

FINDING THE BALANCE TO COMBAT A HYBRID THREAT

A Monograph

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ABSTRACT

FINDING THE BALANCE TO COMBAT A HYBRID THREAT, by MAJ James F. Blanton, 53 pages.

In 2006, the Israelis faced an enemy they were unprepared for. Their training had fixated on the key tasks to be successful in peace enforcement operations, ignoring the broader scope of other forms of war. In contrast, the United States (U.S.) Army prior to 2001 focused training on conventional warfare with combined arms teams engaged with the opposing forces along the central corridor at the National Training Center reminiscent of Desert Storm, or even the breakout in France during the Second World War. In both case studies, each large force lacked training and familiarity with the decisive form of combat with which the war would be fought. Both forces shared the experience of fighting non-state actors.

What then is the right balance between conventional warfare and irregular warfare that will allow U.S. forces to prevail against a hybrid threat? The Second Lebanon War and Operation Enduring Freedom demonstrated through an examination of the operational environment, training, and organization the relevant lessons learned that can be used to create a synthesis model to prepare the U.S. Army to combat a hybrid threat.

These two individual case studies create a picture of what future U.S. military forces must consider for training and organization to be prepared for future conflicts. Hybrid threats may become more prevalent as hostile states and non-state actors adapt to defeat possible U.S. military interventions around the globe. Balancing training across the full spectrum of combat operations including stability and nation building will prevent the U.S. military from shifting to far left or right between high intensity conflict and low intensity conflict.

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ACRONYMS

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
ALP	Afghan Local Police
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghanistan National Security Forces
CAM	Combined Arms Maneuver
FM	Field Manual
HN	Host Nation
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IAF	Israeli Air Force
IDF	Israeli Defense Force
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
INS	Israeli Naval Ship
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IW	Irregular Warfare
JP	Joint Publication
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
TTP	Tactics, Technics, and Procedures
ULO	Unified Land Operations
UNFIL	United Nations Forces in Lebanon
UW	Unconventional Warfare

VSO	Village Stability Operations
VSP	Village Stability Platforms
WAS	Wide Area Security
XO	Executive Officer

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INTRODUCTION

Following Vietnam, the United States (U.S.) military focused on conventional state-on-state wars, and the Army task organized to face the Soviet Union on the plains of Europe. This became apparent with the Army's capstone Cold War doctrine, AirLand Battle, reached its pinnacle during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Following Desert Storm, Army doctrine evolved from AirLand Battle (1986) to Full Spectrum Operations (2001), which primarily fixated on state-on-state wars.¹ With the advent of Unified Land Operations (2012), the Army has shifted to a more holistic approach to war.²

It was not until the post-Iraq invasion of 2003, and the ensuing counterinsurgency fight, that the U.S. Army began to pay more attention to forms of combat other than conventional, high-intensity warfare. This new emphasis resulted in the publication of Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*.³ Refocusing from a conventional fight to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military changed its tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to combat the insurgent threat. Over the last decade, the U.S. military's sole attention on counterinsurgency in

¹Department of the Army, *FM 100-5 Operations* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 1986), 9: **AirLand Battle** doctrine describes the Army's approach to generating and applying combat power at the operational and tactical levels. AirLand Battle recognizes the inherently three-dimensional nature of modern warfare. Department of the Army, *FM 3-0 Operations* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2011), 3-1: **Full Spectrum Operations**: Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.

²Department of the Army, *ADRP 3-0 Unified Land Operations* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 1-1: **Unified Land Operations** describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.

³Department of the Army, *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2006).

Afghanistan and Iraq resulted in a whole generation of officers and non-commissioned officers whose skills in combined arms maneuver atrophied. A similar sort of atrophy in warfighting skills also occurred in the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and contributed to Israel's failure during the Second Lebanon War.

In 2006, the IDF sought a swift victory over the Hezbollah in Lebanon. The IDF fell victim to their past successes of the Six-Day War, Yom Kippur War, the 1982 Lebanon War, which reinforced their belief that overwhelming air power would compel the enemy to capitulate. The IDF focused, for much of the two decades preceding this conflict, on counterinsurgency and constabulary operations against the Palestinians in the West Bank, and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. This emphasis led to a degradation of combined arms maneuver skills. As the IDF's skills worsened, the Hezbollah organized itself conventionally with prepared defenses and a well-organized, trained and highly motivated force. They acquired and adapted technology to defeat the Israeli forces in depth as the IDF's offensive moved into Lebanon. Hezbollah combined both conventional and unconventional tactics to defeat the IDF. This combination of tactics and organization is the essence of a hybrid threat. The significance of Israel's failure is hauntingly similar to the state the U.S. finds its Army today.

These two conflicts provide hard-learned lessons for a conventionally trained force struggling against a hybrid threat and ten years of COIN in Afghanistan. By synthesizing the TTPs from Afghanistan's counterinsurgency fight with the lessons from the IDF, this monograph will provide a model for the organization and training the U.S. military might use to defeat future hybrid threats.

Hybrid Threat

In the last 20 years, the concept of hybrid war or hybrid threat has emerged. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0 *Unified Land Operations* defines a hybrid threat as “a diverse and dynamic combination of regular, irregular, terrorist or criminal forces.”⁴ The concept of hybrid threat came from a prediction by General Charles C. Krulak in the mid-1990s that future wars would resemble the “Stepchild of Chechnya” and be less like Desert Storm.⁵ Frank Hoffman, a former Marine Corps Officer and National Security Analyst, defines hybrid war as incorporating conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.⁶ Dr. Russell W. Glenn adds to Hoffman’s definition by stating, “a hybrid threat may employ political, military, economic, social, and information means, as well as a combination of state and non-state actors.”⁷ This last component, non-state actors, is crucial. A non-state actor is an organization that operates autonomously from a recognized government.⁸ By nature, a hybrid threat may be hard to distinguish from a more conventional threat or a terrorist threat as encountered during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

⁴Department of the Army, *ADRP 3-0 Unified Land Operations*, 1-3.

⁵Frank G. Hoffman, “Future Threats and Strategic Thinking,” *Infinity Journal* (Fall 2011), 17.

⁶Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), 14.

⁷Russell W. Glenn, “Thoughts on ‘Hybrid’ Conflict,” *Small Wars Journal* (2009), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/188-glenn.pdf?q=mag/docs-temp/188-glenn.pdf> (accessed August 20, 2012).

⁸Margaret Buse, “Non-State Actors and Their Significance,” *The Journal* (December 2001) http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/5.3/features/maggie_buse_nsa/maggie_buse.htm (accessed August 18, 2012).

To understand the nature of a hybrid threat, first one must appreciate the meaning of a conventional threat. The idea of conventional warfare generates images of the great tank battles during World War II, or the enveloping maneuvers of Chinese forces during the Korean War. More importantly, conventional wars typically occur between nation-states that generally adhere to established rules of conduct: the Geneva Convention and the Rules of Land Warfare.

Russell F. Weigley, who suggests that the American way of war is war of attrition or annihilation, provides another view of conventional warfare.⁹ To Weigley, attrition or annihilation means either destroying enough of an enemy's force to compel them to surrender or the complete destruction of an enemy's force down to the last man. All of these aspects of conventional war provide contrast that is important to understanding the nature of a hybrid threat.

Perhaps more difficult to define is the idea of unconventional or irregular war. This difficulty, characterized in 2006 in a study by United States Joint Forces Command recommended not including "irregular warfare" in joint doctrine because it was too broad a term to generate consensus as to its meaning.¹⁰ To reduce confusion about the nature or delineation between hybrid threat and other established terms, this monograph provides the following definitions with examples for each.

Unconventional Warfare (UW), a special operations core activity, is the enabling of a resistance movement or insurgency to overthrow a government or disrupt an occupying force.¹¹

⁹Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), xxii.

¹⁰U.S. JFCOM, "Irregular Warfare Special Study" (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2006), IV-1.

¹¹Department of Defense, *JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2011), 355.

The French resistance to the Germans during WWII best exemplifies unconventional warfare.¹² Under this definition, UW is an operation, not a type of warfare. This distinction is essential for separating UW from hybrid warfare. Another type of operation, sometimes confused with hybrid warfare is guerrilla warfare.

Critics of hybrid warfare often use guerrilla warfare, another type of irregular warfare operation, to justify their rebuke that hybrid warfare is not new. FM 31-21, *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations*, defines guerrilla warfare as “military or paramilitary operations in enemy held territory conducted by indigenous forces against enemy forces.”¹³ Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 defines guerrilla warfare as “military or paramilitary operation conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces”.¹⁴ Guerrilla warfare is a supporting operation to conventional warfare. Mao Tse-tung stated that guerrilla warfare is one aspect of total war, because it cannot win a war by itself.¹⁵

JP 1-02 defines Irregular Warfare (IW) as a struggle between state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the population.¹⁶ This definition implies that irregular warfare is an internal struggle, much like the Afghanistan government against the Taliban. However, this is a type of warfare and not simply an operation. What it lacks is clear understanding of the threat.

¹² “World War 2 Collaboration and Resistance,” <http://www.history.co.uk/explore-history/ww2/collaboration-and-resistance.html> (accessed March 16, 2013).

¹³ Department of the Army, *FM 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1961), 8.

¹⁴ Department of Defense, *JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 147.

¹⁵ Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith II (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 42.

¹⁶ Department of Defense, *JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 177.

Until the Global War on Terror, unconventional warfare, and guerrilla warfare were the domain of special operations. Neither Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 nor ADRP 3-0 makes any significant mention of irregular warfare, and none of these definitions sufficiently describe operations against a hybrid threat. Consequently, further examination is necessary to prepare the U.S. military to fight a hybrid threat.

A hybrid threat refers to more than just capabilities. Christopher O. Bowers, a strategic planner at the Army Capabilities Integration Center, suggests that a hybrid threat is a combination of capabilities, maturity, and complex terrain.¹⁷ Bowers adds that hybrid threats also include a certain amount of advanced technology, and the proficiency on and the sustainability of the technology.¹⁸ Maturity in a hybrid threat includes “a high degree of organization, cohesion, depth in leadership, population support, and a strategic strategy.”¹⁹ Bowers’ final variable for a hybrid threat is complex terrain. This terrain is both geographical and human, and potentially includes cyberspace.²⁰ Russia’s war in Chechnya is a good example of a hybrid threat using both urban complex terrain and mountainous areas. The Intifada that began within the Palestinians to resist Israel during the late 1980s and early 1990s serves as an example of how a people with no state and no government imposed their will over a large conventional military.²¹ The first Intifada was a nonviolent, civil disobedient resistance to Israeli occupation. The Palestinians made good use of

¹⁷Christopher O. Bowers, “Identifying Emerging Hybrid Adversaries,” *Parameters* (Spring 2012), 39.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 41.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 43.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 45.

