian opposition forces and their U.S. supporters have stated their preference for a broader scope of U.S. assistance and military intervention. However, other Syrian groups may reject deeper U.S. involvement and prefer that the United States focus any assistance on toppling the Asad government rather than pursuing counterterrorism, security, stability, and/or quality of life concerns.

In light of these dynamics, Members of Congress may wish to focus specific oversight on the relation between U.S. assistance delivered through the program and the legislative purposes defined by Congress to date. Reporting requirement changes included in H.R. 3979 require DOD to report on spending totals by authorized purpose, and assessments of the effectiveness of trained personnel and activities relative to authorized purposes.

Defending Syrian Civilians from Attacks

As noted above (see “Introduction”), the Administration’s September 2014 request for authority envisioned a broader protection purpose for U.S. assistance relative to the purposes defined in H.R. 3979 and H.R. 83. The purposes stated in H.R. 3979 and H.R. 83 authorize assistance to assist vetted Syrians in defending against attacks by the Islamic State organization and do not
mention the Asad government in this context. They also do not specify the types of attacks
Syrians are to be assisted in defending against.

President Obama and Administration officials have indicated that U.S. assistance will be provided
in line with a so-called “ISIL-first strategy,” but may also permit program participants to defend
against attacks by pro-Asad forces. Overall, press reports citing unnamed U.S. officials indicate
that defensive rather than offensive training and equipment is to be provided under the program.14

“Securing” vs. “Stabilizing” Opposition-held Territory and Facilitating the
Provision of Essential Services

H.R. 3979 and H.R. 83 state a more limited purpose for assistance with regard to opposition-
controlled territory than the Administration’s original requests. Like the CR and unlike the
President’s proposal, H.R. 3979 and H.R. 83 do not authorize assistance to “stabilize” opposition-
held territory or to facilitate the provision of essential services. Instead they authorize assistance
for “securing territory controlled by the opposition.” Both “stabilizing” territory and facilitating
the provision of services in opposition-held areas could be interpreted as longer-term, costlier,
and more involved commitments than “securing” territory. It is possible that the Administration
may seek to use State Department funds to achieve stabilization objectives in parallel with the
DOD-led train and equip program.

Promoting the Conditions for a Negotiated Settlement to End the Conflict
in Syria

H.R. 3979, H.R. 83, and the President’s proposals include the same goal of providing assistance
that will promote conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria but do not
define or specify those conditions. In broad terms, the Administration argues that pressure must
be brought to bear on the government of Bashar al Asad in order to convince its leaders to
negotiate a settlement to the conflict that might or might not result in their departure from office.
Administration officials have not publicly described the precise nature of such intended pressure,
the specific terms of its application, or potential measures of its success in achieving its related
strategic ends. The Administration’s requests, H.R. 3979, and H.R. 83 do not explicitly state that
the departure of Bashar al Asad or members of his government is an essential condition for a
negotiated settlement.

Sunset Provisions

H.R. 3979 includes a “sunset” date for the Syria Train and Equip authorities of December 31,
2016 instead of the December 31, 2018 date requested by the Administration and proposed by the
Senate Armed Services Committee in its report.

While the authority in H.R. 83, the FY2015 Consolidated and Continuing Appropriations Act
sunsets at an earlier date—September 30, 2015—FY2015 funds drawn from the CTPF would be
available for two years (Section 1510, H.R. 3979).

14 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Syrians to be trained to defend territory, not take ground from jihadists, officials say,”
The relative length of the authorization could be interpreted as a signal of relative congressional support for the Administration’s plan to train vetted Syrians over a period of multiple years. The annualized target for the current program is 5,400 personnel, meaning that a two-year program might conservatively produce double that number or less.

**Implications of Different Funding Sources and Directives**

Whether a separate source of funding is available for train and equip efforts or funds for the program are drawn from within existing accounts may signal the level of congressional support for the program and have implications for the Administration’s continued commitment to it.

