Secretary of Defense Hagel  p6
ISAF Joint Command 2014  p16
Deniers of “The Truth”  p42
Is Russia Really So Bad?  p99
As I reflect on 2014, I am thankful for the opportunity to serve as the editor-in-chief of such a prestigious publication and as the director of a professional organization filled with dedicated and talented staff. The editors, visual information specialists, administrative personnel, and soldiers of Military Review have worked tirelessly together to make extensive improvements in our journal since I grabbed the reins almost 18 months ago. They possess the vision, creativity, and expertise to take this organization to even greater heights in 2015.

The leadership at the Combined Arms Center (CAC) and Leader Development and Education (LD&E) also played an important role in our success by allowing us the latitude to follow our instincts and find our own direction, and we certainly did that in this edition. The January-February issue features an article from outgoing Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on the challenges he has faced reshaping the military—the Army specifically—in an era of austerity. Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson, commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and deputy commanding general, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, contributes a piece as well that captures the challenges faced by the final three-star operational headquarters in theater during its transition over the last year. Additionally, Col. Tom Hanson, Director of the Combat Studies Institute, provides a very intuitive review essay that juxtaposes two books on the South Vietnamese Army’s 1971 invasion of Laos.

In my past letters to our readers, I’ve emphasized the importance of writing as a way to not only tell the Army story, but to pass along lessons learned, facilitate the creation of new doctrine, and simply to document experiences for historical purposes. “On Writing: Why We Write,” an article by blogger Doctrine Man, really puts this into context. You can find it on his website, The Pendulum, at https://medium.com/@Doctrine_Man/on-writing-10c2f650109b.

The Army Press will soon be open for business with the roll out of the Army University later this year. As we move closer to the opening, we will provide a link to a new website that will house an Army Press publication platform as well as links to numerous Army Press products, Centers of Excellence and Department of Defense publications, and other military forums. Changes are coming; stay tuned for more information about the Army Press and how it will benefit the Army University and the Army. The team at Military Review wishes you a safe and prosperous new year!
Hovering with only the rear wheels touching the edge of a cliff, pilots from the 227th Aviation Regiment, 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, perform a maneuver called a pinnacle in a CH-47F Chinook helicopter during a training flight 26 August 2010.

(Photograph by Staff Sgt. Nathan Hoskins, 1st Air Cavalry Brigade PAO, 1st Cavalry Division)

**Themes for Future Editions**

**2015**
- **March-April** The Army and the Congress: Who Really Should Have Responsibility and Authority for Preventing and Responding to Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault?
- **May-June** Ready and Resilient Campaign: Challenges, Issues, Programs; Officer Broadening
- **July-August** Inform and Influence Activities
- **September-October** The Human Dimension and Technology
- **November-December** The Future of War

**2016**
- **January-February** Global Insurgency—Revisited
- **March-April** Army Firsts
- **May-June** The Future of Innovation in the Army
- **July-August** Dealing with a Shrinking Army
6 Toward a Strong and Sustainable Defense Enterprise

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel

The Department of Defense is investing in long-term innovation and reform that will rely on leadership in the Department and the Congress. The secretary of defense describes the challenges the Department faces and the hard choices the Congress needs to make to support the U.S. defense enterprise on its path to strength and sustainability.

16 International Security Assistance Force Joint Command 2014

The Year of Change


U.S. forces are proficient at tactical-level planning, but operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed weaknesses in their ability to conduct transition planning that accounts for operational and strategic objectives. Lessons learned from the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command’s operational-level planning during the drawdown in Afghanistan can help U.S. Army forces improve doctrine and training for transitions.

26 Preparing Soldiers for Uncertainty


The Army must confront uncertainty as it prepares for current and future challenges. By creating the right mix of education and training, with uncertainty incorporated into the mix, the Army will be prepared when the time comes to fight and win the Nation’s wars.

31 A Paradigm of Dialogue and Trust

Army Mission Command Training


The authors apply the six principles of mission command, making a case for collaborative, corporate leadership enabled by trust. They show that commanders need to give subordinates the opportunity to engage in critical and creative thinking.

42 Deniers of “The Truth”

Why an Agnostic Approach to Warfare is Key

Lt. Col. Grant M. Martin, U.S. Army

The Army’s religious-like belief in the technically rational paradigm has it wedded to an approach to warfare that seems intuitively effective but is largely illusory. The author describes his experiments with different operational art constructs, including incorporating operational design concepts into Special Forces qualification course planning.

About the Cover

A U.S. Army Ranger instructor gives technical instructions for rappelling from the 50-foot rock to his left in Dahlonega, Ga., 13 April 2009.

(Air Force photo by MSGt Cecilio Ricardo)
Contents January-February 2015
Volume 95 • Number 1

52 Back to the Future
Managing Training to “Win in a Complex World”
Capt. Paul Lushenko, U.S. Army, and Maj. David Hammerschmidt, U.S. Army
Training management is as much a lost art as it is the wave of the future. The authors discuss how to restore training expertise among company and field grade officers by going “back to the future” and instilling the counsel of past master trainers.

62 The Training Brain Repository—Exercise Design Tool for Home-Station Training
The authors discuss how the Training Brain Repository—Exercise Design Tool facilitates a commander’s ability to increase the complexity, realism, and depth of an exercise’s live, virtual, and constructive training environment with previously impossible speed and fidelity.

71 Perfection of Process Does Not Equal Perfect Understanding
Maj. David Oakley, U.S. Army
The spirit of design and the practical approach contained in the Army design methodology are two distinct aspects of design as taught at the School of Advanced Military Studies. The author discusses the school’s approach to teaching this methodology, conveying its value for military planners and illustrating the pitfalls of allowing the practical aspects of the Army design methodology to overtake the spirit of design.

75 Networking and Generalship Across the Anglo-Pacific
The author details research conducted to explain how the United States is at the “center of the circle” in networked relationships among senior military officers of the Australian and New Zealand militaries, with implications for the future.

82 Winning Trust Under Fire
Lt. Col. Aaron A. Bazin, U.S. Army
Influencing a nation or a cultural group depends on winning the trust of those who can influence others. The author describes how confidence-building measures can assist leaders and soldiers in improving their ability to gain trust in challenging and ambiguous operational environments.

91 Ethics and the Enhanced Soldier of the Near Future
Col. Dave Shunk, U.S. Air Force, Retired
The super soldier is on the way, but the discussion of ethics for the enhanced soldier is lacking in Army concepts and doctrine. The Army must anticipate and understand the unforeseen ethical challenges and the second- and third-order effects of technological advancements that will physically change soldiers and the way they fight.

Above: A flight medic with 2nd Battalion, 3rd Aviation Regiment, is hoisted into a medical helicopter with Luca, a military working dog with the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, during a training exercise 24 February 2013 at Forward Operating Base Spin Boldak, Afghanistan.
(Photo by Sgt. Michael Needham, 102nd Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

Page 5: Soldiers with the Army Evaluation Task Force give a demonstration of the small unmanned ground vehicle combat application to House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton and fellow committee member Syvetsre Reyes at Fort Bliss, Texas, 12 July 2008.
(Photoby D. Myles Cullen, Joint Chiefs of Staff PAO)
99 Is a Greater Russia Really So Bad?

George Michael, Ph.D.

The author contends that the United States and Russia share similar threats to their long-term security and their national identities. Therefore, it would be in the best interests of both countries to resist a resumption of the Cold War, to reconcile differences, and to make a greater effort to understand their respective points of view and interests.

116 Operation Atlantic Resolve

A Case Study in Effective Communication Strategy

Jesse Granger

Clear, aggressive, and timely communication efforts played a decisive role in the success of Operation Atlantic Resolve. Specifically, this meant facilitating media coverage, providing transparency to the American public, and combating misinformation.

124 A RAID TOO FAR: Operation Lam Son 719 and Vietnamation in Laos and INVASION OF LAOS, 1971: Lam Son 719

Col. Thomas E. Hanson, U.S. Army

A reader provides a review of two books on Operation Lam Son 719, the South Vietnamese Army’s 1971 invasion of Laos.

127 Readers provide analyses of contemporary readings for the military professional

January-February 2015 MILITARY REVIEW
This year’s theme is *The Future of War*. Possible topics include, but are not limited to:

- Changing demographics—what will the world’s population look like and what effect will it have on the Army and the operational environment (e.g., megacities, population growth and displacement, resource distribution)
- Climate change and its threat to security (e.g., water rights, desertification, coastal flooding)
- The impact of regionally aligned forces
- The future of nonstate entities and their relationship to, and impact on, the military
- Army operations on U.S. soil (e.g., the erosion of posse comitatus)

Contest Closes 10 July 2015

1st Place $1,000 and publication in *Military Review*
2nd Place $750 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*
3rd Place $500 and consideration for publication in *Military Review*

For information on how to submit an entry, go to [http://militaryreview.army.mil](http://militaryreview.army.mil)
Toward a Strong and Sustainable Defense Enterprise

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is undergoing a defining time of transition. After 13 years of war fought by an all-volunteer force, we are reshaping our defense enterprise to adapt to a fiscal environment plagued by constant uncertainty and declining resources, and to a strategic environment shaped by a historic realignment of interests and influences around the world.

The Defense Department is grappling with downward budget pressures, cumbersome legislative constraints on how we manage our institution, and the unpredictability of both continuing resolutions and the threat of sequestration. At the same time, enduring and emerging powers are challenging the world order that American leadership helped build after World War II. In the Middle East and North Africa, the order within and between nation-states is being recast in ways that we have not seen for almost a century, often leaving dangerous ungoverned spaces in their wake. In West Africa, a virus one-thousand times smaller than a human hair has, in less than a year, infected over 17,000 people, killed over 6,000, and shaken governments and health care systems alike. In Europe, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine represents one of the most blatant acts of state-on-state aggression on that continent since the end of World War II. And in the Asia-Pacific, competition between rising powers threatens to undermine the stability that has allowed the region to prosper and thrive for decades.

We are at the beginning, not at the end, of this realignment. And as Henry Kissinger writes, only “a subtle balance of restraint, force, and legitimacy” will help forge a new order—an order that will be years, and probably decades, in the making. This means that DOD’s missions and focus will continue to be marked, and defined, by transition.

As these dynamics unfold, the U.S. military is addressing today’s crises and security challenges around the world—degrading ISIL, helping stop the spread of the Ebola virus, and reinforcing our NATO allies. Few would have predicted these missions a year ago; uncertainty is the only certainty in an interconnected world of 7 billion people.

The Defense Department must be prepared for the challenges of that uncertain future. We face the rise of new technologies, national powers, and nonstate actors; sophisticated, deadly, and often asymmetric emerging threats, ranging from cyberattacks to transnational criminal networks; as well as persistent, volatile threats we have faced for years.

Our long-term security will depend on whether we can address today’s crises while also planning and preparing for tomorrow’s threats. This requires making disciplined choices and meeting all our nation’s challenges with long-term vision.

That is what DOD is doing today. We are not waiting for change to come to us—we are leading change. We are taking the initiative, getting ahead.
of the changes we know are coming, and making the long-term investments we need for the future.

This is happening in two important ways. We are investing in our nation’s unrivaled capacity for innovation, so that in the face of mounting challenges, our military’s capabilities, technological edge, strategy, and readiness will continue to surpass any potential adversary. And we are investing in reforms to our defense enterprise, to ensure that our military’s foundation is reliable, agile, accountable, and worthy of the men and women who serve in it. Sustaining both investments will require significant leadership—and partnership—in the years to come.

**Pursuing Innovation**

Today, our military has nearly 400,000 personnel stationed or forward deployed in nearly 100 countries around the world. This continued forward presence—with its unmatched technological and operational edge—has helped anchor America’s global leadership for decades.

However, the superiority of our forces has never been guaranteed, and it is now being increasingly challenged. Technologies and weapons that were once the exclusive province of advanced nations have become available to a broad range of militaries and nonstate actors. And while we spent over a decade focused on grinding stability operations, near-peer competitor countries such as Russia and China have been heavily investing in military modernization programs to blunt our military’s technological edge—fielding advanced aircraft, submarines, and both longer-range and more accurate missiles. They are also developing new anti-ship and air-to-air missiles, as well as counter-space, cyber, electronic-warfare, undersea, and air-attack capabilities.

To sustain our global leadership commitments—and the confidence of our allies—America must continue to safeguard its ability to project power rapidly across oceans and continents through the swift deployment of aircraft, ships, troops, and supplies. If this power projection capability is eroded or lost, we will see a world far more dangerous and
unstable—and far more threatening to America and our citizens here at home than we have seen since World War II.

Without our military superiority, the strength and credibility of our alliances would suffer. Both our friends and our adversaries could doubt our commitment to enforcing long-established international law and principles. Questions about our ability to win future wars could undermine our ability to deter them, and our armed forces could one day go into battle confronting a range of advanced technologies that limit our freedom of maneuver—allowing a potential conflict to exact crippling costs and risk too many American lives.

America does not believe in sending our troops into a fair fight, but that is a credo we will not be able to honor if we do not take the initiative and address these mounting challenges now. The Defense Department must continue to modernize our military’s capabilities and sustain its operational and technological edge. And we must do so by making new, long-term investments in innovation.

We have accomplished this before, even in times of great tumult and change. In the 1950s, President Dwight D. Eisenhower successfully offset the Soviet Union’s conventional superiority through his “New Look” build-up of America’s nuclear deterrent. In the 1970s, after Soviet advances in nuclear weapons had diminished our strategic superiority, then-Secretary of Defense Harold Brown—working closely with Undersecretary, and future Defense Secretary, Bill Perry—shepherded a new offset strategy, implementing the Long-Range Research and Development Planning Program that helped develop and field revolutionary new systems such as extended-range precision-guided munitions, stealth aircraft, and new intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms.

All these systems drew upon technological developments, such as the micro-processing revolution, that had unfolded over the course of a few decades. The critical innovation was to apply and combine these new systems and technologies with new strategic operational concepts in ways that would enable the American military to avoid, as Brown wrote, “matching an adversary tank-for-tank or soldier-for-soldier.” Because subsequent leaders—at the Pentagon, at the White House, and in Congress—sustained these investments on a bipartisan basis, they helped America build and hold our military edge for decades.

That is why, at the Reagan National Defense Forum in California this past November, I announced DOD’s new Defense Innovation Initiative, which we expect to develop into a game-changing third offset strategy. This new initiative is an ambitious department-wide effort to identify and invest in innovative ways to sustain and advance America’s military dominance for the twenty-first century. It will not only put new resources behind innovation but also will account for today’s fiscal realities, by focusing on investments that will sharpen our military edge even as we contend with fewer resources.

Continued fiscal pressure will likely limit our military’s ability to respond to long-term challenges by increasing the size of our force or simply outspending potential adversaries on current systems, so to overcome challenges to our military superiority, we must change the way we innovate, operate, and do business.

The Defense Innovation Initiative will draw on the lessons of previous offset strategies and ensure that America’s power-projection capabilities continue to sustain our competitive advantage over the coming decades. To achieve this, we are pursuing several lines of effort.

Our technology effort will establish a new Long-Range Research and Development Planning Program that will help identify, develop, and field breakthroughs in the most cutting-edge technologies and systems—including the fields of robotics; autonomy; air, space, and undersea systems; miniaturization; big data; and advanced manufacturing, including 3-D printing. This program will look toward the next decade and beyond. In the near term, it will invite some of the brightest minds from inside and outside government to start with a
clean sheet of paper and assess which technologies and systems DOD ought to develop over the next three to five years and onward.

We know technology is not a panacea, which is why the Defense Innovation Initiative also will explore and develop new operational concepts, including new approaches to warfighting, and how we balance DOD’s investments between platforms and payloads.

In some ways, this will entail exploring creative methods of using capabilities we already have to better achieve our strategic objectives. One example of this would be the Army broadening its role in our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific by leveraging its current suite of long-range precision-guided missiles, rockets, artillery, and air defense systems. These capabilities could provide multiple benefits, such as hardening the defenses of U.S. installations; enabling greater mobility of Navy Aegis destroyers and other joint force assets; and helping ensure the free flow of commerce.

The initiative’s other lines of effort will focus on new approaches to war-gaming and professional military education—work that has already begun. In addition, they will focus on our most important asset—our people—by pursuing not only time-honored leadership development practices but also emerging opportunities to re-imagine how we develop managers and leaders.

Each part of the Defense Innovation Initiative will shape our programs, plans, and budgets—increasingly so as the initiative matures over time.

I have asked Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work to guide the initiative’s development, and he will lead a new Advanced Capability and Deterrent Panel to drive it forward. This panel will integrate senior DOD leadership across the entire enterprise: its policies and intelligence communities, the armed services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and research, development, and acquisition authorities.

I expect the panel to propose important changes to the way DOD diagnoses and plans for challenges to our military’s competitive edge, and to break with many of our usual ways of doing business—encouraging fresh thinking that is focused on threats and challenges to our military superiority, not simply adapting plans that are already on the books.

The panel must also face a new challenge head-on: the fact that many, if not most, of the technologies we seek to take advantage of today are no longer in the domain of DOD development pipelines, or those of traditional defense contractors. It is well known that DOD no longer has exclusive access to the most cutting-edge technology, or the ability to spur—or control—the development of new technologies the way we once did. To better understand commercial technology trends that will help us leap ahead of our competitors, we will actively seek proposals from the private sector, including from firms and academic institutions outside DOD’s traditional orbit.

Reforming the Defense Enterprise

Successfully investing in these long-term priorities requires the foundation of a sound, resilient, and accountable defense enterprise—because ensuring the health and vitality of DOD as an institution is critical to our ability to prepare for the future.

As the world in which we operate changes, we must change too. We must revitalize, renew, and when necessary, reform. That applies to everything we do, from special operations and procurement to health care for troops and their families.

The Department of Defense is the world’s largest institution, employing roughly 1 percent of America’s population. Its property includes more than 560,000 buildings and structures at more than 520 facilities stretching over 27 million acres of land—about the size of Tennessee. Any institution of this magnitude, complexity, and breadth of mission and responsibilities is slow to change. But we must realize that change will be forced upon us, on terms not of our choosing, unless we take the initiative ourselves.

That is why DOD must continue to engage in wide-ranging and often uphill reform. We are...
pursuing reform not just for the sake of reform, but wise reform that makes the enterprise stronger and better prepared for the future. Everything else we do depends on it.

I recently announced actions that DOD is taking to revamp our nuclear enterprise, including new resources and shake-ups in organization, policy, and culture. It will take years of committed action to fix problems that have accumulated over many years. But fix them we will—ensuring that our nation continues to have a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. And we will hold DOD leaders accountable to ensure that promises translate into action, and that action translates into real and sustainable improvements.

To further shift the department’s energy, focus, and resources toward supporting our frontline operations, we are undertaking full reviews of DOD’s business and management systems. The first reviews are under way now, starting with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Pentagon must embrace better business practices that are core to any modern enterprise, private or public. This means upgrading our business and information technology systems and processes, striking the right balance between civil service and contractor support, and avoiding duplication of support functions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the armed services.

After years of postponement and delay, we are making progress in moving DOD toward greater financial accountability. The Marine Corps became the first service to earn a clean audit early last year, and in December DOD awarded contracts to independent public accounting firms that will begin auditing Army, Navy, and Air Force current-year appropriations for 2015—ensuring that DOD as a whole remains on track to be completely audit-ready by no later than 2017. That goal could not seem duller, but it is essential for our future effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability.

To streamline the way the Pentagon does business, DOD is also continuing the large acquisition improvement and reform efforts led by Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Frank Kendall. The goal is to, in partnership with the Congress, overhaul the legal framework for DOD acquisitions and reduce unnecessary paperwork so that we can focus on key strategic priorities.

In addition to all of these efforts, we are also pursuing concrete results and improvements through many other reform initiatives essential to the long-term health and readiness of the force. These include improvements to our military health care system, our military justice system, and our efforts to account for personnel who remain missing in action. They also encompass a renewed focus on military ethics and professionalism, systems integration with the Department of Veterans Affairs, and eliminating sexual assault in the military—an area where, despite seeing real progress over the past year, we still have a long way to go. Sexual assault remains heavily underreported both nationally and in the military, and far too many of our sisters and our brothers in uniform have been victims of these crimes. Protecting our fellow soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines is the highest responsibility we have to one another, so we must continue to do whatever it takes to eradicate this insider threat from our ranks and get survivors the help and support they need.

The Defense Department will sustain its focus on all these reform initiatives because they will ultimately shape our ability to develop new capabilities, strengthen our partnerships, and honor our enduring commitments to our people and their families. It is their service that makes possible everything we do. We must never lose sight of that.

Partnering With Congress

The Department of Defense has been making the hard choices and mustering the flexibility required by new realities. But to succeed, we need the support and partnership of Congress—especially at a time when demands on our military are surging, our resources are shrinking, and the latitude to manage our own institution is being circumscribed.

Since 2011, DOD has been forced to operate on continuing resolutions every year, impairing our
ability to plan, invest, and reform. As I have reminded Congress several times, no institution can be run effectively on continuing resolutions, especially the institution responsible for the security of this country. We need actual budgets—budgets that give DOD long-term certainty and predictability—and the flexibility to make the internal management choices about what is required to deal with current and future threats for this country.

We must also undertake critical cost-savings measures, especially reducing excess basing and facilities. Despite numerous efforts, and almost 10 years since the last round, DOD has been unable to secure another round of base realignment and closure from Congress. Today, DOD has 24 percent excess capacity in our basing and facilities—excess capacity that is costing us billions of dollars every year that could otherwise be invested in maintaining our military’s edge. We need Congress to help end this excess spending.

We also need Congress to support proposed reform to military pay and compensation. No one who wears our nation’s uniform is overpaid for his or her service. But since 2001, DOD’s pay and benefits for service members have outstripped private-sector compensation growth by about 40 percent. For military personnel, DOD has proposed continued but more moderate pay increases, continued but more moderate growth of tax-free housing allowances, and modest increases to insurance co-payments. Congress has agreed in part with some of these proposals, but we must act on all of them. The longer we defer the tough choices, the tougher they will be to make down the road—and the more brutal the outcome.

Without the ability to make programmatic adjustments such as retiring aging aircraft, and without base realignment and closure, the Defense Department will face a bill of about $30 billion over fiscal years 2016 to 2020. Denying DOD the
Choosing Wisely

Last year marked the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall—a reminder that America, along with its allies, prevailed over a determined Soviet adversary by coming together as a nation, for the good of the nation.

Over decades and across party lines, we worked together to make long-term, strategic investments in innovation and in reform of our nation’s military—investments that ultimately helped us force the Soviet regime to fold its hand.

America’s leaders made tough choices then—and we must make tough choices now. We must navigate through the current period of transition and realignment, and we must face up to the realities and challenges that our defense enterprise confronts today so that we will be ready for the challenges of the future.

If we make the right investments—in our partnerships around the world, in innovation, and in our defense enterprise—we will continue to keep our nation’s military, and our nation’s global leadership, on a strong and sustainable path for the twenty-first century.

As President Ronald Reagan once said, our nation is at “a time for choosing”: for Congress, for our political parties, and ultimately for the American people.4 We must choose wisely.

Chuck Hagel is the 24th secretary of defense and the first enlisted combat veteran to lead the Department of Defense. He served as a squad leader with the Army’s 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam, rising to the rank of sergeant and earning numerous military decorations and honors, including two Purple Hearts. He subsequently graduated from the University of Nebraska at Omaha. Secretary Hagel previously served as deputy administrator of the Veterans Administration, and represented the state of Nebraska for twelve years in the United States Senate. This article is adapted from his speech at the Reagan National Defense Forum, 15 November 2014.

Notes

2. ISIL stands for Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.
The elders (though that word does not contain sufficient substance to describe the strained
And weathered faces, demarcated by
A hurried youth disrupted and denied)
Approve of my entreaty to their sense
Of liable paternal influence.
They linger though, reclined, content to drone
In colorful, if futile, martial tones,
On lavish (Persian) carpets on the floor,
As old Kalashnikovs in younger, more
Determined hands (paid in rupees), sow
That lethal seed—unrestrained, row on row.

—Poem by Capt. Chad Lewis, U.S. Army
Transitions typically are not discrete events. Rather, they consist of overlapping groups of actions that, over time, interact to create a potent mix of challenges. Transitions can take on numerous forms—sometimes they are relatively simple. For example, during World Wars I and II, units rotated regularly, with fresh troops executing reliefs-in-place with their beleaguered front-line counterparts. At other times, the changes can be more nuanced and complex. For instance, after the initial invasion of Iraq in...
2003, many Army units struggled to make the mental and physical shifts from major combat operations to counterinsurgency.

This article discusses how the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command managed transitions at the operational level during the shift from Operation Enduring Freedom to the NATO-led Resolute Support mission in 2014. The experience offers seven lessons learned:

- Plan early and often.
- Build flexibility into plans.
- Be as transparent as possible.
- Integrate transitions across lines of operation, and synchronize them with operations in support of campaign objectives.
- Ensure key leaders play an active role managing both imposed and conditions-based transitions.
- Adjust staff processes to account for increased requirements during the transition process.
- Design organizations and processes with consideration for their short- and long-term consequences.

Although the focus of this discussion is on counterinsurgency, these lessons can be applied to future contingencies across the range of military operations. Not all transitions are created equal, but transitions are a part of all military operations. The experiences of the ISAF Joint Command, together with similar experiences during drawdowns in Iraq and elsewhere, beg the question: What should military forces do, if anything, to prepare for the inevitable transitions that will occur during a campaign? Moreover, how should units plan for, manage, and execute the myriad transitions they will encounter?

To answer these questions, the U.S. Army needs to develop better doctrine and training on conducting and managing transitions. It needs to explore transitions through rigorous academic study so that forces can ensure transitions support tactical as well as operational and strategic objectives. The experiences of the ISAF Joint Command provide a starting point. These experiences and lessons can inform future leaders’ efforts to oversee their own transitions so they can better anticipate challenges and capitalize on the opportunities.

Reducing Force Posture

In the final year of Operation Enduring Freedom, the ISAF Joint Command adjusted its force posture to set the conditions for the transition to Resolute Support by closing or transferring 75 bases, retrograding over 77,000 pieces of rolling and non-rolling stock, and redeploying over 90,000 personnel—including military, civilian, and contractors—from 48 troop-contributing nations.

Base closures and transfers. The ISAF Joint Command reviewed in detail the effects base closures and transfers would have on its operational reach and on the Afghan National Security Forces’ (ANSF’s) support structure. They balanced the ANSF’s eagerness to assume control of the ISAF footprint with the concern that too many ANSF bases would render them a static force. The Command developed detailed criteria to determine which strategic bases would remain, which would be closed or transferred, and in what sequence.

In cases where property would transfer, the ISAF Joint Command worked closely with commanders on the ground and the Afghan-led Joint Base Closure Commission to develop plans and procedures for base transfers, including identifying real property and infrastructure that would go to the Afghans.

Retrograde and redeployment. In a process similar to base closure efforts, the ISAF Joint Command balanced retrograde and redeployment tasks with current operations to set conditions for Resolute Support. The task was monumental given the sheer amount of equipment and personnel involved.

Early in the year, commanders of the NATO regional commands maintained discretion to determine operational equipment requirements. Regional commanders, loathe to lose flexibility, were reluctant to release resources that they might need later in the year. Unfortunately, the closer the 31 December 2014 deadline came, the less flexibility the ISAF Joint Command had to move equipment and close and transfer bases, mostly due to throughput limitations and dwindling assets in theater. The ISAF Joint Command solved this problem by elevating and centralizing decision-making authority for retrograde and redeployment efforts and for base closures and transfers to the three-star level, effectively removing other commanders from the decision cycle for certain assets.

Reduced coalition presence. The diminished force posture decreased the ISAF Joint Command’s operational reach and restricted coalition operations to areas within medical evacuation range. Likewise, the smaller number of coalition forces across the operational area...
decreased situational awareness—fewer bases and personnel meant fewer sensors to monitor operations and gauge atmospherics on the ground. The ISAF Joint Command continued to support the ANSF with enablers and other assets but at ever decreasing levels. With the reduction in platforms, the Command maintained situational awareness by inserting coalition forces into operations coordination centers—the Afghan version of command fusion cells—at the provincial and regional levels.

Complementing this effort, the ISAF Joint Command developed a strategic communications plan to counter the insurgents’ abandonment narrative, especially when it came to base closures and transfers, and to ensure that the ANSF understood the nature and implications of the changes. Honesty and transparency were critical. Ultimately, force posture reductions, with the concomitant reduction in enabler support, prompted the ANSF to adapt and substitute their own capabilities for coalition assets.

**Changing Missions**

While reducing its force posture, the ISAF Joint Command executed a change in mission. Beginning in the summer of 2014, the Command transitioned from providing unit-level training, advising, and assisting at the brigade- and battalion-levels to providing functionally based security force assistance (SFA) from corps-level platforms to Afghan National Army corps, type-A provincial chiefs of police, and regional operations coordination centers. Functionally based SFA, distinct from tactical-level training, advising, and assisting, is focused on providing institutional advisory support with an emphasis on improving organizations, systems, and processes.

**Advisor focus.** During Operation Enduring Freedom, small-unit mentors, previously focused on their counterparts’ immediate challenges, were limited in their ability to provide long-term sustainment and development advice. During Resolute Support, corps-level advisors began focusing instead on the development of ANSF systems and institutions. These specialized advisors possessed the skills to advise the ANSF on operational and strategic matters, and were capable of applying a systems approach to affect institutional change. In this new construct, advisors integrated their efforts vertically and horizontally by linking ministerial-level systems with corps-level practices.

**Command organization.** This change in mission informed the composition and structure of train, advise, and assist commands (TAACs) and the new headquarters of NATO’s Resolute Support mission. TAACs represented a distinct type of organization, not simply a scaled-down regional command. TAACs would have no operational warfighting responsibility, and commanders configured them based on local conditions, optimizing their staffs to deliver functionally based SFA. At the ISAF (and later at Resolute Support) headquarters, Napoleonic staff structures such as personnel, intelligence, and operations staff became dual hatted, charged with traditional staff duties and the integration of functionally based SFA from the national to regional levels. Colloquially referred to as “mainstreaming,” this practice promoted unity of effort for the essential SFA functions.

**Security force assistance priorities.** The ISAF Joint Command created systems and processes to target and prioritize functionally based SFA. For example, they established the SFA Working Group and the SFA Synchronization Board to identify systemic development issues and target resources to resolve them. This process required a disciplined approach. Issues brought forth from the SFA Working Group to the SFA Synchronization Board were restricted to those that subordinate commanders could not resolve. Regional command and TAAC input ensured that ANSF priorities were captured. The ISAF Joint Command used the SFA Synchronization Board to inform ISAF’s functionally based SFA approach. Overall, the SFA Working Group and SFA Synchronization Board increased awareness of ANSF development shortfalls and SFA implementation challenges across the ISAF Joint Command staff (integrating the staff horizontally) and created feedback loops for issues from the national to the regional levels (integrating functionally based SFA efforts vertically).

**Realigning Headquarters**

Recognizing that functionally based SFA required an entirely different type of headquarters, commands were realigned to set conditions for the new Resolute Support mission. These changes, requiring significant Manning modifications, entailed extensive coordination with ISAF, NATO’s Allied Joint Forces Command-Brunssum, United States Central Command, and the Joint Staff.
Preparation for headquarters reorganization. The ISAF Joint Command helped set the stage for the transition by moving a significant portion of its combined-joint future plans staff (CJ-55) to ISAF early in the summer to plan the transfer of sections and functions to the ISAF (and later to Resolute Support) headquarters. Shortly thereafter, they integrated the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan—formerly a subordinate unit of the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan—into the ISAF Joint Command as a subordinate command and then a staff directorate. They also abolished the ANSF development cell, spreading its functions across the staff, and moved the ANSF Logistics Directorate and Combined-Joint Psychological Operations Task Force to the ISAF headquarters.

United States Forces-Afghanistan transferred engineer and intelligence staff to the ISAF Joint Command to increase capacity, gain efficiencies, and eliminate capability redundancies. NATO Air Command-Afghanistan, ISAF Joint Command’s Afghan Air Force training element, reduced staff and consolidated advisory and training efforts from regional bases to Kabul. Finally, staff sections, including portions of the combined-joint future operations staff (CJ-35), steadily transitioned to ISAF to create these capabilities at the strategic level. All these transitions set the stage for the ISAF Joint Command’s pending merger with ISAF and for ISAF’s subsequent transition to the Resolute Support headquarters.

Joint transition. The two organizations merged via eight packages of personnel and staff functions. The transitions of the combined-joint operations center (CJOC) and current operations (CJ-33) staff were particularly challenging since no commensurate CJOC facility or CJ-33 function existed within ISAF. The ISAF Joint Command and ISAF collaborated closely on this transfer, even developing rigorous training for future CJOC staff to ensure ISAF was prepared for its operational responsibilities.

Regional command reorganization. The reorganization of regional commands into TAACs was executed in two tranches. Tranche 1, including NATO Regional Commands Capital, West, and North, transitioned to TAACs throughout July 2014. Tranche 2, consisting of NATO Regional Commands South and East, made the shift three months later. Compared to Regional Commands South and East, tranche 1 transitions took place in less complex, less violent regions, which enabled the ISAF Joint Command and the TAACs to work through authorities, systems, processes, and friction points with fewer distractions before the more challenging tranche 2 transitions. NATO Regional Commands South and East benefited from their counterparts’ experiences. By the time of the tranche 2 transitions, they were able to implement lessons learned, while the ISAF Joint Command was able to ensure corps-level systems and processes were in place to support the changes.

During the transition to TAACs, many of the functions formerly performed by NATO regional commands, such as patient evacuation and intelligence coordination, were elevated to the ISAF Joint Command, effectively...
becoming operational-level responsibilities rather than tactical ones. As with the Resolute Support headquarters, a great deal of coordination with ISAF, NATO, and others went into sourcing the unique manning requirements for these new platforms. Transfers of authority at the levels of regional command, brigade, and battalion, as well as troop-contributing nation ends of operation and ends of mission, exacerbated the complexity of the dynamic security environment.

The transition to TAACs involved major changes for the regional commands and the ANSF. This transition fundamentally changed the nature of advisory support. For example, force-manning limitations prevented coalition forces from maintaining a persistent presence in Helmand and the region south of Kabul. During Resolute Support, they would only provide periodic advising to ANSF in these regions.

Before the end of these advisory missions, the ISAF Joint Command, in conjunction with the Afghan National Army General Staff, executed combined staff assistance visits to the Afghan National Army’s 215th and 203rd Corps (based in Helmand and the area south of Kabul, respectively) to assess their capabilities and advise them on ways to improve their institutional systems and processes. The ISAF Joint Command also established Advise and Assist Cells Southwest and Southeast within ISAF headquarters to maintain ministerial support from Kabul after the lift-off of advisory support from these corps. Later, the ISAF Joint Command (and subsequently ISAF) executed combined-staff assistance visits to the remaining Afghan corps.

Supporting Afghan Transitions

The year 2014 was marked by political and security transitions, with the Afghans undergoing their own changes parallel to the ISAF Joint Command. There were two presidential elections—general elections in April (which included Provincial Council elections) and a run-off in June. This latter election took place between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah after no candidate received more than the required 50 percent of the vote in the first round. Ashraf Ghani, declared the winner after a run-off and a drawn-out audit, was sworn into office as president of Afghanistan on 29 September 2014.

Afghan elections. The ISAF Joint Command supported the ANSF’s efforts to secure the elections with advisory assistance during planning; air weapons teams and airlift support for the movement of ballot material; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,

Cpl. Andrew Harris, a UH-1Y Huey crew chief with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369, performs a weapons check before an aerial assault support mission for ground convoys 3 May 2014 in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.
close air support, and other enablers on election days. When evidence of corruption threatened to derail the whole process, the ISAF Joint Command supported the United Nations-led audit by transporting nearly 23,000 ballot boxes back to Kabul and by supporting security at the strategically important Independent Election Commission warehouses, site of the audit.

New Afghan government. Once the elections were complete, the ISAF Joint Command supported ANSF efforts to secure the seating of the new government. Along with the new president came rumors of Afghan leadership changes. Rampant speculation created some turbulence for coalition forces; it was not clear whether existing ANSF leadership would remain in their current positions or be replaced. The same held true for key Afghan ministerial-level leaders. Maintaining neutrality, coalition forces worked hard to preserve relationships with the Afghans during this period of great uncertainty.

Shift to Afghan military forces. The ISAF Joint Command significantly decreased its support to the ANSF once the run-off and summer-2014 fighting season were complete. They downsized and consolidated advisory efforts at national command and control nodes. They reduced enablers—such as air weapons teams; medical evacuation; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and close air support—that previously were available to the ANSF. The ANSF realized that they soon would transition from leading security operations to assuming full security responsibility. They responded by substituting their own capabilities for functions formerly performed by the coalition. For example, they increasingly substituted D-30 artillery fire (122mm howitzers) for coalition close air support and their own route clearance assets for ISAF route clearance patrols.

The ISAF Joint Command steadily shifted ANSF training requirements to contractors and to the Afghans themselves in preparation for Resolute Support and the ANSF's assumption of full security responsibility. At the national level, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan transitioned counter-improvised explosive device, combat service support, literacy, and other contractor-led train-the-trainer programs to the ANSF. Regional commands (later TAACs) implemented improvised explosive device awareness, tactical air controllers, and call-for-fire train-the-trainer programs, placing Afghans in charge of their own training.

The ISAF Joint Command socialized all these changes with the ANSF early enough to manage expectations and prevent surprises. Applying transparency and candor early paid off. The ANSF had enough time to start developing their own solutions before coalition assistance ended. The transition occurred early enough—between August and October—to enable the ISAF Joint Command to respond to contingencies, which reduced the probability of the ANSF’s operational or strategic failure. The Command’s decrease in support shifted responsibility for the war to the ANSF and helped both sides adjust to the changing nature of the partnership.

Shifting Mind-Sets

The obvious transitions involved tangible factors, such as base reductions and troop redeployments. Less obvious were the transitions in attitude that took place among the coalition and ANSF. For example, the change to functionally based SFA required a distinct mental shift for both sides.

Coalition attitude changes. During Resolute Support, rather than enabling ANSF combat operations, coalition forces began to provide institutional-level advisory support through functionally based SFA. Despite the coalition forces’ “can-do” attitude, they had to come to terms with their new, more limited role. The same held true for the decrease in enablers. Coalition forces, accustomed to supporting their ANSF counterparts, had to adjust to the fact that they no longer had a combat role now that the ANSF had full security responsibility for their country.

