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U.S. Military Deployments to Africa: Lessons from the Hunt for Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army

James J.F. Forest

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Foreword

Dr. James Forest’s monograph explores lessons and observations from the recent United States Special Operations Forces’ (USSOF) effort to help Ugandan and other African regional forces locate and apprehend Joseph Kony and members of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Dr. Forest examines the context behind the decision to deploy U.S. military advisors to the region and the significant public pressure placed on the Obama administration to do something. The U.S. commitment to helping Africa respond to the LRA threat dates back to the early 1990s.

Dr. Forest provides an overview of the initial troop deployment and the logistics challenge faced and then explores various lessons that can be derived from the first 18 months of deployment. Four themes are identified as important for the success or failure of future U.S. military deployments to sub-Saharan Africa: (1) preparations and logistics, (2) perceptions and expectations management, (3) partnerships and relationship management, and (4) policy and politics.

The observations and lessons about preparation and logistics are described and it is recommended that Special Operations Forces (SOF) teams deploying to this environment should prioritize their learning to focus on the customs, culture, and history of the region. SOF teams can hire translators to help them across the language barriers once on the ground, but they cannot get translators to help them across the cultural barriers. Logistically, the movement of materiel into many areas of Africa is limited by the relatively short length of landing strips, which can be used only by small fixed-wing or rotary aircraft. A considerable amount of creativity and ingenuity is necessary to maximize available space on these aircraft.

Dr. Forest examines the importance of perceptions and expectations in these kinds of small unit deployments to sub-Saharan Africa. It is unreasonable for U.S. policymakers or military planners to expect that something significant can be accomplished there in a short timeframe. Managing our own expectations also involves understanding how the militaries of partner nations function. He argues that in the case of Uganda it is critical that any successes derived from these collaborative operations must be “owned” by the Ugandans, in large part because of the legacy of post-colonial
sensitivities. Not only must USSOF teams understand the perceptions and expectations of all those involved (including their own), it also important to find ways to influence those perceptions and expectations in ways that can be most beneficial to the success of the mission.

Dr. Forest describes the critically important role of establishing and nurturing trusted working relationships with foreign partners and local villagers. SOF work with and through others to achieve security objectives. Clearly, money and resources alone do not guarantee success in these kinds of missions. Knowledge and interpersonal relationships are key—including relationships with our partner countries’ military forces (and the communities they seek to protect), other entities in the theater of deployment (e.g., nongovernmental organizations, neighboring countries’ military forces and intelligence services), and among our own government organizations within the interagency process.

Dr. Forest then examines the policy and political dimensions of the counter-LRA effort that should be considered for future SOF deployments to sub-Saharan Africa. As noted, an honest appreciation for the learning process needs to be built in at the policy level when discussing the length of a particular deployment. Confidence, trust, and healthy interpersonal relationships take time to develop—there are no easy shortcuts. Policymakers also can contribute to (or conversely, impose constraints on) establishing and nurturing relationships in the field. Restrictions on patrols, human intelligence gathering, sharing technology, and other issues constrained the ability of U.S. personnel to address the perceptions and relationships aspects described.

Finally, Dr. Forest’s concluding chapter offers some thoughts about further research and implications for policy and SOF education. Overall this report makes a meaningful contribution to the effectiveness of future USSOF teams deploying to sub-Saharan Africa; a location that will certainly remain an area of interest for USSOCOM and will also be a concern for policy makers in the years to come.

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D.
Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research
Acknowledgements

Many colleagues and subject matter experts contributed valuable insights to this report. Some also played a critical role in arranging introductions and interviews with others they knew. While a significant number of individuals asked that their participation in this report be kept anonymous, those whom I can publicly express my sincere gratitude include: Kasper Agger, Brian Bourgeois, Jonathan Hutson, Gianni Iurassich, Patrick Munduga, Terry McCoy, John Ndugu, Brad Nicholson, Sean Poole, John Prendergast, Leslie Reid, Chris Sanford, Brett Schoonover, Matt Sousa, Lawrence Tubbs, Eric van der Schaft, Dan Walther, Mike Wilkerson, and John Mark Winthrop. I also express my thanks to the Joint Special Operations University’s Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, for the opportunity to conduct this research.
About the Author

James J.F. Forest, Ph.D. is Professor and Director of the Security Studies program at the University of Massachusetts Lowell, and is also a Senior Fellow with the U.S. Joint Special Operations University. He previously served on the faculty of the United States Military Academy (2001-2010), six of those years as Director of Terrorism Studies. He also directed a series of research initiatives and education programs for the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

Dr. Forest has published 20 books and dozens of scholarly articles on terrorism, counterterrorism, weapons of mass destruction and other security-related topics. He is also co-editor of the internationally distributed journal Perspectives on Terrorism, and is a member of the editorial board for several scholarly journals. He has served as an expert witness for terrorism-related court cases, and has provided testimony to committee hearings of the U.S. Senate. His undergraduate degrees are from Georgetown University and De Anza College, and his graduate degrees are from Boston College and Stanford University.

1. Introduction

The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) originated as a quasi-religious rebel group in Northern Uganda during the mid-1980s. The group is a loosely organized band of armed militants that for several years was engaged in an intense and bloody insurgency against the Ugandan government, and is now roaming the thick jungles of Central Africa. They are often described as a terrorist group by scholars, journalists and government agencies, largely because of their longstanding use of violence or the threat of violence to coerce the behavior of local populations and governments in pursuit of a political agenda. The group is led by Joseph Kony, a self-proclaimed messianic prophet who convinced his followers of the need to overthrow Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and establish a new government that would rule according to the Biblical Ten Commandments. Originally, members of the LRA were primarily ethnic Acholi from Uganda, but today the group consists mostly of recruits from other Central African countries. As described in the next chapter of this report, the LRA achieved global notoriety for its brutal massacres and destruction of villages, and for kidnapping young children who are then forced to become members of the group—boys as fighters, girls as sex slaves, porters, scouts and other roles. In 2011, Ambassador Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, stated that 66,000 children had been abducted by the group over the past quarter century. Reflecting the global concern about this group’s actions, in February 2005, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Kony and several other LRA senior commanders for war crimes. This Court has no search and arrest capabilities, but must instead rely on the government forces of nation-states to find and apprehend people like Kony and bring them to justice. Between 2005 and 2007, a series of military offensives by the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) eventually chased the LRA out of Northern Uganda, and since then the group has been operating in small units in remote eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), and some western portions of Sudan and South Sudan (see Figure 1).

Today, their total numbers are estimated at 200-300. The dense vegetation throughout much of this area, like the Garamba National Park in the DRC, provides LRA units ample cover and safe haven, from which they have
periodically engaged in attacks, killing soldiers and civilians, and kidnapped and forcibly recruited hundreds of new members (mostly children) into their ranks. Their brutal attacks on remote villages throughout the region ultimately increased diplomatic and military involvement by these countries, allowing UPDF units to pursue the LRA into their hiding places across borders. Meanwhile, the United States has encouraged and helped forces from the CAR, South Sudan, and the DRC join the fight. For example, the U.S. trained and equipped a battalion of the Congolese military that was deployed to the LRA-affected area of the DRC. More recently, these Central African governments have committed to a Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA, under the auspices of the African Union (AU). Further, in May 2013 the AU authorized the deployment of 5,000 troops to

the region. This AU Regional Task Force (RTF) demonstrates an even greater commitment to ending Kony’s reign of terror.

Nobody knows for certain where Kony is today, but according to a non-governmental organization’s (NGO) report published in 2013, there is evidence to suggest the group may have found a new safe haven in the Kafia Kingi enclave, one of the disputed areas on the border between Sudan and South Sudan. The enclave is currently controlled by Sudan, and numerous eyewitness reports indicate that elements of the Sudan Armed Forces in Kafia Kingi have actively sheltered senior LRA commanders there and provided them with limited material support. Further, this same enclave was featured in a report published by a different NGO in 2014 containing a map of several key LRA events in the previous year.

<table>
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<th>January: Ugandan troops kill LRA officer Binany Okumu after he reportedly delivers ivory to Kony</th>
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<td>7</td>
<td>September: South Sudanese troops destroy an LRA camp in Garamba National Park</td>
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<td>February: Ugandan troops discover an LRA ivory cache north of Djemah, CAR</td>
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As described in Chapter 3 of this report, the U.S. has supported the Ugandan government for over two decades in its struggle against Kony and the LRA. This support has included training, equipment, and financial
assistance. On 24 March 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama signed the *Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009*. This Act formalized the U.S. Government’s commitment to provide “political, economic, military and intelligence support for viable multilateral efforts to protect civilians from the LRA.” Roughly 18 months after signing the Act, on 14 October 2011, President Obama announced the deployment of 100 United States Special Operations Forces (USSOF) advisors to Central Africa to provide assistance to the UPDF and the AU RTF in their efforts to counter the LRA threat. “In October 2013, President Obama extended this deployment for another full year, and in March 2014 the Pentagon announced the deployment of an additional 150 SOF troops along with military aircraft to assist in the hunt for Joseph Kony and the LRA.”

