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Congratulations on retirement and thanks for your service!

Marlys “Kelly” Cook retired in May after serving 40 years as a soldier and Army civilian. She began her career in the Women’s Army Corps and rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel before retiring in 1998. Ms. Cook joined Military Review in 2004 as the supervisory editor and was later promoted to managing editor. She reviewed and edited over 640 articles, corresponded with nearly as many authors, and managed the production of 50 editions of the journal. The staff of Military Review wish Kelly good luck in all her future endeavors.

Nancy Mazzia retired in May after serving 40 years as an Army civilian. She was affiliated with Military Review throughout her career, having begun as a cold-type operator with the Army Print Plant. Nancy joined the editorial staff of Military Review in 2003 as the book/features editor. She liaised with publishers, subject matter experts, reviewers, and authors as manager of the features and book review program for over 50 editions of Military Review. The staff also wish Nancy good luck in all her future endeavors.
Themes for Future Editions

2014

September-October  Soldier and Noncommissioned Officer Development and Leadership
November-December Budget Constraints and Maintaining Readiness

2015

January-February Training Management: Lost Art or Wave of the Future?/Officer Broadening
March-April The Army and the Congress: Who Really Should Have Responsibility and Authority for Preventing and Responding to Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault?
May-June Ready and Resilient Campaign: Challenges, Issues, Programs
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Cadets in Strategic Landpower
Managing the Talent We Need


The emerging concept of strategic landpower refers to the application of landpower toward achieving overarching national or multinational security objectives.¹ The Army is developing its approach to employing landpower as a globally responsive and regionally engaged Army. Through regionally aligned forces that provide combatant commanders with capabilities for regional missions, the Army will...

¹ Lt. Col. Adrian T. Bogart III is the deputy chief of the TRADOC Commander’s Planning Group. He is a civil engineering graduate from the Virginia Military Institute and a special forces officer with combat service and multiple deployments. Lt. Col. Bogart is an “Afghan Hand” (a CJCS initiative placing specially trained experts in positions of strategic importance to further Afghan-ISAF interoperability) who speaks several languages and has regional experience in USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, and USSOUTHCOM.

Capt. J.D. Mohundro is a strategist in the TRADOC Commander’s Planning Group. He is a logistics officer who was a bio-medical sciences major from Texas A&M University. Capt. Mohundro has a working knowledge of Arabic and Spanish and regional experience in USCENTCOM.
engage forward and maneuver strategically with its partners. As Field Manual 3-22, _Army Support to Security Cooperation_, states:

> Whether providing humanitarian assistance training in Southeast Asia, providing mobile training teams in Africa, or developing interoperability with European partners and regional security organizations, the Army as part of the joint force conducts security cooperation activities to help shape the environment and prevent unstable situations from escalating into conflict, in support of combatant commanders and to achieve national security objectives.

Against this backdrop, what skills will Army leaders need? How can the Army develop leaders who will achieve success in applying strategic landpower? The answer is to start as early as possible in a leader’s career. Future Army leaders need to gain critical skills as cadets, when education can lay a foundation in science, technology, engineering, mathematics, languages, and world cultures. Cadets need to use those skills from the beginning of their careers.

To manage the talent it will need, the Army should ask in what ways education, experiences, and training during college will prepare cadets to apply strategic landpower as officers. The strategic landpower concept can guide how the Army prepares its officers during their undergraduate study and their initial years of service. The Army already has taken some steps toward preparing new second lieutenants for future assignments, but it should improve how it recruits students and manages their careers as officers.

In August 2013, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), and U.S. Army Cadet Command cooperated to provide cultural understanding and leadership development to a group of cadets. The new program embedded three Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Cadets with USARAF country desk officers who accompanied the cadets to Lesotho, Zambia, Djibouti, Uganda, and Italy. According to Maj. Christopher D. Sturm, International Army Programs liaison to USARAF, the skills, experiences, and cultural awareness the cadets gained would provide an important baseline for their future positions. Sturm said, “Ultimately, our Army is stronger in the near and far term because of engagements like this.” The Cadet Overseas Training Mission is one small example of how cadets can gain experience that will prepare them to apply strategic landpower. Such programs should be expanded.

**Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics**

The Army’s approach to recruiting and training cadets has much room for improvement; it has changed little in 20 years. The ROTC program should entice elite students and ensure the Army gets the best possible return on its investment. Currently, the main incentive is college scholarships, but career fields are not guaranteed. Cadets take Army ROTC classes in addition to their chosen area of study. Near the end of their senior year, they are assigned a basic
branch, along with all other graduating cadets. The criteria for branch assignment typically are unrelated to their field of study. A mechanical engineer could be assigned to the transportation corps, or a history major could be assigned as an engineer. According to a report in the AUSA [Association of the United States Army] News, the Army has increased its emphasis on recruiting young men and women for ROTC with backgrounds in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (known as STEM).\(^5\) At the recruiting website www.goarmy.com, the only evidence of this is that potential students can find a link that allows them to see the names of technical careers available in the Army.\(^6\)

Several opportunities exist to earn advanced civilian education degrees while in the Army. These opportunities are through fellowships, broadening assignments, and functional area transfers. The Army expends great effort to make sure officers it selects for assignments in professional fields such as financial management, supply chain operations, or international affairs eventually gain the necessary academic preparation. Unfortunately, the first chance officers have to serve in, and study for, such professional disciplines typically is at the four- or seven-year mark of their careers. These opportunities are past the service obligation for officers who earned undergraduate degrees with ROTC scholarships, so any STEM graduates would have to extend their service to use the skills the Army wants them to have.\(^7\) The Army’s model provides a disincentive to STEM students because it is at odds with the nature of STEM careers. The model likely negates potential benefits to the students and to the Army.

Imagine you are a computer science student at a prominent U.S. university. Your skills will be in high demand as soon as you graduate, and your salary in the private sector could be substantial. You have an interest in military service, and you would also like some financial assistance with college. Under the current model, if you accept an ROTC scholarship targeted to a STEM field of study and you complete your degree, you will spend your first four years in the Army replacing your new technical knowledge with training on tank gunnery, assembly area operations, or logistics. After four years, you will have forgotten most of the technical knowledge you learned in college, or it will have become obsolete, or both. The Army will not concern itself with this issue because it will continue hiring contractors to run its computer systems and networks. The Army pays lip service to the need to recruit students with STEM expertise, but with the piecemeal way it manages their careers, the Army squanders the talent it manages to recruit and the money it invests in scholarships.

Instead, the Army should frame its targeted ROTC scholarships within a new career planning model. Rather than offering STEM scholarships isolated from any career plan, the Army should develop a career planning system with a continuous trajectory starting from college. It should take into account a cadet’s talents and interests years before commissioning to branch assignments. Instead of interrupting the development of cadets’ expertise by placing STEM graduates in typical roles for four or seven years, and then offering them technical opportunities, the Army needs to develop its STEM officers in a continuous manner.
education and career plan starting as cadets and continuing as lieutenants.

U.S. Army Cadet Command reported in September 2013 that it had awarded 348 STEM scholarships worth $8.4 million. These scholarships offers were, no doubt, extended to some of the best and brightest college freshmen in America—scholars, athletes, and leaders. The average SAT (Scholastic Aptitude Test) score for all Army scholarship recipients was more than one standard deviation above the national average. However, the proportion of STEM majors receiving scholarships remained low (estimated at about 20 percent or less of the total).

Bluntly put, the basics of infantry maneuver have changed very little over time. The tools needed to lead a transportation platoon have changed very little as well. The Army does not need financial managers from the Wharton School to fill these roles. It needs financial managers from the Wharton School to fill financial management roles.

To improve the use of ROTC STEM scholarships, high school students still should compete nationally. Selected students still should major in their discipline at a school of their or the Army’s choosing, depending on how the program was arranged. Upon graduation, new lieutenants should be assigned to a basic combat branch for no more than a few years, to “learn the Army.” After this period—and most important, before critical STEM skills could atrophy or become obsolete—the lieutenants should be transferred to
another branch or functional area corresponding with their STEM knowledge. Biochemistry majors could be assigned to CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear) defense units. Computer scientists could be assigned to cyber units. Materials engineers could be assigned to research and development. These positions should be tailored to the talent rather than filled by the usual approach of plugging in an available person to fill the needs of the Army at the time.

Senior Army leaders have said the Army needs highly educated officers to fight and win the technologically advanced wars of today and tomorrow. If this is true, the force needs a better way to recruit and use the talent it covets. Using the same approach as usual and hoping for different results is not going to work.

**Language and Culture**

Central tenets of the strategic landpower are regionally aligned forces and an emphasis on the human interaction in war. Effectively recruiting and training talent for regionally aligned forces is imperative, and among the most important skills needed are language and culture skills. Given that most of the Army’s near-future talent is or soon will be enrolled full-time in higher learning institutions, it makes good business sense to find students who already know or are studying languages and cultures. The best language learners and nonnative speakers of any language are those who started learning additional languages when they were young and maintain their skills through ongoing use and study.

Currently, the Army does not seek to identify future lieutenants with skills in, or even an aptitude for, foreign languages. As we reposition ourselves after two long campaigns, the strategic landpower concept can guide us to correct this faulty practice. The Army should require, or at least encourage, all cadets seeking a commission to take foreign language classes while enrolled in ROTC. Near commissioning, the Army should administer the Defense Language Proficiency Test. The Army could use language proficiency scores to assign officers to regionally aligned units in which they could use their language skills right away. As with STEM graduates, the Army should ensure lieutenants with language skills get to use them before they start forgetting. This practice would be an example of true talent management. Language learners need ongoing
travel and study opportunities to keep language skills current; foreign language skills are perishable. If the Army expects to have officers—and not just contractors—who can support the new engagement warfighting function with needed language skills, it should rethink how it manages foreign language programs.

Administering the Defense Language Proficiency Test to cadets is convenient for the Army because college and university ROTC departments have access to the examinations. The test is already funded. Test control officers are available, and Army Regulation 11-6, Army Foreign Language Program (2009), authorizes testing.

Beyond the languages needed to engage and connect with host-nation partners, the Army has realized its leaders need an understanding of cultures, histories, and numerous local or regional characteristics. Encouraging the study of history is one way to provide this type of knowledge, but the history requirement for ROTC cadets consists of a single military history class.

Programs such as ROTC’s “Cultural Understanding and Language Proficiency Program” help students gain regional expertise. Other study abroad programs are available. The Army could benefit by developing more officer candidates through in-depth study of certain cultures and languages and promptly assigning new graduates to the regions studied.

The U.S. Army Cadet Command has begun offering security cooperation training as part of an increased emphasis on language, regional expertise, and cultures. Each year, as many as 1,400 cadets receive the opportunity to participate in three-week training events with host-nation militaries. Teams of 10 cadets provide rudimentary English language instruction, participate in medical training exercises, and embed with unit training. The cadets learn to appreciate the challenges of cultural differences and language barriers. Many look back on this training as career and life changing.

An infantry platoon leader, for instance, with a basic ability to speak French or Arabic—having earned college credit for a regional studies course or study abroad program perhaps in Morocco—would be invaluable to a battalion commander conducting a security force assistance mission in North Africa. The Army could ensure it has hundreds more new officers entering with these types of skills every year.

The End State

Science, technology, engineering, mathematics, language, and cultural expertise will be core skills for Army leaders in the near future. The Army must prepare its leaders to apply strategic landpower starting when they are cadets and continuing right into their first assignments as lieutenants. A focus on STEM is imperative for the Army to gain technical expertise. Cyber-based mission command systems, web-based training venues, satellite communications, and even basic office automation are the technological instruments for an expeditionary army. Proficiency in at least one additional language will be essential—even a speaking proficiency level of 1+ (able to maintain predictable face-to-face conversations and satisfy limited social demands) can help leaders engage host-nation partners. The strategic landpower concept is ideal for guiding how the Army prepares its officers during their undergraduate study and their initial years of service.

Notes


4. Ibid.


7. Ibid.


10. Complete Army ROTC scholarship data for the 2013-2014 academic year were not available. The estimate of STEM scholarships as 20% or less of the total is based on comparing the fall 2013 STEM scholarships to all ROTC scholarships for the 2012 to 2013 academic year—in which about two thousand ROTC scholarships worth about $41 million were awarded. As the total amount for ROTC scholarships is expected to decline due to shrinking budgets, the percentage attributable to STEM scholarships could be slightly higher. See University of North Georgia website’s “Army ROTC Scholarships FAQs,” http://ung.edu/military-college/scholarships-and-grants/army-rotc-scholarship-faqs.php.

We Recommend

**The American Revolution: A Historical Guidebook**

Frances H. Kennedy, editor, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014

In 1996, Congress commissioned the National Park Service to compile a list of sites and landmarks connected with the American Revolution that it deemed vital to preserve for future generations. Some of these sites are well known—such as Bunker Hill, Valley Forge, and Fort Ticonderoga—and in no danger of being lost; others less so—such as Blackstock’s Plantation in South Carolina or Bryan’s Station in Kentucky—and more vulnerable. But all are central to the story of our nation’s fight for independence. From battlefields to encampments, meeting houses to museums, these places offer us a chance to rediscover the remarkable men and women who founded this nation and to recognize the relevance not just of what they did but also of where they did it.

Edited by Frances H. Kennedy, *The American Revolution: A Historical Guidebook* takes readers to nearly 150 of these sites, providing an overview of the Revolution through an exploration of the places where American independence was articulated, fought for, and eventually secured. Beginning with the Boston Common, first occupied by British troops in 1768, and closing with Fraunces Tavern in New York, where George Washington bid farewell to his officers on December 4, 1783, Kennedy takes readers on a tour of the most significant places of Revolutionary history. From the publisher.
A U.S. marine throws a training grenade during a live fire and movement grenade training exercise at Arta Range, Djibouti, 18 February 2014.

(U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Staci Miller)
On Strategic Understanding
Teaching Strategy from the Ground up

Maj. Matthew Cavanaugh, U.S. Army

Not everyone supports junior officer strategic education. Typical arguments in opposition appear to be based on expediency:

- Keep junior officer education focused on tactics since that is what they will do after graduation anyway.
- There is not enough time for them to study strategy and tactics.
- They only exist to service targets.
- They are not smart enough to comprehend strategic issues.
- If they start developing an opinion about strategic issues, they will become disobedient.

Even Plato considered encouraging higher-level thought in young soldiers a bad idea when he wrote about society’s “guardian[s]” in *Republic.* He counseled, “A young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal.” He preferred young warriors who acted like obedient guard dogs.

Such logic persists in the modern era. Author Ward Just writes that West Point Superintendent Maj. Gen. Samuel Koster said in 1970, “We’re more interested in the ‘doer’ than the thinker.” More recently, this author heard an active duty West Point faculty member stating bluntly that the U.S. Army did not want second lieutenant strategic thinkers. In light of such statements, certain questions emerge: why would junior officers need to think beyond the tactical fight, and if so, to what extent? How would they develop their thinking beyond the tactical level if that were indeed necessary?

As strategic landpower takes shape conceptually, all Army officers—particularly junior officers—will need to develop some level of strategic understanding. The strategic landpower concept is evolving but generally refers to the comprehensive and synchronized employment of landpower to effectively and efficiently achieve national strategic objectives. Junior officers will not need to study strategic planning for the Army to implement this concept. However, junior officers will need to develop sufficient strategic understanding—the comprehension of and ability to communicate broad purpose for the use of force and the relationship between tactical action and national policy—to become effective military leaders in the coming era.

Some consider strategic understanding the exclusive province of those who exercise mission command, defined by Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0 as “the exercise of authority and
direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.” Strategic understanding can underpin the exercise of mission command yet need not be limited by it. Mission command is constrained by the term mission. Missions, for the most part, are designed to support war efforts. Thinking about how one’s mission fits into a war is not just helpful; it is necessary. War is about much more than the tactical fight.

This essay will demonstrate that all Army leaders—including junior officers—must develop their strategic understanding. It will describe how to implement a strategic studies education program for junior officers that is consistent with the Army’s strategic landpower concept.

The Need for Strategic Understanding

The security environment is characterized by exponential growth in digital capabilities and capacity. Mobile phones are prevalent on battlefields across the globe. The powerful communications reach and embedded cameras in cellular phones have enabled a proliferation of civilian journalists and novice war correspondents. The numbers are staggering: in a New York Times editorial, Pico Iyer notes, “10 percent of all the pictures ever taken as of the end of 2011 were taken in 2011.” Steven Metz of the U.S. Army War College writes that wars are now “live cast,” and “made available to a global audience in real or near real time.” Thus it appears that landpower is headed toward the same level of scrutiny that instant replay provides to professional sports. Every war fought on land will be on display, subjecting junior officers to greater examination than their predecessors. British General Sir Rupert Smith described this new paradigm as “war amongst the people.”

In this context, the U.S. Army contributes to shaping the security environment by regionally aligning forces. Regionally aligned forces are units assigned or allocated to combatant commands or those prepared for regional missions. Tactical units are to develop sustained relationships with geographical combatant commands, enabling greater cultural specialization. For example, an article in Parameters by Kimberly Field, James Learmont, and Jason Charland described one brigade’s regional alignment experience. Over about six months while assigned to U.S. Africa Command, the brigade conducted nearly a hundred squad- to platoon-size, short-duration missions in more than 30 countries. In short, the regional alignment of forces means that the Army is sending smaller units to more places—more rapidly than ever before. Junior officers will lead these constantly shifting missions.

If this complexity was not enough to contend with, the junior officer also must have a greater sense of joint, interagency, and multinational partner operations. J.C. Wylie writes about a soldier’s need for joint partners in Military Strategy: a General Theory of Power Control:

> The soldier cannot function alone. His flanks are bare, his rear is vulnerable, and he looks aloft with a cautious eye. He needs the airman and the sailor for his own security in doing his own job.

Even beyond recognizing the utility of airpower and seapower, Army junior officers must comprehend the capabilities of the other forces providing landpower—the Marine Corps and special operations forces. Greater strategic understanding by these officers will help improve interservice coordination.

U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno has at least twice indicated his support for strategic understanding in the profession. In February 2013, he wrote that his aim was to develop junior officers “cognizant of the potential strategic ramifications of their decisions.” Then, in February 2014, he called on the Army to focus on objectives that included “cultivating strategic perspective” and using education “to grow the intellectual capacity to understand the complex contemporary security environment.” These statements provide strong support for expanding junior officer strategic education.

Unfortunately, there is evidence that the Army does not value developing strategic understanding in its junior officers. There is no requirement for any dedicated strategic education at West Point or in the Reserve Officer Training Corps (while the U.S. Air Force Academy, for example, mandates two courses). This gap persists despite the fact that after September 11, 2001, then U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric
Shinseki directed a report on leadership from the U.S. Army War College that concluded the Army should “begin growing strategic leader capability at the pre-commissioning level.” Such preparation might have helped a U.S. Army lieutenant stationed at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. Interviewed recently by journalist Rosa Brooks from *Foreign Policy* magazine, he was asked, “What’s your mission here?” His joking reply included the infamous phrase, “Ours is not to wonder why.” Such a question should never go unanswered by a commissioned member of the profession of arms. A sense of strategic purpose is a necessary element of competent officership. The solution is education for strategic understanding.

**Strategic Understanding: Three Critical Components**

Two pathways to strategic understanding for junior officers are formal and informal education. A prime example of informal education is through self-study. A case in point comes from the WarCouncil.org website—a nonpartisan, multidisciplinary academic forum dedicated to the study of the use of force (primarily) for the profession of arms. While writers can submit contributions to the WarCouncil.org blog, its users also can take advantage of a self-study section with over 20 topics and approximately 300 curated links to videos, podcasts, maps, and graphics. Such informal learning can support formal education.

A formal strategic studies course would be as Gen. Shinseki’s report counseled: each soon-to-be junior officer would begin growing strategic leader capability by taking a course during pre-commissioning education. Simply put, strategic studies is the multidisciplinary study of the use of force. As depicted in the figure, three critical components to a strategic studies course are including multiple academic disciplines, using strategic frameworks, and providing venues for practice and exercises. These three components are essential for an effective strategic studies course.

**Multidisciplinary Approaches**

Consider any real-world conflict, historical or contemporary. Now think of the many perspectives one might consult in analysis to better understand that conflict. There are always many. For example, with respect to the evolving situation in Ukraine, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock writes on his blog, “I believe that nobody can understand the likely outcomes of what is happening unless they bear in mind the historical, geographic, political, and psychological factors at play in these dramatic events.” Journalist Sebastian Junger describes war in the broadest of terms: “I mean, the thing about war—it’s sort of everything ... in one complicated package.”

War is a large, complex activity that is entirely too big to fit into a single academic category. Therefore, the study of war is inherently multidisciplinary. Professor Stephen Biddle of George Washington University explains why the study of war cannot be limited to a single discipline:
War does not have a discipline to study it—it lies on the seams of the way academia is organized ... [So to study war] I think the best skill set is diverse and multi-disciplinary. War is a complicated social phenomenon, and to understand it, it helps to be able to approach it from different directions.

Oxford historian Hew Strachan concurs, calling strategic studies, “a hybrid—a disciplinary mix of history, politics, law, some economics, and even a little mathematics.” Individuals serving in strategic roles tend to come from varied backgrounds; this variation strengthens the collective effort. In a recent survey of 234 “current and former senior government officials” that regularly confront strategic challenges, Paul C. Avey and Michael C. Desch found significant diversity in academic background: 13 separate undergraduate majors, as diverse as biology and foreign language, with another 12 percent in the “other” category.

Accordingly, in the elective military strategy course at West Point, there are 14 separate academic disciplines or fields that contribute to the course syllabus. This approach is beneficial in that it avoids myopic, single-discipline approaches to studying conflict. It imparts the sense of intellectual humility that retired Marine Gen. James Mattis counsels: “We need an educated, adaptable officer corps—not one married to any single preclusive view of war.” Strategic studies education for junior officers should embrace this philosophy.

**Strategic Frameworks**

Using many disciplines necessitates strategic frameworks to funnel diverse ideas for analysis. Some frameworks are general and can span the levels of war. Former British Army officer Emile Simpson describes a helpful tactical and operational framework he calls *Can I? Should I? Must I?:* “‘Can I?’ is a legal question about rules of engagement; ‘should I?’ is about the effect—does the potential action support the purpose of the wider operation; ‘must I?’ is a practical moral question which seeks especially to keep potential civilian casualties to a minimum.

Another framework is the well-known balancing of military objectives (ends), military concepts (ways), military resources (means), and risk, as described by Arthur Lykke. More recently, Irving Lachow provides yet another framework: “Is it legal? Is it moral? Can it be effective? Is it wise?” This broader take on Simpson’s framework is useful for its flexibility. It can help leaders assess nearly any strategic or military action, from intervention to cruise missile strike to humanitarian relief. The wisdom question is open to interpretation, but one useful guideline might be achievement of sustainable ends consistent with national interest—at an acceptable cost.
A final example of a strategic framework is Carl von Clausewitz’s critical analysis (kritik). As he wrote in *On War*, “Critical analysis [is the] application of theoretical truths to actual events.” The objective is to unravel “the hidden processes of intuitive judgment,” an important skill for all military officers. This process, described in detail in a full chapter Clausewitz devoted to the subject in *On War*, helps the student connect theories from many disciplines to military experience.

**Practice and Exercise**

Historian David McCullough once remarked—

The great thing about the arts is that you can only learn by doing it—that’s how you learn things. You can’t learn to play the piano by reading a book about playing the piano. You can’t learn to paint without painting. You have to do it.

Similarly, developing strategic understanding is akin to learning an art. The optimal format for studying strategy provides case studies and real-world practice. To this end, at West Point, military strategy classroom instruction is supplemented by a series of *War Council* events (conducted separately, but in parallel with the website). The basic concept is to invite panelists from different academic backgrounds to provide varied perspectives on a conflict. Three recent events included a total of eighteen panelists from ten separate academic departments.

A March-April 2014 survey revealed overwhelming approval of the *War Council* events. A large majority believed the events helped them better understand the use of force in the international environment and inspired them to conduct further self-study. One of the cadets stated, “Events like the *War Councils* are what I came to West Point for. They are the most relevant developmental experiences that I have had here.”

Finding ways to provide venues for practice and exercise—particularly in assessing current strategic issues—resonates with the target audience for this strategic education.

**Outcomes and Value**

Strategic understanding provides junior officers with the ability to ask the right questions about their environment. As they will never be asked to refight the Civil War, Vietnam War, or Iraq War, focusing on a process for solving new problems as they arise seems appropriate.

There are distinct advantages to a junior officer developing a sense of strategic understanding. The first is a sense of context. War is big and chaotic, and the U.S. Department of Defense is massive. For a new member of this organization, understanding the fundamentals of the use of force can provide a compass for navigation. Second, strategic understanding enables practitioners to be more reflective as they are better equipped to link disparate pieces of military knowledge coherently. Third, military judgment is the essence of the profession of arms. Strategic understanding widens an individual leader’s lens to focus on the relationship between tactical action and national policy. Strategic understanding can be a larger way of looking at platoon leadership.

Although there will always be a few holdouts, the contemporary security environment and the Army profession provide strong indicators that strategic understanding should be required for all commissioned officers, including the most junior. These signals ought not be ignored; there is no better time than now to begin to develop strategic understanding in the junior officer corps—success in future landpower contests demands it.

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*This essay is an unofficial expression of opinion; the views are those of the author and not necessarily those of the U.S. Military Academy, Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or any agency of the U.S. government.*

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Notes

2. Ibid., 65 (2.378d).
15. Ibid.
26. The author adapted this phrase from H.R. McMaster, in a lecture for the “Ground Forces Dialogue” program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 20 March 2013, csis.org/node/42400/multimedia.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 389.
30. For more on critical analysis see Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008).
32. To quantitatively assess the value of the War Council events, the author conducted an email survey from March 30-April 1, 2014. All 41 respondents “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that the events helped cadets “better understand the use of force in the international environment.” Also, 95% were “inspired to further self-study” on the subject. For this and other positive feedback, the War Council teaching approach was awarded the 2014 Apgar Award for Teaching Excellence, selected from among eleven U.S. Military Academy faculty nominations.
As the Army of 2020 takes shape, it is clear that looming budget and personnel cuts mean the Army will have to do more with less. Investment in science and technology can help overcome the limitations, but the breakthroughs needed are 10 to 30 years in the future. The Army needs a strategy for the future, beyond 2020, that provides interim goals for structure and development. The concept to fulfill this need is known as “Force 2025.” The Force 2025 concept outlines the development of the right mix of expeditionary capability to support regional engagement while retaining the capability to win on the battlefield. This will be the force design needed to apply strategic landpower.

The concept of strategic landpower is gaining momentum in military circles and is informing discussions about landpower in the future. It introduces a clear narrative on how landpower supports national security and affects influence and engagement strategies. Army leaders are realizing that our force design, our approach to science and technology, and our force employment decisions will need to change significantly. Our focus as a force must go well beyond the next annual budget cycle.

Recent Force Design Efforts
TRADOC’s effort in framing the strategic landpower concept has been an informative process for Army leaders. According to Gen. Robert W. Cone, it has exposed many shortfalls in our training, resourcing, and developing—a result of constant deployment and readiness requirements over the past
10 years. Cone states that for the last decade, science and technology efforts have aimed to meet the Army’s needs in Iraq and Afghanistan—mostly short-term requirements. The result has been a force focused less on combined arms and more on counterinsurgency and wide-area security. The battle labs, justifiably, became Iraq and Afghanistan. As we slowly lost our long-term, over-the-horizon focus and concentrated on the close fight, we became less well prepared to meet ongoing national security requirements.

More recently, the Army has begun to devote significant resources to exercises and experiments designed to determine and understand over-the-horizon requirements. The Army’s interim solution to meeting those requirements was known as “Army 2020.” This concept directed reshaping the current force structure into a smaller force with balanced capabilities. This would bring the Army back from a counterinsurgency force to an Army capable of fighting across the range of military operations.

The Force 2025 Concept

The next step must lead the Army further into the future. The Force 2025 concept answers the call from U.S. leaders to determine way points, based on strategic landpower requirements, that will guide long-term development and innovation. The Force 2025 concept describes how the Army will implement strategic landpower, employing a force that can stay regionally engaged to prevent and shape while maintaining the capability to win.

Force 2025 integrates two approaches to force design. The first is outlining future concepts and capability requirements to guide investment in science and technology. The second is refining ways to test, evaluate, and field new technologies in order to get them into use rapidly. Force 2025’s goal is to integrate developments in science and technology quickly so we can build a more lethal and agile expeditionary force in the midterm. This will buy us time for scientific breakthroughs in 2030 and beyond.

The starting point for the application of strategic landpower and the design of Force 2025 was a prediction of instability in the future global security environment. We must continue trying to anticipate the capabilities needed in a future force—even though the Army has a poor record of predicting the next fight. An inclusive picture of the future security environment does not focus on a single threat but rather on overall conditions. This broad depiction is guiding developers to outline capabilities more like a multi-tool than a single-purpose bayonet. By considering these future requirements, as well as the capabilities our Army has retained from conducting unified land operations, and then taking a detailed look at our experiences and lessons learned over the last decade, Army leaders are building a blueprint for the future.

This blueprint will guide the application of science and technology in building a leaner and more expeditionary Army. The Force 2025 design will use fewer resources to get the necessary assets to the fight and keep them there until the work is complete. It will lead to a force that is as lethal and protected as our current force but more mobile and sustainable. The force will need the network capability for operating in austere and dispersed environments, and the right leaders and soldiers to bring these capabilities together.

Once the Force 2025 concepts are refined and put into a development strategy, we will need a practical way to transition from concepts to reality. As our forces draw down, we are losing the “battle labs” of Iraq and Afghanistan that we have been using for over 10 years. What remains is a limited Army experimentation capability consisting of local testing and fielding operations, center of excellence battle labs, and exercises known as network integration evaluations. “Force 2025 Maneuvers” is the Army’s vehicle for coordinating the evaluation of new capabilities.

Force 2025 Maneuvers

Force 2025 Maneuvers provides an operating plan that directs a series of exercises and experiments focused on validating capabilities required by Force 2025. It offers a listing of venues to conduct “best-fit” testing and evaluation. Force 2025 Maneuvers incorporates center of excellence battle labs, war games, combat training center rotations, and major objective experiments into a coordinated series of events that enable more rapid developing, testing, and fielding of future capabilities.