Afghan attitude changes. Conversely, Afghans had to realize that coalition enablers and other support were a thing of the past. For over 12 years, coalition forces provided all kinds of assistance during combat operations. The early transition of regional commands to TAACs—which coincided with a precipitous reduction in enabler support—confirmed to the ANSF that coalition assistance would not be as forthcoming as it once was. The removal of certain capabilities helped them make the mental transition to the fact that during Resolute Support, enablers would only be available under extreme circumstances.

New confidence. The ANSF’s performance during the elections and summer fighting season, besides proving that they were capable of securing the country, bolstered their confidence and helped them make
the mental transition toward full security responsibility. In fact, this transition may have been the most important. Predicated on successful security operations, the Afghans’ newfound confidence will prove critical to their success and development into 2015 and beyond.

**Lessons Learned**

Transitions and the way they are managed profoundly affect the long-term security environment in a given country. How then can transitions be managed to positively shape the future operational and strategic environments so the United States and its allies can achieve their objectives and secure their long-term interests?

**Lesson one: planning.** The first lesson is to plan early and often. Commanders and staffs should anticipate transitions likely to occur and identify how they interact to influence the operational and strategic environments.

Besides identifying early the majority of the transitions set to occur across the country, the ISAF Joint Command recognized that a fundamental tension existed between reductions in force posture and its ongoing ability to support the ANSF. The ISAF Joint Command balanced each requirement, making sure the ANSF received sufficient support during the elections and the 2014 fighting season while simultaneously retrograding non-mission-essential equipment to achieve required force posture levels by the end of 2014.

In addition, the Command identified whether tasks funded under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act would be continued, amended, or discontinued during Resolute Support. They also identified who—contractors, the Department of State, the government of Afghanistan, or someone else—would assume responsibility for these requirements.

**Lesson two: flexibility.** Second, commanders should build flexibility into their plans because delays and unanticipated consequences will most certainly occur. The way to prepare for the unexpected is to make flexible plans. For example, the ISAF Joint Command planned and pushed hard to complete the transfer and closure of bases by 15 November to allow time for any unforeseen requirements before the end of their mandate. They also maintained the capability to surge engineer assets—both over-the-horizon engineers and United States Central Command material recovery elements—to assist with retrograde and redeployment. Working with United States Central Command, they maintained the capability to support intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets during the elections, fighting season, and high-risk retrograde and redeployment activities.

**Lesson three: transparency.** Third, it is important to be as transparent as possible, especially with host-nation forces, to manage expectations and ensure common
understanding. The ISAF Joint Command recognized that certain transitions would alter its relationship with the ANSF and that communication along the way could prevent misunderstandings.

Before the elections, it was important to maintain sufficient support so that the ANSF could sustain their operational momentum against the enemy; however, afterward the ISAF Joint Command precipitously reduced enablers to retrograde excess equipment and set conditions for Resolute Support. The Command clearly explained to the Afghans the nature of the changes well in advance to help them adjust their expectations. Candid communication helped both sides acclimate to the shifting nature of the relationship, which in turn helped both make the transition in mindset.

Lesson four: integration.
Fourth, transitions, as with strategic communications, should be integrated across lines of operation. Commanders should regularly reassess and reprioritize each transition to synchronize it with operations in support of campaign objectives. The ISAF Joint Command tracked and managed many simultaneous transitions. They emphasized certain ones at different times by prioritizing the realignment of headquarters early in the year and the shift from unit-level TAA activities to functionally based SFA, along with base closures and force posture reductions later. The key is recognizing that transitions will occur concurrently across lines of operation, and commanders and staffs must be aware of the interactions of various transitions so they can better manage the whole.

Lesson five: key leader role.
Fifth, some transitions required a centralized, top-down management process, especially for assets on which commanders depended. Key leaders were the locus for action. Only they could cut through inertia-laden bureaucratic processes—such as the Foreign Excess Personal Property and Foreign Excess Real Property programs—to effect change. These programs, which entail numerous steps to transfer property to foreign governments, were streamlined to expedite the responsible transfer of excess material to the Afghans. Between June and November 2014, the United States transferred equipment valued at over $850 million through the Foreign Excess Personal Property program alone, saving American taxpayers millions of dollars in transportation costs. Commanders’ involvement simplified and expedited an extraordinarily complex process.

Some requirements will be imposed while others will be conditions-based. The 1 January 2015
beginning of Resolute Support was a firm date that drove the entire transition process. Conversely, the ISAF Joint Command elected to transition regional commands to TAACs only when appropriate systems, structures, and force packages were in place. Regardless, leaders played a prominent role in guiding and managing all the transitions, whether imposed or conditions-based.

Lesson six: battle rhythm. Sixth, transitions affected the ISAF Joint Command’s battle rhythm and planning. To maintain situational awareness, the command staff and subordinate headquarters briefed every aspect of the many transitions at battle update briefings each week. Based on campaign priorities, the ISAF Joint Command adjusted the type and frequency of reporting requirements. These periodic updates enabled both the staff and subordinates to understand the impact of transitions across the operational area.

Transitions affected the ISAF Joint Command’s planning capabilities, particularly when their future plans staff (CJ-55), was integrated into ISAF. At this point, the CJ-55 became the ISAF future operations staff (CJ-35), leaving the ISAF Joint Command’s own CJ-35 responsible for increased future operations and future plans responsibilities. After the departure of the ISAF Joint Command’s CJ-55, its CJ-35 was responsible for—among other things—developing transition plans for the entire theater and plans for the August retrograde of audit material, all while simultaneously redeploying and transferring personnel to other headquarters. Combined, these factors placed quite a burden on the overstretched CJ-35 staff. Other staff sections shared similar experiences.

Lesson seven: trajectory. Seventh, transition plans—like any decision—will naturally take on a certain “path dependency.” In other words, it is difficult to change a transition’s trajectory once it starts down a certain path. The long-term direction of new organizations and processes tends to be set at the beginning. Commanders must be cognizant of the short- and long-term effects of their plans and ensure they manage transitions in a way that supports the achievement of both operational and strategic objectives.

For example, the transition to Resolute Support headquarters and TAACs involved significant restructuring to optimize the headquarters to deliver functionally based SFA. Once the structures were agreed upon, they were staffed and equipped accordingly. Lack of foresight or poor design could have created difficulties down the road and potentially threatened the Resolute Support mission. It is important that leaders consider the ramifications of transitions early on, especially how the design of organizations and processes will play out over time, when charting their way ahead.

The Way Ahead

The Army should work to prepare units for the transitions they will undoubtedly encounter during the closing months of military operations. The force can improve its management of transitions through doctrine, training, and research.

Doctrine. The process begins with doctrine. Unfortunately, current Army doctrine does not sufficiently address transitions and how to manage them. While noting that commanders should anticipate, plan for, and arrange tasks to facilitate transitions, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, does not mention that multiple transitions often occur simultaneously. ADP 3-07, *Stability*, does not provide details on how to manage transitions or the major shifts in a campaign that often occur over an extended period of time. ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, hardly touches on the issue and only mentions transitions briefly in the context of phasing and planning. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, does point out that transitions must be integrated into lines of effort by linking operational tasks to campaign objectives, and it is the only manual of those surveyed that notes transitions are a sequence of actions rather than a point in time. That said, it still leaves much to be desired to inform future transition planning and management. Similar deficits as those just mentioned hold true for joint doctrine.

To remedy this, the Army should develop an Army doctrine publication or field manual focused on transitions, detailing both basic and enduring challenges, to guide efforts during subsequent military operations. The manual should be general enough to apply to a broad array of scenarios but specific enough to be useful. The *Senior Leader’s Guide to Transition Planning*, published by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, provides a good foundation upon which to build.
Training. The Army should integrate the conduct of transitions into Army Centers of Excellence training modules. In particular, transition-focused training modules with an emphasis on planning and management should be integrated into existing professional military education at the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. Additionally, transition-focused scenarios should be adopted for use at the combat training centers so that units conducting mission readiness and other exercises can work through the challenges.

Research. The Army should encourage a deeper exploration of the effect transitions have on conflict termination and the achievement of strategic objectives through seminars and research endeavors sponsored by the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. The only way to truly understand a topic is to systematically study and prepare for it. Recent experience in Iraq demonstrates that the way conflicts are terminated has profound effects on long-term strategic objectives. More work is needed to understand the way transitions affect peace negotiations and conflict termination. Along those same lines, more work is needed to determine how to manage and execute transitions to link tactical actions with strategic objectives.

Conclusion

Transitions are an inevitable part of operations. At the tactical level, the U.S. Army does a good job planning for them; military units clearly identify tactical phases and the conditions under which they will transition to the next stage of an operation. Army forces are less adept at managing transitions at the operational and strategic levels. Just as Army leaders identify and plan for transitions tactically, so too must commanders and their staffs plan for them at the operational and strategic levels. The ISAF Joint Command’s experience in Afghanistan provides a good model to extract lessons learned. To truly prepare for and take advantage of transitions, commanders must identify transitions early, while maintaining flexibility and adaptability in the midst of ever-changing circumstances.

Notes

1. Type-A provincial chiefs of police are in the largest or most dominant province in a zone or region and have several type-B and type-C provincial chiefs of police reporting directly to them.
2. Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (the annual U.S. law that specifies the defense budget) provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military forces for counterterrorism and stability operations.


Maj. Matthew M. McCreary, U.S. Army, most recently served as deputy chief, Commander’s Initiatives Group, for the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command in Kabul, Afghanistan. A native of Ohio, he holds a B.A. from Ohio State University and an M.P.P. from George Washington University. He has deployed twice to Iraq and twice to Afghanistan.
Preparing Soldiers for Uncertainty

Lt. Col. Jonathan Due, U.S. Army,

Maj. Nathan Finney, U.S. Army, and

Maj. Joe Byerly, U.S. Army

There is no doubt that new technologies, emerging tactical techniques and capabilities, geopolitical and strategic trends, and the character of contemporary conflict affect our understanding of our profession considerably. Yet, war’s enduring nature and the commonly accepted principles of war come from venerable, even ancient, sources, particularly the classic texts of Thucydides and Carl von Clausewitz. Both
of these time-honored luminaries of military theory can shed light on an element of warfare that the Army must confront as it prepares for current and future challenges: uncertainty.

**The Realm of Uncertainty**

Uncertainty is a factor in everything military forces must do as the executors of national will. The effects of uncertainty—fear, confusion, and friction—are particularly evident in combat. Our strategic, operational, and tactical leaders recognize the pervasive presence of uncertainty. They acknowledge that war always has existed within its sphere, as expressed in the familiar words of Clausewitz: “War is the realm of uncertainty; three-quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.”

Army leaders know they must prepare forces to face uncertainty across the range of military operations. This article discusses how to accomplish this preparation so that Army forces will be able to prevail in armed conflict. Preparation for combat must include rigorous education and self-development, combined with training soldiers to achieve unmatched lethality at the unit level.

Thucydides’ tome on the Peloponnesian War does not discuss uncertainty explicitly. However, the concept is woven throughout the work: in the unforeseen death of Pericles by plague and the changed character of the Athenian regime evident in the Melian Dialogue and the Sicily expedition, for example.

In *On War*, Clausewitz is more explicit in his treatment of uncertainty. In discussing the human nature of war, he writes, “Although our intellect always longs for clarity and certainty, our nature often finds uncertainty fascinating.” Throughout his text, Clausewitz shows that war is the most uncertain of human endeavors. In many ways, recent discussions concerning complexity in military operations could be considered discussions of the fog, friction, and chance inherent in war. Put another way, the idea of complexity is a way to acknowledge the uncertainty inherent in any human activity, and war is the most dangerous and violent activity possible.

War is the most dangerous human activity not only because it involves life and death, but as Clausewitz observes, [It] is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass ... but always the collision of two living forces ... so long as I have not overthrown my opponent, I am bound to fear he will overthrow me. Thus I am not in control: he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him.

In this excerpt, Clausewitz is discussing how physical force, and the fear of an adversary’s physical force, leads to uncertainty. Any soldier inculcated in the U.S. Army’s “seize, retain, and exploit the initiative” culture should consider the Prussian sage’s point. This nonlinear, dynamic interaction creates a course of conflict that is not “the mere sequence of intentions and actions of each opponent, but the pattern or shape generated by mutually hostile intentions and simultaneously consequential actions.”

In other words, war is a clash of wills between two thinking enemies. The advantage of a weapon system or a tactic is quickly countered by an opposing weapon or tactic developed by the enemy as this clash plays out at all levels of war until the belligerents can come to a resolution through annihilation or exhaustion.

**The Expertise Needed to Ensure Readiness**

The Army’s ability to train men and women for war is inherently tied to the budget of the United States, and today the Nation is once again seeing shrinking budgets that will affect how the Army prepares formations. The decrease in money for training means the Army needs to be creative and deliberate in what it trains and to what standard. One thing is certain: soldiers need an understanding of uncertainty and how to mitigate it. The Army can support its soldiers by ensuring their training allows them to develop expertise in three primary areas:

- The history of warfare
- Adapting to uncertainty
- The use of weapon systems and equipment

From the formulaic training approach the Army used during the Cold War to the modern ad hoc amalgam of training the Army uses for counterinsurgency and stability operations, uncertainty has waxed and waned as an element of preparing troops for war. Training and educating for uncertainty in war should be a key theme of leader development.

**Expertise in the history of warfare.** Studying the history of warfare does not mean requiring the reading of a commander’s favorite book from when
he or she was a lieutenant, though that could be a
start. Instead, Army leaders and soldiers should
take a deliberate, disciplined approach to self-de-
velopment; this aspect of education must receive as
much leader emphasis as maintenance, situational
training lanes, and gunnery. Much has been written
on deliberate self-study, including the classic article
“Use and Abuse of Military History” by Sir Michael
Howard.10 Howard recommends three rules:
First, study in width. He [the historian] 
must observe the way in which warfare has
developed over a long historical period ... 
Next he must study in depth. He should
take a single campaign and explore it thor-
oughly ... until the tidy outlines dissolve
and he catches a glimpse of the confusion
and horror of the real experience ... And
lastly, he must study in context. Campaigns
and battles are not like games of chess or
football matches, conducted in total de-
tachment from their environment accord-
ing to strictly defined rules [italics added
for emphasis].11

Warfare must be understood in its historical,
social, cultural, economic, human, moral, politi-
cal, and psychological contexts because “the roots
of victory and defeat often have to be sought far
from the battlefield.”12 Failure to study wars within
their context leads to a superficial view of war, with
lessons and conclusions divorced from their proper
environment.

The disciplined study of the history of warfare
develops important critical thinking skills that help
military professionals deal with the uncertainty of
war and the challenge of institutional change. As
Williamson Murray points out, history offers “mili-
tary professionals an understanding of how to think
about intractable problems, how to grapple with
uncertainty, and how to prepare throughout their
careers for the positions of responsibility that they
must inevitably assume.”13

Moreover, according to Paul Van Riper, the
vicarious experiences provided through the study of
military history allow “practitioners of warfare to
see familiar patterns of activity and to develop more
quickly potential solutions to tactical and opera-
tional problems.”14 This is precisely why soldiers
need to study war, its theory, and its military insti-
tutions carefully and critically.15

A deep, broad, and contextualized understand-
ing of history provides the requisite perspective to
understand and evaluate the theory and the nature
of war. An example of a self-study program that
includes a military history emphasis can be found
in the “Maneuver Self-Study Program” developed at
Fort Benning, Ga. This program supplements pro-
fessional military education with a well-developed
course that can help leaders on their personal jour-
ney toward a broader, deeper, and more contextual
understanding of war and its theories.16

**Expertise in adapting to uncertainty.** Properly
establishing a defense is important and should be
trained. However, the ability to adapt a plan to meet
a new crisis or capitalize on an unforeseen gain
is even more important. As Williamson Murray
observes, “adaptation demands constant, unceasing
change because war itself never remains static but
involves the complexities thrown up by humans in-
volved in their attempt to survive.”17 As leaders study
war and reflect on their own experiences in combat,
they likely will conclude that situations in which
other leaders had to make rapid decisions in the face
of conflicting reports or loss of communications
with a higher headquarters were more common than
a perfectly executed defense or attack.

One way to prepare leaders for combat is to devel-
op scenarios in which friction and uncertainty are the
cornerstones of the exercise. This can be accomplished
easily by introducing the following elements: imper-
fect information, rushed timelines, conflicting reports,
rapid changes in operations, loss of key leadership,
sleep deprivation, ethical decisions, and maintenance
and logistical issues. Units and leaders should be eval-
uated and judged on their ability to operate effective-
ly in these situations. Following execution, trainers
should conduct intense after action reviews to discuss
the exercises. Questions developed in advance to stim-
ulate reflection by participants will greatly enhance
evaluation. Evaluators should avoid using outdated
checklists that merely make grading easier. The evalu-
ations need to be as carefully designed as the exercises
so the benefits of training can be enhanced.

**Expertise in weapon systems and equipment.**
In their seminal work, “Distributed Manoeuvre:
21st Century Offensive Tactics,” Australians Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan posit that war can be viewed as a dialectic struggle between the offense and defense. They describe how as soon as one force gains an advantage, the other quickly counters it. They believe that since detection technology has greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the offense, the defense has countered with traditional countermeasures such as dispersion and decentralized operations to operate below the detection threshold. To regain the upper hand against this type of defense, the offense needs to decentralize operations as well.

For the U.S. Army, training lethal units that can effectively shoot, move, and communicate in varied environments is critical to our ability to meet this latest evolution in the offense versus defense fight. The Army certainly has spent years perfecting an approach to lethality and effectiveness but in the process has lost sight of fundamentals. Units should train on much more than the standard gunnery tables. These are scientific and formulaic but fail to account for uncertainty on the battlefield. Training should require smaller elements to react to unfolding events in multiple environments and quickly gain operational or firepower dominance while limiting civilian casualties in the operational area. The current decisive action rotations slotted for Army training centers certainly are moving in this direction.

**Leader Development Goals**

None of these approaches to increasing soldiers’ knowledge and preparedness for uncertainty will work without a way to evaluate their effectiveness. Each element should be evaluated as a part of normal leader development and training activities. As part of counseling noncommissioned and commissioned officers, the study of warfare should play a part in educational goals. When a rater writes leader evaluations, those goals should be addressed, and the rater should determine if they were met. Similarly, as smaller units improve their ability to conduct decentralized operations, unit leaders must ascertain the failures, successes, and lessons of training. Following training events at all levels, leaders should drive home the lessons of fighting and adapting in an uncertain environment.

**Conclusion**

The Army frequently gives lip service to the complexity of environments in which it has battled during the last decade, while predicting environments that are more complex in the future. However, to ensure soldiers are prepared for such a future, more than lip service is needed. The Army must leverage the lessons of the past. As Huba Waz de Czege writes, “The business of war has never been simple and those that tried in the past to reduce its practice to mere formulas were defeated.”

The Army needs to find a balance with the training of tasks and the education of warfare. It
should ensure that Army leaders—including the many without combat experience—are prepared by training environments that reflect the uncertainty inherent in warfare. By creating the right mix of education and training, with uncertainty incorporated into the mix, the Army will be prepared when the time comes to fight and win the Nation’s wars.

---

Lt. Col. Jonathan Due commands 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, in Vilseck, Germany. He holds an M.A. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and a B.S. from the United States Military Academy. An armor officer, his previous assignments include troop commander, squadron operations officer, and regimental executive officer.

Maj. Nathan K. Finney is an Army strategist, stationed in the National Capital Region. He holds an M.P.A. from Harvard University, an M.P.A. from the University of Kansas, and a B.A. in anthropology from the University of Arizona. His previous assignments include tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Maj. Joe Byerly is an armor officer studying at the United States Naval War College in Newport, R.I. He has commanded a cavalry troop and a headquarters company at Fort Stewart, Ga. He holds a B.S. from North Georgia College and State University. He received the Army’s General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award in 2011.

---

Notes

   3. Clausewitz, 97.
   6. Clausewitz, 86.
   11. Ibid.
   12. Ibid.
   16. “The Maneuver Self-Study Program” (also called the Maneuver Leader’s Self-Study Program) is available online at www.benning.army.mil/mssp (accessed 29 October 2014).

A Paradigm of Dialogue and Trust
Army Mission Command Training

Mr. Robert B. Scaife and

Know your men, and be constantly on the alert for potential leaders—you never know how soon you may need them.

—Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command, defines mission command as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.” While deconstructing this definition, it remains clear that the commander has the central role within mission command, as the nexus of command and decision making. However, leadership is corporate, springing from the inculcation of the mission command philosophy through commanders and staffs to their subordinates. Using corporate leadership, commanders balance the art of command and the science of control.

Commanders and staffs work in concert to leverage their experience and knowledge to accomplish missions. Mission command is the preferred doctrinal approach to command and enables this leverage. The philosophy is based on six principles: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk. The question is—how do commanders instill these principles into the very fabric of their units?

The Army Leadership Development Strategy (ALDS) 2013, reaffirms a commitment to the Profession of Arms, lifelong learning, and embedding the mission command principles within leader development. The ALDS has three lines of effort: training, education, and experience. These three lines of effort are enabled through three training domains: the institutional domain, the operational domain, and the self-development domain.

The ALDS is clear: “the operational domain is where leaders undergo the bulk of their development.” Already, home-station training is the new slogan of training and operations officers throughout the force.

Institutional education within the Army can be seen as a baseline—a common ground from which each soldier and officer begins the real process of learning. Graduation from the Army’s institutional schools does not create experts but rather apprentices (journeymen at more senior levels); the diploma merely represents a license to learn. The commander, as his or her unit’s resident expert, is tasked to mentor, coach, and develop apprentices.

Build Cohesive Teams Through Mutual Trust

Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, established the premise of mission command for the joint force in his 2012 white paper, “Mission Command.” In this paper, he shows trust to be the facilitating factor in future operations. Dempsey borrows a phrase from Dr. Stephen Covey, saying that “operations will move at the speed of trust.” Due to the changes in operating tempo and large operational areas networked by technology, units will be more widely distributed and more isolated from other friendly units than ever before. Isolation of units will result in a greater need for decentralization of command throughout all echelons.

Amplifying the theme of trust, the 2012 “38th Chief of Staff of the Army’s Marching Orders” further defines trust as the bedrock of the Profession of Arms. Trust is between soldiers and their leaders, their families, and the Army; and between the Army and the American people. Indeed, the mission command philosophy means that trust should be instilled at all echelons for the Army to be as effective as possible.

In The Speed of Trust: The One Thing that Changes Everything, Stephen Covey defines trust as “equal parts character and competence.” Covey describes character as constant, founded on ethics, and essential for “trust in any circumstance.” Competence, on the other hand, is situational; it will ebb and flow depending on factors such as trainability, will, and experience.

In the exercise of mission command, it is imperative to ensure that both character and competence are promulgated across the force. The ALDS and the U.S. Army Mission Command Strategy FY 13-19 both see mission command not only as a war-fighting function enabler but also as an “instrument of cultural change.”

The formation of ethic and character within soldiers begins at the earliest levels of professional military education (PME). In acculturating soldiers to the Army, whether at basic combat training, the U.S. Military Academy, Officer Candidate School, or in the Reserve Officer Training Corps, the common touchstone to character development is the Army Values. Army professional military traditions and educational institutions provide some inculcation of values and ethics. However,
beyond schoolroom blocks of instruction or rote memorization of the Army Values, how does the Army ensure that values are instilled in the force?

The answer lies in practical application. The vast majority of a soldier’s career should be spent in the operational field, away from the schoolhouse and the comfort of school solutions presented in 50-minute blocks of PowerPoint instruction. It is during operational assignments where words are put into action and values are truly instilled. The stress of being called upon to discern where on the values spectrum a decision rests, after being awake for days on end during training or deployments, refines a soldier’s character. Thus, it is in the crucible of such moments where the Army strengthens its institutional values by inculcating the two components of trust into its soldiers: character and competence.

Developing competence is where the Army shines in many respects. Functional competence is relatively simple to train and test. Motivated soldiers—wanting to learn a job or task and having the capacity to learn—and competent, knowledgeable instructors are a recipe for functional competence.

Yet, with the increasing specialization in the force across military occupational specialties, how does the Army develop competence across a warfighting function or occupational specialty?

Due to myriad factors, training the force to a reasonable level of competence across warfighting functions and occupational specialties at the institutional level is a difficult endeavor. However, unit leadership can develop a cross-training regime at the operational level to increase the efficacy of knowledge and experience by employing the ALDS.

The ALDS addresses the inherent shortcomings of the institutional education system by recognizing that the onus for mission command inculcation—in particular, the building of teams through mutual trust—rests squarely with operational Army leaders. However, the Army culture remains characteristically defined “through top-down control, endless regulations, and inspections focused on inputs rather than outcomes.”

Trust, therefore, must be built at the unit level (read home-station training) through dialogue and actions throughout the Army force generation rotational cycle.

**Shared Understanding**

Part and parcel of the mission command philosophy is the principle of creating shared understanding.
between commanders, their staffs, and their subordinates. Mutual trust and team building are the key enablers of this principle. Typically, staffs achieve shared understanding of their mission and operational environment (OE) through the receipt of an order from higher headquarters; analysis of the order and OE through staff processes (e.g., the Army design methodology [ADM], the military decisionmaking process [MDMP], or troop leading procedures [TLP]); and the application of knowledge management principles to process and analyze data coming into the command post (developing information into knowledge). One could easily assume that a good, timely operation order provides the basis for building shared understanding. However, these processes and tools are only a few manifestations of all the elements that go into ensuring shared understanding between commanders, staffs, and subordinate units.

Institutionally, the Army is relatively successful in applying the principle of shared understanding as a staff function. When delving more deeply into the principle, it becomes clear that to be completely successful, there must be dialogue. The Oxford Dictionaries Online define dialogue as “a discussion between two or more people or groups, especially one directed towards exploration of a particular subject or resolution of a problem.”14 When a person understands that dialogue is not merely idle conversation—but a purposive, positive task—the benefits should become apparent. However, the Army faces two significant roadblocks to the institutionalization of dialogue.

First, and perhaps most easily addressed, is the common but unfortunate misconception that mission command is only for officers. Nothing could be further from the truth. As Sgt. Maj. Dennis A. Eger stated at the 2013 Association of the United States Army Mission Command Symposium, “Mission command isn’t officer business, it’s leader business.”15 The role of the noncommissioned officer (NCO) in mission command is as an enabler. The NCO leads, mentors, and coaches soldiers to understand the commander’s intent and carry out the mission. However, if the NCO corps believes that NCOs have no role in mission command, and the commissioned officer corps believes essentially the same thing about NCOs, how does the Army change this notion? The solution is dialogue.

To support the exercise of mission command, NCOs and officers must dialogue continuously to create a shared vision. If NCOs feel they are on the outside looking in, it is very difficult for them to commit to the mission or the commander’s intent. Therefore, NCOs must be included in staff processes and decision-making processes. NCOs can make substantial contributions. Besides the NCO role as a trusted agent for action in completing missions, an NCO’s knowledge and insight, acquired from experience, are invaluable in planning operations and training. Consequently, if the Army
inculcates shared understanding among officers and NCOs from two echelons higher to two echelons lower, unit commitment to the mission is easily achieved.

Second, creating an environment conducive to dialogue within a unit is difficult due to several other factors, including the pervasive presence of technology within soldiers’ lives. Technology, in effect, keeps many officers and NCOs on shift all the time through e-mails, text messages, or cell phone calls. Additionally, even when officers and soldiers are off duty during deployments, or when they have gone home for the night in garrison, they put in their earphones and begin the process of unwinding, disengaging from others in a form of social isolation.

In contrast, not that long ago—perhaps 20 years—in a typical barracks scene soldiers sat around tables playing cards or dominoes, typically sparring with words, blowing off steam, and having fun as a group. Concurrently, officers would huddle around a table at a dining facility or an officers’ club discussing the mission at hand or some other professional development topic. In essence, officers, NCOs, and enlisted soldiers habitually participated in some kind of informal, constructive, after-hours dialogue that the operational Army now often overlooks or discounts. One may not see the intrinsic value of soldiers sitting around playing cards, yet in such settings soldiers can learn who their compatriots really are—who is a bluffer, who is an incessant talker, who is a hard-charger, and so on.

Among officers sitting around a dinner table, commanders could gain insight about their staffs: Who is daring? Who is reckless? Who thinks deeply, and who does not? Yet today, what normally occurs is that when the duty day is complete, soldiers go their separate ways. While perhaps not intended, this automatic isolation contributes nothing to engendering the trust mission command calls for.

In contrast, many U.S. allies have preserved the regimental mess, allowing commanders to use this forum for dialogue with their staffs on a regular basis. In this venue, much professional development occurs. Commanders and staffs can speak freely, and the seeds of an ongoing dialogue can be sown.

To take it a step further, a similar situation can be imagined that informally associates soldiers with NCOs on a regular basis. Perhaps once a month or quarter, a venue might be found for an entire unit to sit down together to share their thoughts and concerns in an open forum built on mutual trust and dialogue.

The real value of dialogue is the opportunity for professional development and the creation of shared understanding. Shared understanding built on the foundation

Soldiers from 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, conduct a dismounted patrol at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif., 14 February 2013. (Photo by Specialist Adam Hoppe, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment PAO)
of trust not only promotes a unit’s commitment to the mission but also enables esprit de corps and personal commitment of soldiers and leaders to each other. Dialogue is that important—it should be institutionalized to the greatest extent possible. The disengagement effected by headphones and computer games should be limited.

**Clear Commander’s Intent**

Commanders should tell subordinates what to do, not how to do it. Harkening back to Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, a unit commander should be sufficiently prepared to conduct his operation confidently, anticipate events, and act fully and boldly to accomplish his mission without further orders. If an unanticipated situation arises, committed unit commanders should understand the purpose of the operation well enough to act decisively, confident that they are doing what their superior commander would order were he present.¹⁶

This idea is echoed in the Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, *Mission Command*:

Commanders articulate the overall reason for the operation so forces understand why it is being conducted. They use the commander’s intent to explain the broader purpose of the operation beyond that of the mission statement. Doing this allows subordinate commanders and soldiers to gain insight into what is expected of them, what constraints apply, and most importantly, why the mission is being conducted.¹⁷

With operations now moving with such great speed and complexity, partly due to leaps in technology and mechanization, they can be planned only up to the point of execution. However, it is through the mission command principles of shared understanding and trust that the commander’s intent can be expressed so that it yields the greatest effect by enabling initiative.

The commander develops a statement of the commander’s intent through critical and creative thinking. Dialogue between commanders and their staffs and soldiers to create shared understanding supports this process. One approach the Army uses to facilitate creative and critical thinking is the Army design methodology, or ADM. As defined in ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, the ADM is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them. Army design methodology is an iterative process of understanding and problem framing that uses elements of operational art to conceive and construct an operational approach to solve identified problems. Commanders and their staffs use Army design methodology to assist them with the conceptual aspects of planning.¹⁸

A descriptive planning process, the ADM lends itself to dialogue that helps flesh out emerging tasks and objectives. Yet, creative and critical thinking are
not necessarily an output of dialogue. How does the Army practice creative and critical thinking?

Many of the processes used by staffs are inescapably algorithmic, or closed-ended. In other words, they are formulaic and specific; they lend themselves to checking the block. In comparison, ADM is heuristic, lending itself not to a formula but to a process of discovery through the application of experience and common sense. The heuristic methodology used in the ADM depends on the collective depth and breadth of experience of the staff members, as opposed to algorithmic methodologies such as the MDMP and TLP, which are structured with a plethora of how-tos to guide an inexperienced staff.

Dialogue is an ideal starting point for the teaching of creative and critical thinking within a staff and unit. However, creative and critical thinking skills must also be practiced through scenario-based training to fully prepare soldiers and their leaders for applying mission command. Currently, the Army extensively uses scenario-based training in its exercises and PME. However, there is an expectation that conventional military thinking (e.g., the MDMP and TLP) will prevail, in contradiction to the usual PME motto of training the force, “how to think, not what to think.” Developing creative and critical thinking helps refine the coup d’œil (“stroke of the eye,” or the ability to immediately see and assess the OE) within the commander and staff. How does this come together in a decisive action training environment?

First, it should be noted that algorithmic paradigms have an important place in training and operations and should not be neglected. Recalling the venerable Army Training and Evaluation Program, units would focus on unit-level functional tasks considered essential to mission accomplishment. These tasks were rehearsed and executed by the numbers to the point that a unit that achieved “T” (trained) status would be able to execute the task at night, in the rain, and in mission-oriented protective posture 4 (known as MOPP 4). This method has great utility for certain tasks. For example, perhaps an engineering unit will need to erect a bridge to facilitate a river crossing. The time to be learning to erect the bridge is not upon arrival at a river’s banks during operations with a division close behind.

Clearly, mastery of functional tasks through drill is extremely important to executing a mission. Yet, on the other side of the training paradigm is the heuristic domain. Here, commanders need to understand and develop not only how their subordinates think but also what they think. An example from the popular Star Trek movie series illustrates the point. The Kobayashi Maru was an unwinnable (with one exception) exercise designed to test the mettle of future commanders and also to reveal to their superiors how and what these future commanders would think when faced with an ambiguous, unwinnable situation with overwhelming odds against them.

Understanding the nature of heuristics also involves intuitive judgment; the value of difficult exercises is apparent. As commanders more fully understand and visualize their OE, it is instructive for them to be able to intuit what their subordinate leaders likely will do in a highly stressful and ambiguous environment.
To demonstrate the importance of heuristic training, consider that before the World War II battle of Leyte Gulf (1944-1945), the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had studied extensively the prior actions of U.S. Navy admirals. Understanding that Adm. William F. Halsey was habitually aggressive in his pursuit of Japanese aircraft carriers, the IJN plan, called (objects that need to be added) placed a decoy fleet led by Vice-Adm. Jisaburō Ozawa to lure Halsey’s 3rd Fleet away from the eastern flank of the Philippines. After Halsey’s 3rd Fleet reconnaissance planes located Ozawa’s decoy fleet, he pursued them just as the IJN command had predicted, leaving the San Bernardino Straits unguarded. This allowed the Japanese Central Fleet to pass through the San Bernardino Straits unabated and catch Rear Adm. Clifton Sprague and his Task Unit 77.4.3, Taffy 3, with almost disastrous effect.

This example describes two opposing commanders, but the effects of heuristics are clear. The IJN’s understanding of Halsey’s pathological drive to destroy every IJN carrier allowed Ozawa gain an advantage in support of Shō-Gō 1. If the IJN had not known about Halsey, such an audacious tactic would more than likely have been eliminated from their plans. The importance of gaining this kind of knowledge and applying this type of reasoning can be impressed on our own leaders, but this will not happen spontaneously. Commanders and their leaders must have a directed dialogue to achieve this level of knowledge and wisdom, but how?

Cohesive units are forged in the crucible of combat and training. As steel sharpens steel, so must commanders’ training programs sharpen the steel of their subordinate leaders and troops. It is not enough in complex OEs to be content with the mere training of tasks. When units deploy for training to the National Training Center, the Joint Readiness Training Center, or the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, what is the end state for training that leaders are seeking? Are Army forces using these training environments as a crucible to forge agile and adaptive officers and soldiers that are allowed to execute orders within the commander’s intent, while exercising disciplined initiative and accepting prudent risk? This is where the promulgation of doctrine and the inculcation of the mission command philosophy can provide for the development of creative and critical thinking throughout the force.

Unfortunately, when units are able to deploy to a major training center, the rotations tend to be nominally for training and in reality only for certification. This is counterproductive to the real intent of training. Certification is templated and uniform and by its very nature restricts creative thinking. Just as engineers need to be able to assemble a bridge in the dark, in the rain, and with MOPP 4 gear, so must commanders and staffs, who are expected to deal with unexpected developments in complex OEs, be able to conduct training that approaches challenges through creative and critical thinking.

The philosophy of mission command allows commanders and units to create an environment of trust and dialogue. One part of trust is that subordinates trust their leaders to allow them to fail. Allowing subordinates the freedom to fail in training serves two purposes. First, learning by success is very difficult because there are few lessons learned. In unit training, expectations should be limited to functional competence, with the understanding that the subordinate leadership can choose their own courses of action in support of their commanders. Second, taking risks that could lead to failure in training is, in a manner of speaking, another form a dialogue. It is through the independence of action that subordinate leaders have in mission command that commanders can begin to visualize and develop how and what their subordinates think and will do when confronted with certain stressors and situations.

This is a major ideological shift in training Army units. Units should focus on training to get better, not simply training to win an exercise or training just to check the block. Training should be meaningful by facilitating dialogue with the aim of engendering trust between a unit and its commander.

Exercise Disciplined Initiative, Use Mission Orders, and Accept Prudent Risk

As the principles of the mission command philosophy are inculcated within a unit, commanders and staffs should be comfortable in allowing their subordinates to exercise disciplined initiative within the the commander’s intent. When units have a foundation of confidence, trust, and dialogue through a robust professional development program, subordinate leaders should be willing and able to take the reins on their part of an operation because they have developed confidence in their own ability and in that of their subordinates. As described in ADRP 6-0,
Disciplined initiative is action in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise. Commanders rely on subordinates to act. A subordinate’s disciplined initiative may be the starting point for seizing the tactical initiative. This willingness to act helps develop and maintain operational initiative used by forces to set or dictate the terms of action throughout an operation.22

Again, mission command demands nothing less than trust and critical and creative thinking. How does the Army institutionalize this principle? The answer is for leaders to delegate and to trust.

Let us assume that a commander gives a highly functioning staff, with a solid bedrock of trust, the task to set up and run a rifle qualification range. The commander trusts the staff to accomplish the mission without telling them how to accomplish it. Being familiar with their soldiers through ongoing dialogue and professional development, the staff members know who is capable of running the range and who needs mentoring. Therefore, within the constraints of this task, the staff issues the order with the critical personnel assigned to their respective roles, while also mentoring those soldiers who may not be as capable or competent in range operations. The staff and subordinate leaders are able to use their judgment to exercise disciplined initiative in meeting the commander’s intent of rifle qualification in a way that best serves the unit and further develops leaders.

Additionally, let us assume there is a problem at the desired range. Knowing the commander’s intent, the staff can work within their constraints to achieve the desired end state. There is no need to return to the commander for further guidance unless some concern arises from unforeseen circumstances that could result in a fundamental failure of the mission without further guidance or resources. Disciplined initiative is doing what is legal, moral, and ethical within the commander’s intent to accomplish the mission.

Here, the mission order was as simple as, “I would like to get everyone qualified on his or her rifle no later than March 15th.” Is this enough information for a unit to complete the mission or task? In this case, yes. However, mission orders are not necessarily as short as the one above. Much has been made of Gen. Ulysses S. Grant’s brevity of orders given to Lt. Gen. William T. Sherman in his march to the sea during the Civil War. The minimal information in those orders illustrates a high level of trust and competence between a commander and a subordinate commander. Conversely, a commander, at times, may feel compelled to issue more directive orders depending on the subordinate, the level of trust, or the situation.