H.R. 3979 and H.R. 83 do not identify specific funds for the program or place overall dollar limits on the cost of the authorized program. Instead, H.R. 83 provides $1.3 billion for a new Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) and states that “up to $500,000,000” of those funds may be used for activities authorized by the Syria “train and equip” section of the act (Section 9016). H.R. 3979 does not authorize specific amounts to be appropriated to carry out Section 1209 of that act but limits transfers of CTPF funds to O&M accounts (Sec. 1534).

H.R. 3979 authorizes the Department of Defense to submit reprogramming requests to the four congressional defense committees to redirect funds from any OCO-designated Department of Defense accounts to support the “train and equip” program. To obtain such funds, the Department of Defense must submit reprogramming requests that in turn must be approved in writing by the four congressional defense committees (Armed Services and Appropriations) under Department of Defense regulations. Thus, H.R. 3979 provides the four congressional defense committees an opportunity to approve or disapprove particular proposals. The committees also would review proposals for the use of CTPF funding for the program.

The Administration’s request would not have required reprogramming requests to congressional defense committees. As noted above, the Administration submitted an initial $225 million reprogramming request in relation to the Syria program in November 2014, and congressional committees reportedly approved $220.5 million of the request in December 2015.

**Definitions of Vetting Requirements**

H.R. 3979 requires participants be vetted for their commitment to promoting human rights and the rule of law and H.R. 83 requires vetting for commitment to “the rule of law and a peaceful and democratic Syria.” Both include vetting requirements first stated in the CR that prohibit members of certain armed groups and terrorist groups from participating in the program. The CR authority did not include specific human rights or ideological vetting requirements.

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15 In its initial request in June 2014, the Administration presented the Syria “train and equip” program as a component of its broader request for $4 billion in OCO-designated Department of Defense Operation and Maintenance funds for a new “Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund” (CTPF) category within the Operation and maintenance (O&M), Defense-wide account. The Administration’s budget justification material suggested that $500 million would be allocated for an assistance program for vetted Syrians, for which specific authority was sought.


17 Like the CR, H.R. 3979 and H.R. 83 define “appropriately vetted” to mean that, “at a minimum” the executive branch will conduct assessments of proposed recipients’ associations with terrorist groups including, but not limited to (continued...)
The Administration’s June and September 2014 requests envisioned vetting of Syrians, but did not include definitions of vetting procedures or vetting criteria. Presumably, this would have given the Department of Defense additional leeway in selecting participants.

SASC- and SAC-reported versions of the FY2015 defense authorization and appropriations bills included more expansive vetting criteria.

- The SASC-reported NDAA would have required vetting to preclude the involvement of U.S.-designated terrorists and would have authorized assistance to individuals who reject terrorism; support U.S. counterterrorism and nonproliferation efforts; oppose sectarian violence and revenge killings; seek “a peaceful, pluralistic, and democratic Syria that respects the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all its citizens”; and are committed to civilian rule, civilian control of the military, and the rule of law.

- Similarly, the SAC-reported defense appropriations bill would have excluded designated terrorists and required that vetting assess recipients’ commitment to the rule of law, opposition to sectarian violence, and commitment to a peaceful and democratic Syria under civilian rule. The SAC-reported bill also would have required the Syria program’s compliance with provisions prohibiting the provision of assistance to “members of a unit of a foreign security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.” The prohibition could have been waived under “extraordinary” circumstances, but would have required detailed reporting to the congressional defense and appropriations committees.

**Advance Notification and Reporting of Oversight Information to Congress**

Relative to the CR, H.R. 3979 expands required reporting to Congress in advance of the use of “train and equip” authority and once such authority is in use. Like the CR, H.R. 3979 requires 15-day advance notice of the intended provision of authorized assistance and the submission of implementation plans and an overarching strategy describing how the assistance program relates to other U.S. objectives and activities. The four congressional defense committees also will receive reprogramming requests in advance that will have to be approved according to DOD regulations.

H.R. 3979 adds additional criteria to current notification and progress reporting requirements. It requires reporting on sustainment and support activities in the context of the overall strategy as well as progress reporting on the command and control of supported individuals and groups, descriptions of sustainment and construction activities, periodic and aggregate spending totals by authorized purpose, and assessments of the effectiveness of trained personnel and activities relative to authorized purposes and required plans and notifications to Congress.