Force 2025 Maneuvers differs from previous evaluation approaches such as 4th Infantry Division’s testing of the Army’s Force XXI concept in 1998. It is not like a single-unit test in which training is driven...
by the concept developer. The new idea is to establish a test venue and procedures dictated by the type of training and unit rather than the developer or evaluator. The testing hub may continue to be the Brigade Modernization Command at Fort Bliss, but that is not where the testing stops. Building a process that rapidly gets the right equipment to the field requires a menu of options—a series of tailored exercises that allow developers, testers, and units to work together to create a better product in a timely manner.

**Conclusion**

Force 2025 and its associated maneuvers strive to maximize the use of Army resources. Directed investment in the development of future capabilities aligned with future operational requirements should drive the design. As a midterm progress review, Force 2025 is needed for the Army to check its work, make necessary adjustments, and most importantly, put the right mix of capabilities on the ground.

The Army of 2020 will sustain our capabilities in the short term, but we risk losing our overmatch if we continue to rely on adaptation. The concept of strategic landpower calls for an expeditionary force fully trained and equipped for the next fight. Force 2025 will guide our Army to develop the right mix of capabilities to be regionally engaged and, if the Nation calls, to win decisively on the battlefield.

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**Notes**


3. Ibid.


Strategic Leadership for Strategic Landpower

Make Explicit That Which is Implicit, and Do What Your Boss Needs You to Do


We would like to share 12 principles of strategic leadership based on our personal experience. We believe their application can support the success of leaders and organizations as the Army works through the strategic application of landpower in its role as the foundational element of the joint force. Successful strategic leaders generally follow personal rules devised from their own hard-earned experience, as well as the business

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rules of the organizations they lead. To gain widespread credibility with the joint force and policy makers regarding the strategic utility of landpower, senior Army leaders will need to develop the high level of leadership competency that ensures their bosses can make the hard decisions necessary to achieve national strategic objectives. Good leaders learn from experience and develop personal rules over time. Strategic leaders will use the lessons they learn to improve their leadership competency, and they will share lessons they believe could help other leaders improve their competency.

As military leaders advance through years of service, they become more focused on managing strategic issues for the Army—issues that affect ever-larger numbers of people and organizations. The Army’s lieutenant colonels, colonels, general officers, sergeants major, and senior Army civilians are its strategic-level leaders. They face the challenges of leading in a way that ensures the Army can apply landpower to achieve positive strategic outcomes across the range of military operations.

The Role of Strategic Landpower

Our nation’s land forces must sustain the capacity to dominate traditional land warfare. They must assure allies and deter adversaries. They must compel enemies to change their behavior in ways favorable to the
United States. The principal players in the application of strategic landpower are the Army, the Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command. Each is designed for a different purpose, but those purposes intersect on the land where people live and interact. Our discussion here focuses specifically on the Army.

The Army is applying the strategic landpower concept across the “prevent, shape, and win” construct. This means in the absence of a crisis, the Army will employ landpower in key areas to maintain stability, build awareness, and establish relationships that prevent or resolve conflict before it becomes a bigger problem. Regionally aligned forces are an example of how the Army does this now. We maneuver forces worldwide to maintain strategic balance and prevent conflict, deterring aggressors and assuring our friends. Maneuvering strategically means engaging partners with mission-tailored forces to advance shared interests and maintain a relative positional advantage over time.

Once a crisis occurs, the Army will use landpower via expeditionary maneuver to restore strategic balance. Because of the time and effort invested during pre-crisis activities among the people of a particular region, the force will be better prepared to apply landpower responsibly and effectively during decisive operations. When conflict escalates to war, our Army will compel changes in enemy behavior through the ethical application of violence. All the Army’s efforts at the tactical and operational levels should be focused on achieving the desired national strategic end state.

**Twelve Strategic Leadership Principles to Make Leaders Successful**

All Army leaders must succeed at two practical tasks. The first is to make explicit that which is implicit. This means they must understand vision or intent and put it into definable, measurable, positive action. The second is to do what the boss needs them to do, whatever that is and whether or not they understand or agree with it. Both tasks address how we support our civil and military leaders, equip them to make the right decisions, and assist them with their strategic responsibilities. We offer these 12 principles to help Army leaders understand the strategic perspective and enhance their leadership competency.

**Vision—take the time to get it right.** Strategic leaders must clearly articulate what needs to be done and, in a general sense, the acceptable ways their organizations conduct business. Crafting a vision is no easy task, and it takes time to get one right. An effective vision helps subordinates establish the campaign objectives that produce desired strategic outcomes. It should be supported by thorough research that stands up to close scrutiny.

To ensure your vision is clearly understood by your intended audience, get the perspective of those in the organization with experience and credibility. Your vision should be simple, relevant at each subordinate echelon, and easy to communicate to others.

**Make mission command reality.** The Army’s mission command philosophy advocates the use of mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within
the commander’s intent. Mission command requires investment in subordinate development—a time-intensive process. Strategic leaders foster a climate that promotes mission command principles all the time, not just during deployments and exercises. They provide a clear commander’s intent for routine matters as well as complex operations. They coach, teach, and mentor. Strategic leaders are transparent and easily understood. Commitment to mission command allows you to enable and be comfortable with the independent initiative of your subordinate leaders because you are reasonably certain those subordinates understand your expectations.

See yourself accurately. An interesting story about the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius says that as he paraded through the streets of Rome receiving the accolades of his fellow citizens, his servant would whisper into his ear, “You’re just a man … just a man.”

Humility is critical to your success as a strategic leader. It keeps you grounded in the mission and the interests of your soldiers. It helps prevent toxicity. Most of us do not see ourselves very well without some sort of outside look, and at the strategic level, it is easy to assume things are better (or worse) than they really are. Climate surveys and 360-degree evaluations are valuable tools for you to get that outside look and gauge your success, or determine where you need to improve. Seeing yourself as others see you provides valuable perspective on your performance.

Remember that we are all on the same side. There are many players on the joint team, and an inclusive approach is beneficial. At the strategic level it is always best to presume those with whom we disagree are operating in good faith. Strategic leaders know that no one wins in a personal conflict, and those who make professional differences personal develop negative reputations quickly.

Look for opportunities to compromise, keep an open mind, and remain focused on the strategic objective. Save your energy for the battles you need to fight against the enemy, not your teammates.

Develop decision points ahead of policy. Often we hear that we have to get policy right first. At the strategic level, it is absolutely true. Set the policy correctly and the rest follows. However, events on the ground often outpace policy.

A viable practice, uncommon but effective, is to work backwards from policy implementation to develop your decision points. Then, should circumstances create gaps between policy and necessary decision points for implementation, you have at least bought some time to work with policy makers to close those gaps since you have identified issues earlier in the process.

Hurried decisions generally produce poor results and bring regret. It is wise to discuss ideas informally with the trusted agents on your staff to determine what they really think about decisions you are about to make. Candid feedback is a rare thing; seek it out.

Use all the tools available. Clausewitz said, “When all is said and done, it really is the commander’s coup d’œil, his ability to see things simply, to identify the whole business of war completely with himself, that is the essence of good generalship.” This statement is no less true today. However, commanders now have many more tools at their disposal to inform their strategic decision making and problem solving—to enhance their coup d’œil.

Humility is critical to your success as a strategic leader. It keeps you grounded in the mission and the interests of your soldiers. It helps prevent toxicity.

Your staff, your subordinate commanders and their staffs, and your peers all have skills that can help you solve complex problems. Do not work alone; build a convergence of perspectives from multiple sources to make well-informed decisions. Never underestimate the effectiveness of using indirect leadership to build consensus and organizational support.

Take care of people. Taking care of people is a strategic imperative. Leaders take care of people by training and developing them so they achieve success in the Army profession and as part of the joint team.
Invest in a professional relationship with your subordinates and reach out to their families. Understand their goals and devote time to mentoring them. You know you have done right by your subordinates when they seek you out as a mentor, and when they achieve professional success years down the road.

**Never put your leaders in a bad situation.** A strategic leader will deal with highly complex problems and likely will need to solve them quickly. It can be too easy to put undue pressure on subordinates, even unintentionally, when facing tough challenges. Subordinates want the team to be successful, and they want to support their leader. This represents power that any leader must employ carefully and thoughtfully.

Therefore, you must avoid putting undue pressure on your subordinates, while still providing your boss the same timely, accurate advice and support you expect your subordinates to give you. Moreover, when your boss makes a decision, you must execute it as if it was your own.

You probably provide one of many information feeds your boss must consider, but the boss’s decisions may be predicated on other information or guidance unknown to you. Therefore, unless something is obviously missing or just does not make sense, you should proceed as directed. If you need to, huddle with your boss to gain understanding of the situation and his reasoning.

**Think completely outside your lane.** Good strategic leaders know as much as possible about their roles and responsibilities, as well as those of other people that affect their organizations and missions. They have a thorough understanding of outside influences on their areas of responsibility. There is no artificial separation between the organizations of strategic leaders.

Take the broadest possible view of everything that affects your lane and get smart about those things. Professional curiosity leads to greater understanding. The broader your informed perspective, the better service you provide others as a strategic leader.

**Challenge convention.** Ask questions that challenge what passes as conventional wisdom in your organization. Challenge people to explain the status quo—why things are the way they are—even when your instinct tells you your organization can do better. Trust your instinct, build confidence in your academic and analytical rigor to address problems, and produce thoroughly investigated decisions.

Develop a team of deep, critical thinkers who can wrestle a problem to the ground, work through the analytics, determine where your thinking is wrong or right, and build an accurate set of options for your consideration.

**Tell your boss when he is wrong.** Sometimes the boss is wrong. There are different ways to bring it up, depending on the situation, but the best approach is always to use tact and candor. Communicating with your boss can be hard; telling him he is wrong is even harder.

The best way to start usually is with private, face-to-face discussions, especially for contentious issues. You can bring up how you disagree with your boss in a meeting if asked. Conveying disagreement through staffs can be effective, as long as it is done respectfully. Creating a forum for diverse perspectives sometimes works. So does a written message or memorandum, but never surprise your boss with something in writing. Try to settle the issue orally first. Use writing to follow up. Pay attention to how your boss best receives certain kinds of information, and use good judgment.

**Build personal relationships.** Personal relationships—friendships—can foster effective working relationships with counterparts in other organizations. Building friendly networks inside and outside your organization can greatly enhance your strategic leadership.

Use your seniority to collaborate with other senior leaders outside your organization and agency to achieve common objectives. This is particularly important with interagency teaming. Friendly relationships with your counterparts in the Department of State, United States Agency for International Development, and other governmental agencies can be very valuable when making strategic-level decisions across the joint, interagency, international, and multinational community.

**Conclusion**

As a strategic leader, giving intent-based orders in a positive command climate where everyone understands their left and right limits is essential. Never lose perspective about what you are doing strategically and how it will play out tactically. This is a key to balancing intellectual energy with practical application. Know the facts before you make decisions; you can never be too well informed when dealing with tough problems. Operate through your network and within your spheres of influence to make various strategic
efforts fit together logically. Finally, remember that people do things during war they would not normally do. Build systems to guard against negative influences, complacency, and poor discipline.

Strategic leadership encompasses the field grade and flag officers, interagency partners, Foreign Service officers, and ambassadors engaged in furthering our national interests. Applying it effectively can be difficult. Doing it well will be personally gratifying and extremely important to the future well-being of our Army and Nation. We hope some or all of our 12 principles can serve you well.
Hurtling Toward Failure

Complexity in Army Operations

Maj. Donald L. Kingston Jr., U.S. Army

For years, soldiers, military researchers, theorists, and writers have discussed the need for the Army’s planning and decision-making models to account for complexity. Army doctrine on operational art, for instance, incorporates creative ways to manage military forces effectively as part of complex situations. According to Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, operational art is a cognitive approach to developing strategies, campaigns, and operations that tries to account for the complex relationships between tactical actions and strategic objectives. Commanders and staffs can use this approach to visualize and understand a complex operational environment (OE).

Commanders and staffs use information systems to support shared understanding. Information systems designed to support mission command are supposed to help a commander and staff visualize their OE by collecting, collating, and displaying information. However, in the drive to obtain more and more information through technology, we have magnified the complexity of military operations more than we have improved our ability to understand an OE. The increased complexity—which is of our own making—increases the risk of a catastrophic failure during any given mission regardless of a commander’s approach to understanding an OE.

Army Mission Command Systems

This paper describes employment of Army information systems in the context of operational art and the complexity of military operations. The discussion uses the phrase mission command systems (plural) as it is commonly used—to refer to the information systems that support mission command. Army doctrine in ADRP 6-0, however, uses the term mission command system (singular) to include personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment.

Doctrinally, an information system consists of equipment that collects, processes, stores, displays, and disseminates information. It includes hardware, software, communications, policies and procedures.

In addition, for the purposes of this discussion, the meanings of the terms data and information sometimes overlap.

The mission command systems assembled to support an operation form a complex system of systems somewhat similar to the complex information systems used by large commercial aircraft. The commanders of Army operations and the captains of large commercial
aircraft must manage enormous amounts of data and information provided by their information systems. The Air France (AF) Flight 447 disaster provides a case study of how the complexity arising from information systems intended to support operations can contribute to catastrophic failure.

**Too Much Information**

On 1 June 2009, AF 447, from Rio de Janeiro to Paris, crashed into the south Atlantic killing all on board. The final report on the crash, published in 2012, attributed the cause to a series of events and situations that included training deficiencies, equipment failures, procedural problems, and human error. Although the plane was equipped with up-to-date electronic safety systems, the information provided—some of it incorrect—confused the flight crew. They did not understand their situation, and their behaviors and decisions led to the crash.

According to author Andrew Zolli, the use of numerous safety systems on airplanes—and in any type of operations—increases the complexity of the whole until the safety features become sources of risk. The number of potential interactions between systems increases so much that the information becomes unmanageable and unpredictable. Authors J.M. Carlson and John Doyle describe how complex systems, whether natural or artificial, can be “robust, yet fragile” because they are robust in handling the expected, yet fragile when faced with an unexpected scenario, a series of small failures or problems, or a flaw in design, manufacturing, or maintenance.

Ever since Clausewitz described how the friction inherent in war makes even the simplest of tasks difficult, military commanders have desired certainty on the battlefield as a means to achieving victory.

Achieving certainty depends partly on acquiring the information needed to make decisions, so it is no surprise that the military has sought to collect data and information in its planning and decision methods. Army doctrine first codified a formal decision-making approach in 1932. Since then the doctrine has evolved considerably, increasing the number of variables as well as the complexity of the processes. The Army now has its operations process and subordinate planning processes known as the Army design methodology, the military decision-making process, and troop leading procedures. Operations are considered so complex that doctrine does not claim to provide a one-size-fits-all decision-making model; commanders are expected to select a process or processes appropriate to their situation. The operational art construct serves as an overlapping approach that is supposed to help commanders understand complex situations and integrate numerous variables at tactical and operational levels.

**Too Much Complexity**

Complexity theory is an umbrella term referring to the study of organizations as complex adaptive systems that must be able to receive and adapt to feedback. In principle, operational art incorporates adaptability. According to
ADRP 3-0, commanders pursue strategic objectives through tactical actions. They combine their “skill, knowledge, experience, and judgment to overcome the ambiguity and intricacies of a complex, ever changing, and uncertain operational environment to better understand the problem or problems at hand. Operational art … integrates ends, ways, and means, while accounting for risk.”

The Air France crew experienced a sudden torrent of information—a sort of data avalanche. … They could not analyze all of it effectively, and they lost their lives.

Decisions depend on understanding, understanding depends on information, and information depends on data and analysis. As technology has evolved, the Army has explored various means to provide timely and relevant information to the commander and staff. For example, in Vietnam the Army used airborne command and control helicopters.7 Beginning in the 1980s, the Army began to incorporate information technology and computer networks.

Mission command systems are an amalgamation of computer networks, sensor systems, radio networks, and satellite communications. Recent efforts in the mission command systems community (referring to all developers, users, and stakeholders of Army information systems) have focused on increasing the sensors and collection networks and their horizontal and vertical information sharing. As the systems and networks have grown in size and capacity, they have also grown in complexity. For example, one major system that supports mission command is known as Command Post of the Future (CPOF). This complex computer network comprises over nine subordinate networks each with its own sensor or collection network.10 One could argue that CPOF is a complex system-of-systems by itself. However, it is only one part of any overall systems architecture in support of mission command—and the systems differ for every mission because every commander selects and employs systems based on the mission.

The complexity introduced by such systems is not limited to their structure. They add to the complexity faced by commanders due to the volume of data and information they provide. The Army routinely uses information systems in experiments, rotations at combat training centers, and real-world operations. In numerous experiments, training events, and operations, data and information inundate the staff and commanders—much of it unimportant, inaccurate, conflicting, or irrelevant. This phenomenon is not unique to the military. Technology blogger AnuKool Lakhina discusses concerns about businesses losing key insights in a “big data avalanche” (meaning a rapid or sudden arrival of big data) coming from information systems while analytics technology remains inadequate for making the data meaningful.11 Department of Defense (DOD) and Army networks are greater in size and scope than even the largest corporate computer networks in terms of inputs and nodes. If business leaders worry about this problem, perhaps military leaders should be worried, too, because the military’s problem is far bigger.

The Air France crew experienced a sudden torrent of information—a sort of data avalanche. They were unable to make the decisions that might have saved their airplane due, in part, to an overwhelming amount of relevant, irrelevant, conflicting, and inaccurate information. They could not analyze all of it effectively, and they lost their lives. No doubt Army units using information systems intended to support mission command have found themselves in a similar state of paralysis due to excess information.

Proponents of the of Army’s mission command systems claim their systems allow units to integrate information vertically and horizontally, share it quickly, and make faster decisions.12 As championed by Stanley McChrystal, rapid information sharing should help soldiers and leaders at each level develop a holistic understanding, gain key insights, and act decisively on the battlefield.13 All of this is supposed to reduce uncertainty. McChrystal pioneered ways to improve information sharing during operations, but it was the adaptive leaders trained to receive, process, and act on the
information who made his approach effective. However, the Army has continued to emphasize technology as the solution to uncertainty and therefore has continued to increase the quantity of information systems. The approach typically represented by Army lessons learned publications is similar, emphasizing technological solutions over training or leadership solutions.

Resilient Leaders, Resilient Systems, and Resilient Forces

Military forces need a way to reduce uncertainty without simultaneously increasing complexity. True, they need resilient mission command systems that can enable resilient forces. Resilient systems and resilient forces are adaptable, versatile, and flexible, but adaptability (or adaptation) is the most important characteristic. G. Scott Gorman’s statement about adaptable soldiers, penned in 1998, holds true today: “Adaptation, although it may involve technological solutions, does not originate from technology. Adaptation springs from the minds of both leaders and followers.”14 Adaptable leaders and followers need to be able to analyze and interpret information correctly and make rapid decisions repeatedly as information changes or when bits of information seem incongruous. The 2012 U.S. Army Capstone Concept addresses the need for adaptiveness from an institutional perspective.15 It discusses scientific, technological, and social advancements in terms of human interactions, saying that such advancements should be “combined with appropriate doctrine and integrated effectively into the organization and training of Army forces.”16 The importance of ensuring integration and training in applying this concept cannot be overstated. The document also states:

The Army must pursue emerging technologies to maintain its strengths, address weakness, exploit opportunities, and develop countermeasures to future threat capabilities and maintain its technological advantage over future threats.17

The Army will be able to maintain any technological advantage only by complementing advances in technology with concurrent and corresponding leader development that will ensure adaptiveness. To prevent catastrophic battlefield failures similar to the Air France disaster, the Army must consider how to use mission command systems in a way that does not increase complexity to unmanageable levels. In its drive to help commanders understand their OEs, the Army has built complex systems that increase the overall complexity of operations—and, hence, the uncertainty. The Army’s mission command systems are robust, yet fragile.

Notes


3. Ibid.


8. ADRP 3-0.


16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.
The most difficult military problem to resolve is that of establishing a security system, as inexpensively as possible in peace, capable of transforming itself very rapidly into a powerful force in case of the danger of aggression.

—Gen. André Beaufre, Strategy for Tomorrow, 1974
cycle. The desire, commitment, and personal sacrifice of soldiers and visionary senior leaders together with vast supplemental appropriations enabled unit readiness.

The ARNG has demonstrated its capabilities not only in the wars of the past decade but also during domestic crises such as Hurricane Katrina and Super Storm Sandy. The Nation expects the ARNG to maintain its readiness as an operational force. The ongoing readiness of the ARNG is a strategic objective of the Department of Defense.¹ However, in an era where dollars are in short supply, fulfilling this objective will be tough—but not impossible. The ARNG can meet the Nation’s expectations by implementing the right imperatives.

Because of the accelerating decline of fiscal resources, Army leaders are adjusting how they apply the ARFORGEN model—to avoid paying for surplus readiness.² Using a “flattened” rotational cycle, National Guard units can be funded to maintain a platoon-level training proficiency rating of T3 (the unit can accomplish 55 to 69 percent of its mission essential tasks) and a personnel readiness rating of P3 (70 to 79 percent of required strength).³

A U.S. Army soldier assigned to 2nd Squadron, 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Tennessee Army National Guard, participates in a convoy operations exercise 1 January 2010 at Camp Shelby Joint Forces Training Center, Hattiesburg, Miss., in preparation for a scheduled deployment to Iraq.

(U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Russell Lee Klika)
Notably, ARNG units will find it difficult to obtain a higher level of readiness without adequate resources.

Throughout history nations have let their military forces deteriorate for various reasons, later realizing the magnitude of their errors. The infamous Task Force Smith—a poorly prepared and ineffective U.S. operation in South Korea in 1950—remains a prime example of the consequences of inadequate military preparedness. Many contemporary leaders have understood the principles of readiness in pragmatic terms. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (interviewed by Ray Suarez, *News Hour*, PBS, 9 December 2004) famously stated, “You go to war with the Army you have. They’re not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” When conflict begins, military forces are not always ready. In World War II, the U.S. Army needed almost one year to prepare before it engaged the enemy in ground combat during Operation Torch in North Africa and two and a half years before it was ready to execute D-Day.

In Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, five ARNG brigades were mobilized—three maneuver brigades and two field artillery brigades. Why only the field artillery brigades made it to the field of battle is debatable. However, the fact is that when maneuver brigades first were needed, they were not ready.

In 2008, the Israeli Winograd Commission released a critical review of Israel’s 2006 Lebanon Campaign (sometimes known as the Hezbollah-Israeli War). U.S. Army historian Matt Matthews reports that the commission’s analysis attributed the Israeli Army’s poor showing partly to inadequately trained and equipped reserves. In the Hezbollah-Israeli War, the Israeli Army failed to degrade the operational effectiveness of Hezbollah. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated, “the war was a national catastrophe and Israel suffered a critical blow.” Considering the potential consequences, military units that are not operationally ready have no business being on the battlefield.

Flattening the ARFORGEN cycle will not, by itself, help the ARNG adapt to being an...
To remain ready, the National Guard should commit to a new approach. This article presents four imperatives that will ensure every dollar invested adds up to ARNG readiness:

- Retain our combat-experienced soldiers and leaders to sustain their war dividend.
- Generate and sustain individual and unit readiness through expert training management.
- Forge partnerships at every level and strengthen relationships to gain economies of effort through collaboration and shared resources.
- Hone the professionalism of our soldiers and leaders to maintain the force's discipline and character over time.

**Retain Our Combat-Experienced Soldiers and Leaders**

The ARNG currently enjoys a war dividend of combat experience gained by thousands of its soldiers over the past decade. However, collective combat experience will decrease as these veterans leave the force, and fewer deployments will mean fewer combat-experienced soldiers fill the ranks of the ARNG.

Most captains and nearly all lieutenants and junior noncommissioned officers in the ARNG joined after 9/11. These men and women are astute and resilient. Today’s junior leaders are more capable than ever, and they operate with far more autonomy. The ARNG can ill afford to lose them; they are our future first sergeants, battalion and brigade commanders, and command sergeants major.

These men and women have stayed in the ranks for the past decade mainly because of their patriotism and allegiance to our country after the 9/11 attacks. However, they are likely to find numerous reasons to leave the service. Operational tempo has remained high while personal and professional accolades have diminished. In spite of planned downsizing and a flattened ARFORGEN, the ARNG expects major commitments of time and energy from our men and women. Senior commanders need these young leaders to meet more requirements than ever. Our young leaders must be technical experts on equipment that senior leaders have never used. Add in the citizen-soldiers’ challenge of maintaining balance between their families and civilian occupations, and continued service in the ARNG is more difficult than ever.

To help retain these soldiers, senior ARNG leaders must exercise focused mentorship of their subordinates. Senior leaders must be directly involved in supporting their subordinates’ ARNG and civilian careers. They must understand all their subordinates as whole persons—taking a broad and inclusive approach to mentoring. Leaders need to consider not just what subordinates’ next military assignments will be but also what they want to achieve in their civilian careers and personal lives. Leaders must acknowledge that priorities of ARNG soldiers change based on challenges at home, at work, and in the military. Senior leaders who use an inclusive approach will help soldiers achieve success and balance in their personal and professional obligations. If these young men and women are not given encouragement, positive direction, and understanding, we could lose the best of this generation.

Junior leaders deserve a personalized career roadmap so they can anticipate future assignments and coordinate their military and civilian careers. Many of our junior leaders consider their deployments the most challenging and rewarding time in their military careers. The absence of mentorship may make them think those careers have culminated when their deployments end. It is no wonder many begin to look solely toward advancement in their civilian careers.

A formal career management program can help reduce an individual’s career uncertainty. Each state should be able to track leaders as they move from assignment to assignment. A career management program should incorporate information about previous assignments, qualifications, and performance. This type of program can help identify and exploit what RAND Corporation analysts Barak A. Salmoni, Jessica Hart, Renny McPherson, and Aidan Kirby Winn call “opportunity space.”

Opportunity space can be created by providing broadening experiences through professional opportunities outside standard professional military education. Examples include National Guard Title 10 (referring to the United States Code) assignments, educational and congressional fellowships, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) teaching positions, term service with the U.S. Army Reserve, and Active Component positions in the combatant commands or the First U.S. Army. Commissioned and noncommissioned officers must know about these opportunities to learn and grow in the profession of arms.
The war dividend of leadership, knowledge, and capabilities is critical to the future of the ARNG. We must protect our investment in our junior leaders by guiding, encouraging, and affirming them as they proceed up the ranks.

**Generate and Sustain Individual and Unit Readiness**

At a minimum, ARNG soldiers must be individually ready (for example, qualified in their military occupational specialty [MOS], physically fit, and able to be away from their family). Units must be proficient at platoon level and staffs must be proficient at all levels. For our squads and platoons, this means mastering the fundamentals. Can they operate as a team? Can they shoot, move, and communicate? For staffs, proficiency means being masters of planning processes such as design and the military decisionmaking process, orders production, and especially of information networks and systems that support mission command.

Meeting identified training objectives within a modified ARFORGEN cycle is crucial. Individual and unit readiness begin and end with the commander and depend on training. The commander is accountable for and must be the resident expert on training management. However, continuous deployments have limited opportunities for junior leaders to gain training management experience. Inexperienced commanders must learn to employ training methods for collective training events to mitigate the effects of fewer resources, fewer opportunities, and less combat experience.

First, the ARNG must acknowledge that requirements exceed training time available. Therefore, the ARNG and the state National Guards should prioritize training requirements and accept risk by waiving requirements that do not support the commander’s unit status report—commanders prepare and submit unit status reports to document unit readiness, according to Army Regulation
Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration—Consolidated Policies (2010). Business practices should reinforce the importance of using unit status reports for documenting strengths, capabilities, challenges, and opportunities. Commanders at all levels must apply full intellectual rigor in reviewing their subordinate commanders’ reports. This review should ensure each commander’s comments accurately depict a unit’s training status—including items such as changes in equipment, training, or warfighting functions; improved proficiency in using information systems to support mission command; and results of completed collective training events. Unit leaders must work relentlessly toward maintaining the standard of T3 readiness and accurately documenting the status of readiness in the unit status report.

National Guard commanders should prioritize training requirements based on a unit’s ARFORGEN force pool, the type of unit and its members’ MOSs, and the available training time. The goal is to increase the net training time available for MOSs and unit collective training. State and brigade headquarters must train company commanders and first sergeants on effective training management skills, such as how to develop detailed training schedules, how to maximize the use of training aids, and how to plan for logistics that enable effective training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Battlefield Command System</th>
<th>Manned (XX/XX)</th>
<th>Equipped (Y/N)</th>
<th>Commander’s Training Status</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distributed Common Ground System – Army</td>
<td>XX/XX</td>
<td>Y/N</td>
<td>![Red-Yellow]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Meteorological System</td>
<td>XX/XX</td>
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<tr>
<td>Command Post of the Future</td>
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<td>Maneuver Control System</td>
<td>XX/XX</td>
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<tr>
<td>Digital Topographic Support System</td>
<td>XX/XX</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System</td>
<td>XX/XX</td>
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<td>Air and Missile Defense Workstation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battle Command Sustainment Support System</td>
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<td>Battle Command Server</td>
<td>XX/XX</td>
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<tr>
<td>Integrated System Control</td>
<td>XX/XX</td>
<td>Y/N</td>
<td>![Red-Yellow]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) Army Battlefield Command System (ABCS) Status Chart Example**

22O-1, _Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration—Consolidated Policies_ (2010). Business practices should reinforce the importance of using unit status reports for documenting strengths, capabilities, challenges, and opportunities. Commanders at all levels must apply full intellectual rigor in reviewing their subordinate commanders’ reports. This review should ensure each commander’s comments accurately depict a unit’s training status—including items such as changes in equipment, training, or warfighting functions; improved proficiency in using information systems to support mission command; and results of completed collective training events. Unit leaders must work relentlessly toward maintaining the standard of T3 readiness and accurately documenting the status of readiness in the unit status report.

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Second, commanders and staffs must plan and prepare unit training that simulates real-world operations as closely as possible. Commanders must incorporate experiences and challenges faced in the counterinsurgency fight of the past 13 years into present-day unit training. This calls for innovative training events that use organic resources aimed at platoon and staff proficiency.

Besides developing proficiency in mission-essential tasks, a National Guard commander’s responsibility includes ensuring each unit is prepared to conduct domestic operations. At any given time an ARNG unit may be tasked to provide support to civil authorities. Therefore, the commander’s training emphasis must be balanced between the unit’s mission-essential task list and domestic operational requirements.