However, due to the complexities of OEs and the speed of war, it is imperative that commanders issue orders reflective of the situation and their level of comfort with their staff, while accepting prudent risk. Accepting prudent risk is the culmination point for the principles of the mission command philosophy:

Commanders focus on creating opportunities rather than simply preventing defeat—even when preventing defeat appears safer. Reasonably estimating and intentionally
accepting risk are not gambling. Gambling, in contrast to prudent risk taking, is staking the success of an entire action on a single event without considering the hazard to the force should the event not unfold as envisioned. Therefore, commanders avoid taking gambles. Commanders carefully determine risks, analyze and minimize as many hazards as possible, and then take prudent risks to exploit opportunities.23

Additionally, practicing issuing mission orders that are outcome based rather than directive for common tasks and training allows the staff to fail in a safe environment. This approach lends itself to improved training and professional development. It allows commanders to leverage the knowledge of their staff and the relatively benign training environment to accept risk and create learning advantages.

**Conclusion**

U.S. Naval War College professor Milan Vego notes in an article on military creativity in *Joint Force Quarterly* that creative and critical thought is hindered by the authoritarian tendencies of higher commanders, bureaucratic requirements of the military organization that forces fixed routines and outcomes, conformity that is compounded by the very structure of the military, parochialism that leads to resistance to cooperation, dogmatic views on doctrine, and anti-intellectualism.24 These hindrances can be difficult to overcome, especially in an Army that is both shrinking and resetting its mission. However, it can also be argued that now is the perfect time for the establishment of a tradition of creative thought in the Army.

Mission command attempts to resolve “the internal conflict between will and judgment.”25 The *will* is the “can-do” and the *judgment* is the “cannot do”. Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall states,

> The will does not operate in a vacuum. It cannot be imposed successfully if it runs counter to reason. Things are not done in war primarily because a man wills it; they are done because they are do-able. The limits for the commander in battle are defined by the general circumstances. What he asks of his men must be consistent with the possibilities of the situation.26

Commanders can influence soldiers’ will by inculcating the philosophy of mission command within their staffs and subordinates. Their influence extends to modeling the Profession of Arms through vigorous professional development programs, opportunities for subordinates to engage in dialogue, and leader development.

Leader development in the Profession of Arms focuses on three domains: *military-technical*, or, quite simply, competence; *moral-ethical*, or character; and, *political-cultural*, or how the unit and its personnel operate both inside and outside the institution.27 The mission command philosophy forms the bedrock of mentorship in these three domains. To develop agile and adaptive leaders ready and able to conduct unified land operations, units must practice and train these principles in everything that they do.

Moreover, the Army needs what Col. Thomas M. Williams calls “heretics”—people who question accepted ideas, norms, and outcomes.28 To facilitate questioning, commanders can use professional development programs to push their subordinates to express their own original ideas. Again, this assumes a level of trust and willingness that must be established in a unit. Commanders must encourage and allow their subordinates to risk failure through creative and audacious solutions to problems.

On the face of it, this may seem counterintuitive due to the nature of the Army’s business; failure means the loss of equipment, resources, or personnel. However, how often do people learn significant lessons from their successes? Subordinates must be allowed to make their own decisions and observe the results within a safe training environment. In this way, they can learn from their mistakes before embarking on real-world missions where failure is no longer an option. More often than not, failures in training lead to more well-rounded individuals and future successes.

Finally, open dialogue and trust are the very foundation of *esprit de corps* and effectiveness. Without trust, a unit will be hobbled by poor communication. Without open dialogue, units likely will miss opportunities to improve performance. With trust and dialogue, they can become more cohesive, with a singular focus on conducting unified land operations to “prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.”29
Mr. Robert B. Scaife was an instructor/facilitator with the Joint Multinational Simulation Center’s Mission Command Program, 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Center at Grafenwöhr, Germany, until June 2014. He holds a B.A. from the University of Arkansas at Little Rock and is a Fulbright Scholar. When this article was written, Mr. Scaife was completing a M.A. from Kansas State University and the command and staff curriculum with the Naval War College.

Lt. Col. Packard J. Mills, U.S. Army, Retired, is a training program management specialist with the Joint Multinational Simulation Center’s Mission Command Program at the 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Center at Grafenwöhr, Germany. He holds a B.A. from the University of Washington and an M.A. from American Military University. Mills served as both an armorman and an intelligence officer, and has deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Notes


3. Ibid., iv.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 11.
10. Covey, 30.
11. Ibid., 31.
17. ADRP 6-0, 2-3.
23. Ibid., 2-5.
25. Vermillion, 49.
28. Williams, 51.
Deniers of “The Truth”
Why an Agnostic Approach to Warfare is Key

Lt. Col. Grant M. Martin, U.S. Army

I will never forget the day I ate lunch with a retired chaplain and his son in Leavenworth, Kansas in 2008. At one point, an acquaintance of the chaplain walked up to him in the restaurant and shared with him his opinion of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS).

“They are deniers of The Truth,” he proclaimed, and went on to describe the school’s sin: the instructors encouraged students to question their most fundamental beliefs. At the time, I thought it curious that someone would apply a religious attitude to the study of the military arts. After my first few months at the school, however, I realized that as one questioned one’s assumptions about the nature of war it was only natural that one would also start to question other assumptions about life, God, and
everything. Critical thinking was difficult to limit to just one subject.

Amazingly, there were even more officers uncomfortable with questioning their fundamental assumptions about warfare. Today I realize that SAMS could only do so much in introducing different ways to approach the subject. Even after looking into postmodern philosophies, alternative construction of social meaning, and complexity theory and systems thinking, the SAMS curricula could not break away from the demands of the Army in forcing upon us the technically rational paradigm. Thus, after studying how complex adaptive systems resist reductionist understanding and deliberate, rational approaches—we launched into the military decision-making process (MDMP), center of gravity analysis, and backwards, intuitive planning.

But why should we approach warfare the same way most of us approach religion? Is it any coincidence that most military officers believe in the technically rational paradigm, even if largely unaware of what it is, much less critically questioning it?

In this article, I will describe an exploratory research effort I participated in to offer a reflective practice approach that might better serve our military. This study consisted of observations made during 14 iterations of the U.S. Army Special Forces Qualification Course’s Robin Sage exercise for more than a year’s time wherein, mostly indeterminantly, I introduced some of the concepts found within design into the planning portion of the training. As my time in command neared an end, I more consciously engaged in conversation with students about some of the concepts behind design. From my viewpoint, I observed a difference between those who had no exposure to design, those who had some exposure, and those who received a little more than some. Of the student teams during the last two iterations of my command, two of them were encouraged to approach their mission planning in a more unstructured manner, and during a class on planning, I engaged with all the officers in a conversation about different planning methods to include design.

My observations, admittedly very subjective and unscientific, follow. My hope is that further experimentation can improve upon the military’s use of unstructured approaches to warfare, especially in complex operations such as counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, and the like. I assert that our religious-like belief in the technically rational paradigm has us wedded to an approach to warfare that seems intuitively effective, but is largely illusory. This study supports the Army Special Operation Forces (ARSOF) 2022 vision as stated by Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command commanding general, in terms of experimenting with different operational art constructs.

A student performs a training task 15 September 2010 during the Robin Sage exercise. The exercise is conducted as the final test for students attending the Special Forces Qualification Course.
and incorporating the new special operations forces operational design concepts into training and education.7

**The Experiment**

When describing an experiment in social science terms, it does not always follow that a deliberate approach was utilized under clinical conditions. What follows is a collection of observations during the Robin Sage portion of the Special Forces Qualification Course. I define an MDMP team as one that either had no exposure to design or who received no guidance to plan in any way differently than they had already been taught. I define Army design methodology (ADM) teams as those that, during the course of conversations with those teams I received briefings from, the topic of the ADM was inevitably broached. I define the unstructured teams as those that, during conversations with those teams I received briefings from, the topic of the ADM was inevitably broached. I define the unstructured teams as those teams that I, while roleplaying as their commander, offered guidance to approach their planning in a less structured manner. During my last three classes, I gave a block of instruction on planning, largely due to some insightful conversations I had had with previous teams during commanders’ briefbacks. Inevitably the subject of design was broached during this instruction. This last group of teams, therefore, received some formal exposure to design and unstructured approaches. Table 1 shows the number of teams I observed from each group.

Table 1. Number of Teams Observed by Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)</th>
<th>Army Design Methodology (ADM)</th>
<th>Unstructured Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before Observer’s Command</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During Observer’s Command</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After Observer’s Command</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Of the seven unstructured teams and 55 MDMP teams during the observer’s command period, 29 received a brief introduction to design.

The real value of my observations lies in the feedback I received from students and instructors during planning, after planning, and after their training exercise was completed. These observations, casually recorded much later in more of a reflective journal-like manner, were the basis for conclusions I shared during an interview with the Army Research Institute in February 2014. After sharing the conclusions with several others afterwards, I was encouraged to describe and publish my observations and efforts in the words of social science. Thus, it is less important to focus on the methodology of the experiment, as it was decidedly exploratory (and admittedly did not follow the conventional orthodoxy of social science experimentation), and focus rather on preliminary observations that strongly suggest a basis for more controlled and structured future study.

**The Control Group: Military Decision-Making Process**

To underline the point made in the previous paragraph, there was no control group per se other than the teams I observed that either had no conversation with me about design, or were not encouraged to approach their planning in any other way but through MDMP. As noted in table 1, these were the vast majority of the teams I observed.

The teams that used strict MDMP were more likely to display certain behaviors (discussed in detail below).
However, not all teams using MDMP displayed all the noted behaviors, and not all members of these teams displayed the same behavior. On the average, more team members from a greater number of the MDMP teams were more likely to display the following behaviors from my observations.

**Five Salient Recurring Patterns Under Conditions in Which Observations Were Made**

First, the planning week was normally characterized by the officers spending most of their time building PowerPoint slides. During mealtime, the officers would be huddled in a corner working on computers while the NCOs were away eating. The planning week largely consisted of building products, and little time was spent on rehearsals. The officers would usually copy what was in the higher headquarters’ order. Little thinking was spent on the logic behind what the team was instructed to do, or thought they should do, or the logic behind the higher headquarters’ objectives. Even worse, the higher headquarters’ implicit assertions went largely unquestioned by the team even though the higher headquarters’ order pertained to a larger area and provided a more general analysis of the population.

Second, the individuals on the MDMP teams had trouble articulating the logic behind what they were going to do and why. The officers generally accepted the higher headquarters’ understanding of the environment as sufficiently correct or, worse, did not even grasp what their higher headquarters assumed about their area of operations. The NCOs, on the other hand, basically had not thought much about their mission at the conceptual level and thus, the intent was unclear in their minds. Typical post-briefing questions by the students were “Can tactical level units use unconventional warfare as their task in their mission statement?” or “Should we use defeat or conduct special operations as our tactical task?” These questions, to me, indicated a focus on trivial subjects and a lack of critical thinking.

Third, the MDMP teams normally briefed 80 or more—sometimes more than 100—PowerPoint slides and spent two hours or longer conducting their briefings. Their intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB) portion was largely a copy of their higher headquarters’ IPB, their war-gaming foils (the entity they “war-gamed” their COAs against) were always enemy focused, and the team’s three courses of action (COAs) largely revolved around how to organize or lead the guerrillas. Typical war-gamed COAs included: one guerrilla base versus multiple bases, rural insurgency versus urban, and multi-use guerrilla bases versus single-use bases. All teams and the vast majority of members assumed they would have to win the hearts and minds of the people, and that the guerrillas would have to do likewise; that the guerrillas’ local interests naturally aligned with those of the larger shadow government; and, that everyone’s interests naturally aligned with those of the United States.

Fourth, on average, I found the MDMP teams had the most trouble of all teams in adapting to their reality once they hit the ground. They had more trouble building rapport with the guerrilla chief, more trouble adapting their original plans to the reality, and more trouble figuring out what was going on in their sectors. They were more likely to keep fighting their original plan and to refuse to adjust their incorrect assumptions, even when they discovered evidence to the contrary of their assumptions. On average there was a slightly higher rate of recycle and relief of officers from the MDMP teams, although I suspect this was probably the least rigorous finding of the entire research. The MDMP teams were more likely to spend a longer time getting to more complex training objectives than other teams due to their initial struggles to accomplish simpler ones such as building rapport with the guerrilla chief, completing initial assessments, and figuring out what was motivating the local populace and the guerrilla band and leadership.

Finally, upon completion of the exercise, officers on the MDMP teams were more likely to admit they did not see much value in their planning efforts. The NCOs, however, were generally more than three times as likely to be able to explain in clear language what the concept of their operation was going to be. A typical post-briefing comment and question was, “We noticed some conclusions we had during our design portion kind of got lost when we started into MDMP because they clashed with our higher’s order. How do we fix that?”

Third, the ADM teams normally built many more slides than just the twenty they displayed—many had hidden slides that amounted to about 100 slides. Once they initiated MDMP, the training they had received kicked in; they turned to filling out the formatted slides and doing much of their analysis using the product they had to create for their briefings. This meant that the ADM teams did not spend as much time doing rehearsals as the unstructured teams. Once the team started its MDMP, many of the conclusions from the design effort were lost.

Many in the ADM groups admitted it seemed to be a contradictory approach: design encouraged them to build their own understanding of the environment and problem, but when it conflicted with their higher’s, they were unsure of what to do. Notably, those teams that looked at their higher headquarters’ order before conducting their design effort were more likely to have their design effort match the conclusions of their MDMP. Because these teams eventually conducted MDMP, the problems associated with the MDMP teams in terms of the IPB, the most likely and most dangerous enemy course of action (COA), and their own three COAs were largely the same. The one area of the MDMP portion in which the ADM teams differed greatly from the MDMP teams was that they were

Five Salient Differences Between the MDMP teams and the Army Design Methodology Groups

First, the ADM teams were more likely than the MDMP teams to include their NCOs in on the conceptual planning portion of their preparation. Since teams were encouraged to build only 10 PowerPoint slides, the ADM teams were more likely to spend more time together during planning. A typical visit to a team found the entire team discussing their sector—usually around a whiteboard or a map. The ADM teams were also more likely to initially question their higher headquarters’ assumptions and commander’s intent, although they were also normally more likely than the unstructured teams to ultimately adopt their higher headquarters’ assumptions and nest their intent with their commander’s.

Second, during their briefings, the teams conducting ADM were less likely than the MDMP teams to have trouble articulating the logic of what they thought they were about to do. The NCOs were more likely than those on the MDMP teams to be able to explain in clear language what the concept of their operation was going to be. A typical post-briefing comment and question was, “We noticed some conclusions we had during our design portion kind of got lost when we started into MDMP because they clashed with our higher’s order. How do we fix that?”

Third, the ADM teams normally built many more slides than just the twenty they displayed—many had hidden slides that amounted to about 100 slides. Once they initiated MDMP, the training they had received kicked in; they turned to filling out the formatted slides and doing much of their analysis using the product they had to create for their briefings. This meant that the ADM teams did not spend as much time doing rehearsals as the unstructured teams. Once the team started its MDMP, many of the conclusions from the design effort were lost.

Many in the ADM groups admitted it seemed to be a contradictory approach: design encouraged them to build their own understanding of the environment and problem, but when it conflicted with their higher’s, they were unsure of what to do. Notably, those teams that looked at their higher headquarters’ order before conducting their design effort were more likely to have their design effort match the conclusions of their MDMP. Because these teams eventually conducted MDMP, the problems associated with the MDMP teams in terms of the IPB, the most likely and most dangerous enemy course of action (COA), and their own three COAs were largely the same. The one area of the MDMP portion in which the ADM teams differed greatly from the MDMP teams was that they were
less likely to naturally assume that the population in their sector or the guerrillas would have interests that nested with their own or that of the shadow government.

Fourth, on average, the ADM teams had less trouble than the MDMP teams in adapting once they infiltrated. On average, most officers reported they had less trouble adapting, but almost the same percentage of NCOs noted trouble with adapting. They were, as a team, less likely to keep fighting their original plan, but most struggled initially (just as the MDMP teams did) to build rapport and do assessments. They were also more likely to spend less time getting to the complex training objectives than the MDMP teams, once that initial struggle was overcome.

Fifth, upon completion of the exercise, officers and NCOs on the ADM teams were more likely to admit they saw some value in their planning efforts, although it was not by much. Most reported struggling with fitting their design efforts into the MDMP. A significant number saw value in the ADM effort in terms of being able to better incorporate the design insights into an MDMP effort in the future.

Five Salient Differences of the Unstructured Group from the MDMP and ADM Groups

The last group was the unstructured group. During planning, this group normally received information from discussions with me on theoretical design that stressed reflexive thinking, situation-unique preparation, and a multi-paradigmatic approach. The teams were instructed to build no more than 10 PowerPoint slides, but preferably none. Most of their briefings were done using only a map and whatever notes they had. They were instructed to rehearse those tasks they knew they would perform, preferably outside of their team room 1-3 hours every day. They were told they could use MDMP, but they were encouraged only to do so for those very specific tasks they knew they would have to accomplish in a relatively short timeframe (infiltration, meeting the guerrilla chief, first twenty-four hours in the guerrilla base, initial assessments, internal communications/dissemination plan, etc.), and to develop their own approach as to how to prepare for the more conceptual parts of the mission. They were encouraged to brief only conclusions during their briefings and allow the more detailed areas to be teased out by the higher commander’s interests. Lastly, they were encouraged to disregard everything in their higher’s order initially and to always identify unsupported assertions.

The majority of NCOs and officers who used the unstructured approach provided very positive feedback. During the planning week, very little...
PowerPoint was used. A typical scene might involve the entire team gathered around a large map and a soldier saying, “If we’re thinking transition from day one, then it is going to be important to quickly get an idea of what the locals in this area value and why the guerrillas we are going to be with are fighting—and compare both of those to what our higher is wanting and the U.S. overall wants.” The planning week was spent mainly on rehearsals and conversations such as the one above. Very detailed and MDMP-like planning and rehearsals were conducted for the infiltration and initial priorities, but all other preparation was unique to the team and conducted more conceptually. The officers and NCOs consistently questioned the higher headquarters’ order and its implicit assertions, especially with respect to their sector and how their sector most likely differed from their higher headquarters’ more general characterizations.

Second, their briefings consisted of conversations with their higher commanders on the best use of the team’s sector in the overall campaign and how they would go about adjusting that use based on changing circumstances and the discovery of false assumptions. Perhaps most impressive, the NCOs were engaged with the higher commander during backbriefs and most were able to articulate the logic behind what the team was planning to do. A typical post-briefing question was, “If our analysis is correct, and we’re able to act as a training and supply sector for other areas, at what point do you foresee us possibly shifting to other areas?”

Third, the unstructured teams normally briefed 10 or fewer slides, and their briefings typically lasted less than an hour. Their IPB conclusions were usually different than what their higher headquarters’ order asserted, their war-game foils were normally associated with non-enemy entities, and their own COAs were normally built around their infiltration plan. Teams typically assumed that the local populace and guerrillas in their sector would have divergent interests from each other, as well as from the United States.

Fourth, for the most part, the unstructured teams had the least trouble of all teams in adapting to the reality on the ground. They anticipated many of the problems they would face, and when other problems cropped up, they were more prepared for them. Perhaps most impressive for these teams was their ability, on average, to get to more complex training objectives quicker than the other groups. Because of their focus on rehearsing in detail for their infiltration, the first twenty-four hours in the guerrilla base, and their initial assessment constructs, these teams typically skipped some of the dilemmas many other teams faced.

Finally, and perhaps most important, after completing the exercise a very high percentage of officers on the unstructured teams believed their planning time had been valuable and had helped them learn faster and adapt more effectively. The NCOs were also more likely than those in the other groups to report that they saw value in their planning. A significant minority of officers did not feel comfortable deviating from what they had been expected
to learn and regurgitate throughout the Special Forces Qualification Course, but the majority did appreciate the chance to think instead of simply regurgitate prior-templated solutions. That all the officers were potentially months away from deploying as commanders of operational Special Forces teams made that point all the more important to me personally.

Table 2 provides a comparison of all three groups.

Conclusion: The Divinity of Doubt

What makes officers in the U.S. Army blindly learn a concept, regurgitate it faithfully, and become complacent about questioning it? I rarely see Special Forces teams outside of the schoolhouse who follow a standard approach to all missions. Mostly what I have seen are teams who naturally fight attempts to tell them how to think about or approach situations. Instead, they look suspiciously at doctrinal templates and higher headquarters’ implied assertions.

These informal observations reinforced my own experience: we need to have an agnostic approach to warfare and not be caught up in any one paradigm. The ADP, like MDMP, is just one way of approaching things. Both are largely products of just one paradigm, the technically rational one. This paradigm assumes that the world is like a clock and can be understood by measurement and reductionist methods. Complexity theory, another paradigm, asserts that the world is non-linear and therefore
not reductionist. Systems thinking implies that measuring complex systems is difficult, if not impossible, rendering quantitative approaches insufficient. Critical realism supposes that the world as sensed by humans is predominantly a social construction and thus can be better appreciated only by incorporating multiple viewpoints. I am not advocating any one of these paradigms. I think we should instead utilize a more comprehensive approach: appreciating multiple viewpoints and paradigms.

This, of course, would not replace MDMP; it would simply make MDMP a tool we would use consciously where it makes sense. Likewise, we would not necessarily turn to a technically rational approach to all things, especially warfare. Warfare has to be one of the most social of phenomena in this world; a better approach is to be reflective about ourselves and our processes.

In Victor Bugliosi’s book, Divinity of Doubt, the author asserts that an agnostic religious approach is more rational. I assert that we should apply his thinking to warfare. We should doubt that our paradigm is right and question assertions to the contrary. Creatively thinking about warfare ought to be encouraged and we must resist institutional attempts to codify how to approach thinking.

Notes

1. During my time at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), then director Col. Stefan Banach was known to advocate a more unconventional approach to design with themes from postmodernism, systemic operational design, and complexity theory. Later SAMS directors reportedly pulled away from the more conceptual approach to design, ultimately coinciding with the adoption of the term Army design methodology, effectively codifying one method for all situations and tying the approach firmly to the preferred institutional paradigm of technical rationality.

2. Chris Paparone, The Sociology of Military Science (New York: Continuum, 2013). The technical rationality paradigm is one that permeates all of the U.S. Army’s (and DOD’s for that matter) systems, processes, and intellectual approaches to situations. It asserts that all things in the universe can be understood by reductive observation and measurement leading to the discovery of universal principles.

3. The military decisionmaking process (MDMP) is the classic technically rational tool. A higher authority assigns one’s unit a list of tasks that are purportedly in support of the higher purpose and that, in aggregation with all other units’ tasks, will theoretically lead to the realization of the president’s national security objectives.

4. Donald Schon, The Reflective Practitioner (New York: Basic, 1983). Reflective practice is the ability to reflect on one’s actions in order to engage in continuous learning. One cannot learn if one cannot reflect on how one learns.

5. Robin Sage is the final phase of the Special Forces Qualification Course. Ten-twelve student teams of 15-19 soldiers each travel into different areas all over North Carolina and surrounding states, meet up with role-playing guerrillas, and spend their time assisting, advising, and leading them on insurgent missions within a controlled training environment.

6. This was by no means conducted uniformly. During some iterations, there was only one group introduced to operational design, and sometimes none. In a few iterations, all groups were given some exposure to operational design.


8. The different approaches the teams normally used had something to do with my reading of how open their instructors were to unconventional methods; it cannot be ruled out that certain types of instructors were more likely to recommend officers in general for recycle or relief.

9. The teams that received the Army design methodology concept were not uniformly instructed, not uniformly distributed...
throughout the time period, and were the least interacted with in terms of time spent gathering information.

10. Further experimentation must be undertaken as feedback interpreted by one person, especially an advocate of the unstructured approach such as myself, cannot be seen as sufficiently unbiased to scientifically establish firm patterns of differences among groups.

11. The Joint Capabilities Integration & Development System (JCIDS) process, the strategic planning process, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) are all approaches to DOD problems that are wholly reliant on the technically rational paradigm.


---

We Recommend

Counterinsurgency in Eastern Afghanistan 2004–2008
A Civilian Perspective

Robert Kemp, published by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training

After the 2001 ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan, the United States and its allies found themselves in a country devastated by a series of wars. This book looks at how, working with their Afghan counterparts, they engaged in a complex effort to rebuild security, development, and governance, all while fighting a low-intensity war.

Drawing on his experience on the ground, Robert Kemp gives us a firsthand, unfiltered view of how U.S. military and civilian officers coped with a confusing, constantly changing situation along the border with Pakistan. It looks at how they developed programs and methods, such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams, while learning to work with the Afghans—and each other.

Eastern Afghanistan is one of the most colorful, traditional, and unique areas left in the world. This book looks at what happened in 2004–2008, as the United States became heavily engaged there. —From the publisher
Back to the Future
Managing Training to “Win in a Complex World”

Capt. Paul Lushenko, U.S. Army, and

Maj. David Hammerschmidt, U.S. Army
The importance of training—including training management—to the profession of arms is well established. Less clear is whether company and field grade officers, having served in regular deployments since 2001, can effectively plan, prepare, execute, and assess realistic training using new information technology tools such as the Integrated Training Environment—a combination of “live, virtual, constructive, and gaming training enablers” that should create a “realistic training environment.” This system, expected to be fielded to all Army installations by 2020, provides an architecture that reduces the need for large, expensive, one-time field exercises. It helps commanders use their systems effectively and efficiently to conduct training. It also represents a cost-effective solution to replicate the complexity of future operations and achieve sustained readiness.

Consistent with the Army’s training heritage, platoon leaders through brigade training and operations officers must focus training on conducting mission-essential tasks in an environment characterized by innumerable threats and vulnerabilities. These officers must go back to the future and inculcate the counsel of past master trainers such as Gen. George C. Marshall. After serving as the assistant commandant of the Infantry School from 1927 to 1932, Marshall reflected that training officers must “get down to the essentials, make clear the real difficulties, and expunge the bunk, complications, and ponderosities.”

Given the undisputed importance of effective training, the purpose of this paper is to show that training management is as much a lost art as it will be the wave of the future. The 2014 U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC] Pamphlet 525-3-1) is predicated on striking the right balance between readiness and the pursuit of future capabilities. It is training and the management thereof, however, that senior leaders consistently say will ensure “Army forces thrive in chaotic environments” to prevent, shape, and win.

This discussion begins with an overview of how Army leaders conceive of training management and how training practitioners are conducting training amid austerity. Next, it addresses three factors contributing to a loss of training expertise among members of the company and field grade cohorts. Such introspection is difficult but necessary before Army leaders can address this problem. Finally, the article argues that it is up to senior leaders to set the conditions for company and field grade officers to gain training expertise. Through leader development, senior leaders can restore training management competency across a generation of subordinate Army leaders and align resources against requirements.

How Does the Army Manage Training During Austerity?

Because of sequestration, as well as a concurrent loss of training management expertise, planners are investigating how to achieve sustained readiness using fewer resources. Such study is increasingly important given that Army force generation (ARFORGEN) has outlasted its usefulness, according to senior leaders such as Maj. Gen. Terry Ferrell, commander of the 7th Infantry Division at Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM).

The ARFORGEN rotational cycle represents a byproduct of the Army’s counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan. It facilitated “unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units.” Deploying units were certified through exercises at one of three combat training centers (CTCs): the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (Hohenfels, Germany), the Joint Readiness Center (Fort Polk, La.), and the National Training Center (Fort Irwin, Calif.). Spending caps, the reduction in force, and an international landscape fraught with human security challenges—such as Japan’s triple disaster in 2011—have influenced innovative approaches to home-station training during a time of ARFORGEN’s waning relevance.

Company and field grade officers have experimented with three general, if not mutually supportive, training approaches: regionally aligned training, live-environment training, and what this article calls CTC-like training. Senior leaders have yet to anoint one approach as the preferred model. A brief
discussion of each will help with deconstructing training as a lost art and determining how to foster training management as the wave of the future.

**Regionally aligned training.** As chief of staff of the Army, Gen. Raymond Odierno has committed the Army to being globally responsive yet regionally engaged. Regional alignment enables the Army to “rapidly deploy, fight, and win whenever and wherever” America’s interests are threatened. This concept provides for an array of forces, usually at less than even company or platoon strength, affording commanders tailorable and scalable options. Such forces are supposed to be comparatively more culturally attuned, based on focused training. Consequently, advocates argue that regionally aligned forces are more capable of conducting a range of operations spanning from security cooperation, to consequence management, to high-intensity combat. To apply regional alignment, land-based forces are positioned close to regional threats and vulnerabilities. This allows for more battle-focused training, enhanced responsiveness, and heightened interoperability with allied and partnered nations.

One example of a regionally aligned training approach is a program called Pacific Pathways. Training planners expect that units participating will complete a CTC rotation, followed by no more than three back-to-back exercises or security cooperation events in the unit’s partnership area during a six-month deployment. More than 800 soldiers from 2nd Battalion, 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, recently executed the first Pacific Pathways iteration: Garuda Shield in Indonesia (September 2014), Keris Strike in Malaysia (September 2014), and Orient Shield in Japan (November 2014).
An informal assessment of these exercises indicates general advantages and disadvantages of a regionally aligned training approach. The main advantage is that this approach effectively synchronizes training in time, space, and by unit. However, it seems myopically focused on maneuver forces divested from the intelligence providers that should situate their deployment. Another disadvantage in the Pacific is that planners must determine how to resource units over an expansive and noncontiguous region. One exercise participant reported that as the 2nd Battalion transitioned from exercise to exercise, soldiers often languished waiting for arrival of their equipment via contracted sea vessels. This countermanded their ability to train and rapidly respond to a contingency, causing one junior officer to assess that Pacific Pathways “is minimally achieving what it was briefed to accomplish.”

Another disadvantage is that live-environment training does help protect against a loss of technical proficiency, in particular, by maximizing training opportunities. In addition, it allows for decoupling the training of less common military occupational specialties from maneuver units comprised mainly of infantry, armor, and field artillery skill-sets. This is an important consideration given that a traditional CTC rotation risks subordinating the training of highly specialized soldiers to the training objectives of the maneuver commander. The increasing constraints on resources and time, caused by sequestration, can only increase this negative potential.

**CTC-like training.** According to Maj. David Rowland, amid austerity, “brigades and garrisons will need to leverage all available resources, necessitating collaboration among multiple Army commands and requiring multi-echelon and multidiscipline training.” In contrast to regional alignment and live-environment training, this third approach to training management replicates a CTC scenario to certify deploying units using home-station resources, third-party observer-controller-trainers, and a degree of external support. Agencies such as the Training Brain Operations Center, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, and Operations Support Technology, Inc., provide the advantage of designing realistic scenarios that are relatively affordable. Another advantage is that CTC-like training uses mission command and facilitates integration of intelligence and sustainment enablers into maneuver planning and operations.

During Operation Gryphon Tomahawk in February 2014, the 201st Battlefield Surveillance Brigade trained more than 800 soldiers at JBLM for approximately one-fifth the cost to send a Stryker Infantry Battalion from the state of Washington to the National Training Center, according
to Rowland.22 In addition, Rowland says that “Company A, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment ... received multiple iterations of cordon and searches, key leader engagements, ambushes and raids (including an air assault) over the course of the three-week exercise—all intelligence driven.”23 The 109th and 502nd Military Intelligence Battalions provided intelligence through their multifunctional teams.

Arguably, CTC-like training best represents the integrated training environment. Yet, this approach is undergirded by two key assumptions, the invalidation of which could undermine its utility.

First, CTC-like training may not always facilitate a higher degree of maneuver-intelligence integration. During Gryphon Tomahawk, multifunctional teams operated in concert with ground forces. Unfortunately, they did not integrate as early or as often as needed, nor at all necessary echelons of command.24 The extent of the integration often pivoted solely on capabilities briefs delivered to the maneuver commander, usually a platoon leader.25

Second, CTC-like training presupposes the availability of training management proficiency not always present across battalion and brigade staffs comprised mainly of company and field grade officers. Gryphon Tomahawk demonstrated, according to Rowland, that “a high-quality training exercise is possible at home station given thorough planning and an adaptive and creative staff.”26 However, it also showed that competency for planning, preparing, executing, and evaluating training represents CTC-like training’s soft underbelly.

Training Management as a Lost Art

Among 100 promising captains recently assembled by Gen. Odierno during the inaugural Solarium Symposium at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., mid-July 2014, one officer expressed a desire for junior leaders to become “the experts at training that we [in the Army] once were.”27 Even given innovations embodied by the regional alignment, live-environment, and CTC-like training management approaches, there is a shortage of training management expertise across the captain and major ranks.

If accepted as true, this statement begs several questions. What factors explain an erosion of training management expertise among company and field grade officers? What lessons can senior leaders extract from this lost art to animate the Army’s operating concept? More specifically, what measures will enable the Army to go back to the future to capitalize on the integrated training environment?

Three factors help explain how training management became a lost art: ARFORGEN, the lack of training management education within the institutional domain, and inconsistencies regarding how to enable mission command in a home-station training environment.

Army force generation. Senior leaders instituted ARFORGEN in 2003. This constituted the single greatest transformation to the Army’s readiness system since the Cold War. ARFORGEN serves as both a supply-based and demand-based process designed to systematize the progress of units through three force pools called RESET, Train/Ready, and Available. At a bureaucratic level, ARFORGEN represents more of a “process of systems” envisioned to sequence, synchronize, and optimize disparate “organizing, staffing, equipping, training, deploying, sustaining, modernizing, and mobilizing” systems.28

The extent to which ARFORGEN has streamlined these systems is debatable. Col. Rodney Fogg, in a strategy research report for the Army War College, argues that ARFORGEN is misaligned with the Army’s personnel management system—resulting in a delay, if not a loss, of development opportunities for junior and mid-grade officers.29 Fogg observes, “the cohort of leaders developed in combat over the last decade has become proficient at operating within a fast-paced and rapidly changing tactical environment.”30 At the same time, Fogg states that they are “less familiar with how to use their skills in the more regimented, policy-driven and regulated environments while ... in Army garrisons.”31

Lt. Gen. Michael Tucker, commander of First Army, more directly criticizes the hidden costs of ARFORGEN, particularly among company and field grade officers. In a 2011 article, he writes that much “unit structure and training competency that existed nine years ago are no longer present.”32

The institutional domain. The institutional training domain—professional military education, in effect—should be the medium through which
Capt. Cory Roberts, an instructor at the Captains Career Course-Common Core Proof of Principle, gives guidance to Capt. Kate McCray on her progress, Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., 1 September 2011.

to cauterize the hemorrhaging of training management competency. Not only does the institutional domain transcend all components and branches of the service, but also soldiers consistently navigate between the institutional and operational domains for training and education.

Moreover, Brig. Gen. Joseph Martin notes that TRADOC, including Fort Leavenworth’s School of Advanced Leader Training, has sought to standardize the education of training management across the institutional domain. Still, based in large part on ARFORGEN, brigade commanders consistently identify training management as a shortfall among recently promoted captains. For captains attending the Maneuver Captains Career Course (Fort Benning, Ga.) therefore, “a basis of understanding of training management is now taught in the course.” While majors matriculating into the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth are trained and developed to conduct unified land operations, they also graduate with a thorough understanding of the Army’s military decisionmaking process.

Commanders at battalion level or higher use this process to plan training.

Based on sequestration and ARFORGEN, however, fewer captains and majors privy to revamped training approaches are available, sharply mitigating the ability of the institutional domain to instill such competency any time soon. This situation exacerbates training management as a lost art.

According to Chris Campbell in a 2014 Stars and Stripes article, officer separation boards identified nearly 500 majors and 1,200 captains for early release or retirement. As sequestration continues to compel a winnowing of the force’s end strength to perhaps as low as 420,000 soldiers, senior leaders anticipate further cuts. Similarly, because of the prolonged conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, some 4,000 majors in year groups 2003 or earlier have not attended intermediate-level education.

Further compounding this diminished population of junior officers formally educated in training management is the so-called optimization of intermediate-level education. According to Maj. Gen. Gordon Davis, the optimization policy emplaced a
merit-based selection process for resident attendance of CGSC that would provide “the right education at the right time for the right officer.” Authorized by Secretary of the Army John McHugh in 2012, Army Directive 2012-21 (Optimization of Intermediate Level Education) initiated a transition from inclusive to selective attendance of CGSC. While officers not selected for resident attendance of CGSC are still afforded either a satellite-campus or distributed-learning experience, it stands to reason that such substitutes will not as rigorously indoctrinate the skills required to manage training.

Mission command. Inconsistent understanding of and support to mission command also threaten to further frustrate training management. According to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command, the term mission command is defined as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders.” The principles of mission command include building cohesive teams through mutual trust, creating shared understanding, and accepting prudent risks. Prudent risks include those that accompany giving subordinates the opportunity to exercise disciplined initiative. Feedback provided during the Solarium conference reaffirmed that Army leaders should apply this philosophy if they wish to retain talented junior officers from the millennial generation.

Unfortunately, the Army’s ongoing reconsolidation and reorganization of forces stand to temper the sort of archetypical application of mission command so effective in Iraq and Afghanistan. Retired Army Lt. Gen. David Barno writes in the Washington Post that “risk-taking is systematically extinguished by layers of rules, restrictions, and micromanagement aimed at avoiding any possible shortcomings.” Brigade commander Col. Curtis A. Johnson also notes that “the garrison environment
often creates conditions where junior officers are not only being told what to train on but how to do it.”46 He continues, “in addition to the planning responsibility being stripped away by a higher headquarters, so are many of the assessments required throughout the training cycle.”47 Set against these and other warnings, the Army’s movement to garrison sets the conditions for a further divestment of training management development and responsibilities from company and field grade offices for at least two reasons.

First, numerous experts, such as Donald E. Vandergriff, contend that the institutional (generating) force seemingly disagrees with the operating force on how to implement mission command.48 While the latter has attempted to integrate combat-derived lessons related to mission command, namely trust and underwriting risk, the former is still preoccupied with auditing for compliance, primarily regarding no-notice or short-notice tasks.49 These countervailing perspectives of mission command reinforce the state of training management as a lost art. They lead to making junior officers more concerned with satisfying ostensibly time-sensitive checklists disseminated from higher headquarters rather than forecasting and appropriating resources against training plans. Mandatory “AR 350-1” tasks (tasks for which units must be trained, according to Army Regulation 350-1) are a manifestation of such discontinuity.50 The majority of required tasks are unrelated to preparing for combat but consume an exorbitant amount of time and resources that company commanders could otherwise expend in building an eight-step training model to facilitate execution of a mission-essential task.51

Second, although completion of such tasks would hardly accord “enough time for a junior leader to plan, execute, and assess his or her training,” according to Johnson, brigade, division, and corps headquarters continue to align their planning and operation cycles against a wartime operations tempo.52 This is understandable given an era of persistent conflict punctuated by the recent activities of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Yet, the corresponding reduction of troops available to complete myriad training and operational tasks stretches units to the brink of exhaustion. Training management will remain a lost art if home-station commanders fail to prioritize their unit training ruthlessly against mission-essential tasks for the simple fact that subordinate leaders will possess limited time, resources, and leader development.