²¹Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone* (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2006), 109. The first Intifada began in 1987 and ran until 1993.

the media portraying Israeli tanks, suppressing rock-throwing youth, which essentially turned international opinion against the Israelis.

All these definitions provide a conglomerate of the capabilities and nature of a hybrid threat. For the purpose of this monograph, hybrid threat will be considered a nation-state or non-state actor utilizing conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal tactics simultaneously, usually to defeat a militarily superior force. By examining the definitions of conventional and unconventional warfare, this helps delineate a hybrid threat from other forms of warfare, or types of operations. With the definitions established, one can now examine the two case studies with greater appreciation.

Hezbollah, in Lebanon, is one such non-state actor that can be identified as a hybrid threat. Hezbollah, during the 2006 war, differed from traditional terrorist organizations. They were organized more like a conventional force, yet still employed irregular tactics.²² This is a change from traditional organization which portrays state actors as conventional fighters and non-state actors as irregular fighters.²³ Finally, Hezbollah epitomized a hybrid threat when as a non-state actor it engaged with a larger more westernized Israeli military outside of the borders of Lebanon. Section two will expand and describe in more detail how Hezbollah meets the definition of a hybrid threat.

Another form of hybrid threat is the insurgency seen in Afghanistan. This form of hybrid threat involves a non-state actor fighting against an existing government inside of a nation's borders. The insurgent's goal is to overthrow the government or break away to form a new

²²Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman, "The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy," September 2008, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub882.pdf> (accessed August 20, 2012), xii.

²³Ibid., xiii.

state.²⁴ Poorly armed insurgents operate more covertly than overtly. Initially an insurgent utilizes more irregular forms of war, but will eventually incorporate more conventional tactics combining both forms of warfare into a hybrid threat. Each insurgency is different, and employment of large formations and massed firepower is more often counterproductive to the counterinsurgents' goals, which focus on the population, minimizing collateral damage, and building rapport.²⁵

Insurgents are adaptive. What previously worked one week may not work the next. What worked in one theater or against one insurgency, may not work against another. An insurgency may even differ inside a theater of operation between one area of responsibility and another. Section three will describe in more detail how the insurgency in Afghanistan, specifically the Taliban, meets the definition of a hybrid threat.

Current Doctrine

Understanding current doctrine helps put later synthesis into the right context. The current operational doctrine on how the U.S. Army plans to fight is Unified Land Operations. ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (ULO) is the Army's operational concept. ULO defines how the army will seize, retain and exploit the initiative to gain the advantage over its enemies.²⁶ Decisive action, a term that represents simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations, describes how the Army gains the advantage in combat. Inside the United States, decisive action also includes defense support to civil authority. Decisive action replaced the previous term, Full Spectrum Operations.²⁷ ULO is part of the larger defense strategy Unified Action. Unified Action

²⁴Department of the Army, *FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* (Washington DC, Department of the Army, 1990), 2-0.

²⁵Department of the Army, *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, ix.

²⁶*Ibid.*, v.

²⁷Department of the Army, *ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations*, v.

integrates and synchronizes government and non-governmental agencies along with all components of the Armed Services.²⁸

The four foundations of ULO are initiative, decisive action, core competencies, and mission command.²⁹ Core competencies are further delineated into combined arms maneuver (CAM) and wide area security (WAS). These core competencies are not tasks, nor are they separate. CAM and WAS are executed simultaneously to provide focus for decisive action.³⁰

Combined arms maneuver is the application of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative.³¹

Wide area security is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative.³²

In short, combined arms maneuver is gaining a position of advantage and wide area security is preventing the enemy from gaining a position of advantage.³³ Unified Land Operations utilizes landpower through simultaneous combined arms maneuver and wide area security to conduct decisive action to accomplish the mission.³⁴ Army Doctrinal Publications and Army Doctrinal Reference Publications have radically shifted from doctrine published as recently as 2011. The 2011 Field Manual 3-0, Change 1, *Operations* made extensive reference to irregular

²⁸Ibid., 1-3.

²⁹Ibid., 2-1.

³⁰Ibid., 2-8.

³¹Ibid., 2-9.

³²Ibid., 2-9, 2-10.

³³LTG David Perkins, "Doctrine 2015" (lecture, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, November 28, 2012).

³⁴Department of the Army, *ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations*, 2-1.

warfare, today's operational manual ADRP 3-0 does not.³⁵

With the rise of the Soviet Union threat following World War II the U.S. Army focused primarily on high intensity conflict, two opposing armies facing off against each other in state versus state warfare. This form of warfare was the cognitive model that carried the bulk of the Army into Operation Enduring Freedom. The United States Marine Corps led doctrinal development on irregular warfare with the publication of the Small Wars Manual in 1940.³⁶ In 1961 and 1963, the Army published a series of four irregular warfare manuals.³⁷ These manuals would carry the Army through until 1992 with the publication of FM 7-98, *Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict*.³⁸ In 1995, FM 100-7 *Decisive Force* introduces the term Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW).³⁹ MOOTW included everything from humanitarian assistance, peace enforcement, counterdrug, and irregular warfare. It was not until after Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom turned into large-scale counterinsurgencies that the Army

³⁵Department of the Army, *FM 3-0, Operations* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2011), 1-4, 2-2. FM 3-0 discussed irregular warfare and the forms of irregular warfare to include hybrid threat in the introduction by GEN Dempsey, in chapter one under the changing nature of the threat and the law of land warfare, and chapter two under spectrums of conflict; and, Department of the Army, *ADRP 3-0 Unified Land*, vii, 1-6. ADRP 3-0 states that it does not formally define irregular warfare, and mentions counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare as examples of operations with no definition or description provided.

³⁶U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual United States Marine Corps* (Washington DC, Department of Defense, 1940).

³⁷FM 31-15 *Operations Against Irregular Forces* published May, 1961; FM 31-21 *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations* published September 1961; FM 31-16 *Counterinsurgency Operations* published February 1963; FM 31-22 *Counterinsurgency Forces* published November 1963.

³⁸Department of the Army, *FM 7-98 Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict*. FM 7-98 was preceded in 1990 by *FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* a joint Army and Air Force publication.

³⁹Department of the Army, *FM 100-7 Decisive Operations: The Army in Theater War* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 1995), 160.

developed new doctrine. These doctrinal references captured the lessons of passed conflict, but also sought to correct a de-emphasis on irregular warfare in the lack of doctrine in the 80s and 90s.

In December 2006, the Army published *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*.⁴⁰ Under the leadership of then Lieutenant General David Petraeus, the Combined Arms Center commander, it pulled together both military and civilian experts. In 2009, a supplementary *FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency* followed FM 3-24.⁴¹ Together these two manuals helped shape counterinsurgency operations in for the U.S. military.

FM 3-24.2 states five goals for counterinsurgency.⁴² According to FM 3-24.2, these five goals are a requirement for successful counterinsurgency operations at the tactical level.

- unity of effort with host nation (HN) forces for fighting insurgents and building host nation government legitimacy
- continuous control and security of the population
- initiating operations from areas of HN strength into areas under insurgent control
- expanding security and control into areas of insurgent control; and,
- use of information engagements to favorably influence HN and public opinions, and to discredit insurgents.

Israeli Military Doctrine Prior to 2006

Prior to the 2006 Lebanon War, the Israeli military based their planning on three assumptions. First that their military was prepared for any conflict, second that they would be

⁴⁰FM 3-24 is a joint Army and Marine Corps (MCWP 3-33.5) publication.

⁴¹Department of the Army, *FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency* (Washington DC, Department of the Army, 2009).

⁴²Department of the Army, *FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, 3-1, 3-2.

able to influence the Lebanese to abandon support for Hezbollah, and finally that they would be able to achieve military objectives quickly with minimal casualties.⁴³ These assumptions were supported by three operational principles.

The first of these principles was the importance of air power. Some within the Israeli military went as far as to believe that the next war would be won exclusively with air power. Air power would be used to rapidly concentrate precision fire power against the enemy causing both physical and psychological paralysis. The use of ground forces was a last resort, and a supporting effort to air power.⁴⁴

The second prevailing principle for the IDF was that future wars would be more low intensity conflict than large conventional wars. This principle meant that ground maneuver was relegated to the bottom of the training priority and ground forces were focused on a threat that looked like the Palestinian Second Intifada.⁴⁵

The last principle was the operational approach called Operational Combat Theory. This theory was championed by then Brigadier General Shimon Naveh. Operational Combat Theory was defined as “total of all military actions and the operations that accompany them, which are subordinate to a single idea and are directed at achieving that goal.”⁴⁶ This theory is based on systems analysis, and was fixated on attacking the enemy’s entire system not just its armed

⁴³Andrew Chadwick, “The 2006 Lebanon War: A Short History,” *Small Wars Journal* (September 11, 2012): 2.

⁴⁴Amir Rapaport, “The IDF and the Lessons of the Second Lebanon War,” The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, <http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/MSPS85En.pdf> (accessed March 16, 2013); 9-10.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 11.

⁴⁶ Amir Rapaport, “The IDF and the Lessons of the Second Lebanon War,” 11.

forces. The IDF adopted this theory at the expense of tactics and strategy.⁴⁷ Operational combat theory relied on designing military objectives which were logical, feasible and met political objectives, planning for operational goals and defining missions for subordinate forces, and executing missions based on the tensions that existed on the ground. This theory is also referred to as design.⁴⁸

Methodology

This monograph analyzes two case studies to extricate the lessons and examples needed to define the nature of an emerging hybrid threat and develop a strategy for an appropriate response. This strategy is intended to enhance the principles of the current Unified Land Operations doctrine. The first case study examines the 2006 Second Lebanon War. The second case study summarizes the TTPs used by the U.S. Army during the ongoing counterinsurgency operation in Afghanistan. Case studies will be examined using operational environment, organization, and training as criteria. Despite the difference in the two conflicts, both provide invaluable lessons that shape the way future hybrid wars can be fought.

The first case study analyzes the 2006 Second Lebanon War using various authors and subject matter experts to form a wide of perspectives on the case study. For example, authors such as Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff in their book *34 Days* provide a view from the perspective of two Israeli analysts.⁴⁹ Dr. Avi Kober, who served in the Israeli Department of Defense, gives another important Israeli point of view.⁵⁰ Additionally, Lebanese military officers

⁴⁷ Ibid., 12.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, *34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008).