During the past decade, SOF have developed a broad range of expertise in combating terrorism. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was given responsibility in the 2004 Unified Command Plan for synchronizing Department of Defense (DOD) plans against global terrorist networks and, as directed, conducting global operations against those networks. Further, in October 2008 USSOCOM was designated as the DOD proponent for security force assistance, giving it the lead on U.S.-sponsored training and assistance programs to foreign militaries on combating terrorism.

Of course, the U.S. was leading several counterterrorism efforts elsewhere in the world during this time period, with conventional troops and SOF deployed in dozens of countries worldwide. To the average U.S. citizen, the conflict in northern Uganda involving the LRA was considered a local affair for the Ugandan government (and then subsequently its neighbors) to deal with, rather than something that warranted direct involvement by the U.S. or its Western allies. But as described later in this report, a confluence of domestic political pressure and global security concerns eventually led to the deployment of U.S. “boots on the ground” in East Africa.

It is important to keep in mind that the mission for this deployment is of an advisory capacity only. Members of the team are authorized to carry weapons for self-defense, but they are not allowed to join efforts to directly confront LRA members. Further, they are not allowed to join their UPDF or AU RTF counterparts on missions where contact with the LRA is expected, although in late 2012 they were allowed to participate in limited joint patrols with certain units. As explained by General Carter Ham, until recently the Commander of United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), the U.S.
military has “no direct operational role. Instead of conducting the manhunt themselves, U.S. troops are providing information- and intelligence-sharing, logistics, communications and other enabling capabilities for host-nation troops pursuing Kony in Uganda, the CAR, South Sudan and the Republic of the Congo.” This mission also reflects the kind of “light footprint” engagements that are most likely for U.S. security policy toward sub-Saharan Africa in the foreseeable future. In other words, the deployment of SOF teams—self-sustainable, culturally-fluent, and adaptable—will be far more likely than any large-scale deployment of U.S. troops and bases to Africa, particularly after the exhausting ordeals in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to one recent report, this mission “is the blueprint, the prototype for what to expect in the future; small units of advisors, deployed to help local forces do what they do, and hopefully help them improve what they do.”

This report therefore seeks to draw lessons from the first 18 months of the SOF effort to help Ugandan and AU forces locate and apprehend Joseph Kony and members of the LRA. Perhaps one of the most central themes to emerge from this report is that expectations of any SOF mission must take into account local context (political, sociocultural, physical, etc.), and should be well-understood by decision makers and practitioners. In this specific instance of deploying small units of advisors to assist local forces confronting a complex and longstanding security challenge, there can be no realistic expectation of “victory” or ultimate problem solving. Instead, incremental positive change is the most likely outcome, regardless of how long these SOF units will be deployed in this region.

Further, this report highlights several issues that are important for decision makers and policymakers in Washington, D.C. to consider, particularly with regard to establishing unreasonable timelines and expectations for the African context. Things take time in Africa, and expectations for mission completion based on how things get done in the U.S. are completely unreasonable and counterproductive. There are no shortcuts one can take when building trusted relationships, the cornerstone of activities throughout the African continent. This must be taken into account in budgeting decisions, logistics, and rotation plans, and everything else surrounding a deployment of U.S. forces to Africa. Unfortunately, some politicians and media in the U.S. portrayed “visions of Abbottabad” (a reference to the Special Operations Forces mission that located and killed Osama bin Laden) when describing the mission to assist UPDF units in locating and apprehending
Joseph Kony and other senior LRA leaders. At the very outset, this mission was never meant to be a lethal one—in fact, a broad range of constraints were placed (both by the U.S. Government and by collaborating nations in Africa, as described further in Chapter 7 of this report) on what U.S. forces could do in theater.

Meanwhile, this research reveals how critical it is that any successes derived from these collaborative SOF operations must be “owned” by the African country forces, in large part because of the legacy of post-colonial sensitivities. Frequently, those interviewed for this report noted that the very last thing U.S. forces should do is give the impression that “we parachuted in, took care of the problem for you because you weren’t able to do it yourselves”—clearly, that would not be the way to lay the groundwork for future successful deployments in sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, concerns about the nature of the U.S. commitment directly impact the kinds of confidence and trust that underpins healthy relationships. If the U.S. were to withdraw its forces from the region before Kony is captured and/or the threat of LRA attacks is virtually eliminated, this would have a huge and negative impact on local perceptions toward the U.S.—not just in Central Africa, but throughout the entire sub-continent. In this light, the October 2013 decision by President Obama to extend the SOF deployment for another full year—and the March 2014 deployment of additional SOF troops and aircraft—sent an important and powerful message about the U.S. commitment to the mission, a message which was welcomed by African force partners and undoubtedly worries Kony and his LRA fighters.

This report of the counter-LRA (C/LRA) deployments also indicates that identifying the right sort of individuals for these missions is critical, with maturity and humility among the most common themes identified. As well, future SOF deployments to sub-Saharan Africa require special kinds of training and preparation in order to be successful, and pre-deployment training must involve experts on the sub-region to which they will be deployed. Trainers should promote discussion about the critical importance of building and nurturing relationships with locals and managing expectations. SOF teams deploying to Africa should also be committed to understanding and influencing perceptions (of our intentions, our capabilities, our integrity and
accountability, etc.). Certainly there will be a need for detailed discussions about logistics and preparing for the unique kinds of physical and cultural terrains found throughout sub-Saharan Africa. And SOF pre-deployment education should also examine the local drivers of conflict (for example, unequal resource distribution, or tribal/clan/ethnic political marginalization) and other historical aspects of the specific context to which the team will be deployed.

Of course, one should be wary of anyone who calls himself or herself an “Africa expert”—this is a continent that is four times larger than the United States, with 54 independent countries and vast cultural, tribal, geographic, political, economic, and ethno-linguistic diversity. Each country has many tribes, languages, dialects, and religious differences. In some cases, a country’s borders are merely lines on a map, with no physical evidence on the ground. Even someone who has studied Africa for an entire lifetime, lived there and developed an encyclopedic base of knowledge can still only know a small percentage of what is knowable about Africa.

Finally, it is widely understood that SOF military advisors on the C/LRA mission see themselves as implementing U.S. Government policy, not influencing it. However, when SOF leaders can influence policymakers and politicians, they should educate them about the ways in which their policies can have a positive or negative effect on the issues described in this report. An honest appreciation for the learning process needs to be built in at the policy level when discussing the length of a particular deployment. Confidence, trust, and healthy interpersonal relationships take time to develop, thus an appropriate amount of time must be invested to establish and nurture these vital working relationships. In short, political pressures for a short-term deployment undermine the potential success of the C/LRA mission.

Summary

The primary impetus for this report was the desire to make a meaningful contribution to the effectiveness of future U.S. military teams deploying to sub-Saharan Africa. It is based on field research in Uganda, interviews in Washington, D.C. and at USAFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, and analysis of open source documents. This research project was sponsored by the Joint Special Operations University Center for Special
Operations Studies and Research. The original manuscript was written during the spring of 2013 and revised through the JSOU Press editing and peer review process in early 2014. The analysis provided here is thus based primarily on events and information available up to May 2013, although some developments from late 2013 thru early 2014 are reflected in the discussion. It is particularly noteworthy that as this report goes to press, an additional deployment of 150 SOF troops, along with four CV-22 Osprey aircraft, are currently en route to Central Africa. The Ospreys, which can take off and land vertically, are capable of transporting 24 troops and their gear deep into remote jungle areas where Kony and his followers are believed to be hiding. The implications of this new development remain to be seen, but will surely be relevant to many parts of the analysis provided here.15

The next chapter of this report provides a brief historical overview of the LRA and its evolution. For those seeking a much more comprehensive background on this group and its activities, please see the endnotes for that chapter (provided at the end of this report). Chapter 3 examines the context behind the decision to deploy U.S. military advisors to the region. Clearly, there was significant public pressure placed on the Obama administration to do something, and that pressure had a considerable impact on expectations held by a wide variety of people. This chapter also contains a brief overview of the initial troop deployment and the logistics challenges they faced. Chapters 4 through 7 explore various lessons that can be derived from the first 18 months of this deployment, organized around four themes that were identified as important for the success or failure of future U.S. military deployments to sub-Saharan Africa: (1) preparations and logistics, (2) perceptions and expectations management, (3) partnerships and relationship management, and (4) policy and politics. And finally, a concluding chapter offers some thoughts about further research and implications for policy and SOF education.
2. A Brief History of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army

Uganda is a landlocked country in Central Africa, roughly the size of Oregon, bordering the countries of Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, the DRC, and South Sudan. It was a British colony until its independence in 1962. Like several countries of sub-Saharan Africa, Uganda has a tropical, generally rainy climate with two dry seasons (December through February, and June through August). Its wealth of natural resources—mountains, rivers, lakes, and abundant wildlife—and its overall political stability in recent decades has led to a thriving tourism sector. Beyond tourism, the economy is largely based on mining (copper, cobalt, gold, and limestone) and agriculture. Coffee accounts for the bulk of its export revenues. Almost 25 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, but the economy is comparatively better than in many other African countries.