Training Management as the Wave of the Future

Considering the tradeoffs embedded in ARFORGEN and the lack of training management instruction within the institutional domain, how can senior leaders best prepare junior officers to conduct training management? The answer lies in the conduct of leader development activities, through which senior leaders can engender agile and adaptive junior leaders. This solution will enable the Army to capitalize on innovations within the integrated training environment, epitomized by regionally aligned, live-environment, and CTC-like training management approaches.

Because leader development should accentuate the trust that underlines mission command, it goes beyond the occasional leader professional development session. Leader development is about certification as well as shared risk. Subordinate leaders who lack the experience and expertise to align resources against requirements feel most heartened by commanders who do not marginalize them but rather model and impart doctrinally sound planning and evaluating tools.

To develop junior leaders, senior leaders should enact leader certification programs that teach the essentials, including how to conduct training meetings and quarterly training briefs, manage schedules, coordinate tasks among various organizations, and use the eight-step training model. The 7th Infantry Division’s new certification program could serve as a model for other units.53 Ultimately, leaders are accountable for the ability of their subordinates to effectively and efficiently manage training. If leaders neglect this responsibility, they could very well erode trust. And “when we begin to erode trust,” Gen. Martin Dempsey warns us, “we begin to erode the profession.”54 A sense of mutual trust and shared risk between commanders and junior officers, therefore, is key to overcoming the deficit of training management expertise and will ensure it becomes the wave of the future.
Capt. Paul Lushenko is the commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Company for the 502nd Military Intelligence Battalion, 201st Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash. He is a distinguished honor graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and holds an M.A. in international relations and a Master of Diplomacy from the Australian National University. He has deployed several times to Iraq and Afghanistan with Stryker and special operations forces.

Maj. David Hammerschmidt is the executive officer for the 502nd Military Intelligence Battalion, 201st Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash. He is a graduate of the University of Florida Army Reserve Officer Training Program and holds a Master of National Security and Strategy from the U.S. Naval War College. He has deployed several times to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines with air assault, airborne, and special operations forces.

Notes


1. ADRP 7-0.
5. Ibid.
7. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, 48.
8. On 11 March 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck off the coast of Japan, causing a tsunami that damaged multiple reactors at the Fukushima Nuclear Plant.
15. Ibid.
19. Ibid.

22. Operation Gryphon Tomahawk represented a brigade-level, CTC-like exercise designed to certify subordinate battalions for deployment in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. For more information, see Rowland, 68.


25. Lushenko, 55.


30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.


33. Brig. Gen. Joseph Martin, email to the authors, 5 November 2014. The authors are indebted to Martin, who serves as the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center's deputy commanding general for training, for his valuable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article.


35. Joseph Martin, email to the authors, 5 November 2014.

36. ADRP 7-0, 3-3.


40. Gordon Davis and James Martin, "CGSC—Developing Leaders to Adapt and Dominate for the Army of Today and Tomorrow," Military Review 92(5)(September-October 2012), 72. Previously, Maj. Gen. Davis served as the Combined Arms Center’s deputy commanding general for leader development and education as well as the deputy commandant of CGSC.


42. Ibid.


44. Kevin Lilley.


47. Ibid.


49. Paul Norwood, email to the authors, 16 October 2014.


51. The eight-step training model provides a guide for leaders at the brigade-level or lower to align resources to requirements as well as to sequence and synchronize training. The steps consist of plan the training, train/certify leaders, conduct a reconnaissance, issue an order, rehearse, execute, conduct an after action review, and retrain.

52. Johnson, 5.

53. To learn more about the 7th Infantry Division’s training management certification program, contact information for the division is available at http://www.lewis-mccord.army.mil/7id/ (accessed 17 November 2014).

The Training Brain Repository–Exercise Design Tool for Home-Station Training

Col. David G. Paschal, U.S. Army, Retired, and

Maj. Alan L. Gunnerson, U.S. Army, Retired

The business of planning and developing home-station training has assumed greater significance as the Army transitions to an Army of preparation in an environment of reduced resources. The challenge to create a more robust home-station training capability requires realistic training that incorporates the depth and complexity of real-world operational environments; technological capabilities that are affordable and sustainable; and a return to command ownership of the process of creating training tasks, objectives, and goals.

In support of the Army’s effort to revitalize home-station training, the Training Brain Operations Center (TBOC), an element of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G-2 (Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence) Operational Environment Enterprise, is answering this challenge. The TBOC has created a tool that returns ownership of training to commanders by harnessing technology to train faster, better, and more efficiently. The tool replicates the operational environment by setting the conditions in which meaningful training can occur, and it facilitates how users plan and implement training while significantly reducing the time it takes to develop rigorous exercises. This article illustrates how the Training Brain Repository-Exercise Design Tool (TBR-EDT) facilitates a commander’s ability to increase the complexity, realism, and depth of an exercise’s live, virtual, and constructive training environment with previously impossible speed and fidelity.

As Operation Iraqi Freedom concluded and Operation Enduring Freedom’s demands decreased,
senior Army leadership directed a holistic review of home-station training for the post-conflict security environment. From this guidance, the training community conducted Army Training Summits I, II, and III. During Army Training Summit II, Gen. Martin Dempsey, then commanding general, TRADOC, asked for a repository that would allow the force to share and access training data regardless of unit or data location. This repository was to contain off-the-shelf scenario materials and files containing models and simulations that would provide an “80-percent solution” [referring to a solution that is effective but less than perfect] that unit commanders could update and tailor with their specific training objectives. This guidance was the catalyst for the initial development of the TBR and subsequent creation of the EDT.

Fulfilling the basic repository requirement through a typical SharePoint collaboration portal would be uncomplicated. However, after extensive analysis and proper framing of the problem, the TBOC identified the requirement for a more fundamental, yet complex capability: exercise design. Thirteen years of top-down training within the Army force generation rotational cycle, where fully developed training plans and exercises were delivered to deploying units, resulted in atrophy...
of the skills of Army training managers in both command and staff roles. An entire generation of soldiers has had little experience with the exercise design process at brigade level and below. The Army has needed a tool to automate the exercise design process, empowering units to spend more time conducting training than developing training. Although the TBR-EDT does not teach the design process, it does provide a repeatable and intuitive approach for users to learn the design process.

The Scope of the Challenge

Training developers, in the past, typically have spent an excessive amount of time searching for relevant and realistic data from past operational environments or previous training exercises to develop training events that would meet the commander’s objectives. The data may have included unit-specific training tasks, storylines and events, master scenario event lists, tables of organization and equipment, maps, terrain data, and mission command information system requirements. The methodical, time-consuming process of finding data comes at the expense of time for developing unit leaders and staff for a training exercise. Today’s combat-proven soldiers and leaders have grown accustomed to the fast pace and complexities of ever-changing operational environments. Their planning tools should allow them to design and manage training quickly and expertly.

As the Army transitions to an Army of preparation, it must provide high-quality training experiences that replicate real-world operational environments and stimulate agility and adaptability. The TBR-EDT facilitates developing these critical skills by enabling leaders to focus on training more than training design.

What is the Exercise Design Tool?

The design tool is the central component of the exercise design environment, connecting other capabilities in the design environment and allowing leaders to collaborate in designing meaningful training. The TBR-EDT supports accurate replication of an operational environment and provides an innovative capability to create, clone, store, and share Warfighter Training Support Packages (WTSPs).

The TBR-EDT is open source and web based. It provides exercise designers, trainers, commanders, and staffs with an unprecedented ability to find, reuse, and tailor exercises and training information to reflect the desired operational environment and address unit training objectives. The TBR-EDT places the exercise design capability back in the hands of commanders and staffs; they no longer have to rely on predetermined one-size-fits-all scenarios provided by engineers and script writers. Small-unit and higher-level staffs, other service exercise planners, and instructors at TRADOC centers of excellence now can use the TBR-EDT to quickly identify and adapt previously executed training exercises to build tailored training packages based on their commanders’ objectives and intent. Users can modify WTSP elements, such as unit types, standard mission-essential task lists, training locations, operational environments, or master scenario events lists, to fit unit needs.

The TBR-EDT complies with and automates processes contained in Army Training Circular 7-101, Exercise Design, and it stores WTSP data in accordance with TRADOC Pamphlet 350-70-1, Training Development in Support of the Operational Domain. More importantly, the TBR-EDT is integral to the development of the Army’s Integrated Training Environment, another training tool that links live, virtual, constructive, and gaming capabilities to accurately replicate operational environments. Combined with the TBR-EDT, the Integrated training environment increases training efficiency and overall effectiveness by allowing soldiers and leaders to spend more time training and less time managing training.

Although the TBR-EDT follows the Army’s exercise design process, it is not just for Army users. Anyone in the Department of Defense with a common access card can access and use the TBR-EDT or search for unclassified and classified WTSP data for their own organizational use. The TBR-EDT is accessible on the Nonsecure Internet Protocol Network at https://tbr.army.mil and the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network at https://tbr.army.smil.mil.

In addition, the TBOC and the Joint Staff Directorate for Joint Force Development (J-7) are
partners in an effort to create a joint EDT that is joint exercise life-cycle-based and will be available on the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network. This joint tool may become a large piece of the Joint Live Virtual Constructive 2020’s “Scenario Management Tool,” a single EDT that will incorporate additional joint data to enable developing joint training exercises for all the services.8

**Components of the Exercise Design Tool**

TRADOC created the TBR-EDT capability by integrating separate capabilities and technologies to automate the exercise design process. This effort required designers to combine and integrate authoritative data, start-of-exercise data, mapping and operational graphics, a storyline synchronization tool, a collaboration capability, role player development, higher headquarters’ operation orders, and data reuse, while mapping the entire process.

**Authoritative data.** The TBR-EDT links with and receives data from authoritative sources including the TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity, the Department of the Army’s Intelligence Information Service, the Central Army Registry, the Combined Arms Training Strategy, the Joint Lessons Learned Information System, and the J-7’s Joint Training Data Service. It publishes to the Rapid Data Generation Common Data Production Environment, enabling the rapid discovery, retrieval, and reuse of data and services across the spectrum of communities enabled by modeling and simulation. The goal is to present the right type of authoritative data to the user at the appropriate point in the exercise design process, alleviating the need to search for each type of data separately. To support regionally aligned force training, the red force (opposing or threat structure) will soon include real-world threat data, provided through the Modernized Integrated Database.9

**Collaboration.** The collaboration capability in the TBR-EDT allows a unit staff, or numerous distributed service or joint staffs, to work simultaneously on developing the WTSP documentation. Upon creating the exercise, the initial exercise owner can further assign and delegate (or disable as required) additional roles to other users. These roles are owner, contributor, and reader. Each role has certain capabilities that facilitate the creation, implementation, and execution of the exercise. For example, these capabilities include—

---

**Figure 1. TBR-EDT Mapping and Graphics, Task Organization**
• Owner: The S-3 can review the overall WTSP as it is being developed by the unit staff.

• Contributor: Unit staff members, such as the intelligence, logistics, or signal staff officers can develop their own separate annexes, appendices, or tabs for the operation order.

• Contributor: An attached fire support officer from a supporting unit can complete the fire support overlay.

• Contributor: Support units stationed at another post can complete their portions of the logistics annexes.

• Reader: Supporting personnel at the mission training complex or a combat training center with the responsibility to execute the exercise can observe and comment on the planning as it develops in real time.

**Start-of-exercise data.** The TBR-EDT supports live, virtual, and constructive situational training exercises; field training exercises; and command post exercises by producing start-of-exercise data through an Order of Battle Service (OBS) file (versions 2.0, 3.0, and 4.0 are currently supported). The TBR-EDT exports OBS data (Army and other services) to stimulate simulations, such as the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation system, with a future expanded capability for One Semi-Automated Forces and Warfighters’ Simulation. Presently, it contains the *red* (opposing or threat) and *green* (host-nation or coalition) force structure for the Decisive Action Training Environment, version 2.1.11

**Mapping and graphics.** The TBR-EDT provides mapping and drawing tools, allowing the user to take advantage of different mapping technologies to draw operational graphics. Figure 1 provides an example of a system-generated map with graphics.

Similar to Command Post of the Future, the TBR-EDT provides the user with several map choices and multiple overlays, allowing multiple users to develop graphics in multiple layers (mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, protection, units, and user-customized) at the same time. Users can toggle

---

**Figure 2. TBR-EDT Storyline Synchronization Tool**

---
the overlays on and off to display various layers, depending on mission requirements. Users can also create additional custom layers of graphics to depict phased operations, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, courses of action, or any other desired graphic requirements. If a user changes the training location, the graphics automatically move to the new map location where they can be easily repositioned, resized, or reoriented to fit the new terrain and operational requirements.

**Storyline synchronization tool.** Gone are the days of tedious storyline and event synchronization using Excel, sticky notes, or manually created events designed to cause different outcomes. TBR-EDT’s storyline synchronization tool reduces or eliminates this action. With this tool, users and planners can deconflict storylines and events to ensure they take place at the correct time during the exercise. Figure 2 provides an example of the storyline synchronization tool. The tool enables the manipulation of the timing and duration of storylines and events along a master timeline. Once changed, underlying files instantly update the entire master scenario events list, which can then be downloaded or printed.

**Role player development.** Role playing in today’s operational environments must be authentic, efficient, and effective. The importance of role players has gained increased emphasis to better expose U.S. military, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational participants to the diverse set of operational environments, cultures, foreign languages, and organizations.\(^\text{12}\) The TBR-EDT includes the capability to develop and reuse role-player actors and their associated instructions as part of the operational environment. Specific role attributes include name, gender, marital status, occupation, date of birth, and nationality. Overall, there are a total of 36 attributes available for assignment to a specific role player. The role attributes act as feeder data to other reports that may be used within the exercise. Figure 3 provides an example of system-generated role-player attributes.

**Higher headquarters’ operation order.** One of the major exercise design components, and often the most time consuming to create, is the higher headquarters’ operation order that drives the unit’s military decision-making process. The TBR-EDT provides the capability to build any number of doctrinally compliant higher headquarters’ operation orders, including up to 150 corresponding annexes, appendices, tabs, and exhibits.

The TBR-EDT maps data between the base operation order, annexes, and appendices, and then automatically fills in specific operation order data, thus reducing the time required to create the order. For example, the mission statement in the base order will automatically populate the corresponding mission paragraph within the annexes, where users can use it as is or modify it as necessary. If the mission statement in an annex is modified, it will automatically appear in the next lower document, but it will not change the base order itself. The user can also add images and hyperlinks within the order and annexes. In addition to the operation order, the user can create a warning order to initiate the exercise.

---

**Figure 3. TBR-EDT Role Player Attributes**

Tokhi, Nazo

- **Middle Name:** Nazo
- **Last Name:** Tokhi
- **Alias:** Naz
- **Gender:** Male
- **Marital Status:** Married
- **Occupation:** Farmer
- **Date of Birth:** 1985-03-02
- **Place of Birth:** Atropian
- **Nationality:** Atropian
- **Ethnicity:** Shia
- **Religion:** Shia
- **Language:** Spanish
- **Education:** Middle
- **Family:** Father: Jafar Tokhi (56)
- **Military Service:**
process or a fragmentary order to manipulate or drive the exercise.

**Data reuse.** Data reuse is a major feature of the TBR-EDT. It allows users from across the Army to leverage previously generated exercises. Tailoring the input from previous exercises conducted by other Army users maximizes efficiency and greatly reduces the time to design an exercise. A brigade operations staff officer (S-3) in Georgia can clone an S-3’s work in Hawaii, Texas, or South Korea and then modify that work to suit his or her own unit’s unique training objectives. After cloning the exercise, the S-3 can search for and reuse other individual exercise elements. These may include storylines, events, operation orders, role players with associated reports, or data tied to the operational variables (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time).

In another example, a unit may be deploying to a location that has internally displaced persons. That unit could search stored exercises from several different theaters for events that contain internally displaced persons and then modify those events for use in its own training exercise. The TBR-EDT also allows units to search for types of operations and operational environments similar to those they are preparing for—such as stability operations in Indonesia—so they can locate sample training objectives to help them develop objectives for their units.

**Scheduled Updates to the TBR-EDT**

Future versions of the TBR-EDT will allow users to search through many years of applicable mission command information system operational messages that generally support the events and storylines within the exercise. When users find the appropriate messages, they will be able to use the TBR-EDT’s embedded tools to transform proper names, date-time groups, and locations within the message data to fit the specific training environment. Once transformed, the message content is changed to replicate the new training location, but the context of the original message remains the same, allowing trainers to create a much more realistic and robust exercise event.
Feedback from Users in the Field

The TBR-EDT became operational on Nonsecure and SECRET Internet Protocol Router Networks in November 2013, enabling Army units to test it and provide feedback. The TBOC demonstrated the TBR-EDT at training and leader development venues, including the Brigade Pre-Command Course and Functional Area 57 Course, the Maneuver Center of Excellence, and Army National Guard training sites. A comment by one Army user is representative of the feedback TBOC has received on the value of the TBR-EDT: “I just spent a month and a half developing a TSP [training support package]; with the use of the TBR, I was able to create a similar TSP with the same level of fidelity in an afternoon.”

One modeling and simulations (FA57) officer recently commented that he believed using the TBR-EDT would improve the development of TSPs at the brigade, division, and corps levels. He said it would make FA57 officers into “rock stars when they get to their first operational assignments.”

Moreover, senior Army and joint officers are responding very positively, with many saying they wished this type of tool had been available for past training.

The TBOC completed its Army certification of the TBR-EDT in August 2014. The tool is awaiting final Army accreditation with approval of authority to operate.

Conclusion

While the TBR-EDT cannot do all the staff work required to create a home-station training exercise, it will provide an effective start-of-exercise solution. Units still must conduct the military decisionmaking process and create their own unit orders for an exercise. The tool will provide a WTSP that contains tactical, control, and setup materials, as well as evaluation plans and references for exercises. This means exercise planners will easily realize significant resource savings while designing exercises. Units can expect to complete a WTSP in days rather than months, enabling them to concentrate on training more than on training development.

The TBR-EDT’s end product is a joint or Army exercise across all levels, developed within a complex, realistic, integrated, and challenging training environment that will drive operations, stimulate staff battle drills, and help meet commanders’ training objectives in less time and at a significantly lower cost. If units invest the time to use this valuable capability, it will greatly assist the Army in its effort to revitalize home-station training and build a campaign-quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities.

Finally, The TBR-EDT is but one of a number of complementary capabilities available from the TBOC. As an element of the TRADOC G-2 and the Operational Environment Enterprise, the TBOC accesses real-world data, information, and knowledge and shapes them for focused application in training, education, and leader development venues.

The TBOC supports realistic and relevant home-station and institutional training by providing depth and complexity to scenario and exercise development. It develops operational environment visualizations and gaming products consistent with the Army learning model and responsive to unit needs.

Col. David Paschal, U.S. Army, Retired, is the director of the Training Brain Operations Center in Newport News, Va. He is a retired infantryman with numerous command assignments and operational deployments, including command of the Warrior Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, for a 14-month tour in Kirkuk, Iraq; and the 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, during a deployment to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Maj. Alan Gunnerson, U.S. Army, Retired, is a senior consultant with CGI Federal Corporation, supporting the Training Brain Operations Center as the Data Transformation Laboratory enterprise management supervisor.
Notes


5. TRADOC Pamphlet (TP) 350-70-1, Training Development in Support of the Operational Domain (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 24 February 2012). A WTSP is a complete, stand-alone training package that integrates all training products, resources, and materials necessary to support operating force training. It meets the broader scope of what the collective training community requires for training events. WTSPs may vary greatly in size and depth of content depending on the events to be trained, training environment, audience, and available training aids. A WTSP provides variable levels of detail for describing a unit training event for use in live, virtual (including gaming), and constructive environments, or any combination thereof.

6. Training Circular 7-101, Exercise Design (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 26 November 2010); TP 350-70-1 provides detailed guidance supporting TRADOC Regulation 350-70, Army Learning and Policy Systems (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 6 December 2011) and amplifying guidance on procedures for producing unit training products. This guide utilizes the instructional system design model often referred to as the analysis, design, development, implementation, and evaluation process.


8. The Joint, Live, Virtual, and Constructive (JLVC) 2020 Technical Architecture is an update to the Joint Training Environment to meet Joint Force 2020 training needs. The technical architecture is an enterprise architecture vice integration of monolithic models; it includes cloud computing and Web 2.0 technologies, and it is requirements based and risk managed. Joint Staff J-7 leads the JLVC 2020 effort. JLVC2020 Cloud-Enabled Modular Services includes a Scenario Management Tool that includes event design and scenario design tools. The joint EDT may provide a large portion of the services required for the SMT.

9. Modernized Integrated Database is a Department of Defense Intelligence Information System Intelligence Mission Application. It serves as the primary repository for data production and dissemination of military intelligence involving worldwide orders of battle, facilities, command and control networks, targeting, battle damage assessments, and other related information required for strategic assessments and national policy decision making.

10. The TBOC selected to use Order of Battle Service (OBS) eXtensible Markup Language (XML) as the modeling and simulation output format for the TBR-EDT. The OBS XML was developed in support of the JLVC federation, and it provides a single source for initialization data across all of its federates. The 23 federates utilized within the JLVC cover models and simulations across joint, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps forces.

11. Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) version 2.1, February 2014. TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity developed DATE to provide the Army training community with a detailed description of the conditions of five virtual operational environments in the Caucasus region: Ariana, Atropia, Gorgas, Minaria, and Donovia.


13. Senior opposing force analyst comment made during the initial unit testing in late August 2013 of the TBR, Fort Campbell, KY.

14. Comment made by an FA57 officer during a 2014 FA57 Course that included an introduction of the TBR-EDT. The TBR-EDT is currently introduced in various military instructional venues, including the FA57 Course and Brigade Pre-Command Course.

15. During several visits to the TBOC, senior Army and joint officers have made positive comments regarding the TBR-EDT, including the referenced comment.

Two distinct aspects of design—as taught at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Fort Leavenworth, Kan. —are the spirit of design and the practical, methodological approach contained in the Army design methodology (ADM). The spirit of design is not concerned with specific processes or particular methods but is a way of thinking that appreciates the interconnectedness, complexity, and uncertainty in the world. Embracing the spirit of design conditions Army planners for the unpredictability that defines their operational environment. The ADM is the Army’s practical approach for dealing with that unpredictability—it provides planners a common lexicon to enable effective collaboration and communication. Although the ADM enhances planning, Army planners must remember that design is not a perfected military decisionmaking process.

Perfection of Process
Does Not Equal Perfect Understanding

Maj. David Oakley, U.S. Army
2.0, but it is a way of thinking about a complex operational environment.\textsuperscript{4}

To highlight these aspects of design, this article applies a framework of 	extit{environmental framing, problem framing}, and 	extit{operational approach}. This framework, derived from Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, 	extit{The Operations Process}, will clarify the approach SAMS uses to teach design, convey the value of design for military planners, and illustrate the pitfalls of allowing the practical aspects of the ADM to overtake the spirit of design.\textsuperscript{5}

**Environmental Framing**

The obvious question when trying to appreciate design is, “why design?” The answer comes from the difficulty of understanding the confusing sociopolitical environments in which humans live and the need to explore these spaces for understanding. An operational environment is an open system characterized by complexity, uncertainty, and interdependence.\textsuperscript{6} During operations, Army forces are not an external audience viewing the environment but an integral part of a system; their actions will affect the system in indeterminate ways.\textsuperscript{7}

Although there is purposefulness within a system (i.e., all the parts that make up an environment), we cannot achieve complete understanding of it. Moreover, we often are incapable of determining cause and effect due to their separation in time and space.\textsuperscript{8} While we would like to bask in the comfortable warmth of certainty, our overconfidence is a symptom of hubris that could lead to tragic failure. Even when we believe we know the problem and respond appropriately to our understanding, we often are reacting to superficial symptoms and not to the underlying problem. As we improve our understanding, we slowly uncloak the veil of ignorance that has rested comfortably upon us.\textsuperscript{9} Although our understanding increases and our confidence grows, changes in the environment can make our understanding fleeting and can cause us to fall victim to an enemy more insidious than ignorance—the illusion of understanding.\textsuperscript{10}

**Problem Framing**

Even if military planners could understand the complex nature of their environment and appreciate the dynamic challenges it poses, forces still would have to do more than achieve understanding—they are tasked to do something, to achieve objectives. The problem is that in their pursuit of \textit{doing something}, they often introduce thoughtless action into this complex system. Our thoughtless action not only can result in failure to achieve objectives but also can lead to further chaos within the system.

This is our conundrum: How do we ensure purposeful action to achieve our objectives within a complex and dynamic open system that is uncomplicated and unpredictable and that is made more complicated and indeterminate by our actions? In addition, once planners appreciate the complexity of the environment, how do they convey their understanding of the environment to others so the unit builds and maintains a collective understanding that enables purposeful action?\textsuperscript{11}

**Operational Approach**

To help planners appreciate their operational environment and understand the various problems it poses, SAMS embraces a dual-pronged approach. Instructors aim to develop within students a deeper appreciation of the spirit of design while providing them the practical tools that the ADM offers. Although SAMS provides a block of instruction focused on design, the instructors and cadre teach the spirit of design (call it a line of effort) throughout the curriculum. They consistently encourage the adoption of design principles and challenge students to ask why in order to increase understanding and enable purposeful action. This comprehensive approach toward inculcating the spirit of design in SAMS students is understandable when one considers that design is not a process but a way of thinking. Once SAMS students understand the spirit of design, they realize this way of thinking should not be turned on and off like a light switch but kept active throughout the operations process (during planning, preparing, executing, and assessing).

The practical aspect of the ADM (a second line of effort) is taught exclusively during the “Design of Operational Art” block of instruction at SAMS. Although the practical aspect is useful, the purpose of the ADM is less to educate the mind for uncertainty than to train staff officers on planning methods and language to communicate understanding.

The SAMS dual-pronged operational approach of combining the spirit of design and the practical aspect of the ADM should result in thoughtful and humble leaders. They will become mindful of the herculean task of striving for continued understanding and communicating their understanding to others.
The Need to Know Why

German philosopher Friederich Nietzsche famously quipped, “If you know the why, you can live any how.” Within Nietzsche’s simple yet eloquent statement is the acknowledgement that the how is not as important as the why in determining purposeful action. Unfortunately, all too often as military professionals we are predisposed to embracing the how. The Army takes pride in its ability to collect and promulgate tactics, techniques, and procedures and lessons learned. It always searches for optimal solutions to perceived problems. Enamored with finding out how to solve a problem, and encouraged by doctrine replete with examples of the best processes, steps, and guidelines to quench the soldier’s voracious appetite for action, the soldier often fails to answer the why.

Previous experiences become problematic when soldiers try to develop understanding through the perfection of a process and not through appreciation of the environment. In contrast, the spirit of design embraces a humble way of thinking that accepts the human inability to achieve complete understanding. The strength of design lies in appreciating the possibilities within an open system rather than embracing a specific process.

Although the practical aspect of the ADM can provide utility if its purpose and value are understood correctly, it is important to appreciate that no planner “perceives more than a tiny patch of the vast tapestry of events,” and no process or methodology will change this fact. This humbling notion should remain in every planner’s mind to ensure he or she does not confuse the spirit of design with the practical methodology of the ADM. Perfection of process does not equal perfect understanding.

Maj. David Oakley is an Army strategist (functional area 59) at U.S. Army North. He served as a civilian staff operations officer in the Central Intelligence Agency and as a contractor at the National Counterterrorism Center. He has a B.A. in political science from Pittsburg State University, an M.P.A. from the University of Oklahoma, and two M.M.A.S. degrees from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He is a Ph.D. candidate in security studies at Kansas State University. Oakley wrote this article while attending SAMS from 2012-2013.
Notes

3. ADRP 5-0, 2-4.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 2-6.
9. Samuel Freeman ed., The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). This is not the same concept as the “veil of ignorance” found in John Rawls’ philosophy, which seeks to establish fairness and equality in decision making.
12. Friederich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols; or, How to Philosophise With the Hammer, Richard Polt trans. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1997), Kindle Edition, Kindle Location 87-89. One of Nietzsche’s main points is the importance of questioning “idols” and not leaving anything sacrosanct, in order to increase understanding. Although Nietzsche was mainly focused on religion, his emphasis on constantly questioning and reassessing our reality is valuable to military professionals in conducting operations.

We Recommend

Strykers in Afghanistan

Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute

With the Taliban threatening Kandahar city in the summer of 2009, the Soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry – part of the first Stryker brigade to deploy to Afghanistan – mounted a series of actions to destroy insurgent power in the region. Strykers in Afghanistan tells the story of the battalion’s initial operations, focusing on its difficult fight for the Arghandab Valley. The valley, located near Kandahar city, was a Taliban safehaven characterized by dense orchards and irrigation canals.

This study by the Combat Studies Institute recounts how the men of 1-17 IN took advantage of their equipment and adapted their tactics in the face of a determined foe defending complex terrain. To download a copy, please go to: http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/
Networking and Generalship Across the Anglo-Pacific

Maj. Matt Cavanaugh, U.S. Army, and
Maj. Nick Howard, U.S. Army

This article reports the findings from a March 2013 social network analysis among senior military officers across the principal Anglosphere nations of the Asia-Pacific region. We chose this area for its increasing importance to the United States, particularly in light of President Barack Obama’s remarks in a 2011 speech to Parliament in Canberra, Australia, that “as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future.”

In this research, we found persuasive evidence supporting the hypothesis that U.S. military leaders occupied a central position among senior military officers in the Asia-Pacific, and that these officers’ personal networks were primarily experience-based (i.e., that they had resulted from extensive personal contacts made during attendance at military schools and during service at multinational headquarters such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan). Among general and flag officers, if a picture is worth a thousand words, a handshake is worth a thousand e-mails. The policy implication is that if the United States values its position in the Asia-Pacific, it should support continued investment in these experience-based networks.

Quantitative Research

Harvard University Professor Joseph Nye writes that in the future, “much of the work of global governance will rely on formal and informal networks.” Nye also finds that, due to the United States’ strength in this respect, “predictions of an Asian century remain premature; the United States will remain more central in a dense global web of governance than other countries.” Former Princeton University Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter agrees. She argues that in contrast to a hierarchical conception of power, the new “measure of power is connectedness,” and “the state with the most connections will be the central player.” Instead of “king of the hill,” one should think “center of the circle,” and “here the United States has a clear and sustainable edge.”

Following these assertions about the U.S. role in the Pacific, we wanted to answer two questions using social network analysis: First, quantitatively, among general and flag officers, what could we say about the United States’ position in relationships with Australian and New Zealand senior military leaders? Second, qualitatively, how were these officers’ social networks constructed?

For the purposes of this article, social network analysis is “concerned with understanding the linkages among social entities and the implications of these linkages.” Methodologically, social network analysis does not fit easily into one domain, making it “inherently an interdisciplinary endeavor.” The first thing one finds in social network analysis is that networks are always changing—individuals leave assignments, and people fall out of contact or gain new contacts—thus, research always yields a snapshot in time. This modest drawback, however, is mitigated by the fact that a momentary social network analysis is better than no study at all. Moreover, there is a clear benefit to studying the nature of allied relationships for a U.S. military that consistently fights war as part of a multinational team.

Method of Sample Selection

We structured the study to narrowly gauge external perceptions of the United States among discrete groups of senior officers in the Australian and New Zealand militaries. Owing to the difficulty of obtaining a random sample of the target network, we relied on talking to those who could make themselves available for a short interview. The lack of a random sample means that our network may show some bias toward more sociable general officers. If this is the case, it is also important to note that we were able to obtain a significantly larger sample of the Asia-Pacific Anglosphere network than is usual for social research; studies often include well below 1 percent of a social network. Our study netted 27 interviews of Australians and New Zealanders. Twenty-one were general officers while six were civilian academics who networked with military officers. For a sense of relative sample size, there are approximately 74 general officers in the Australian Army and 20 general officers in the New Zealand Army. Thus, our sample size for this study was more than 20 percent of the total number of general officers in the Australian and New Zealand Armies, which is more than sufficient to draw valid and reliable conclusions.

The relatively small size of the Australian and New Zealand militaries provided the ability to obtain a meaningful sample size. In light of the difficulty of obtaining a random sample, this was another reason these nations were selected for study.

It is important to note that this study focused on networked connections as perceived by Australian and
New Zealand general officers, so U.S., Canadian, and British senior military officers were not interviewed. Therefore, indications of networked connections to the latter groups only appear if specifically noted by the Australian and New Zealand general officers interviewed.

**Methodology**

Personal interviews were conducted to develop a high-quality data set. The majority of the interviews were accomplished face-to-face. Each participant received the same scripted prompt, which concluded with the guidance to provide “the social connections that are useful to you in a work or professional sense—who might you reach out to for advice when you have a particularly tough issue?” This prompt’s objective was to show to whom general and flag officers talked on important matters and from what country within the Anglosphere those individuals came.

**Quantitative Findings**

Using the interview data, we built a social network model of general officers and policy makers. Each node represented a person, and nodes were deemed connected if either person named the other in an interview. In this way, we formed a model of 191 people with 256 connections, as depicted in figure 1.

### Figure 1. Network Derived From Interviews Asking Australian and New Zealand Senior Military Officers Whom They Contact for Advice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number Individuals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of the network yielded several interesting observations. First, the model showed that the Australians were more central than U.S. officers within the network, and analysis of centrality measures (not shown here) suggested that in this network, Australians held the most “important” social position. This was expected due to sampling bias. The interviews were conducted with 14 Australians and 13 New Zealanders. Intuitively, one would expect them to have closer relationships among themselves and talk with people in their countries’ defense institutions more than with people from other countries. However, it was surprising that despite the sampling bias toward Australians and New Zealanders, many Americans were in the network. Although no Americans were interviewed, more were included in the network than any other nationality.

We also found that the Australians and New Zealanders in the network were more connected to Americans than to any other foreigners, as shown in table 1. This observation was somewhat surprising also, especially in the case of the New Zealanders due to the dissolution of the New Zealand-United States leg of the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Treaty in the mid-1980s, which ostensibly lessened ties between the militaries of the United States and New Zealand.

Even with a small sample of interviews, the strong bias among Australian and New Zealand officers toward U.S. officers provided persuasive evidence for the hypothesis that the United States was in the “middle.” This meant that when Australian or New Zealand general officers encountered thorny issues and reached beyond their domestic borders for advice from similarly ranked peers, they were more likely to call on an American than an officer of any other nationality within the Anglosphere. This finding was consistent with Nye and Slaughter’s overall conjecture—at the senior military officer level, the United States holds a central position among these key allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific.

We also hypothesized that the higher the rank held, the more connections an officer would have. Thus, high-ranking officers were expected to be more central in the network model. However, our data on this point yielded no correlation. This likely was a function of sampling bias as many of the individuals interviewed were brigadier generals and major generals. In a social network model, people who are interviewed will be connected to everyone they name, which increases their centrality in the network model. Those who are not interviewed will appear in the model only if someone else names them and so will be less likely to be mentioned several times and have several connections.

In summary, the network data in this study were biased toward brigadier generals and major generals from Australia and New Zealand, which limited the analysis and conclusions we could draw. Despite this heavy bias, the study provided persuasive evidence that New Zealand and Australian military officers were more socially connected to U.S. officers than to those of any other country in the Anglosphere nations of the Asia-Pacific region. This was particularly surprising among the New Zealanders since one would expect them to name more Australian than U.S. officers due to their geographic proximity and Commonwealth relationship—but the data indicated otherwise.

### Qualitative Research

Qualitatively, our study aimed to determine the nature of these social networks. Stanley McChrystal once famously observed that in Iraq and Afghanistan, “the [enemy’s] network is self-forming.” This assertion begs a question addressed in our research: how do general officers acquire their networks? Are they experience-based, as a result of military educational

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>New Zealand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australians</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealanders</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1. Average Number of Connections for New Zealanders and Australians**
or international staff time, or, alternately, are they self-forming in this age of technological connectedness?

We performed a thorough review of the responses and subjectively determined whether an individual could be said to have an experience-based or self-formed network. For example, if participants said all their contacts resulted from military schools and international headquarters (e.g., Iraq or Afghanistan), their networks were categorized as experience-based. When individuals described their sole approach to networking as taking the initiative to reach out to others with whom they had shared no prior experiences, their networks were listed as self-forming. A third category was for those who reported using both methods.

Qualitative Findings

Our analysis yielded the categorization of the 27 individuals’ networks, depicted in Table 2. We found the self-forming category almost entirely composed of academics or recently retired officers, with one actively serving officer as an outlier. As academics who study defense and security subjects tend to find their employment dependent upon relationships with active duty military officers, it is reasonable to explain that people in this category have greater incentives to seek their own social contacts. Also, retired general and flag officers have more time to devote to social relationships than while in active service, particularly for self-directed networking.

Nearly all the actively serving general and flag officers’ connections fell in the experience-based category. This is valuable information because it suggests that active duty officers do not deliberately set out to acquire their networks—rather, their networks develop as a natural result of work experiences. While this conclusion is significant, it must be noted that the sample size limits the ability to draw specific claims based solely on this data. There is room for conducting further studies, which might include interviewing American, British, and Canadian officers to elicit data showing a different perspective.

Implications

Based on this study, we assert that U.S. military senior leaders have a larger influence on Australian and New Zealand general officers than they have on each other. In addition, the data suggest that U.S. military leaders have more influence than British military leaders, a conclusion that was not obvious prior to data collection and analysis (i.e., one would expect military leaders from Commonwealth countries such as Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia to have stronger ties with each other than with leaders from the United States).

Anecdotal evidence supports the validity of this study’s findings. For example, the appointment of Australian Maj. Gen. Richard M. Burr to deputy commanding general for operations at U.S. Army Pacific, early in 2013, suggests that ties between Australian and U.S. military leaders are strong. Moreover, the commander of U.S. Army Pacific, Lt. Gen. Francis J. Wiercinski, expresses his commitment to international coalition defense networks: “In this business … relationship building is building trust, and that’s the part I want to make sure we hold onto.”

Although social networks seem to provide significant benefits, budget clouds cast a shadow over the U.S. Army’s ability to develop and sustain them. U.S. Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network Type (Category Total)</th>
<th>Current Generals and Flag Officers</th>
<th>Recently Retired Generals and Flag Officers</th>
<th>Civilian Academics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience-based (16)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-forming (7)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience-based and Self-forming (4)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Academics in the network served in military schools and worked almost exclusively with military officers.