⁵⁰ Avi Kober, "The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War," *Journal of*

Brigadier General Elias Hanna and Lieutenant Colonel Hany T. Nakhleh offer an alternative perspective of the conflict.⁵¹ Finally, U.S. authors Stephen Biddle, Jeffery Friedman, Matt M. Matthews, and others provide assessments of the conflict from an outside perspective.⁵² The Second Lebanon War is also examined by looking at the operational environment, the organization of the two opposing forces, and how the conflict participants were trained.

The second case study involves a detailed look at counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. Of interest is the changes the U.S. military underwent to fight a counterinsurgency and the TTPs that were adopted. Summaries of Afghanistan counterinsurgency TTPs include primary sources such as the fifteen vignettes given in *Counterinsurgency on the Ground in Afghanistan*.⁵³ Other sources, such as narratives, from brigade commanders like Colonel John M. Spiszer and Colonel Donald C. Bolduc, provide evidence of the U.S. Army's ability to adapt to the changing environment of modern battlefields and emerging adversaries.⁵⁴

Strategic Studies (2008).

⁵¹Elias Hanna, "Lessons Learned from the Recent War in Lebanon," *Military Review* (2007): 82-89; and, Hany T. Nakhleh, "The 2006 Israeli War on Lebanon: Analysis and Strategic Implications," *Strategy Research Project* (March 23, 2007) <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA468848> (accessed August 11, 2012).

⁵²Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman, "The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy;" and Matt M. Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008).

⁵³Jerry Meyerle, Megan Katt, and Jim Gavrillis, "Counterinsurgency on the Ground in Afghanistan," *CNA Analysis and Solutions* (November 2010) <http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Counterinsurgency%20on%20the%20Ground%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf> (accessed August 11, 2012).

⁵⁴John M. Spiszer, "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan Lessons Learned by a Brigade Combat Team," *Military Review* (January-February 2011) http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20110228_art012.pdf (accessed August 11, 2012); and, Donald C. Bolduc, "Organizing Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan," *Small Wars Journal* (August 4, 2009) <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/organizing-counterinsurgency-operations-in-afghanistan>

The conclusion introduces a model for combating a future hybrid threat. This model involves the synthesis of the two case studies and typifies a force capable of fighting and winning against a hybrid threat. This model is described in terms of the three evaluation criteria used to look at the case studies: operational environment, training, and organization.

Finally, this monograph makes recommendations for preparing the U.S. military to face future hybrid threats. In 1997, the Marine Corps Commandant, General Charles C. Krulak introduced the idea of the three block war. Krulak anticipated that in wars of the future Soldiers would be providing humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and mid-intensity battle all in the same day, all within three city blocks.⁵⁵ While the wars in Lebanon and Afghanistan were broader than three city blocks, Krulak's predictions are no less true. Forces prepared to match an adaptive, flexible enemy can successfully defeat future hybrid threats. The Army should avoid the mistakes of past interwar periods that minimized irregular warfare and focused almost exclusively on combined arms maneuver, sometimes referred to as major combat operations, conventional war, or high intensity conflict. Thus, synthesizing the lessons learned from the 2006 Second Lebanon War, and the TTPs from the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan will lead to a model that may best prepare the U.S. military for the most likely future hybrid threats.

2006 SECOND LEBANON WAR

Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) is a politico-military confrontation between contending states or groups. It is below general war and above routine peaceful competition. It often involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. LIC ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing

(accessed August 11, 2012).

⁵⁵Charles C. Krulak, "The Three Block War: Fighting in Urban Areas," *Vital Speeches of the Day* 64, no. 5 (Dec 15, 1997), <http://search.proquest.com/docview/221470774?accountid=28992> (accessed January 12, 2013), 139.

political, economical, informational, and military instruments. LICs are often localized, usually in the Third World, but they contain regional and global security implications.⁵⁶




Figure 1. Middle East Crisis⁵⁷

Setting the Stage

The present struggle between the Arabs and Israelis began after World War II with the creation of the Israeli state in 1948. Over the next sixty years, Israel engaged in five major conflicts leading up to the Second Lebanon War in 2006. Consequently, each conflict played an important role in shaping Israeli doctrine and the psyche of the country going into the Second Lebanon War.

During the 1948 War of Independence, the Arab League attacked the fledgling state of Israel.⁵⁸ This war set the precedent for Israel in combat. The smaller Israeli force eventually

⁵⁶Department of the Army, *FM 7-98 Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 1992), 1-1.

⁵⁷BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/629/629/5177932.stm (accessed November 28, 2012).

defeated the larger, better-armed Arab League and established the dominance of the Israeli nation and its willingness to fight for its survival. The roots of the IDF formed during this conflict and established a pattern that would be important in 2006: a small regular force with a large reserve force. Another major outcome of the 1948 war was the establishment of Israel's borders, and Egypt's control of the Gaza strip. This issue would play out in the 1956 Sinai Campaign.

In 1952, Lieutenant-Colonel Gamal Abd al Nasser led a group called the "Free Officers" to overthrow the Egyptian king.⁵⁹ The coup was successful and Nasser became the president of Egypt. Nasser began large arms purchases from the Soviet Union, a blockade of Israeli shipping in international waters, and the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956. In the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt trained and supported irregulars the Fedayeen, who conducted attacks in Israel.⁶⁰ In coordination with French and British forces, which were intent on seizing the Suez Canal, the IDF launched a masterful preemptive strike by parachuting an airborne brigade behind Egyptian lines in the Sinai on October 29, 1956. Israel followed with armor attacks that penetrated as far as the Suez Canal. For the IDF, the Sinai campaign demonstrated its superiority in modern warfare. The significance of this campaign was the validation of Israel's reserve system, which successfully mobilized for the conflict. Of additional importance internationally, the Sinai campaign would spur the creation of United Nations peacekeeping forces for the first time.⁶¹

⁵⁸Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars* (New York: Random House, 1982), 23. The Arab League consisted of the Transjordan (later the Kingdom of Jordan) Arab Legion, armies from Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.

⁵⁹Ibid., 111.

⁶⁰Ibid., 114.

⁶¹Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars*, 140.

Following the 1956 war, Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. In the Arab world, radical revolts occurred in Iraq and Syria.⁶² The Six Day War in 1967 saw the IDF again execute a preemptive attack against an Arab threat on its southern, eastern, and northern border. The campaign itself was an expert stroke wherein the Israeli Air Force (IAF) destroyed the Egyptian, Syrian, Jordan, and Iraqi air force within the first 48 hours of combat.⁶³ Israeli armored forces succeeded in capturing not only the Sinai Peninsula, but also the West Bank from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria. These successes gave Israel a strategic buffer between itself and its neighbors. Israel's over-reliance on air superiority, which would plague it in 2006, began with this campaign.

The Yom Kippur War in 1973 saw the Arabs on the offensive for the first time since 1948. Egypt's President Anwar Sadat used the war as a chance to gain international leverage against Israel in the Middle-East peace process.⁶⁴ In the first four days, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and pushed 15 kilometers into the Sinai. In the north, Syrian forces penetrated to the Golan Heights. The Israelis, initially caught off guard, pushed both armies back to the pre-war borders and beyond.

Both sides claimed victory. For Israel, it was a tactical and operational victory, but for Sadat, the war was a strategic victory that resulted in the 1979 Camp David Accords.⁶⁵ Israel believed that its intelligence network would provide them 48 hours warning before any attack. This reliance on early warning in Israeli intelligence would also play a major role in 2006.

⁶²Ibid., 146.

⁶³Ibid., 153.

⁶⁴David T. Buckwalter, "The 1973 Arab-Israeli War," n.d., <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/pmi/1973.pdf> (accessed September 29, 2012), 129.

⁶⁵David T. Buckwalter, "The 1973 Arab-Israeli War," 129: The Camp David Accords establish the first peace treaty between Israel and one of its neighboring countries, Egypt.

A preamble to the IDF's attacks in Lebanon in 1978 and then its invasion of Lebanon in 1982 occurred during a 1964 Arab Summit in Cairo. The Arab League sponsored the formation of an organization to represent the Palestinian people, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).⁶⁶ The PLO swore to begin an armed struggle against Israel and the formation of a state for the Palestinian people. The PLO suffered a setback in 1970 when after a failed power struggle with Jordan, King Husayn of Jordan expelled the Palestinian fighters who then took refuge in Lebanon, creating conditions for a disastrous civil war in that country.⁶⁷ The 1975 Lebanese Civil War further destabilized the region and gave the PLO more freedom to stage attacks against Israel out of southern Lebanon.⁶⁸

These attacks led to an incursion by the IDF into southern Lebanon in 1978, which halted at the Litani River. This incursion brought about the creation of the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Despite the presence of UNIFIL, Syrian forces, and Lebanese forces, the PLO continued its terror attacks causing the Israeli to invade Lebanon on June 6, 1982. Israeli policy makers chose an all-out war instead of a limited objective incursion.⁶⁹ The First Lebanon War, also called Operation Peace of Galilee, Israel's strategic and operational goals were the destruction of the PLO.⁷⁰ Israel occupied southern Lebanon until 2000, continuously fighting a guerrilla war against the PLO. This war gave birth to Hezbollah and planted the seeds for the 2006 conflict.

⁶⁶Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2013), 270.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 314-316.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 349.

⁶⁹Daniel Isaac Helmer, *Flipside of the COIN: Israel's Lebanese Incursion Between 1982-2000* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007), 32.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, 35.

Hezbollah: Hybrid Threat in Lebanon

Hezbollah, translated as the 'Party of God', originally formed as militant resistance to the Israeli occupation, and eventually evolved into a political and military organization. Today, Hezbollah's paramilitary capabilities rival and even exceed the capabilities of the Lebanese military and police.⁷¹ In 1992, Hezbollah expanded into the political realm winning eight seats in the Lebanese parliament and subsequently won ten seats in 2009. However, the U.S. State Department strictly designates Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.⁷² Under the proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, the United Nations has classified various acts of terrorism as criminal offenses.⁷³ This classification further ties Hezbollah to the definition of a hybrid threat.

Hezbollah, a Shiite Islamic organization, receives significant backing from both Iran and Syria. This backing comes in the form of economic, political, and military aid, which in turn gives Hezbollah significant capability in not only the Middle East, but also Africa, Europe, and South America. Iran also provides Hezbollah with a capable training cadre.⁷⁴ All these together make Hezbollah more than just a non-state actor within the country of Lebanon. Hezbollah, in

⁷¹Casey L. Addis and Christopher M. Blanchard, *Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 1, 9.