The population of Uganda, roughly 34 million, is ethnically diverse: 17 percent Baganda, 10 percent Banyakote, 8 percent Basoga, 7 percent Bakiga, 6 percent Iteso, 6 percent Langi, 5 percent Acholi, and the remaining 42 percent a mix of dozens of smaller ethnic groups. This ethnic diversity, as will be described later in this chapter, is an important factor underlying the kinds of violent rebellion that groups like the LRA represent. The people of Uganda are also religiously diverse, with roughly 42 percent Roman Catholic, 42 percent Protestant, and 12 percent Muslim. Most observers characterize Ugandan society as deeply conservative—for instance, it is one of the few places in Africa that has formally passed legislation against homosexuality. Compared to other countries on the continent, Ugandans have a high level of literacy (67 percent). There are nearly 17 million cellular phones in use throughout Uganda, and Internet access is available in urban areas. Uganda also has the fourth highest fertility rate in the world (averaging 6.14 children per woman). Unfortunately, the people of Uganda are also at risk from a variety of major infectious diseases, including hepatitis A, typhoid fever, malaria, and plague. Uganda also ranks eighth in the world for number of citizens living with HIV/AIDS.

The political history of Uganda, as with many African countries, includes a few military coups and periods of violence. The first President of Uganda,
Sir Edward Mutesa, ruled from 1962 to 1966, when he was overthrown by his Prime Minister Milton Obote. The ethnic diversity of the country was an underlying factor in the struggle for power during these early years of independence. Mutesa had been head of the Bagandan ethnic group from the south of the country, while Obote was from the Langi tribe in the central and northern regions. Obote established a secret police organization, filled mostly with members of the Langi tribe, and also favored members of the northern Acholi tribe in his security forces. He appointed Idi Amin as head of the Army, who then began recruiting into the military members of ethnic groups from his home district of the West Nile, such as the Kakwa, Madi and Lugbara.¹⁹

In January 1971, while President Obote was away on a state visit to Singapore, Idi Amin seized power in a military coup. At first, Amin was welcomed by Ugandans who were tired of suffering under Obote’s disastrous economic policies, which had led to food shortages and massive price increases. Amin quickly dissolved parliament and altered the constitution, granting himself absolute power and eliminating all opposition. He also placed military tribunals above the system of civil law, appointed military officers to top

![Figure 2. Map of Uganda. Central Intelligence Agency Map](image-url)
government posts, and demanded that civilian cabinet ministers adhere to military discipline. Obote, meanwhile, took refuge in Tanzania, having been offered sanctuary there by Tanzanian President Julius Nyere. He was soon joined there by thousands of Ugandan refugees fleeing Amin’s regime.20

Amin ruled Uganda with an increasingly brutal hand, deploying “death squads” who were responsible for thousands of “disappearances” and who purged Langi and Acholi from the government and military (whom he perceived as potentially loyal to Obote and thus a threat to his power).21 In July 1971, for example, Langi and Acholi soldiers were massacred in the Jinja and Mbarara Barracks.22 Along with ethnic discrimination came political and economic marginalization of the central and northern homelands of these tribes. In 1972, a group of Ugandan exiles launched a failed coup attempt against Amin, reinforcing his paranoia that Obote supporters were trying to remove him from power. In addition to the ethnic purges, Amin was also responsible for the murder of religious leaders, journalists, artists, senior bureaucrats, judges, lawyers, students and intellectuals, criminal suspects, and foreign nationals.23 Amnesty International estimates that over 500,000 people died under his eight-year regime.24

In 1978, Amin attempted to annex the Kagera province of Tanzania, leading to the Uganda-Tanzania War that ultimately led to his downfall. Tanzania’s military was joined in the fight by armed Ugandan exile groups who had united under the banner of the “Uganda National Liberation Army” (UNLA) led by Tito Okello, Yoweri Museveni, and a few others. Together they marched north and reached Kampala within a few months. In April 1979 Amin fled by helicopter to Libya and then went into exile in Saudi Arabia, where he remained until his death in 2003.

After a series of brief temporary government administrations, a military commission was established in May 1980, led by Paulo Muwanga. Museveni served as his deputy. The commission announced that a democratic election would be held in 1980, and shortly thereafter Museveni announced his candidacy for President. Meanwhile, former President Milton Obote returned from exile and also stood for the presidential election, which he eventually won in December (amid numerous allegations of vote-rigging, fraud, and corruption). In February 1981, Museveni launched a guerrilla war against the Obote government, exploiting longstanding tensions between ethnic groups throughout the country. Museveni’s forces were largely composed
of Bagandans, while Obote’s military once was again populated mainly by Langi and Acholi tribesman.

By many accounts, Obote’s regime committed massive human rights abuses in its effort to crush Museveni’s insurgency. Amnesty International estimates that his regime was responsible for more than 300,000 civilian deaths across the country, and particularly in an area of central Uganda known as the Luweero Triangle. Eventually, his heavy-handed tactics alienated even his closest supporters, and in June 1985, he was overthrown in a military coup led by one of his own generals, Tito Bazilio Okello, a well-respected senior Acholi tribesman. Obote fled into exile in Tanzania, then Zambia, and eventually South Africa. Okello established a new government and offered to negotiate with Museveni’s rebel group, the National Resistance Army, but in January 1986 Museveni’s forces captured the capital Kampala. Fearing massive reprisals and atrocities, government forces fled to the north of the country (their Langi and Acholi homelands) with their weapons and equipment. Museveni then sent his forces into the north to subdue and eliminate any potential threat to his hold on power.

The ensuing period of conflict (which some have characterized as a civil war, while others have described it as an insurgency), and the underlying ethnic tensions fueling it, laid the roots for what became the LRA. The
security situation also meant that the economic and political marginalization endured by the people of northern Uganda under the brutal Idi Amin era was renewed under the Museveni regime. Various combinations of factors like these have been seen in many cases of political violence and insurgency around the world; the research literature on conflict and security supports the notion that as the legitimacy of a political regime declines, their citizens are more likely to rebel (with legitimacy loosely defined as governance that meets the basic needs of the people the regime purports to represent). This is an important point to keep in mind when examining the rise and sustained existence of the LRA.

Today, the government of Uganda is considered nominally democratic—while regular elections have been held since the 1980s, President Museveni has been in power since 1986, and charges of election fraud and corruption have been common. Museveni’s regime has also been accused of bribery, human rights abuses, oppression of free speech and assembly, corruption, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, and many other things. For example, in May 2013, Museveni sent police forces to shut down two of the country’s most popular news services for 11 days. The news services had published a controversial letter suggesting that he was grooming his son Muhoozi Kainerugaba—a Brigadier General in the army and head of Uganda’s special forces—to be his successor as President, and that assassinations were planned against those who opposed this. The country’s next election is scheduled for 2016, though currently there is no indication that Museveni has any intention of relinquishing power.

The Lord’s Resistance Army

When President Museveni took power in 1986, he came to view all armed groups not under his control as potential threats to his government, particularly because of the different ethnic loyalties of those groups, and launched a military campaign to confront and defeat any such threat. His primary concern was dealing with the former Langi and Acholi soldiers who had fled to northern Uganda, some of whom were joining or supporting various opposition groups. One such group was known as the Holy Spirit Movement (sometimes called the Holy Spirit Mobile Force), led by Alice Lakwena, an Acholi woman and tribal mystic who convinced her followers that she was
channeling spirits and called upon them to help her fight the “evil occupying forces of the government.” She preached that the Acholi people had turned away from God, and she required her followers to participate in a variety of mystic rituals that she believed would help them defeat Museveni—treating rocks with special oils to create ‘hand grenades’, blessing fighters with water that would protect them from the bullets of the military, etc. Her insurgency was short-lived, however. In 1987, a defeated Lakwena fled to Kenya, where she later died in a refugee camp.

Joseph Kony, another Acholi from the Odek village in Gulu district who claimed to be related to Lakwena, began gathering her followers to form another Holy Spirit Movement. He declared himself to be a messianic prophet, and sought to overthrow Museveni and establish a new government that would rule according to the Biblical Ten Commandments. In 1988, despite an attempted peace agreement facilitated by Acholi tribal leaders, Kony’s band of militants began to attract larger numbers of former soldiers and others, allowing him to launch increasingly effective guerilla attacks against government forces. Museveni responded with a heavy-handed policy that included, among other things, rounding up civilians in Acholi villages and relocating them to camps. In early 1991, the military established checkpoints throughout northern Uganda, blocked radio communications (even by churches and humanitarian organizations), and banned all journalists from the area. However, their attempt to isolate and capture Kony and his followers actually backfired, as it increased resentment of the government among the local population and led some to join Kony’s group.