Table 2. Categorization of Interview Participants’ Networks
Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond T. Odierno acknowledges that the Army “will have to adjust to … declining budgets, due to the country’s worsened fiscal situation.”

In this context, it seems the force may migrate from traditional face-to-face defense diplomacy to online platforms to develop military networks because online networking is inexpensive. One such private effort is Rally Point, an online site that appears to replicate LinkedIn for a military audience. This sort of cost-saving measure could appeal to many, especially as the millennial generation (sometimes referred to as “digital natives”) is comfortable with online communication.

As a result, could the end of experience-based military social networks be on the horizon?

This techno-optimistic idea is not supported by our research effort. Our study found noteworthy evidence supporting the conjecture that American military officers occupy a central position among senior military officers from Anglosphere nations of the Asia-Pacific because the personal networks among them are heavily experience-based. The resulting policy implication is to support continued investment in promoting these experience-based networks. Among this population, frequent flier miles and name badges still matter more than video teleconferences and character-limited messaging.

Finally, how do these findings provide value to the U.S. taxpayer? This question matters as it focuses on the effectiveness of the U.S. military’s approaches to conducting defense diplomacy. In turn, more effective alliance and partner activities enhance U.S. capabilities, so these activities can become a cost-effective way to achieve national objectives. For the Army, networks among allied military leaders support the chief of staff’s regionally aligned forces initiative. Moreover, continued development of these networks should ease the inevitable difficulty of working in alliances and coalitions. Therefore, social network analysis relative to identifying and explaining network development and functioning contributes tangible benefits.
Disclaimer: This essay is an unofficial expression of opinion; the views are those of the author and not necessarily those of the U.S. Military Academy, Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or any agency of the United States Government.

Maj. Matt Cavanaugh, U.S. Army, is an instructor of military strategy in the Defense and Strategic Studies Program at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y. An FA59 (Army strategist) officer, he is working on a Ph.D. dissertation on generalship under Professor Colin S. Gray at the University of Reading, U.K., and blogs regularly at WarCouncil.org.

Maj. Nick Howard, U.S. Army, is an instructor of mathematics at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York. He earned a master’s degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a bachelor’s degree from the U.S. Military Academy, both in operations research. He has served more than three years in combat assignments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Notes

1. For the purposes of this essay, "Anglosphere" refers to the five countries with shared linguistic and cultural backgrounds and a history of military cooperation: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Though some might object to this as an exclusively racial construct, one glimpse at the modern multi-ethnic composition of these societies provides sufficient evidence to the contrary.


4. Ibid.


6. Ibid.


8. Ibid, 10.

9. Academics, in this context, refers to individuals with sustained career focus and employment in the security or military fields, typically at an educational, research, or policy institution.

10. These figures are considered approximate because they do change on occasion as international and deployment assignments can curtail or extend opportunities for senior military figures. New Zealand figure obtained from Lt. Col. Stephen Kearney, Defence Personnel Executive-New Zealand Defence Force, 30 September 2014, e-mail to author. By rank, the New Zealand Army has 15 brigadier generals, four major generals, and one lieutenant general. Australian figure: Ian McPhedran, "Too Many Troops in Army Mess" The Daily Telegraph–Sydney (16 August 2010), http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/too-many-troops-in-army-mess/story-e6freuy9-12259055742957?nk=cd6f6eb22de-80702b50a97f905865c77 (accessed 30 October 2014). By rank, the Australian Army has 49 brigadier generals, 22 major generals, and three lieutenant generals.


Acknowledgement: The authors wish to express thanks and gratitude to Col. John Graham and the West Point Network Science Center for their generous funding and support for this study.
In war, soldiers often pursue the negative aim of imposing one nation’s will upon another through the force of arms. However, at the conclusion of a war, or during activities other than combat, a soldier’s primary purpose can become much different: to influence the will of others positively, using constructive means. Military forces often pursue positive actions essential to reassure allies, influence neutrals, and dissuade potential adversaries. Influencing a nation or a cultural group depends on winning the trust of those who can influence others. As such, any soldier or military leader who cannot win the trust of key influencers risks failing to accomplish the mission.

How do service members build trust with key indigenous stakeholders—influencers—in the current security environment? In this article, I will describe
conclusions from a research project that set out to answer this question. The research consisted of a study of interviews in the Combat Studies Institute’s “Operational Leadership Experiences” (OLE) collection (all interview excerpts in this article are taken from OLE collection transcripts). I looked for ways soldiers and members of other services reported they had built confidence and gained trust over time. From their experiences, I sought to create a generalized model that future forces could apply to this difficult mission. My goal was to ground the model in real-world experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and to make it easy to understand. Moreover, I wanted to create a starting point for a deeper discussion on this critical skill set.

My research indicated that in Iraq and Afghanistan, forces often created and then applied incremental confidence-building measures to win trust over time, while taking into account the cultural context. (For the purposes of this research, confidence building is conceived as a contributor to gaining trust.) Generally, I found these confidence-building measures fell into three categories, which I will call physical measures, communication measures, and relationship measures. A model based on my findings could assist in training soldiers and leaders so they could improve their ability to build trust in often challenging and ambiguous operational environments.

The Importance of Establishing Trust

National-level policy documents, such as Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, describe the need for forces to conduct a wide array of missions. Many require the operational flexibility to build relationships as well as apply military lethal force. Therefore, soldiers and leaders can expect to take on roles that require gaining trust to achieve the nation’s policy goals and to protect its vital interests.

At the tactical level, building trust often becomes critical to personal survival and mission accomplishment. In Afghanistan today, both combat and noncombat units interact with host-nation military, police, or local leaders daily to build legitimacy and set the conditions for a secure environment. What makes this even more of a burden is that in counterinsurgency, discerning whether a person is friend, foe, or fence sitter is not easy. Ideally, when soldiers gain trust at the tactical level, they can reassure those on their side and win over the undecided, and this leads to denying adversaries the support of the populace.

When soldiers assume an embedded trainer or advisor role, they should have the ability to gain trust so they can train and prepare their partner forces for combat. When the partner forces begin to execute real-world missions, they and the advisors must have already established high levels of mutual trust. If trust is inadequate, the stresses of combat can further impair how effective the partners are in fighting together.

Soldiers sometimes serve with interagency partners to help improve quality-of-life conditions. For example, members of reconstruction, development, or agribusiness teams need to gain trust. Without the trust of the populace, determining which projects to execute and garnering local support to help complete them will be difficult. In fact, the projects these teams execute are a vehicle to winning trust and building legitimacy.

At the operational and strategic levels, commanders continually conduct key leader engagements with civilian stakeholders and military counterparts to set the conditions for mission accomplishment. When building partner capacity, fostering military-to-military relationships, enabling civil authorities, or conducting counterinsurgency, strategic- and operational-level leaders must earn trust from a wide array of stakeholders to accomplish their missions and further national objectives. Without establishing mutual trust, even though senior leaders will talk, they may not truly communicate.

Moreover, because complex coalition operations are the norm and will be into the future, partners need glue that can hold a coalition together—trust is that glue. In long-standing coalition relationships, such as between the United States and the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, trust already is established. This trust provides the foundation for successful interoperability during crises. However, for trust to endure, the parties must engage with each other and continually work on understanding each other’s perspectives.

For new or nontraditional coalitions, replacing uncertainty with trust becomes even more critical. In many roles, and at many levels, soldiers and leaders must succeed in winning trust before they can accomplish missions.
A Research Methodology for Identifying How to Win Trust

This research started with a wide aperture and narrowed its focus as it progressed. I began by analyzing 2,515 transcribed interviews from the OLE collection to find experiences related to gaining trust where the experiences had occurred in the five years from 2008-2012. I found 67 interviews that met these criteria, which I analyzed and coded line by line to determine the specific behaviors reported to contribute to building confidence and gaining trust. From this data, I constructed a generalized model of confidence-building measures with specific examples in each category. Then I compared and contrasted the model with findings reported on this subject in academic literature.8

Subsequently, I conducted in-depth interviews with subject matter experts who had interacted regularly with host-nation soldiers or civilians. They provided additional accounts of confidence-building activities, based on numerous deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, or both. I used the interviews with the subject matter experts to further validate and improve the initial model. The result is a holistic model based on rich accounts of how military members gained the trust of stakeholders in operational environments characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity.

A Definition of Trust

According to Denise M. Rousseau et al., trust is "a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another."9 Contemporary literature in the field of psychology indicates that trust is a complex human phenomenon with many variables and facets, and as such, scholars view it in very different ways. From a biopsychological view, trust is a series of specific chemical and neurological responses in the brain. A person’s distrust, conditional trust, or trust releases certain chemicals in the brain and stimulates different areas to store perception memories.10

Humanistic psychologists such as Carl Rogers have stated that all people have a need for safety, empathy, and acceptance.11 When people encounter others who treat them respectfully and positively, positive relationships begin to form. From the view of humanistic psychology, trust involves a human connection that results from deep and genuine interactions at a personal level.

According to cognitive-behavioral psychology experts Jesse H. Wright, Monica Ramirez Basco, and Michael E. Thase, when humans interact, their relationships proceed through stages: (a) event, (b) cognitive appraisal (including automatic thoughts), (c) emotion, and (d) behavior.12 From this perspective, trust develops during cognitive appraisal, affects the felt emotion, and eventually manifests in an individual’s behavior. Cognitive-behavioral psychology experts believe that looking at what comes before, during, and after a behavior allows a person to gain adequate contextual understanding, evaluate the situation, and restructure thoughts and emotions. Moving from distrust to trust requires a new cognitive appraisal and a shift in individual judgment.

Confidence-Building Measures

At the height of the Cold War, psychologist Charles E. Osgood wrote about an idea he called graduated reduction in tension, in which the Soviet Union and the United States could reduce tension in the arms race.13 His approach called for small conciliatory gestures that would walk back the conflict from the precipice of war on a global scale. One such small measure, the telephone hotline between the White House and the Kremlin, became a major factor in averting nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis.14

As acceptance of Osgood’s ideas grew, international relations and political science scholars, such as Michael Krepon, called these approaches confidence-building measures, or confidence- and security-building measures.15 International agreements such as those from the Stockholm Conference (1986) and the Declaration of Helsinki (1975) codified confidence-building measures as formal political agreements.16 These measures took many different forms, such as inspections, notifications, economic assistance, structured communication, and nonthreatening interactions. After the Cold War, scholars such as Landau and Landau began to apply the idea of confidence-building measures to new areas, such as structured mediation.17

When viewed holistically, the literature on the subject of trust indicates that, as a very human phenomenon, trust is not easy to understand. My research proceeded based on the assumption that if the concept of confidence-building measures was a valid way to approach conflict resolution, then the idea could have
merit in the context of soldiers asked to win trust in Iraq and Afghanistan.

A Model for Winning Trust

The model constructed from this research represents one valid way for soldiers and leaders at all levels to approach winning trust, with an emphasis on confidence building at the tactical level. The research findings indicated that three important variables formed the trust equation: (1) the context of each situation, (2) time, and (3) the confidence-building measures employed. The results also indicated that three main types of confidence-building measures were involved: (1) physical measures, (2) communication measures, and (3) relationship measures (see figure 1).  

Context

I found that understanding the context was an extremely important theme in the overall success of confidence building. Understanding the cultural factors set the conditions for success. I found that personal factors such as one’s ability or one’s experiences during other deployments could affect how effective trust-building efforts were.

For example, Maj. Paul Madden, interviewed for the OLE collection in 2009, describes how the personal experiences of one of his soldiers limited that soldier’s ability to build trust:

Our warrant officer was a young private in Desert Storm so he hated going out there. He still didn’t trust them [the Iraqis]. We kind of had to drag him. … He didn’t trust those guys. … He went out there but he never really enjoyed it because of the experience he had with those guys before.

It is important to note that a thorough understanding of context included understanding the degree of permissiveness in a given operational environment.
Overall, confidence and trust were highly dependent on context; understanding specific variances in places, people, and situations played a critical role.21

Time

Time emerged as an important theme in the overall success of building confidence and winning trust. Activities could lead to a substantial relationship of trust in just a few weeks or in as many as seven months. Usually, however, forces needed about two to three months to establish a foundation. If partners went through an initial period of high enemy activity together, they would bond more quickly.22 The importance of the time variable is expressed by Maj. Andrew Bellocchio in his 2011 OLE interview:

> You have to live as close as you can to it and spend as much time as you can with them [indigenous stakeholders]. It’s also a trust thing; it builds the trust. They feel you’re not just reporting on them but they see you’re trying to help them; you’re with them and part of the team. That does make a difference. I think it speeds up the relationship you can have with them. Just contact time; you have to live with them and work with them.23

Additionally, because the perception of time often varies between individuals and cultures, one could expect the time variable to differ in each situation. Overall, the findings indicated that soldiers should dedicate a significant amount of time if they are to establish a true relationship of trust.24

Confidence-Building Measures

The findings indicated that confidence-building measures generally fell into three categories: (1) physical, (2) communication, and (3) relationship measures (see figure 2).25 It is important to note that the boundaries of these categories are flexible. Depending on the circumstances, their relationships and influences on each other can vary in unexpected ways.26

Physical measures. Physical confidence-building measures, activities that demonstrate positive intention, were the most often employed and the most effective. The findings indicated that within the category of physical measures, the progression from conducting partnered activities to having the host-nation stakeholders lead the activities was critical, as was helping the population meet their basic human needs. One of the more interesting and unexpected findings was that soldiers reported participation in sports such as soccer or other physical training with their partners dramatically increased the trust in the relationship.27 Maj. Jason Moulton, interviewed for the OLE collection in 2010, describes interaction with the Iraqis:

> For me it was very enjoyable; I played soccer quite a bit on their helipad.... It let them see that we were just like them; that we wanted to do the same things they wanted to do. I wanted to let people who think other thoughts about the U.S. in general see that we were on the same page as them. It paid dividends when you try to actually go talk to them about doing things and convince them that they need to approach new avenues on how to do things. I think it helped a lot.28

Of particular interest was a confidence-building measure in which soldiers would take an unobtrusive security posture. The interviews indicated that taking off body armor or helmets, for instance, or keeping weapons out of sight, would communicate trust to other parties. However, the research subjects were careful to note that even though a relaxed posture communicates trust, soldiers need to remain aware of the risks they take. Soldiers must balance the need for personal force protection with the need to build confidence and win trust. This is a difficult dilemma and one where soldiers must apply their own professional judgment. Overall, in gaining trust, the research indicated that actions often speak louder than words.29

Communication measures. Communication measures—activities to exchange information, ideas, and perspectives—emerged as the next major category. In a situation where parties in a conflict speak different languages, measures to build communication are critical, and translators become the lynchpin that holds the relationship together. The interviews indicated that the selection, vetting, and retention of the best interpreters were critical to success. The time it takes to train a soldier in a foreign language can be very long; however, even learning a few words or phrases in the local language was reported as beneficial to building trust.30 For example, when asked by an OLE interviewer in 2011 what parts of his predeployment training were most beneficial, Maj. Robert L. Reed answered,
Figure 2. Examples of Confidence-Building Measures

**Physical**
- Conducting partnered activities
- Sharing experiences
- Having partners lead activities
- Colocating or living with partners
- Meeting basic needs (security, food and water assistance, economic aid, medical support)
- Maintaining unobtrusive security posture but balancing it with the need for personal protection
- Sharing risk
- Providing security
- Participating in sports or physical exercise together
- Assisting vulnerable populations
- Supporting development projects
- Training together
- Setting conditions for sustainable jobs
- Shopping at local markets
- Conducting discovery actions

**Communication**
- Opening lines of communication
- Using interpreters as cultural advisors
- Using the native language
- Sharing intelligence and information
- Having regular meetings
- Asking questions
- Listening
- Handling requests
- Holding conferences
- Negotiating agreements
- Keeping promises
- Providing answers
- Acting as an intermediary
- Planning together
- Identifying problems
- Solving problems
- Engaging continually
- Having follow-up discussions
- Seeking an understanding of local conditions

**Relationship**
- Sharing food or drink
- Building rapport
- Getting to know partners personally
- Having positive social interactions
- Overcoming significant challenges together
- Showing respect
- Building camaraderie
- Understanding personalities
- Reinforcing existing institutions
- Displaying patience
- Making amends
- Interacting as peers
- Allowing partners to demonstrate their skills and expertise
- Learning from partners
- Coping with politics
- Enabling local governance
The language. To gain their respect right off the bat was the main thing we needed to do because they [the indigenous stakeholders] don't trust you from anything; they don't know you. As soon as you can gain their respect they'll do anything for you. To be able to go in there and [speak] just the key phrases like, “Hello. How are you? How is your day?” Things like that were huge.

Overall, the findings suggested that for confidence building to succeed, a soldier should open the lines of communication, speak as well as listen, and help identify and solve problems using appropriate communication tools.

*Relationship measures.* Relationship measures are activities that improve interpersonal connections. They can range from sharing food or drink, to learning about the other person, to showing patience and understanding. Professionally, a service member should strive to learn from the other party and accept a way of doing things that may be inconsistent with how the service member personally believes things should happen.

For example, in a 2010 OLE interview, Maj. Taly Velez explained,

> Our reception in the Aburisha Brigade turned out to be a good one, mainly, if I should say, [it] was due to us taking the time to build relationships with them and not dictate how things were going to be. Once we gained their trust, they were willing to do anything for us. I think that was what made our and their success a great one.

> When asked what recommendation he would make to Army, Velez said, “Personal relationships. That’s probably the key to everything.”

Soldiers may want to consider sharing some personal details about their lives, treating local people as peers, and most important, admitting when they have made a mistake. If relationships between any two humans involve a continual give and take, with risk and reward, relationships in this context are no different.
Do’s and Don’ts of Confidence Building

In the interviews I conducted with subject matter experts, I asked them to detail advice they would give to soldiers needing to build confidence and win trust. This open-ended question produced some interesting and insightful rules of thumb, compiled in figure 3. Soldiers could find this simple list of do’s and don’ts valuable when trying to build confidence.

Behaviors and attitudes soldiers should adopt include keeping an open mind and planning to change and learn—these stood out among the experts’ responses. Among the behaviors and attitudes to avoid are assuming that indigenous people share one’s thoughts (sometimes called mirror-imaging), rushing people, or talking down to them because they do not speak English—these were emphasized consistently by the experts. Overall, the lesson for would-be confidence builders is that to gain trust, soldiers should treat others as they would like to be treated.

Conclusion

Human emotion is often hard to fully understand, and even more troublesome to influence or change. Earning the trust of another is a complex endeavor, and many unknowable factors could contribute to success or failure. Therefore, this, or any model of how to build trust, can never be without flaws. Soldiers must apply sound professional judgment that is appropriate for the context of the situation and based on their own experience, training, and intuition. This model provides one way by which a soldier can choose to build confidence and win trust.

It is very unlikely that all future conflicts to which the United States deploys its soldiers will be a carbon copy of Iraq or Afghanistan. However, the nature of conflict and the range of military operations short of full-scale combat will necessitate that soldiers are as skilled in building relationships as they are in employing brute military force.

Overall, I found that if soldiers understand context and apply physical, communication, and relationship measures over time to build confidence, they can succeed in winning the trust of key stakeholders, even in the most complex and challenging environments. Establishing trust is and will remain an essential function, critical to the Army’s ability to win in a complex world.

Figure 3. Confidence-Building Rules of Thumb

soldiers are as skilled in building relationships as they are in employing brute military force.

Overall, I found that if soldiers understand context and apply physical, communication, and relationship measures over time to build confidence, they can succeed in winning the trust of key stakeholders, even in the most complex and challenging environments. Establishing trust is and will remain an essential function, critical to the Army’s ability to win in a complex world.

Lt. Col. Aaron Bazin, U.S. Army, works at the Army Capabilities and Integration Center, Fort Eustis, Va. A strategic plans and policy officer (functional area 59), he served previously at U.S. Central Command as lead planner for the 2010 Iraq Transition Plan and other planning efforts. This article on confidence-building measures represents a brief synopsis of research for his doctorate in psychology. His operational deployments include Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan.


19. Ibid.


22. Ibid.


25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.


30. Ibid.


33. Ibid.


35. Ibid.


37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.
We live in a world of rapidly advancing, revolutionary technologies that are not just reshaping our world and wars, but also creating a host of ethical questions that must be dealt with. But in trying to answer them, we must also explore why exactly it is so hard to have effective discussions about ethics, technology, and war in the first place?

— P.W. Singer

Ethics and the Enhanced Soldier of the Near Future

Col. Dave Shunk, U.S. Air Force, Retired

A soldier aims an XM-25 weapon system at Aberdeen Test Center, Md. It features an array of sights, sensors, and lasers housed in a target acquisition fire control unit on top, an oversized magazine behind the trigger mechanism, and a short, ominous barrel wrapped by a recoil-dampening sleeve.

( Photo courtesy of Army News Service)

MILITARY REVIEW January-February 2015

91
The super soldier is on the way—maybe not tomorrow, but soon. As technological inventions are changing our society, so will technology ripple through our battlefields and soldier ethics. Soldier enhancement possibilities are often discussed, but less so are the ethical challenges of the new technologies.

In the near future, science and technology will offer many startling choices to enhance or equip the soldier. Like any innovation in warfare, the Army must discuss the ethics of enhancing soldiers. Planning must begin on how to incorporate the enhanced soldier into the Army. A comprehensive planning effort could prevent the unintended repercussions of technology implemented without consideration for ethics, concepts, and doctrine. The Army must come to terms not only with creating—or fighting against—enhanced soldiers but also with understanding the unforeseen ethical challenges and the second- and third-order effects of such warfare.

At the very basic level, all items soldiers carry and use could be considered enhancements to aid them in battle. In 480 BCE at the battle of Thermopylae, the Spartans’ enhancements were in the form of their shields, spears, and swords. At the Battle of Agincourt in 1415, English King Henry V and his forces had their enhancements: English knights rode atop warhorses and wore armor plate while the English bowmen fired arrows with the long bow.

Today, U.S. soldiers carry enhancements of body armor, weapons, radios, and batteries that weigh in excess of 75 pounds. However, the way of exterior enhancement soon will be augmented with technologies yet to be developed.

The soldier of the future likely will be enhanced through neuroscience, biotechnology, nanotechnology, genetics, and drugs. According to Patrick Lin, writing in The Atlantic about the ethics of enhancing soldiers, “Soldier enhancements, through biological or technological augmentation of human capabilities, reduce warfighter risk by providing tactical advantages over the enemy.” Lin describes efforts to develop a “super-soldier” who can perform more like a machine.
Why Are Ethics Important to the Enhanced Soldier?

A 2010 report prepared for United States Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory about the appropriateness of cognition-enhancing drugs for troops says that the Army has tested modanifil and caffeine (to promote wakefulness) for use in military operations and that Army policy already approves some drugs for cognition enhancement. The report’s authors expect that more drugs will be considered for enhancing warfighters. However, the authors barely mention the ethical concerns of using drugs such as modanifil for enhancement rather than for their intended therapeutic purposes. Moreover, their review of the literature and issues on ethics is based on about six sources and takes up about one page of a 50-page report.

A definition of enhancement. According to the Oxford Dictionaries Online, enhancement is “an increase or improvement in quality, value, or extent.” One working definition of an enhancement as it might apply to warfighters, according to Lin, is that “an enhancement is a medical or biological intervention to the body designed to improve performance, appearance, or capability besides what is necessary to achieve, sustain, or restore health.”

Dangers of enhancement to soldiers. The risks that accompany enhancement are not new. Throughout history, armies have used risky enhancements such as addictive drugs to improve soldiers’ performance in combat. For example, high-dose caffeine, modanifil, and amphetamines all have been shown to be highly effective in temporarily reversing mental performance degradation in sleep-deprived soldiers.

Even in the early days of Western civilization, our mythology idealized the super soldier. The story of the nearly invulnerable Achilles in the battle for Troy, which originated circa 850 BCE, is still told today. The search for the enhanced Achilles occurred during World War II, accompanied by ethical problems as well.

The Enhanced Soldier in World War II

The U.S. military and other armies during World War II gave amphetamines to soldiers to prevent what was called “battle fatigue.” Armies used amphetamines “to combat fatigue, depression, and to enhance endurance performance.”

German Wehrmacht. One of the first large-scale attempts to enhance soldiers involved the German Wehrmacht. Andreas Ulrich describes how the German military provided a stimulant called Pervitin to soldiers in combat. Pervitin, a methamphetamine, was generally viewed as a proven drug to be used when soldiers were likely to be subjected to extreme stress. Ulrich reports that a memorandum for German navy medical officers stated,

Every medical officer must be aware that Pervitin is a highly differentiated and powerful stimulant, a tool that enables him, at any time, to actively and effectively help certain individuals within his range of influence achieve above-average performance.

Ulrich also reports,

between April and July of 1940, more than 35 million tablets of Pervitin and Isophan (a slightly modified version) were shipped to the German army and air force. Some of the tablets, each containing three milligrams of active substance, were sent to the Wehrmacht’s medical divisions under the code name OBM, and then distributed directly to the troops. The packages were labeled “Stimulant,” and the instructions recommended a dose of one to two tablets “only as needed, to maintain sleeplessness.”

Ulrich states that although Pervitin had begun to be available only by prescription by the end of 1939, it still was consumed in enormous amounts. Serious health damage resulted, including fatal heart attacks in some German soldiers. Therefore, in June 1941, Pervitin was designated as subject to the opium law. After that, illicit consumption and illegal sale of Pervitin were punished as a crime. Medical officers had to follow strict orders concerning the use of Pervitin and its distribution to soldiers.

Eventually, the German medical officers were told about the danger of addiction to amphetamines, and use declined. However, this does not mean there were no more problems with Pervitin. Officers and common soldiers were punished for misusing it or remained addicted, some even years after the war had ended.
**United States Army.** The U.S. Army also became interested in amphetamines and caffeine for soldier enhancement. Some of the earliest evaluations were conducted at the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory and involved caffeine comparisons with the amphetamine called Benzedrine. This interest was stimulated by the use of methamphetamine by the Germans during the early years of the Blitzkrieg. Harris R. Lieberman, Jessica Cail, and Karl E. Friedl report that the U.S. Army issued Benzedrine to servicemen during the war, mainly as 5-mg tablets, though inhalers were also available.\(^1\) The Army continued to use amphetamines even after other countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom were beginning to recognize problems from unrestricted use of the drugs.\(^1\) Studies published after the war noted concerns about impaired judgment and willingness to continue nonproductive or dangerous performance. Studies also found that amphetamine, as opposed to caffeine and modafinil, increased risk-taking while prolonged wakefulness increasingly impaired judgment.\(^1\)

Withdrawal symptoms of amphetamine consisted primarily of mental fatigue, mental depression, and increased appetite. Symptoms lasted for days with occasional use and for weeks or months with chronic use, with severity dependent on the length of time and the amount of amphetamine used. Withdrawal symptoms also included anxiety, agitation, excessive sleep, vivid or lucid dreams, and thoughts of suicide.\(^1\)

So what was the ethical problem of giving amphetamines to combat soldiers in World War II? With the eventual understanding of their effects, under what combat conditions did the short-term benefits of being alert and awake overrule the ethical issue of possible amphetamine addiction? Similar conundrums already complicate consideration of future potential enhancements.

**The Ethical Problem**

With the possibilities of several types of enhancements to the warrior in the near future, what are some possible future ethical challenges? According to William D. Casebeer, “ethical questions are normative questions. They deal with what we ought to do, what is permitted in good and right thought and conduct, and what kind of people we ought to be.”\(^1\)

The *Oxford Dictionaries Online* define *ethics* “as moral principles that govern a person’s or group’s behavior.”\(^1\) Combat ethics define the allowable actions in warfare. The *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Association Terms* has neither a definition of ethics, combat ethics, nor enhancement.\(^1\)

Ethics are not new to the soldier in combat. The Geneva Conventions and other treaties aid in defining what is ethical and not ethical in combat. What is new is the coming onslaught of technologies that will bring ethical questions about enhanced soldiers in combat operations.

New ethical challenges are arising from the technological developments in stem cells, genetics, neurosciences, robotics, and information technology. Lawrence Hinman of the Center for Ethics in Science and Technology, University of San Diego, reports that “these developments have created ethical vacuums, situations in which our technology has outstripped our ethical framework.”\(^1\) This statement, although made in 2008, remains true. In fact, current military references to enhanced soldiers are very limited.

**Enhanced Warrior War Story—1993**

Many Somali men, particularly the young men who cruised around Mogadishu on “technicals,” vehicles with .50-caliber machine guns bolted in back, were addicted to *khat*, a mild amphetamine that looks like watercress. Mid-afternoon was the height of the daily cycle. Most started chewing at about noon, and by late afternoon were wired, jumpy, and raring to go.

Patrick Lin states,
Our ability to “upgrade” the bodies of soldiers through drugs, implants, and exoskeletons may be upending the ethical norms of war as we’ve understood them ... . We want our warfighters to be made stronger, more aware, more durable, and more maneuverable in different environments ... . Once ethical and safety issues are resolved, militaries will need to attend to the impact of human enhancements on their operations ... . In changing human biology, we also may be changing the assumptions behind existing laws of war and even human ethics.22

Edmund G. Howe, director of the medical ethics program at the Uniformed Services University, writes in a 2010 book on bio-inspired innovation that new methods in biotechnology, nanoscience, and neurobiology raise ethical questions because of how they can change the human body.23 Howe says that even though innovations support accomplishing missions, consideration of their use must account for ethics. He believes that before new technologies are used in military operations—which should be the priority of use—U.S. forces need to set ethical boundaries.

The Department of Defense discusses soldier enhancement in the 2011 Force Health Protection Concept of Operations (CONOPS).24 This document states that human performance optimization “will improve the ability of the future joint force to complete essential tasks.”25 While not clear on the means, it states that human performance optimization “will extend physical and mental endurance and enhance physiological and psychological resilience to reduce injury and illness.”26

Enhanced Warrior War Story—2003

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, B-2 stealth bomber pilots flew non-stop combat missions from Whiteman AFB (Air Force Base), Missouri, averaging 35.3 hours per sortie. Missions to Afghanistan reached a maximum sortie length of 44 hours. Each crew of two pilots used fatigue countermeasures consisting of preflight zolpidem and in-flight use of napping, caffeine, or dextroamphetamine.

—David N. Kenagy et al., “Dextroamphetamine Use During B-2 Combat Missions,” Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, Volume 75, Number 5, May 2004.
Tactical-Level Ethical Factors with Second- and Third-Order Effects

What are some of the effects that enhanced soldiers may bring to tactical operations? As an example, will enhanced and unenhanced soldiers serve in the same units? Will enhanced soldiers be in their own elite units? How will their employment affect unit cohesion and morale? How will training standards be governed with enhanced and normal soldiers? Could a normal officer lead enhanced enlisted soldiers effectively?

Would enhanced soldiers rush into riskier situations when their normal counterparts would not? As both an investment and potential benefit to the individual warfighters, should enhanced soldiers be treated differently from the unenhanced, such as on length of service and promotion requirements? Would preferential treatment to any particular group lower overall troop morale?

If an enhanced soldier’s behavior goes out of control and violates the laws of war, who is at fault? Who is responsible? Is it the soldier, the combat leader, or the medical team that created him? Do the laws of war need to be modified to account for enhanced soldiers? Will enemy forces be reluctant to take our enhanced soldiers as prisoners? Will enhanced soldiers be targets for capture to reverse engineer biological or neural implants?

In combat, will enhanced soldiers be tasked with more dangerous missions than others? Will they be the permanent point man on patrol? Will normal soldiers shun the enhanced soldiers whose personalities have been modified? For instance, new approaches may prevent soldiers from experiencing combat fatigue. Medication may reduce physiological responses to stress, such as heart palpitations, trembling, and sweating. Such medication could result in soldiers having less than normal fear during combat.

If two soldiers are wounded, one normal and one enhanced, will the enhanced soldier receive priority based on the value of the enhancements and the probability of survival? Will combat medics need additional training to treat enhanced soldiers?

What are the ethics of fighting an enemy enhanced soldier? Will the Geneva Conventions and the other conventions apply? What if an enhanced enemy soldier carries a biological threat in his bloodstream? What type of enemy prisoner of war facilities
will be needed to confine the enemy enhanced prisoner of war? How will friendly forces know their enemies are enhanced? How will medical units treat enemy prisoners of war during their drug withdrawal? Will our medical units sustain ongoing drug treatments for enemy prisoners of war? How will facilities safely deactivate neural implants or bionic or biological weapons in enemy enhanced prisoners of war?

What are the ethics of fighting an enemy enhanced soldier who does not feel pain? Will the only way to stop that soldier in battle be to cause severe trauma or death? Questions such as these concerning the enhanced soldier and combat ethics seem to garner little discussion within current military concepts and doctrine.

**Examples of Technology Innovation Without Ethical Discussion, Sharing, and Planning**

Two recent examples illustrate technological innovations can go wrong when implemented without ethical discussion, sharing, and planning. These two examples are drone strikes and National Security Agency (NSA) privacy violations.

Drone strikes demonstrate the complexity of technology, policy, war, and ethics. Drones provide U.S. forces with persistent presence through long-range strikes at little or no risk to our operators. Our enemies, neutral nations, and allies see a different view. From the international view, the use of U.S. drones shows a disregard for other nations’ sovereignty, airspace, and boundaries. In covering the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, foreign news media depict individuals who speak of the psychological terror from the daily presence of drones overhead.

Foreign news sources share stories of people constantly wondering which patterns of behavior drone controllers find suspicious. People are concerned that drones make decisions about who will live and die, how much civilian death is acceptable, and how a “militant” will be defined.29

The next area is the NSA, which used software programs to intercept Internet use and emails, in the United States and abroad. The NSA has used various technological means to spy on U.S. and foreign citizens, foreign heads of state (including the chancellor of Germany), and foreign companies.30 These software programs involved unauthorized surveillance of Americans or other persons in the United States, contrary to statute and executive order. Additionally, NSA may have targeted allies overseas with these same surveillance programs.

Both drone strikes and NSA spying demonstrate the problem of technology implementation without careful ethical considerations. Both programs have lacked the oversight of integrating technology, law, and ethical decision making. Both cases illustrate the problem of technology implementation without careful discussion, sharing, and planning. Technology can make it easy to kill or to ignore the rule of law.

**Conclusion**

The discussion of ethics for the enhanced soldier is lacking in Army concepts and doctrine. One of the challenges of the advance of science and technologies will be the ability of Army combat ethics to stay ahead of the enhanced soldier. Like any innovation in warfare, the combat ethics of the enhanced soldier must be discussed. Standards must be established and shared. Comprehensive planning must begin for how to incorporate the enhanced soldier into the Army.

Technological advancements are coming that may radically change not only the face of combat but also the ethical world of combat. Let us hope the enhanced soldier will come on the scene guided by our ethics and not by technology alone. Friedrich Nietzsche warns: “He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby become a monster.”31

**David Shunk** is a researcher and writer in the Army Capabilities Integration Center, Future Warfare Division, Fort Eustis, Va. He has an M.A. in military art and science from the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College and an M.S. in national security strategy from the National War College. Shunk is a retired U.S. Air Force colonel, B-52G pilot, and Desert Storm combat veteran whose last military assignment was as the B-2 vice wing commander of the 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo.


4. Patrick Lin.


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.


22. Patrick Lin.


25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.


30. Electronic Frontier Foundation, “NSA Spying on Americans: Timeline of NSA Domestic Spying,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, org, https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying/timeline (accessed 30 October 2014). Although this article is focused on domestic activities of the NSA, the timeline includes international events and reports.

The Russian military’s foray into the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea in late February 2014 set in motion a chain of events that some observers fear threatens to dismantle the post-Cold War order presumed to be based on global integration and the rule of international law. Such observations are overblown and bear close, critical scrutiny. After such an analysis, one may very well conclude that developing events involving Russia and its bordering states are of grave concern to the United States, but not for the reasons one might first expect.
Are Russia’s newly resurrected expansionist tendencies the harbinger of a secret plan for world conquest, or do they signal something else altogether? Why should the United States be concerned at all? The fact is that the United States should be concerned because in the evolving global system, both nations are going to need each other—a lot. Consequently, anything the United States can do to more fully grasp the underlying motivations for Russia’s apparent newfound aggressiveness, and to use such insight to shape policy aimed as assuaging the bitterness Russia currently harbors toward the United States, will be hugely important to U.S. national interests.

For better or worse, the two nations share similar threats to both their long-term security and their national identities. Consequently, the policy priorities of the United States should focus on cultivating Russia as a valued ally instead of continuing with ham-fisted efforts to publicly humiliate it into compliance with American wishes on the world stage over such issues as its relationship with Ukraine. This is only serving at present to convert Russia back into a Cold War-like adversary.

Unquestionably, preservation of Ukraine as an independent, sovereign nation should be a serious objective but one that can be best achieved by a concerted effort to see the issue from a Russian perspective and reasonably accommodate Russian concerns and interests.

**The Return of Russia as a Great Power?**

A good place to start any critical analysis of the Russian viewpoint regarding the events in Ukraine is to consider whether Russia has any legitimate vested interest in that nation. From the Russian perspective, it certainly does. Russian interests stem in large part from historical roots in Ukraine. Ethnic Russians see Ukraine as the ancestral home of the founders of the Russian nation itself—the Kievan Rus. Consequently, Ukraine has been regarded for the better part of a millennium by many ethnic Russians as an integral part of Russian territory.2 (Most ethnic Ukrainians appear to disagree with that premise.)

Irrespective of either view, there is little doubt that owing to Ukraine’s geographical proximity to Russia and undeniable common Slavic ethnic and cultural roots, Ukraine is legitimately within Russia’s cultural as well as strategic sphere of interest. All the more so, Russia’s only warm weather port—at Sevastopol in the Crimea—was located in Ukrainian territory (now annexed to Russia), which made it vulnerable to constant threats of closure during periods of regional or international political tension.

Seen in such context, it is understandable why Putin’s bold gambit to seize Ukrainian territory was so extremely popular among ethnic Russians both in and outside of Russia. It was widely seen among such as a positive step toward reasserting Kremlin authority over what most regarded as fundamentally Russian territory and ethnic-Russian enclaves that at various times in history had been part of the Russian empire. From such a perspective, one can also readily understand why Russian troops entering Ukraine were so warmly received by ethnic Russians living in the Crimea, who saw such an incursion as rescue from ostensible infringements on their civil rights by an increasingly nationalist Ukrainian government that wanted to distance itself from Russia.