⁷²U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Terrorist Organizations"(January 2012) <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm> (accessed September 14, 2012).

⁷³United Nations, "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996 Sixth Session (28 January-1 February 2002)," <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/248/17/PDF/N0224817.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed March 26, 2013).

⁷⁴Charbel Moussa, Bashir Helou, George Kanaan, and John Faddoul, "Triad of Terror: Syria, Iran and Hezbollah," *American Lebanese Assembly* (May 2011), <http://americanlebaneseassembly.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Triad-of-Terror.pdf> (accessed September 14, 2012).

many respects, is a state within a state, an organization with political and military power that does not answer to the established government of the nation in which it resides, nor to international norms and institutions such as the United Nations. This is an important distinction when discussing a hybrid threat.

The July War, the name given to the 2006 conflict in Lebanon, saw the IDF fight against a very different enemy from its previous conflicts in Lebanon of 1978 and 1982. In 2006, Hezbollah engaged the IDF in an organized fashion, utilizing conventional anti-armor tactics and canalized terrain with prepared defenses in depth. It also incorporated irregular tactics of improvised explosive devices (IED) and blending in with the population. Hezbollah of 2006 organized, equipped, trained, and more importantly prepared specifically to defeat an IDF incursion.

Hezbollah consisted of a core group of regular fighters, approximately 1000 men, and a much larger group of village fighters.⁷⁵ Some of these fighters further organized into anti-tank teams and rocket teams. The short-range Katyusha rocket teams are organized south of the Litani River to engage northern Israel territory. The teams further divided responsibility for setting up launchers, positioning the rocket, and firing the rocket.⁷⁶

Hezbollah organized its fighters into small squad-sized elements with a highly decentralized chain of command, which gave junior leaders a lot of autonomy. The village fighters organized to defend their own villages, which provided them all the motivation they

⁷⁵Andrew Exum, "Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment" The Washington Institute of Near East Policy (December 2006), http://www.lebanonwire.com/0701MLN/Hezbollah_at_war.pdf (accessed October 10, 2012), 5.

⁷⁶Matt M. Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War*, 17.

needed to fight.⁷⁷ This also lent itself to their ability to stash their weapons and blend back in with the population, a characteristic of a hybrid threat.

As Bowers' asserted in his theory about hybrid threats, technology set Hezbollah apart from other insurgent groups. Hezbollah made use of advanced anti-tank systems, long-range missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, night vision devices, and radio intercept technology.

The most remarkable difference was the long-range shore-to-ship missiles Hezbollah used effectively on July 14, 2006, against the Israeli Naval Ship (INS) *Hanit*. The missile was an Iranian C-802 radar-guided anti-ship missile, which resulted in four sailors killed and the crippling of the ship.⁷⁸ Echoing the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Hezbollah effectively used anti-tank missiles, including RPG-29s and AT-14 Kornet E, to counter Israel's armor advantage.⁷⁹ The AT-14 is a laser, beam riding, guided anti-tank missile fitted with a tandem, shape-charge warhead.⁸⁰ The AT-14s though not the ubiquitous RPG-7 used effectively in the Battle of Mogadishu, require both training and skill.⁸¹

⁷⁷Ibid., 11.

⁷⁸Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, *34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon*, 101.

⁷⁹The AT-14 has a 5-kilometer range versus the Merkava Mark IV IDF main battle tank with an estimated 3-kilometer range. The RPG-29 has only a 500-meter range but its tandem warhead was able to effectively penetrate the Merkava Mark IV during the Second Lebanon War. Specifics of the Merkava Mark IV weapons ranges and armor thickness are not available on open sources.

⁸⁰“Kornet E Anti-Tank Missile, Russian Federation,” army-technology.com, <http://www.army-technology.com/projects/kornet/> (accessed October 10, 2012).

⁸¹During the Battle of Mogadishu, Somali fighters used RPG 7s to shoot down two U.S. MH-60 Black Hawks.

In addition to advanced weapons, Hezbollah possessed the capability to monitor the IDF's communications networks and cellular phones.⁸² Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard trained and equipped Hezbollah with unmanned aerial vehicles. These examples demonstrate that Hezbollah possessed significant technology, rivaling some nation-states, and the training to use it.

In preparing for the war, Hezbollah had come to know its enemy, in every sense of Sun Tzu's dictum: know the enemy and know yourself.⁸³ Hezbollah analyzed not only the 1978 and 1982 conflicts, but also the performance of Israel's air power in previous Arab-Israeli conflicts. Hezbollah conducted detailed terrain analysis, recognizing that the IDF's heavy armored forces would be canalized by the terrain. The Hezbollah defensive strategy was to use improvised explosive devices, and fixed, well-camouflaged anti-armor positions in depth to delay and destroy ground advances.⁸⁴ While this defensive tactic was conventional in nature, Hezbollah had no plans to hold ground; they only had to survive to claim victory. The combination of a conventional defense with a guerrilla strategy is what makes Hezbollah a hybrid threat.

Hezbollah focused their attacks on breaking the will of the Israeli people.⁸⁵ Hezbollah leaders rightfully believed that Israel had a low tolerance for casualties. This attitude is called Post-Heroic Warfare, and meant that the Israeli government and the public was casualty averse.⁸⁶

⁸²Avi Kober,. "The Israel defense forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the poor performance?," 20.

⁸³Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 84.

⁸⁴Elias Hanna, "Lessons Learned from the Recent War in Lebanon," 85.

⁸⁵Department of Defense, *JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2011), xxi: A center of gravity is a source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.

⁸⁶Edward Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 3 (May 1995): 109-22. Post-heroic warfare is the belief that technology can be used to avoid high casualties. When significant casualties occur, the public is disillusionment with effectiveness of

This attitude influenced decisions from the strategic level down to the tactical level. Hezbollah used the continuous barrage of short-range Katyusha rockets to produce mass casualties and indirectly affect the will of the Israeli people. On the morning of July 12, 2006, beginning with a diversionary rocket attack, an elite Hezbollah commando unit infiltrated the Israeli border and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers.⁸⁷

2006 Second Lebanon War

In 2006, the Israeli Defense Force had not been at war for 24 years. Commanders from the division level and below had no combat experience.⁸⁸ Unique to this conflict was the fact that the war was fought between a nation-state and a non-state actor. Since the first Intifada in 1987, the Israeli army had been on policing duty, and was accustomed to fighting numerically inferior, poorly trained and equipped terrorists. In 2006, Hezbollah was a well-equipped, trained, and motivated force. During the 34-day operation, Hezbollah fired almost 4000 rockets into northern Israel, culminating with a barrage of 250 rockets on the final day. Reliance on effects-based doctrine and a lack of training for operations other than COIN explains Israel's lack of success in the Second Lebanon War.⁸⁹

technology, and in the military and the political leaders who oversold the public on technology. A good example of post-heroic warfare is Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1993; after the Battle of Mogadishu where 18 Soldiers were killed and two helicopters shot down, the United States quickly withdrew its forces.

⁸⁷Andrew Chadwick, "The 2006 Lebanon War: A Short History," *Small Wars Journal* (September 11, 2012): 1.

⁸⁸Avi Kober, "The Israel defense forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the poor performance?," 14.

⁸⁹Russell W. Glenn, "All Glory Is Fleeting: Insights from the Second Lebanon War," RAND Corporation (2012) <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG708-1> (accessed October 31, 2012), xii-xiii.

For at least a year prior to July 12, 2006, Hezbollah prepared and rehearsed for the infamous kidnapping that would eventually trigger the Second Lebanon War. In truth, Hezbollah had been preparing since 1993. Although prepared for an Israeli ground assault during a retaliatory attack by the IDF, Hezbollah was unprepared for the massive air and artillery assault, a lesson Hezbollah would carry forward to 2006.⁹⁰ Beginning in 2005, Hezbollah made three attempts to kidnap an Israeli soldier.⁹¹ While none succeeded, each bore the trademarks of Hezbollah: infiltration across the Israeli border, and mortar, rocket and anti-tank fire used as a diversion.

On the morning of July 12, Hezbollah specifically picked the ambush location in the dead space between Israeli border cameras. The attack began with an explosion, heavy machine gun fire, and a simultaneous rocket attack: rocket attacks were TTP they had used repeatedly before to desensitize the Israeli border patrols. It was over an hour before the first ground unit, a tank platoon, crossed the border. As the platoon advanced toward a nearby village, a large IED killed the entire crew of the first vehicle. As the IDF reacted to this second event, heavy small arms fire engaged the first responders. These events demonstrated that Hezbollah had not only rehearsed and planned the attack, but had accurately identified the avenue of approach ground forces would use to respond and planned a delaying action to allow its team to escape with their captives.

The IDF identified Hezbollah command and control nodes as the operational center of gravity.⁹² It sought to attack these with air power, as well as attack Lebanese infrastructure to influence the Lebanese government and people no longer tolerate an armed and active Hezbollah;

⁹⁰Matt M. Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War*, 8.

⁹¹Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, *34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon*, 6.

⁹²Matt M. Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War*, 21.

neither line of operation worked. Hezbollah had decentralized its command and control to avoid such attacks, and the Lebanese government had little control over Hezbollah; Iran and Syria had greater influence over Hezbollah than Lebanon.

The prevailing mindset for Israel's policymakers, prior to the 2006 conflict, was that the might of the IDF conventional force would represent a significant enough deterrent that Israel would not face another major war. Israel expected that future wars would be low intensity conflicts fought by air power and special operations forces.⁹³ The IAF believed that it alone could effectively deal with security threats. Both Desert Storm and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 fueled this over-reliance on air power. Within the first 48 hours of the Second Lebanon War, the IAF effectively neutralized all of Hezbollah's long-range missiles, but it was unable to affect the shorter-range Katyusha rockets. Israel believed that the revolution in military affairs, superior air power, and effects-based operational doctrine, would prevail. Effects-based operations are "planned, executed, assessed, and adapted to influence or change systems or capabilities in order to achieve desired outcomes."⁹⁴ The IDF's operational doctrine published in April 2006 reflected this belief that a revolution in military affairs (RMA) had occurred and therefore placed a heavy reliance on technology.⁹⁵

Advances in technology, systems development, operational innovation, and organization spawn revolutions in military affairs.⁹⁶ Modern RMA theory came about after Operation Desert

⁹³Efraim Inbar, "How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War," *Middle East Quarterly* XIV, number 3 (Summer 2007), <http://www.meforum.org/1686/how-israel-bungled-the-second-lebanon-war> (accessed October 12, 2012).