Unit leaders and trainers must learn to use modeling and simulations so they can reduce costs, train faster, and increase proficiency. The use of live, virtual, constructive, and gaming training enables commanders to conduct low-cost, multi-echelon events in complex operational environments while at home station. Digital training through modeling and simulations allows commanders to train on exercising mission command while integrating all of the warfighting tactical systems in realistic combat situations. National Guard leaders at all levels must be able to employ training models and simulations that support decision making, course-of-action development, mission planning, rehearsals, and operations.

In addition, National Guard commanders must embrace distance learning (DL) as a cost-saving measure. Currently, access to DL is a significant challenge for many ARNG soldiers; the National Guard Bureau must continue to expand access to DL opportunities. Soldiers must realize that advancement opportunities depend on personal initiative that includes DL, and commanders must seek out ways to accommodate soldiers who are pursuing DL requirements.

Structured self-development is part of the Army’s strategy to reinforce the Noncommissioned Officer Education System, but inadequate funding for individual qualification training will continue to limit opportunities. Regardless, commanders must remain committed to making MOS qualification and required professional military education a high priority. Soldiers who attend a qualification school will not always receive funding to attend annual training during the same training year. Commanders must consider this when planning training, but they should allow soldiers to attend school programs to advance their careers.

In conjunction with the unit status report, the ARNG also should measure the readiness of a brigade’s digital systems. The unit status report should provide senior commanders a snapshot of a unit’s digital capability.

Commanders can assess capabilities using the standard man, equip, and train model. For manning, does the unit have 90 percent of the required MOSs for that section? For equipping, does the unit have all necessary equipment and is it functional? Finally, the unit commander can estimate how proficient the unit is with the equipment and how well it can support mission command. The figure (Status Chart Example) provides an example of one way an infantry brigade combat team could use a simple chart to represent an overview of the status of its digital systems.

Tracking the status of each brigade combat team’s digital systems is crucial to maintaining the ARNG as an operational force. Individual commanders and the force as a whole need a standard approach to monitoring and reporting on digital capabilities. The ARNG has no standard quantitative or qualitative method for brigade commanders to track the status of all their digital systems in relation to overall readiness. The ARNG should host a planning conference with brigade-level commanders to determine the components that require measurement and tracking. Each brigade-level commander should brief the ARNG commander—or the aligned-for-training division commander—annually on the overall status of the brigade’s digital systems. This practice will help ensure there is enough time to rectify readiness issues before they become critical.

True readiness can only be achieved through training that replicates real-world problems, stresses the mastery of mission command, exercises the expert application of lethal force, and reinforces standards and discipline. Innovative, resolute commanders who anticipate needs and become experts in training management—from planning training to writing unit status report comments—will help their units thrive in an era of fiscal austerity.
Forge Partnerships at Every Level and Strengthen Relationships

The ARNG needs partnerships that will help it accomplish missions as an operational force. Effective partnerships are mutually beneficial partnerships. Partnering provides economies of effort through shared resources and expanded awareness through collaboration. This is especially important in the Guard’s functions during domestic operations.

The top priority of the ARNG is the security and defense of our homeland. The Guard prides itself in its capability to cooperate with the joint force and with state and federal agencies to respond to domestic emergencies. The ARNG needs to cultivate its relationships with all military, governmental, and civilian partners to carry out its responsibilities effectively. The Guard has singular capabilities for homeland security and the great responsibility of being the military’s closest connection with the American public. ARNG leaders have the moral and professional obligation to develop subordinate leaders who understand and embrace their grass-roots responsibility as citizen-soldiers.

An example of the importance of partnering is the response to the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings, when National Guard assets supported local, state, and federal efforts from the moments of detonation. Any national security event will demonstrate the same type of critical collective effort. However, partnering is just the beginning. As important, but much more challenging to understand and foster, is how these partnerships enhance our connection with the American people.

Internal partnering includes personnel reassignments between brigades and other major subordinate commands. These reassignments can be for a full tour of duty or only for two weeks during a mutually supporting training exercise. For example, sustainment brigades and forward support battalions exist within many states: one is operational, the other tactical. Assigning personnel from one to another as a broadening assignment benefits the soldiers, units, and the ARNG. Another opportunity would be having special forces personnel train alongside conventional units. Special forces units can be incorporated into field training and staff exercises. Training events could be small or large, direct action, or humanitarian assistance, but in all cases they would be mutually beneficial. Similar internal partnership possibilities are abundant across the ARNG and should be actively pursued.

External partnering can be categorized as training, support, and mission opportunities. Training partnerships include assignments to and support of the Air National Guard, the U.S. Army Reserve, ROTC, other services, and nonmilitary partners. Increasingly, ARNG units are sharing training facilities with the U.S. Army Reserve. Units in these shared-used facilities need to observe and participate in each other’s training. This practice should be expanded upon at every opportunity, to increase efficiencies in cost, time, and performance.

Support partnering includes relationships with civilian, government, and community agencies. Interactions with organizations such as the United Services Organization (known as the USO), the Veterans Administration, and private foundations can be less formal and require relatively few resources. However, they provide great benefits, not just for deployed and redeploying soldiers but also in other areas the Department of Defense cannot serve. For example, in Illinois the prestigious Pritzker Military Library has cooperated with the Illinois ARNG on numerous historical and mutually beneficial projects. The states and territories all have organizations to record and enhance their history. Partnering with organizations such as these helps the Guard and the American people.

Mission partnering includes the Guard’s vital State Partnership Program and deployments in support of combatant commanders’ theater security cooperation efforts. Participation in these opportunities is mutually beneficial. They increase unit readiness and also increase the capabilities available to combatant commanders by providing specialized civilian skill sets inherent in Guard units. The State Partnership Program, along with the other partnering programs, also provides those broadening opportunities so critical for professional development to sustain the war dividend.

Hone the Professionalism of Our Soldiers and Leaders

Members of the profession of arms must exhibit a high level of personal character and professional competency. Any sustained lapse in the values, morals, and ethics of the profession will quickly erode America's
trust and confidence in the Guard. Therefore, the ARNG must make great efforts to hone professionalism within its ranks every day and at all levels of leadership.

A Gallup poll reports that as of 2013, Americans surveyed continue to have more confidence in the military than in other U.S. institutions. However, time and again, serious breaches in conduct have damaged the total force’s professional identity. Sexual assaults have dramatically increased. In 2013 there were 5,061 reported sexual assaults in the Army. This is especially troubling given that sexual assault is the most underreported crime in the Nation; many believe it is much more so in the Army.

Even general officers have been found guilty of extramarital affairs, sexual misconduct, and the misuse of funds. If the standard-bearers of our professional values are failing, how can we expect our soldiers to want to remain in the service?

Marcus Buckingham and Curt Coffman’s landmark book, First Break All the Rules, examines why people stay with organizations. Their main answer, after interviewing thousands, is that people stay with an organization because they have a great boss. Leaders of excellent personal character make great bosses for many reasons. Among those reasons is that they do not abuse their subordinates or their positions.

We must prove that the force values leaders of character and enforces professional standards. If the behavior of Army leaders violates professional standards, they must be held accountable immediately. The punishment of senior leaders found guilty of misconduct should be severe enough to be a deterrent. The trials of convicted senior officers should be videotaped and publicly broadcast. A milquetoast response to criminal acts undermines the trust of the American people.

The obligation to maintain the professionalism in the ARNG falls on all Guard personnel, from the highest leaders to the grassroots. Units need more than an “awareness month” or policy statements pinned to orderly room bulletin boards to eliminate criminal and unprofessional actions. Every soldier must refuse to tolerate misconduct. The discussion of how to solve problems such as sexual harassment and assault cannot just take place within the inner courtyard of the Pentagon. Leaders must develop innovative strategies that inculcate professionalism across the ranks. Such strategies will not be effective if they are simply crammed into an already full training schedule as part of professional development. Time must be made to conduct training that is deliberate, thought provoking, and meaningful. Conducting lane training where ethical vignettes are woven into the situation is a good start.

To hone professionalism in the ARNG, leaders must find the time to mentor subordinates. At brigade level and below in the ARNG, a mentoring challenge is
maintaining consistent contact with soldiers who are geographically dispersed across a state, without significantly increasing operational tempo. To meet this challenge, commanders and sergeant majors should consider using technological tools to mentor junior leaders. One technique is holding periodic telephone conference calls or using Defense Connect Online sessions to target specific audiences (e.g., company commanders, squad leaders, or medics). Participants at a typical meeting could discuss a preselected professional development topic, emailed along with supporting material in advance. Round-table discussion will increase lines of communication, foster a stronger relationship between the different levels of command, and expand professionalism.

Like it or not, the total force is under the public microscope, and even Congress is irked at what it sees. The good news is that this microscope can help us identify and understand issues that need prompt correction. We must not jeopardize our bond with the American people. We must continue to hone our professionalism each and every day.

**Summary**

The ARNG must sustain its ability to serve as an operational force. It must do this by retaining combat-experienced soldiers and leaders, generating and sustaining individual and unit readiness through expert training management, forging partnerships at every level and strengthening relationships, and honing the professionalism of its soldiers and leaders. By addressing each of these imperatives, the ARNG will be able to achieve its strategic objectives.

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**Notes**


8. Ibid.


16. Ibid., 10.


The year 1814 would test whether the United States had learned enough from the disappointments of the past eighteen months to defeat the wave of British veterans that was about to reach North America. President Madison and his cabinet understood only too well that, if the United States was to win its war, victory would have to come quickly before the full might of Britain arrived on America’s borders. To achieve this end, the Army would need to be stronger. Congress attempted to expand the size of the Army by raising the enlistment bonus from $40 to $124 and by increasing the authorized strength to 62,500 men. It also augmented the numbers of regimental officers and noncommissioned officers to give regimental commanders more recruiters. Despite these measures, Army strength rose only to approximately forty thousand men by the time active campaigning began in 1814. This brochure covers a number of battles, including Oswego, Sandy Creek, Chippewa, and Lundy’s Lane, among others. From the publisher.
The Defense Entrepreneurs Forum

Developing a Culture of Innovation

Lt. Col. Curtis D. Taylor, U.S. Army, and
Maj. Nathan K. Finney, U.S. Army

When you combine a culture of discipline with an ethic of entrepreneurship, you get the magical alchemy of great performance.

—Jim Collins, Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap … and Others Don’t

On a chilly afternoon in October 1920, two young officers who shared a duplex at Fort Meade, Maryland gathered with their wives for a leisurely dinner that likely changed the course of American history. For years, these two officers held an unpopular, almost heretical view—that tanks, used with only limited success in World War I, held the key to victory in any future ground war in Europe. Their names were Capt. Dwight Eisenhower and Maj. George Patton. Both officers had suffered criticism for their ideas. In Eisenhower’s case, his 1920 article in Infantry Journal about armored forces won him a stern condemnation from the chief of infantry, who assured him that his unorthodox opinion guaranteed a career climax as the head coach of the Fort Meade intramural
football team. Patton made a similar splash with a letter in *Cavalry Journal* advocating the creation of an independent Tanks Corps. Historians would later cite these articles as “nothing less than a proposed tank doctrine for the next war ... what these two upstart tank officers were suggesting would alter the whole doctrine of land warfare.”

Their invited guest that afternoon was a rising star in the Army at the time named Brig. Gen. Fox Connor. Connor had known Patton for years but had just met the young Capt. Eisenhower. After dinner the three officers and their wives went to the motor pool to give Brig. Gen. Connor a ride on a British Whippet tank. Connor was so impressed with Eisenhower and his thoughts on the future of armored warfare that he invited him, at Patton’s urging, to become his brigade executive officer. Decades later, President Eisenhower would cite Connor as his most important mentor during his long climb from lieutenant to commander in chief.

Patton and Eisenhower were, to use a modern phrase, *disruptive innovators*. They were applying innovative solutions and creative approaches to a novel problem faced by their military service (how to use tanks effectively). Their ideas, however, challenged and even threatened the established organizations and traditions of their respective branches. The history of military innovation reveals that this is not a new phenomenon. In fact, most revolutionary ideas emerge from junior-level practitioners—who are unlikely to be able to refine or implement their innovations within the straightjacket of the military bureaucracy. What these innovators need is—

- a means to connect with one another for the purpose of refining and incubating their ideas;
- a forum to discuss their ideas; and
- an understanding mentor who can help them navigate the bureaucratic hurdles necessary to overcome or manage the institutional resistance to innovation.

Soldiers from Company D, 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Squadron, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division conduct gunnery with tanks at Grafenwoehr Army base during the multi-national training exercise, Combined Resolve II, 10 June 2014. (Capt. John Farmer, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division)
Our ability to innovate and adapt to changing circumstances is one of the great asymmetric advantages of the U.S. military. A good amount of the innovation within the services has come from loyal insiders, particularly from the junior ranks—people who see problems at the tactical level and can create and share innovative solutions. Internal innovators who successfully implement their ideas usually develop and refine them through informal networks, peripheral to the people they work with daily. These networks provide a fail-free zone and energetic supporters.

Nearly a century after Eisenhower and Patton challenged the dogmas of their day, we continue to observe a similar dynamic. Energetic young service men and women are coming out of more than a decade of conflict full of ideas and empowered with the autonomy they found on a complex battlefield. Many innovations that proved vital to our successes in Iraq and Afghanistan—from vehicle adaptations that protect soldiers against improvised explosive devices to software programs that track volumes of intelligence reports—were in fact developed by innovative junior officers and noncommissioned officers serving on the front lines. These were the battlefield innovators who gradually helped our Army adapt to a quickly changing situation on the ground.

As we draw down our forces engaged in major conflicts, leaders accustomed to having a large amount of autonomy and flexibility while deployed will find fewer opportunities to innovate. We must encourage and equip these energetic and idealistic people, or else we will struggle to keep them in our ranks. We must facilitate their creativity and take advantage of their innovation rather than lose them and their ideas. Instead of passively waiting for such innovators to develop their ideas, we must help them network with one another outside the bureaucratic system. We need to encourage the creation and use of mechanisms that help innovators connect and collaborate, find constructive criticism of their ideas, and develop feasible implementation strategies.

**Creating a Culture of Innovation**

A 1999 RAND analysis of military innovation, commissioned by the U.S. Army, used case studies for trying to understand how militaries improve battlefield effectiveness. The study concluded that military necessity alone is insufficient to produce successful innovations. The right social and environmental factors must propel innovative solutions beyond the gravitational pull of the bureaucracies from which they emerge. If, according to Plato, necessity is the mother of invention, then an organizational culture that encourages innovation must become its father. Creating the right culture for innovation will be crucial in overcoming the challenges facing the Army as we move into a post-war posture of declining fiscal resources and increasing global and strategic uncertainty.

A culture of innovation can only emerge inside a bureaucracy if there is a viable marketplace for both idea creation and incubation, as well as a safe space for trial and error. Ideas need a place where they can germinate at the practitioner level and then undergo a rigorous peer-evaluation process in which they are refined and developed. In the business community, small business startup incubators such as Techstars, the Harvard Innovation Lab, and the d.school at the Stanford Institute of Design provide this function for new business ideas. They provide a rigorous yet flexible process for generating, refining, and culling good business ideas before they are presented to venture capitalists for investment and action.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has no process similar to these companies that help startups. While many senior leaders recognize that our best ideas often arise at the grassroots practitioner level, the reality is that very few innovators at this level possess the bureaucratic acumen and the practical experience to turn a good idea into a programmatic change within the nation's largest bureaucracy. What these innovators need is a mechanism—indispened of the bureaucracy—that provides a safe place to refine and incubate these ideas as they emerge.

**The Defense Entrepreneurs Forum**

Just such a mechanism, the Defense Entrepreneurs Forum, was developed, funded, and executed entirely by junior officers across the services beginning in 2013. Conceived as a web-based forum that brought participants together in person annually to promote innovation within the DOD, the Defense Entrepreneurs Forum has grown into a movement of considerable diversity. Its members rank from sergeant to general officer. They come from every branch of military service, and include civilians from the defense industry. The Defense Entrepreneurs Forum hosted its first annual conference...
on Columbus Day weekend, 2013, at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. Over one hundred men and women of varying ranks and ages, and from all four services, gathered to discuss innovation and to propose creative solutions to challenges facing the DOD. The three-day conference included a series of keynote speeches by successful innovators from the DOD and the private sector. Inspiring stories from small business CEOs and Internet startups were followed by proposals for creative solutions to complex institutional problems such as suicide prevention and acquisition reform. On the final day, conference attendees received an opportunity to pitch innovative ideas to a panel of venture capitalists and a senior military officer. While the conference was a success, its real value was the creation of informal networks among a new generation of military entrepreneurs. These networks will continue to foster a culture of innovation across the DOD.

**Why the Defense Entrepreneurs Forum Matters**

The Defense Entrepreneurs Forum is built on a well-established foundation of military officers taking advantage of informal ties to improve their militaries. Take for example the *Militärische Gesellschaft*, “a volunteer society to discuss military affairs” founded by Gerhard von Scharnhorst in the early 19th Century. He envisioned that such a society would provide intelligent and energetic professionals a means to further their knowledge in the art of war. Key components of the society were developing—

- written solutions to proposed problems;
- mechanisms for impartiality to prevent interference with or suppression of truthful, but problematic proposals; and
- a community that leveraged junior-level talent and senior-level experience.

The Defense Entrepreneurs Forum was not built as a copy of the *Militärische Gesellschaft* although some of its goals are similar. The creators of the Defense Entrepreneurs Forum also intended to construct a community that could support the development of promising young innovators. The purpose was to encourage them to remain engaged with their craft and dig deeper for personal and professional knowledge.
Much of our time as military professionals is taken up with our jobs. Nonetheless, some of us seek ways to look beyond today’s activities and toward understanding the true nature of war. We look for ways to develop ourselves so we can play our part in meeting the needs of our Nation. Mechanisms such as the Militärische Gesellschaft and the Defense Entrepreneurs Forum provide an outlet for such self-development. At the same time, they tie us closer to networks of people who can help us along the path of development, helping us improve our profession and ourselves.

Overcoming the Antibody Response to Innovation

In 1902, a young U.S. Naval officer serving in the Far East came across a British technique for providing continuously aimed naval gunfire onboard a rolling ship deck.12 His name was Lt. William Sims. Before this, U.S. naval gunners would wait for the sea to readjust the elevation of the guns, and they would time the firing of the guns as well as they could. Recognizing the importance of a continuous-fire capability, Sims learned all he could about the British technique. He sent the findings back to the Navy leadership, ultimately providing 13 written reports as he gradually refined his technique. After his final report, the Bureau of Ordnance responded with a terse message saying that it had shown conclusively that his techniques were unworkable. Not to be deterred, Sims persisted, eventually sending a letter to President Theodore Roosevelt. Fortunately for Lt. Sims, Roosevelt was a naval enthusiast and was actively seeking ways to promote U.S. sea power abroad. Saving the impetuous Lt. Sims from almost certain court martial at the hands of the Navy, President Roosevelt demanded an objective test of the Navy’s long-range gunnery skills. In short order the test revealed the necessity of adopting Lt. Sims’ technique, and the young officer was appointed the “inspector of target practice” for the Naval Gunnery School. Through a shrewd use of competition during training, over several years Lt. Sims instituted the practice of “continuous aim firing” throughout the U.S. Navy—which no doubt had a tremendous influence on its ability to confront the German Navy in the North Atlantic at the start of World War I.

Lieutenants corresponding directly with their commander in chief about service-related problems certainly would not represent a desirable method of institutional reform. Nonetheless, the example of Lt. Sims demonstrates that our best ideas often are found at the lowest echelons of the organization, where junior professionals see the consequences of inefficiency on a daily basis. The bureaucracy, despite the best intentions of well-meaning people, often will react to these disruptive innovations with a sort of “antibody response” because the innovations naturally threaten the specialization and efficiencies that make that bureaucracy stable and successful. The solution then is not letters to the President but peripheral networks such as the Defense Entrepreneurs Forum where ideas can be developed, refined, critiqued—and sometimes discarded—until the very best thinking emerges in a competitive marketplace of ideas. Sufficiently incubated, proposals arising in this way can then inform programmatic decisions within the institution.

Unlike Silicon Valley, where the marketplace would provide developmental support for innovative startups, no similar support exists for military innovation. To continue to thrive in a complex world, the military needs to retain dedicated professionals who can promote change from within the organization. The Defense Entrepreneurs Forum seeks to be one of many forums committed to this effort. Created, funded, and run completely by junior officers outside their official duties, this organization aims to support its members’ desires to innovate within their areas of expertise, not to network for access to government contracts or advocate for parochial interests within the DOD budget. For example, some of the solutions from the weekend in Chicago included the development of a suicide prevention application, a social media assessment tool for professional military education, and an innovative approach to certifying military nurses in patient care. While not all of these ideas may be implemented as successfully as Sims’ gunnery revolution, the mechanisms and relationships created will continue supporting ideas that have the best potential.

The Defense Entrepreneurs Forum is not a place where military personnel can complain and bemoan the issues of the day. Instead, this forum facilitates relationships and provides opportunities for discussion—which loyal insiders need to develop their ideas and make valuable connections for implementation. The Defense Entrepreneurs Forum is, essentially, an
incubator to insource innovation. It supports service members working to provide viable solutions to real problems where they can and how they can. Additionally, prospective entrepreneurs can draw on the wisdom and experience of more seasoned innovators who can help them develop practical approaches to implementing their ideas within the context of a skeptical bureaucracy.

Conclusion
The bureaucratic nature of our military is useful to provide for our common defense and has been sufficiently so for over 200 years. Unfortunately, this bureaucracy can severely restrict innovation. Like many peripheral networks of the past, the Defense Entrepreneurs Forum has sought to provide its participants an environment free from bureaucratic burdens and blind spots. This kind of environment should be replicated in other avenues to support the creation of a culture of innovation, one in which ideas complement the existing institutional bureaucracy. Within its loose confines, the Defense Entrepreneurs Forum provides a hub for innovation where self-identified entrepreneurs can support one another through informal, peripheral networks. The Defense Entrepreneurs Forum is autonomous and free from parochial interest. It provides an adaptive, no-cost, fail-for-free environment where ideas can be discussed, experiments can be designed and tested, and ventures can be discarded if appropriate, so entrepreneurs can push workable solutions to the DOD.

Notes
6. This aphorism comes from the quote, “a true creator is necessity, which is the mother of our invention,” Plato, The Republic, Robin Waterfield, translator, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 59.
12. The authors are indebted to Lt. Cmdr. B.J. Armstrong for his support and personal work on William Sims and the gunnery revolution. More information on his work can be found at the U.S. Naval Institute, beginning here: http://blog.usni.org/2012/06/08/a-junior-officer-and-a-discovery.
War as Political Work
Using Social Science for Strategic Success

Matthew J. Schmidt, Ph.D.

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This article is based on a report originally written for the Army Research Institute’s 2011 Strategic Thinking Initiative Conference.

War is not just about defeating the enemy. War is about creating social and political order when past systems of order have disintegrated or been broken down intentionally by the use of military force. Good military strategy demands that the role of enemy forces be considered within the context of the larger social and political order, and its failure. Sound operational planning depends on this.

Defeating an enemy force is not the strategic aim of any war. The strategic aim should be to recreate a stable order that can be sustained without major ongoing military participation from the battlefield victor. Defeating enemies militarily is merely the prerequisite to strategic victory, not its conclusion. Real war, of course, is complicated because the end of a war is not the end of the strategic task. The way in which battlefield “victories” are achieved can quickly doom the probabilities for strategic success. Vietnam and Iraq are only two examples of this; military history is littered with others.
Military victory merely sets the conditions for the transformative social and political order that come after the guns go quiet. For better or worse, the job of winning the victory always falls to the military. There are not, nor have there ever been, State Department divisions parachuting in to do the “political” work of securing the victory. This is a false dichotomy. War is political work. Militaries—armies especially—are tools used to do the fundamental work of politics. They use force to determine which side gets to decide the key questions of social and political order when the normal structures for determining order have ceased to work.

War demands a qualitative mindset because war is a social phenomenon. Military commanders need to understand politics in a deep and systematic way if they are to ensure military force is a successful strategic tool. They need to think strategically about the ultimate aims the force under their control will support. The way to do this is to begin to think in context, to put the role of force in context with the other variables on the battlefield. To think in context systematically, commanders need to buttress their ability to think qualitatively and use the methods of social science to approach military questions.

Strategic thinking involves evaluating “political, economic, psychological, and military forces [i.e., influences]” to ensure military operations support national policies. These types of “forces” have a common characteristic: they do not lend themselves to quantitative analysis. Army professionals who wish to practice strategic thinking will need to adopt a qualitative approach to evaluating such factors. This is more easily said than done because qualitative analysis is unnatural to Army culture.

The study of political science, economics, psychology, and military science requires grounding in qualitative social science methodology. While this methodology is essential to effective strategic thinking, it is contrary to the Army’s dominant professional culture. Army culture prefers a techno-scientific, quantitative, and predictive approach based on mathematical-type analysis; that approach cannot provide an accurate understanding of strategic issues, let alone predict outcomes of military operations with anything close to certainty.

Contemporary social science studies social phenomena in terms of interdependent—rather than independent and dependent—variables. For phenomena that are made up of interdependent variables—phenomena such as war—establishing clear cause-and-effect theories is frustrating even for social scientists accustomed to that type of research. In fact, interdependent variables make predictions of the hard-science type impossible. This does not mean, however, that qualitative approaches should be dismissed. Rather, understanding the value and limitations of qualitative methods is crucial for a profession tasked with using force to create qualitative sociopolitical end states.

What is the Problem?

Quantitative approaches work best when researchers can isolate individual problems and when relationships are hierarchical. A complex military problem, such as “how do we invade Region X and establish security?” provides a simplified example. The problem-solving process typically used is quantitative and predictive. It starts with a defined highest-order problem (invading Region X and establishing security) and breaks it down into smaller problems such as—

- How would we get there?
- How long would a trip by boat or plane take?
- How many weapons and supplies would we need?
- What kind of weapons and supplies would we need?

A reductive approach is then used along with the analytical tools of mathematics and statistics in a repeating process until a series of answers can be summed together to solve the original problem.

Strategic problems, on the other hand, are not really “problems” at all; they are metaproblems. Strategic questions ask about intent and values; they are questions about choosing an explanatory framework to use when addressing problems of application. Strategic problems have only qualitative answers. Rather than ask, “How do we invade Region X,” a strategic question seeks to understand why or whether invading Region X would indeed help achieve larger goals and whether its negative ripple effects over time might outweigh its short-term benefits. Strategic questions are first-order questions:

- Should we invade Region X, considering all the potential consequences?
- What would we expect an invasion to achieve?
- In what other ways could we achieve our goals (e.g., such as by bombing alone)?
- Should we also seek the dissolution of the region’s monarchy or ruling system?”
These are not the types of questions any military organization encourages commanders and staffs to ask (publically, at least). Instead, most military organizations proceed on the assumption that civilian policymakers already will have connected the dots between strategic intent and military capability. History shows repeatedly how wrong such assumptions can be. Still, such questions are fundamental to planning because they probe strategic aim: What change in the military and political context would a series of military operations ultimately achieve? Put another way, strategic questions look for answers to similar metaquestions: What is the qualitative change in conditions (e.g., destruction of the war-making capability of Region X) that war plans should achieve, and how well would those changed conditions support national strategic goals? This is especially important for military leaders to ask when national goals seem unclear or clearly in excess of what military force can do at acceptable cost in time, blood, and money.

What is a Qualitative Approach?

Qualitative approaches can be understood by their function and their form. First, the function of qualitative research is to interpret context—the interrelated conditions in which something exists or occurs. To interpret context means to understand conditions within a cohesive whole. Any categorization of conditions—including any statistical analysis, if appropriate—would be based on their relationship to the whole. Second, the basic form of all qualitative research is the gathering or developing of what could be called “texts”—referring to spoken and written language—because reading and conducting interviews are the primary means of obtaining data and information. Qualitative researchers gather existing texts from archives, memoirs, and other sources, or they generate texts through interviews and interrogations or derivative methods such as focus groups or surveys. To interpret a subject’s utterances during an interview or understand an archived memorandum, the researcher would need sufficient training in the appropriate language and culture.

During a 2012 lecture at Duke University, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, discussing his experience in strategic decision making, emphasized the significance of context:

When I go into a meeting to discuss policy, discuss strategy, discuss operations, plans, whatever it happens to be, he who has the best context generally prevails in the argument, not necessarily who’s got the best facts. There’s a difference. It’s who has the best context in which those facts exist.

Context differentiates a qualitative from quantitative way of seeing the world. By thinking in context—using qualitative approaches—commanders will be better able to set the on-the-ground conditions they are asked to establish. Not being an adept partner in strategic discussions that include context is a guarantee of military misfortune.

Why is a Qualitative Approach Needed Now?

The modern American military tradition is techno-scientific to the extreme. In practice, this means the American tradition is defined chiefly by what Antoine Bousquet calls “systemic application of science and technology,” as a way to gain “complete predictability and centralized control over armed conflict…”. In the Army, this pattern became exaggerated after the Vietnam War. Gen. William DePuy, founder of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), sought to refocus the new all-volunteer force toward what he saw as a future war dominated by technologically skilled teams operating advanced weapons systems as efficiently as they would a lawn mower. In the 1990s, the debate over what was known as the “revolution in military affairs” trod similar ground.

DePuy sought tactical superiority through systematized training and the development of generalized, quasi-scientific rules and methods for battle. These rules and methods would maximize the chance of success in any engagement by minimizing the risk of not maintaining control of the situation. This approach would reduce tactical engagements to predictable events in which basic variables (on-fire rates, weapons performance, mobility, and so on) could be controlled reasonably well. Crucially, the guiding tactical principles were regarded as valid in a predictive, hard-scientific sense. Mission accomplishment surely would follow their application. This was only possible, though, because the nature of the imagined war against the
Soviets was apolitical—it was a fantasy war at the end of history. The winner would survive; the loser's society would be annihilated. All the annoying questions of sociopolitical context were excluded from the scenario.

Therefore, during operations, neither tactical principles nor tactical aims would be questioned even though tactical principles left room for applying judgment. The relatively consistent tactical successes of U.S. forces, especially since the 1970s, provided proof. Consistent application of position, cover, fires, communication, and so on, led to successful operations. The sum of all this experience reinforced the idea that a quantitative approach produced tactical success. Tactical success became an end in itself, separate from the uncomfortable complexities of war as politics in extremis. Military science increasingly came to be seen, erroneously, as a scientific branch of the hard sciences. It had become no more than quasi-scientific at best, pseudoscientific at worst.