Similarly, and not surprisingly, this pan-Russian sentiment was again manifest just two months after initial Russian involvement in the Crimea by an uprising of pro-Russia militias that seized other cities and towns with ethnic Russian populations in eastern Ukraine and took control of the respective local governments. Thus, in backing and then sponsoring ethnic revolt, Russian President Vladimir Putin took advantage of Russian xenophobia already piqued by unpopular efforts of the European Union and United States to fundamentally alter the balance of power in Europe by working to sever Ukraine’s economic ties with Russia and realign them with Western Europe. By fanning the flames of ethnic Russian identity inside Ukraine, he successfully provoked an armed rebellion that he used to justify the annexation of some Ukrainian territories and the virtual annexation of others.

It should be understood that Putin is an opportunist with a larger agenda. He thinks of himself as a pan-Russian leader following in the footsteps of the tsars. This attitude is prevalent in his public discourse. For some time, he has publicly espoused the necessity of restoring Russian greatness and international prestige by reconstituting and extending the Russian
empire over its former territories. For example, in a speech to the Russian Duma (Parliament) in June 2014, he invoked as justification for renewed Russian expansionism the legacy of Vladimir the Great—the prince of Kiev who established Christianity in Russia. Putin then signed a treaty that formalized the Russian annexation of Crimea, the land where Putin’s own ancestor was baptized in the year 988. Another manifestation of Putin’s restive Kremlin has been its increasing proclivity to aggressively challenge U.S. political influence on many fronts globally.

How does this pugnacious, nationalistic attitude play among the Russian people? Reliable polls show a depth of popular Russian support for Putin’s convictions and supporting actions that are nothing if not ominous. In recent months, Putin’s popularity ratings, as measured by Pew Global Attitudes Polling, have soared to 83 percent—a four-year high—after a lingering period of disenchantment with Putin following his presidential electoral victory in 2012.

This stands in stark contrast to perceptions of Putin among Western leaders that are uniformly negative. Putin’s aggression against the nominally independent Ukraine occasioned widespread outrage and condemnation in the West. In a display of protest and disapproval, the Obama administration quickly imposed economic and banking sanctions against Russia. The European Union followed suit and even threatened to cancel the $20 billion South Stream pipeline, intended to export natural gas from Russia to Europe while bypassing Ukraine.

At the time of this article’s publication, none of these measures have had the effect apparently intended by the West on either Putin or the attitudes of the Russian people, mainly because Western Europe needs Russian natural gas. Quite the opposite, disapproval from the West, and the ineffectiveness of measures taken against Russia by the West, to protest
annexation of Ukrainian territory have appeared to actually embolden rather than dampen resurgent Russian defiance.

In the realm of popular culture, Russians have returned as villains. For instance, one of the hottest personalities now in World Wrestling Entertainment is Lana—“the Ravishing Russian”—a female manager who praises Vladimir Putin and taunts audiences with anti-American invective. Likewise, new anti-American popular sentiment has gripped Russia in which the United States is viewed as its main enemy and geopolitical rival. Thus, on the surface, Russia under the tutelage of Putin seems to be on the dangerous course of reasserting a claim to superpower status on the international stage. However, on more detailed examination, the actions of Putin and Russia are actually acts of increasing desperation and are destined to be relatively short lived.

Russia is beset by an enormous array of internal problems that present staggering obstacles to the Kremlin's ability to maintain its new sense of confidence or stature for anything but a limited amount of time measurable in decades, much less reclaim superpower status. Almost all of these challenges are tied to dramatic impending shifts in Russian demographics.

**Russia and the Womb Bomb**

U.S. policy makers should recognize that Russia is at perhaps the most critical juncture in its history in terms of its Slavic identity. Current demographic changes in Russia threaten to change the face of what it means to be Russian, and consequently the dynamics of international relations with that country. Russia's dilemma is almost entirely related to the diminishing number of ethnic, traditionally orthodox-Christian, Russians as opposed to the rising numbers of non-Slavic ethnic groups, many of whom principally identify themselves as ethnic Chinese, Islamic minorities, or both.

With a low birth rate and a comparatively high death rate, Russia's ethnic-Russian population has been shrinking since the early 1990s. At the time of the Soviet Union's collapse, Russia's population stood at an estimated 148.5 million. By 2009, the population had dropped to 141.9 million, a decline of close to 5 percent. This trend is continuing and, according to the Russian government's own projections, the population will drop another 5.5 million by 2025.8 Official Russian forecasts, along with those from international organizations such as the United Nations, project a decline to between 80 and 100 million by 2050.9

Russia has experienced repeated bouts of depopulation in the twentieth century, but that was during an epoch punctuated by wars, revolution, famine, and political upheaval. In contrast, the current depopulation trend differs in key respects. First, it is by far the longest period of depopulation in modern Russian history. Second, this period has been taking place during a period of relative stability and peace, and, therefore, must be attributable to other factors than catastrophe.

Another peculiarity of this period of decline in Russian population is that it is being dramatically shaped by changes to its ethnic composition, which is shifting rapidly from an ethnically Slavic majority to a non-Slavic, Central Asian Islamic majority in the west and a Chinese majority in the east. If current trends hold true, without replenishment of Slavic populations to retain the Slavic character and culture of the Russian nation, there is a very real possibility that the Orthodox Christian-oriented Russia, as it is known today, will disappear by the end of this century. Such a change could lead to radical shifts in international alliances with concomitant changes to the balance of power in Asia and in Europe.

Seeking to counter these trends, the Russian government has offered incentives for ethnic-Russian couples to have babies, but so far, these measures have had only limited success.10

**Impact of Population Shifts on the Relationship Between Russia and China**

One of the key relationships being most affected by demographic change is that which Russia has with its sometime ally China. Since the end of the Cold War, the two countries have made progress in political reconciliation and resolving—at least for now—long standing territorial disputes along their long Far Eastern border. Bilateral trade has increased between Russia and China as well. Additionally, both countries have felt what they mutually appear to regard as the humiliating sting of living under the global hegemony of the United States. Consequently, they have worked
together in attempts to strategically undermine U.S. influence in the Far Eastern region. A good example of this is the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001—a political, economic, and military union that includes Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Be that as it may, there are clear indications that Russia does not count on the era of bilateral cooperation with China to endure, viewing its long-term future relationship with Beijing as one of extreme competition and conflict, not cooperation.

Among the dynamics at the root of the friction is China’s sheer superiority of numbers. China’s population of 1.32 billion people already dwarfs Russia’s approximately 141 million. Barring some unforeseen factor that increases Russian population in the Far East, this imbalance will increase with time.

The difference in population mirrors the development and overall status of the two nations. Over the past two decades, there has been a sharp reversal in the standings of Russia and China as great powers; China has been ascending in power and influence while Russia has been in a general trajectory of decline. Like Russia, however, progress in China has been complicated by a Muslim separatist movement in its Uyghur Province of the Xinjiang Region. While the Russian and Chinese economies were roughly equal in 1993, China’s was more than 3.5 times larger by 2008. Even in the current era of global economic slowdown, the Chinese economy still remains more robust than Russia’s, in no small measure because the population advantage gives it greater potential for economic development.

Moscow’s greatest long-term concern stems from China’s undisguised claim to territory in Siberia that it regards as historically Chinese. This claim is rooted in the historical relationship between Russia and China. As the Russians commenced their eastward expansion into Siberia in the seventeenth century, the Chinese disputed and attempted to check all Russian territorial claims. As a result, bitter territorial confrontations between Russia and China have been numerous and nearly continuous, with only minor interruptions up until very recently.

Subsequent Russian control of its eastern territories has been exercised primarily from key settlements by ethnic Russians. Although situated in an extremely resource-rich area, Russian settlement of Siberia has never been extensive and has been greatly hampered by a bitterly cold and inhospitable climate. As a result, ethnic Russian communities in the area often were maintained only as a result of military basing, forced resettlement, or as penal colonies.

With the broadening of personal liberties following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the number of Russian inhabitants in Siberia has been dwindling. The declining population of ethnic Russians has returned much of Siberia to the status of wilderness. Such a situation has ironically made the Russian-Chinese frontier in the Far East a major flash point. The potential for increased conflict between the two countries results now in no small measure from migrating ethnic Chinese who are moving into the thinly populated Siberian border area adjoining those depopulated Russian territories as departing ethnic Russians leave for less austere living conditions and greater economic opportunity in western Russia.

Currently, the population density on the Chinese side of the Far East border is 62 times greater than that on the Russian side and is increasing. The already significant demographic imbalance between the ethnic groups in the area, short of some unseen significant change in population trends among ethnic Russians, will continue to increase the imbalance in favor of ethnic Chinese into the foreseeable future. Up to five million Chinese now live in Far Eastern Russia, roughly equal to the only six million Russians that remain there whose numbers are steadily declining. Russian observers suspect that this population is poisoning itself, with Chinese government support, to cross the border en masse at some future propitious time when the Russian government may find itself distracted by other strategic concerns and priorities, and physically unable to stem such a migration. Thus, the depopulation of the Slavic population, and the unopposed steady immigration of the Chinese near Siberia, could be setting the stage for Beijing to become the de facto overlord of Russia’s resource-rich Far East in the not too distant future. This inevitably would result in a diminished Russia in the Far East, a circumstance that would make it no longer a counterweight to offset the rising power of China.

Such a development would have far reaching consequences for the United States since America’s long-term security interests as outlined in The National
Military Strategy of the United States of 2011 have a decidedly Pacific-rim focus and rest on the presumption of continued U.S. hegemony in the area.18

**Russia and the Muslim World**

The other key impact of the decline in the population of ethnic Russians is a shift in the traditional cultural orientation and character of the Russian state itself. While the Slavic majority declines in numbers, the Central Asian Muslim minorities continue to grow rapidly.

Russia’s indigenous Muslim population has grown by 40 percent since 1989.19 The native Muslim population also has been bolstered by an influx of three to four million Muslim migrants from former Soviet republics such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, who have entered the country in search of employment.20 Currently, roughly 80 percent of Russia’s Muslims reside in the North Caucasus and Middle Volga regions. However, Russia’s capital city itself—Moscow—also hosts an estimated 2.5 million Muslims, which is more than any other European city except Istanbul, Turkey.21

Additionally, in 2010, the Russian Federal Security Service’s Border Service reported a sharp increase in illegal immigration from the Middle East and Southeast Asia.22 Many of these new immigrants are Muslims from the former Soviet republics of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Illegal immigration into Russia has sparked a backlash. Xenophobic gangs of armed ethnic-Slav vigilantes now routinely assault immigrants. Reportedly, the police often ignore these attacks. In the summer of 2008, the ultranationalist Movement Against Illegal Immigration staged several large marches in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Its members are increasingly being heard by the government.23

Precise figures are elusive, but according to some estimates, the Muslim population could be as high as 27 million, accounting for roughly 15 percent of the population of the Russian Federation.24 Although Russia’s Muslims are currently a minority, they are on a population growth trajectory that could make them the majority by the middle of the century.25

**Character of Cultural Change**

As a group, Muslims in Russia exhibit fewer social maladies than their Slavic countrymen. Divorce rates are much lower for Muslims than for Slavic Russians. In addition, Muslim women have more children on average than Slavic women and are far less likely to have abortions. Muslims also suffer fewer premature deaths and live longer than their Slavic countrymen, despite a generally much lower economic status.26

What is more, Muslims generally appear to be far more observant in the practice of their faith than their Orthodox countrymen. Churches in Moscow are reported to be nearly empty during worship services, while the mosques by comparison are filled.27 In 1990, there were only 500 mosques in Russia. By 2008, this figure had reached 8,000. This has some significant potential socio-political impacts.28

First, generally speaking, widely shared values within growing Islamic communities encourage large families as opposed to the generally secular values that prevail among ethnic Russians that works against child bearing and the formation of large families.29 The anomie of post-Soviet society created a Russian populace that continues to suffer from a severe lack of optimism and confidence in their nation’s future. Faced with such malaise, fewer children are born to ethnic Russian couples, while social maladies such as drug addiction and alcoholism are endemic. As a result, not only are death rates high among ethnic Russians, but birth rates are very low. With a “total fertility rate” of 1.61 live births per woman among ethnic Russians, Russia now ranks 178th in the world in this measure of procreation.30

Population disparities appear tied in some respects to the sad condition of the public health system, which has severely deteriorated in the post-Soviet era due to abysmal medical standards, runaway drug addiction, and an AIDS epidemic. One consequence has been that by 2011, Russia ranked 144th in the world in life expectancy, placing it in the bottom third of all nations and far outside the norm of industrialized countries.31

Observing these demographic trends, the political economist Nicholas Eberstadt noted, Russia today “resembles not an emerging middle-income market economy at peace, but an impoverished sub-Saharan conflict or post-conflict society.”32

Second, a practicing Islamic majority may in time seek to replace prevailing secular law with Islamic law over the objections of other groups that fall into minority status.
Lastly, a majority Islamic Russia, particularly one that has inherited a government legacy of animus toward the United States left by Putin or successors, could become fertile recruitment ground for those appealing for global jihad against the West. A potential radicalization of some significant segment of the Muslim population, coupled with the demographic transformation of the country, could drastically alter Russian culture, society, and politics. As Ilan Berman noted, the rise of radical Islam poses a grave threat to “the very integrity of the Russian state.”

In the very near future, the effects of Islamization could be reflected in the Russian military. Joseph D’Agostino of the Population Research Institute predicts that Muslims could soon comprise up to half of the conscripts in the Russian Army. Although Russians still comprise a clear majority of the population, and military service is compulsory, only about 10 percent of young Russian men actually serve due to college deferments, bribes to evade the draft, and the like. As D’Agostino points out, given the notoriously brutal nature of the Russian Army, avoiding military service is understandable. He asks—

But will the generals be able to avoid having a Muslim military if most men who haven’t fled Russia are Muslim? Will such a military operate effectively given the fury that many domestic Muslims feel toward the Russian military’s tactics in the Muslim region of Chechnya? What if other Muslim regions of Russia—some of which contain huge oil reserves—rebell against Moscow? Will Muslim soldiers fight and kill to keep them part of the Russian motherland?

Additionally, it is not inconceivable that an emboldened and ideologically polarized Muslim majority in Russia might one day seek to absorb the five erstwhile Muslim republics of the Soviet Union—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—and form a Muslim superpower that would surpass all other Muslim nations in population, resources, and military might. Thus, the transition of Russia to a Muslim-majority population could be even more disruptive than the dissolution of the Soviet Union, radically upsetting the balance of power in Europe and Asia. For example, on the Indian subcontinent, an Islamicized Russia might seek common cause with its former adversary, Pakistan, and leave India—America’s ally and counterweight to China—in a much weaker relative position. The Russia of the future could plausibly emerge as a Muslim nuclear superpower with a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

If demographics are really destiny, then the United States must prepare for the contingency of a Muslim-dominated Russia in control of a formidable nuclear arsenal. Such a development, linked to the looming prospect of an increasingly Islamicized Western Europe, would place the United States in an extremely complex security predicament as it would have to deal with “Eurabia” in the West on the one hand, and a Muslim majority Russia in the East. It is not hard to see in such a development a significant potential challenge to U.S. national security in the future.

**Radical Islam in Russia**

With regard to the current challenges Russia itself faces from radical Islam, the Caucasus region remains a political quagmire. Since the conflict with Chechnya commenced in 1994, between 10,000 and 15,000 Russian soldiers have died there, which is comparable to the estimated 13,833 Soviet soldiers that were killed in the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The wars have taken an even more devastating toll on the Chechen people, resulting in significant residual bitterness and hatred for ethnic Russians. What first began as a nationalist struggle for self-determination later morphed into an Islamist jihad with the Caucasus emerging as a critical theater. As a consequence, Chechen politics became both Islamized and internationalized, which laid the groundwork for future conflict.

Additionally, the global jihadist movement has sought to use the Chechen struggle for independence as a vehicle to transform the Caucasus into an Islamist stronghold. If such were achieved, radical Islamists could use the region as a springboard to launch terrorist strikes into Russia, Europe, and the Middle East. With the above in mind, it is ominous to observe that, in recent years, Chechen militants have staged a comeback from earlier Russian successes against them and have carried out a number of deadly terrorist attacks in Russia.
Turning Russia from Ally into Enemy

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks against the United States, the Kremlin initially was seen as a partner in the U.S.-led war against Islamic terrorism in so far as the Russian army had been fighting a protracted campaign against Chechen separatists. The Kremlin even supported the intervention in Afghanistan by allowing the U.S. military to use bases in the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia over which it still exerted a strong influence. Irrespective, the U.S. government never wholeheartedly reciprocated support for the Kremlin’s campaigns to squelch the jihad in the Caucasus. In fact,
in the late 1990s, the Clinton administration not only criticized Kremlin conduct of the war but even provided tacit encouragement to Chechnya’s Muslim allies and private security companies to assist Islamist rebels in Chechnya.\textsuperscript{42}

More recently, the administration of President Barack Obama has shown even less tolerance for Russia’s efforts to stamp out separatist movements inside Russia by defeating restive rebellions within its borders. In January of 2012, he appointed the strident Kremlin critic, Michael McFaul, to serve as the U.S. ambassador in Moscow, where he has subsequently hosted at the embassy a variety of opposition activists including secessionists, some of whom were suspected as being linked to terrorists, according to the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.\textsuperscript{43}

Although such policies may win short-term geo-political gains among some international groups sympathetic to separatist goals, they could have devastating consequences in the future because they stymie efforts to cultivate the kind of good will and support from Russia that the United States will need to deal with its own set of emerging security challenges.

**Russia Courting the Islamic World**

To counter what it apparently perceives as hostility from the West in general, and the United States in particular, Russia appears to be making a strategic effort to ingratiate itself with, and restore some of its Soviet-era influence in, the Islamic world. To that end, Putin has sought to publicly demarcate in the Muslim world his view of what constitute “good” and “bad” Islamic militants; the latter are the Chechen separatists and their allies in the North Caucasus and Tatarstan, while the former include those who challenge the United States and Israel.\textsuperscript{44}

This approach has had significant political success. At the 2003 meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization held in Kuala, Malaysia, amidst anti-Zionist and anti-American tirades, Putin elaborated on that theme while describing Russia in stark contrast to the West as Islam’s “historic defender.”\textsuperscript{45} Russia was later invited to join that organization as an official observer in 2005.

In this same vein, at a speech on 24 June 2009 in Cairo before the Arab League Conference, then-President Dmitry Medvedev emphasized the importance of Islam to Russia, commenting that owing to Russia’s large Muslim population, his Muslims pray outside Moscow’s main mosque during celebrations of Eid al-Adha, 15 October 2013. The feast, celebrated by Muslims worldwide, is called Kurban-Bairam in Russia.
country “does not need to seek friendship with the Muslim world. Our country is an organic part of this [Muslim] world.”

While Putin clearly identifies Russia as a largely Christian nation, he is attempting to establish a dividing line between the shared values of believers in many religious traditions and those of the secular West. Increasingly, he emphasizes Russia’s shared moral values with the Middle East, Asian, and other non-Western societies. As part of this soft power strategy, he seeks to exploit the differences between the social values between the West and the predominantly Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa, for example, on issues such as feminism and gay rights. By doing so, he is seeking to transform Western values into a liability rather than an asset for Western governments, with some significant success.

One apparent consequence of Putin’s outreach initiatives is that in much of the Muslim world, Russia is increasingly seen as a viable counterweight to American influence. Acceptance of this view can be expected to grow as the Muslim population in Russia increases.

Additionally, Putin apparently feels secure enough politically to ignore the pleas of Western governments who have insisted that the Kremlin stop providing assistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran to complete work on its Bushehr nuclear reactor. He has further taunted the West by sponsoring the education of many Iranian nuclear scientists who have received training from Russia. As a result, Putin has successfully used Iran as a lever to lessen U.S. influence and trust among Middle Eastern nations while at the same time exploiting the Sunni-Shia Islamic divide by elevating the status of Shia Iran as a barrier to Sunni radicalism in Russia’s interior.

Be that as it may, like the United States, Russia probably harbors reservations of its own toward Tehran’s quest to acquire a nuclear arsenal. No doubt, some Russian leaders suspect that an emboldened, nuclear-armed Iran might someday try to reclaim the “northern territories” of the former Persian Empire currently circumscribed within the Caucasus and Central Asia at the expense of Russia. Such an eventuality is plausible based on projected demographic changes in the region. According to

**Reconstituting the Russian Empire**

Russian President Vladimir Putin is well aware of the existential threats his nation faces due to changing demographics. In 2006, he described the demographic decline as “the most acute problem in contemporary Russia.” This is a circumstance that Putin—the passionate Russian nationalist—can be expected to try to reverse at almost any cost. And just how would a leader of Putin’s background and character do that? To answer that question, it may be useful to review his background and the some demographic projections, by the year 2050, Russia’s population could shrink to as little as 100 million, while Iran by itself could grow to 90 million. Moreover, by that time, Iran would be in an advantageous position vis-à-vis Russia in terms of oil and natural gas development as well as nuclear technologies.
influences that have reportedly shaped his worldview.

Under the depressing circumstances that Russia faces, it is not hard to see why a strong personality like Putin would have such public appeal in Russia. According to his primary biographer, Masha Gessen, Putin was never a communist ideologue; rather, his faith in communism was always shallow which, long before the fall of the Berlin Wall, he had concluded was no longer plausible. Rather, Putin placed his faith in Soviet institutions of the central government and the historical resilience of the Russian people.52 First and foremost, his loyalty was to the KGB and the Soviet empire it defended. Thus, when collapse came (as stated in his own words), the dissolution of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the twentieth century.

When Putin first came to power in 2000, he exploited the disillusionment and weariness of the Russian population, who had suffered under the economic instability of the Yeltsin years, ruthlessly reconcentrating power in a centralized state government.53 His efforts were abetted by a concomitant surge in global oil prices that created a huge windfall for the energy sector of the Russian economy and helped the government’s fiscal position.54 In fact, the sober, highly disciplined former KGB officer successfully established a great measure of economic stability, elevated Russia’s position in foreign affairs, and extended its international influence on the world stage.

His numerous perceived faults notwithstanding, Putin’s efforts have made him a national icon because he restored in great measure a lively sense of national pride to his countrymen, who had felt betrayed and humiliated by their nation’s rapid decline from being a recognized superpower in the 1990s.55 Despite significant domestic dissent and rumblings in recent years protesting his autocratic style and efforts to undermine the institutions of pluralistic democracy, he appears to be firmly in control of the Russian state with widespread public support.

**Influences on Putin’s Thinking**

Putin may be a faithful reflection of wider Russian attitudes. There appears to be broad cultural agreement among ethnic Russians that their nation either grows or it dies. Putin apparently shares that worldview, which was shaped by a broad range of nationalist politicians and intellectuals, espousing a platform of irredentism promoting expansion. Across the political spectrum, leading political thinkers have publically advocated ways to reconstitute the Russian empire, ideas that have seemingly wide public support.56 As far back as 1995, the late Nobel laureate Alexander Solzhenitsyn called for the reconstitution of the Slavic nations of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, along with Kazakhstan in his book *The Russian Question at the End of the Twentieth Century*.57 On the political left, Anatoly Chubais, the liberal architect of Russia’s pro-Western economic reforms of the 1990s, also voices support for imperial expansion.58
Another strident voice is that of Alexander Dugin, an academic at Moscow State University and former KGB archivist, who is recognized as the chief ideologist of a new Russian empire. Dubbed “Eurasianism,” his worldview is an odd blend of ultranationalism, Russian imperialism, cultural traditionalism, and neopagan mysticism. In his paradigm outlining the new empire envisioned, Dugin describes America in Satanic terms, asserting that it is destined for confrontation with Russia.

Dugin’s views have influenced Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of the Communist Party of the Federation of Russia, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the flamboyant leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, and most importantly, Vladimir Putin. According to some observers, Dugin’s geopolitical vision has become the lodestar for Putin’s foreign policy. For example, seemingly echoing Dugin, Putin decries unipolarity and pushes for a multipolar world system that would decentralize power.

In the face of the existential crisis Russia now faces, many such Russian opinion leaders now confidently predict the inevitable reintegration of the former Soviet republics. The Kremlin has sought to harness this nationalist activism by taking steps to counter the current demographic decline among ethnic Russians in part by seeking justification for reincorporating Russian enclaves found in former territories into Russia. As a result, an increasingly chauvinistic Russian government may now be expected to provoke justifications for waging a series of revanchist campaigns to reclaim lost territories on its borders. Like the Crimea, Belarus and Eastern Ukraine are good candidates for future annexation by Russia. Large numbers of ethnic Russians in both regions appear sympathetic to, and see themselves as part of, the new Russian empire both in political and ethnic terms.

Russia now may see in such actions an opportunity to replenish the Russian ethnic majority. Moreover, from the perspective of Putin, it may be better to strike sooner than later while there is a U.S. administration at divided purposes with Western Europe over an array of political policies in circumstances where long-term demographic, political, and economic trends militate against waiting.

To America’s intellectual elite, aspirations for territorial expansion may seem strangely anachronistic as well as illegal under international law. For Putin, however, as well as many Russians, such expansion may likely be seen as a matter of national survival. Thus, the foray into Crimea and efforts to promote ethnic strife elsewhere can be seen not as indicators of emerging Russian strength but rather acts that mask Russia’s festering decrepitude.

**Limits of Russian Objectives**

Through the lens of history, current fears of Russian imperialism extending beyond states on its frontiers into Western Europe are consequently
overwrought. Only twice in history has Russia been able to drive into the heart of Europe. The first time was at the climax of the Napoleonic Wars in 1814, when the Russian army briefly occupied Paris. The second was at the end of World War II, when the Soviet army reached Berlin. In each case, Western Europe had been severely weakened by wars. Thus, in ordinary times, Western Europe appears quite capable of resisting Russia.

Furthermore, for the foreseeable future, Russia will not be able to project sizable conventional forces far beyond its borders due to present shortages of manpower and the lingering effects of steeply reduced funding levels after the end of the Cold War. According to the Kremlin’s own assessment, the Russian army performed miserably in the war with Georgia. Additionally, at the present time, Russia is surrounded (beyond the former Soviet sphere) by countries and regions that are more dynamic—politically, economically, and demographically—than it is. Simply put, Russia’s conventional forces would be no match for its principal neighbors—neither NATO in the west nor China in the east.

Setting aside suspicions regarding Russian territorial ambitions, the saber rattling between the United States and Russia is extremely counterproductive for both. Although Western leaders may bristle at Putin’s authoritarianism and aggression, it would be folly to resurrect the Cold War with Russia. First, for obvious reasons, it advisable that both countries refrain from rhetoric that could ignite a new arms race or even nuclear confrontation. With a greatly reduced conventional force, Russia’s strategic strength lies in its nuclear warheads left over from the Soviet era. Despite big cuts, these arsenals remain large, and the consequences of their actual use are unthinkable. Moreover, many of the weapons are still on high alert, thus the possibility of an accidental unauthorized launch of a warhead continues.

Irrespective, in a May 2014 interview with the Wall Street Journal, Secretary of State John Kerry stated that the Obama administration was fully aware that a confrontation with Russia over Ukraine could lead to nuclear war. Such rhetoric is, to say the very least, astoundingly inadvertive, running the unnecessary risk of escalation of global annihilation not unlike the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

Ironically, the current situation is in reality a window of opportunity for the United States (and the West in general). Setting aside their serious differences and competitive political instincts, including the unlawful incursion into Ukraine, Russia and the United States need each other. On many vital issues confronting the two nations long term, the interests of the United States, Western Europe, and Russia closely parallel and often overlap.

For example, for the foreseeable future, the U.S. military will be involved in fighting a protracted and open-ended conflict with implacable terrorists and global insurgents—mainly from the world of Islamic extremists—bent on overthrowing the West. This stems in large measure from the chronic instability that bedevils the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia as evidenced by the recent turmoil in Libya and the attempted establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria by well-armed and well-funded radicals. Inasmuch as the United States is in the forefront of combating global jihadism, it is important to maintain a solid front with other nations facing the same threat—especially with Russia.

As it happens, Russia shares with the United States a constant and unabated internal threat from radical Islamic groups with similar avowed aims against the state, mostly from the Caucasus region. Thus, like the United States, Russia is engaged in what is now a long and dangerous open-ended conflict with militant Islam. The interests of both nations will be much better served by the increased efforts to cooperate more closely to combat that mutual threat and deal with it globally. (To share how closely United States and Russian interests coincide in this area, it is useful to note that Chechen and Uzbek jihadists have been found fighting U.S. troops in Afghanistan.)

In another area, the U.S. government is concerned about the stability and security of its primary Middle Eastern ally, Israel, and its other key regional allies, Jordan and Egypt. Similarly, the Kremlin is concerned over the fate of its long-term ally, Syria, and for its own national interests, wants a stable and peaceful Levant.
In yet another parallel interest, the United States and Russia have a mutual interest in stemming nuclear proliferation in the Islamic world. The immediate prospect of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons, especially, would pose a threat to both Russia as well as U.S. allies throughout the region.

Finally, among many other issues of common concern, Russia and the United States share a common potential threat from a rising and increasingly aggressive China, which in terms of sheer population outnumbers the combined population of Russia and the United States together by a factor of three to one.

These examples illustrate that the United States and Russia have a vital interest in jointly cooperating to overcome challenges that threaten common interests. Moreover, the frank truth of the matter is that without Russia's participation and cooperation, as has been demonstrated repeatedly both with the case of Iran and Syria, U.S. attempts to secure its objectives in the regions without Russian cooperation are impossible. Therefore, a rapprochement between the two countries is necessary so that the two can move forward on such important issues of collective concern together to ensure a more stable world, which is fundamental to the true national interests of both.

However, unfortunately, instead of reconciliation, since the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy toward Russia seemingly has been built around a military policy of encirclement and containment as evidenced by NATO expansion.73 As Charles A. Kupchan, a professor of international affairs at Georgetown University pointed out, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States and its NATO allies have constructed a post-Cold War order that effectively shut Russia out.74 Diplomatic isolation of Russia by the United States has only increased the Kremlin's sense of embattlement and given credence to the sentiments of the ultranationalists seeking armed expansion of Russian territory.

Thus, treating Russia as an international pariah has proven to be a terrible policy mistake on a number of levels. Further isolation of Moscow, such as ousting Russia from the Group of Eight (G8) industrialized democracies, would only embolden Putin to forge cooperative relationships with almost every nation or aspiring nationalist group that regards the United States as an enemy, including closer ties with a rogue's gallery of regimes such as Syria, Venezuela, and Iran.75

Instead, to ensure pan-European as well as global stability, efforts must be made to integrate Russia into the Atlantic alliance.76 As the noted defense analyst Thomas P.M. Barnett once noted, renewing the Cold War with Russia would “simply play into the hands of al-Qaida by dividing the Core against itself.”77

**Conclusion: Cultivating Russia as an Ally**

As a matter of realpolitik, the current anti-Russian orientation of the U.S. government is shortsighted. In fact, greater collaboration between the two countries could go a long way in solving some of the most critical security challenges the United States will face this century. With the persistent threat of militant Islam and the growing economic and military power of China, a strong Russia is essential to the long-term national security of the United States and the West.

For example, the U.S. military is overstretched and cannot afford a ruinous competition with the Russian military despite the latter’s diminished status since the end of the Cold War. Also, in an increasingly tight fiscal environment, there are only so many tasks that the U.S. military can undertake. Thus, U.S. foreign policy must be bounded, missions prioritized, and partners such as Russia sought.

For Russia’s part, the United States and the West are crucial for its modernization as well as a hedge against what may develop to Russia’s east and south in the coming decades.78

Thus, it would be in the long-term best interests of both countries to resist a resumption of the Cold War, reconcile differences, make greater effort to understand the respective points of view and interests of each other, and turn their attention to dealing with threats that collectively endanger both of them.
George Michael is an associate professor of criminal justice at Westfield State University in Massachusetts. He received his Ph.D. from George Mason University’s School of Public Policy. Previously, he was an associate professor of nuclear counter-proliferation and deterrence theory at the Air War College in Montgomery, Ala. Michael is the author of seven books, and his articles have been published in numerous academic journals. He has lectured on C-SPAN2’s Book TV segment on five occasions.

Notes

1. Michael Crowley and Simon Shuster, “This is War,” Time, 19 May 2014, 32.
2. Wynne Russell, “Russian Relations with the Near Abroad,” in Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990, ed. Peter Shearman (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 53. Areas of Ukraine formally came under the control of the Tatar of Russian in the late eighteenth century after the partitions of Poland and the conquest of the Crimean Khanate. Since then, Ukraine has been part of a union with Russia until it gained its independence with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. As Wynne Russell explained, some of the erstwhile Soviet republics, Ukraine and Belarus in particular, have been “viewed by many Russians as not merely former family members but in fact as inelivisible from the concept of Russia itself.”
3. Crowley and Shuster, 33.
15. Parker, 22.
27. Paul Goble, “Moscow’s Orthodox Churches Deserted While Streets are Filled with Muslims,” The Interpreter, 30 July 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/moscow-orthodox-churches-deserted-while-streets-are-filled-with-muslims/ (accessed 5 November 2014). Buoyed by the Islamic revival, the Union of Muftis in Russia has pressured Moscow authorities to reverse themselves and allow for the construction of at least one mosque in each of the ten administrative divisions of the city. Mayor Sergei Sobyanin has resisted this plea for fear of the reaction from Muscovites. Despite this rebuff, many Muslims in Moscow are reportedly now joking among themselves about the fate of Orthodox churches in Constantinople (which is now Istanbul) after the Muslims took over the city and made it the capital of the caliphate.
32. Eberstadt, 291.
34. D’Agostino.
35. Bat Ye’or, Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis (Madison, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson Press, 2005). Eurabia is a neologism created by the Israeli writer Gisele Littman under her pen name Bat Ye’or. She warns that if the demographic balance in Europe shifts to a Muslim majority then the continent will move away from its alliances with the United States and Israel.
38. Berman, 43.
40. Berman, 44.
42. Bodansky, 175. U.S. policy toward separatists appears to be intended to weaken Russia’s hold over the region so that western firms could move forward with their plans to construct the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which runs through the Caucasus region. The pipeline would make Europe less dependent on Russian energy products and also provide a huge windfall for western oil companies. The U.S., Russian, and Chinese governments have indeed given serious consideration to Afghanistan as a prospective site for constructing pipelines. The journalist Ahmed Rashid has chronicled this endeavor as the “Great Game II.” As he reported, the Clinton administration sought to assist a U.S. firm, Unocal, in its effort to build an oil pipeline to pump gas from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan. The Pakistani intelligence agency, ISI, urged the United States to support the Taliban insofar as it would make Unocal’s project less cumbersome. However, U.S. domestic politics soon interfered as the plight of Afghan women became a cause célèbre among feminists and prominent liberals in Hollywood. Vice President Al Gore was eager to retain the support of these constituent groups in his upcoming presidential election. Furthermore, the continuing moderation of the government in Iran made that country a more attractive partner in the region. As a result, U.S. policy began to toughen against the Taliban. See also, Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (New Haven, CT: Yale Nota Bene, 2001), 156-177.
45. Ibid.
46. Pipes.
50. Parker, 24-25. This analysis is from Yevgeny Satanovsky, the head of the Near East Institute in Moscow.


53. Lucas, 53; Gessen, 177-197.

54. Crowley and Shuster, 33.

55. United Press International, “Gorbachev Named Least Popular Russia Leader,” 2 February 2012, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2012/02/02/Gorbachev-named-least-popular-Russia-leader/UIP-27121328208913/ (accessed 5 November 2014). In a poll conducted by the Russian state media in early 2012, Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin were identified as the two most unpopular leaders of the past century. By contrast, a respectable 61 percent of those Russian surveyed described Putin’s policies during his two presidential terms as “generally positive.”


58. Berman, 108.


61. Ibid, 96.


63. Ukraine government website, http://ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/ (accessed 7 August, 2014). Ethnic Russians compose roughly 17 percent of the population in Ukraine; Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1996), 164. As Huntington noted, Belarus “is part of Russia in all but name.” Belarussian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka once suggested merging his country with Russia to form a union, though he later moved away from this position in part because of public snubs from Putin; Lukas, 133-134 and 147. Previously, pro-Moscow candidates have won overwhelming victories in regional elections in Crimea.

64. Parker, 14-15. In 2009, Russia’s military budget stood at $61 billion which places it below several other nations including the United States ($663 billion), China ($98.8 billion), Britain ($69.3 billion) and France ($67.3 billion).


66. Graham, 55.


68. Parker, 17.

69. Federation of American Scientists, Status of World Nuclear Forces, http://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/ (accessed 5 November 2014). According to the Federation of American Scientists, as of 2014, the total U.S. nuclear arsenal includes 7,315 warheads of which 1,920 are operational strategic weapons. For Russia, those figures are 8,000 and 1,600 respectively. Despite these large figures, they are a substantial reduction from the peak levels of roughly 32,000 and 45,000 nuclear warheads held by Washington and Moscow, respectively, during the cold war; see also Amy F. Woolf, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 8 April 2014), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41219.pdf (accessed 5 November 2014). Since the end of the Cold War, Washington and Moscow have entered into a number of arms control treaties. The most recent was New START which was ratified in early 2011. According to the provisions of the treaty, both the United States and Russia will reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 1,550 warheads.

70. Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 96-97. In 1995, for example, Russian forces mistook a Norwegian weather rocket for a U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missile which prompted President Boris Yeltsin to open the ‘nuclear suitcase’ for the first time in the nuclear age.


74. Charles A. Kupchan, “Why Russia Should Join the Atlantic Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, (May/June 2010): 100-112. Kupchan went so far as to call for the inclusion of Russia in the NATO alliance. By doing so, it could revitalize the transatlantic link by making Europe the stronger geopolitical partner that the United States urgently seeks, which is important considering how slow the European Union moves on matters of defense. What is more, if Russia were to join, it would enable states such as Georgia and Ukraine to join as well without provoking a crisis with Moscow. The dividing lines and competition between these states would fade away.


78. Parker, 1.
When Lt. Gen. Donald Campbell, then commanding general of U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), finished speaking at the Maritime Museum in Tallinn, Estonia on 22 April 2014, the reaction of those in attendance was one that neither he, nor anyone in the room, would likely forget. The event, a charity dinner for the Carolin Illenzeer Foundation, brought together a mix of elites from Tallinn and the Estonian military to support the children of those killed or seriously injured while in service of the Estonian Defense Forces. Campbell’s presence came at the request of Maj. Gen. Riho Terras, the Estonian Defense Forces commander, and the president of Estonia, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, ahead of a deployment of U.S. paratroopers to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. The operation was not yet announced publicly, so only a few in the room were privy to the ongoing
work to implement the troop movement over the next 48 hours. Before Campbell got up to deliver his remarks, President Ilves pulled him aside and asked that he divulge to the audience the U.S. plans to send troops to Estonia. As he addressed those in attendance, Campbell departed from his scripted remarks to confirm to the crowd that American forces were inbound to their country, to stay and train with their Estonian counterparts for an indefinite period. The audience expressed relief as they stood in applause of the general. Some in the crowd openly wept.