Figure 4. Joseph Kony. Photo used by permission of Newscom.
During the early 1990s, Kony renamed his group the Lord’s Resistance Army and issued a variety of demands for government reform. Meanwhile, the Sudanese government of Omar al-Bashir offered its support (and safe haven in southern Sudan) to Kony as a form of revenge against Museveni for his government’s support of anti-government Sudanese rebel groups like the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). He also enlisted LRA assistance in helping crush these southern rebels, and in return provided weapons and supplies to Kony and his followers. It is important to note the presence of many Acholi villages in southern Sudan—the same ethnic group that Kony and his followers belong to. In truth, the Acholi tribes have always lived throughout this border region, and were divided into citizens of different nations by the British.

During this time period, LRA leaders issued a number of manifestos and statements in which they attempted to justify their use of violence. They claimed to be fighting on behalf of the Acholi people, whom they believed to be marginalized, abused and excluded from Uganda’s development by an oppressive regime. They pointed to the fact that northern Uganda was (and remains to this day) economically the most under-developed region of the country. They also argued that human rights abuses committed by the military, and the comparatively minimal political representation of northern Ugandans in Kampala, reflected a form of institutionalized ethnic discrimination. Essentially, they portrayed their struggle as a quest for justice, combined with a religious agenda of establishing a form of government that incorporates the Biblical Ten Commandments. Regardless of these claims, the tactics—in many cases, atrocities—of the LRA undermine what little resonance their ideology may have among their target audiences.

From their bases in southern Sudan, the LRA continued raiding villages throughout northern Uganda and southern Sudan, capturing thousands of young Acholi who were then forced to become members of the group—boys as fighters, girls as sex slaves, porters, scouts, etc. Thousands were also massacred during 1994-1996. In one notorious incident, on 20 April 1995 an LRA unit marched into the town of Atiak, rounded up an estimated 300 men, marched them to a nearby river and executed them by firing squad. They then handpicked young boys and young girls from the rest, to conscript into their ranks. Another prominent example was the kidnapping of 139 schoolgirls from St. Mary’s boarding school near Aboke in October 1996. In this instance, the LRA attacked in the middle of the night, destroying windows
and a wall of the dormitories, before marching off with their captives into the bush. One of the senior nuns of the school chased after the group, and was eventually able to negotiate the return of 109 of the girls. The other 30 were taken to a camp in southern Sudan and given as “wives” to various LRA commanders. Five of them died in captivity – at least one of whom was beaten to death in front of the others for attempting to escape.\textsuperscript{37}

During the 1990s, the Ugandan government and a variety of nongovernmental entities, like the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative and the Catholic organization Community of Saint’Egidio, organized several attempts to bring a peaceful end to the conflict. In 1998, the government even passed an overarching amnesty bill, which Museveni signed in December 1999, providing amnesty for all combatants and former combatants who renounced violence and agreed to no longer fight against the government. Also in 1999, Uganda and Sudan reached a deal, known as the Nairobi Agreement (facilitated by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter), to stop supporting insurgent groups in each other’s countries.\textsuperscript{38}

Implementation of the Nairobi Agreement was slow at first, but picked up steam following the terrorist attacks in the U.S. on 11 September 2001, with the presidents of both countries pledging their support for the so-called Global War on Terrorism. In late 2001, the U.S. included the LRA on its list of foreign terrorist organizations, and provided material support and advisors to the Ugandan military. In March 2002, the Ugandan government launched Operation Iron Fist with 10,000 troops crossing the border (with permission) into southern Sudan to attack LRA strongholds. One of the bloodiest periods of the conflict, this campaign included helicopter gunship attacks on LRA sites and retaliatory LRA ground attacks. Many LRA and UPDF soldiers were killed, and the civilian population of southern Sudan suffered tremendously.\textsuperscript{39}

While a significant amount of weapons and ammunition were recovered, and thousands of young LRA prisoners were rescued, the operation did not defeat the LRA, but instead led to a scattering of disparate LRA units into various parts of northern Uganda. The government then established a number of large camps and issued an ultimatum to the rural population of northern Uganda, ordering them to relocate to the government camps within 48 hours.\textsuperscript{40} Those who refused were considered either enemy combatants or collaborators. By October 2002, Human Rights Watch estimates that over 70 percent of the population of northern Uganda lived in government
camps or had relocated to villages “protected” (though sometimes abused) by government-armed militias, known as Local Defense Units. Here again, though, the government efforts to defeat the LRA were ineffective, and in fact increased anti-government sentiment among the Acholi and other groups of northern Uganda.

Further, LRA fighters attacked poorly defended camps or villages, taking more captives (often children) to force into their ranks. In several cases, kidnapped children were forced to return to their homes and murder or mutilate members of their own family or tribe (cutting off lips was one of several signature LRA atrocities). These tactics served multiple purposes, such as fostering the “moral disengagement” process described by psychologist Albert Bandura, as well as ensuring the children would never be welcomed home should they try to escape. The many psychological horrors inflicted by the LRA on local populations have been well documented by many organizations and researchers, as noted in the endnotes to this chapter. Meanwhile, parents and local communities who failed to protect these children from kidnapping felt tremendous guilt. In several cases they were reluctant to prosecute captured LRA members, instead portraying them as victims of circumstances beyond their control.

In March 2003, both Kony and Museveni called for ceasefires, but again the effort to bring peace to the region failed, and a second Operation Iron Fist was launched in March 2004. This time, South Sudanese forces joined with the Ugandans in attacking some LRA camps, including one in Nisitu (southern Sudan) in July 2004 that killed 122 LRA members. During this period, an increasing number of LRA members began to take advantage of the 2000 Amnesty Act. They were encouraged to do so by several broadcasts from the government’s radio station in Gulu with testimonials from former militants who spoke of favorable treatment upon their return home. The Ugandan government also announced several nonmilitary initiatives as part of their broader effort to combat the LRA. For example, the 2003 Ugandan Strategic Plan for the North focused on issues of governance, resettlement, infrastructure investment, and basic law and order. Similarly, the 2007 Northern Uganda Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan articulated four objectives: 1) consolidate state authority, 2) rebuild and empower communities, 3) revitalize the economy, and 4) peace building and reconciliation. These and other efforts were considered effective at addressing underlying
causes that had motivated some northern Ugandans to join insurgent groups like the LRA.

Figure 5. Village of Gulu, Northern Uganda. Photo used by permission of Newscom.

Meanwhile, in January 2004 the International Criminal Court (ICC), at the request of the Ugandan government, launched an investigation that culminated in warrants issued on 8 July 2005 for the arrest of Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, and Raska Lukwiya. The warrants included charges of crimes against humanity (sexual enslavement, rape, and murder) and war crimes (pillaging, attacks on civilian populations, enlisting children, etc.). A key result of these ICC warrants was that the Ugandan Amnesty Act of 2000 would no longer apply for these five individuals. When asked at a press conference in June the following year whether he would go to the ICC to face trial, Kony blamed all the atrocities on the Ugandan government, claiming these charges were merely the result of propaganda and denying any culpability: “I did not do anything.”

In 2006, another major effort was launched to try and bring an end to the two decades-old conflict. Peace talks were organized in Juba, the capital of autonomous Southern Sudan (not far from where several LRA strongholds
had been years earlier), beginning in July, and by September a ceasefire had been agreed. The talks stalled, however, with recriminations of bad will on both sides. In August 2006, Raska Lukwiya (one of the senior LRA commanders for whom the ICC had issued an arrest warrant) was killed in a battle with UPDF soldiers. And in October 2007, Vincent Otti (another LRA commander for whom the ICC had issued an arrest warrant, but who more recently had played a leading role in the Juba peace effort) was killed—likely under orders from Joseph Kony himself, who accused Otti of being a government spy. Finally, after nearly two years, a final peace agreement had been drawn up and all parties (including the LRA) indicated their intent to sign it. In April 2008, however, the gathering of media and dignitaries were frustrated yet again when Joseph Kony refused to show up and sign the agreement. Two months later, the LRA carried out an attack on a Southern Sudanese town, prompting the Government of Southern Sudan to officially withdraw from their mediation role.