⁹⁴U.S. Air Force, *AFDD 2, Operations and Organization* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2007), 13.

⁹⁵Avi Kober, "The Israel defense forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the poor performance?," 18.

⁹⁶Steven Metz and James Kievit, "Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs," (June

Storm which theorist believed was the last war of the industrial age or the first war of the information age. This so-called revolution involved precision weapons, information dominance, standoff platforms, stealth, missile defense, and limited casualties.⁹⁷ For the Israeli's there was a second historical event, the Kosovo War, which influenced their thinking. Operation Noble Anvil or Allied Force was the air campaign against Serbian military to force their withdrawal from Kosovo. The campaign lasted from March to June 1999 and resulted in the withdrawal of the Serbian military without NATO boots on the ground.⁹⁸ The Israeli's saw the advance in information dominance, precision guided munitions, and air superiority as a revolution in military affairs. However, critics of RMA countered that the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan during the Global War on Terrorism and the failure of the IDF during the Second Lebanese War invalidated this iteration of RMA theory.⁹⁹

The most important aspect of the IDF's failure against Hezbollah was its unpreparedness to conduct combined arms maneuver. In 2006 combined arms maneuver for the Israeli's would have been the synchronization and coordination of infantry, armor, artillery, air, and engineer units during an attack. Since 2000 or even as far back as 1987, the IDF had been conducting policing operations along with limited counterinsurgency operations. Perishable skills like tank gunnery and the annual training for reservists had been neglected or were non-existent.¹⁰⁰ The

27, 1995), <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/stratrma.pdf> (accessed January 12, 2013), 3.

⁹⁷Ibid., 7.

⁹⁸“Kosovo: Operation Allied Force / Operation Noble Anvil,” [Globalsecurity.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/allied_force.htm), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/allied_force.htm (accessed January 12, 2013).

⁹⁹Scott Stephenson, “The Revolution in Military Affairs: 12 Observations On an Out-of-fashion Idea,” *Military Review* (May-June 2010): 38-46.

¹⁰⁰Matt M. Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War*, 27.

fact that three of the four divisions that took part in the Second Lebanon War were reserve divisions magnified this deficiency.¹⁰¹ Infantry leaders did not know how to maneuver or utilized attached tanks. The IAF decided it would no longer use fix-winged aircraft for close air support, and support for ground maneuver would come from helicopters. Ground forces, used to village clearing operations, often positioned armored vehicles in static positions thus making them vulnerable to attacks from within built up areas. Caution and indecisiveness replaced the bold maneuver warfare that had highlighted Israeli victories in 1967, 1973, and 1982.¹⁰²

In the first five days of the war, Israel conducted only limited raids into Lebanon. The firing of Katyusha rockets into northern Israel forced them to expand their campaign after their efforts to employ effects based operations had failed to curtail the rocket attacks.¹⁰³ On 17 July, the IDF committed a small special operations team into the town of Maroun al-Ras with the purpose of gaining a foothold in Lebanese territory. Within 24 hours, the unit was virtually surrounded and the IDF was forced to commit the equivalent of a brigade size element to extract the team. This battle exemplifies how years of COIN operations against the Intifada had degraded the IDF's combined arms skills, and how little the IDF knew and understood about their enemy.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹Avi Kober, "The Israel defense forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the poor performance?," 30.

¹⁰²Trevor Dupuy, *Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars 1947-1974* (Fairfax: Hero Books, 1984), 336. Israeli armored doctrine emphasized shock, mobility, boldness, flexibility, and aggressiveness; and, Daniel Isaac Helmer, *Flipside of the COIN: Israel's Lebanese Incursion Between 1982-2000*, 41. The IDF employed tactical lessons learned from the 1973 war, such as combined arms, with devastating effects during the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee.

¹⁰³Matt M. Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War*, 43. Israel used the NATO air campaign in Kosovo and the 2003 invasion of Iraq as a model of what effects based operations could accomplish. The intent of their air campaign was to knock out Hezbollah missiles, disrupt their command and control, turn the public support by the Lebanese people against Hezbollah, and force Hezbollah's compliance with Israeli demands.

¹⁰⁴Russell W. Glenn, "All Glory Is Fleeting: Insights from the Second Lebanon War," xii.

Hezbollah used its anti-tank systems not only against armored units, but also against soldiers who used houses for cover, a predominant tactic in Israeli COIN operations, which again demonstrated the adaptive nature of Hezbollah.

Despite the initial challenges, Israeli leadership continued to press the ground offensive with the deployment of three brigades toward the city of Bint Jbeil. The Hezbollah Secretary-General Nasrallah delivered a famous victory speech after Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 from Bint Jbeil and Israeli officials hoped to win a psychological victory by capturing the town.¹⁰⁵ Wishing to minimize the risk of casualties, a single battalion conducted the initial attack, which reflected the preconceived notion the IDF held that Arab forces would scatter and run at the first sight of Israeli tanks.¹⁰⁶ Despite reinforcements and severe fighting, the town never completely came under Israeli control. (see figure 2)

¹⁰⁵Avi Kober, "The Israel defense forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the poor performance?," 45.

¹⁰⁶Parkinson R. Brian, "Israel's Lebanon War: Ariel Sharon and 'Operation Peace for Galilee'." *Journal of Third World Studies* 24, no. 2 (2007), <http://search.proquest.com/docview/233188145?accountid=28992> (accessed January 26, 2013), 70. While the PLO offered initial resistance to the advancing Israeli forces, they quickly retreated to West Beirut. It was the vacuum left by the PLOs retreat that gave rise to the Hezbollah to fill the void.




Figure 2. Battle of Bint Jbeil¹⁰⁷

The degradation of the IDF's ability to maneuver as a combined arms team was further highlighted by the success of the IDF in 1982 when Israeli forces penetrated to Beirut in northern Lebanon in six days; but by August 5, 2006, Israeli forces had penetrated no more than four miles across Lebanon's southern border.¹⁰⁸ Pressured by an impending UN resolution for a cease-fire, Israel sought to expand the war and improve their position at the negotiation table. Deploying four divisions, the IDF's objective was to penetrate to the Litani River. (see figure 3) In each case, the divisions were only able to penetrate short distances, and in one engagement, a textbook anti-armor ambush by Hezbollah at Wadi al-Saluki destroyed 11 out of 24 Israeli tanks.¹⁰⁹ This

¹⁰⁷Matt M. Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War*, 46.

¹⁰⁸Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars*, 349; and, Avi Kober, "The Israel defense forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the poor performance?," 50.

¹⁰⁹Avi Kober, "The Israel defense forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the poor performance?," 55.

spectacular ambush illustrated the lack of training the Israeli forces had in combined arms maneuver and executing simple defile drills.



Figure 3. Final Offensive¹¹⁰

Summary

Looking at the Second Lebanon War through the criteria lens of operational environment, training, and organization several key deficiencies are immediately evident. A majority of the problems center around training, the inability to conduct combined arms maneuver, the past focus on peacekeeping operations, and the over reliance on technology. The IDF launched ground operations before it had sufficient intelligence preparation of the battlefield and understood the nature of its adversary. Both policy makers and the IDF failed to comprehend the operational environment within southern Lebanon. Past successes and their belief in the RMA and effects based operations caused the Israelis to underestimate the complex environment in Lebanon. The Israeli choice of targeting Lebanese infrastructure also displayed a lack of understanding of the

¹¹⁰Matt M. Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War*, 53.

operational environment. The IDF was organized tank heavy, which contributed to their lack of combined arms capability. Israel seemingly ignored a conclusion from the 1973 Yom Kippur war that found that alone the tank was vulnerable, but not when employed as part of a combined arms team.¹¹¹ The IAF was under the false conception that they no longer provided close air support, which reflects both an organizational and training issue.

The U.S. military has a long history with counterinsurgency. Even using post World War II as a starting point the U.S. military has fought counterinsurgency in Greece, Vietnam, South America, Somalia, and most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹¹² Counterinsurgency has been a prevalent form of conflict since 1945, which makes maintaining the lessons learned from twelve years of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan more important to preparing the U.S. Army for future conflicts.¹¹³

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

We had been hopelessly labouring to plough waste lands; to make nationality grow in a place full of the certainty of God... Among the tribes our creed could be only like the desert grass – a beautiful swift seeming of spring; which, after a day's heat, fell dusty.

-T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*

¹¹¹Trevor Dupuy, *Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars 1947-1974*, 591.

¹¹²Kalev I. Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* (2005): 8-9.

¹¹³Seth G. Jones, "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan," RAND Corporation (2008), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.pdf (accessed November 14, 2012), 132.



Figure 4. Afghanistan¹¹⁴

Setting the Stage

The case study focuses on war/conflict in AFG from 1973 on. While conflict permeates Afghanistan’s two hundred year history as a nation, the road to the U.S. involvement really began in 1973 when the former Afghanistan Prime Minister, Daud Khan, conducted a bloodless coup against the struggling constitutional monarchy of Zahir Shah.¹¹⁵ Subsequently, the Afghan people perceived Khan as trying to return royalty to Afghanistan, which sparked another revolution in 1978 led by the military.

The leftist wing of the Afghan military conducted the revolution and at its conclusion turned power over to leftist politicians when the revolution was complete. The new leader, Nur

¹¹⁴<http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/afghanistan.html>

¹¹⁵Bamber Gascoigne, “History of Afghanistan,” History World, <http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?ParagraphID=itc> (accessed November 5, 2012).

Mohammed Taraki, began taking Afghanistan along lines of communist reform, including land redistribution and women's rights. However, by March of 1979, the Muslim population declared a jihad against Taraki (Taraki later dies of a mystery illness after his capture). The ensuing instability opened a window for the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan.¹¹⁶

In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded and installed a puppet leader, Babrak Karmal. This began the ten-year struggle of the Soviets against the Mujahidin guerrilla fighters of Afghanistan, backed in part by the United States. The Soviet War in Afghanistan gave rise to another organization, the Taliban, and its leader Mullah Omar.¹¹⁷ The Taliban preached a fundamentalist Muslim philosophy that was appealing to the population after the Soviet's withdrawal in 1989. In September 1996, the Taliban forces seized the capital of Kabul and established itself as the new ruling government. The ruthless Muslim fundamentalist rule of the Taliban and their strict adherence to Shar'ia Law traumatized a once hopeful population.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶Bamber Gascoigne, "History of Afghanistan," History World.
<http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?ParagraphID=itc> (accessed November 5, 2012).