(...continued)

the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Jabhat al Nusrah, Ahrar al Sham, and other al-Qaeda related groups; Hezbollah and Shia militias aligned with or supporting the Government of Syria; and groups associated with the Government of Iran.
Like the CR, H.R. 3979 requires the Administration to report to Congress on procedures and
criteria for vetting at least 15 days prior to the first provision of authorized assistance. It further
requires reporting every 90 days on the progress of authorized assistance, to include any changes
in program operations (which presumably would include changes to vetting procedures) and any
misuse of U.S. assistance. Under H.R. 3979, the House and Senate Committees on Armed
Services, Foreign Affairs/Relations, Intelligence, and Appropriations will receive the
implementation plan, presidential strategy, and progress reports.

Terms Related to Authorization for the Use of Military Force

For analysis of proposals related to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force relative to the
Islamic State, see CRS Report R43760, *A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
the Islamic State: Comparison of Proposals in Brief*, by Matthew C. Weed.

The Obama Administration argues that it already has constitutional and statutory authority for the
use of force in Iraq and Syria (e.g., the President’s commander in chief and foreign affairs powers
under the Constitution, and the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for the Use of Military Force
against Al Qaeda and in Iraq, or AUMFs), but it has committed to engaging Congress for
additional authorization for the use of force in support of its plans to degrade and destroy the
Islamic State organization or other terrorist entities in those countries. Several Members of the
113th Congress introduced proposals to authorize the use of military force against the Islamic
State, and the Obama Administration said it welcomes specific authorization from Congress
under certain conditions.

H.R. 3979 and H.R. 83 state that nothing in their terms should be construed to constitute a
statutory authorization for the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into “hostilities” or
circumstances that could be considered “hostilities” as defined pursuant to the War Powers
Resolution.

Related provisions in these bills and others are described in more detail in the table below.

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18 See Letters from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate, War Powers Resolution Regarding Syria and Iraq, September 23, 2014.

19 See CRS Report R42699, *The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty-Eight Years*, by Richard F. Grimmett; and CRS
Report RL31133, *Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and
Legal Implications*, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Matthew C. Weed. During the 2011 debate over the authorization of U.S.
military operations in Libya, the Obama Administration argued that U.S. military operations did not constitute
“hostilities” for specific reasons. Some Members of Congress disagreed with the Administration’s arguments.
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<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>“Notwithstanding any other provision of law,” Secretary of Defense authorized, with concurrence of Secretary of State, “to provide assistance, including the provision of defense articles and defense services, to appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups or individuals”</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense authorized “in coordination with the Secretary of State to provide assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, and sustainment, to appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups and individuals”</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense is authorized, “in coordination with the Secretary of State, to provide assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, stipends, construction of training and associated facilities, and sustainment, to appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups and individuals”</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense is authorized, “in coordination with the Secretary of State, to provide assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, sustainment and stipends, to appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups or individuals”</td>
<td>(See separate vetting provision below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interagency Process</td>
<td>Authority requires “concurrence” of Secretary of State.</td>
<td>Authority requires “concurrence” of Secretary of State.</td>
<td>Authority requires “coordination with the Secretary of State” in general terms and on submission of required assistance plan and required progress reports.</td>
<td>Authority requires “coordination with the Secretary of State” in general terms and on submission of required assistance plan and required progress reports.</td>
<td>Authority requires “coordination with the Secretary of State” in general terms.</td>
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</table>
Purposes

“(1) Defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and securing territory controlled by the Syrian opposition;
(2) Protecting the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from the threats posed by terrorists in Syria;
(3) Promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.”

“(1) Defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Syrian regime, facilitating the provision of essential services, and stabilizing territory controlled by the opposition;
(2) Defending the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from the threats posed by terrorists in Syria;
(3) Promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.”