During this time period, successive military operations had forced the LRA out of both southern Sudan and northern Uganda, and into the densely vegetated area of the Garamba National Park, in the DRC. From its new safe haven, the LRA launched attacks against villages in the DRC and southern Sudan, killing soldiers and civilians, and kidnapping and forcibly recruiting hundreds of new soldiers (mostly children) into their ranks. In perhaps their most notorious attack to date, in December 2006 the LRA attacked the Makombo area of northern Democratic Republic of Congo. During a four-day killing spree, they killed at least 321 people and abducted more than 250 others, including at least 80 children. The vast majority of those killed were adult men, but among the dead were at least 13 women and 23 children. The youngest victim was a three year-old girl; the eldest was a 72-year-old man. Most of those killed were tied up before the LRA hacked them to death with machetes or crushed their skulls with axes, clubs, or heavy sticks. In December 2008, the UPDF joined with the Armed Forces of the DRC and the SPLA to launch an offensive against the LRA called Operation Lightning Thunder. The U.S. provided intelligence, equipment, and other forms of assistance to this operation, which led to the destruction of several LRA strongholds in the Garamba National Park (see Figure 6). However, the operation failed to capture Joseph Kony, who regrouped and launched a series of reprisal attacks against villages in northeastern DRC. These attacks resulted in an estimated 500-1,000 casualties. Since then, there have been sporadic
reports of villages attacked in northeastern DRC and southern portions of the CAR. Recently, a United Nations (UN) agency expressed concern that the LRA appears to be regaining strength.49 National Security Advisor Susan Rice, who had formerly been the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, noted that the DRC suffered 54 LRA attacks between January and March 2013—the most among LRA-affected countries in the region.50

Meanwhile, it is widely believed that the majority of LRA units are now in the CAR, and were likely operating in the Kafia Kingi enclave—one of the disputed areas on the border between Sudan and South Sudan—for the past several years. The enclave is currently controlled by Sudan, and numerous eyewitness reports indicate that elements of the Sudan Armed Forces in Kafia Kingi have actively sheltered senior LRA commanders there and provided them with limited material support.51 In the CAR, the LRA was

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**Figure 6:** LRA Areas of Operation, 2002-2008. Used by permission of Conciliation Resources.
given a reprieve of sorts in early 2013, when a union of rebel groups operating under the name Seleka (‘Alliance’ in the local Sango language), overthrew President Francois Bozizé. Both the AU and the U.S. refused to recognize the new administration of Michel Djotodia, the leader of Seleka, who would not recognize bilateral agreements signed by the previous government and Kampala, including accords that allow Ugandan troops to pursue LRA fighters in the CAR. Ugandan troops ceased all active operations against the LRA and returned to their bases in the southeastern towns of Zemio, Djemah, and Obo. USSOF advisors were withdrawn from a base in Djemah, and regrouped in Obo.\textsuperscript{52} These developments were particularly significant given that the majority of LRA fighters were believed to be in this country. Further, some intelligence reports (informed by former fighters) suggested that Kony was in the CAR’s northern Vakaga prefecture at the end of March 2013.\textsuperscript{53}

But during the first week of April 2013, a series of meetings in Chad’s capital, N’Djamena, brought leaders of many African countries together for emergency talks. In a May 2013 briefing to the UN Security Council, the head of the U.N. Office for Central Africa, Abou Moussa, applauded the AU’s decision to dispatch a Ugandan-led Regional Task Force of 5,000 soldiers to hunt down Kony, and also noted that the CAR’s new Prime Minister Nicolas Tiangaye had indicated its readiness to cooperate with the AU in the hunt for Kony and the remnants of the LRA.\textsuperscript{54} This AU commitment to deploy troops to the region is considered by some observers as a major breakthrough, a sign that trans-national military relationships are evolving in a positive direction. Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of State contributed to the effort by having the Embassies in the respective countries place a greater emphasis on the C/LRA mission. New staff, dedicated solely to LRA strategy implementation, were assigned in Washington, D.C. and in Central Africa.\textsuperscript{55}

As of this writing, Joseph Kony is still at large, as are an estimated 200-300 of his followers. According to a 2013 (unclassified) presentation by USAF-RICOM, LRA units are believed to be operating in an area roughly the size of California, crossing the borders of four countries (see Figures 1 and 6). However, there are indications that, as General Ham noted in his March 2013 testimony to the U.S. Senate, “some significant tactical gains” have been achieved—“Today, we are seeing increased levels of LRA defections, fewer LRA attacks and enhanced cooperation between the military forces in the region.”\textsuperscript{56} A March 2013 report by the Small Arms Survey, based at the Graduate Institute of Geneva, describes a trend of “relatively large numbers
of women and children escaping, or being allowed to leave, areas under LRA control. At the beginning of March 2013, 28 women and children came out of LRA zones in the DRC. The women, mostly widowers, said they were told to go home as the LRA group commander could no longer care for them or their children. Another nine people left CAR’s Haut-Mbomou prefecture in the first two weeks of April. Two mothers and a young baby were rescued on the border with South Sudan’s Western Equatoria state, while six others emerged near Obo in CAR.\textsuperscript{57} Separately, in a June 2012 interview, General Ham described “indications that the organization is increasingly in a survivalist mode; they are moving frequently, they are focused more on self-preservation than they are on extending their influence … into the small towns and villages across the region.”\textsuperscript{58}

Unfortunately, the LRA has shown a significant capacity for adaptation and resilience, and has posed the most complex and illusive terrorist threat to the entire region for several decades. However, an optimistic appraisal suggests that time is running short for the group. One recent NGO report suggested that an increase in the number of kidnapped women and children being released by LRA units may be an indication of diminishing commitment to the fight, and that the costs of feeding and monitoring these kidnapped victims are exceeding the benefits of keeping them.\textsuperscript{59} Further, the report also noted that in 2013 a majority of adults kidnapped by LRA were used primarily as porters for looted goods after raids, and were released instead of being forced to help the LRA rebuild its fighting capacity. These and other signs give the local population (and the military forces who are hunting the LRA on their behalf) hope that the day will soon come when Joseph Kony is brought to justice for his crimes.

**Summary**

In a recent speech at the UN, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted that from 1987 until 2012, the LRA was responsible for more than 100,000 deaths; between 60,000 and 100,000 children are believed to have been abducted; and 2.5 million civilians have been displaced.\textsuperscript{60} It is clearly a terrible tragedy that such a group has been allowed to operate in this region for so many years. But the good news is that the international community has taken notice and has expressed overwhelming support for efforts to carry out the
ICC arrest warrants for Joseph Kony and the other senior LRA members, and to secure the release and safe return home of those whom the group has abducted and forced into service. In addition to the deaths of Raska Lukwiya and Vincent Otti mentioned previously, other LRA senior commanders—including Caesar Acellam and Vincent ‘Binany’ Okumu—have also been captured or killed.61 According to Donald Yamamoto, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, “Since 2000, more than 12,000 fighters and abductees have left the group and been reintegrated and reunited with their families through Uganda’s Amnesty Commission. The successful rehabilitation and reintegration of those who leave the LRA creates a positive feedback cycle that encourages others to defect.”62 Clearly, Joseph Kony’s days are numbered. It remains to be seen whether the deployment of U.S. troops to the region, described in the next chapter, will have a decisive impact on the eventual end of this longstanding conflict.
3. The Deployment of U.S. Advisors

As described in the previous chapter, the LRA has been committing its atrocities for over two decades, but the general public and media in the U.S. have not until recently paid much attention nor considered the group a significant threat to U.S. security interests. The LRA was designated by the U.S. Department of State in 2001 as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, but until recently U.S. support for the effort to defeat the LRA was limited to a bit of training and equipment for Uganda. There was still no sense of urgency when the 2006-08 Juba peace accords fell apart, as most U.S. observers felt optimistic that military operations and pressure had forced the remnants of the LRA to splinter into mobile groups, desperate for their survival, spread across a vast territory crossing the borders of the CAR, the DRC, the Republic of South Sudan, and Sudan. Further, by March 2009, the UPDF had negotiated agreements with the governments of their neighboring states allowing them to establish rural base camps within their countries, from which they could conduct operations against the remaining LRA forces in the region. The tide seemingly had turned against the LRA, whose fighters were forced to constantly be on the move from one campsite to another in order to evade UPDF military-tracking efforts in the tri-border area.\textsuperscript{63} And yet, for a number of reasons described later in this chapter, the U.S. now has uniformed personnel on the ground in East Africa providing assistance to these forces in a collaborative C/LRA effort.

U.S. involvement in this saga did not originate with the election of Barack Obama. Since the early 1990s, successive U.S. administrations have made statements and provided tangible support (including humanitarian and security assistance) to help Uganda curtail the LRA’s brutalities against civilian populations.\textsuperscript{64} For example, through various programs funded by the U.S. Department of State, military units in Uganda, the CAR and the DRC have all received counterterrorism training and equipment for several years. The 700-member counterterrorism division of Uganda’s national police force has also received training and equipment. Between 1997 and 2009, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided more than $436 million in humanitarian assistance to Uganda, including $370 million in food aid.\textsuperscript{65} Naturally, some foreign policy observers have argued that the U.S. has no real interests in Uganda, and have questioned the rationale
for these kinds of support, while others have countered with the argument that U.S. political credibility in the region demands our attention to local conflicts like this.

When the ICC issued its arrest warrants for Joseph Kony and several LRA commanders, members of Congress and the administration of President George W. Bush voiced their support. This administration also announced the establishment of USAFRICOM as a new DOD entity dedicated to helping African nations address their security challenges.66 In 2011, Ambassador Donald Yamamoto—U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs—reflected on the impact of this in a Congressional hearing:

Before the creation of AFRICOM, the Department of State had to coordinate with three different Geographic Combatant Commands, each of which had varying priorities and security cooperation objectives. The DOD was able to unify these efforts by placing all of the previous areas of responsibility for Africa under one command solely focused on Africa 365 days a year ... AFRICOM’s work is critical to the success of our Administration’s broader efforts to build a more peaceful, prosperous and democratic Africa.67

Also, the U.S. has had good relations with the Ugandan government for many years, despite the many allegations against Museveni’s regime that were discussed in the previous chapter. In August 2004, the U.S. Congress passed the Northern Uganda Crisis Response Act, citing violence by the LRA and the displacement of more than 1 million people. The Act called for a peaceful resolution to the conflict in northern Uganda, making relief and resources available to the region, and allowing for resettlement, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. Press reports at the time noted that the U.S. provided over $77 million in assistance to Uganda in fiscal year 2004 for initiatives such as the World Food Program, reintegration of former child soldiers and abducted persons, and to combat HIV/AIDS.