¹¹⁷Laura Hayes, Borgna Brunner, and Beth Rowen, "Who Are the Taliban," Infoplease (2007). <http://www.infoplease.com/spot/taliban.html> (accessed November 5, 2012).

¹¹⁸"What is Shar'ia", Barnabas Aid (January-February 2007)
http://www.barnabasfund.org/_Images/BF/9_Baid/bfaid-jan-feb07.pdf (accessed November 9, 2012), i-iv. Muslim scholars developed Shar'ia law over the history of Islam, which governs every aspect of a person's life. Sharia law is binding at all levels: individual, society, and state. The Muslim endeavors to live his religion; and, "On the Five Fundamental Principles of Islam," Teachings of Islam, <http://imamshirazi.com/fiveprinciples.html> (accessed January 12, 2013). There are five fundamentals of Islam: the oneness of the creator (the creator is the cause and effect of all things), the justice of the creator that man will be rewarded or punished for his deeds (Muslims do not believe in predetermined destiny), prophets who are above all others and their word is accepted without question as the guidance of the creator, leaders who provide guidance or Imam (they are one step below prophets, there have been 12 Imams), and resurrection or the belief that all shall one day be resurrected and face the ultimate judgment for their deeds.

Another figure and organization that had its roots in the Soviet-Afghanistan War was Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda.¹¹⁹ Bin Laden and his organization worked closely with Omar and the Taliban to establish Afghanistan as a sanctuary and terrorist training ground. It is from Afghanistan that Al Qaeda matured into an international terrorist network and launched attacks against the western world.

In the northern reaches of Afghanistan, the army of the Northern Alliance, under Ahmed Shah Masood continued to resist the repressive regime of the Taliban. After September 11, 2001, the Northern Alliance became the natural allies of the United States. When initial diplomatic requests for the Taliban Government of Afghanistan to turn over Osama Bin Laden failed, the United States utilized special operations forces in conjunction with the Northern Alliance armies of Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban and rebuild Afghanistan as a democratic republic. Although the Taliban and Al Qaeda were defeated, they were not destroyed and most escaped across the porous eastern Afghanistan into Pakistan in order to reorganize and refit.¹²⁰

When the United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, much of the spotlight shifted from the fledgling nation of Afghanistan. This allowed for the Taliban and other terrorist networks to make a resurgence in Afghanistan and limited COIN operations became a countrywide counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan. As of this writing, the United States plans to drastically draw down combat forces in Afghanistan in 2014. The fighting in Afghanistan for 13 years shaped the U.S. Army leaders at all levels from mid-level non-commissioned officers to senior military officials on how to train and conduct war. The focus of training became COIN and

¹¹⁹Bill Moyers, "A Brief History of Al Qaeda," Bill Moyers Journal (2008), <http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/07272007/alqaeda.html> (accessed November 5, 2012).

¹²⁰Seth G. Jones, "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan," 29.

the preparation for deployments, but in order to prepare for COIN, the U.S. military had to understand the nature of the insurgent.

Taliban: Hybrid Threat in Afghanistan

The Taliban, who get their name from the Arabic word for student “taleb,” are the largest and best organized of the insurgent groups in Afghanistan.¹²¹ As already described in this monograph, the Taliban’s goal is to re-establish a fundamentalist Sunni government in Afghanistan. The Taliban maintain anywhere from 5,000-10,000 fighters, organized as a shadow government within Afghanistan.¹²²

The Taliban have become increasingly adept at utilizing conventional and irregular tactics. These include intimidation of the population, propaganda, and armed attacks. The average Taliban fighter operates in rural areas and is most likely a farmer during growing and harvest seasons, and a fighter in between. The Taliban has also increasingly adopted suicide attacks, and utilized support in the form of explosively formed penetrators from Iran.¹²³

The Taliban continues to recruit and train fighters despite the surge of U.S. in Afghanistan. The Taliban operate mobile training camps which focus on small unit tactics compared to Ranger training in the U.S. Army.¹²⁴ Attacks have become increasingly complex including mortars, rifle propelled grenades, and machine guns. Additionally, Taliban fighters

¹²¹Pierre Tristam, “History of the Taliban: Who They Are, What They Want,” <http://middleeast.about.com/od/afghanistan/ss/me080914a.htm> (accessed November 14, 2012).

¹²²Seth G. Jones, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” 39.

¹²³“Afghanistan: Taliban Tactics,” *The New York Times* (June 17, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/15/news/15iht-15.oxan.6152417.html?_r=0 (accessed March 28, 2013).

¹²⁴ Karen DeYoung, “Taliban Surprising U.S. Forces with Improved Tactics,” *The Washington Post* (September 2, 2009), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-09-02/world/36788859_1_nato-troops-taliban-nato-forces (accessed March 28, 2013).

have become increasingly sophisticated by utilizing radio silence prior to attacks and prepping the area to reduce their signature.¹²⁵ This demonstrates many of the hybrid threat characteristics by combining irregular and conventional tactics as well as more advanced forms of attacks.

An insurgency is both a political and a military organization, which has time on its side. In Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, the insurgents fight not only against the government and against what they see as a foreign occupying force, the United States' military. In Afghanistan, the insurgents do not have to defeat the U.S. military; they simply have to outlast them. Their goal is to exhaust the will of the U.S. people, and undermine public support of both the U.S. and Afghanistan.¹²⁶

In Afghanistan, the Taliban function as a shadow government across the country. They have established provincial governors, courts, and levy taxes. Taliban fighters claim to provide security for the population, and protect their Muslim identity.¹²⁷ A shura or consultative council is organized by the Taliban to deal with military, propaganda, finance, religious, political and administrative issues. These factors organize the Taliban as non-state actors operating militarily and politically within a sovereign country.

The present insurgency in Afghanistan also includes Haqqani Network, Hezb-i-Islami, foreign fighters, tribal insurgents, and criminal networks.¹²⁸ In order to maintain the unclassified nature of this monograph, this section addresses only those insurgent groups researched through

¹²⁵ Karen DeYoung, "Taliban Surprising U.S. Forces with Improved Tactics."

¹²⁶ Tim Foxley, "Countering Taliban Information Operations in Afghanistan," *Prism* 1, no. 4 (Sept 2010), 81.

¹²⁷ Thomas Joscelyn, "The Taliban's Shadow Government," *The Long War Journal*, http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/09/the_talibans_shadow_government.php (accessed March 28, 2013).

¹²⁸ Seth G. Jones, "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan," 37.

open sources. While this list may be outdated, it provides a good representation of the complexity of the environment in Afghanistan.

The Haqqani Network is also one of the better-known and well-organized insurgent organizations in Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network originally organized under the Taliban and named itself for a Soviet occupation era fighter, Jalaluddin Haqqani. His son, Siraj Haqqani, is the current head of the organization.¹²⁹ The Haqqani operates in southeastern Afghanistan, along the Pakistan border, and supports the Taliban's goal of creating an Islamic state.

The Hezb-i-Islami is an insurgent group formed by a former Soviet occupation era fighter Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.¹³⁰ As an insurgent group, Hezb-i-Islami cooperates with other insurgent forces in Afghanistan, but their primary goal is establishing Hekmatyar as the leader of Afghanistan. In recent years, the group has cooperated with the current government of Afghanistan and entered the political process.¹³¹

The remaining three groups fall into very general categories. Some foreign fighters may join organized groups like the Taliban, while others simply fight the holy war (Jihad) against the coalition forces. Many tribal insurgents fight for their own tribe's place in Afghanistan where Pashtuns makes up 42% of the population and six other tribes making up the majority of the remaining population.¹³² Finally criminal organizations, which along with insurgents grow

¹²⁹Jeffrey A. Dressler, "The Haqqani Network," Institute for the Study of War (October 2010), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_Network_0.pdf (accessed November 14, 2012), 2.

¹³⁰"Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin," Institute for the Study of War, <http://www.understandingwar.org/hizb-i-islami-gulbuddin-hig> (accessed November 14, 2012).

¹³¹Ibid.

¹³²"The World Factbook," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> (accessed January 12, 2013).

poppies used primarily for the production of Opium, which is then sold to finance crime or insurgency.¹³³

Joint doctrine defines insurgency as a movement whose endeavor is to overthrow the legitimate government of a state through subversion and armed conflict.¹³⁴ Counterinsurgency, a subset of irregular warfare, is the efforts by a government to defeat an insurgency. Doctrine drives the military's involvement in counterinsurgency and provides a common understanding for military forces involved.

Operation Enduring Freedom

“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”

-Carl von Clausewitz, On War

The above statement made by Carl von Clausewitz is perhaps the single most important factor when fighting a counterinsurgency (or hybrid threat). Often the government is slow to recognize that it is involved in an insurgency, often Soldiers are slow to acknowledge that they cannot kill their way out of an insurgency. The lessons learned center around the population as the center of gravity in a COIN environment. Building capacity and security helps to protect the population, increases rule of law, and gives the people confidence in their government. Restraint prevents the counterinsurgency force from alienating, angering, or turning the population away from the government.

¹³³<http://www.opioids.com/poppy.html> (accessed November 28, 2012): The opium poppy or papaver somniferum, is a grown for the narcotic use, produced from the pollen in the bud of the plant. Besides illegal opium, the poppy is used in the production of morphine.

¹³⁴Department of Defense, *JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 167.

In his commander's guidance, General Stanley A. McChrystal, then the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander stated, "A military force, culturally programmed to respond conventionally to insurgent attacks, is akin to the bull that repeatedly charges a matador's cape only to tire and eventually be defeated by a much weaker opponent."¹³⁵ McChrystal renounced the idea that insurgency can be defeated by attrition. For example, in a vengeance culture like Afghanistan, the killing of two insurgents causes their families to seek revenge, which may increase the insurgents' ranks by ten or twenty.¹³⁶

One of the most enduring lessons from OEF is that solutions must be Afghan in nature. Neither the United States on its own nor the US utilizing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) can impose a western solution that will endure. Afghan solutions must drive government, security, and economic reform. McChrystal's guidance reiterated this by stating that it is the Afghan people who will decide the victory of the counterinsurgency conflict.¹³⁷ Military leaders had to create unity of effort among Afghan forces and civilians, coalition partners, and non-government organizations in order to support the Afghan people achieve a peaceful, stable Afghanistan.¹³⁸

In a counterinsurgency, safety of the population is the starting point for success. In Afghanistan, where the population is spread across 34 provinces and often small, isolated villages, security is a difficult objective. Special Operations Command uses Village Stability

¹³⁵ Stanley A. McChrystal, "ISAF Commander's Guidance," http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf (accessed November 11, 2012), 2.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹³⁸ John M. Spiszer, "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan Lessons Learned by a Brigade Combat Team," 77.