The problems of war and warfare, in reality, are not quantifiable problems of the hard sciences because they involve the behavior of human beings. As Nobel Prize-winning physicist Steven Weinberg noted, "It has been an essential element in the success of science to distinguish those problems that are and are not illuminated by taking human beings into account." Social scientists seek to understand and explain why people do things. Students of warfare using a qualitative approach would seek to understand why people started wars, ended wars, and prosecuted wars in certain ways and at certain times. Answering any of these questions would involve getting at the subjective motivations of kings, generals, soldiers, and civilians. The ongoing difficulty is creating a reasonably objective science of fundamentally subjective phenomena. Military commanders need to see their lifelong professional role as active participants in the effort to build the discipline of war studies as a social science.

What is the Function of Time?

All social science questions involve time as an interdependent variable. L.P. Hartley's now aphoristic line, "The past is a foreign country," is but one illustration of why time makes cause and effect questions so complicated and difficult to answer. Explaining complex events such as warfare in the kind of out-of-time rules used in hard science is impossible. In hard science, rules are rules because they nearly always explain and predict things that happen. On the other hand, answering why the Hundred Years War happened is not the same as explaining why Vietnam happened. Whatever the broad similarities, the differences from one case to another tend to be greater.

The United States surged 30,000 troops into Afghanistan in 2008 based largely on military arguments that a successful surge into Iraq in 2006 would predict a successful surge in Afghanistan. One problem with this way of thinking was that it assumed similar conditions in each state. In reality, the differences between the societies in Iraq and Afghanistan were considerable according to analysts Rick Nelson, Nathan Freier, and Maren Leed. Neither the problems nor...
the strategic aims were similar across these states. Another problem was that researchers would need at least 10 years to develop a qualitative analysis of the surge in Iraq—to identify the critical variables and understand the cause-and-effect relationships and interactions. However, action in Afghanistan in 2008 had to be taken quickly.

In 2008, the surge in Iraq had not been analyzed sufficiently to establish generalizations—quantitative or qualitative—about why it worked or why a similar action might work elsewhere. What about that surge might have caused a drop in violence? Was it the number of troops, the population density of the key neighborhoods, or any of the hundreds of techniques individual commands used? Military operational researchers have the statistical background to run complex regression analyses to attack such questions. They mostly lack the grounding in theory needed to put those analyses into a historically validated framework that could provide contextual input to a commander’s decision-making process. In other words, military operational research specialists will struggle to see subsurface historical and social differences when comparing societies with which they are unfamiliar.

Frustration with a qualitative approach is understandable because of the time it can take. A desire for predictability is understandable as well. However, the idea that quantitative analysis, even when it does take less time, will predict the outcomes of military actions is an illusion—especially if outcomes are to be considered beyond a given mission or operation. Moreover, a quantitative analysis is faster only when it is limited to analyzing the accomplishment of a given mission at a given time—which is not the same as strategic thinking.

One common English definition of strategy is “a careful plan or method for achieving a particular goal usually over a long period of time.” Any definition of strategy is based on aligning present decisions with an idea about a desired future. Strategic thinking is about “thinking in time,” and thinking in time is about thinking in terms of the interrelated nature of variables across time—about context.

**What is the Real Question?**

Decision makers who think strategically will try to understand qualitative changes in complex political, economic, psychological, and military contexts. A qualitative approach to strategic thought is concerned with describing the values and interests of legitimate social groups and ensuring those values and interests are represented in public decision-making processes. According to Bent Flyvbjerg, this helps ensure “due diligence” in the public realm. Flyvbjerg argues that understanding values and interests is at the core of the qualitative approach to science. Furthermore, in this sense there is no static state called *victory* against which progress can be quantitatively measured. Rather, strategic thinkers must continually make judgments about the qualitative changes they are charged with affecting. Those changes, of course, reflect the values and interests of people and institutions in the public realm. As people and institutions change...
or the rank order of values and interests changes, the strategic proposition itself changes. Victory is a changeling mirroring the shifts in values and interests of those who have the power to define it.

Moreover, because the nature of strategic thought requires thinking about systemic (interrelated) conditions over time, quantitative measures are of limited use. Most important, strategic thinking is less a discrete activity than a habit. Developing the habit of thinking strategically after assimilating a professional culture focused on quantitative measures of tactical proficiency is extraordinarily difficult.

This is not to say that quantitative measurement does not have its place in military science. There are good reasons quantitative measures are preferred in the military. Skills such as hitting a target with a bullet decisively and repeatedly are properly assessed with quantitative measures. As soldiers advance in their Army careers, the dominant evaluation method they are exposed to is quantitative. The issue for leaders and planners is knowing which approaches to evaluation suit each situation. Each approach represents a different way of knowing about the world; neither is perfect or foolproof. The quantitative approach supports strategic thought but is not sufficient to ignite or sustain it.

When making decisions, commanders frame questions as problems to be solved. This is the language of quantitative algebra. Let us suppose that to counter a certain threat, U.S. forces were considering invading Country Y. Strategic thinking would ask about metaproblems, such as—

- What would an invasion gain for us?
- How long would this gain last?
- Would it be worth the cost to invade Country Y?
- Is there a better alternative such as bombing or letting a partner take action?
- What might be the unintended consequences of invading?
- What would happen after the invasion?
- How would invading qualitatively change our situation?

Quantitative analysis can inform this decision-making process, but quantitative analysis still depends on making subjective judgments about what constitutes success. Every measure of effectiveness requires a standard to be established against which actions will be measured. Do you measure if a military action is worth the cost in terms of causalities, money, or both? Does worth the cost mean achieving territorial or political gains? Could the action in question simply be a moral imperative and thus be outside the standard cost-benefit discourse? That is, even when strategists use quantitative methods, they must be aware that they reflect a value judgment from a subjective perspective—that of their bosses, themselves, the enemy command, the enemy population, and so on. In military planning, even the standards used in quantitative analysis need to be framed from the perspective of the key actors in the conflict.

**What is the Context?**

Every measure, quantitative or qualitative, should be interpreted in context. By their nature, qualitative measurements presuppose the kind of theoretical frameworks essential for strategic thought (a theory must exist to justify the measure). Though qualitative methods certainly can be used to generate quantitative-looking measures of effectiveness, categorizing focus-group information into numerical scores, for instance, would require an explicit causal framework as a basis for the categorization. Since there would be many different contexts for causal frameworks—national culture, the professional cultures of the military services or the government, or the view from partner nations—no single result would be definitive. Moreover, time as a variable would complicate the articulation of context. Thinking in terms of the interrelated nature of variables across time is thinking about context.

One of the biggest challenges to implementing the strategic landpower concept will be embracing qualitative analysis. The culture of the U.S. Army still tends to discount its value. Army commanders’ institutional norms enable a can do attitude based on an institution-wide overconfidence in the ability of analytical methods to provide understanding of cause and effect. However, the idea that the quantitative scientific methods with which Army professionals are comfortable will be adequate for strategic landpower undermines real strategic thought by upholding the false objectivity of quantitative measures.

Operations are, and always have been, too complex to reduce to supposed scientific analyses. Even if politics and warfare were hard sciences, the reliable
quantitative basis for military decisions, strategic or tactical, would be very limited. Politics and warfare are not hard sciences: Afghanistan is a prime example.

Why Does Qualitative Analysis Matter?

The qualitative approach is central to understanding how people are the same and how they differ. Differences are not easy to understand. People, and the formal and informal institutions in which they aggregate, project what they know into assumed *equations* about how the world works. In this way, they form generalized causal theories about international relations and the political views that other people and countries hold. In other words, one group of people assumes certain values guide the behavior of another group. In strategic thought, we must recognize that such projections are just that—projections.

In one sense, the qualitative approach differs from the quantitative because it asks *framing* questions—the holistic “why” and “what does it mean” questions leading to understanding the big picture, such as “How has the security ecosystem changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union?” or “What will the drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan mean to the incumbent government?” In another sense, the qualitative approach differs because the data-gathering methods cannot escape the problem of subjective interpretation. Any textual data obtained requires a human researcher to categorize it using subjective criteria.

Strategic thinking should not be imagined simply as a way to solve problems. Strategic thinking is a way to search for answers to big-picture questions. These answers can help guide activities at almost any level of the organization. A study of the potential effects of a major change in Afghanistan, such as the drawdown of U.S. forces, needs a qualitative approach. Strategic thinkers will develop questions that include context. A decontextualized question would have narrow boundaries: What will a U.S. drawdown of forces in Afghanistan mean to U.S. security? Questions that account for context would include the key people:

- What does Karzai himself think about this?
- What words does he use to describe his feelings about this event?
- Does his language show he fears for his job or his life, or does he see a drawdown as an opportunity to consolidate or expand his power?

In other words, what does the objective description of Karzai’s subjective response reveal?

Qualitative study develops a collected and collated description of these kinds of subjective experiences—of one man, of select branches in the government, or of swaths of the population. Categorizing opinion surveys, interviews, speeches, or economic data will help researchers construct a tentative picture of the strategic implications of the drawdown. The point is to estimate the range of possible futures and then to examine which policies and which actions most likely would leave the United States in the best position. To return to Gen. Dempsey, the facts mean little without context.

The qualitative approach puts the facts into context. That this requires subjective choices on the part of qualitative or strategic thinkers is not a weakness. The significance of a qualitative approach is not necessarily in its predictive capability but in how it helps decision makers ask and study the right questions in the right way. Thinking strategically is thinking through questions of context over time. The number of armored vehicles in the Afghan National Army or even the number of soldiers who passed basic training will not tell us much about what we really want to know: is the Afghan National Army now of high enough quality—in many different senses of the word—to do its job effectively?

Policy makers and military professionals need to understand why people behave as they do because the strategic goals that military operations support involve changing human behavior. Human behavior is a product of what people think and feel and believe. Numerical measurements can indicate *how many* people feel or think or believe certain ways, but they cannot explain why. Strategic thinking is about answering those *why* questions. Ideally, we need to find answers not based our worldview about Islam or Vladimir Putin or even about democracy. What matters is to understand how our enemies see their own actions as rational, and a qualitative approach is the only means of study to achieve that.
What is the Solution?
The Army must learn how to adopt genuine strategic thought. It will need to figure out how to apply strategic thinking in institutional and operational settings and at different echelons. It will need to determine ways to use strategic thinking to enhance time-constrained decision making during operations as well as to develop strategic policy guidance as part of the professional requirement to give advice to civilian leaders. Army senior leaders will apply strategic thinking differently than mid-level commanders, staffs, or soldiers on the ground.

The Army already has a good start on some initiatives that will improve its ability to use qualitative analysis. One example is improving cultural awareness through regionally aligned forces. The Army can further improve its use of qualitative analysis in three broad ways:

- Encouraging deep familiarity with the social science theories and debates that drive policy making by sending more officers to top-rated university doctoral programs,
- Increasing the emphasis on teaching the Army design methodology in professional military education, and
- Encouraging questioning during educational experiences and during staff planning.

The future is filled with complex political-military conflicts. Only an Army culture steeped in the ethos of strategic thinking and the qualitative approach that supports it will succeed in connecting military victory to long-term strategic success. This was the tradition of the Army at its finest, under Washington, Grant, Marshall, and Eisenhower—who were among the finest strategic and qualitative thinkers of their time. The conflicts of the 21st century will demand the same of today’s Army. There is no reason that challenge cannot be met and every reason it must be.

NOTES


Army Experimentation
Developing the Army of the Future—Army 2020

Van Brewer, Ph.D., and Capt. Michala Smith, U.S. Navy, Retired

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Capt. Michala M. Smith, U.S. Navy, retired, is an employee of Quantum Research International and is a member of the Joint and Army Experimentation Support Team. Capt. Smith spent 29 years in the U.S. Navy. Assignments included command of a shore installation and as a staff officer in J-4, the Joint Staff. She holds a B.A. from the College of Steubenville and an M.A. from the Naval War College.
The Chief of Staff of the Army directed the effort to redesign the Army of 2020 in response to increasingly constrained resources and changes in defense strategy. As the Army begins to reduce its active force from 570,000 to 490,000 or less, and as budgets continue to shrink, it is critical to design an effective warfighting force around the new numbers. The Army is at a crossroads and must determine how it will remain a globally effective force based in the continental United States, under resource constraints.

A History of Drawdowns

All U.S. military services faced such challenges when forces drew down after World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. As the largest service, the Army’s challenges during the 20th century were particularly significant as it sought to retain the force structure it anticipated needing for future commitments. The Army’s difficulties were exacerbated when political pressure to cut costs accelerated the reduction of the force. Drastic reductions of the Army after World War II to meet fiscal constraints, for example, caused many units to become below strength and under trained. When the Korean War began, the Army was woefully underprepared for the conflict and experienced embarrassing defeats as a result.

After Vietnam, the Army conducted a drawdown that led to the “hollow force” of the late 1970s and early 1980s. To counter this deterioration, the Army focused on developing a contemporary force through what was known as “the Division 86 Project.” The subsequent reorganization was based on a concept called AirLand Battle, which became the Army’s warfighting doctrine of the mid-to-late 1980s. Thus began a modern era of thought focused on anticipating how combat would be fought in the future and what the Army would need to remain successful in accomplishing its mission. Experimenting with different ideas was a common approach to analyzing the potential effectiveness of the new organizations, without combat. These early experiments represented future threats and capabilities in a projected environment and then evaluated the results of these war games to determine the validity of the emerging concepts.

The ability to create and examine tailored learning venues that replicate the Army’s complex challenges remains the raison d’être of operational experimentation.

Today, Army experimentation continues to examine future force structures and force reductions (both human and hardware) in real-world scenarios. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) runs Army experimentation through organizations subordinate to its Army Capabilities Integration Center. The Joint and Army Experimentation Division, the concept development and integration directorates at each Army center of excellence, and other partners conduct experimentation. Experimentation is an objective method of determining the capabilities, organization, and command and control needed to counter any threat at any anticipated time or place. The Army models, simulates, and war games various force structures and unit designs to determine the most effective use of its limited resources. This deliberate process reduces risk to soldiers and increases the odds of getting things right the first time a force faces real-world adversaries. In the past few years, some experimental designs have worked well, while others have not.

Starting in 2012, the Army embarked on a three-year effort to examine implications of “Army 2020,” assessing major force design changes that would transition the force from an Army involved in two intensive conflicts to a peacetime Army capable of meeting any threat. This article discusses the results of experiments in fiscal years (FYs) 2012 and 2013. The Joint and Army Experimentation Division uses a collaborative approach for investigating critical issues through an experimentation community of practice comprised of TRADOC and Army battle laboratories and other joint and interagency stakeholders.

Fiscal Year 2012 Experimentation

In FY 2012, the community focused on force design; reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities; intelligence, sustainment, and communications capabilities; and command and control requirements. The yearlong 2012 experimentation plan investigated and assessed proposed force design concepts through a wide range of military operations. The experiments emphasized a traditional conventional war fight that included pre-conflict and postconflict challenges. The base platform (scenario) for the experiment used a valid near-peer adversary in a realistic operational environment.

Army experimentation began to use a complete major operation in 2012, linking activities from beginning
to end through all joint operational phases. The joint phasing construct provided a comprehensive framework to assess ideas under investigation—applied in peace and war, across various time periods, and in disparate, widely dispersed geographic areas. Execution of the FY 2012 experimentation plan constantly evolved as emerging insights revealed a need for deeper investigation of some areas or additional investigation in entirely unanticipated directions. Table 1 summarizes FY 2012 experimentation findings.

Experimentation in FY 2012 reinforced the critical observation that the Army cannot design and attempt to execute a land campaign without deliberate consideration of war termination issues and without the involvement of unified action partners. War termination planning must consider the support and protection of populations and forces, including protection of critical enablers during withdrawal. Also apparent from experimentation in FY 2012 (and previous years) was that while we are developing a highly capable Army, its capability derives from a fragile foundation of enablers. We must exercise caution to prevent the condition of these enablers from becoming an Achilles heel.

### Fiscal Year 2013 Experimentation

Experiments in FY 2013 built on the results of the 2012 experiments. In 2013, the community sought to assess the integration of Army force design initiatives and proposed solutions for mitigating capability shortfalls. Originally, over forty initiatives had been associated with Army 2020. In FY 2013, the Army identified eight critical areas it would use to assess organization changes, interdependencies, and capabilities the future force would need to achieve operational and tactical objectives:
- Brigade combat team reorganization.
- Reconnaissance and surveillance brigade combat team (later changed to reconnaissance and security).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Findings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collapse an echelon of command and control</td>
<td>Merging theater Army and corps creates a span of control too broad for commanders and staffs as currently organized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echelons above division functional alignment; assess Army advisory</td>
<td>Functional alignment at echelons above division along warfighting functions did not gain efficiencies for maneuver support or medical support. Advisory efforts must be tailored for each mission and culture, and for support of unified action partners.</td>
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<td>assess Army's role in conflict prevention through shaping and</td>
<td>Military operations must be viewed in a whole-of-government context. Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) need integrated plans that establish unified objectives and activities.</td>
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<td>countering anti-access and area denial</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regionally aligned corps, divisions, and brigades</td>
<td>Improve the Army’s ability to engage with other nations’ military forces and civil agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance and surveillance brigade</td>
<td>The proposed structure had insufficient combat power to support commanders at echelons above brigade. The design was modified to a reconnaissance and security brigade combat team (BCT), which allowed it to function as intended.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special operations forces and conventional forces integration</td>
<td>There is a need for an Army overarching concept to facilitate interdependence among special operations forces and conventional forces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>War termination</td>
<td>DOD and DOS need to lay out a framework for war termination planning, before commencing joint forcible entry.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assess interdependencies with unified action partners</td>
<td>The Army and the other services will become more interdependent with unified action partners, requiring identification of capabilities and gaps.</td>
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Table 1. FY 2012 experimentation findings
The 2013 experimentation campaign was composed of six events designed to address sequenced operational activities including theater shaping, transition to combat, combat, and transition from combat to peacetime. Each experiment evaluated organization design, organization performance, capabilities required to perform tasks, and personnel skills executed across the joint operational phases. Table 2 summarizes the FY 2013 experimentation findings.\(^\text{11}\)

In a cooperative effort with 2nd Infantry Division, aspects of Army 2020 were included in the division’s Mission Command Training Program Warfighter exercise conducted in Korea in December 2013. This provided an opportunity to “test drive” select Army 2020 initiatives in a real-world environment and captured subject matter expert feedback on Army 2020 operational and organizational concepts. This event examined operations in a certain set of conditions, within an exercise environment that imposed a particular set of constraints, limitations, and assumptions. Despite these limitations, the event provided an essential operational perspective to augment experimentation results.

Both years of Army-level experimentation, followed by a 2014 division-level operational assessment, yielded very consistent results on the impact of future force designs on the Army’s posture.\(^\text{12}\) These findings merit deliberate consideration for future force design, development, and implementation.

Army 2020 designs generally performed as intended. However, it became clear that "resiliency must be a...

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<th>Factors studied</th>
<th>Findings</th>
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<tr>
<td>Combat power of brigade combat teams</td>
<td>Army 2020 force design updates increase the combat power of the brigade combat team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations at corps and division</td>
<td>Army 2020 force design updates and legacy systems limit corps and division commanders' ability to control operational tempo and limit flexibility of assigning missions to subordinate units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assets for division and below</td>
<td>Army 2020 force design updates result in critical shortfalls in the number of surveillance, reconnaissance, military police, engineer, air and missile defense, network, and intelligence assets available at division and below.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-density, high-value assets</td>
<td>The vulnerability of low-density, high-value assets creates risk to the mission and the force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills for conducting major combat operations</td>
<td>Basic skills required for the conduct of major combat operations have atrophied or are nonresident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of new designs</td>
<td>Commanders must take into account the additional time, training, and integration required by the Army 2020 force designs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air-ground interactions</td>
<td>The increase of air-ground interactions (such as fixed wing, rotary wing, unmanned aerial vehicle, air defense artillery, rockets, mortar, and missiles) has created a complex airspace coordination problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and control</td>
<td>Army 2020 force design updates increase command and control challenges and require a greater understanding of battlefield systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>Army 2020 will require updates to and clarification of doctrine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration, coordination, and synchronization of forces</td>
<td>Army 2020 increases the capability to integrate, coordinate, and synchronize assets at corps and division.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[\text{Table 2. FY 2013 experimentation findings}\]
significant consideration for future force designs. Army 2020 designs approach prudent limits on the useful extent of force pooling, require excessive task organization (which introduces significant training and span of control challenges), and place increasing reliance on low-density, high-value enablers.

**Conclusion**

The examination of Army 2020 initiatives will lead to better force design and planning factors for assessment. Later in 2014, the Joint and Army Experimentation Division expects to disseminate a new document describing the Army 2020 organizational and operational concept. This document will discuss the successes and challenges experimentation has identified with the Army 2020 force construct. All units in the operating force undergoing transformation are expected to receive the document as part of an educational support package.

Systemic pressures such as budget and force reductions have forced the acceleration of Army 2020 concepts and planning factors for implementation in 2015. Therefore, the Army is shifting its focus to 2025. The force needs to assess not only the characteristics of the threat but also how to meet and defeat it. As the Army marches into the future, experimentation remains the most cost-effective and lowest risk venue to test new concepts. The use of modeling and simulation, war games, and other types of experiments allow the Army to explore capabilities and force designs before investing scarce resources. Experimentation helps identify challenges, risks, and opportunities. Finally, it ensures that today and tomorrow the U.S. Army will remain the pre-eminent land force in the world.

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**Notes**

3. Ibid., 16-17.
5. Combat Studies Institute, 41-49.
6. The Joint and Army Experimentation Division (JAED) of ARCIC, TRADOC battle laboratories, and Army battle laboratories collaborate as the Army’s experimentation community of practice. Other joint and interagency participants include sister services, Department of State representatives, unified action partners from the UK, Australia, and Canada, and other government agencies.
9. The phrase **unified action partners** captures all types of entities with whom military forces synchronize, coordinate, and integrate activities (formerly called joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational [JIIM] partners).
10. A 2012 TRADOC tasking order outlined a plan for Army 2020, based on the concept originally developed by Department of the Army. The order had listed 40 issues to be addressed; the JAED staff selected eight areas for experimentation.
12. A draft Army 2020 Organizational and Operational Concept was under development at the time this article was prepared, in cooperation with the staffs of the JAED, the 2nd Infantry Division, the 8th Army, the Mission Command Training Program, and other members of the community of practice.
The Rise of Al Jazeera
The Need for Greater Engagement by the U.S. Department of Defense

Col. Shawn Stroud

Col. Shawn Stroud was a U.S. Army War College Fellow assigned to the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School from 2012 to 2013. He currently serves as the chief of public affairs for Eighth Army in Seoul, Korea. Col. Stroud holds a B.S. from the University of Wisconsin-LaCrosse and an M.S. from Indiana University. His public affairs assignments include deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, where he served as an advisor and communication director.

In January 2007, I traveled with then Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell, IV, chief military spokesperson for Multi-National Force-Iraq, to the Al Jazeera Media Network headquarters in Doha, Qatar. At that time, the Iraq government had forced closure of Al Jazeera’s television news bureau in Baghdad—accusing it of fomenting discord among the Iraqi people and heightening the insurgency.

Nonetheless, Al Jazeera’s popular broadcasts still reached Iraq from Qatar. Our purpose for the trip was to conduct live and taped television interviews and to engage Al Jazeera’s senior leadership in dialogue concerning some of its misreporting about our operations. Our experience was remarkable. First, the network’s highest leaders warmly welcomed us. They joined us for over two hours of discussions.
about major issues both parties were encountering. Second, we participated in several interviews on the Arabic and English channels. Each interviewer challenged our assertions and data but also gave us many opportunities to clarify or reinforce our positions. Last, and perhaps most important, we were asked to come back.

We returned to Baghdad after a full day to discover our appearances on both channels were highly successful in sharing information with the Iraqi population and viewers around the world. Subsequently, we convinced the Iraqi government to reconsider its closing of Al Jazeera’s Iraq bureau. Within a month, the chief Iraq correspondent had returned. Al Jazeera asked Multi-National Force-Iraq to provide weekly interviews from Baghdad, using live satellite broadcasting capabilities in the U.S. embassy and interviews recorded at its office. In addition, we made three more visits to Doha, the last in May 2007. These interviews positively influenced “the surge,” “Operation Fardh al Qanoon,” and “the Anbar Awakening.” The Department of Defense (DOD) welcomed the success of this new and constructive relationship and wholeheartedly supported our findings and efforts.

I returned to Doha in October 2011 to discover that the friendly relationship between Al Jazeera and Multi-National Force-Iraq had been neglected: no similar outreach efforts had occurred since our May 2007 visit. Many of the same executives and correspondents welcomed us warmly, but they expressed frustration at the force’s unwillingness to speak with them or participate in televised interviews.\(^1\) We found it unfathomable that for nearly five years neither the multinational force nor the U.S. military had fostered a relationship with one of the world’s largest and most influential media networks, especially after our efforts had been so effective.

This paper explains why the U.S. military should build and maintain a mutually beneficial relationship with Al Jazeera. It summarizes the history of the Al Jazeera Media Network, its relationship with the United States, and its influence as a news media organization. It explains the importance of engagement and offers recommendations for implementation by DOD. It is my hope this information will serve as a catalyst for renewed engagement.

The Rise of Al Jazeera and Its Relationship with the United States

Since its inception in 1996, the Al Jazeera [Arabic for the island or the peninsula] Media Network has been hailed by world leaders for its independent and nonpartisan coverage of global issues, yet hated by those same leaders for its coverage of their domestic news. According to deputy managing director Ehab Alshihabi, it has endeavored to be “an independent and nonpartisan satellite TV network free from government scrutiny, control, and manipulation.”\(^2\) Al Jazeera’s reporting, however, has been a flashpoint for U.S. audiences who have found its news coverage provocative and biased against the United States. During an interview in 2001, former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell acknowledged Al Jazeera’s importance to the Arab world but alleged it also gave “time and attention to some very vitriolic, irresponsible kinds of statements.”\(^3\) Washington Post writer Alice Fordham reported that former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had described the network’s reporting as “vicious, inaccurate, and inexcusable” in 2004 (but by 2011 he had agreed to an interview).\(^4\) Cliff Kincaid, writing for media watchdog organization Accuracy in Media, called Al Jazeera “a mouthpiece for al Qaeda.”\(^5\)

We found it unfathomable that for nearly five years neither the multinational force nor the U.S. military had fostered a relationship with one of the world’s largest and most influential media networks...

Even if such allegations are or were true, today Al Jazeera continues to grow as an influential and adaptive global news provider. In October 2001, it was Al Jazeera that provided the world with the first images of the U.S. attacks in Afghanistan. In January 2011, it was Al Jazeera that shared some of the first images of the Arab Spring, prompting then Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton to single out its coverage of the events. Writer David Folkenflik reported that Clinton told the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 2011, “You may not agree with it, but you feel like you’re getting real news around the clock instead of a million commercials and, you know, arguments between talking heads.” Senator John McCain, one of the most respected members of the U.S. Congress, also publicly praised the efforts of Al Jazeera during a forum it hosted in Washington, D.C. Writer Keach Hagey quoted McCain lauding its coverage of the Tunisian uprising:

What Al Jazeera has done is achieved something that all of us I think want to achieve, particularly as we grow older, and that is to make a contribution that will last and will be brought to future generations that lie ahead of us. I want to assure you that these young
people who were able to watch Al Jazeera and be inspired by the example of others is a remarkable achievement.\textsuperscript{7} Laudatory comments from senior U.S. officials in the State Department and Congress now seem to represent the opinions of a growing number of leaders—including some military leaders in the Pentagon and forward deployed around the world.

While assigned to NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan from August 2010 until November 2011, I noticed many senior leaders preferring the Al Jazeera English channel over CNN (Cable News Network) or BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation)—the latter two having been the dominant cable television news choices during my deployment to Iraq in 2006 and 2007. In spite of Al Jazeera’s growing credibility and popularity among service members, DOD leaders seem to remain averse to engaging Al Jazeera in on-camera interviews or private meetings. In fact, 2012 discussions and correspondence between this author and several members of the Al Jazeera English news bureau in Washington, D.C., confirmed this observation.\textsuperscript{8} Although many U.S. leaders now acknowledge Al Jazeera as a quality news provider, appearances by current or former DOD senior leaders have been, for the most part, few and far between. Adm. Jonathan Greenert, chief of naval operations, appeared in March 2012, but few senior leaders in the Pentagon have appeared in Al Jazeera taped or live interviews during their current postings. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen appeared in January 2011, and former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates appeared in September 2009 and June 2010.\textsuperscript{9} To their credit, these senior leaders’ appearances were perceived as extremely positive by the Al Jazeera staff in spite of some difficult topics.

Given the change in U.S. defense strategy from an operational focus in Afghanistan and Iraq to globally integrated operations, a shift in communication strategy is needed. In the \textit{Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020}, Gen. Martin E. Dempsey highlights the new operational challenges: “As we have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, military actions will receive intense media scrutiny, a dynamic that potentially invests otherwise inconsequential actions with strategic importance.”\textsuperscript{10} In the past, DOD public affairs could focus media relations efforts on domestic audiences. Today’s global realities and pervasive information environment, however, require renewed emphasis on engagement with global news networks that can inform and educate international audiences about DOD’s strategy, policies, and operations. Given Al Jazeera’s growing audience, global presence, and increased influence, the network provides a viable alternative to other global television news networks. Perhaps now is the time for DOD’s senior leadership to take a more deliberate and positive approach with Al Jazeera.

\textbf{Al Jazeera’s Growing Audience}

Today Al Jazeera claims more people in the Middle East and North Africa watch their news “than all other pan-Arab news channels combined.”\textsuperscript{11} Al Jazeera English alone claims to reach “more than 260 million households in more than 130 countries.”\textsuperscript{12} Al Jazeera English launched in November 2006, coinciding with the network’s ten-year anniversary, to provide global news coverage to the English-speaking world. Al Jazeera America began broadcasting late in 2013. Al Jazeera’s plan is to “build a distinctively U.S. channel for American viewers with 60 percent of the content produced locally and 40 percent coming from Al Jazeera English, their global network.”\textsuperscript{13} From 2006 to 2012, the network reports the number of viewers increased 400 percent, and it claims a steady rate of increase continues.\textsuperscript{14} With the establishment of Al Jazeera America and its 12 U.S. news bureaus, Al Jazeera’s global audience could exceed 300 million in 2014.\textsuperscript{15}

Al Jazeera also has expanded its web-based media presence. In 2012, the Al Jazeera English website received over 150 million visits with more than 40 percent of all visits coming from the United States. VidStatsX.com ranked the Al Jazeera YouTube site as the eighth most viewed news and political producer (two positions ahead of CNN).\textsuperscript{16} Al Jazeera English claims 1.96 million followers on Twitter, and their Facebook page shows 3.6 million “likes.”\textsuperscript{17}

The innovative program “The Stream” features an interactive dialogue that leverages social networking sites Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Pinterest, and Google Plus to generate instant audience-based commentary and feedback. Popular among the young and educated international audience, it covers topics ranging from how Israelis perceive Iranians to how Americans view gun control. The Stream gained over 200,000 viewers
in its first year. Al Jazeera’s dramatically expanding audience coupled with its visual programming and web-based platforms could provide many opportunities for the DOD to inform and educate large audiences of all ages around the world.