In late 2008, when the joint forces of Uganda, the DRC, and South Sudan launched Operation Lightning Thunder (described in the previous chapter) in the Garamba National Park, President Bush directed USAFRICOM to provide financial and logistical assistance to the Ugandan government during the operation. Millions of dollars’ worth of aid, including fuel trucks, satellite phones, and night-vision goggles, were provided to the UPDF during this time. No U.S. troops were directly involved in the operation, but 17 U.S.
advisors and analysts provided intelligence, equipment, and fuel to Ugandan military counterparts.  68

Figure 7. UPDF unit on a patrol in Central Africa. Photo used by permission of Newscom.

When President Barack Obama began his first term in 2009, he was surrounded by senior staff members who had expressed their own concerns about the situation in Uganda, including Hillary Clinton (his new Secretary of State), Susan Rice (his new Ambassador to the UN), and Johnnie Carson, (the new Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, formerly Ambassador to Uganda during the 1990s). He also faced an increasingly vocal Congressional coalition, who eventually authored the bill that became known as The Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act. In a rare feat of bipartisanship, this bill passed unanimously in the U.S. Senate on 11 March 2010, with 65 senators listed as cosponsors. The bill passed unanimously in the U.S. House of Representatives on 13 May 2010, with 202 representatives as cosponsors. This is an important point to make, as some of President Obama’s critics have tried to suggest that the recent White House focus on Joseph Kony and the LRA is merely a political ploy to divert attention from the administration’s domestic troubles.
President Obama signed this legislation into law on 24 May 2010. Later that year, on 24 November 2010 (as required by the Act), his administration released a strategic plan to guide future U.S. support in central Africa to mitigate and eliminate the threat to civilians and regional stability posed by the LRA. Entitled, “Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the Lord’s Resistance Army,” the Obama administration’s strategy outlines four objectives to support regional and multilateral efforts: 1) Stopping LRA leaders; 2) Protecting civilians from LRA attacks; 3) Encouraging escape and defection from the LRA; and 4) Providing humanitarian assistance to affected communities.

Subsequent statements from the Obama administration also described its commitment to building telecommunications infrastructure—cell phone and radio capacity—so that communities being targeted have a way of getting information out to the outside world. The U.S. has also committed to improving the capacity of militaries in the region to coordinate amongst each other, and to provide mobility support. Notably, a month earlier (in October 2010), Uganda, the CAR, Sudan, and the DRC had agreed to form a joint military force to fight the LRA. The importance of this regional military cooperation (which has not been the norm in sub-Saharan Africa) cannot be overstated. All too often, an armed militia that finds safe haven in a neighboring country (like the PKK in northern Iraq, the Taliban in Pakistan, the ETA in southern France, or Hezbollah in southern Lebanon) can sustain its campaign of terror against its target relatively unhindered for many years.

Within the Central African context, there is little precedent for cross-national cooperation of any kind, particularly on military or political initiatives. Mobilizing support among these countries for a joint C/LRA mission is itself a herculean (and ongoing) task. Unfortunately, the history of Uganda’s cross-border actions has served to undermine this to some degree. In particular, its well-documented human rights violations and cases of mineral exploitation in the DRC understandably lead to reluctance among the leaders and citizens of that country to allow Ugandan forces onto their soil. As described later in this report, SOF leaders and practitioners need to recognize and appreciate these kinds of historical cross-border animosities, and how they can impact the outcome of any deployment of U.S. forces to Central Africa.
A year later, on 14 October 2011, President Obama announced his decision to deploy troops to join the multinational C/LRA mission. In his letter to House Speaker John Boehner and Daniel Inouye, the president pro tempore of the Senate, Obama said:

I have authorized a small number of combat-equipped U.S. forces to deploy to central Africa to provide assistance to regional forces that are working toward the removal of Joseph Kony from the battlefield ... I believe that deploying these U.S. armed forces furthers U.S. national security interests and foreign policy and will be a significant contribution toward counter-LRA efforts in central Africa.\(^{74}\)

Unlike the bipartisan support for the Act of Congress described earlier, this decision to put “boots on the ground” was met with a fair amount of negative response. For example, U.S. Senator John McCain, chair of the Armed Services Committee, stated that the LRA poses no direct national security threat to the U.S. and argued that deploying troops on a mission like this does not seem to make sense when the country faces a massive budget crisis.\(^{75}\) However, General Carter Ham noted that this mission “is consistent with AFRICOM’s overall strategy and priorities ... a safe, stable, secure Africa is in the best interest of not only the African countries, but of the United States as well.”\(^{76}\)

Further, for several years a groundswell of domestic public pressure to do something had been building in the U.S., driven by increasing publicity about the efforts of NGOs like Invisible Children, the Enough Project, and Resolve. The most prominent example of this public interest in Central Africa came shortly after the release of Kony 2012—a short film meant to educate the public about Joseph Kony and the atrocities being committed by the LRA. The film was posted online on 5 March 2012 and became one of the most-watched YouTube videos of all time; by 17 October 2012, the video had been viewed by over 97 million people.\(^{77}\) Behind the scenes of these efforts, Hollywood celebrities like George Clooney, and wealthy advocates like Shannon Sedgwick Davis, CEO of the Bridgeway Foundation, worked the halls of political power in Washington, D.C. to motivate Congressional leaders to take action. In November 2012, a “Global Summit on the Lord’s Resistance Army” was held in the U.S., attended by a number of celebrities and dignitaries from several countries.\(^{78}\) Overall, increasing public attention...
and citizen advocacy surely played a role in motivating the U.S. Government to get more involved in the multinational effort to defeat Kony and the LRA.

Another reason for the deployment of troops to the region is that it demonstrates the U.S. commitment, articulated in the establishment of USAFRICOM, to helping African nations confront their security challenges with increasing sophistication and success. According to the mission statement: “U.S. Africa Command protects and defends the national security interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations and, when directed, conducts military operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development.” Further, as General Carter Ham notes, “when there is an organization such as the Lord’s Resistance Army, a man such as Joseph Kony who so egregiously violates the human rights of others, and we have an ability to assist, then I think my president believes we also have an obligation to assist.”

Of course, the LRA is obviously not the only terrorist threat of concern in the sub-continent. The U.S. has stationed over 1,000 troops in Djibouti for nearly a decade as part of the Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA) effort to improve security in the region. In North Africa, the U.S. has helped African forces confront the threat of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, as well as the al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist group al-Shabaab in Somalia. Uganda has been an especially important partner in the efforts to defeat al-Shabaab, and in recent years, USSOF teams have provided advanced training on urban counterinsurgency (COIN) operations to Ugandan counterparts deploying to Mogadishu. Hundreds of UPDF soldiers have been killed in the struggle against these Islamist militants. Further, the regional terrorist threat from al-Shabaab was underscored in 2010 when it claimed responsibility for two bombings in Kampala, the capital city of Uganda. During the evening of 11 July, crowds had gathered at sports bars throughout Kampala to watch the final game of the World Cup. During halftime, a suicide bomber destroyed the Ethiopia Village Club, and roughly an hour later two more explosions ripped through the crowd gathered at the Kyadondo Rugby Club. In total, 74 people were killed and hundreds injured. Al-Shabaab later claimed the attack was a form of retribution for Uganda’s commitment of troops and other support for the Somali government.

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. committed itself to combating terrorism around the world, and especially terrorists affiliated with the global
al-Qaeda network. While the humanitarian crisis and devastation wrought by Joseph Kony and the LRA are clearly tragic and deserve our attention, it is also true that the UPDF could be more effective in combating al-Shabaab if it did not have to deal at the same time with the LRA. Thus, an argument can be made that helping the Ugandans defeat Kony and the LRA once and for all can actually benefit the U.S. national security objective of defeating al-Qaeda and its affiliates (in this case, al-Shabaab in Somalia).

The U.S. commitment to the C/LRA effort also involves much more than military action. For example, USAID’s Northern Uganda Transition Initiative spent $23-million between 2008 and 2011 renovating public service buildings throughout war-affected regions of Uganda, including government office buildings, schools and teacher houses, health clinics and health clinic housing, markets, boreholes, and police and justice facilities. The U.S. has also funded a variety of programs throughout the region to assist with reconstruction, HIV/AIDS, malaria, water, and sanitation. In fiscal year 2011 the U.S. provided more than $18 million in humanitarian assistance, health services, food aid, civilian protection, and economic recovery assistance for LRA-affected populations in the CAR, the DRC, and South Sudan. And in 2013 the U.S. Ambassador to the UN announced that “To help bring the LRA’s top commanders to justice, the United States, through the War Crimes...
Rewards Program, is offering rewards of up to $5 million for information leading to the arrest, transfer, or conviction of LRA leaders Joseph Kony, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Ongwen.”