Operations (VSO) to achieve the goal of local population confidence. VSO is part of “bottom-up” stability operations and is oriented towards strategically important, insurgent-controlled rural areas with little or no Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) presence.¹³⁹ An essential part of VSO is establishing local U.S. forces presence, referred to as a Village Stability Platform (VSP), and recruiting and training local villagers for Afghan Local Police (ALP). Local leaders’ approve the establishment of VSPs, therefore not forcing a U.S. presence on a village, and gets local buy-in to the program. Local village elder nominate potential ALP, which represents a community trying to secure itself. The final two goals of VSO is to create a link between the village, district, and provincial government, and then to transition security to the Afghans.

ALP and VSO are part of the line of effort to building capacity within the Afghan Security Force (ANSF), which included both the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA).¹⁴⁰ For some units this endeavor was only a small part of their overall campaign plan, but in order to develop security this operation had to become the primary mission for Brigade Combat Teams.¹⁴¹ McChrystal charged that at all levels of ISAF forces are

¹³⁹COL Ty Connett and COL Bob Cassidy, “Village Stability Operations: More than Village Defense,” *Special Warfare* (July-September 2011), http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/archive/SW2403/SW2403VillageStabilityOperations_MoreThanVillageDefense.html (accessed November 10, 2012).

¹⁴⁰Department of the Army, *ADRP 3-0 Unified Land Operations*, 4-5: A line of effort is a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts towards establishing operational and strategic conditions. In this case the line of effort is building capacity within the ANSF, the establishment of VSO and training of ALP are one task within that line of effort.

¹⁴¹John M. Spitzer, "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan Lessons Learned by a Brigade Combat Team," 75.

responsible to live, train, plan, and operate with ANSF.¹⁴² Indigenous forces, not external forces, win counterinsurgencies.¹⁴³

Counterinsurgency operations must be coordinated and synchronized under a single command with unity of purpose and unity of understanding.¹⁴⁴ This is important in a country the size of Afghanistan. Currently Afghanistan has a dual command structure under NATO and ISAF.¹⁴⁵ There is an additional disparity between the goals and objectives of each command, and even under ISAF a difference between the goals of conventional forces and special operations forces.¹⁴⁶ To conduct effective operations, COIN practices must be integrated in all operations at all levels, and not thought a separate line of operation.¹⁴⁷

While basic battle drills (react to contact, enter and clear a building, etc.) remain the same for small units (company size elements or smaller), counterinsurgency places a new demand on leaders to show restraint.¹⁴⁸ Over the last decade of COIN operations, a hard-learned lesson has been restraint.¹⁴⁹ Condolence payments for civilians killed or injured through collateral damage

¹⁴²Stanley A. McChrystal, "ISAF Commander's Guidance," 5.

¹⁴³Seth G. Jones, "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan," 9.

¹⁴⁴Donald C. Bolduc, "Organizing Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan," 1.

¹⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*; and, Department of the Army, *ADRP 3-0 Unified Land Operations*, 4-5: A line of operation is a line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and that links force with its base of operations and objectives.

¹⁴⁸John M. Spiszer, "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan Lessons Learned by a Brigade Combat Team," 75.

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*

has been in the hundreds of thousands dollar range or higher.¹⁵⁰ Restraint is more than a shot or no-shot scenario, for young leaders it is accepting additional risk in order to build trust and confidence with the local population.¹⁵¹

Unlike high intensity conflict, COIN is small unit centric. Furthermore, it is often junior leaders, officers and non-commissioned officers that are making decisions that can have ramifications to the strategic level.¹⁵² In Afghanistan, it is common to find platoon or even squad size outposts.¹⁵³ These small combat outposts support an overarching principle of COIN, that security of the population is a key to depriving insurgents of their support base. Operating in small units brings with it an inherent risk. The Battle of Wanat, in July 2008 demonstrated this risk, when 200 insurgents determined to overwhelm the small outpost attacked a U.S. platoon and ANA detachment.¹⁵⁴ After a nine-hour battle, the enemy eventually withdrew due to the application of close air support, artillery support and the raw determination of the infantry platoon

¹⁵⁰John Ryan, "Condolence Payments to Afghans Total Millions," <http://www.armytimes.com/news/2012/01/military-afghanistan-condolence-payments-millions-012312w/> (accessed January 12, 2013).

¹⁵¹John M. Spiszer, "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan Lessons Learned by a Brigade Combat Team," 75.

¹⁵²Rodger Shanahan, "Strategic Corporal or Tactical Strategist?" <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/07/29/Strategic-corporal-or-tactical-strategist.aspx> (accessed January 12, 2013).

¹⁵³Basici Catanzaro and Kirk Windmueller, "Taking a Stand: Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police," *Special Warfare* 24, no. 3 (July-September 2011): 32-34. Village Stability Platforms are manned by small special operations teams sometimes with squad augmentation from general purpose forces or ANSF; and , Fred Baker, "Combat Outpost Serves as Front Line in Afghanistan Fight," <http://www.army.mil/article/19059>(accessed January 12, 2013). In addition Wanat was a platoon size combat outpost.

¹⁵⁴Combat Studies Institute, *Wanat, Combat Actions in Afghanistan, 2008*(Leavenworth, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 141-194.

at the outpost, but Wanat clearly reveals some of the inherent risk in small unit COIN operations and the importance of combined arms operations.

One of the things that make counterinsurgency in Afghanistan different is the fact that the country could be classified as a pre-modern society.¹⁵⁵ Majorities of the population lives in small, rural villages, have never left their villages, and have no knowledge of the outside world.¹⁵⁶ This rural population identifies itself more with their tribe and family, than as Afghans.

Understanding this aspect of Afghan society is critical when shaping the operational environment for counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.

FM 3-24 says that the population is at the center of COIN.¹⁵⁷ This means that with the diverse, isolated population of Afghanistan, cultural understanding is the root of gaining a rapport with the people. More importantly is building relationships, one battalion commander in Helmand province decided that citizens would go no more than 72 hours without seeing a Marine or ANP.¹⁵⁸ This policy supported not only gaining a better consideration of the people through continuous interaction, but also supported building a rapport with the people, and promoting security through a continued presence.

¹⁵⁵Liviu Vlad and Adina Negrea, "Afghanistan: Post-Modernizing a Pre-Modern Society?" *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* 9, no. 3 (September 2009): page nr. A pre-modern society is a rural, agricultural based society with no industrial production, and whose identity is centered more on the village level than the large national level.

¹⁵⁶Jerry Meyerle, Megan Katt, and Jim Gavrillis, "Counterinsurgency on the Ground in Afghanistan," 3.

¹⁵⁷Department of the Army, *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, 1-28.

¹⁵⁸Jerry Meyerle, Megan Katt, and Jim Gavrillis, "Counterinsurgency on the Ground in Afghanistan," 40.

An essential part of counterinsurgency is denying insurgents a base of support from the population or sanctuary across international borders.¹⁵⁹ Denying insurgents sanctuary, along with cutting off support to insurgents from the indigenous population denies insurgents two of their primary means of support. In Afghanistan, this outside sanctuary is in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.

Historically the U.S. Army has struggled to achieve this isolation. During the Philippines Insurrection in the early 1900s, the U.S. Army effectively denied the enemy support and sanctuary. Conversely, during the Vietnam War, the Army failed to deny the Vietcong or the North Vietnamese sanctuary in neither Laos nor Cambodia.

Summary

In Afghanistan, insurgency has become more a manifestation of a hybrid threat than simply a radical organization whose focus is to overthrow the legitimate government. Insurgents in Afghanistan resort to irregular tactics, such as IEDs and blending into the population, as well as conventional ambushes and complex attacks, and finally criminal methods by using the sale of illegal drugs to finance operations.

The most prominent criteria for looking at lessons learned in Afghanistan is understanding the operational environment. The shift to major COIN operations reflects a shift in the operational environment. Afghanistan's history even in the last 40 years examined in this monograph reveals that the population is not easily conquered or ruled. The diverse natures of the Afghan people make this even more difficult. The operational environment is also very important in COIN. Security and the population take a higher priority than killing the enemy. The training lessons from Afghanistan are numerous. Most revolve around the idea of training to fight in a

¹⁵⁹Seth G. Jones, "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan," xiii.

COIN environment. While the overall organization of the Infantry was not addressed, the emphasis on small unit operations, Wanat and VSO, reflects that in the COIN environment company size elements and below are being asked to do more, over more battle space, with greater autonomy than ever before.

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan has shaped the U.S. Army since 2001. New doctrine has developed and technologies improved to meet the needs of the force. These lessons have been hard fought and hard won and will shape the Army for the next decade. After investigating both the 2006 Lebanon War and Operation Enduring Freedom, it is now possible to examine a synthesis of the lessons from the two conflicts.

CONCLUSION

“Thus, what happened in wars of the past provides lessons for those who will fight the wars of the future.”

-Brigadier General Elias Hanna, Lebanese Army, Retired¹⁶⁰

The 2006 Second Lebanon War and Operation Enduring Freedom demonstrate two separate conflicts whose armies took two different training paths before hostilities erupted. Prior to the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers, the IDF had trained exclusively on peace enforcement and COIN operations, ignoring the full spectrum of warfare. Their organization had become limited to almost niche capabilities with the army concentrated on armored maneuver, which was separate from the infantry and artillery, and the air force dedicated to strategic bombing. Israel failed to adapt to the changing environment in Southern Lebanon, and failed to recognize that the enemy, Hezbollah, had adapted to defeat the overmatch of Israeli military capability with their own, which included use of advanced technology.

¹⁶⁰Elias Hanna, "Lessons Learned from the Recent War in Lebanon," 82.

In contrast, the U.S. Army prior to 2001 focused training on conventional warfare with combined arms teams engaged with the opposing forces along the central corridor at the National Training Center, reminiscent of Desert Storm, or even the breakout in France during the Second World War. This training relied on the outdated Soviet model, and was better organized for centrally controlled maneuver warfare, and not the decentralized, small unit tactics of counterinsurgency. The rapid collapse of the Taliban government and the perceived success of special operations forces supporting indigenous forces led to a false sense of success. Given more than twelve years of conflict, the U.S. Army eventually adapted to a protracted hybrid threat, but with a steep learning curve in tactics and the importance of cultural understanding. The U.S. Army did not grasp the nuances of Afghan culture, and lacked the training to work in conjunction with the local security forces.