“(1) Defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and securing territory controlled by the opposition;
(2) Protecting the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from the threats posed by terrorists in Syria;
(3) Promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.”

“(1) Defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and securing territory controlled by the opposition;
(2) Protecting the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from the threats posed by terrorists in Syria;
(3) Promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.”

“Defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and securing territory controlled by the Syrian opposition;
Protecting the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from the threats posed by terrorists in Syria;
Promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vetting Definitions</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>None</th>
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</table>
| FY2015 OCO Request – June 2014 Revised Administration Request for CR – September 2015 | “the term 'appropriately vetted' means, with respect to elements of the Syrian opposition and other Syrian groups and individuals, at a minimum, assessments of such elements, groups, and individuals for associations with terrorist groups, Shia militias aligned with or supporting the Government of Syria, and groups associated with the Government of Iran. Such groups include, but are not limited to, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Jabhat al Nusra, Ahrar al Sham, and other al-Qaeda related groups, and Hezbollah.” | “The term “appropriately vetted” means, with respect to elements of the Syrian opposition and other Syrian groups and individuals, at a minimum—
(A) assessments of such elements, groups, and individuals for associations with terrorist groups, Shia militias aligned with or supporting the Government of Syria, and groups associated with the Government of Iran. Such groups include, but are not limited to, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Jabhat al Nusra, Ahrar al Sham, other al-Qaeda related groups, and Hezbollah; and,
(B) a commitment from such elements, groups, and individuals to promoting the respect for human rights and the rule of law.” |
| FY2015 CR (Section 149 of H.J.Res. 124/P.L. 113-164) | | “the term “appropriately vetted” as used in this section shall be construed to mean, at a minimum, assessments of possible recipients for associations with terrorist groups including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Jabhat al Nusra, Ahrar al Sham, other al-Qaeda related groups, Hezbollah, or Shia militias supporting the Governments of Syria or Iran; and for commitment to the rule of law and a peaceful and democratic Syria” |
| FY2015 NDAA (Section 1209 of H.R. 3979, P.L. 113-291) | | |
| FY2015 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Section 9016 of H.R. 83, P.L. 113-235) | | |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions on Eligible Defense Articles or Services</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>None</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requires reporting 15 days prior to transfer on plans for end-use monitoring and, inter alia, details on intended “types of training, equipment, and supplies to be provided”</td>
<td>Requires reporting 15 days prior to transfer on plans for end-use monitoring and, inter alia, details on intended “types of training, equipment, and supplies to be provided”</td>
<td>States that “none of the funds used pursuant to this authority shall be used for the procurement or transfer of man portable air defense systems.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sunset Provisions</td>
<td>December 31, 2018</td>
<td>The earlier of passage of FY2015 NDAA or September 30, 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding Source</td>
<td>OCO-designated 'Operation and Maintenance, Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund’ proposed account</td>
<td>Any OCO-designated Department of Defense Operation and Maintenance funds made available by H.J.Res. 124 or any other act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of Funds</td>
<td>Three-year Funding</td>
<td>One-year Funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending Amount Limit</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>None</td>
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Notional $500 million figure in text accompanying Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund/Syria Regional Stabilization Initiative request.
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<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Contributions</strong></td>
<td>Authorizes acceptance of contributions from and provision of assistance to foreign governments.</td>
<td>Authorizes acceptance of contributions, including in-kind assistance, from foreign governments.</td>
<td>Authorizes acceptance and retention of contributions, including in-kind assistance, from foreign governments.</td>
<td>Authorizes acceptance and retention of contributions, including in-kind assistance, from foreign governments.</td>
<td>Authorizes acceptance and retention of contributions, including in-kind assistance, from foreign governments.</td>
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<td>Foreign contributions may be used “until expended.”</td>
<td>Requires notification of congressional defense committees prior to obligation of foreign contributions.</td>
<td>Requires notification of congressional defense committees prior to obligation of foreign contributions.</td>
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<td>Requires notification of congressional defense committees prior to obligation of foreign contributions.</td>
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<td><strong>BCA Exemption</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td><strong>Requires contributions to be OCO-designated</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Requires contributions to be Operations and Maintenance account-designated</strong></td>