Al Jazeera’s Global Presence

Since its modest beginnings in Doha, Qatar, where it began broadcasting a part-time satellite television channel in Arabic with fewer than 150 employees and fewer than a million viewers, Al Jazeera has grown to over 80 news bureaus across the world. Most are located in Africa, Asia, and Central and Latin America. By comparison, CNN has closed many of its international bureaus and today only maintains 44 editorial operations, 14 in the United States. Al Jazeera employs more than 3,000 staff members across the globe, including more than 400 journalists from more than 60 different countries. Al Jazeera English, the largest of the Al Jazeera channels, employs “more than 1,000 highly experienced staff from more than 50 nationalities, making Al Jazeera English’s newsroom among the most diverse in the world.” Operating from its Doha headquarters and two different news centers 24 hours a day, seven days a week, Al Jazeera now broadcasts into more than 130 different countries (over two thirds of the world’s countries) in languages including Arabic, English, Bosnian, and Serbo-Croatian, with plans to add a Turkish channel later this year.

One of Al Jazeera’s founding editorial philosophies was to cover news stories from areas of the world typically underreported, such as Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East and other parts of developing Asia—sometimes known as “the global south.” Seeing an opportunity to reverse the established information flow, mainly from “the global north” (North America, developed parts of Europe, and East Asia), Al Jazeera has markedly outdistanced its competitors in this effort. Researcher Tine Ustad Figenschou studied Al Jazeera news programming during two months in 2007 and two months in 2008 and found that Al Jazeera English had covered the global south with in-depth reporting more often than the global north. It is safe to assume this trend continues with current programming. As U.S. strategic defense priorities now focus on the Asia Pacific region, the Middle East, and North Africa, Al Jazeera can make a significant contribution toward helping the defense community understand and communicate with those nations.

In 2011, Al Jazeera provided significantly more coverage of global issues than news media based in the United States. According to the Pew Research Center’s “The State of the News Media 2012” report, in 2011 CNN had devoted about 34 percent of its coverage to international events and matters that concerned U.S. involvement abroad. The report stated, “the percentage was considerably less, 20%, on Fox, and even smaller, 14%, on MSNBC.”

Al Jazeera’s global reach enables rapid cross-sharing of information between its news channels. During the Arab Spring, it took footage from “citizen journalists” and its professional correspondents in Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and Egypt and rebroadcast it over its channels around the world, with commentary in the viewers’ languages, well before its competitors. To provide timely coverage, many news providers in the United States could only rebroadcast Al Jazeera’s footage.
Al Jazeera’s Greater Influence

Al Jazeera’s greatest strength may be its ability to provide uncensored global news to its Arab audiences and an Arab perspective to other viewers. For these reasons, Al Jazeera has attracted loyal and diverse audiences all around the world. Its influence on its viewers’ global perspectives is unmatched.

Al Jazeera’s viewers are loyal because it adheres (for the most part) to its foundational principles, such as reporting both sides of every story. Adopting the motto “the opinion and the other opinion,” and creating programs “intended to stimulate debate and controversy,” it has challenged the status quo of Middle Eastern media and the absolute power of authoritarian governments. The network strives for objectivity and balance by providing a variety of programming marked by diverse viewpoints and opinions. Unlike other media outlets within the Middle East, Al Jazeera has sought to open dialogue on some of the most controversial topics in the Arab world, such as government corruption, illicit sex, and other taboo topics. Even in topics previously covered from only one perspective by Arab media, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Al Jazeera has offered both sides the opportunity to present their viewpoints and perspectives.

Another principle that has dramatically bolstered Al Jazeera’s audience loyalty is its effort to serve as “the voice of the voiceless.” Its reporting highlights many of the ills of the global society and the lives of those who suffer, especially those who perceive themselves as disenfranchised. News coverage is not limited to official statements from those in power. Reports try to bring out the human interest perspective of every story, including civilian casualties from war, starving families in refugee camps, and widowed spouses of police officers.

Al Jazeera’s wide popularity and tremendous influence extend beyond the Arab world to the worldwide Muslim community, a community that the DOD and U.S. Government have struggled to communicate with. In fact, recent findings by the Pew Research Center suggest Muslim countries’ opinions of U.S. policies have decreased by 19 percent from the time of a similar study in 2009. By contrast, Al Jazeera enjoys relative popularity and trust within these same countries. According to author and Middle Eastern affairs expert Dr. Glenn Robinson, “the data I have seen shows that not only is Al Jazeera by far the most watched source of regional and international news among all Arabs (at about 50 percent), Al Jazeera is also the most trusted source of news in the Arab and Muslim worlds.”

Recommendations for Fostering a Culture of Engagement with Al Jazeera

In the spirit of Abraham Lincoln’s famous quote, “I don’t like that man. I must get to know him better,” I believe the most important first step the DOD can take to foster a culture of engagement with Al Jazeera is to understand and learn to appreciate, the organization. The simplest way to accomplish this is through face-to-face meetings with the senior leadership of Al Jazeera in Doha and its leaders in Washington, D.C. Although scheduling and travel could pose challenges, a first step such as this would demonstrate a willingness to move toward a better relationship. Although the DOD media relations team should spearhead this effort, DOD senior leaders should be active participants, especially in visiting the headquarters in Doha. At either location, all initial conversations should be informal and off
the record, simply to build trust. Senior leaders could see firsthand how Al Jazeera produces and distributes news to its channels. Future senior leader engagements could be scheduled, including office calls within the Pentagon or with the service chiefs and their staffs.

The next step would be for the senior leaders to participate in a more structured event, such as an editorial board (a gathering of news producers and regional news directors, if available). The format could be negotiated, but these types of engagements are most beneficial when they are informal and conducted with a low profile. This makes it easier to hold in-depth discussions of topics needing significant context and explanation. These types of engagements can help news producers understand DOD concerns, policies, and responses to issues.

DOD senior leaders should then make themselves available for on-camera interviews with Al Jazeera. The interviews should be closely coordinated in advance to define the focus and the boundaries. To be sure, the line of questioning on any Al Jazeera program will be fast paced and wide ranging. However, with adequate preparation and a firm mutual understanding of each party’s expectations, DOD senior leaders and Al Jazeera can achieve their desired goals. Al Jazeera must provide experienced and noncombative interviewers, especially for the initial interviews of the most senior DOD officials. Following interviews, senior leaders can determine the benefits of the engagement and provide feedback to the Al Jazeera senior leaders on their experience.

The 2012 Al Jazeera interview with Adm. Jonathan Greenert set a good precedent. In addition, a reporter for Al Jazeera English was embedded with the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet for an exercise in September 2012. These types of actions set the tone for service-wide engagement and can lead to other opportunities. Services could consider ways to incorporate Al Jazeera into their professional military education curricula. It is common practice at almost every level of professional military education to schedule a media panel or invite members of the press corps to deliver remarks to the students, faculty, and staff. When I have attended such events, representatives from Al Jazeera are noticeably absent. Inviting Al Jazeera to participate in a venue such as an international media panel at the U.S. Army War College would certainly spur intense debate and dialogue during the event. Moreover, it would help assuage many of the stereotypes and biases on either side.

Finally, no group understands the importance of improving relations with Al Jazeera more than those in DOD public affairs. Unfortunately, most DOD public affairs professionals have limited knowledge or experience with the network. This, however, can be remedied by including Al Jazeera representatives as guest speakers at the Defense Information School, where all the services send their public affairs specialists. Other opportunities to expose DOD public affairs students to Al Jazeera could include group visits to its news bureau in Washington, D.C. Students could participate in editorial boards with the bureau’s senior leaders and correspondents. This could help public affairs students build new relationships with members of the press corps—a critical requisite for success as a public affairs professional. Additionally, the military service public affairs leaders should consider Al Jazeera for opportunities as part of the Training with Industry program. Rather than sending mid-level public affairs officers to work with marketing firms for a year, a viable option would be to send officers to work with the Al Jazeera English bureau or the new Al Jazeera America headquarters in New York City.

Much of DOD’s resistance to engagement with Al Jazeera comes from inadequate culture and language skills. Unlike the U.S. State Department, within the military only a handful of public affairs professionals have a working knowledge of Arabic. This places our public affairs specialists at a disadvantage in understanding broadcasts or conducting interviews; our leaders and public affairs teams must rely on contracted translators and interpreters. The services should consider identifying top-performing public affairs specialists and allowing them to become regional public affairs specialists complete with culture and language training so they can communicate with their regionally aligned audiences and media.

**Conclusion**

As DOD faces certain budget cuts and our forces become more “globally responsive,” it will be incumbent upon our leaders to ensure the world understands U.S. military efforts. As the face of the U.S. national security strategy, people around the world can see U.S. forces as agents of occupation or
ambassadors of good will, sometimes depending on the news they receive. Whether in words or deeds, we must seek out opportunities to better educate and inform global audiences in times of peace and war.

Embracing a culture of engagement with Al Jazeera would symbolize a willingness to listen and a willingness to learn—qualities we have espoused often but failed to follow.

This paper is based on a dissertation by Shawn A. Stroud, “Al Jazeera and the DoD: The Need for Greater Engagement,” prepared in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the U.S. Army War College Fellowship, April 2013.

Notes

1. Ehab Alshihabi, deputy managing director, Al Jazeera-English, Doha, Qatar, 19 October 2011.


3. Colin Powell, quoted in El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 176.


17. Twitter statistics are taken from the Al Jazeera English Twitter site at https://twitter.com/AJEnglish; Facebook statistics are taken from the Al Jazeera English Facebook site at https://www.facebook.com/aljazeera.


25. Ibid.


You Are Fired


Maj. Gen. Michael W. Symanski served the Army from 1970 through 2007. He commanded the 89th Regional Support Command and served as the Army Assistant G-3/5/7 for Mobilization and Reserve Affairs. He was the senior advisor for logistics, strategy, and policy to the Afghan Ministry of Defense 2009-2010. He holds a B.A. in history and political science, and an M.A. in history from the University of Illinois.

You may not see it coming, but usually few are surprised when a senior leader does his duty by relieving a subordinate leader who committed unacceptable personal behavior or who publicly failed in leadership and management. The firing probably is done for the good of the service or to ensure mission accomplishment, and the guilty party and the public expect it. Granted, toxic leaders rarely are aware of their own poison and believe they are good...
performers up to the moment the ax falls. Sometimes, however, unseen forces are at work, and the victim and bystanders are taken unaware.

The military is a hierarchal organization that can suffer from the same self-serving behaviors that often afflict any bureaucracy. The motives of the senior official who pulls the plug may be courageous and commendable, or they may be craven and contemptible. The decision is often a judgment call. It may be made under pressure of outside influences. The dismissal of anyone of strategic rank can push disruptive ripples throughout the institution, so we should explore the process by which the authority arrives at the unhappy decision. Effective leaders must fully understand this decision-making process and the necessary follow-up from the perspectives of their own office and the person who is relieved. Relief is a necessary and inevitable tool of leadership that must be applied judiciously and effectively. Moreover, its user must accept personal accountability for the decision. Relief can even be used creatively.

Getting the chop is a gut-wrenching experience, and so is wielding the ax. Therefore, for readers who have never been fired, this article will try to involve you in the emotions of getting canned, by including you as the subject of a fictional scenario based on historical events. How would you handle either side of the desk? Some of either character’s actions leading up to the firing might have been less than noble. How might anyone’s professional compass become perverted? How can a hierarchical organization prevent corrupt and corrupting behavior? Is corruption among those who wield power inevitable?

You have been called into the presence of your immediate senior, who says—

I am relieving you from command, immediately, and sending you home. Since this meeting and conversation are not being recorded, I can be starkly frank about why. This may surprise you. Sit down; your knees look wobbly.

I want to make it clear that there is no allegation of moral turpitude. There have been several instances when your conduct has been below standard, and I have tried hard to work with you to help you improve so it pains me to give up on you, but I must. This dismissal is due, in reality, to your poor performance as a leader. Aside from that, the recent exposure on social media of your unprofessional behavior would be sufficient grounds for termination. That public exposure means I cannot delay because I cannot cover up your failures, and it gives me the opportunity to make a highly visible change by firing you. This will show everyone that I am clearly in charge and leading. It does not make the bad news better, but it relieves some stress and satisfies the public.

No doubt, you will feel humiliated and angry because I am crushing your dream of a long military career and a place in the history books. Remember, though, that when you accepted the authority of command and the deference that comes with it, you also accepted the risk of blame and disgrace for failure. Your troops are risking wounds or worse in combat while you only have risked your reputation. Stalin’s commissars may have given a failed general a pistol and a single bullet to do what must be done, and a defeated Roman commander may have sought an honorable death fighting in the front rank, but that is not the American way. I don’t want you to be a damned fool about this and harm yourself.
You are not the first commander that I have relieved during this deployment. I fire officers when they are an impediment to successful operations, to the command, and to my career. We all know how often our boss has removed officers, and that recently he has been very unhappy about our lack of operational progress. If I don’t fire you, he probably will fire me.

When you assumed command, you probably made a list of your objectives, imperatives, and priorities—including those imposed by me, and maybe a second list of the things that could get you fired, but I doubt you anticipated this. Maybe you couldn’t manage your own time or priorities well because your bosses always imposed their own priorities. Nowadays, the public’s perception is as damning as hard evidence against a senior officer. Since a commander is held responsible for everything, it is easy to blame him for things outside his control, but you were not blameless even if there was plenty of blame to go around.

Did you think that a Secretary of the Army would take the blame because some unsupervised soldiers were living in an untidy room in a motel about to be abandoned? Did you imagine that a brigadier general would be fired because a staff sergeant was running a cell of sadists? You should have seen the ax coming or at least prayed for enough luck to get through your assignment.

We all know how critical luck is for success and survival in the military. Napoleon wanted all of his generals to be lucky, above all other traits. Anyone who rises to lieutenant colonel in the Army has been lucky and has had a successful career. The officers who rise further in rank often forget how lucky they have already been, and they come to believe that they are entitled to even more, like many people who inherit wealth. Some who are stupid survive by good luck, but your good luck ran out when that video went viral.

As the senior commander, I set the culture of my command. My boss is a no-nonsense reliever of officers, and he expects me to be ruthless, too. Am I a toxic leader if I enable a threat-based command climate in which my subordinates expect instant and arbitrary punishment for less than outstanding performance? Like executing Admiral Byng on his own quarter-deck—as Voltaire said in his novel, *Candide*—the others are encouraged to do better, or else! Of course, if my officers are always looking over their shoulders, their fear and anxiety probably choke their imagination and initiative. So, what! We are engaged in combat, and unforgiving leadership is most appropriate for accomplishing combat’s short-term objectives. The operational force is like a big business that has only quarterly objectives—the burned out hulks of over-stressed employees attest to the leader’s anxiety for getting a good bottom line instead of building a cohesive management team. He has a budget instead of a strategy. The hierarchical nature of our military powerfully draws us into such bureaucratic behaviors and values. Scott Adams’ comic strip “Dilbert” represents the sociology of military-leader behavior better than most of our leadership courses with their aphorisms and bumper-sticker platitudes. Like any good bureaucratic manager, I must be seen to be in control of my lane, whatever the reality, and I must box out all rivals for my boss’s favorable attention. But that is not why you are being fired.

Would my future be brighter with someone else commanding your unit? I could not fire you if I did not have a qualified replacement on hand, and someone is now available. Since my boss is pressuring me, I can’t wait any longer to fix the problem. You must go, today. Even if the replacement commander only has better luck than you had, my stress will be less than it is now.

This cannot be an opportunity for an ingenious use of relief even though history shows the possibilities. In World War I, the 89th Division was organized and trained in Kansas by a two-star commander. He was not allowed to deploy with the division because he would have competed with Pershing for the top job. The best of the two brigade commanders led the 89th to France and expected to command it in combat. Instead, he was replaced by a competent two-star from Pershing’s headquarters. The relieved brigadier general was in despair, but he was retained in command of his brigade. Thus, the most able and experienced brigade commander led the division spearhead while Pershing’s surrogate directed division operations. The result was outstanding success. At the armistice, Pershing sent the two-star to command a corps, and the brigadier resumed command of the division. But we do not have these kinds of options.

To your credit, you accepted the responsibility of command and were comfortable being in charge. You took the risk of seizing the initiative, and you balanced your tactical audacity with situational awareness so
that you did not become a gambler against the odds. You kept me informed. I once commanded an officer who did not alert me to an initiative that eventually failed. He explained that it was easier to seek forgiveness than to ask permission, so I did not counsel him before I fired him. Commanders can only hope not to be second-guessed by someone with hindsight, as my boss often does.

You were a barely adequate commander when we were in garrison and training for deployment. Then, your mission was to build readiness, and your role was to be a good coach, teacher, and mentor who would grow the long-term abilities of your officers. Your performance then was passable. Your talents and style are better suited for combat, however, when you have to execute decisively in the short term. Maybe other commanders have been no more effective than you, but leadership practices that work in combat do not always work in garrison.

I have concerns about your integrity and character. Your driving ambition to succeed as a commander has beguiled you into rendering glowing reports in self-assessments, especially in subjective readiness reporting. You may have been dishonest with yourself, if not completely delusional. For instance, after your final predeployment exercise, you reported your command was ready for the range of military operations even though some key personnel and equipment were not yet on hand. If you had reported the quantifiable truth that your command was only marginally combat ready, you might have been replaced then for the deficiency, and we would have been spared this situation now.

You are physically capable of commanding. In fact, most of your command policies promote the physical fitness that the Army seems to admire more than technical skills. When the Army has to reduce the force, soon, it will probably start by cutting the overweight people regardless of their professional credentials. You are only marginally technically competent, but you are at least physically fit. Maybe you preferred extreme exercising to the hard mental work it takes to be a better officer and commander.

What is expected of a combat commander and by what metrics is his performance evaluated? There is very little about this war that can be sensibly quantified. We cannot define the terrain that we control tactically, and the enemy body count is an irrelevant indicator of his combat power. We soldiers are here because we accept the risk inherent in a soldier’s job, but neither you nor I brought our soldiers here to become casualties. We protect our soldiers by the quality of our training and leadership although we cannot protect them from very, very bad luck. Since we can’t win the war by hiding behind our compound walls and vehicle armor, we have to expose our soldiers to greater risk by taking the offensive. Our friendly casualty rate is another unhelpful metric here, unless it indicates poor training, inadequate equipment, or that the commander is having consistent and prolonged bad luck.

If only one of your subordinate units was failing, I could blame its commander. When two or more peer units are failing, however, I must look for their common denominator at their higher headquarters. Admittedly, you have been able to recover from your tactical mistakes much better than the last commander I relieved. He could not fix a bad development, which eventually cost him the confidence of his troops, peers, and me. Your setbacks have taught you some valuable lessons, and pain is a much better teacher than uninterrupted success. To some extent, you have learned and recovered from defeats. It may have been Marshal Turenne who said, “Show me a general who has made no mistakes and I will show you a general who has seldom waged war.”3 When the political and military authorities are in the same hand, wrote Field-Marshal Montgomery, the failed generalissimo does not fear dismissal.4 Because he was unaccountable to anyone, Napoleon’s authority survived his defeat in Russia in 1812, and he went on to very nearly win at Waterloo in 1815. Our boss, however, remembers failure better than comeback successes and holds us accountable for them.

You are energetic. Indeed, you are often frenetic! Hyperactivity is part of your theatrical effort to be a Homeric, larger-than-life, Pattonesque figure. Instead, you should have been calmer under pressure. You should have shown confidence that your planning and battle management, and your team, would succeed in the end. Defeat is born in the mind of the commander, wrote Field-Marshal Montgomery, and the commander must demonstrate confidence in the basic plan even after adjusting it during execution.

I admit you were a loyal supporter of the policies and operational intent of your seniors and, even if skeptical of them, gave the subsequent orders in your
own name. Loyalty is not easy to give here. Whenever some back channel feeds our boss information that we couldn’t possibly know about our troops, he loves to blindside and embarrass us with snarky gloats that he knows more about our commands than we do. It’s his way of chest beating and keeping us on the back foot. Even though you were loyal to your higher chain of command and the Army, we cannot remain loyal to you.

You took command with appointed authority, but you did not grow it into acquired authority. Early American militiamen elected the best-known local fighters to be their officers. If the soldiers lost confidence in any officer later, they shunned him until he went home. The insurgent leaders’ authority over their followers is acquired, and some Afghan government officials have recommended that the Afghan Army soldiers elect their own officers, too. In your case, your bullying manner has alienated your officers, and they were united only by their despair and frustration. It is like the tragedy of Shakespeare’s *Macbeth* (act V, scene II)—

> Those he commands move only in command,  
> Nothing in love: Now does he feel his title  
> Hang loose about him, like a giant’s robe  
> Upon a dwarfish thief.

We commanders lean heavily on our staff to provide analysis and recommended courses of action. We need them to protect us from ourselves by speaking truth to power—you did not let your staff do that for you. They have to be a team of star performers with a deep bench within their areas of expertise. The commander should explain his intent well enough for everyone to understand it. But you have forced your staff only to silently cower in mutual fear of your capricious outbursts and hope for your removal. If your soldiers were militiamen, would they elect you to be their commander? Your leadership is weak, and that screwball video makes it clear that they have no respect for you.

I already told you that we are held responsible for so much that is actually beyond our control—and that my boss plays the “gotcha!” game. We are driven to micromanage to avoid being caught by surprise. We can’t really trust our subordinates’ judgment if our own necks are always on the block. Anyway, military culture always admires commanders who are in total control.

When the television reporter came, you politely declined a one-on-one interview and directed her to talk to your public affairs officer. That was the smart way to handle the press. I can’t think of anyone who has been fired for not talking to a journalist, but I can remember several who were fired for what they said to a reporter, like the Navy commander who said that his job did not include chasing pirates. We shouldn’t leave a trail of unguarded statements. You remember the foolish officer whose naughty emails to his deployment “cruise romance” were forwarded to the world, last summer.

Your replacement will be able to get the organization back on track because the dysfunction is mostly confined to the two echelons of people below you. Two levels of command down is the normal “effective range” of senior leadership traits. Command policy letters will affect everyone, but optimism or paranoia is transmitted primarily through direct contact. We senior leaders are too far removed from the junior enlisted soldiers to
lead them effectively from in front. Platoon sergeants and company commanders are far more important to privates than are generals, and most private soldiers remember only the eccentricities of their distant senior officers. Your theatrical attempts to conjure up charisma have caused your soldiers to write you off as a phony flake. Remember when a unit of your soldiers marched past your field command post in the rain, and you stood outside the tent entrance to show them that you shared their suffering? They concluded that you didn’t have enough common sense to get out of the rain!

I calculated the cost of dismissing you. The government has made a substantial investment to develop you as a senior commander over the years—perhaps even as much money as I hope to make in my future senior officer’s pension. Could you still be considered an asset? The Army has gone through a period of rapid promotion for almost all eligible officers, so maybe some have been advanced before they were ready. You were assigned beyond your leadership ability; yet, you might be fit to serve somewhere on staff. Under the circumstances, I cannot recommend that you be kicked upstairs to some other position of higher responsibility. Since you are not a career competitor to my boss or to me, we would have no reason to block your reassignment elsewhere at your current rank. Of course, you will undergo a psychological evaluation so that you will have very little hope of appealing our decision.

Therefore, it behooves us to give you the push and hope that some of the stink of this operational stagnation will follow you out the door before it rises up your chain of command. The announced reason for your relief will be the candid camera video of you that your staff noncommissioned officer (NCO) made with his cell phone. When you lectured your staff about how half of them are parasitic morons, you never suspected that his edited video of it would go viral and make you the lunatic poster boy for toxic leadership. There is no need for me to take the time to build a documented case against you, so your relief is immediate. There will be no change of command ceremony, and two NCOs will escort you to your office to ensure that you do not destroy or take classified material. They will then parade you through your headquarters to the exit carrying a cardboard box with your family photos. Remember, this isn’t personal … it’s just business.

The characters described in this article are fictitious, except for named historical or literary figures.

Notes

1. Admiral John Byng of the Royal Navy was executed in 1757 for failing to do his utmost while commanding in battle at Minorca. Voltaire satirized him in the novel Candide with a scene in which an officer is executed by firing squad with the explanation that “in this country, it is good to kill an admiral from time to time, in order to encourage the others.”


3. Although several authors have repeated the quote from Turenne, I have found no confirmation that he actually said or wrote it in 1641.

America’s Frontier Wars: Lessons for Asymmetric Conflicts

In July 1755, Major General Edward Braddock, commander in chief of all British forces in North America and a 45-year career soldier, was killed along with 900 of his men by a smaller French and Indian force. On his way to capture Fort Duquesne, Pennsylvania, Braddock had split his force into two divisions. Because of the difficulty of crossing the wilderness, they opened a distance of 60 miles between the “flying column” division of rapidly moving soldiers and a support column hauling “monstrously heavy eight-inch howitzers and twelve-pound cannons” completely unsuited to the terrain.

The lead column stretched a mile in length and was attacked on the far side of the Monongahela River by Indians streaming along either British flank and hiding within the forest they had long used as hunting grounds. The British responded using traditional tactics—continuously trying to form companies and return fire but only concentrating their number further for Indian attack. Braddock ordered forward the main body of his troops, which then collided with retreating elements ahead. In the resulting confusion, 15 of the 18 officers in the advance party were picked off. Still, the remaining forces continued to fight the way they were taught: maintaining platoon formations and firing together even as they drew heavy fire to the line from well-hidden Indians. It was not until Braddock himself was shot in the back that the British broke in retreat, carrying off the body of their commanding officer.1

Asymmetric Warfare: Yesterday and Tomorrow

Why do I begin an article addressing tomorrow’s conflicts with an account of a battle fought two and a half centuries ago? As an avid student of history, I believe it is critically important for us to understand that asymmetric warfare is not something new. In fact, it has been a recurring theme of American military
history and is familiar to many of today’s military officers. Many of its best historical examples come from the series of conflicts we collectively refer to as the Indian Wars. Braddock’s defeat highlights as many useful insights as contemporary examples of asymmetric action, like Russian battles with the Chechens. Overcoming future challenges will require that we both understand the lessons from the past and develop strategies and tactics appropriate to tomorrow’s battlefield.

While asymmetric warfare is not something new, it is very much in vogue today in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. Given America’s resounding success in that conflict, potential adversaries have learned Iraq’s lesson that it is foolish to try to match us conventionally. Instead, they are seeking ways to turn our strengths against us. This is the heart of the concept of asymmetry, broadly defined by Steven Metz and Douglas Johnson of the U.S. Army War College as: “In the realm of military affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action.”

**Asymmetry on the Future Battlefield**

In operational terms, asymmetry derives from one force deploying new capabilities that the opposing force does not perceive or understand, conventional capabilities that counter or overmatch the capabilities of its opponent, or capabilities that represent totally new methods of attack or defense—or

Image from Jered Sparkes, *The Life of George Washington*.
a combination of these attributes. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) now thinks of ways to characterize tomorrow’s asymmetric challenges. In considering its arguments, I was struck again by the utility of lessons learned from earlier campaigns against Native Americans such as Braddock’s defeat. So I have matched TRADOC’s insights for the future with asymmetric examples from the past. Only by studying the lessons of history are we likely to adapt to asymmetric challenges.

TRADOC’s analysis begins by stressing the differences between our current perception of the future operational environment and what is likely to be true. Today we think of close combat as involving deliberate actions conducted at a tempo decided by the United States and characterized by the application of technology and systems that leaves opponents virtually helpless to respond or retaliate. Therefore, the public expects military operations to involve few casualties and precision attacks, secure our homeland, and be short-lived. On the contrary, potential adversaries will likely choose to fight in ways that negate these expectations. Future close combat will be much more dynamic and lethal, marked by greater intensity, operational tempo, uncertainty, and psychological impact. We cannot expect the experience of the Gulf War to be repeated.

Likely Characteristics of Adversaries

With this as a starting point, TRADOC has discussed attributes a potential enemy is likely to possess: greater knowledge of the physical conflict environment, better situational awareness, a clearer understanding of U.S. military forces, and an ability to adapt quickly to changing battlefield conditions. These attributes strongly mirror challenges for British, and later American, soldiers in Indian campaigns of yesteryear.

The physical environment remains the defining variable of close combat. For U.S. military forces, it is almost certain that future conflicts will occur in regions where the enemy has a greater understanding of the physical environment and has better optimized his forces to fight. A common characteristic of many Indian campaigns was the Indians’ superior knowledge of the terrain. A great example of this was the attack on the forces of Colonel Henry Bouquet during his march to relieve Fort Pitt, Pennsylvania, during Pontiac’s War in August 1763. The Indians attacked in an area of old growth forest, offering limited fields of fire, around Bushy Run. They forced Bouquet’s forces back into a defensive position on a hilltop, attacking the position repeatedly but without waiting for a counterattack. Their detailed knowledge of the area allowed them to simply fade into the forest, suffering few casualties. This is but one example of the advantages that accrued to many Indian tribes through the late 1800s.

Opposing forces will also have greater situational awareness in future conflicts. We should expect them to have human networks operating over telephone lines or with cellular phones and using commercial imagery systems. This will be critical, not only because the adversary can distribute information quickly but also because crucial information will only be available through human interaction. The United States, even with its sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, will have difficulty in complex settings unless it builds a more effective human intelligence capability in strategically important regions. Moreover, these new adversaries will learn not only how to adapt technology but also tactics, formations, and operations in light of changing battlefield conditions during the course of operations. Such adaptations will help them counter a precision warfare strategy by creating uncertainty while also trying to control the nature and timing of combat engagements.

During the war in Chechnya, the Chechens fought using few prepared positions, preferring instead, as Chechen Vice President Yanderbaijev said, to “let the situation do the organizing.” They would move from city to city to deny Russian maneuver and fire superiority and would use the local population as cover for their activities.