The decision to deploy U.S. troops to the region—dubbed “Operation Observant Compass”—raised hopes that Kony’s reign of terror would finally be coming to an end. When the deployment was first announced, the Obama administration noted that the initial deployment would be in Uganda, and the advisors would operate in South Sudan, the CAR, and the DRC “subject to the approval of each respective host nation,” and that American military personnel would not be operating independently nor carrying out unilateral operations. Several constraints were placed on the deploying SOF teams, as discussed in Chapter 7.

The mission—to remove the threat of the LRA from a four-country region—includes training, funding, airlift, logistics, communications and intelligence support, and represents the kind of “light footprint” deployments that many observers of U.S. security policy have suggested are the future for U.S. engagement in sub-Saharan Africa. According to the recent U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance, “Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives on the continent, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.” As Rear Admiral Brian Losey, former Commander of Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA), noted: “This is a different way of doing business for us. It fits what USAFRICOM does. It is designed to address African issues in an African way. Necessarily, it’s a small footprint operation. There’s not a lot of bodies involved, but it leverages the strengths that we feel we bring to supporting our African partners.”

According to Johnnie Carson, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, the decision to deploy the SOF teams was made after consultation with the leaders of African nations affected by the LRA violence.

AFRICOM planners traveled throughout the region and met with the governments there. Their conclusion was that sending a small number of U.S. military advisors to work with these national forces, both at headquarters and the field-level, could enhance their capacity to coordinate and fuse intelligence with effective operational planning.
In October 2011, a group of roughly 100 U.S. military advisors arrived at the USAFRICOM Counterintelligence Coordinating Element (ACCE) in Entebbe, Uganda. This became what Rear Admiral Losey calls the “center of gravity for our command and control elements.” From late 2011 through early 2012, teams of advisors then moved to forward operating locations in LRA-affected areas, eventually leading to Combined Operations Fusion Centers (COFC) in Obo and Djema, the CAR; in Dungu, the DRC; and in Nzara, South Sudan. The COFCs are small offices with computers and communications equipment used to facilitate coordination between the four militaries—the CAR, the DRC, South Sudan, and Uganda—as well as share intelligence about LRA movements and plan joint military operations. The COFCs also began working closely with humanitarian agencies and the UN to inform local communities about hot-spot areas of LRA activity and movements, in an effort to improve civilian protection.

Members of the SOF team met frequently with members of the partner nations’ militaries and local communities to discuss their mission objectives, identify needs, and begin targeting capability gaps. During an April 2012 press conference, Rear Admiral Losey described how SOF teams are focused on activities like “sharing of information and intelligence, fusing that into a common operating picture, integrating that into operations across the LRA-affected areas, reinforcing that with communications, improving logistics efficiencies—all those things can be done from forward operating locations, not necessarily on patrol.” In truth, a number of restrictions were placed on units deploying on this mission, to the degree that they could not go on patrol into the bush looking for LRA units. As described in Chapter 5, these restrictions were the source of some frustration among the troops on the ground. However, as an African-led operation it is necessary that, as Losey noted, “Patrols are conducted by the African partners.”

The diplomatic dimension to this effort cannot be overstated. While it is broadly recognized that an “African-led political initiative has the best chance to improve regional cooperation,” there are very few precedents for this kind of multinational African collaboration.
Summary

This contextual backdrop, against which the U.S. decided to send a small team of SOF to the region, must be kept in mind when discussing the observations and suggested “lessons learned” offered in the remaining chapters of this report. While collaboration with UPDF and other regional forces is the primary objective, the mission of the deployed troops is to advise and assist, not to engage in direct patrols or operations against the LRA. It is, and will remain, an “African-led operation.”

Because this mission represents the kind of “light footprint” engagements we expect to see regarding the future security relationship between the U.S. and countries of sub-Saharan Africa, those interviewed for this report were asked to provide insights and observations that should be taken into account for future deployments of this kind. Analysis of these interview transcripts and other documents revealed four themes as important for the success or failure of future U.S. military deployments to sub-Saharan Africa. Conveniently, each of these themes begin with the letter ‘p’:

1. Preparations and logistics
2. Perceptions and expectations management
3. Partnerships and relationship management
4. Policy and politics

For each of these themes, specific examples and issues are explored in the next four chapters of this report, and then a final chapter will offer some concluding thoughts about SOF education and training, further research, and policy implications.
4. Preparations and Logistics

One of the first and most important steps in the initial planning process was gathering detailed information about the local context—particularly, deployment teams needed to know who in Uganda, the CAR, the DRC and South Sudan has power and influence (both formally and informally), and whom to call in order to get things done. In many post-colonial African countries, decision-making authority is often centralized in the hands of relatively few people. Detailed planning should include influence maps, identifying who in a community or region is influential and why, as well as how they view the U.S. and the mission for which the SOF teams will be deploying. Additionally, there are a number of Western-educated elites in Africa; some are pro-American, though there are also some who are vehemently anti-Western or anti-American. Both types can be found within each of the governments in this Central African region.

Several interviewees in this report recommended that SOF teams deploying to this environment should prioritize their learning to focus on the customs, culture, and history of the region (note: not just a country, but the region, because in many cases, ethnic and tribal histories transcend country borders, requiring us to look beyond the lines on a map). The basic sentiment expressed here was that while language training is useful, it was more important to know the host nation and the people first, and then learn some words in their local dialect. Some felt that language proficiency is nice, but should be secondary; SOF teams can hire translators to help them across the language barriers once on the ground, but they cannot get translators to help them across the cultural barriers. Knowing (and following) local protocol is essential—for example, in many African countries, deference to age and elders is very important. One NGO interviewee noted that the SOF personnel he had recently interacted with were seasoned professionals but had no knowledge or understanding of Acholi tribal history, or of the different tribes in the region; they did not know what kinds of crops the Acholi farmed, or how their huts were constructed in ways that are visibly different from the huts of other regional tribes, nomadic herders, and so forth in the region.

At the very least, it seems, the SOF team should have had a regional expert brief them on these things before deployment. Similarly, cultural sensitivity education, to include knowing what not to do or say, is an important part of
pre-deployment preparation. SOF are highly visible in this context, and have great potential to make a significant impact—positively or negatively—and this requires an ability to recognize how words and actions are perceived within the local context (issue of perceptions management are discussed further in Chapter 5 of this report). Knowing when to resist the urge to say something is a useful attribute, particularly when something that seems innocent or humorous could be misunderstood, potentially causing anger and undermining mission effectiveness.

Of vital importance to any collaborative security engagement like this is knowing how the local militaries are organized and operate. How do they classify things, debrief, etc. and how do these things compare with the way the U.S. military operates? As described in Chapter 5, noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in most sub-Saharan African militaries are much different (and treated much differently) than in Western militaries. Thus, U.S. forces should anticipate significant differences in standard operating procedures, training, discipline, regulations, and much more.

Determining what (and whom) to bring on this mission was also an important early step in the process. Several interviewees noted that local African forces accomplish a great many things “without fancy expensive gadgets,” so U.S. forces should study and adapt accordingly. Technology is of limited use in many parts of Africa. There may be no meaningful role for motion sensors, signals intelligence gathering, or aerial surveillance technology in the jungle or the bush. A few interviewees in this report felt that the Tusker Sand initiative (involving aerial surveillance by small aircraft equipped with the Jungle Advanced Under Dense-Vegetation Imaging Technology (JAUDIT) system) was wasteful, as the jungle canopy in the region is too thick to really find the photos useful. Instead, they argued, human intelligence (HUMINT) is really the only way to find rebel groups in this environment. More discussion on HUMINT is provided in Chapter 6.

Shortwave, FM and HF radios and towers were used for local collaboration and communication. According to one interviewee, UPDF radio systems were old and weak, and could only allow signals once or twice a day. Patrolling units would typically radio in for coordinates in the morning,
and then at night they would report what happened. U.S. forces brought new real-time communication capabilities, but UPDF and AU RTF patrols were not allowed to use them. Several interviewees in this report noted that local radio broadcasting stations and receivers have been important assets in learning about and communicating with a small population spread over a vast area. Further, radio broadcasts were used effectively by the UPDF during their engagements with the LRA in 2005 through 2008, encouraging a significant amount of defections. However, when the LRA moved north and west (into South Sudan, eastern DRC, and southeastern CAR), there was no radio infrastructure, and thus no defection messaging capabilities.