A 173rd Airborne Brigade paratrooper (left) waits with a Canadian paratrooper to board a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter for a parachute jump exercise 22 June 2014 during Operation Atlantic Resolve at Adazi Training Area, Latvia.

Assessing the Information Environment

When Russian forces seized control of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in late February, 2014, it was a reminder to the NATO nations on Russia’s border of the benefits of the military alliance. NATO responded in early March by exercising military options in the air and on the sea. A U.S. deployment of F-16 fighter aircraft and Air Force personnel to Poland for training exercises, stepped-up air policing over the Baltic states, and enhanced maneuvers and joint-exercise participation by a U.S. guided-missile destroyer in the Black Sea were the first pieces put into play on the Western side of the chessboard. For U.S. Air Force Gen. Phillip Breedlove, commander, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and NATO’s supreme allied commander, Europe, the first few moves were relatively simple.

“The tougher piece is, how do we do the assurance piece on the land?” Breedlove told the Associated Press in early April as he was developing his recommendation to employ ground forces in Eastern Europe. “Because these are measures which are more costly (and) if not done correctly, might appear provocative.” The United States would have to proceed cautiously to shore up support for its NATO allies without escalating an exceedingly tense situation.

A few weeks later, roughly 600 U.S. paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade, based in Italy, were en route to Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia as part of what would later be dubbed
Operation Atlantic Resolve. According to Breedlove, a company-sized contingent of airborne infantry in each of the four countries would hardly be an obstacle against the “force of about 40,000” Russian troops massed on the Ukraine border at the time.  

However, that was not the point. Ground forces deployed in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve to achieve a tactical objective and, perhaps more importantly, a communication objective. USAREUR’s coupling of the desired tactical and information end-states of the operation offers a model for applying communication strategy to future operations.

The presence of U.S. boots on the ground was the core tactical condition intended to signal U.S. commitment to NATO’s Article 5 obligations and of itself would have no trouble generating headlines. Lacking proper context though, the move could have resulted in disaster if it was “erroneously perceived as a precursor to violence, a unilateral U.S. effort, or provocative to the Russians,” according to Col. Rumi Nielson-Green, the USAREUR public affairs officer at the time. As the designated Army Service Component Command for Europe, it would be USAREUR’s responsibility to fulfill the troop deployment and Nielson-Green’s public affairs office charged with framing the activity in the appropriate light. The success or failure of Operation Atlantic Resolve would hinge on aggressive, timely communication efforts. Specifically, this meant facilitating media coverage, ensuring transparency to the American public, and combating misinformation.

The emphasis on communication was clear at the highest level of both U.S. and partner governments. In announcing the deployment from the Pentagon briefing room, Department of Defense spokesman Rear Adm. John Kirby spoke not in terms of military maneuver, but of messaging. “I think the message is ... that the United States takes seriously our obligations under Article 5 of the NATO alliance,” Kirby assessed.

Furthermore, the news of the deployment broke deliberately ahead of the official announcement. Poland’s minister of defense, Tomasz Siemoniak, walked into the offices of the Washington Post and revealed part of the U.S. plan following a meeting at the Pentagon with U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel.

Formulating a Communication Strategy

USAREUR public affairs personnel noted the signals from leadership and planned accordingly. “Public affairs is decisive to this operation,” read the primary bullet point in the public affairs portion of Figure 1.
the staff estimate briefed to Lt. Gen. Campbell in the initial planning stages, according to Lt. Col. Craig Childs. Childs, a member of Nielson-Green's staff and a primary contributor to the estimate, recalled, "At first I don't think the staff agreed with the notion that public affairs activities belonged in the commander's intent paragraph" of the operation order. Campbell was on board with the concept, though. "One of the most important things we did was acknowledge early on that there was going to be a heavy public affairs component to it, and get the capabilities we needed on the ground in the Baltics and Poland," said Campbell of his guidance to the staff in the planning stages. The operation order would have to make clear that tactical and communication objectives would go hand-in-hand, ensuring the actions and words of the operation were in synch.

"One of the most important things we did was acknowledge early on that there was going to be a heavy public affairs component to it, and get the capabilities we needed on the ground in the Baltics and Poland," said Campbell of his guidance to the staff in the planning stages. The operation order would have to make clear that tactical and communication objectives would go hand-in-hand, ensuring the actions and words of the operation were in synch.

Just a few years ago, this would have been a novel concept. Dennis Murphy with the U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership thought so when he advocated for a similar compulsory function to be added to the operational planning process. "Having a clearly stated information end state to accompany the traditional military end state," Murphy wrote in a 2009 article for Parameters, would compel commanders to consider their communication strategy in operations. According to Joint Doctrine Note 2-13, Commander's Communication Synchronization, published in 2013, this is now a part of joint planning operations. Yet no such planning mechanism exists in Army doctrine.

As Nielson-Green wrote in a 2011 article for Military Review though, a doctrinal change would only work as a "starting point." Effective communication strategy means that leaders "weigh the effects of their actions against effects on the population or adversary perception and train their troops to think likewise," the 14-year Army public affairs veteran asserted in her analysis. Five years
After Murphy’s article, Operation Atlantic Resolve offered Nielson-Green a chance to showcase her vision for effective communication strategy as the head of USAREUR public affairs. More broadly, it was an opportunity to demonstrate that the principle of pairing military and information end-states in operational planning could work in practice.

As shown in figure 1, when the USAREUR order was published on April 18, the end state of the commander’s intent paragraph included the phrase, “key audiences are informed of U.S. commitment to our allies.” One of the four key tasks listed to reach that end state was “conduct public affairs activities.” Subsequently, the USAREUR command and staff mobilized around maximizing media coverage and enabling public affairs operations to get the message out.

**Implementing a Communication Plan of Action**

Within 48 hours of the order being issued, USAREUR deployed a team of public affairs personnel to Poland before the arrival of the first deploying U.S. forces. The team of six from USAREUR would augment the three public affairs personnel of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Sgt. Maj. Carmen Daugherty, the senior enlisted public affairs soldier for the European Theater at the time, led the USAREUR team.

“We left out on Easter Sunday, packed into a rental car and drove about 1,000 kilometers to Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area in Poland. When we got there to meet up with the 173rd team, we had less than 72 hours until our paratroopers walked off the plane onto Polish soil,” Daugherty recalled. The team would need every minute in between to coordinate with host nation defense officials, U.S. embassy country teams, and international media; facilitate coverage of the impending disembarkation events; arrange senior leader engagements with the media; and ensure timely release of official imagery that would assure the American public of the transparency of Defense Department activities. Moreover, due to the emphasis on public affairs activities in the operation order, the public affairs teams, forward-deployed and at the main command post in Wiesbaden, Germany, helped shape the execution of the plan on the ground.

“Originally, the plan was for our guys to jump in at night. We had to go back to them and tell them, “That’s not going to work. Media can’t cover something they can’t see,”” according to Maj. Mike Weisman, public affairs officer for the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The plan changed from night airborne jumps to daytime aircraft landings and ceremonies, to create conditions that would maximize opportunities for the media to get imagery that reinforced the message: U.S. and host-nation forces standing shoulder to shoulder.

When the plan called for four simultaneous arrival ceremonies in four different countries, to mark the U.S. paratroopers’ arrival in Poland,
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, the public affairs team again raised concerns. “We wanted to maximize the exposure of the events in the news cycle. One big splash would be forgotten a couple days later," said Childs of the decision to stagger the ceremonies. In addition, events in four separate countries posed unique challenges for coordination and would have left the forward USAREUR and 173rd public affairs teams overextended. The plan was thus changed to have four ceremonies over the course of five days. The forward public affairs team split up into teams to ensure proper coverage and coordination of the ceremonies, with each team handling responsibilities in two countries.

As shown in figure 2, Weisman's Facebook update following the first ceremony in Poland offered another glimpse as to how influential public affairs guidance was on the final outcome of the operation. "Got to tell the Polish Air Force today, 'I need that fighter jet moved up like 5 feet…perfect,'" read Weisman's Facebook status just after midnight on 24 April.24

**Evaluating Effectiveness of Communication Efforts**

Consequently, when the 173rd’s Company C, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 503rd Infantry Regiment, streamed out of two C-130 Hercules aircraft at Swidwin Air Base in Poland, the cameras were waiting. Photographers with Polish national daily publications and regional television outlets jockeyed for the best shots with international wire photographers such as Agence France Press, Getty Images, and Reuters, recalled Weisman. “All the Polish television outlets broadcast the event live and CNN picked up the Reuters live-video feed,” added Weisman, allowing the images to reach the U.S. and host-nation audiences in real time.25

The public affairs teams’ efforts to ensure imagery and information were quickly available to tell the story accurately were right on the mark, according to Sean Gallup, chief photographer of Germany News for Getty Images.26 Gallup, whose photos were some of the first publicly available from the ceremony in Poland, later shared his perspective of the U.S.-Poland military event. “I would say the visual impression the event created was that the U.S. had sent a serious military unit but was not pursuing a confrontation,” Gallup wrote in an email.

What Gallup and the rest of the media saw was exactly the message that the Department of Defense, U.S. EUCOM, USAREUR, and the 173rd intended to convey at the outset of the mission. As days of furious planning culminated in paratrooper arrival ceremonies over the last week of April, the images and personal impressions the public affairs operators had visualized became reality on newspaper pages and TV screens worldwide. The story and accompanying imagery made the front pages of *The Wall Street Journal, International New York Times*, and *USA Today* weekend edition.27 An initial report to higher headquarters from Nielson-Green read, “[Ministry of Defense] and Embassy media experts assess that the coverage is positive and message of assurance and U.S. commitment are well received by public.”

Jurga Zelvariene, a media affairs representative with the U.S. Embassy in Vilnius, provided the most vivid illustration of public attitude in her translation of a few powerful lines from a column in one of Lithuania’s largest daily publications, *Lietuvos rytas*. “About the arrival of the U.S. troops,” Zelvariene translated, “we celebrate one small victory today. The trample of American boots on Lithuanian ground is the most beautiful music, as is the rumble of NATO fighter jets flying over Vilnius. This is how our freedom sounds.”28

The results were clear: U.S. Army Europe and its public affairs practitioners had met the goal to ensure “key publics are informed of U.S. commitment to our allies,” as established in the operation order. Bruce Anderson, a civilian member of the USAREUR public affairs staff, compiled the media analysis of the operation.

Anderson noted that reporting early on focused almost exclusively on the theme of assurance, and later included more use of the words “deter” and “reassure.” Some of the coverage characterized U.S. action as “escalatory” or “provocative to Moscow,” Anderson noted in his findings, but “these were mostly drowned out by the dominant narrative of support for the U.S. move.”29

Campbell’s reception at the charity dinner in Tallinn illustrated that the mere arrival of U.S. forces was enough to assure a room full of Estonian spectators of U.S. commitment to allied nations. Moreover, the arrival of military forces, according to Campbell, promoted a similar sentiment among the nations’ militaries. “Having been on the ground, it is reassuring,”
said Campbell, “even at the numbers that we are.” The general could not visit every venue in Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, though, nor could a company of airborne infantry, but media reports could. To achieve the desired sentiment on a national level in four countries, it was incumbent upon USAREUR’s public affairs personnel to work with their host nation counterparts and U.S. State Department country teams to deliver the message to stake-holding populations through the national and international media.

**Institutionalizing Lessons for the Future**

USAREUR’s achievement of both tactical and communication end-states offers lessons for implementing communication strategy in future operations. Nielson-Green, in evaluating the work of her team, pointed to a few key conditions that set the stage for that success:

- **Being part of the staff estimate:** In spite of dissent from some in the staff, identifying the decisive nature of public affairs activities, and alerting the commander to that fact, laid the foundation for mission accomplishment.

- **Thorough planning:** Meticulous planning by the main command post public affairs team allowed the forward-deployed team to execute without hesitation. This included early and regular engagement with U.S. Embassy and U.S. EUCOM personnel to ensure interagency accord and sharing of information and resources.

- **Public affairs should be no different than any other operational capability that the commander has:** The integration of public affairs with the staff allowed for last-minute planning adjustments that avoided costly mistakes.

- **A seat at the table:** It is critical that public affairs leaders demonstrate they can be trusted to accomplish the mission. They, and their people, must train and practice their craft so that when the unexpected happens, they are trusted members of the team.

- **Mission Command:** Trust your noncommissioned officers and civilian public affairs experts. The plan could not have been implemented without allowing members of the team to take initiative and think independently. Waiting on decisions or explicit guidance from leadership would have cost time when every hour was valuable.

Today, Operation Atlantic Resolve continues. The 173rd Airborne Brigade paratroopers have rotated home, replaced by regionally aligned forces from the U.S. who continue to serve and train in the same capacity as their predecessors. Accordingly, communication efforts continue to play an ongoing and vital role as American soldiers train with their host-nation counterparts, the U.S. continues to reinforce the NATO alliance through reassurance efforts, and transparency of U.S. government activities abroad is still owed to the American public.

On 3 September 2014, President Barack Obama stood just five kilometers from the place where Campbell delivered the welcome news to Estonia that American forces would stand by their side. The president addressed U.S. and Estonian soldiers gathered in an aircraft hangar at Tallinn Airport with the prime minister of Estonia, Taavi Rõivas.

“You’re sending a powerful message that NATO, including the United States, will defend Estonia, will defend Latvia, will defend Lithuania, will defend all of our NATO allies,” Obama told the paratroopers.30

The commander-in-chief’s visit and remarks highlighted the central role of the troops, and the message communicated by their presence, in fulfilling one of the nation’s strategic priorities.

The delivery of that message is owed in no small part to the initial and ongoing communication efforts of the Ministries of Defense and U.S. Embassy personnel in Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, U.S. EUCOM, and USAREUR public affairs.

Jesse Granger is a U.S. Department of the Army civilian with the U.S. Army Europe Public Affairs Office. He holds a B.S. from University of Maryland University College. Granger previously served in the Army as a broadcast journalist/public affairs specialist with tours in Iraq, Germany, and Fort Hood, Texas. He was awarded the Maj. Gen. Keith L. Ware award as the Army civilian broadcast journalist of the year in 2010.
Notes

3. Campbell.
4. Ibid.
5. Col. Rumi Nielson-Green, e-mail message to author, 23 April 2014.
10. Dahlburg.
18. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX), Planning Formats and Guidance 31 August 2012. The JFC is required “to include communication goals and objectives in the commander’s intent and to have an approach ensures unity of themes and objectives among key activities. This includes consistency in intent or effect between command operations, actions, information, and a risk assessment of the information or actions that may affect unintended audiences, create unintended consequences, or require risk mitigation measures. This APEX manual also provides a template for completion of Annex Y, ‘Commander’s Communication Strategy,’ to the JFC plan.”
21. Ibid.
26. Sean Gallup, chief photographer, German News, Getty Images, email message to author, 4 September 2014.
After more than 40 years, there is still no comprehensive analysis of the Nixon Administration’s policy of “Vietnamization.” Thankfully, two recent works on the South Vietnamese Army’s 1971 invasion of Laos go some way toward remedying this gap. James H. Willbanks’ *A Raid Too Far: Operation Lam Son 719 and Vietnamization in Laos* and Robert D. Sander’s *Invasion of Laos 1971: Lam Son 719* are both well-researched and engaging pieces; they are welcome additions to the historiography of the wars in Vietnam. Written from different perspectives and motivations—despite their common subject—the books are more complementary than redundant.

Both books provide meticulous tactical and operational details and analysis of the corps-level attack by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) on North Vietnamese military installations inside Laos in early 1971. However, where Willbanks confines himself to providing the strategic setting for the operation itself, Sander provides a much lengthier section on the evolution of the strategic situation confronting the United States in Southeast Asia. His narrative summary of North Vietnamese development of their
infiltration routes into the south is concise, but it clearly conveys the criticality both sides attributed to those routes in the way the war ultimately played out. By doing so, Sander's narrative becomes an operational history of U.S.-led efforts to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail, of which the ARVN invasion was simply the largest single event. Willbanks, by contrast, uses Lam Son 719 as a vehicle to expound on the successes and failures of President Richard Nixon's policy of Vietnamization as a whole.

Coming on the heels of the "Sanctuary Offensive" into Cambodia in 1970, Lam Son 719 (the name honors the birthplace of fifteenth-century Vietnamese national hero Le Loi) was conceived as a spoiling attack to prevent the North Vietnamese from launching a major offensive against the Republic of Vietnam in 1971. U.S. military leaders in Vietnam, including Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, endorsed the operation despite their knowledge of both internal and external obstacles to success.

The internal obstacles included a South Vietnamese military culture that valued compliance with authority over initiative. More importantly, South Vietnamese senior leaders lacked proficiency at comparatively simple tasks like air-ground integration, as well as the complexities of synchronizing the efforts of a multi-brigade joint force. Externally, the greatest handicap facing the ARVN was a prohibition against U.S. forces conducting military operations outside the borders of South Vietnam. Legislated by Congress in the wake of the Cambodian incursion, the law barred U.S. ground forces from accompanying ARVN units into Laos in any capacity, even as advisors. As Willbanks writes, "for the first time ARVN would go into battle without their American advisors," upon whom they were overly reliant for access to and integration of "enablers" such as close air support, medical evacuation, and logistical support.

Willbanks and Sander pull no punches in their sketches of the positions taken in Vietnam, in Washington, and in Paris where Henry Kissinger hoped to secure a cease-fire deal with the North Vietnamese that would allow the U.S. to declare victory and disengage from a politically damaging war. Nixon needed Lam Son to succeed in order to justify the Vietnamization policy he had adopted in 1969. Kissinger needed Lam Son to succeed as a way to pressure the North to reach an agreement. Nguyen Van Theiu, South Vietnam's embattled president, needed the operation to succeed in order to safeguard the continued flow of supplies and military hardware to his country and thus prevent a Communist victory.

Finally, Abrams needed Lam Son to succeed because of his considerable investment in building up the reputation of senior ARVN commanders, including Lt. Gen. Hoang Xiang Lam, the commander of the ARVN I Corps. The number of competing agendas during both planning and execution is illuminating, and helps explain why the ARVN I Corps, after enjoying a brief period of success, ultimately sustained an operational defeat of significant proportions.

Sander's treatment of the debacle at Landing Zone Lolo on 3 March 1971 demonstrates his encyclopedic knowledge of the U.S. units, officers, and men who flew alongside him in support of the ARVN during Lam Son. His dispassionate description of the planning, equipment, and leadership challenges that adversely affected successful execution of this mission makes his analysis of Army shortcomings all the more damning.

Without resorting to invective, Sander uses contemporary sources to show that, even as late as 1971, American planners and commanders exhibited a shockingly low appreciation for the skill of North Vietnam's army. Worse, the decision to entrust the mission to a newly created battalion without prior experience with planning or coordinating rotary-wing aircraft in combat can only be described as criminally negligent. Sander's work, already much more deeply involved in detailing this event than Willbanks' follows up with an excellent discussion of the second-
third-order effects of the loss or damage of 53 aircraft during a single mission.

The best chapters of Raid focus on various ARVN units’ actions during the course of the six-week operation. Although the attack was timed to occur between the two monsoon seasons, poor weather and late winter temperatures conspired with the difficult terrain and a determined enemy to deny a rapid and smooth advance to the attacking forces.

Here for the first time, scholars will find carefully researched arguments written in clear and unemotional prose that conclusively disprove the derogatory generalizations of the ARVN soldier’s supposedly innate lack of character and martial ability. Indeed, Willbanks, a Vietnam veteran who advised an ARVN regiment during the 1972 battle for An Loc, explicitly hopes that Raid will silence critics whose simplistic and reductionist arguments are inspired by media photos of a handful of panic-stricken ARVN soldiers clinging to the skids of American helicopters to escape the North Vietnamese counterattacks.

The conclusions that both Willbanks and Sander reach will not surprise anyone. Both authors make admirable use of documentary evidence, diaries, letters, personal interviews with participants, contemporary media, and a host of secondary material to identify the numerous problems that beset such an ambitious plan. Nixon, National Security Advisor Kissinger, Gen. Alexander Haig, President Thieu, and Abrams share in the responsibility for the operation’s failure. Readers will perhaps be surprised that both Sander and Willbanks treat Army Chief of Staff Gen. William Westmoreland with some sympathy.

Westmoreland was in the minority in opposing Lam Son 719 from the beginning. He based his opposition on his own assessment, conducted when he was the commander in Vietnam, that such an operation would require a minimum of four U.S. infantry divisions to guarantee success. Finally, neither author believes that Lt. Gen. Hoang Xanh Lam, commander of the ARVN I Corps and overall commander of the operation, possessed the professional education and experience, or the intellectual capacity, for such responsibilities. Both men correctly identify that, by 1971, Thieu was more concerned with personal loyalty than competence in his senior military officers.

Both Raid and Invasion are good history of a kind all too infrequently encountered today—exhaustively researched, dispassionately written, and highly readable. Anyone already familiar with Willbanks’ previous writing will find this latest contribution sustains a tradition of excellence established long ago. Should Invasion prove to be Sander’s only contribution to the body of work on the Vietnam War, he will nevertheless have done the historical profession and the Army a profoundly important service. Anyone with an interest in the Vietnam War will value both studies, as will strategists and policy planners looking to identify pitfalls to the execution of future large-scale operations by a U.S.-trained host-nation force. For the professional military officer who seeks to learn the antecedents of today’s emphases on security force assistance and regionally aligned forces, Raid and Invasion are essential texts. Finally, thinking Americans of all political leanings would benefit greatly from reading both books in order to better understand the linkage between domestic politics and American foreign policy.
AMERICAN GENERAL: The Life and Times of William Tecumseh Sherman

The late John S.D. Eisenhower’s conclusive biographic work centers on the life and times of arguably the first “modern general,” Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman. Completed shortly before his December 2013 death, Eisenhower presents Sherman’s life from his humble Ohio orphan beginnings, to his post–antebellum career as Army general-in-chief, and eventually to his days as a private citizen.

We learn how young “Cump” was raised by family and family friends after the untimely death of his father. We see a young Sherman enter into the United States Military Academy at West Point and earn high marks and an acceptable standing in class, only to be seen as “no soldier” by his peers and superiors. At West Point and during follow-on assignments throughout the southern United States, we see Sherman’s early interactions with men who would later play pivotal parts in his Civil War career to include future Union Generals Halleck, Thomas, Rosecrans, and most importantly, Grant.

Eisenhower, as he has done in previous works, lets the subjects speak for themselves. Through the author’s exhaustive research we read of Sherman’s courtship of the future Ellen Sherman, and we get a sense of his thoughts and feelings on events of his day such as the California gold rush, the legislative Compromise of 1850, and ultimately, the key events leading up to the tragic Civil War. Eisenhower takes time to present Sherman not as the “beast” with an appetite for war that Southerners of his generation and their descendants would long remember, but as a man who hoped that war could be avoided. The author then paints an effusive picture of Sherman as the nation goes to war and the general matures over the course of various battles, including Shiloh, Vicksburg, Chattanooga, Atlanta, and the notorious “march to the sea.”

Between the narratives of the many battles Sherman participated in, we discern the intimacy Grant and Sherman share as they stand by one another through periods of both national adulation and tribulation. Eisenhower does not just collect and rehash various battles, but takes great care to show the evolution and formulation of strategy through the participatory eyes of Sherman, and how that view was both right and wrong at times.

The only critique of the storied author I offer is his light treatment of Sherman’s post-bellum tenure as general-in-chief, a period Eisenhower states “was not significant.” I disagree that this time, 1869–1883, was insignificant, especially in the West where the Army fought a new form of warfare against a worthy adversary—the Native American. This book is worthwhile for those in the security community wanting to learn more about the development of “the modern general” and those with a general interest in the Civil War.


PROCEED TO PESHAWAR: The Story of a U.S. Navy Intelligence Mission on the Afghan Border, 1943
George J. Hill, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2013, 288 pages

Lt. Albert Zimmermann, U.S. Navy Reserve, was a young naval intelligence officer in 1943. By chance, he became a central figure in a moderately exotic, though not particularly consequential,
one-month mission to report on conditions along the border between Afghanistan and that part of British India that would become the state of Pakistan. Traveling by jeep with two other officers, one British and one American, Zimmermann observed life and conditions in one of the world’s most remote and, for Americans at the time, least known regions. That the mission is the subject of a book owes much to two factors: first, the notes Zimmermann thoughtfully compiled during his trek, and second, that they inspired his son-in-law, George Hill, to assemble a complete account.

Beyond its easy readability, the book is interesting in several ways. The story unfolds a bit like a travelogue, interspersed with allusions to context and background profiles of various individuals who figured in the expedition. Hill allows Zimmermann’s impressions to carry the story as he guides the reader through the protagonist’s career path leading to his journey across an alien region. The result may not be entirely satisfying as history but captures rather well the sense of discovery that attended the mission.

Intellectually armed with little more than an extensive knowledge of Rudyard Kipling’s novels and a ten-week intelligence training course, Zimmermann was selected for assignment as a naval liaison officer to Karachi. This posting was only slightly relevant to the war effort, but intriguing to a young man nurtured on stories about the “Great Game” (the competition between the British and Russian Empires for control of Central Asia to include Afghanistan). Discreet references in Zimmermann’s notes suggest that while many of his encounters in Karachi were purely social, some were professional.

The work’s principal drawbacks are the slim development of strategic context, notwithstanding some interesting nuggets provided here and there, and the tendency to recount every incidental meeting with any individual who had anything whatsoever to do with the mission. Indeed, hardly any detail of the trip, whether concerning train schedules, maps, bedbugs, or officers’ spouses, passes without comment.

Although these distracting tidbits may occasionally enhance the “slice of life” dimension of the book, they do not advance the historical narrative. Yet, the tone remains true to Zimmermann’s own recollections. As the author notes, “Reading AZ’s letters, it was hard to believe there was a war going on.”

In the end, the book’s title is slightly misleading. The reader will learn as much about etiquette and society among the British diplomatic and social circles in India, or even the naval intelligence training program at Dartmouth College, as about events in Afghanistan or Peshawar. Still, despite its occasional aimlessness, Hill’s book adds to the literature on the unheralded exploits of those serving in peripheral regions during the war.

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY: How Franklin D. Roosevelt and Five Extraordinary Men Took America into the War and into the World

Michael Fullilove, Penguin Press, New York, 2013, 480 pages

Recent years have seen a number of books reexamining President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s role in America’s entry into World War II. Michael Fullilove’s Rendezvous with Destiny is a well-researched addition to that literature. Fullilove states that the period from 1939 to 1941, rather than the beginning of the Cold War, was the turning point of the twentieth century which brought the United States out of isolation and into the world. This emergence was helped, Fullilove argues, by Roosevelt sending five personal envoys to Europe before the United States entered World War II.

Roosevelt distrusted his State Department and preferred to rely on personal representatives in dealing with world leaders. The first of these envoys was the frigid undersecretary of state Summer Welles, who toured the warring capitals, including Berlin and Rome,
on a fact finding mission. After the fall of France, Roosevelt dispatched Bill Donovan, future head of the OSS during World War II, to investigate Britain’s military situation. Donovan reported that Britain could survive, but needed U.S. aid. The president responded with Lend-Lease legislation, while at the same time attempting to rearm the United States and prepare a reluctant public for war. Along with Lend-Lease, he also sent his adviser Harry Hopkins to Britain and later, after Germany invaded Russia, to the Soviet Union. Not only was Hopkins vital in getting Lend-Lease aid extended to the Soviets, but also in forging the friendship between Winston Churchill and Roosevelt. The final two envoys were Wendell Willkie, Roosevelt’s former Republican opponent in the 1940 election and Averell Harriman, who oversaw Lend-Lease shipments to Britain, while at the same time having an affair with Churchill’s daughter-in-law.

“FDR was a seductive figure,” Fullilove writes about Roosevelt, and the author is not immune to his charms. “Roosevelt was the most important statesman of the twentieth century,” the author states. “He saved American democracy from the Depression, [and] led the Allies to victory over fascism.” Yet the book never really examines the moral dimension of a U.S. president attempting to involve his country in a war the majority of the population opposed. Months before the United States entered the war, Roosevelt secretly informed Churchill that he would “wage war, but not declare it,” and the United States quickly became more belligerent toward Germany.

On hearing the news that Pearl Harbor had been bombed, Harriman and U.S. Ambassador John G. Winant, according to Churchill, “nearly danced for joy.” America’s entry into the Second World War was undoubtedly a good thing; however, if Roosevelt’s name was replaced with another president, perhaps William McKinley, it is unimaginable that he would have received such positive accolades.

Nevertheless, Rendezvous with Destiny is well researched, informative, and those interested in foreign affairs will find it a joy to read. One cannot help missing however, the irony of Roosevelt’s attempts to enter the war in Europe instead of Asia from whence the war finally came. If anything, this is a reminder of the fickleness of international fate.

Alexander Lovelace, Pasadena, Md.

QATAR: Small State, Big Politics

In Qatar: Small State, Big Politics, Mehran Kamrava, a noted author and director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar, delivers a persuasive and well-written monograph every U.S. military officer who is interested in Middle Eastern politics should read. From the outset, Kamrava declares Qatar a shrewd and influential country that is uniquely positioned—financially, regionally, and security-wise—to rub elbows with larger, dominant countries (like the United States) and strange bedfellows (like the Taliban and Iran), all the while shaping regional and global politics.

Qatar’s ability to execute this diplomatic strategy spurs conventional wisdom and traditional international relations theory. Kamrava asserts it is Qatar’s “subtle power” and “hedging strategy,” where you simultaneously work with divergent parties (such as Hamas, Iran, Israel, and the United States), that have allowed it to gain a seat at the big-boy table. Conversely, this assertion may rankle the likes of hard- and soft-power acolytes.

To make the case, the book is structured around three interrelated arguments dispersed over six chapters. First, Kamrava identifies the waning influence of the traditional powers of the Middle East (i.e., Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Iran), which is no doubt obvious. Next, he discusses the changing nature of power in the international arena. This too is evident, especially with those waning powers mired in internal conflicts and civil wars.

Finally, he looks at Qatar’s developmental capacity in the form of its government (a monarchy), a largely obedient population of indigenous Qatari and immigrants, and its contrived nationalism and cultural identity which, ironically, is largely influenced by Western standards. Kamrava insists that these factors contribute to the success Qatar is experiencing today. Based on the government’s approval rating among the people, its profitable global
investments, and the absence of any internal conflicts, Qatar’s success will probably continue for the foreseeable future.

Just over 200 pages, the book moves quickly through each of the arguments. Along the way, Kamrava delves deeply into supporting topics such as the nation’s history; its political scene; internal Shia and Sunni relations; everyone’s favorite media whipping boy, the Arabic-language media network Al-Jazeera; Qatar’s role as a regional mediator; and the country’s larger diplomatic efforts. Noticeably absent, however, is the outright declaration that the major player in the region is the U.S., bar none, and Qatar’s rise is largely hinged on U.S. acquiescence. Let us be honest for a moment: Qatar enjoys its global stature because the U.S. allows it, oil and natural gas reserves notwithstanding.

By and large, Qatar provides an in-depth look at this small nation’s politics, power, and regional and global influence. Readers glean a thorough understanding of what makes Qatar operate. As an elite member on the international scene, Qatar’s influence has been widely recognized among the global powerbrokers, but not so much by the general public. After reading it, you gain a better understanding of why it is hosting the 2022 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup, why they accepted the Taliban Five, and why major U.S. universities are flocking to the country. Considering what is going on in the Middle East today, military practitioners of all stripes should read this book over a weekend.


---

**CONFLICT AND COMMAND: Civil War History Readers, Volume 1**

Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio, 2012, 336 pages

As a collection of Civil War History articles, this text is on time and on target. Owing a great deal to the generations that came before, this compilation of articles from the *Journal of Civil War History* provides the reader a true primary research source for accounts by those close to the actors in the drama that was the Civil War. Avid historians provide much of the material and introduce concepts based on selected themes that both orient the reader and offer additional means to decipher the challenges of, and rationales for, actions taken during the course of the war and its immediate aftermath.

This is a compelling collection and the ideal approach to truly embracing the lessons of the most significant period of the nineteenth century in America. The current edition (Volume I) leaves the reviewer in great admiration of the different authors, and the quality of the individual pieces illuminates current understanding of the Civil War. Considering that we are in the midst of the 150th year anniversary of some of the most bloody and savage fighting of the war (1864), the volume provides a timely and outstanding list of contributors.

One of the most compelling apparent misconceptions unraveled through the reprinting of original publication material pertains to Maj. Gen. George McClellan. It has become virtually axiomatic among Civil War historians that McClellan suffered from the “slows,” a penchant for indecisiveness and inactivity during many vital actions of the war. A conventional accusation leveled against him to explain the alleged slowness is an overactive imagination that greatly expanded his perception of opposing enemy strength, which in turn led to continuous requests for reinforcements together with reluctance to act until such reinforcements were received. However, the material presented in this volume proposes an alternate explanation: he believed and was following the advice provided to him by the intelligence service supporting him that was supposed to be reliable.

The additional insight from this compilation contends that perhaps the famous intelligence collecting service, the Pinkerton Agency, was more of an Achilles’ heel than his reputed overactive imagination, and therefore implicit in events for which he is now almost universally skewered. In fact, his estimates of enemy strength appear to have been in line with information provided to him by that agency, something that has surprisingly not been discussed in any literature I have reviewed previously. Consequently, in this one particular reprint, all the previous theories on McClellan’s incentives are potentially turned on their heads.
This is but one example of the relevance of renewed consideration of material that applies to our current understanding of the events and leaders during that period. The compilation of these previous articles provides significant counter point to prevailing given wisdom that may change many philosophies and ideological positions on the war concerning how it was fought by the Union. This collection is truly worth a read.


COLUMNS OF VENGEANCE: Soldiers, Sioux and the Punitive Expeditions, 1863-1864
Paul N. Beck, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma, 2013, 328 pages

Conventional wisdom holds the Plains Indian Wars and the United States Civil War were two separate, unrelated events. Historian Paul Beck’s latest book, Columns of Vengeance, challenges this commonly held view. In his analysis, the Dakota War of 1862 and the U.S. expeditions of 1863-64 against the Plains Indians were not isolated campaigns, but part and parcel of the larger Civil War. Throughout the book, Beck routinely demonstrates the links between the two theaters and the impact of the Plains War upon both Grant’s and Sherman’s attacks into the Confederate south.

Beck opens with an extensive examination of the Sioux and Dakota peoples, cultures, intertribal relations, and desire for territorial expansion based upon population growth and competition for natural resources. Further, he explains the tribes’ growing concern over white settlements on Indian land and failed attempts to broker treaties with the U.S. government. Indian frustration with unwanted encroachment, forced removal to reservations, and broken promises created a schism with some tribes openly advocating for violence while others opting for peace. Ultimately, this frustration led to attacks against individual homesteaders and settlements. Indian raids forced the abandonment of entire towns, potentially threatening the Union’s war effort as Washington relied upon the Great Plains to provide critically needed manpower and material. In response, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton created the military Department of the Northwest and ordered Maj. Gen. John Pope to take command of the offensive. Pope would spend the next three years pacifying the tribes through a campaign of revenge that still generates controversy today.

Undoubtedly, Columns greatest strength is Beck’s extensive use of private letters, diaries, and personal accounts—to include those from the Indian perspective—to reveal a more complete understanding of the war. These individual accounts ensure Columns is more than just a dry retelling of the battles as much of the prose describes the soldiers’ view of the operation. The men, mostly volunteers fresh from civilian life, wrote prolifically, and their words will sound eerily familiar to Iraq and Afghan veterans.

They vividly describe vague political objectives, campaigning on the open plains, the difficulty of identifying the enemy hidden within an unfamiliar civilian population, and their longing for home. Similarly, Pope and his senior commanders frequently fought Washington for resources required on the Plains that were too often diverted to the Eastern and Southern campaigns of the Civil War.

The book suffers from two problems distracting from its narrative. First, Beck includes just two very simple “pen and ink” maps and a paltry six photographs to illustrate the story. Readers unfamiliar with the details of the campaign will have difficulty visualizing its conduct. More critically, Beck’s writing in the latter half of the book appears heavily biased against the U.S. Army, leaving the reader to question the impartiality of his analysis. While this imbalance distracts from Columns overall value, Beck does reveal an often overlooked dimension of an important era of American history.


BEYOND WAR: Reimagining American Influence in a New Middle East
David Rohde, Viking, New York, 2013, 213 pages

In Beyond War, Pulitzer Prize winning journalist David Rohde critiques American nonmilitary strategies during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and in countries affected by the Arab Spring, positing solutions for future American engagement in the Middle East. The author begins by highlighting American strategic failures in Iraq and Afghanistan that indicate a lack of long-term thinking and inadequate support to nonmilitary efforts. A thread Rohde begins in his discussion of Iraq and Afghanistan and picks up with relish when continuing on to discuss American policy in Pakistan, Turkey, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt is an American tendency to give aid and fund projects receiving countries did not request and cannot sustain.

One dismaying consequence of this is the United States often spends vast amounts of money and yet is viewed negatively by local recipients. The author details problems inherent in Washington that prevent successful foreign aid policy, including a culture of risk aversion and non-collaboration, which leads to fractious policy and serious understaffing.

Based on abundant examples, Rohde posits American aid should fit into the receiving country’s plan and vision, and should depend on two policy requirements. First, the United States must listen to that country’s concerns and desires. Second, it should provide generous, tailored, appealing incentives to address those issues, along the lines of the European Union’s accession program, rather than mandated spending, spending attached to a timeline, or aid with conditions attached. The author also calls for the United States to gear foreign aid towards harnessing American strengths like business, investment, and technology. He calls for the U.S. government to foster trade and educational exchanges, and to create a permissive environment for American businesses to interact in partner countries.

As the title Beyond War suggests, Rohde believes the United States needs to shift from military solutions towards equal investments in civilian institutions promoting diplomacy, development, and trade. He calls for a broad, long-term vision of American influence that is slow and deliberate; one that uses foreign aid efficiently to foster strong relationships and self-sustaining solutions to problems that matter to Middle Eastern countries.

The book does have flaws, notably a tendency towards lionizing or demonizing both individuals and groups. For example, the author offers bountiful praise of Richard Holbrooke and no substantive criticism. Conversely, Rohde generally maligns contractors as a group, using anecdotes like those relating to Raymond Davis [a private security firm employee and former United States Army soldier who killed two reportedly armed men in Lahore, Pakistan] to paint them as hotheads. However, these flaws do not detract from the importance of the author’s points or his conclusion. Ultimately, this book’s value lies in pushing the reader to consider a question vital to American interests: how can the United States shape a stable, successful Middle East?