Similarly, the Seminole Indians adapted continuously during the second Seminole War of 1835-1842. One noted historian puts it this way: “The second Seminole War did not follow the precedent set in earlier Indian wars by producing a single dazzling stroke by a spectacularly brilliant leader. No fewer than seven American commanders would try and fail to bring the war to a successful conclusion. When confronted with superior firepower and at a tactical disadvantage, the Seminoles simply dispersed into small bands and continued to fight a guerrilla war ... best suited to the terrain and their own temperament. Where other
eastern Indians could usually be depended upon to follow the rules of the game—to defend a fixed position and be routed—the Seminoles ... regularly rejected pitched battles and instead relied on ambushes and raids to bleed the Army, sap its strength, and generally discourage its leadership."

In the future, such an adaptive enemy would put additional pressure on the United States' ability to respond, as their battlefield successes would be covered instantly by the global media, instantaneous communications, and media coverage.

Finally, our future adversaries will almost certainly have greater knowledge of U.S. forces than we will of theirs. We are the most studied military in the world. Foreign states have regular military features and, in some cases, entire journals (most notably Russia's *Foreign Military Review*) devoted to the assessment of U.S. military force structure, doctrine, operational concepts, and capabilities. All major U.S. Army field manuals (FMs) and joint doctrinal publications are freely available on the Internet, and many foreign organizations access them regularly. As an example, in April 2001 alone, the Center for Army Lessons Learned recorded 5,464 sessions on its website from Europe and 2,015 from Asia. This access, combined with their knowledge of battlefield terrain, greater situational awareness, and adaptability, will make future adversaries far more menacing.

**How Will They Fight?**

The essence of future asymmetric warfare is that adversaries will seek to offset our air, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and other technological advantages by fighting during periods of reduced visibility and in complex terrain and urban environments where they can gain sanctuary from U.S. strikes. This will also deny these areas and their inherent protective characteristics to U.S. forces, keeping us exposed and on the defensive.

U.S. forces will have to contend with greater uncertainty in the field as adversaries mask the size, location, disposition, and intentions of their forces. They will seek to convince U.S. commanders that they are using conventional tactics while making us vulnerable to unconventional, adaptive, and asymmetrical actions.

At the same time, adversaries will use both old and new technologies to great effect on the battlefield. They may use older technologies in unique ways as the Chechens did by buying commercial scanners and radios to intercept Russian communications. They will also try to acquire advanced niche technologies like global positioning system jammers and systems for electronic attack to significantly degrade our precision strike capabilities. Moreover, we must be prepared for adversaries to upgrade software capabilities in the middle of an operation, potentially allowing for a more networked opposition.

While some of the technology may be new, the Indian campaigns again provide useful insights. Many Indian campaigns demonstrated the effectiveness of asymmetric tactics in countering larger and better-armed British and American forces. In fact, "Indian skulking tactics—concealment and surprise, moving fire, envelopment and, when the enemy's ranks were broken, hand-to-hand combat—remained the cardinal features of Native American warfare" over a period of 140 years. The longevity of their effectiveness shows how important it is to develop appropriate responses to asymmetric tactics.

One of the most successful Indian tactics was the ambush. Captain William Fetterman's massacre in 1866 near the Lodge Trail Ridge in Wyoming left 92 American soldiers dead in a classic ambush some believe was masterminded by Sioux leader Crazy Horse. A lesser-known battle, almost a century before, shows the effectiveness of the ambush, particularly when matched with reckless leadership. At the Battle of Blue Licks in August 1782, a group of 182 Kentucky militiamen, led by Colonel John Todd and including Daniel Boone and members of his family, was in hot pursuit of Indians who had attacked an American fort. Boone noticed the Indians were concealing their numbers by sharing tracks, yet making the trail easy to follow. He smelled an ambush by a force he estimated at 500 and advised breaking off the pursuit until reinforcements could arrive. A more junior officer yelled, "Them that ain't cowards follow me," and recklessly charged across the river toward several decoy Indians, with much of the force following him. The remaining Indians were waiting in ambush, as Boone had feared, and delivered a devastating defeat to the rangers.

Like Blue Licks, the Battle of Bushy Run not only shows the efficacy of Indian raids until defeated...
by Bouquet’s brilliant feigned retreat and flanking maneuvers; it also shows how an enemy can use deception effectively. The official history of Bushy Run says Bouquet’s forces were engaged and surrounded by Indian forces at least equal in size to his own. However, when I toured the battlefield, Indian re-creators, who have studied the battle extensively from the Indian point of view, maintained that the Indians numbered no more than 90 and that the tactics they used in the forest made their numbers seem larger. This disparity is a good example of attempts to confuse conventional forces so that the size of the opposing force is impossible to discern.

Finally, the Indian campaigns provide some excellent examples of the role of technological advances in asymmetric campaigns. Noted historian Armstrong Starkey emphasizes that the Europeans arrived in North America during a time of military revolution in Europe: “European soldiers brought the new weapons and techniques of this revolution with them to North America and by 1675 had provoked a military revolution of a sort among Native Americans, a revolution that for 140 years gave them a tactical advantage over their more numerous and wealthier opponents.”

Specifically, King Philip’s War (1675-1676) was the first conflict in which the Indians had modern flintlock firearms. This proved an important advantage because some of the American militias were only equipped with matchlocks and pikes, and because the Indians were excellent marksmen. More than 200 years after the Civil War, the same faulty assumptions were still at work—namely, that the U.S. military retained unmatched technical advantages over its more primitive adversaries. At that time, the U.S. government rearmed its forces with breechloaders in place of magazine rifles—due to a bias against unaimed shots and excessive use of ammunition—while the Plains Indians acquired such weapons by direct purchase and thus, in some cases, had superior arms in the 1870s. We must be on the lookout for technological matches like these in our own future conflicts.

**New Threats**

We have seen the great utility of examining historical conflicts between Europeans and Native Americans to learn lessons about possible future conflict. Yet there are two additional dimensions to asymmetric warfare that must be mentioned—the threat of weapons of mass destruction, potentially used against the American homeland, and of cyberattacks on U.S. military, government, and private information systems.

At the heart of asymmetry is the assumption that an adversary will choose to attack the weakest point. In the case of the United States, asymmetric tools may well entail terrorist acts—with or without nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons—on the U.S. homeland designed to disrupt deployments, limit access, erode public support, and take the fight to the American people. In some respects, this homeland tactic is not new. Beginning with King Philip’s War, the New England Indians abandoned their traditional restraints and “prepared to wage total war on all of the colonists, making no distinction between combatant and noncombatant.” Attacks on Americans using weapons of mass destruction take these homeland tactics to a new level. Because of the devastation of these attacks and the interest of many potential adversaries in acquiring these capabilities, the United States must develop strategies for preventing and responding to such an occurrence.
The cyberthreat now facing the United States is equally compelling and risks both the effectiveness of U.S. forces on the battlefield and the safety of private and government systems throughout the United States. Recent Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed cyberwarfare exercises like Eligible Receiver and Zenith Star showed how vulnerable command and control networks are to cyberattacks, a prime asymmetric target given the U.S. military’s continued reliance on information technology. Moreover, there are now approximately 30 nations that have developed “aggressive computer-warfare programs.”

Again, there is a relevant Indian war complement to today’s challenges. Indians of the Southern Plains disrupted American efforts in the West through unconventional means. “The telegraph line, which once had commanded their awe, no longer was mysterious. By 1882, the Apache had learned its function and its method of operation. When they jumped the reservation, they would cut the lines and remove long sections of wire, or they would remove a short piece of wire and replace it with a thin strip of raw hide, so cleverly splicing the two together that the line would appear intact and the location of the break could take days of careful checking to discover.” This disruption forebodes the potentially far greater problems from cyberattacks if we do not design strategy and tactics for dealing with this as part of an asymmetric campaign.

Preparing for Asymmetric Attacks

The first step in preparing to better meet tomorrow’s challenges is to learn from the past. As the examples drawn here indicate, there is a rich history to be tapped in the early American experience. But there are many other examples as well—Yugoslav partisans fighting the occupying Nazis or Afghans against the Russians and Serbs in the recent NATO operation in Kosovo. Military commanders must study history. Modern, technologically sophisticated warfare—with the asymmetric challenges that accompany it—makes that requirement more true, not less.

Our forces must also be adaptive. Just as our adversaries will continuously change tactics and approaches to seek our weaknesses, so must we be able to counter them through continuous adaptation.
If we do not, we risk the mistakes of the past. “While European military revolutions provided states with the means to project power into the interior of North America, they did not provide troops with appropriate training and tactics to succeed on the frontier.”16 Therefore, our forces, doctrine, and tactics must continue to embrace agility and adaptability and prepare for a range of missions. The Army continues to do so in its most recent doctrinal publications, FM 1 and FM 30.17 Efforts to address asymmetric threats must also retain the unique American strengths—superior training, leadership, and technology—that give us an edge against any potential adversary.

Finally, we must guard against arrogance. An account at the time of Braddock’s defeat noted the irony that his preparations for the march to Fort Duquesne were precise. He attended to every minute detail except “the one that mattered most: Indian affairs.”18 He dismissed those Ohio Indian chiefs who might have been allies for his expedition as savages who could not possibly assist disciplined troops. We must not fall into the same trap of underestimating a potential adversary because of his different culture or seemingly inferior capability. To do so would be to repeat the errors of the past with potentially devastating future consequences.

Notes


3. This operational definition of asymmetry is drawn from my conversations with General Montgomery Meigs, Commander of U.S. Army Forces, Europe, who is an excellent source for insights on operational art.

4. I am deeply indebted to General John Abrams and his staff, especially Colonel Maxie MacFarland at TRADOC for many of the ideas presented here. In addition, I would like to thank Professors Graham Turbiville and William Robertson at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for their assistance with the historical examples. Their help was invaluable in constructing this article. I am also grateful to Erin Conaton, professional staff member with the House of Representatives’ Committee on Armed Services, for her assistance with researching and writing this article.

5. See Anderson, 547-63.

6. Jack Lane’s biography of General Leonard Wood notes that as a new surgeon in the Army Medical Department, Wood “learned why the Apaches … proved to be the army’s most impervious foe in the 1870s and 1880s. Perfecting guerrilla warfare to a fine art, the Apaches operated in small raiding parties rarely numbering more than 100 braves. The hardy warriors had developed incredible stamina and a seemingly unlimited ability to endure with only the bare necessities for long periods in the almost impenetrable, barren mountains and deserts of southern Arizona and northern Mexico. Organizing themselves into small bands, they roamed the Arizona territory at will until, pursued closely by the army, they retired into the strongholds of the Sierra Madre Mountains. To defeat such an enemy required exceptional leaders and men.” See Jack C. Lane, Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 4.


10. Isaac Newton Skelton III and Earl Franklin Skelton, Ike, This is You (Washington, DC: 1995), 132-41. The author’s great-great-grandfather, Squire Boone, was wounded during this battle.


13. Ibid., 72.


18. The Journal of Captain Robert Chomley’s Batman, 20 and 23 May 1755, cited in Anderson, 94. The rest of the account of Braddock’s defeat is largely drawn from Anderson’s work; see 94-107.
Joseph Miller

The editors of Rape in Wartime and I share the inability to give their impressive collection of essays on this topic the summary it deserves. The U.S. military’s highly publicized efforts to prevent sexual assault within its ranks illustrate how intense discussion of this subject can be, even in an army that very rarely rapes civilians and enemy combatants.

There is a pressing need for substance in this increasingly emotional debate. Rape in Wartime contributes that substance in a collection of meticulously researched, carefully argued, and painstakingly translated essays from diverse scholars who studied rape globally and historically. It provides a brilliant combination of military history, anthropology, and legal studies that are perfectly balanced by a feminist perspective. This anthology is an ideal work for commissioned and non-commissioned officers who are facing cultural reform regarding gender roles in the military and the integration of women into combat units. Rape in Wartime is a substantive, concise, and readable book on women in combat and rape that occurs during wars.

The work casts some indirect criticism on the current policies of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in multiple essays that describe German, Russian, and Belgian military courts that treated rape as problem of conduct, or good order and discipline, managed by commanders. In all three cases (less so with Belgian), rapes went widely unpunished or carried minor internal disciplinary reprimands. It is important to
recognize the similarities between the current Uniform Code of Military Justice and the legal procedures regarding rape that were practiced in both the German and Russian Armies on the Russian front described by Regina Mühlhäuser and Marianna G. Muravyeva. Even the highly professional Wehrmacht had high rates on unpunished sexual assaults, treating rape as “a crime against discipline” rather than a capital crime.

This book also demonstrates how women—both fighters and civilians—often endure the hardships of war. An essay by Norman M. Naimark describes the way that German women on the Russian front endured rape as punishment in response to German military atrocities. They were able to move forward with their lives by recording their experiences in memoirs. Amandine Régamey recounts in her essay how snipers in Chechnya were thought to be exclusively women by the Russian Army. These supposed female soldiers were raped, and then tossed from windows with hand grenades between their legs. These snipers were believed to aim for “the balls” so there was a fear of literal emasculation that fueled these atrocities. Rape in Wartime also identifies women paramilitary insurgents and revolutionaries who were raped or sexually assaulted prior to execution because their service in combat usurped patriarchal hierarchy and social order.

Important yet often overlooked is the discussion of the rape or sexual assault of men. Often unreported, male rape is doubly shameful because it represents traumatic experience as well as impotence and a loss of manhood. Nayanika Mooherjee’s essay describes how during the Bangladesh War of 1971 men were commonly checked for circumcisions and subsequently sexually assaulted. This act was the ultimate assault on identity because it was traumatic, emasculating, and an ass ailment on the quality of the victim’s faith in Islam. What made it even worse was that female rape survivors in this conflict were celebrated as war heroines and given the title “birangonas.”

Rape in Wartime illustrates how widespread rape and pillaging have remained a driving force in warfare even in recent times. In Bihar, India, rape was often openly threatened against Maoist guerrillas, and rape has also become an enduring symbol of racist depictions of African soldiers in the Spanish Civil War.

This book demonstrates that regardless of whether rape is real or imagined, it causes great distress because the pervasive fear of rape is as potentially damaging mentally as rape itself. Like post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from the strain of repeated combat missions, the perceived threat of rape creates similar mental burdens on civilian and combatant women during conflicts like those in India, Colombia, Greece, Chechnya, Nigeria, and on the Russian front. These women, facing the threat of violence in combat and the threat of rape, are exposed to higher levels of fear as well traumatic injuries and death. Recent reports indicate women under these conditions have higher rates of mental illness. Rape in Warfare, through substantive analysis, illustrates how warfare always places a mental burden on both genders, whether they serve in uniform or not, but the added threat of sexual assaults increases mental strain for women and men alike.

Two essays in Rape in Warfare are particularly useful because they describe the imperfect solutions that nations and cultural groups have used to prevent or reduce stigma in the childbirth that occurred as a result of wartime rape.

Antoine Rivière’s essay describes the French system used during the First World War as a flawed, but elaborate method of safeguarding the children of German rapes from ostracism. Women pregnant as a result of German rapes were placed into special maternity care centers isolated from the public. After the children were born they were placed with families that were provided false information about the children’s origins. Despite all of the efforts to safeguard these children they had a higher infant mortality rate than other French children during the war. This was attributed to the effects of the mothers’ psychological states, brought on by bearing the children of rape by the enemy.

During the Nigerian Civil War there was widespread rape and numerous subsequent studies on its affect on mothers, but even more on how the children’s lives were changed. The careful study of Adediran Daniel Ikuomola provides an example of this by effectively creating a social history of the offspring of wartime rapes. These children were named as war offspring by their culture and this influenced each gender differently. Both women and men created distance from the stigma of their names by adopting nicknames and moving away, but husbands insulted women privately because women were unable to hide their legal names and origins. Because of the patriarchal hierarchy in
Nigeria, married women had significantly higher rates of depression and mental illness than married men: 46 percent versus 11 percent.

Of particular interest and value is Nadine Puechguirbal’s article on the reduction of stigma associated with rape in African conflicts. Some African countries follow a policy of comprehensive medical treatment, synchronizing physical and psychological aid. They understand the value of expressing trauma to a qualified listener, providing “listening houses” with trained psychological caregivers. The U.S. military could achieve similar gains by placing similar emphasis on mental illness care.

The most compelling article in the series was also the most unusual. Tal Nitsán’s essay describes the moral outrage over her master’s thesis on the lack of rape during the Israeli occupation of Palestine. The thesis won awards and was praised by Israeli military leaders—yet morally driven, nationalistic journalists attacked Nitsán. Her work did not argue that the moral superiority of the Israeli people resulted in the lack of rapes. Rather, it looked at institutional culture—how the sense of place and occupation made Israeli soldiers more aware of rape and therefore achieved objectives “not by rape, but by rape avoidance.” Awareness rather than morality prevented the rapes; for Israeli nationalists this was an affront to their sense of moral superiority. The author, by the circumstances of getting her doctorate in Canada and the misspelling of her name in the original press source, was insulated from the highly vitriolic criticism of a thesis that was complimentary of the Israeli military. Some sources went so far as to wish for someone to rape her, even erroneously providing a picture of a different woman, though claiming she was not attractive enough to warrant a rape. Her work on the institutional culture of the Israeli Army, praised by high-ranking military officers, illustrates that the most viable solutions to limit rape in warfare and military units is linking “rape avoidance” to military strategy.

This collection of work by international scholars has little to say about American military culture. However, the work of scholars like John Grenier, who links American attrition strategy to the targeting of civilians during colonial tribal warfare, and Sharon Block, whose monograph on rape in early America recognized the use of rape to punish tribal opposition, show that western—and by extension U.S. military traditions—are more closely aligned to raping and pillaging than celebratory histories proclaim.

The U.S. military must build and maintain the capacity to support and rehabilitate rape survivors. This requires infrastructure, doctrine, and policy changes that can all be informed by the body of work titled *Rape in Wartime*. This volume provides insights to how other generations and nations have addressed such difficult problems.
Christopher Hamner's *Enduring Battle: American Soldiers in Three Wars, 1776-1945* tackles the age-old question of why men put themselves in harm's way despite their natural inclination to survive. Hamner explores this question through battles in three American wars: Cowpens, Shiloh, and the Huertgen Forest. He describes the impact that technology, weaponry, equipment, military doctrine, leadership, and the nature of war had on the individual soldier. He shares the individual soldier's experiences to aid the reader in understanding the ever-evolving nature of war.

Military historians and psychologists have offered theories about the changing aspects of the battlefield, the most popular being group cohesion theory (the bonds linking individuals together). Hamner challenges this theory using Omer Bartov's *Hitler's Army*, which says the savage fighting on the Eastern Front rendered unit cohesion an impossibility because of personnel attrition. He challenges conventional thinking that men fight only for their comrades. Hamner argues that the actual answer is far too complex. He says that self preservation is the ultimate reason for survival and that forming bonds with those around increases the likelihood.

Hamner links Cowpens, Shiloh, and the Huertgen Forest to give the reader an appreciation for how war evolved from 1776 to 1945. He provides a rational understanding of why each battle was fought in a particular manner.

Hamner suggests altruism as a potential area for the future study of men in combat. He argues that combat medics are renowned for leaving places of safety to aid wounded comrades and using their own bodies to shield the wounded. Such behavior goes beyond the simple explanation of comradeship or survival, especially in light of the prohibition against medical personnel carrying weapons.

Christopher Hamner's *Enduring Battle* is a must read for those interested in the psychology of war.

**Jesse McIntyre III, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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The battles of Saratoga were crucial turning points in the War of American Independence. The rebel victory convinced the French government to grant diplomatic recognition and extend military aid to the cause of colonial independence. The ultimate insurgent victory resulted from the combination of French military aid, rebel leadership, increasing military proficiency, and the British government's loss of will to continue the war. However, the rebel cause was not unified. Rivalries pitted the colonies against each other, making it difficult to form a united front.

As contemporaries understood, it was a civil war, with minorities supporting rebellion and loyalty, while most people wished to survive with their lives and property intact or fight their own local disputes. The war divided families and pitted neighbors against one another. Ethnic and religious strife marked relations among the colonists from the outset.

Internal struggle occurred within the southern colonies, but it also occurred in the northern Hudson River-Champlain region. With the frontier on the Hudson, its possession by either side would have...
divided New England from the rest of the colonial insurgents or allowed them to unite. Conflicting claims issued by New York and New Hampshire to the area that eventually became Vermont turned the skirmishes into a civil war.

This struggle is the subject of Corbett’s book. He begins with the 1763 treaty, which opened the region to British settlement. He shows how regional religious, political, economic, and family fractures formed and how their differences framed the regional struggle for colonial independence, which the decisive victory at Saratoga did not influence. He shows that the war in the north was identical to the war in the south. He ends, not with the successful achievement of independence but with its aftermath—the debtor rebellions in the 1780s.

Corbett argues that the war for American Independence was a multi-sided struggle pitting rebels, loyalists, and their allies against each other. There was a struggle between the governments of New York and New Hampshire for control of the territory that became Vermont. Settlers holding land grants transferred their loyalty to whomever provided protection and recognized their claims. Colonists took sides based on their own interests, family, social class, and religion.

This rich, dense study shows the complicated interaction of political and military goals and demonstrates that decisive victory was not always decisive for the British who retained practical control of the Hudson-Champlain region until the 1783 peace treaty was signed. The war’s aftermath was as cruel as the war itself. Social splits between men of property (creditors) and ordinary farmers (debtors) flared up after the war ended. The new nation was neither peaceful nor unified—civil war did not end when independence was achieved.

Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., Seoul, Korea

FORGING NAPOLEON’S GRANDE ARMÉE: Motivation, Military Culture, and Masculinity in the French Army, 1800-1808

Michael J. Hughes, New York University Press, New York, 2012, 284 pages, $50.00

Michael Hughes’ *Forging Napoleon’s Grande Armée* examines the changes within the French military during the early

Napoleonic Wars. Soldiers shifted from being committed supporters of the republic and republican values, to devotees to a monarch with absolute power far beyond anything of the Ancien Régime. Hughes looks at five sources of motivation: honor, patriotism, a martial and virile masculinity, devotion to Napoleon, and coercion. The motivators kept Napoleon’s soldiers committed to him and eventually committed to the French nation.

The Army of the Coasts, which eventually formed the core of the Grande Armée, provides an opportunity to study early 19th-century armies. The army remained together as a coherent unit much longer than most 19th-century formations, allowing a more thorough indoctrination and strengthening of unit cohesion. Napoleon created ways to ensure loyalty to himself, including military songs, plays, orders of the day, awards, and honorary associations. Napoleon manipulated the French army from being motivated by revolutionary virtue to a more individualistic honor. Patriotic writers who viewed virtue as alien to the French character deemed this an advisable shift. The army emphasized the search for honor and glory as a reward for military service. Closely tied to this search for glory was the cult of Napoleon who, as the most glorious figure in France, could spread and reflect the glory of his troops. Napoleon was portrayed as the embodiment of honor, glory, and virtue, and as the focus of resacralization of the French monarchy.

*Forging Napoleon’s Grande Armée* is most useful for the military professional in its discussion of military culture. French soldiers believed their service was for the benefit of their nation, which was assumed to be the greatest in the world. They believed France was a beacon of enlightenment that would liberate benighted nations of the world. Soldiers were taught to expect rewards for military service, honor and respect from their fellow Frenchmen, and the exposure to a variety of sexual opportunities both at home and abroad. Feats of virile masculinity, often bordering on rape, were one way of demonstrating the Frenchman’s superiority over foreigners. Even soldiers unimpressed by army life were able to be motivated through primary group loyalties and devotion to lower-level officers. Perhaps more importantly, they were compelled to accept the legitimacy of their government and the wars conducted for the Empire’s sake. Hughes’ analysis of group
loyalty and motivation is compelling and offers a useful case study for the shaping of sentiment in a military unit.

**John E. Fahey, Lafayette, Indiana.**

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**THROUGH THE PERILOUS FIGHT:**
*Six Weeks That Saved the Nation*

Steve Vogel, Random House, New York, 2013, 522 pages, $30.00

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In the course of celebrations of its bicentennial, America’s war of 1812 (which dragged into 1815) is getting some warranted attention. Renewed war with Britain posed a serious test for a young America that was still sorting out its institutions, not to mention its very identity. Nothing better attests to the fragility of America’s position in the world at that time than the British strike on Washington in the summer of 1814, which left the U.S. capital a smoking emblem of humiliation.

Author Steve Vogel, an accomplished writer and popular historian, has stitched together a stirring and colorful account of Britain’s fateful drive to defeat the United States in the third year of the war. Drawing extensively from first-person recollections, he invites the reader to see breaking developments from multiple perspectives. From the British side, he focuses on Rear Adm. George Cockburn, describing him as “ruthless and witty” and “determined to make Americans pay a hard price for their ill-considered war with Great Britain.” In his many character sketches, Vogel captures the spectrum of emotional states conjured up by the struggle from contempt and arrogance to fear and rage. Among the central players is Francis Scott Key. Key was a lawyer and friend of James Madison’s administration who found himself in the unlikely position of watching the British attack on Baltimore from a vessel of the Royal Navy. Despite his fascination with historical figures, Vogel has not neglected the gravity of the British campaign or the critical significance of tactical and strategic events. He describes how the Chesapeake region’s killing heat affected the ordinary soldier during forced marches.

Had it succeeded, the British attempt to capture Baltimore would have been a devastating blow to America’s strategic situation and the national psyche. Instead, U.S. troops rallied in front of the city and Fort McHenry withstood a furious naval bombardment. Cockburn’s thwarted gamble marked a dramatic reversal of fortune and broke the momentum of the 1814 offensive. The U.S. victory in turn restored its negotiating position as well as its self-confidence.

*Through the Perilous Fight* is highly readable and brings the history of the war to life. The author does not dwell on diplomatic context or strategic analysis but appropriately notes how validation of its “independence and sovereignty” restored national feeling and “severed ties with America’s colonial past.” A resurgent United States rapidly asserted its ascendancy in the Americas, sidestepping the terms of the Treaty of Ghent in its westward push and proclaiming the Monroe Doctrine as a warning to Europe to back off.

**Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**MACARTHUR IN ASIA:**
*The General and His Staff in the Philippines, Japan, and Korea*


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Originally published in Japanese, this book focuses on two themes. First is a study of the 15 “Bataan Boys” who escaped with Gen. Douglas MacArthur from Corregidor, their relationships, and the key roles they played on MacArthur's staffs for the next decade. Second is an analysis of how MacArthur’s reforms and experiences in the Philippines from 1935-1945 provided a template for policies he later used in the occupation and reconstruction of Japan.

Hiroshi Masuda tells the story of MacArthur’s prewar preparations in the Philippines, how he responded to Japanese attacks, the conditions on Corregidor, the escape to Australia, and preparations for his return. Here Masuda shines—he combines a riveting story with maps and analysis that provides a different perspective into this period of our history.
The well-trained Japanese 14th Army, 65,000 strong, faced 150,000 U.S.-Filipino forces when the Japanese invaded the Philippines. The Japanese landed their main force in the northwest, spearheaded by the mechanized 48th Division (16,000 men), and sent the 16th Division (7,000 men) to invade southeast of Manila. Numerically, the U.S. and Filipino forces had an overwhelming advantage. And the Americans had more fighter aircraft based at Clark Field than the Japanese used—why then, did they not hold?

Surprise was the major factor. Even though the Americans had been warned of hostilities, the Japanese attacked Clark Field around noontime, destroying 70 percent of the American fighters on the ground. A second factor was MacArthur’s reticence to send the bombers he did have against the Japanese airfields in Formosa. After the Japanese surprise attack, that option was no longer viable.

On the ground, 30,000 men comprised the U.S.-Filipino main force—75,000 Filipinos were organized in 10 Army divisions, but with significant equipment challenges. An additional 45,000 were in the constabulary and support units. War plans called for a defense of Manila Bay. However, in the weeks prior to the invasion, MacArthur successfully pushed for a more aggressive defense of all the islands, intending to repel an attack on the coastline. This was a strategy that Lt. Col. Eisenhower, MacArthur’s chief of staff in 1939, had previously studied, and rejected—the forces available would not be capable of executing it.

The destruction of U.S. air power at Clark Field, and the withdrawal of the Asiatic Fleet made it easy for Japanese advance parties to land. Recognizing this, MacArthur quickly changed his strategy to the prewar plans, which he had earlier criticized, and directed a withdrawal from Manila to the Bataan Peninsula. Maj. Gen. Wainwright, with 28,000 men, opposed the Lingayan Gulf landings and delayed the Japanese 10 days in their advance on Manila, thus permitting the movement of 80,000 Filipino-American troops and 26,000 civilians into Bataan.

Emphasis on this delaying action was later judged “a tragic error.” More emphasis should have been placed on the removal of munitions and provision supplies to Bataan. This failure later haunted the defenders and their ability to survive, without the means to do so. Filipino-American forces in Bataan suffered more from disease, starvation, and lack of munitions than actions in combat.

The Japanese, too, made a number of mistakes, including operational-level miscalculations that cost them heavily. The plan was to first destroy Filipino-American forces, and then take Manila. The Japanese continued to attack toward Manila, where they expected major opposition, even when intelligence indicated the shift of forces to Bataan. They missed the opportunity to keep close contact with the enemy while it was on the run. They occupied a major population center (Manila), but did not achieve the more important goal of destroying the enemy force.

The Japanese also miscalculated that the Americans would not stop in Bataan, but continue their retreat overseas. As 14th Army prepared to attack in Bataan, its key units were withdrawn to other areas (Thailand and the Dutch East Indies). The remaining forces, thinking they faced an almost defeated enemy, were repulsed with 25 percent casualties, including heavy leadership losses. The Japanese were forced to suspend the campaign until the arrival of substantial reinforcements.

The Philippines was a costly investment for the Japanese army. Masuda notes that by 1945, the scale and intensity of the Japanese investment in the Philippines was massive: 631,000 Japanese soldiers fought there, suffering 498,000 (79 percent) killed in action or death due to starvation or disease. By the war’s end, this represented 20 percent of their total losses in the Pacific war.

The surrender of the Japanese government in September 1945 ended the fighting, but left the Allies with an unprecedented challenge: the demobilization and disarmament of seven million men organized in 154 Japanese army divisions. This was a far-greater challenge than that faced in Germany, where most organized military forces were already destroyed. There were 2.5 million Japanese soldiers (57 divisions) in Japan, where only two and a half U.S. divisions were tasked to demobilize them.

Masuda captures the essence of what MacArthur and his key staff members did during the occupation of Japan through MacArthur’s relief in April 1951.