In both case studies, each large force lacked training and familiarity with the decisive form of combat with which the war would be fought. Both case studies accentuate the danger of a weaker force defeating a perceived stronger force. This dichotomy emphasizes that an adaptable force must be able to transition along the entire spectrum of operations. Lebanon and Afghanistan provide a model for the organization and training that the U.S. military must adopt to be prepared to fight future hybrid threats.

In some ways, the two case studies stand in stark contrast to each other; in some ways, the lessons from each conflict are similar. Both case studies represent a conventional force deployed against a hybrid threat, a condition that has become more prevalent in the past century. Addressing both case studies by the three evaluation criteria of operational environment, training and organization, then synthesizing those results produces a descriptive model that can be used to prepare against future hybrid threats.

One of the shared experiences of both case studies was fighting against non-state actors. The IDF has been engaged with other non-state actors like the PLO since its formation in 1964

and fought numerous expressions of a hybrid threat over their nation's history. In 2006, the IDF faced a hybrid threat composed of Hezbollah backed and equipped by Iran and Syria. The Lebanese government and military had no control over the activities of Hezbollah even though it operated within the borders of their country. The government of Lebanon played no role in the conflict between the two opposing sides. In Afghanistan, the hybrid threat was in the form of insurgent forces composed primarily of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The government of Afghanistan actively engaged with U.S. forces to confront the threat. The U.S. Army has a long history, since the wars against Indian nations of the American West during the nineteenth century, of fighting insurgencies and irregular wars, which makes up a part of a hybrid threat. The conduct of the wars against insurgents in Afghanistan after 2001 and against Hezbollah in Lebanon during 2006 each represented a lack of understanding non-state actors. The IDF's experience in 1982 during Operation Peace for Galilee caused them to draw the wrong conclusions about their opponents, while the U.S. Army was unprepared for such a large insurgent outbreak after the completion of their primary objective, toppling of the Taliban government.

Both the U.S. and Israel shared an over-reliance on technological might. The IDF use of effects-based operations did not produce the results demonstrated during Desert Storm and Kosovo. Hezbollah used irregular warfare techniques to counter the IDF's technological superiority, rendering the precision guided munitions of the IAF ineffective at forcing Hezbollah's capitulations to Israeli demands. Meanwhile, the U.S. found it difficult to operate or even identify insurgents in the rugged mountain terrain that dominates Afghanistan. The two nations also faced enemies that could blend in with the population, which made identification and engagement problematic at best. This reveals gaps in both the training and doctrine of the U.S. Army and the IDF. Recognizing these limitations, any synthesis of future organizations and capabilities must not be solely reliant on concepts such as network-centric warfare, effects-based operations, or shock and awe. Technology is a force multiplier, not a method for prosecuting war.

Both the U.S. Army and the IDF had tailored their training inappropriately prior to the two conflicts. The IDF's lack of training in combined arms maneuver showed a shortcoming in organization as well. This is highlighted by the IAF's belief that their role was strategic targeting, not close air support. The IDF's defeat at Bint Jbeil, their lack of ability to penetrate during the final offensive, and the decimation of an armored formation proves the high cost in allowing ones combined arms capability to atrophy. The principal training focus of the U.S. was combined arms maneuver, organized in combined arms teams designed to be fought in division and corps sized elements. In a COIN fight, small units at company level and below executed operations with relative autonomy. The large conventional force organized for maneuver warfare did not necessarily relate well to conditions in Afghanistan. Additionally, the U.S. Army, originally organized to close with and destroy the enemy, had to reorient itself and its doctrine towards stability, restraint, and nation-building operations.

The case studies demonstrate a need for a balance between combined arms maneuver and wide area security in training. The Second Lebanon war lasted only 34 days, during which time the IDF could not learn or adapt fast enough to prevent their defeat. Operation Enduring Freedom which has been ongoing since 2001 has given the U.S. military a long time to internalize the lessons and make changes to tactics, but the cost in lives that occurred during this learning curve has been substantial for modern warfare. This supports a need for increased understanding of the operational environment before engaging in hostilities. It also makes the case for an organization that is flexible in its application and adaptable to fit a variety of opponents and conditions.

Achieving this balance begins with doctrine. The decline in doctrine clearly illustrates how the Army that initially fought the Global War on Terrorism faced a conflict that they had not studied or prepared for. It may be suggested that the conduct of war on the small unit level (battalion and below) does not change between irregular warfare and conventional warfare, a decade of protracted counterinsurgency by these small units would suggest otherwise. Current

doctrine limits the discussion of irregular warfare to only one type, counterinsurgency.¹⁶¹ While ADRP 3-0 provides a definition of hybrid threat, future ULO doctrine should discuss theory, practice, and application of hybrid threats to maintain a balanced readiness capable of fighting simultaneously across offense, defense, and stability operations.

These two individual case studies create a picture of what future U.S. military forces must consider for training and organization, and provide a compelling argument for understanding the operational environment in a conflict. Both conflicts demonstrated that when approaching the unknown first one has to appreciate the environment. The operational environment is more than just terrain and weather patterns. Hybrid threats may become more prevalent as hostile states and non-state actors adapt to defeat possible U.S. military interventions around the globe. Balancing training across the full spectrum of combat operations including stability and nation building will prevent the U.S. military from shifting too far left or right between high intensity conflict and low intensity conflict. The Second Lebanon War revealed the need for a force temporarily oriented toward peace enforcement to maintain a simultaneous focus on conventional warfare. Hezbollah validated how non-state actors or weaker states will move towards combining technologies and tactics in new manners to gain an advantage.¹⁶² Both the July War in Lebanon and Operation Enduring Freedom show that training must encompass all aspects of warfare.

Culture is as much a part of war as the rifles and tactics used by different states. The American way of war differs from the Oriental way of war, which differs from the Islamic way of

¹⁶¹Current published Army doctrine only addresses counterinsurgency in FM 3-24.

¹⁶²James N. Mattis and Frank G. Hoffman, "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars," *Proceedings* (November 2005):18-19.

war, and European warfare.¹⁶³ The Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual* published in 1940 urged the study of natives and racial characteristics.¹⁶⁴ This type of study was as much about understanding the environment as it was about knowing one's enemies. FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* references culture through the manual and calls for "agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders."¹⁶⁵ Looking at the environment, the culture, and the people will help a military force prepare for conflict against a hybrid threat just as much as training and proper organization will. In Lebanon, Hezbollah had changed since its organization in 1982. It had organized a defensive belt, tied into terrain and adapted technology for the purpose of defeating Israeli forces. These were changes that the IDF had not anticipated, and in 34 days of conflict were unable to adapt. Recognizing a hybrid threat enemy is as much about the environment as it is about the tactics used. The U.S. Army had time to adapt to the environment change in Afghanistan, given the long duration of the conflict. Accepting that a solution in Afghanistan had to be embraced and implemented by the Afghans and that security of the population was more important than large scale clearance operations were critical shifts in comprehending the operational environment for the U.S. Army.

Both the Second Lebanon War and Operation Enduring Freedom are examples of combat operations overlapping with stability operations. This was more prevalent in Afghanistan. Building partner capacity has been the main effort, while the battle at Wanat demonstrates that high intensity conflict can occur in a stability environment. In Lebanon, the IAF used strategic bombing to influence the people of Lebanon to reject their support of Hezbollah, the prevailing

¹⁶³Patrick Porter, "Good Anthropology, Bad History: The Cultural Turn in Studying War," *Parameters* (Summer 2007): 49. Porter address the difference between eastern and western warfare.

¹⁶⁴U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual United States Marine Corps*, 13, 18, 25.

¹⁶⁵Department of the Army, *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, 2.

thought was that precision munitions would reduce collateral damage and not turn the local population against operations. As the IDF began ground operations in a conventional manner, although ineffective due to the lack of combined arms, they ignored the more irregular aspects of a hybrid threat and the need to have a plan to interact with the civilian population. Adaptive enemies will not allow us to fight the war we want to fight, but will attempt to exploit the weakness that have been revealed over the last ten years of protracted conflict.

Training the future force for conflicts along the entire spectrum of operations requires leaders and soldiers to become conversant in all manners of warfare. The most important value will be to put training and readiness above competing requirements. As the IDF discovered, a force that had been trained for peacekeeping could not transition to combined arms maneuver. The U.S. suffered the opposite bias. The post Desert Storm force that entered Afghanistan was stopped by a hybrid force; like its predecessor in Vietnam.¹⁶⁶ This false dichotomy is the dilemma that leaders must wrestle with when developing training. Tailoring the training of a force for a specific mission or a single type of war, ignoring the full spectrum of warfare, can create a force incapable of dealing with the unknown.

For Hezbollah, the July War was both a tactical victory over a superior military force and a strategic victory by proving that a non-state actor could stand up against a militarily and technologically stronger army.¹⁶⁷ In Afghanistan, the U.S. Army first resurrected and then revised its capability to fight a non-conventional war. Modern doctrine provides the basis for how to approach preparing for future conflicts, but it is the lessons from history and an eye for the future that will carry the U.S. Army to be ready and trained when the need arises.

¹⁶⁶Antoine Bousquet, *The Scientific Way of Warfare* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 154.

¹⁶⁷Avi Kober, "The Israel defense forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the poor performance?," 6.

War is an uncertain endeavor; future conflicts are unpredictable.¹⁶⁸ What form it will take, its intensity, and its duration cannot be determined they only exist in the unknown of tomorrow. Our enemies have the potential to adapt and change in accordance with what they observed during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and other conflicts over the last half century. War has changed since Desert Storm. Our enemies will not face us head-on. Analysis and synthesis of the past provide a starting point. Contingency planning and war planning can minimize potential surprises, but flexibility, adaptability, and training are the only certainties when confronting the uncertainty of war. General Krulak's hypothesis clearly reinforces what the case studies demonstrated by the necessity to have a flexible and adaptable force able to transition between combined arms maneuver like experienced in Lebanon and building partner capacity like in Afghanistan. Staunch reliance on heavy maneuver forces with visions of the grand sweeps across Europe or the Middle East is not the answer for readiness, nor is COIN the solution to all problems. Achieving a balance is not an easy endeavor, and disciplined initiative must be trained. As the Army prepares for potential conflicts against future hybrid threats, it is important to incorporate the lessons of the past to help shape the operations in the future.

¹⁶⁸Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (New York: Everyman's Library, 1993), 117.

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