Capt. Justine M. Meberg, U.S. Army, El Paso, Texas

---

VIETNAM LABYRINTH: Allies, Enemies, & Why the U.S. Lost the War
Tran Ngoc Chau with Ken Fermoyle, Texas Tech University Press, Lubbock, Texas, 2012, 480 pages

For decades, the scholarship of the Vietnam War was almost entirely from an American view. Recent years have provided other perspectives from those who fought and lived through the Vietnam War. These other points of view have been invaluable in aiding in our understanding of a war which has been challenging to comprehend in many aspects. One recently published volume which unquestionably offers a unique perspective is Tran Ngoc Chau’s superb volume, Vietnam Labyrinth.

What makes Chau’s book so distinctive is the author’s incredible life story. The twists and turns in his life and the life changes he made are unlike any you will read. Chau spent much of his childhood studying to be a monk. In 1945, he left school and joined Ho Chi Minh’s forces to expel French forces from Vietnam.

After five years, he became disillusioned with his life and the life changes he made are unlike any you will read. Chau spent much of his childhood studying to be a monk. In 1945, he left school and joined Ho Chi Minh’s forces to expel French forces from Vietnam.

After five years, he became disillusioned with their motives and changed sides to serve in positions with the South Vietnam government. Chau held many key positions in the government, but in 1970 was jailed on charges of collaborating with the North. Following his four year confinement and the Communist takeover, he was sent to reeducation
camps. Finally, in 1979 he was able to escape with his family to the United States. It is a powerful account which Chau (with ample support from his co-author Ken Fermoyle) superbly articulates.

*Vietnam Labyrinth* is not entirely focused on Chau’s extraordinary life. Chau also interweaves discussions of two other subject areas into the volume. First, he provides a superb historical narrative of Vietnam from 1945-1978. Because of his perspective and the positions he served, he is able to address events normally not discussed in other volumes tied to the history of Vietnam after World War II. The discussion prior to U.S. involvement is immensely beneficial. Clearly, to better understand the U.S. role and experience in Vietnam War one must possess this kind of a foundation; *Vietnam Labyrinth* conclusively provides such a foundation for readers.

Second, and somewhat overshadowed by the other portions of the volume, is Chau’s analysis and opinions of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. The author is blunt in his assessment of U.S. policy and decisions made concerning Vietnam. He concludes that U.S. ignorance of Vietnam’s history and culture was instrumental in the final outcome of the Vietnam War. It is counsel he hopes America will heed in the future.

The account of how *Vietnam Labyrinth* came to print is a story in itself. Chau and Fermoyle met in the mid-1980s and in 1987 started a business venture together. A year later, they began collaboration on a book focused on Chau’s life. As they expected, it was an extremely laborious process that included taping hours upon hours of Chau’s recollections and translating hundreds upon hundreds of written notes and pages from Vietnamese to English. Some 25 years later, the results of their painstaking work are found in the pages of *Vietnam Labyrinth*.

To label *Vietnam Labyrinth* as simply another book on the Vietnam War is clearly an injustice. It is far more than that. Certainly, it is a significant volume in aiding in our understanding of the Vietnam War and the history of Vietnam from 1945 to 1978. Moreover, I believe its ability to detail the incredible life of a man who loved his country is gripping. These in combination make *Vietnam Labyrinth* a must for readers of varying interests.

**Rick Baillergeon, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

---

**LAST STAND AT KHE SANH: The U.S. Marines’ Finest Hour in Vietnam**

Gregg Jones, Da Capo Press, Boston, Mass., 400 pages

In late 1967, the 26th Marine Regiment moved into a remote area of Vietnam near the village of Khe Sanh to disrupt traffic along the Ho Chi Minh trail. The North Vietnamese quickly countered this move and in a few weeks had managed to surround the 6,000 Marines with nearly 40,000 soldiers. What followed from January to April 1968 were 77 days of both horrific and heroic fighting that Gregg Jones captures in his book *Last Stand at Khe Sanh*.

As the title implies, part of purpose for this work is to determine what happened at Khe Sanh, but the author is clearly more focused on understanding what was it like for those Americans who fought there and how it impacted their lives. In particularly, he wanted to see the battle through the eyes of those young Americans who fought at Khe Sanh. The reader will quickly discover that it is in the achievement of the latter goal that this book excels. Jones has done an incredible job gathering the firsthand accounts from those who served and weaving them into a seamless narrative that flows across both time and space.

The author vividly re-creates for the reader the incredible amount of stress these young Marines dealt with on a daily basis. Their personal narratives recount the constant threat of death from incoming artillery fire and nightly enemy probes of their positions, with everything compounded by long night watches and the ever-present shortage of food and water. However, despite being “hollow-eyed and exhausted,” they continued to show amazing levels of dedication and discipline. In modern Army terms, they displayed the essence and importance of mission command at all
levels. In the absence of orders and communications, and even with the death of key leaders, young leaders at the squad and team level continued to function and display initiative and bravery in accomplishing their mission and taking care of their Marines.

In addition to capturing the stress, chaos, and confusion of siege warfare, this work also relays extraordinary acts of individual bravery. Examples include the story of Army Special Forces 1st Class Eugene Ashley Jr., who saved a Special Forces detachment from certain annihilation. He would be the only recipient of the Medal of Honor (posthumously) for actions at Khe Sanh. Almost as heroic were the efforts of the pilots and air crews who supported Khe Sanh. Fighting limited visibility and constant artillery and small-arms fires, these aviators regularly risked their lives to evacuate the wounded, and bring in follow-on troops and supplies.

As stated above, one of the intents for this work was to examine how the battle at Khe Sanh affected the lives of those Marines who fought there. The author uses the epilogue of this work to accomplish this final task. As can be imagined, some of the terrible mental and physical wounds of such a battle healed slowly, if at all. The reader will discover that some of these stories ended in triumph while others ended in unfortunate tragedy. However, what is reinforced in the epilogue and makes this book worth reading is that it shows the incredible valor and sacrifice the Marines at Khe Sanh made for their mission and each other.


**VANISHED: The Sixty-Year Search for the Missing Men of World War II**
Wil S. Hylton, Riverhead Books, New York, 2013, 288 pages

Wil Hylton’s *Vanished* is a mystery story replete with many classic mystery elements including a troubled and eccentric, yet brilliant, sleuth as the lead protagonist. There are innocent victims, illusory clues that lead to dead ends, and other clues that may only be understood long after they are first discovered. There is even pirates’ gold, or at least “Yamashati’s Gold,” involved. The antagonists are the most difficult of all for they are time, the elements, and human intervention.

In short, *Vanished* has all the components of any spellbinding piece of fiction. Hylton’s narrative moves at speed without regard to chronology, focusing instead on bringing together past and present. However, *Vanished* is much more; it is a compelling human story of courage, fear, loss, hope, persistence, and dedication spanning some 60 years. It is also a tribute to the human spirit of those who were lost and those who sought them.

So who were the victims? They were young airmen who died on bombing missions mounted in the late summer of 1944 that aimed to “soften” up the Japanese defenders of the Palau Islands including Peleliu. The campaign in the Palau Islands lasted some 18 months. All told, B-24 Liberator bombers dumped more than a million pounds of bombs on the islands. However, the Marines who fought at Peleliu could attest that the effort fell short. *Vanished* is about three B-24s and their crews that were shot down during three of the many missions carried out by Liberators assigned to the “Long Rangers,” more formally known as the 307th Bombardment Group. The three Liberators went down in and around the waters and the Islands of Koror and Babeldao. To be specific, some pieces wound up in the sea and others landed on the shore.

*Vanished* is fascinating account of one man’s conviction that these men deserved better than “missing in action” status more than 50 years after they were last seen. This conviction that they had to be found and brought home led ultimately to the families of one crew in particular learning the fate of their young men.

Pat Scannon is in some ways an unlikely sleuth of affaires militaire. A successful medical researcher with a Ph.D. in chemistry to hang alongside his medical degree, Scannon founded the company for which he worked. Although the son of a soldier, the Army (or any other service for that matter) never appealed to Scannon, whose life as an Army brat left him cold toward what he perceived soldiers were all about. Nevertheless, Scannon more or less stumbled onto the mystery that captivated him for the better part of 20 years. He began by initially becoming interested in a project conceived by a coworker to find Japanese gold alleged to have been buried in the Palau Island Group.
As a first step, Scannon’s associate proposed they locate and dive on the wreck of Japanese ship supposedly sunk by a young U.S. Navy pilot named George H. W. Bush.

The plan was they would produce a documentary film to raise money to search for the gold, an odyssey that began in 1993 and finally concluded in 2010 with burial of the remains of five airmen that called themselves the “Big Stoop” crew. On that first trip Scannon, who was not an experienced diver, was of little use to the “documentary crew.” However, when his wife joined him, he made the discovery that changed his life and that of a great many others.

On a tour of World War II wrecks, a guide showed him the wing of an aircraft shot down in the shoal waters of the archipelago. Scannon would later identify that wing as belonging to a Liberator flown by William Dixon and nine other airmen that was shot down two weeks before the Marines landed in Peleliu. Identifying the Dixon crash site was fairly easy; for Scannon it was also an epiphany. He went on to find clues to the fate of two other aircraft that he then felt compelled to follow up on. Subsequently, he found and identified a second wreck flown by a crew led by Glenn Custer that was shot down 8 months after the Marine Corps landing. Still later, the most compelling discovery came from finding a Liberator tail bearing the number 453, which had flown with the “Big Stoop” crew on 1 September 1944 and then vanished. The least was known about this last plane’s fate.

Hylton traces at a dizzying pace how Scannon’s fascination with these three airplanes grew. He researched archives, he attended reunions of the 307th where he interviewed old soldiers and their families, he became a certified diver, and he founded a nonprofit called the Bent Prop project devoted to supporting the efforts to locate “missing” downed aircraft in Palau. He apparently went to Palau every year from 1993 through at least 2007 where he interviewed islanders, rented aircraft and boats to search, and finally mounted expeditions that ultimately located 453. He even made it possible for the son of one of 453’s crewmembers to dive on the wreck. All of this he did while coping with the legitimate bureaucratic rules associated with these wrecks, including dealing with the joint service organization in Hawaii that recovers remains. As his research expanded, he tracked down what happened to several airmen who apparently were able to parachute safely from the plane but later died at the hands of the Japanese. During this period he went down blind alleys, but persisted and ultimately helped return some of these soldiers to their families.

What emerges from Hylton’s narrative goes beyond Scannon’s compulsion. Hylton reveals insight into the suffering of the families, and how this little known backwater campaign touched the lives of so many. However, the very best way to understand why this was important is best left to Scannon. He was touched by the sacrifice of these young, half-trained men who died in support of an effort some later claimed was unnecessary. As Scannon put it, for those young men, “it made no difference that they died in a backwater campaign. They died young and violently. They deserve to be remembered.” All should read this book and remember.


THE TRUE GERMAN: The Diary of a World War II Military Judge

This is an odd book. It purports to be the contemporary diary of a Wehrmacht military judge, Major Werner Otto Müller-Hill from 1944-45.

Anyone expecting to learn more about the Wehrmacht judiciary or military justice system will be disappointed, as there is nothing of substance about those institutions at all. Instead, almost every page is taken up with a series of never-ending, withering, and contemptuous comments directed at Adolf Hitler, Josef Goebbels, the Wehrmacht high command, Major Müller Hill’s superior officers, and fellow judges. The comments are uniformly strident. For example, “It’s not possible for
us small-time soldiers to do more—for instance, by removing this unfortunate regime.” Even more inflammatory: “The man responsible for all the mistakes, Hitler himself...should have been eliminated by his generals.”

Keeping a diary written in this form or making any of the statements that Major Müller-Hill claims he made at the time, would be Landesverrat (treason) and Wehrkraftzersetzung (undermining the war effort), both punishable by death—particularly as Germany rapidly deteriorated and defeat was all but certain. What motive, then, would the author have had to keep a running tally of self-incriminatory evidence, whose only use would be to hang the scribe? The short answer is that he would not have done so. The author was evidentially intelligent and critical, not a suicidal social renegade.

Major Müller-Hill spent most of the war in Strasbourg with Division z.b.V. 405, later transferring to Freiburg and Tübingen. In military law parlance, his duties seem to have consisted mostly of administrative law matters—although this is not certain due to his reluctance to discuss his cases—and his principle source of information about the wider war came from the radio, newspapers, and periodic letters he exchanged with colleagues.

On balance, it seems more likely that the truth is somewhere in between: Major Müller-Hill kept a wartime diary—but not the political and acerbic published version—and then enhanced it after the war. He died in 1977. Accordingly, if it is not contemporary, its value as a historical testament is lessened. There are no surprising revelations in the text, other than one short passage from a 23 September 1944 entry where he admits to hearing about a freight train with “50 cars full of Jews who were gassed and burned,” as well as other crimes.

Because the book only covers the period from 1944-45, it is impossible to determine how the author’s viewpoint was shaped and why. Was he always a dedicated opponent of the regime or did he come by it gradually? Why did he volunteer to serve a system that he believed embodied stupidity and criminality?

The editors, though, have done a remarkable job and the explanatory footnotes are a model to anyone who uses them in the future and they should be commended for the decision to let the author speak his piece, whether or not that piece is entirely what it claims to be.

Mark M. Hull, Ph.D., J.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

---

THE ARIADNE OBJECTIVE: The Underground War to Rescue Crete from the Nazis
Wes Davis, Crown Publishing Group, New York, 2013, 352 pages

Ariadne, or “most holy” in Cretan Greek, was the mythological daughter of Minos, King of Crete, and his queen, Pasiphae. She is most often linked to the mazes and labyrinths of Crete, and in particular with the Minotaur and Theseus. Reading Wes Davis’ book The Ariadne Objective: the Underground War to Rescue Crete from the Nazis, I cannot imagine a more fitting character to use as a symbolic backdrop to the action in his fast paced story. Crete represented an important strategic objective to Nazi Germany early in World War II and, on 20 May 1941, they launched the first ever large scale airborne assault against the island’s Allied defenders. After sustaining crippling losses early on, the German airborne troops eventually gained control of the island’s main airfield and as a result were able to bring in massive reinforcements, ultimately securing the island in ten days.

Wes Davis, an archeologist by profession, has spent many years studying the unique history of Crete. Crete is a mountainous island pocked with thousands of caves, many of which are linked to characters from Greek mythology. During one of his many trips to the island, Davis learned of an interesting story about a swashbuckling British intelligence agent named Patrick Leah Fermor and his role in fighting the Nazi occupiers of Crete. Davis does a nice job painting a picture of Fermor, describing how his mischievous curiosity caused him to have trouble adjusting to mainstream British society. During the 1930s, Fermor spent much of his early adulthood exploring Europe and Eurasia on foot. He was particularly fascinated by the culture and history of Greece and Turkey.

During these adventures, Fermor saw firsthand the impact of the rising tide of Fascism in Nazi Germany; something that influenced his decision to join the British Army at the beginning of World War II. Due to his previous experiences, it did not take long for the British military establishment to realize Fermor’s value and, as a result, he was recruited as one of the early
members of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), roughly equivalent to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in the United States.

Subsequently, Fermor spent several years in Crete aiding the Cretan partisans in reclaiming their beloved island from the Nazis. Davis’ story builds to an exciting climax as Fermor and his band of SOE irregulars hatch a plot to turn the Nazi occupiers on their heads. The success of this plot seems constantly in doubt as the story progresses. By the end you feel like you have just gotten off a roller coaster ride.

Partisan warfare was very important to the Allies in many of the territories occupied by the Nazis. The Ariadne Objective is an important narrative of this part of World War II that is often overlooked, and Fermor’s small piece of this irregular fight is interesting to say the least. The mythological character Ariadne makes frequent appearances symbolically throughout Davis’ fast-paced narrative and is an important detail that helps provide insight into the character and personality of the Cretan people. Adriand ultimately helps Theseus destroy the Minotaur, and clearly the stories of Fermor’s exploits in Crete closely mirror this centuries old mythological tale. I think this is a great read and recommend it to anyone interested in World War II history.


---

THEY CALLED THEM SOLDIER BOYS:
A Texas Infantry Regiment in World War I
Gregory W. Ball, University of North Texas Press,
Denton, Texas, 2013, 352 pages

They Called Them Soldier Boys was thoroughly researched. Ball’s 28 pages of endnotes and 18 pages of sources show that he has done his homework. His sources include draft registration cards, personal accounts, letters, newspaper articles, and official works. He presents plenty of period photographs as well. The historical tidbits and human interest stories set this work apart from other, more general, histories. The reader feels the regiment’s pain as Ball names and recounts the individual fates of many of the men lost in battle.

There are lighter moments as well. For example, during the battle at St. Etienne, a mess wagon was unable to bring up food because during an artillery barrage a cook named Perkins had dived under his
mess wagon and set his pants on fire. Ball chronicles the meals of cold beans and cold coffee, putting the reader in the trenches with the men from Texas and Oklahoma.

_They Called Them Soldier Boys_ is good reading. Ball’s tone is objective and his prose is clear and direct. Those interested in infantry organizations, National Guard integration, and especially those interested in Texas history, should find the book interesting and enjoyable.

**Michael L. Waller, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kan.**

---

**WOUNDED: A New History of the Western Front**

*Emily Mayhew, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013, 288 pages*

The Great War centennial is here, and so is the usual onrush of mass market histories bred by such anniversaries. Many consist of the usual cast of czars, kaisers, generals, or doughboys, and are illustrated with the typical stock photos and symbol-saturated maps. Emily Mayhew’s _Wounded: A New History of the Western Front_ breaks rank from this lockstep approach to the war and provides one of the most gripping, humanized histories in recent scholarship. Her history of the war ignores the political elite and military hierarchy in favor of telling the story of the most common yet least understood way of experiencing the war—that of being wounded.

While roughly 8.5 million soldiers died in the war, their suffering died end and their memory was enshrined in national glory. Civilians tried to forget the war and resumed their lives. Yet over 21 million men suffered wounds during the conflict, beginning a searing, painful journey that often began in no-man’s-land and continued throughout the rest of their lives as they sought healing for both body and soul. Their story has largely gone untold until now.

Mayhew focuses on the British experience along the Western Front, examining the lives of wounded soldiers, chaplains, stretcher-bearers, nurses, medics, surgeons, and other medical auxiliaries. Even though the British medical system processed millions of wounded men, later government workers disposed of much of the documentation, leaving Mayhew to piece together this story from personal journals and letters combined with remaining official papers. While that is a regrettable loss of historical knowledge, the sources ensure that the story is told with the voice of the wounded man and not that of the government statistician.

Mayhew’s storytelling is compelling and powerful, bringing images of both the characters and the battlefields to the reader’s mind. While geography and campaigns are referenced, they do not serve as part of grand strategy discussions; instead, they are described as the soldier would have known them—an unfamiliar foreign town where his life changed forever. The reader quickly becomes invested in each character’s story, rooting for the soldier, nurse, or chaplain to come through the experience alive. Yet all too often, the narratives abruptly end as those trying to save the lives and souls of others met death themselves.

Like Remarque’s _All Quiet on the Western Front_, Mayhew’s work places war in its full human context and shows the depth of pain that conflict can bring. While the emotional and physical suffering is not gratuitously described, the experiences Mayhew highlights are so intensely sobering and emotionally draining that the reviewer could only read a few chapters at a time. These realities of pain and suffering are the true legacy of the Great War and should temper all future cries for a rush to arms. Mayhew has done a truly remarkable service by ensuring that we can still hear the stories of these soldiers one hundred years later. In this way, the book's material is timeless, providing a much needed reminder that the call to war will require a generation of a nation’s young men and women to bear irreparable scars from the battlefield through the rest of their lives.

**Jonathan Newell, Hill, N.H.**

---

**SOUTH PACIFIC CAULDRON: World War II’s Great Forgotten Battlegrounds**

*Allan Rems, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2014, 312 pages*

Allan Rems adds breadth and context to our understanding of World War II’s South Pacific campaigns in an accessible, highly readable and well-packaged new book that is especially timely given the approach of the 70th anniversary of VJ (Victory over Japan) Day. While others have
written extensively on specific campaigns or battles in the South Pacific area of operations, Rems tackles its entirety in one fell swoop—encompassing the Solomon Islands, the Bismarck Archipelago, Eastern New Guinea, and numerous smaller islands critical to the Allied cause.

In straightforward, concise prose, the author does justice to his expansive topic, beginning with Guadalcanal in the Eastern Solomon Islands in August 1942, and culminating with Australian combat operations in other of the Solomon Islands, New Britain, and New Guinea just prior to Japan’s capitulation in September 1945. How does Rems pull this off? By seamlessly interweaving the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, and deftly covering the key decisions and their subsequent actions and consequences, the author intricately narrates a compelling narrative.

Similar in scope to Eric Bergerud’s excellent treatment of ground combat in *Touched With Fire: The ‘Land War in the South Pacific*, Rems makes his finest contribution by making sense of the South Pacific campaigns given their intimidating geographic context—the complex islands, cultures, bewildering place names, and time-distance factors—that framed Allied strategy. Thus, one readily obtains a sense of what key leaders were trying to do, from the perspective of the Allies (Nimitz, MacArthur, Halsey, Blamey), as well as the Japanese (Yamamoto, Koga, Imamura, Hyakutake). The author effectively describes critical decisions facing each side: how and when to employ spare forces and resources; whether to attack or bypass enemy strong points; and whether to press or withdraw. Rems relates how such decisions were rendered hopelessly complex by faulty intelligence, inter-service rivalries, and national political considerations.

Like any good book on the Pacific War, the author never lets one forget the human element. Each of his chapters is titled with an excerpt or quotation from a key leader (e.g. “The Closest Thing to a Living Hell”) to help frame the individual events or battles being covered. The entire South Pacific panorama is thus uniformly covered, from events such as the death of Japanese Adm. Yamamoto, to key battles ranging from Guadalcanal and Bougainville, to the encirclement of the great Japanese hub at Rabaul. Rems also pays tribute to the more obscure, but no less important, contributions made by the Australian and New Zealand forces, which went far beyond just “mopping up” isolated Japanese forces upon withdrawal of U.S. forces to continue the drive towards mainland Japan.

With extensive notes, excellent photographs and a very useful chronology, Allan Rems’ new book serves as an excellent and concise introduction to Allied operations in the South Pacific. Effectively interweaving the levels of war and linking the ground, sea, and air campaigns rather than treating them in isolation, he makes an effective case for the enduring importance of the region to the Pacific theater, and for continuing to honor those who fought there.

**Col. Mark Montesclaros, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Gordon, Ga.**

---

**THE PHYSICS OF WAR: From Arrows to Atoms**

Barry Parker, Prometheus Books, Amherst, New York, 2014, 320 pages

For many, reading a text on physics may not sound like the best way to spend free time. Without a background in the subject, one conjures obscure formulae, levers, ramps, and Galileo dropping weights from atop the Tower of Pisa. Nonetheless, one must appreciate that physical science underpins how the world works regarding motion, force, and energy, and serves as the starting point for nearly all technological advancements. It is a subject so expansive that many of its laws and implications may be taken for granted.

Dr. Barry Parker’s *The Physics of War* attempts to focus our appreciation of the science by comparing the history of man’s scientific understanding of physical science and man’s quest for the next wonder weapon. The book is primarily a work on the history of science and an introductory text on physics.
and weapons serve merely as a backdrop to explain the former through a wide survey of military history, mostly of the Western tradition. The reader, particularly if a student of military history, must keep this in mind while reading as the historical assertions can be general and somewhat anecdotal. From the onset, the author is clearly a physics professor, ostensibly a fine one, but no historian. Despite allowing for easier understanding of difficult scientific concepts, the folksy and conversational language sets an unauthoritative tone. Too often, he reaches out to less-than-august academic sources on the web such as Wikipedia, How Stuff Works, and About.com.

When The Physics of War hits on an interesting, important, and well explained topic, the book soars. For instance, the author’s explanation on the application of rifling and ballistics is fascinating. The pieces devoted to the development gunnery would make any artilleryman proud. Other sections on the long bow, radar, and atomic bomb may not be ground breaking or revelatory, but are nevertheless insightful. If anything, the reader gains confidence in finding confirmation in what he already knows about the world.

Despite all that is right with it, the work is often so broad in its treatment of war’s history, from chariot to drone, that it often suffers from a lack of focus. The few gems in it are sparsely separated by muddled, easily contestable topics that fall flat. The author claims outright that the Romans had disdain for science.

The Roman arches and aqueducts that function after thousands of years may silently confute such an assertion. Also, he claims that few advances in science occurred in the medieval period despite the numerous discoveries in natural science and mathematics that actually occurred during that millennium of human history. Moreover, the book’s decidedly Western focus on wars and weapons prevents all but the slightest nods of acknowledgment toward such non-Western technological advances as, say, the Chinese development of gunpowder.

If the author would have focused less on the history and more on the major leaps in technological advancements it explains well, this book would have been much more successful. As a physics text, which is what the author mainly appears to have intended it to be, the work succeeds. Unfortunately, The Physics of War falls short of making the must-read recommendation list for the military reader.

Maj. Bradley J. Hardy, U.S. Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas

FIGHTING THE MAU: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency
Huw Bennett, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2013, 317 pages

Kenya was the scene of one of Britain’s last colonial wars. There, between 1952 and 1956, the British army and local security forces fought a bitter, but successful, campaign against the Mau, insurgents from the Meru, Emru, and Kikuyu tribes. When the “Emergency” was over, counterinsurgency experts like Frank Kitson pointed to the victory as vindication of the British Army’s principles of minimum force, rule of law, and civil-military cooperation. The reputed success added to an enduring narrative that celebrated the British as the masters of “population-centric COIN” (counterinsurgency).

That narrative has been shaken by the more recent British experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, and historians have been inspired to take a more critical look at the British record in places like Palestine, Northern Ireland, Malaya, and elsewhere. In his book, Fighting the Mau, Huw Bennett uses newly released government documents to challenge the received view about the Kenyan “Emergency.” Examining the British colonial experience, he finds that, stretched across a vast empire, the British army’s “thin red line” could rarely afford a “hearts and mind” approach to counterinsurgency.

Instead, what the army’s staff college taught about counterinsurgency was trumped by a more practical and long-term tradition of using exemplary brutality to quell uprisings before they could spread. Rebellions had to be “nipped in the bud.” That was the actual policy that guided the Kenyan Emergency. In crushing the Mau Maus, the army, the police, and the tribal Home Guards never succeeded in separating the tribes from the insurgents.
and, instead, used collective punishment, forced resettlement, prisoner abuse, and arbitrary execution to cow the target population into submission.

Gen. George Erskine is typically cast as the hero of the Kenyan campaign. He arrived to lead East Africa Command in June of 1953 and is usually credited with giving the counterinsurgency effort a badly needed strategic vision while, at the same time, eliminating the worst excesses among the security forces.

Bennett asserts that Erskine did indeed initially seek to moderate the violence, but quickly realized that investigating and prosecuting those officers and men who operated outside the law would lose him support of his own chain of command and might even risk mutiny among his soldiers. Erskine, Bennett claims, thus compromised by turning a “blind eye” to the brutal methods his men used to suppress the Mau Mau while investigating only the most egregious abuses. In doing so, the general apparently acted to shield his troops from the intrusion of civil oversight.

The resulting campaign saw atrocities on both sides. While Bennett believes that most British soldiers acted honorably in fighting the Mau Mau, he finds that the British Army’s experience in Kenya is hardly a ringing endorsement of the kind of progressive techniques espoused in the U.S. Army’s FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. In fact, Bennett concludes there is no such thing as “soft COIN.”

His disturbing conclusion: “Because intelligence about who insurgents are and [because] shifting political loyalties cannot be surmounted, it may be that counter-insurgencies will always be brutal.”

Fighting the Mau Mau is recommended although it is hardly a smooth read. The author’s chooses a thematic chapter structure rather than a chronological account and that, along with his close adherence to the documentary record, sometimes makes for a choppy narrative. Nevertheless, his book is significant both for what it tells us about the British “small wars” experience and how it might shape the U.S. Army’s ongoing debate on counterinsurgency.

Scott Stephenson, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

WARRIOR GEEKS: How 21st Century Technology is Changing the Way We Fight and Think about War
Christopher Coker, Columbia University Press, New York, 2013, 384 pages

In this book, Professor Coker, head of the Department for International Relations at the London School of Economics, explores the human dimension of war and warfare and the changes that may occur in the future if technological advances separate man from the West’s morals and ethics. He examines war’s changes from possible technological and medical advances that alter the human warrior, or by using surrogate warriors such as autonomous systems (SKYNET), or some combination of both in the post-human environment. Describing his own intent, the author says—

What I have tried to do in this book is to examine the likely impact of early 21st century technologies—digital, cybernetic, and bio-medical—upon our understanding of how war and our humanity will continue to co-evolve.

Coker begins with a discussion of warfare as understood by the ancient Greek philosophers as the “human thing.” As contrast, he blends in a view of the digital world that produces impersonal relations and interaction. He then effectively incorporates expert opinion from a vast array of multiple disciplines, from the time of the ancient Greeks until today, in examining the subject as he predicts the future. These disciplines are not limited to social scientists and moral philosophers; they also include science fiction writers, bio- and neuroscientists, genetic engineers, post humanists, cyberneticists, and many others.

Will warfare change with these possible advances? What happens if war becomes the normal way of resolving issues? With no citizens at risk but only machines will societies change? Will the decision to go to war have no more importance than a shopping trip to the local grocery? As we have seen over history, if man can envision it, man can achieve it. This book is one more voice in the ongoing discussion of what the future could look like and the possible pitfalls along the way.
This book is well written, follows logical paths, and does not require the reader to be an expert in future technologies, history or philosophy—though these could be helpful—to understand the issues raised by the author.

Nevertheless, I found this a challenging read because this topic is dealt with in such vast breadth and depth by the author. He brings so many issues into the discussion that I found this book to be a study. It quickly caught my attention and, from this reading, I gained a better insight into the national, and possibly global, discussion of the future directions of war and warfare. This book is for military professionals, futurists, policy formulators, and the scientific community who are developing these new technologies and capabilities.


AN INOFFENSIVE REARMAMENT: The Making of the Postwar Japanese Army
Frank Kowalski, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2013, 224 pages

A reader that experienced the occupations of Iraq or Afghanistan will appreciate An Inoffensive Rearmament. Written by a key leader charged to develop the National Police Reserve (later the Self-Defense Forces) in post-World War II Japan, the work provides remarkable insights into how the United States handled a partner nation that was once an enemy. Translated from the original Japanese, the work balances the political scene and mercurial relationship between post-World War II Japan and pre-Korean War United States.

Japan, the book’s hero, once a great nation, was burned physically and spiritually by the worst of war, but was seeking to build a utopia from the ashes. The United States, a proven international power and Japan’s dramatic foil, sought to enable this utopian dream through occupation. One soon realizes that U.S. occupation policy has remained largely unchanged from 1945 through current operations by always forcing the defeated nation into serving as a weakened, pro-American client.

Following the war, Japan sought to reestablish sovereign legitimacy by shifting its governance from the whims of an emperor and military elite to a constitution which merely limited self-defense capability. Japan hoped that a new U.S.-led international world order would prevent future conflict by honoring Japanese passive “higher ideals.” Squashing future imperial ambitions, Japan would never seek conflict beyond its borders again.

The United States, in contrast, occupied Japan to establish an impotent, American-modeled client state. In a punitive sense, and under United Nations directive, MacArthur prohibited a new Japanese Army due to its history, not its future. What nation would dare reconsider war after suffering global conflict and the atom bomb? The Japanese Diet (national legislature) staunchly resisted an American-made constitution banning the right to self-defense until Hirohito ordered acquiescence.

Consequently, Japan would depend on U.S. power for security through four U.S. divisions stationed throughout the islands. This situation worked only until the outbreak of war in Korea which forced the divisions’ departure. With no U.S. troops, an imminent communist threat from China, and no legal means to stand up a response, Japan was left defenseless. The American occupiers scrambled to organize a new host nation defense force by scraping together raw recruits and leadership using enough political sleight of hand to keep many from questioning the clear violation of the Japanese constitution and U.N. mandate.

Here, the reader senses a trend in U.S. occupation policy that echoes policies dealing with Iraq and Afghanistan. In all cases, the United States destroys the enemy military and purges its remaining leadership, only to stumble on a self-induced defense vacuum. Peace treaties constrain who can fill this gap and how it can be done.

The U.S. military, seeking a reduced commitment, is then forced to cobble together a force of unskilled soldiers and inadequate leadership. Former enemies are turned into crippled friends who must depend on U.S. collaboration as the only path to international esteem, security, and regional influence. Further, the United States leveraged the staunchly democratic and fairly stable islands of
Japan to withstand the powerful tide of communism in Asia.

Today, in a similar pattern, the United States attempts to create compatible islands of stability in Southwest Asia to deter Islamic extremism and Iranian influence.

The book’s lessons indicate that post-war American occupation may be messy and somewhat duplicitous. However, this duplicity may be the only method to ensure security and liberal ideals are maintained at home. The reader’s heart may be troubled and hands feel a little dirty after reading this history, but the reader’s eyes will surely be opened.

Maj. Brad Hardy, U.S. Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas

---

**IMPERIAL DESIGNS: War, Humiliation & the Making of History**

Deepak Tripathi, Potomac Books, Washington, D.C., 2013, 208 pages

In *Imperial Designs*, former British Broadcasting Corporation correspondent Deepak Tripathi discusses how external military and political influences impact the perceptions of a people. He explains that as imperial powers expand, they invariably attempt to seat elements of influence in a foreign body politic over which they have gained control in order to ensure continued control and security over it. In previous generations, this meant military occupation, but with globalization, political changeover and economic reliance have become the norm.

The nature of this type of foreign policy, the author discusses, eventually sows the seeds of future conflict as the people who have been humiliated and made impotent by the imperial power attempt to correct a perceived wrong. To prevent the emergence of domestic resistance in foreign states under the hegemony of imperial powers, effort is made by imperial powers to weaken such resistance, which leads to a further sense of haplessness that exacerbates the initial resentments until such boil over in outright revolt.

In the author’s opinion, war (and other intrusive forms of foreign involvement) brings with it only short-term success at the expense of long-term goals. There is little acknowledgement of the impact that these actions have upon the psyche of a people who then seek retribution later when they are capable. For example, during the Cold War, such a dichotomy was unintentionally created among Iranians, as the United States and United Kingdom attempted to leverage Iran to offset the influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. British and U.S. influence over Iranian domestic affairs and political policies created the sense of mass public resentment against foreign domination that eventually led to the Islamic Revolution, creating an insurmountable divide between the Anglo-American and Iranian parties that exists to this day.

The bulk of Tripathi’s book is inherently very critical of U.S. foreign policy. While his assessments and examples are not incorrect, his selection of miscalculations and failures does paint the entire U.S. foreign effort in a bad light. It is understandable that, in order to support his argument, the author would only focus on events that highlight his hypothesis. However, his approach may alienate many readers who think his objectivity in treating the material was compromised by anti-American sentiments. If the reader can look past the author’s display of emotion, there is indeed a perspective which can be useful.

Much like the intent of our Founding Fathers when they drafted the Constitution, or the crucible of the American Civil War, the specter of our shared history impacts the decisions we make today. Lessons we have learned, wrongs we have experienced, and successes that we have had embodied in our U.S. history exert a powerful national narrative force on the U.S. population that outsiders find difficult to fully fathom. Just as the patterns and narrative of our history impacts us, so do the histories of other peoples impact them, and thus with any course of action we take toward other nations, we must be cognizant of that fact. That is what *Imperial Designs* mainly offers: a realization that the history of other cultures can, and will, impact the result of our actions toward them as much as the employment of any other means of influence, including our most powerful and destructive foreign policy tools.

Two Vietnam War veterans, retired Command Sgt. Maj. Bennie G. Adkins and Spc. 4 Donald P. Sloat, were each awarded the Medal of Honor in a ceremony at the White House, 15 September 2014. Adkins received the medal in person from President Barack Obama. Sloat’s award was posthumous; his brother, Dr. Bill Sloat, received the medal on his behalf.

Adkins was presented the medal for numerous acts of valor during a 38-hour battle at Camp A Shau, Republic of Vietnam, and 48 hours of escape and evasion, 9-12 March 1966. He is credited with killing more than 135 enemy soldiers during the battle while suffering 18 wounds.

When a large North Vietnamese force attacked the Camp A Shau on 9 March, Adkins manned a mortar position. He mounted a defense of the camp, sustaining wounds from several direct hits by enemy mortar rounds in the process. He left the mortar position temporarily, facing mortar and sniper fire to drag several wounded comrades to safety. Adkins repeatedly exposed himself to enemy fire to evacuate wounded casualties and retrieve supplies.

On the morning of 10 March, the enemy launched their main assault. Adkins continued to man the mortar until he had exhausted all rounds, then fought off waves of enemy soldiers with rifle fire. Withdrawing to a communications bunker with a small element of soldiers, he continued to fight off the enemy, receiving more wounds in the process. Adkins and the group destroyed the signal equipment and classified documents, then fought their way out of the camp. Because he was carrying a wounded soldier, Adkins and his group could not reach the last evacuation helicopter. Instead, he led them into the jungle and evaded the enemy for 48 hours until they were rescued by a helicopter on 12 March.
Adkins, a native of Opelika, Ala., deployed to Vietnam for three nonconsecutive tours as a member of the U.S. Army Special Forces.

Sloat received the award for sacrificing his life to save those of his fellow squad members while on patrol in Que Son Valley, Republic of Vietnam, 17 January 1970.

When the lead soldier in the patrol hit a trip wire attached to a hand-grenade booby trap, the grenade rolled downhill to Sloat. Knowing that detonation was imminent and he could not throw the grenade in any direction without harming his fellow soldiers, he chose to pull the grenade into his body, absorbing the blast to shield the others, and ultimately, saving their lives.

Sloat was a native of Coweta, Okla. He was twenty years old when he died.

President Obama said during the ceremony, “Over the decades, our Vietnam veterans didn’t always receive the thanks and respect they deserved. That’s a fact. But as we have been reminded again today, our Vietnam vets were patriots and are patriots. You served with valor. You made us proud. And your service is with us for eternity. So no matter how long it takes, no matter how many years go by, we will continue to express our gratitude for your extraordinary service.”

During his remarks, President Obama mentioned the delinquency of the awards, presented over four decades after the events took place. He said, “Normally, this medal must be awarded within a few years of the action. But sometimes even the most extraordinary stories can get lost in the fog of war or the passage of time. Yet when new evidence comes to light, certain actions can be reconsidered for this honor, and it is entirely right and proper that we have done so.”

Adkins and Sloat were inducted into the Pentagon’s Hall of Heroes on 16 September.