Masuda and MacArthur’s key staff members credit MacArthur with a sharp mind and an excellent photographic memory. MacArthur always communicated
directives clearly. He was a man of conviction, and seldom became angry. He also had an introverted and unsociable side to his disposition. He rejected any attack, criticism, or defamation directed at him and would transfer the responsibility to others. His fixed ideas and prejudices often distorted his judgment. However, as the key individual responsible for the transformation of Japan, “one finds no one who surpassed MacArthur in dignity, knowledge, coordination, decision making, and control.”

And, what of the general’s staff? Masuda rates Eisenhower (prewar), Sutherland, and Whitney as his best officers. They all readily comprehended MacArthur’s intentions and, perhaps more importantly, shared the ability to convert those into concrete ideas, and communicate them effectively to others.

Lt. Col. Chris North, U.S. Army, Retired, Afghanistan

AFTER LEANING TO ONE SIDE:
China and Its Allies in the Cold War
Zhihua Shen and Danhui Li, Woodrow Wilson Center and Stanford University Press, Washington DC, 2011, 331 pages, $60.00

As the Cold War recedes into history, researchers have growing access to the archives of various participants. After several decades of research and at least one period of imprisonment, historian Zhihua Shen has obtained extensive records from both China and the former Soviet Union. This has allowed him and his wife, Danhui Li, to assemble an explanation of the tangled relationships between the two leading Marxist regimes, as well as Beijing’s troubled partnerships with North Korea and North Vietnam. The resulting picture, while still incomplete, helps Westerners better understand their former adversaries.

A case in point is the 1950 Chinese intervention in the Korean conflict, an intervention that inflicted a serious, if temporary defeat upon the United States and its allies. The traditional explanation for this intervention was that Beijing was responding to a perceived threat as U.N. forces approached its borders after defeating North Korea. More recently, revisionists such as Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai have argued that Mao Zedong was so angered by American intervention in Asia that he concentrated troops on the Yalu River even before the U.N. counteroffensive at Inchon. Mao’s principal reasons for delaying his attack thereafter were to obtain more Soviet military aid and satisfy his critics within the Chinese government. Professor Shen combines these two stories, suggesting that while Mao was inspired partly by a sense of international solidarity with the Korean communists, he sought to avoid direct conflict as long as possible. Mao’s actual reasons for intervention were a complex mixture of a perceived threat from the United States, a desire to limit Soviet influence in the region, and a need to convince Joseph Stalin of China’s loyalty. Once in the war, China repeatedly disagreed with its North Korean ally, and had to get Soviet diplomatic support to ensure a unified military command and logistical system.

Additional chapters look at other issues of the Cold War. From Beijing’s viewpoint, the 1953 armistice agreement represented a diplomatic retreat by the United States, not a communist concession in response to the threat of nuclear attack. Throughout the 1950s, the Soviet Union genuinely attempted to facilitate China’s economic development, but according to Shen, the Chinese broke off the relationship in 1960 because Nikita Khrushchev was skeptical about the Chinese communal system and Great Leap Forward. Finally, the book provides the Chinese version of Richard Nixon’s efforts to establish relations with Beijing. In this view, Beijing was interested in improving U.S.-Chinese relations for fear of conflict with Moscow, but refused to assist or even recognize the American point of view about negotiations to end the Vietnamese war.

The book is a collection of essays rather than a single narrative, and as such is sometimes repetitious and appears to jump back and forth in time. Moreover, the authors present all their conclusions from the Chinese viewpoint, which causes them to repeat impossible claims of casualties inflicted on the United States as well as distorted interpretations of American foreign policy. Despite such minor irritations, however, After Leaning to One Side is a further step in removing the veils that have obscured communist actions during the Cold War. The book also helps the reader understand the history and perceptions of one of the most powerful states in the current world scene.

Jonathan M. House, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
If you want a new idea, read an old book. Similarly, if you seek new ideas on current and future foreign policy issues, take a moment to review a book on a previous foreign policy. Though not the author’s stated intent, it’s hard not to make parallels between many of today’s current foreign policy issues and American policy in Laos in the 1950s. In Before the Quagmire, journalist and author William Rust takes a historical look at American involvement in Laos and examines how a small foreign policy issue was transformed into a much larger conflagration. He does so by seeing Laos in the greater context of the Cold War, and examining the internal American and Laotian decisions that ultimately set the U.S. on a course of greater military involvement in both Laos and Vietnam.

Rust focuses this detailed history of American policy in Laos on the years of the Eisenhower administration. He saves Kennedy’s role for his upcoming book on the Kennedy administration and Laos. Rust points out that contemporary fear of communism often limited what the key players considered as viable policy alternatives: accept communism or try military intervention. In this case, the Eisenhower administration clearly ruled out any role for the communists in any Lao government. Eisenhower in particular found it difficult to reconcile nationalism with communism, and focused on combating what appeared a monolithic and aggressive communist threat. Rust paints a portrait of an Eisenhower who, despite keeping the U.S. out of the French war in Vietnam, was determined not to let Laos fall to the communists on his watch.

Brothers John Foster Dulles at State Department and Allen Dulles at the newly established CIA were central characters in forming American policy towards Laos. While the principal aim of American policy in Laos was to prevent a communist takeover, the policies pursued by the administration—specifically by the State Department, the CIA, and the Defense Department—were often contradictory and counter-productive. Rust brings the reader inside the American embassy in Vientiane, where the internal philosophical struggles, as well as friction between ambassadors and increasingly influential CIA stations chiefs, led to coups and conflicting support to competing Laotian politicians and generals. Rust details various local political and military leaders; these Laotians were principally judged and supported based on their commitment to resist communism, rather than their effectiveness in developing a well governed Laos.

Hence, American foreign assistance to Laos became disproportionately represented through military support, with traditional French military advisors soon pushed aside. This military emphasis enabled various political and military Laotian players, but did little to improve the lives of the predominantly rural and poor Laotians. Even the few attempts to support the population were militarized. In the end the U.S. supplanted France as the principal patron of Laos.

The title of Rust’s book alludes to Laos as the prequel to a greater and ultimately unsatisfying American involvement in Indochina, particularly in Vietnam. Throughout this richly researched narrative are short, insightful character sketches and assessments of key figures, both American and Laotian, which aptly bring a human element to this tragic foreign policy story. Before the Quagmire should interest not only readers of the Cold War and Vietnam War eras, but also provides key insights to students of the development of American foreign policy.

Col. John M. Sullivan Jr, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

BLOWTORCH: Robert Komer, Vietnam, and American Cold War Strategy
Frank Leith Jones, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2013, 416 pages, $52.95

Only rare individuals can effectively balance ends, ways, means, and risk into a coherent design and have the personality and experience to drive its implementation—Robert “Blowtorch” Komer was one such individual. Author Frank Jones provides a discerning and worthwhile biography of Komer. Although a “second echelon” security professional, Komer was a master of strategic art.

BLOWTORCH: Robert Komer, Vietnam, and American Cold War Strategy
Frank Leith Jones, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2013, 416 pages, $52.95
‘Blowtorch’ is broken into three distinct parts. The first part examines Komer’s early life, from growing up in Missouri to becoming a trusted assistant of President Kennedy. He attended Harvard and was a U.S. Army intelligence officer and historian during World War II. After his wartime service and completion of a master’s degree, Komer climbed the corporate ladder within the new Central Intelligence Agency and then within Kennedy’s White House staff, exerting great influence on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and South Asia. More importantly, he earned Kennedy’s trust, along with recognition from the broader foreign policy community.

The second part focuses on Komer’s efforts during the Vietnam War. Working alongside Vice President Johnson during a goodwill tour of the Middle East and later as an interim national security advisor, Komer earned Johnson’s respect. Komer’s reward proved a challenge, as he served as the head of pacification in Vietnam. Jones describes Komer’s pacification efforts, which included starting the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support organization (CORDS).

Finally, Jones examines Komer’s post-Vietnam efforts, which hold some of the best insights for readers interested in strategy and Cold War history. Komer’s career took on new life during the Carter administration. Rising again to a key advisor position, this time he focused on NATO and U.S.-Middle Eastern strategy. Komer’s criticisms of early Reagan maritime strategy helped shape Navy strategic thought and stoked debate on the 600-ship Navy.

While Jones clearly admires Komer, the author treats him with fairness. On one hand, Jones demonstrated that Komer was a perceptive pragmatist who creatively integrated action and reflection. On the other, Jones reminds us that Komer was an ambitious and difficult man, often disliked as only bureaucratic iconoclasts can be. While one may view these as negative traits, they also embody hallmarks of other great strategists.

‘Blowtorch’ is valuable for those interested in counterinsurgency, aspiring strategists, and Cold War historians. Given recent counterinsurgency operations and the prevalence of insurgencies today, Komer’s work in Vietnam, especially starting CORDS, is worth studying and debating. Jones’ book also provides an insider’s view into Komer’s efforts to make and implement strategy throughout the Cold War. Finally, ‘Blowtorch’ contributes to the historical record of the Cold War by discussing Komer’s formative years and, more importantly, his efforts after Vietnam.

Lt. Col. Jon Klug, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

STRIKE WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: An Introduction to Non-Nuclear Attack by Air and Sea
Dale E. Knutsen, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2012, 198 pages, $27.95

“Everyday citizens who would simply like to know more about the basics are often left in an awkward information void, caught between historic or fictional stories … and detailed discussions full of technical terms,” prefaces Dale E. Knutsen regarding current literature on modern strike warfare. Strike Warfare in the 21st Century bridges this gap by addressing complex subjects through the utilization of commonplace terminology and familiar examples. Knutsen’s focus on the fundamentals of strike warfare emanates from a desire to “help Americans better understand some of the tools and factors that influence military operations during times of tension and conflict.”

Strike warfare encompasses myriad sea and air-launched delivery platforms to use nonnuclear weapons against surface targets, both on land and sea. This reduces risk to friendly delivery platforms “by way of standoff engagements.” Knutsen uses this definition to lead the reader through the full range of strike warfare fundamentals, from target designation to strike planning and from weapon classifications to support operations.

Knutsen conveniently breaks his work into two sections—the first on strike warfare operations and the second on strike weapons development. By partitioning the work in this manner, Knutsen addresses both the operational and logistical (procurement) aspects of American strike warfare. Throughout the work the author provides general diagrams, which assist the reader in understanding the key concepts of both sections while avoiding overly technical descriptions. A significant body of appendices further consolidates the concepts of the work within a readily accessible format.
Knutson only briefly examines the critical role of the intelligence process, which drives everything from identifying future capabilities of potential adversaries, to the targeting of adversarial structures, to the post-strike assessment. Knutsen’s deferment to the private end of the bureaucratic battleground in the work’s conclusion, which underlies any weapons acquisition project, reveals a “pro-business” leaning. The migratory nature of managerial military personnel, piecemeal congressional budgeting, and excessive oversight “creep,” such as the Nunn–McCurdy Provision, certainly slow acquisition. However, those examples of development projects troubled by private fraud, waste, and abuse are conveniently absent from Knutsen’s concluding remarks.

Knutson’s work provides a compelling, albeit generalized, overview of the development and implementation of U.S. strike warfare. By using commonplace terminology and day-to-day comparisons, the author achieves his objective of bridging the gap between the fictional and technical. Strike Warfare in the 21st Century is an excellent introduction for the average citizen but also for military personnel unfamiliar with the topic. The increasingly joint nature of warfare necessitates that any commander possess an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of strike weapons, which provide life-or-death support within the contemporary operating environment. Knutsen skillfully contributes to this understanding within his appealing work on modern strike warfare.

Viktor M. Stoll, Lee’s Summit, Missouri

LOGICS OF WAR:
Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts
Alex Weisiger, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2013, 288 pages, $45.00

Logics of War uses bargaining models to explain the intensity and duration of interstate conflicts. Its models are most useful at strategic or political-military policy levels. Logics of War contains no insight on how to conduct war, but is a must read for those concerned about war’s motivation, potential cost, duration, or intractability. Alex Weisiger makes two major contributions. First, he argues that there are multiple paths to war—equifinality in academic jargon. This insight seems fitting given the complex nature of war and liberating by allowing his development of independent causal mechanisms. Second, his explanations are comprehensive, accounting for both short and long wars and variations in intensity.

Logics of War is a political science book, which is at best moderately successful in explaining its statistical methods for the unfamiliar or out of practice. Statistical evidence is buttressed with case studies that any reader can understand. Because the book is not limited across time (after 1816) or space, Weisiger’s theories are not restricted to any particular war. As with any such literature, much depends on the validity and reliability of proxy variables. For example, concepts of power, commitment, trust, or leaders’ interpretation of information are either unavailable or unobservable. However, Weisiger designs and justifies his measures as well as or better than similar scientific literature. Weisiger’s choice of cases such as the Paraguayan War of 1864-1870, World War II in Europe and the Pacific, the Iran-Iraq War, the Falklands War, and the Persian Gulf War builds confidence in the statistical results.

Logics of War characterizes leaders as information-bounded rational actors. Perhaps to appeal to a broader audience, the book avoids the term rational and fails to adequately explain the meaning of rationality paradigms. It is unclear whether this lessens or increases the risk of rejection of its theories. Uninitiated readers may be mystified by or suspicious of the abrupt introduction of bargaining models.

In contrast, Weisiger clarifies and supports three causal mechanisms—over optimism, domestic principal-agent problems, and commitment problems—to explain war’s initiation, limitations (or lack thereof), and ease of settlement. Overoptimistic wars are fought because of participants’ divergent expectations of their outcomes. Battle results more or less quickly inform one or more sides of their misconceptions resulting in fairly rapid negotiation and termination. Principals-agent wars are domestically, rather than externally, motivated and are explained by politicians’ desire to retain power or to serve narrow interests. Because these conflicts are at risk of losing public support, even in authoritarian regimes, they can be intense or long, but not both. Commitment problem wars are potentially
the bloodiest. Commitment problems result when states have difficulty trusting their opponent to bargain in good faith. In an insightful variation of standard realist arguments, Weisiger contends declining powers attack to preclude their relative decline. The most destructive long and intense conflicts are a subset of those in which the defender survives the initial onslaught and concludes the attacker is inherently aggressive. These wars defy negotiated settlement because defending states believe security cannot be assured short of the attacker’s unconditional surrender.

Logics of War does not claim predictive knowledge per se. Indeed, much of the book’s reasoning relies on initial or continued misjudgment by leaders and decision makers. The author’s explanations are based on results rather than forecasts. Nonetheless, practitioners can make good use of Logics of War’s insights. Weisiger’s theories can inform and be applied to the design of policy and campaigns. Alternatively, they may be used to more swiftly discern operating causal mechanisms once war is already engaged. Logics of War’s frameworks potentially add rigor to the analysis of strategic and operational environments.

Richard E. Berkebile, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

GI's IN GERMANY:
The Social, Economic, Cultural, and Political History of the American Military Presence
Eds. Thomas Maulucci and Detlef Junker, Cambridge University Press, New York, 378 pages, $89.10

Is in Germany is a compilation of 15 essays that explains the “complex” relationship between the United States and Germany. The essays are grouped into select topics: strategy and politics, the impact of military communities, tensions between the two countries, the making of the Bundeswehr, and the contentious period covering the 1970s through the 1980s.

Germany’s opinion of U.S. presence in Europe was positive as the U.S. status turned from that of occupier to that of a more benign “protector” role. However, the relationship suffered during the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the ensuing U.S. economic downturn, recurring U.S. soldier criminal activity and racial conflicts, and the poor state of U.S. military readiness in the 1970s and early 1980s. The two countries’ relationship evolved less from efforts in diplomacy and more from social, military, and cultural interactions shaped by the permanent, multi-generational presence of U.S. troops and their families.

After the start of the Korean War, new Cold War battle lines were drawn across the face of Europe. The question was how to defend the continent with Germans insisting on a far-forward defense while U.S. leaders desired a more cautionary defense. Through compromise, Germany’s approach was adopted and the country acquiesced to rebuilding a formidable conventional force right after it regained its sovereignty in 1955. The paradox to building the Bundeswehr was how to make the military force “stronger than Russia but weaker than France.”

Although the Federal Republic embraced U.S. superior air technology, it adopted its own form of mission command (Auftragstaktik) and a conscription force based on inner civic leadership. Simultaneously, the United States provided conventional forces at the pivotal Fulda Gap, stationed families on a permanent basis in Germany, and backed up its commitment with nuclear weapons assuredness. Although political leaders intended to maintain a permanent U.S. presence in Europe, it was the U.S. military that was kept in a state of flux as politicians argued over overseas troop levels. This flux resulted in low standards of living for military members and their families as infrastructure investments were kept on hold for decades at a time. It wasn’t until the 1990s, when major troop redeployments out of Europe were imminent, that the Defense Department recapitalized facilities overseas, only to see many of the renovated and modernized bases handed back to the host nation.

American family members lived alongside allied military forces and the local German population in Berlin, even during the tense periods of the Berlin Airlift in the late 1940s, and later in 1961, and when the Berlin Wall was built. In contrast, the Soviets evacuated their family members. Family member presence in Germany had a multi-fold strategic mission: to show the Germans that the United States was committed to protection of the Federal Republic and to send a signal to the Soviets that the U.S. mission in Europe was
defensive in nature. What better way to show that than by sprouting the landscape with “Little Americas”? Another reason for U.S. families being stationed in Germany was to project U.S. soft power by having citizens serve as goodwill ambassadors. Although, on occasion this backfired as cultural differences surfaced between German citizens and U.S. family members.

*GIs in Germany* argues that the real reason for family member presence in Germany was to ensure good order and discipline among U.S. soldiers. By 1950, G.I.s had brought 20,000 war brides back to the United States, and most unfortunate by 1955, there were 37,000 out-of-wedlock German and Austrian children fathered by U.S. servicemen.

The U.S. military is coming to grips on how best to use its force posture to ensure that wars are prevented, partnerships are developed, and if necessary, wars are fought and quickly won in a fiscally responsible and politically acceptable manner. America is downsizing family-accompanied maneuver ground units in Germany and Korea in what seems to be a logical cost-saving measure. In return, CONUS-based units are rotated overseas on a temporary, expeditionary basis. Such an approach may make fiscal sense and seem more politically acceptable to congressional leaders, but will a rotational program show enough U.S. commitment and resolve to our foreign allies? Will the rotations and lack of permanence be considered a sign of U.S. ambivalence or weakness to adversarial state actors such as Russia or China or Iran? Will a lack of troops stationed on foreign soil create security angst in Germany, Japan, and Korea, forcing those countries to adopt their own nuclear weapons programs? How will retention be impacted in the military as soldiers and marines leave their families for extended periods on noncombat overseas ventures? Will the military default in clamping down on military members on isolated bases when training overseas?

*GIs in Germany* is worth a read not just for its account of the cultural, political, and social history that created the relationship between Germany and the United States today, but also to serve as a lesson for the pitfalls that our military is sure to face as it changes how forces are postured in the years to come.

**Lt. Col. Tommy J. Tracy, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Lee, Virginia**

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**QATAR: A Modern History**

Allen J. Fromherz, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 2012, 204 pages, $29.95

Few would challenge Allen Fromherz’s contention that the tiny state of Qatar is “able to pack a punch far beyond its weight.” With less than 250,000 citizens, Qatar changed Arabic news media, served as an international mediator, and is a key regional ally of the United States. Fromherz’s challenge is to prove that Qatar is not simply a “classic rentier state,” living off its massive oil and gas wealth, but possibly, “a new model of modernity.”

“Rather than following the typical course of angst and anomie normally associated with rapid modernization,” Qatar has forged its own unique “neo-traditional” identity. Fromherz’s study focuses on the ruling al-Thani family, and particularly the current (at the time of publication) emir. Sheikh Hamad’s adroit balancing of internal and external powers strives to shield Qatar from the reckoning that the author believes is inevitably coming to the Gulf monarchies. Historically appealing to British, Iranian, and later U.S. interests, the al-Thani family has avoided the extremes of the ostentatious consumerism of the United Arab Emirates; softened, while ostensibly maintaining the Wahhabism of the Saudis; and provided strong support to the United States, while placating Iran a short distance across the Gulf. Equally impressive has been the al-Thani’s complicated relations with the clans and families inside Qatar, which Fromherz analyzes in a detailed, tribe-by-tribe manner. Through it all, the al-Thani family comes across as benevolent and savvy, yet powerful rulers. For all the trappings of democratization and genuinely massive investment in education and public welfare, Sheikh Hamad remained an absolute ruler, willing even to depose his own father via a coup when he deemed it necessary.

Since its publication, rapidly moving events in the region have made Fromherz’s analysis even timelier. There is a common belief that the extravagant Gulf monarchies—with as little as 15 percent of their population as citizens, in Qatar’s case—would be most vulnerable to revolution. Fromherz asserts that Qatar, in fact, has built a complex network of supports to
lessen that possibility. With the republics of the Middle East currently in revolution, and monarchies like Qatar seeming islands of stability, Fromherz’s analysis deserves a closer look. Similarly, a close study of the elaborate political strategy of Sheikh Hamad is even timelier with his relinquishing of power to his son in March 2013.

Qatar: A Modern History reads more like a reference work than an argument about Qatar’s past and future, with some sections being encyclopedic. Few would want to read it from cover to cover. Despite lifting the veil off Qatar’s official history, it nonetheless gives the ruling family a generous amount of latitude. The 85 percent of the population without Qatari citizenship is mentioned ominously at points, but definitely downplayed in the text. Even with these caveats, Fromherz’s study is essential reading for anyone with a deep interest in Qatar and the future of the Gulf monarchies.

Col. David D. DiMeeo, U.S. Army, Retired, Bowling Green, Kentucky

STALIN’S GENERAL: The Life of Georgy Zhukov

Prominent historian Geoffrey Roberts’ book, Stalin’s General: The Life of Georgy Zhukov, focuses on the Soviet Union during World War II. Roberts’ attention is on the Great Patriotic War’s hero, Gen. Georgy Zhukov. Roberts argues that Zhukov was the best all-around general of World War II. However, this major point doesn’t come until the concluding chapter of the book and then comes as a surprise. Roberts uses the preceding chapters to provide a strong biography of Zhukov and his rise to greatness.

Roberts researched the Russian State Military Archives and combed over Zhukov’s memoirs to provide a vivid image of a Soviet success story. Zhukov was born in 1896 to a peasant family and began work as a furrier at age 12. He was later conscripted into the Tsarist army in World War I, where he was wounded and decorated for bravery. He joined the Red Army in 1917 and fought with the Bolsheviks during the Russian civil war. Roberts points out that Zhukov was not merely a military opportunist, but rather a committed communist who believed in the principles of the revolution. Based on his tenacity and overwhelming commitment to victory, Zhukov rose through the ranks of the Red Army. As a result of his performance at Khalkin-Gol, the Battle of Moscow, and the Battle of Stalingrad, he earned the reputation as an outstanding commander and trusted military officer.

Roberts explains the political and military contexts of the various periods throughout Zhukov’s life to provide a deeper understanding of Zhukov and the Soviet Union. As a result Roberts’ biography provides critical historical insights into the Soviet Union during World War II and the early Cold War period.

Roberts highlights areas in Zhukov’s memoirs that do not always reconcile with archival evidence. For example, Zhukov gives the sense that he was at the center of major decision making during World War II, even when he was not. Roberts tells of Zhukov’s tragic demise under Stalin after the war but then springs his thesis that Zhukov is the best all-around general of World War II.

To support his thesis, Roberts argues that Zhukov had an exceptional will to win while hampered with a largely peasant Army that had minimal training. Roberts compares Zhukov to Eisenhower, Montgomery, Patton, and MacArthur, and argues that the “Marshall of the Soviet Union” embodied the best attributes of these stars of the Allied war effort. This thought-provoking thesis is valuable to anyone wanting to consider the relative comparison of generalship in World War II. Roberts’ insightful and well-researched book provides a complete portrait of Zhukov.

Sean N. Kalic, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ALLIED MASTER STRATEGISTS: The Combined Chiefs of Staff in World War II
David Rigby, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2012, 270 pages, $29.95

Multinational coalition warfare is not a new concept for the United States. In fact, every major military conflict undertaken by the United States in the 20th and 21st centuries has and continues to involve multinational
coalitions. In *Allied Master Strategists*, author David Rigby adds to the exhaustive field of World War II scholarship by tackling the complex inter-workings of arguably the most successful multinational coalition in modern history, the Anglo-American Alliance during World War II. Rigby focuses on the organization, structure, effectiveness, and personalities involved in the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Established in January 1942, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, serving as “the supreme uniformed military command for the Western Allies,” had the daunting task of formulating strategy to quickly and decisively defeat the Axis powers.

Rigby sets the foundation by providing brief biographical sketches of key members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This not only provides essential background information, but also allows a better understanding of the biases—national, service, and individual—which shaped the staff’s overall contributions to the committee. Rigby outlines the structure and intra-workings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and provides insight into the function of the respective national feeder organizations, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British chief of staff. When explaining the success of the Western Alliance, Rigby is not short on his praise for Field Marshall Sir John Dill and the British joint staff mission in Washington, which the author rightly argues is instrumental in the close cooperation enjoyed by the military leadership of the Western Allies. By comparison the alliance between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union did not enjoy such a fruitful relationship and was often rife with suspicion and bureaucratic inefficiencies.

Much of the overt tension within the alliance concerned two major strategic decisions—the Germany-first strategy that relegated the defeat of Japan to a secondary effort and the desire of the United States to open a second front on the western European continent in 1942 or 1943. The reader gets a feel for the challenges facing the Combined Chiefs of Staff as Rigby lays out the skillful diplomacy required when addressing these two issues. The Americans, full of emotion after the attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor, sought approval of an offensive campaign plan in the central and western Pacific, while the British feared that vital resources would be diverted from the European Theater of Operation. Likewise, the U.S. delegation was continually suspect of British reluctance to invade the continent, instead favoring operations in the Mediterranean as well as operations the United States felt were guided more by the restoration of colonial influence rather than strategic necessities. Rigby records the gradual shift in power as the might of the U.S. military industrial complex begins to overshadow the equality of the Allies, and the United States moves to a position of dominance in influencing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and overall strategic objectives adopted by the Allies. In the chapter “Delegation versus Control for the Center,” Rigby describes an early version of mission command as the Combined Chiefs of Staff sought to empower the theater commanders to achieve their broadly outlined strategic objectives without becoming entangled in the operations of each theater.

The final portion of the book is devoted to explaining the role the Combined Chiefs of Staff played in shaping wartime production in both Britain and the United States. One quickly grasps the enormity of global warfare by the examination of the production of wartime materials and munitions, the allocation and transportation of those resources, and the force generation and apportionment to each theater. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, by influencing such organizations as the War Production Board in the United States and Ministry of Aircraft Production in Britain, were able to ensure the resourcing of their master strategy. Through the complex allocation of those resources they were able to change the weight applied to efforts and thus had nominal control over the various theaters.

The author does an excellent job providing an introductory look at a complex subject. The book is easy to digest, logically organized, and supported by extensive research balancing primary and secondary sources. It is a great first reference and foundational work for military officers, students of history, and those interested in furthering their knowledge of the Combined Chiefs of Staff or the Anglo-American Alliance during World War II.

Lt. Col. Steve Rosson, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
CARTELS AT WAR: Mexico’s Drug-Fueled Violence and the Threat to U.S. National Security
Paul Rexton Kan, Potomac Books, Dulles, VA, 2012, 192 pages, $29.95

Cartels at War is must-read for professionals needing to understand the crisis emerging on the U.S. southern border. Paul Rexton Kan, an associate professor of national security studies at the U.S. Army War College, offers a concise, but comprehensive analysis of the cartel violence in Mexico, and illustrates why this phenomena may become the primary threat to U.S. national security in the future.

Kan demonstrates how two major structural changes, the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the shift in domestic political power from the Partido Revolucionario to the Partido Accion Nacional, established the conditions for cartel expansion and conflict. The former removed barriers for both licit and illicit trade between the United States and Mexico, and the latter ended the cozy “live and let live” agreements between the Partido Revolucionario and the drug lords. The result was increased shipments of narcotics to the north and amplified violence in Mexico.

A valuable aspect of the book is its explanation of what is actually transpiring in Mexico. Many academics, military officers, and journalists conflate cartel violence and activities with insurgencies and terrorism. While they use similar means, Kan demonstrates that the cartels are not striving for a strategic political objective such as the overthrow of a government or the implementation of an ideology. Instead, their activities are considered high-intensity crime, which is “a war waged by violent entrepreneurs who seek to prevail over one another and the state in a hypercompetitive illegal market in order to control it or a particular portion of it.” The war is waged for control over the business supply lines and distribution nodes of the illegal narcotics trade. This difference strongly implies that the solutions to the problem are often not military in nature, but require other elements of national power.

In fact, among the policy recommendations he offers at the end of the book, several stand out for their clarity of thought and strategic purpose: avoid further militarization of the situation, strengthen the Mexican state and civil society, concentrate on cartel finances, and tackle U.S. drug usage. Given the constant level of U.S. drug demand over the past years, cartel spill-over violence into American cities and towns beyond the border region, and millions of dollars invested in counter narcotics measures; this book deserves a place in the professional library for critical thinking on the subject. Like recent publications in the same genre such as National Defense University’s Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization, Cartels at War provides relevant insights into what is developing as the key threat to U.S. national security in the next decade.

Lt. Col. Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D., U.S. Army Reserve, Zurich, Switzerland

KIEV 1941: Hitler’s Battle for Supremacy in the East

Judged by its scale, the Battle of Kiev was the Wehrmacht’s greatest victory. By encircling Stalin’s forces in the bend of the Dnepr River, the German First and Second Panzer Groups ripped a vast hole in the enemy line, destroyed an entire Soviet Front along with its four component armies, and captured—according to the German propaganda machine—665,000 men. By any standard, the German triumph in the Ukraine in September 1941 was mind boggling.

David Stahel’s new book, Kiev 1941, gives us a new and insightful account of this titanic battle, yet it is hardly a celebration of Nazi military expertise. Instead, the author builds on the analysis of his earlier work, Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East, which argued that Germany’s plan to subjugate Soviet Russia in a single campaign was doomed from the start by poor planning, insufficient resources, and dysfunction at the highest levels of command. In his previous book, Stahel focused attention on the difficulties encountered by the campaign’s main effort, the two panzer groups of Army Group Center. In his new book, the author continues that theme by showing how the panzer groups that linked up east of Kiev in late
September were dogged by exhaustion, bad weather, supply and maintenance bottlenecks, and relentless Soviet counterattacks. Stahel does not overturn our understanding of the Wehrmacht’s failure in the East by highlighting German difficulties, but his perspective is fresh and compelling—it is hardly an account of invincible blitzkrieg.