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<td>Statements re: Authorization for the Use of Military Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Not to be “construed to constitute a specific statutory authorization for the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein hostilities are clearly indicated by the circumstances.”</td>
<td>“Nothing in this section shall be construed to constitute a specific statutory authorization for the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein hostilities are clearly indicated by the circumstances.”</td>
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<td>“Nothing in this section supersedes or alters the continuing obligations of the President to report to Congress pursuant to section 4 of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1543) regarding the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.”</td>
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<td>Section 9014 states: “None of the funds made available by this Act may be used with respect to Syria in contravention of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.), including for the introduction of United States armed or military forces into hostilities in Syria, into situations in Syria where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, or into Syrian territory, airspace, or waters while equipped for combat, in contravention of the congressional consultation and reporting requirements of sections 3 and 4 of that law (50 U.S.C. 1542 and 1543).”</td>
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<td>Section 9016 states: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to constitute a specific statutory authorization for the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein hostilities are clearly indicated by the circumstances, in accordance with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution.”</td>
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<td><strong>Notification Requirements</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>15 days prior to initiating a program to transfer defense articles or provide defense services as authorized by this section, the Secretary of Defense shall provide the congressional defense committees with a report describing the details and objectives of such program, including the goals of the program, a concept of operations, the amount of assistance to be provided, the cooperation of partner nations, the number of United States Armed Forces personnel involved, and other relevant details.</td>
<td>15 days prior to providing authorized assistance “to vetted recipients for the first time” the Secretary of Defense “in coordination with the Secretary of State” shall submit a report describing the assistance plan, vetting requirements and procedures; and end-use monitoring plans. Requires the President to submit a report to appropriate congressional committees and House and Senate leadership on “how such assistance fits within a larger regional strategy,” to include reporting on goals and objectives, concept of operations, roles and contributions of partners, the number of U.S. Armed Forces personnel deployed, and additional military support and sustainment activities.</td>
<td>Directs President and Secretary of Defense to “comply with the reporting requirements in section 149(b)(1), (b)(2), (c), and (d) of the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015 (Public Law 113-164).”</td>
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<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>90 days after the submission of assistance plan by Secretary of Defense and each 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide a “progress report” to appropriate congressional committees and House and Senate leadership, to include changes in plan, groups receiving assistance, recruitment and retention, misuse or loss of equipment, and assessment of effectiveness.</td>
<td>90 days after the submission of assistance plan by Secretary of Defense and each 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide a “progress report” to appropriate congressional committees and House and Senate leadership, to include changes in plan, groups receiving assistance, recruitment and retention, misuse or loss of equipment, and assessment of effectiveness.</td>
<td>Directs President and Secretary of Defense to “comply with the reporting requirements in section 149(b)(1), (b)(2), (c), and (d) of the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015 (Public Law 113–164).”</td>
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**Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined**

None

Refers to congressional defense committees

House and Senate Committees on Armed Services, Foreign Affairs/Relations, Intelligence, and Appropriations

House and Senate Committees on Armed Services, Foreign Affairs/Relations, Intelligence, and Appropriations

Refers to P.L. 113-164 for reporting requirements, implying endorsement of definition of appropriate committees.
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<tr>
<td><strong>Waiver Authority</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Authority to Provide Assistance to Third Countries</strong></td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>None.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>&quot;For purposes of the provision of assistance pursuant to subsection (a), the President may waive any provision of law if the President determines that such provision of law would (but for the waiver) impede national security objectives of the United States by prohibiting, restricting, delaying, or otherwise limiting the provision of such assistance. Such waiver shall not take effect until 30 days after the date on which the President notifies the appropriate congressional committees of such determination and the provision of law to be waived.&quot;</td>
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<td><strong>Source:</strong> Legislative Information Service, Administration requests to Congress, House Rules Committee website.</td>
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Author Contact Information

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Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs  
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Amy Belasco  
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget  
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