Beyond his operational narrative, Stahel emphasizes that the outcome of the battle depended on two men, Hitler and Stalin. For his part, the late summer of 1941 found Hitler wrestling control of the Russian campaign from his generals who believed the main effort of the operation needed to continue along the axis taken by Army Group Center in the direction of Moscow. It was the Fuhrer’s idea to turn Guderian’s panzers south into the Ukraine and the exposed flank of the Soviet Southwestern Front. At the same time, Stalin insisted on defending Kiev, even after his generals had warned him of the danger of losing the city and its defenders to German encirclement. Hitler took personal credit for the victory; Stalin assigned blame elsewhere.

At the conclusion of the battle, the chief of the German General Staff, Franz Halder, wrote in his journal that the Soviet colossus had lost an arm but that its back remained unbroken. It was a prophetic judgment. The Germans needed weeks to reorient their main effort back on the Moscow axis, time the Soviets used to prepare Moscow’s defense. Those weeks are described in the next book in Stahel’s account of Barbarossa, this one entitled Operation Typhoon, Hitler’s March on Moscow, October 1941. I look forward to reading it, anticipating the same high standard of research and analysis Stahel brings to Kiev, 1941.

Scott Stephenson, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE LAST BATTLE:
When U.S. and German Soldiers Joined Forces in the Waning Hours of World War II in Europe

The Last Battle is the story of a little known battle that took place just across the German border in the Tyrol region of Austria in the final hours of World War II. What makes it unique is that German soldiers, French civilian detainees, and U.S. soldiers fought side-by-side against Nazi Waffen SS troops to safeguard civilian detainees and prevent their likely executions.

The French civilian detainees had been leaders in the French government during the early days of the 1940 German occupation and with Hitler’s orders were arrested and confined. The detainees were moved to Schloss Itter, a hilltop castle located just over the German border in Austria. The French VIPs included French army generals, former prime ministers (who detested each other), a former national defense minister, a trade union secretary-general, a tennis star, and several others. They lived together in the castle, but their political differences kept them from working together. When the detainees realized the German forces were retreating, and on the verge of losing the war, they knew they might be executed so they could not testify against crimes committed by their German captors.

As news broke of Hitler’s suicide and with Allied forces approaching, several high-ranking German Wermacht officers in charge of Schloss Itter decided surrendering to advancing Allied forces was probably their best chance of survival. They made the decision knowing that hard-core Nazi Waffen SS troops would kill them if their intent was discovered.

With the help of the castle’s Croat handyman-trustee, a message was carried to approaching Allied forces who eventually received permission to mount a rescue mission. By the time the Allied force arrived at Schloss Itter, all they had was one Sherman tank, 14 American soldiers, the 10 Wermacht soldiers defending the castle, and the French VIPs to defend the castle. The 17th Waffen-SS Panzer Grenadier Division attacked and killed the lead German officer working with the Allies and disabled the Sherman tank. The Allies rallied their forces and held on long enough for a relief force to arrive.

The book gives a comprehensive history of each of the characters and shows how they decided to abandon their positions of “loyalty” to band together for survival. Harding does an excellent job in his research and pieces together the few available fragments to tell a story of trust, uncertainty, and moral righteousness.

Lt. Col. George Hodge, U.S. Army, Retired, Lansing, Kansas
THE BLOOD OF FREE MEN:
The Liberation of Paris, 1944

Many of the accounts of the liberation of Paris are a part of an agreed-upon myth about the Nazi occupation of France, the conduct of the Vichy government, and the French people. It took a generation for historians to unravel the legend. The fall of France destroyed the French Third Republic and exposed a long-standing sociopolitical divide which Marshal Philippe Pétain's Vichy government aspired to fill. It unleashed a civil war between resisters and collaborators. Michael Neiberg's book must be read knowing this context.

Neiberg's work shows the struggle between French resistance factions, collaborators, the Anglo-American Allies, and the Free French movement (the Wehrmacht was also involved). According to Neiberg's research, the heroes are the people of Paris who played a large part in their own liberation and Charles de Gaulle, whose opponents included the Anglo-American Allies, the French Communists, and the Nazis.

Neiberg begins with a theme that has become commonplace in the historiography of World War II—the Nazi victory in 1940 destroying the old European bourgeois social and political structure. The defeat led to an undeclared and a barely acknowledged civil war in France. French society was divided between collaborators and resisters. The former included those who preferred Hitler to Leon Blum (a French politician)—reactionaries and opportunists who wished to accommodate themselves to the new realities of power. The latter included French citizens from all segments of the political spectrum who thought subjugation to Germany was inconceivable. The resistance was very small until the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union and the Nazi defeat at Stalingrad. Even then it was still a small portion of the population.

While we may see collaborators solely as opportunists, we should understand that most in western Europe were prepared to collaborate with the Nazis because they were now dominant. In the summer of 1940, it appeared they would rule for a very long time. The opposition consisted of fringe elements. Neiberg sets the stage by explaining how the opposition fissures were temporarily patched and the ways in which de Gaulle (an unknown renegade general) created a resistance coalition, cooperating with and dominating both communist and noncommunist resistance groups.

Neiberg builds his narrative on primary and secondary material that illuminates commonplace Parisian life under occupation, the character of the Nazi military governor, Gen. Dietrich von Choltitz, and the struggle at Allied headquarters over whether or not Paris should be liberated. Parallel to this discussion, Neiberg shows how the Parisian resistance organizations took matters into their own hands and began a two-week insurrection which, with pressure from de Gaulle and the 2nd French Armored Division, forced American commanders to divert forces to help complete the liberation of Paris.

Neiberg is a scholar and a storyteller who has written an account that keeps the reader in suspense even though one knows how the story will end. His conclusion discusses the meaning of the liberation for postwar French society and politics. The Blood of Free Men: The Liberation of Paris, 1944 is a relatively short book that illuminates the interaction of politics, strategy, and operations in warfare.

Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., Seoul, Korea

THE DRAGON EXTENDS ITS REACH:
Chinese Military Power Goes Global

The Dragon Extends its Reach—the title suggests that China's military modernization is going strong—and it is. China's modernization effort has forced Western authors to reexamine the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) capabilities and intentions. The new global environment—marked by digitalization and space conquests—has required China to seek out new resources and competencies, which in turn, have created new missions and requirements for the PLA. They have not attempted such global activities for the past 50 years.

Larry Wortzel's research has succeeded as few have in uncovering the PLAs expanding military effort and
encompassing all areas of the PLA from the macro- to the micro-level. As an ex-military attaché to Beijing, he is familiar with China’s military and the various aspects of their culture. He has access to information found mainly in Chinese-language sources, attainable because of his fluency in the Chinese language. For example, he notes that *A Guide to the Study of Campaign Theory* is an unclassified “study guide” for PLA officers on how to understand and apply the campaign doctrine presented in the PLA book, *The Science of Campaigns*. Any Chinese military analyst would consider such a document vital to his understanding of the PLA’s conduct of military operations, but it is only accessible to those who can read Mandarin.

*The Dragon Extends Its Reach* examines a number of areas, each of which is usually covered individually by a single U.S. specialist (C4ISR, ground forces, nuclear doctrine, etc.). Wortzel exceeds this parameter of singularity and offers readers a comprehensive look at the PLA in a single source. His analysis encompasses not only the traditional areas of the military services and their equipment, but also the PLA’s thoughts on deterrence and its use, the integration of information operations into political departments, the PLA’s role in foreign policy, and the integration of current thought with past legacies, among other issues.

The book rarely misses a topic area. For example, there are detailed discussions of the Chinese general staff system; military regions, theaters of war, and military districts; the decision-making process of the military; and legal issues affecting space and ocean activities. Wortzel descends into the depths of the services, to include an examination of topics such as how network-centric operations affect their activities. More importantly, he touches on topics that are seldom, if ever, seen in the open press, such as the Chinese Qu Dian theater-level, automated system of command and control.

The information in this book serves as an excellent introduction to the PLA for those just starting to study the Chinese military, and as a well-rounded compendium for those senior Chinese analysts who may have set their focus on one area of military research.

**Tim Thomas, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**BREACH OF TRUST: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their Country**

Andrew J. Bacevich, Metropolitan Books, New York, 2013, 238 pages, $26.00

Andrew Bacevich’s *Breach of Trust* is a must read for policymakers, military professionals, and the citizens on whose behalf those groups serve. The only critique is that the book’s title does not capture the richness of Bacevich’s argument. His foundational argument is that the all-volunteer force has allowed 99 percent of the population to shirk the shared responsibility of national defense. Although this accusation has become trite over the last 11 years, Bacevich moves beyond the simple military versus civilian argument, identifying how the all-volunteer force is eroding the checks-and-balances construct upon which American democracy is based and creating perverse incentives that enable global adventurism.

Bacevich argues that initially, the all-volunteer force seemed like a “bargain” for both citizen and soldier. Citizens received a professionally trained military capable of protecting the nation, while remaining unburdened by the requirements of common defense. Soldiers received the approbation of 99 percent of the population who were not only grateful for their service, but more than willing to pay the costs of contracting common defense to the other one percent. Overtime, the population became unconcerned with how the professional Army was employed, as long as the costs were not immediate and life continued seemingly uninterrupted. In return, the soldier enjoyed an elevated status in society and vast improvement in the quality of life compared to their military ancestors.

Bacevich concludes that 40 years later, the decision to “abandon the tradition of the citizen-soldier” resembles less a “grand bargain” and more a millstone around the neck of American democracy. Jingoistic policymakers, unconstrained by a disengaged population, use military force in pursuit of idealistic policy objectives of questionable national interest. An institutional military that bureaucratically benefits from global adventurism willingly undertakes these missions, even if individual soldiers become exhausted from the weight of repeated deployments. The result is what George C. Marshall
warned in August 1944 when he argued, “there must not be a large standing army subject to the behest of a group of schemers. The citizen-soldier is the guarantee against such a misuse of power.”

The military professional, who paradoxically prospers and languishes from the all-volunteer force, will embrace some of Bacevich’s conclusions, while simultaneously angering at others. The military reader should not merely cherry-pick those elements of Bacevich’s argument that seem to elevate the soldier, but also appreciate their role in this Faustian bargain. We often believe what is good for the military is good for the nation (or what is good for our individual service is good for the nation). Although institutional parochialism is often unavoidable, we must remain cognizant that we are here to serve the national interest and not vice-versa. Finally, America’s agonistic system of checks and balances must be fueled by meaningful debate among disagreeing parties. For too long, we have equated non-support for policy as non-support for the troops. Although as military professionals we cannot make policymakers responsible or the population more engaged, it behooves us to remember that sometimes the war protestor is our biggest ally and the hawk our greatest threat.

Maj. David P. Oakley, U.S. Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas

CAVALRY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Jim Piecuch’s Cavalry of the American Revolution is a fascinating collection of nine essays that visits the introduction and development of the cavalry during the American Revolution. The first essay, Gregory J.W. Urwin’s “The Continental Light Dragoons, 1776-83,” sets the stage for the subsequent essays, providing the reader with a comprehensive overview of the evolution of light cavalry and dragoons during the Revolutionary War. The remaining essays cover key milestones in the implementation and use of light cavalry and dragoons to include the efforts and exploits of Brig. Gen. Casimir Pulaski, Light Horse Henry Lee, and Col. Anthony White, as well as decisive battles and campaigns such as the Battle of Cowpens and the Philadelphia Campaign.

Throughout the reading I found myself gripped by two themes. The first is the belated recognition of the tactical value of a mounted force and its slow development and often catastrophic employment. The second theme is the American combination and use of guerrilla tactics and mounted raids against static British tactics and mounted outposts that disrupted Maj. Gen. Cornwallis’s southern campaign and set the conditions for the American decisive victories at the battles of Cowpens and Yorktown.

Gen. Washington’s view of the creation of American light cavalry and dragoon formations was similar to the contemporary argument that armor and cavalry formations are too costly and not compatible with today’s operational environment. Initially, Washington did not pressure the Continental Congress to resource a mounted force, opting instead for artillery to support his infantry regiments. Washington assumed that the restrictive New England terrain—with its hills, rivers, and densely forested areas—would neutralize the maneuver of a mounted force. He also believed that the cost of feeding horses and equipping a mounted force was not sustainable and that the Continental Congress could simply not afford it. Most important, Washington did not believe the cavalry would be of much use keeping the British pinned in port cities of Boston and New York. This tactical oversight put Washington’s operational plans at risk. Only after being driven out of New Jersey and New York by British Gen. Howe, aided by his two regiments of light dragoons, did Washington recognize the tactical relevancy of having his own mounted force. He petitioned Congress to field a cavalry force when he recommended the establishment of one or more corps.

Michael Scoggins’ “South Carolina’s Backcountry Rangers in the American Revolution” covers the little known but frequent and bloody skirmishes between Tory Loyalists led by the infamous Lt. Col. Tarleton and partisan patriot’s led by brigadier generals Daniel Morgan, Francis Marion, and Thomas Sumter. These skirmishes are described as a part of a brutal civil war pitting Loyalists and American communities against one another throughout the Carolina back country. The essay also describes the change of American tactics after the fall of
Charleston and Savannah to the British in 1780 and the subsequent performance of Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates. The author illustrates how partisan mounted troopers, along with continental regulars, successfully leveraged guerrilla tactics and mounted maneuvers against static British outposts and lines of communication. This action crippled Maj. Gen. Cornwallis’s Southern Campaign, forcing him to seek refuge at Yorktown with his occupational forces isolated in the coastal ports of Charleston and Savannah.

_Cavalry of the American Revolution_ is not a quick read. Because each of the essays is written independently there is some overlap of information that may or may not be consistent, making the reading difficult to follow. Many of the essays are weighed with details and facts that only contribute to a more sluggish read. A technique I found useful was to refer to a map as I read each author’s description of particular battles and campaigns.

That said, overall I enjoyed the book and reread many of essays. I confess that my library is full of contemporary military history going back to 1939, along with a limited number of Civil War works. This book has spurred a curiosity in the American Revolution and how partisan forces shaped the British southern campaign. One can draw comparisons between the British reliance on strong points and use of loyalist formations to our recent efforts in Afghanistan. I recommend this book.

_Lt. Col. Andrew H. Lanier IV, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas_

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**RÜCKZUG: The German Retreat from France, 1944**
Joachim Ludewig, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2013, 504 pages, $40.00

You failed to execute your decisive operation, you are outnumbered by more than 16 to 1, you can move only at night because of your opponent’s overwhelming air superiority, you only have 12 of the 54 divisions you started with, and you have to contend with a delusional psychopathic leader. This is the situation the Germans faced in the summer of 1944 as told by Joachim Ludewig in his detailed and well-researched book _Rückzug: The German Retreat from France, 1944_. What makes this work both unique and fascinating is that Ludewig analyzes the battle across France primarily from the German perspective with the purpose of determining how the German Army was able to stabilize the western front and eventually establish the conditions for the Ardennes Offensive, despite facing such overwhelming obstacles.

So how were the Germans able to stabilize the front after being on the verge of a complete rout? From Ludewig’s perspective, the two key reasons for this were _Auftragstaktik_, or mission command, on the part of the Germans, and an adherence to fighting the plan and not the enemy on the part of the Allies. From the German side, the tenants of mission command (initiative, agility, and adaptability) were absolutely indispensable in helping them maintain control of their forces despite being pushed back almost 1,000 kilometers during three months of intense fighting.

The reader is provided a clear picture of a chaotic and rapidly changing situation that was only controlled through strong leadership and the skillful application of mission command. The high tempo of Allied operations placed the German leadership in a position where they only had time to provide their subordinates with a mission and intent, and then had to trust them to exercise the initiative necessary to accomplish the mission. This is precisely the type of environment the current U.S. Army doctrine of mission command is intended to contend with.

Ludewig also finds the Allies guilty of fighting the plan and not the enemy. His research supports the Allies’ assessment that by mid-August the German western front was on the verge of collapse. Furthermore, the author believes that if the Allies had adjusted their plan at this critical point and designated a main effort they could potentially have reduced the war by months. Instead, he finds fault with Eisenhower’s decision to continue advancing across a broad front despite facing a logistics situation that could no longer support that scheme of maneuver. This error in evaluating Germany’s window of vulnerability would continue to haunt the Allies into September. The German’s were extremely vulnerable in August, but in a matter of weeks the situation changed as they were able to stabilize the front. Unfortunately, the Allies did not update their assessments, and this influenced the outcome of Operation Market Garden.
As early as July 1944, Hitler had been contemplating a counterattack against the Allies. However, until conditions were set—weather, terrain, equipment, and a stabilized front—this attack could not happen. From a historical perspective, Rückzug clearly demonstrates how important Germany’s ability to manage its retreat from France was in setting the conditions for the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944. From a more current standpoint, this work offers valuable lessons and insights into key concepts such as mission command, planning, and battlefield decision making. **Lt. Col. William Kenna McCurry, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**ANTI-ACCESS WARFARE:**
**Countering A2/AD Strategies**
Sam J. Tangredi, U.S. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2013, 308 pages, $35.91

For strategic landpower advocates concerned over the current AirSea Battle debate, this book is an essential and foundational analysis of the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) military problem. Given the author’s background as an expert naval analyst, the book may be overlooked at first glance. From the book’s title and provocative dust cover jacket depicting a U.S. aircraft carrier hit by a Chinese guided ballistic missile, one would expect a focus on the technical and tactical details of the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) with a decidedly naval slant. But this book is not that at all; instead it places the narrow JOAC/AirSea Battle solution to the A2/AD problem into a far larger and properly balanced strategic perspective.

Tangredi, an award-winning naval writer and accomplished defense consultant, examines the issue of defeating A2/AD capabilities from both a historical and a modern-day strategic perspective. He uses selected historical vignettes of A2/AD successes (the Greco-Persian Wars, the Spanish Armada in 1588, Gallipoli in 1915, and the Battle of Britain/Operation Sea Lion in 1940) as well as defeats (Fortress Europe in 1944, the Pacific War in 1942-45, the Falklands War in 1982, and Saddam’s failure to interdict Operation Desert Storm in 1990) to effectively argue for what he terms as “five fundamental elements” of the A2/AD problem. The JOAC paper and AirSea Battle discussions focus on just two of these: the criticality of information and intelligence, and the general predominance of the maritime domain as conflict space. However, the author insists that A2/AD warfare challenges and opportunities must be understood while considering the other three elements (perception of strategic superiority of the attacking force, the primacy of geography, and determinative impact of extrinsic events). Tangredi is quick to point out that countering adversary A2/AD is not an air and/or sea prerogative by default since much depends on the actual circumstances of the situation. Defeating A2/AD methods is also frequently a necessary precursor for the introduction of landpower into the battlespace to win the larger military contest.

The reviewer tested the author’s five fundamental elements in analyzing other historical anti-access scenarios not discussed in the book (the Norwegian campaign in 1940, the air assault into Crete in 1941, the never-executed Axis plan to invade Malta, the air assault into Leros in 1943, and the Soviet amphibious assaults in the vicinity of Novorossiysk in 1943). These fit just as well within Tangredi’s analytical framework as those provided in the text.

After establishing his strategic analytical framework, the author discusses contemporary A2/AD problems: PRC anti-access means and ways versus a potential U.S. military intervention on Taiwan, Iran versus the U.S. in the Persian Gulf, North Korea versus a U.S.-led alliance, and Russia versus NATO in a Central Asian scenario. Most striking is how different all of these situations are from each other and how potential solutions would have to take all five fundamental elements into account.

Through both his historical and contemporary analyses, Tangredi makes a strong case for widening the lens in understanding how adversary A2/AD methods can be successfully overcome. If strategic landpower thinkers are frustrated by the all-too-narrow terms of conversation in AirSea Battle, this book provides a more far-ranging and inclusive mental framework for A2/AD warfare problem-solving. **Col. Eric M. Walters, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, Fort Lee, Virginia**
THE ROCKY ROAD TO THE GREAT WAR:
The Evolution of Trench Warfare to 1914
Nicholas Murray, Washington, Potomac Books, 2013, 320 pages, $27.96

Nicholas Murray examines the “theory and practice of trench warfare” to help readers understand how the belligerents found themselves deadlocked for four years. Murray, an associate professor of history at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College, assesses the development and evolution of field fortifications from a theoretical or conceptual perspective using four case studies: the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878; the second Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902; the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905; and the Balkan War among and between the lesser Balkan Powers and Turkey, 1912-1913.

The conventional wisdom is that the First World War cost so many lives largely because of military incompetence shared equally among the combatants. The trenches made famous on the western front are often cited as demonstrating the stupidity of the generals who presided over the fighting. However, though incompetence abounded, it was not the only reason for the slaughter of combatants during that war. In 1914, the technology of war had outstripped conceptual thinking about warfare. Even this explanation falls short. Murray’s analysis of the development of field fortifications provides some answers as to why things happened as they did.

Murray examines the evolution of field fortifications through six themes he identified from reviewing field fortification theory from 1750-1914. The themes include: using field fortifications to prevent desertion, providing physical protection for troops, enhancing fighting power, reinforcing key tactical points, providing a secure base, and dominating an area. What he found is that armies adjusted the employment and use of field fortifications to keep pace with improvements in weapons and innovation in field fortification. Belligerents, as they had always done, developed field fortifications along the best lines that the terrain afforded and accounted for differences in that terrain. Over time, these efforts led to more sophisticated, more complex, and in the end, more effective works.

Murray ably makes the case that army leaders carefully considered the role and use of field fortifications in any war they might fight. Even leaders from those armies who had no occasion to fight were able to analyze the use of field fortifications because it remained common until World War I for nonbelligerents to send observers to combat zones. Observers were afforded good access to the fighting by those at war. The U.S. Army and the Europeans paid close attention to fighting they observed or found themselves embroiled in, and learned many valuable lessons. Murray draws many of his observations from American observers of these campaigns.

Murray’s chapter on the state of military thought in 1914 is his best. Murray debunks the claim that Ivan Bloch and others who argued that modern warfare had become impossible were ignored. Murray argues that Bloch was mistaken in much of his thinking. In any case, Ivan Bloch was not ignored.

In only one particular is Murray unconvincing. His assertion that the theory of field fortifications included the idea of using them to prevent desertion is not entirely illustrated in the review of the cases he chose. His contention seems logical nonetheless. For example, deserting from a well-developed trench work would not be as easy as leaving a formation on the move at night. Indeed, desertion from the trenches was uncommon in World War I.

Murray appends a short discussion on field fortifications in the American Civil War. This appendix seems unnecessary and added as an afterthought. Perhaps the appendix is intended to preclude criticism that Murray had not included the American Civil War among his cases. If so, his main reason for not including the American Civil War is that the weapons used were not sufficiently modern. This is unconvincing. It is far more likely that he did not include the American Civil War because Europeans generally felt there was nothing really to learn from the American experience. In any case, the appendix adds little and he owes the reader no explanation for his choices beyond those made in the body of his work.

Despite this criticism, Murray’s Rocky Road is an excellent account of the technical and theoretical evolution of trench warfare. It is essential to the history of World War I because it illustrates that the combatants did not merely burrow into the ground in the fall of 1914. Instead, they took advantage of what they had
learned by observation or by experience in the years before the war. By 1914, the capacity of weapons technology had far outstripped the capability of the contemporary armies to overcome the defensive advantages afforded by these weapons. Worse still, when attacks succeeded, the attacker proved unable to rapidly exploit tactical gains. The armies, particularly those in the West, dug in—however miserable, trenches preserved lives. They were well conceived and took advantage of some 30 years of improvement and careful thought as to how they should be emplaced and developed. Rocky Road is satisfying both in its explanation of the technical changes and of the development of theory from Plevna to the start of the First World War.  

Col. Gregory Fontenot, U.S. Army, Retired, Lansing, Kansas

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THE LAST FULL MEASURE:  
How Soldiers Die in Battle  

In The Last Full Measure, author Michael Stephenson analyzes a topic that is central to warfare but seldom discussed: how soldiers have died in combat. Stephenson, the former editor of the Military Book Club and the author of a book on the Revolutionary War examines how soldiers met their deaths throughout history. His goal is to explain this topic in a professional, nonsensational, and sensitive manner, and demonstrate that the battlefield realities were often harsher than the romanticized visions and sanitized histories people are accustomed to reading. He argues that “the stench and screams give way to rousing images. The death agonies settle into the encouraging heroic gestures of the war memorial and the movies.” Overall, the author succeeds in his goal and provides the reader a lasting image of combat’s harsh realities and a unique analysis of war.

The Last Full Measure brings together the factors that cause death on the battlefield. The author organizes the book chronologically to account for the specifics of each historical period concluding with “Soldiers Die in the Style of Their Times.” This approach makes it easy for the reader to understand the historical period and see the connections across the ages. The book primarily focuses on deaths caused by ground combat rather than by sickness and disease. Each chapter, from ancient times to the wars of today, discusses the weapons that killed soldiers, the tactics and strategy that impacted their deaths, the decisions soldiers made and the ones made for them, and the impact of medical services. Stephenson also analyzes the cultural context that affected the soldiers and played a role in their motivation.

This unique approach, looking at how soldiers died, offers the reader a fresh perspective not normally found in books analyzing the experience of battle. Although some of the information about the experience of battle is covered in other books, linking it to how soldiers died is the book’s strength. Stephenson used memoirs and other research in his analysis. He weaves these personal accounts into his analysis where they are particularly effective at not only illustrating his points, but at providing the reader a feel for the events. The author uses U.S. sources and adds the perspectives of many other nations to bring depth to his analysis. Of particular interest to readers may be the way the author highlights the connections between historical periods of how soldiers died.

Although the book is well written, some readers may find a few of the author’s descriptions a bit over the top. For example, when describing the killing power of artillery he writes, “the cannon was a beast of omnivorous and indiscriminate appetite, guzzling greedily on the herds of men conveniently marching toward its muzzle.” In addition, in the early chapters, the author will occasionally reference battles without providing context, which can be confusing to a reader who does not know the details of those battles. However, these points are minor.

Overall, the book will be a great addition to the libraries of those readers interested in the experience of battle. I highly recommend it.  

Lt. Col. Robert Rielly, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
In Charles Portis 1968 novel, a man of “True Grit” is brought to life; grit being defined as having perseverance, fortitude, firmness of mind, resilience, and unyielding courage. In *A General Who Will Fight: The Leadership of Ulysses S. Grant*, author Harry Laver also explores a man of similar qualities. Laver challenges the reader with one overarching question: how does an ordinary young man, devoid of any apparent drive or leadership traits, rise to the rank of Commanding General of the Union Army? Laver convincingly argues that Grant had an overriding personal quality, which was “a great force of will.” Laver contends that this will, this inner drive, developed throughout Grant’s victories during the Civil War. The author portrays a man shaped by those around him, and clearly demands that the reader question the old axiom that leaders are born not made.

Today’s leaders can learn from Laver’s leadership analysis of Grant and the importance mentors played in Grant’s development. During the Mexican-American War Grant observed both Generals Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott during the zeniths of their careers. Grant adopted the best attributes of these officers and incorporated them into his leadership style. He also absorbed many tactical lessons during the Mexican-American War. One such lesson that would serve him well in his future was the importance of pressing the fight, no matter what the odds or possible setbacks.

Harry Laver’s main objective is to inform the reader of a side of Grant that is not well known. Laver does not dissect battles; he tells the story of how Grant developed as a leader within the context of his life. Laver clearly meets this goal in a well researched and documented work. The author’s writing style is direct and easy to read. Laver does an excellent job of explaining events after the Mexican-American War, when Grant fell on hard times. Within two years of his stationing out west, Grant resigned his commission as a captain. Over the next five years he attempted many vocations, but failed at all. Laver successfully argues that regardless of these failures, Grant never lost hope that things would get better. He always believed no matter how bad things became, good fortune would eventually come his way.

Once the Civil War commenced, Grant was appointed to the rank of colonel by the governor of Illinois and given command of the 21st Regiment of Illinois Volunteers. Laver continues to chronicle the rise of Grant through the first two years of the war on the western front. During that time Grant encountered another mentor, Brigadier General Charles F. Smith, who served as commandant of West Point when Grant was a student. Grant cherished their relationship and learned from another seasoned warrior. Laver portrays Grant developing his abilities during increasingly significant battles. The author depicts a maturing Grant, expanding his knowledge and developing self-awareness in such places as Forts Henry and Donelson, Shiloh, and Vicksburg. Laver critiques Grant after each of these victories, and expertly explores where Grant stumbled and where he shined.

During these critiques Laver emphasizes Grant’s ever-increasing self-confidence, and underscores his determined resolve to continuously press the battle to achieve victories and ultimately win the war. Today’s leaders could learn from Grants evolving leadership style as he was executing mission command well before his time. It was Grant’s “great force of will” to press on that turned the tide of many battles in the Union favor. Grant eventually commanded all Union armies, battled Lee in the east, and eventually defeated Lee’s Army, accomplishing what many before him could not do.

President Lincoln once said, “Grant has the grit of a bulldog.” Laver persuasively tells the story of a determined man who learned from his mistakes while molding himself after strong role models; a lifelong learner who rose to lead our military during one of the most difficult times in our nation’s history. Given our military’s drawdown and reduced budgets, I would highly recommend this book to all leaders as an example of how to face uncertain times with strength and determination.

*Lt. Col. Marc A. Wagner, U.S. Army, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas*
Former Sgt. Kyle J. White was awarded the Medal of Honor by President Barack Obama in a ceremony at the White House on 14 May.

President Obama said of White—

"You make us proud, and you motivate all of us to be the best we can be as Americans, as a nation; to uphold our sacred obligations to your generation and all who have faced that "measure of danger" and "the willingness to incur it."

The Seattle, Wash. native received the nation’s highest military decoration for his actions during combat operations in Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 9 November 2007. White’s unit, comprised of 13 Americans and a squad of Afghan soldiers, was ambushed on a narrow mountain path as they were returning to Combat Outpost Bella after a meeting with Aranas village elders.

Wounded by shrapnel from rocket-propelled grenades and briefly knocked unconscious, White awoke to find several of his comrades had sustained life-threatening wounds. Taking immediate action, he repeatedly exposed himself to enemy fire to provide first aid to the wounded soldiers and marines.

He exposed himself to fire again to retrieve a radio from a fallen comrade, which he used to call for air support and, ultimately, medical evacuation.

Five soldiers and one marine died during the Battle of Aranas.