A key development over the last 18 months of the USSOF deployment has been the installation of communications infrastructure (including new radio towers and equipment) and facilitating collaboration between NGOs (including Invisible Children and the Enough Project) and military forces on developing new tactics for promoting defections, particularly spreading information about newly established “Safe Reporting” sites throughout the region.\(^98\) Messages in Acholi and French (and other languages, all of which basically say “come home, get medical treatment, you will be taken care of”), often from former LRA members, have proven very effective.\(^99\) In general, ordinary radio broadcasts can play a useful role in any sub-Saharan African collaborative security deployment.

Self-sustainability should be the central principle of preparations and planning for SOF deployments to sub-Saharan Africa.\(^100\) Access to clean drinking water is of course critical, and each forward-operating site used versions of MIL300 Portable Water Filtration Systems to supplement their potable water supply.\(^101\) Current and future investments in research and development will bring new technologies to the field that can help meet the logistical challenges identified in this report. For example, the Marine Corps’ Experimental Forward Operating Base program, involves the development of alternative energy systems—solar blankets, LED lights, solar generators, etc.—and small unit water purification systems, tools that would clearly enhance the self-sufficiency of SOF teams deploying to sub-Saharan Africa.\(^102\)

While SOF teams might receive some local assistance (food, ammunition, etc.) from the host nation, this should not be expected; in some cases, local military and security forces in Africa may go for several days without being fed, and are often under-resourced by their own country’s government. One interviewee noted that the UPDF often goes out into the bush
with a 60-pound rucksack that contains almost everything they need for 30 days, and that they know how to ‘live off the land’ in ways that SOF teams can learn from. Another interviewee noted that U.S. personnel should not plan to bring new amenities with them, with a mindset of “this is how you should really do things,” because if it’s not self-sustainable locally long-term (i.e., without resupply of batteries or other things from the U.S. or Western allies), eventually it will fail. Energy poverty is endemic; most of sub-Saharan Africa sleeps in the dark, and access to reliable electricity is limited in even the most advanced countries. Several of the interviewees in this report felt strongly that when faced with a challenge in this environment, SOF teams need to find an African solution; a U.S. solution may not be workable or even contextually appropriate. Local forces in sub-Saharan Africa are necessarily resourceful, and have proven to be very adept at figuring out how to get things done with limited resources for decades. Learning about “needful things” in this environment should also be a priority—for example, do local forces need medicines, mosquito nets, etc. to help them operate successfully?

Logistically, the movement of materiel into many areas of Africa is limited by the relatively short length of landing strips, which can be used only by small fixed-wing or rotary aircraft. For the C/LRA mission, various kinds of “short take-off and landing” aircraft, including Cessna 208 Caravans, were used to transport supplies to the most remote airfields. However, many of the airfields required reconditioning or improvement, and virtually none of them were equipped with runway lighting, which limited resupply operations to strictly daylight hours. Units deploying to this environment must be prepared with ample fuel, tires, batteries, food, and water—delivering (and resupplying) these necessities requires a great deal of ingenuity given the cargo constraints of aircraft that can land in this environment.

Some of the logistics challenges encountered by the initial SOF team have been recently published in a Special Warfare article by two Army Special Forces officers. They describe their experiences planning and executing the reception, staging, onward-movement and integration of forces to rural base camps in the CAR and South Sudan, and note that initial assessments of the local environment “identified significant shortfalls in adequate and dependable field-landing strips and road infrastructure to support infiltration and long-term sustainment operations.” Road infrastructure must be closely studied, as in many parts of the sub-continent the rainy season renders dirt roads impassable for several months (in the case of Central
Africa, from April to October). According to their report, “Rainy season conditions limited line-haul resupply operations to only four to five months out of the year. These limitations required logistical planners to formulate a line-haul schedule to transport and stockpile adequate supplies during the dry season. As a result of the road conditions, a general planning factor required 7 to 10 days for line-haul supplies to arrive at their final destination.” An important point to make here is that small unit deployments of this kind are much different than the experiences many troops have had recently in Iraq or Afghanistan, where a great deal of time, effort, and money was spent developing an infrastructure that could allow for much greater logistical flexibility.

In many cases, local trustworthy suppliers of these necessities will need to be identified (again, knowing who’s who in the local context is critical). It is also important to learn what kind of currency is in circulation locally, and how much things cost. Showing up with a pocket full of U.S. 100 dollar bills is ill-advised, as this makes it very difficult for locals to sell things to you and to make appropriate change. Small bills in a local currency can go a long way. Further, cash currency may not be as useful in some environments as a cow, chicken, bicycle, or some other useful commodity that can be bartered.

Logistics become especially important when considering the implications of medical response to (or evacuation of) sick or injured soldiers. In this
kind of environment, the tyranny of distance will often mean rescue in a timely fashion is impossible. Furthermore, the lack of all-weather day/night field-landing strips and degraded road infrastructure directly impacts the reliability and responsiveness of evacuation assets for the sick and wounded. Thus, deploying teams must include personnel with advanced medical skills to provide on-site assistance. In the case of the C/LRA mission, a special operations resuscitation team (SORT) was provided in order to ensure care was available for serious or critical patients before and during medical evacuation to the nearest facilities (typically hundreds of miles away). Importantly, the SORT also served as advisors and trainers in advanced medical skills for C/LRA partner-nation force medics and physicians.\textsuperscript{108} And of course, any personnel deploying to sub-Saharan Africa must take their vaccinations and medications (especially antimalarial drugs) very seriously, use only verifiably clean water for drinking or brushing teeth, and be wary of local prescription medicines (counterfeit medicines are all too common in Africa).

The interviews and observations compiled for this report suggest that pre-deployment training for SOF teams heading to sub-Saharan Africa should develop an understanding of the relationships between the collaborating nation (i.e., the country hosting a SOF deployment) and its neighboring countries. In this instance, information is needed on all four countries participating in the AU RTF (CAR, DRC, Uganda, and South Sudan), as well as non-participating neighbors, like Sudan. As noted in Chapter 3, the mission of Observant Compass is to remove the threat of the LRA from this four-country region.\textsuperscript{109} Accomplishing this mission thus required learning about each of these countries, their militaries and security challenges, government constraints and capabilities, and tribal/ethnic diversities. Of particular importance (as described in Chapter 2), during the 1990s the Sudanese government provided some level of support and safe haven to Kony and his insurgents. This relationship supposedly ceased after an agreement signed in 1999, although as noted earlier the presence of LRA units in the Darfur region and in Kafia Kingi suggest there may still be some covert or tacit support provided by Khartoum.

Meanwhile, cross-border security cooperation has been much improved. UPDF units (now with U.S. military advisors accompanying them) have a fair amount of freedom to operate in areas of the CAR and South Sudan\textsuperscript{110} in the multi-national effort to track down Kony and his followers, and bring them to justice. In September 2013, South Sudanese and DRC forces conducted
their first joint offensive action against the LRA, utilizing substantial U.S. military logistical and intelligence support. As described in Chapter 7, these and other operations are facilitated by a good deal of diplomacy and, in some cases, incentives provided by the U.S. to ensure cooperation. SOF actions during a deployment could strengthen (or undermine) these crucial diplomatic relationships. Understanding the political history and sensitivities of the region is thus necessary.

SOF deploying teams should also study the goals and capabilities of the militaries and militant groups in the broader region, and local political dynamics, particularly regarding civil military relations. Meanwhile, the UPDF has deployed in the region several times in the past, and has been known for human rights abuses; thus some locals have a negative reaction to UPDF because of this history. All these things can impact the success of a SOF mission to the region.

Finally, within this environment, there are subtle indicators of activity that SOF should learn to identify—for example, are prices at the local markets rapidly going up or down? This can be a sign that trouble is nearby or expected. Overall, throughout the interviews conducted for this report, it was made clear that information about one’s adversary (in this case, Joseph Kony and the LRA) is only one small part of the broad spectrum of knowledge that SOF teams must gather and analyze.

When designing pre-deployment training, SOF leaders should seek the advice of experts with first-hand knowledge of a host nation’s armed forces, particularly its history (including any past military coup attempts), capabilities, and relations with the general population. In many cases, it may prove useful to locate British, French, Belgian or Portuguese experts, given these countries’ colonial histories and ongoing relations with many countries in Africa. Another suggestion was that SOF teams should consult with African military officers attending any of the U.S. military educational programs or institutions (such as the Army War College, Naval War College, National Defense University, or Naval Postgraduate School). Similarly, in some instances foreign military officers may be earning graduate degrees at civilian universities or colleges in the U.S., and could potentially be called upon with requests to provide a briefing on their country’s armed forces.

For the C/LRA mission, the local U.S. “country team” in Uganda (based in the U.S. Embassy in Kampala) played an essential role in identifying key aspects of the local operating environment. Equally important was the
information provided by field personnel of USAID and a range of NGOs operating in the region. Their expertise and local knowledge, often developed over years of living in remote villages throughout the region, was critical. And another key source of knowledge can be found among allied nations with extensive experience in the region, often due to colonial ties. In this case, French military forces and diplomats were essential sources of knowledge about the DRC and the CAR, while British personnel had deep historical experience in Uganda. To be effective, SOF teams deploying to these kinds of environments must show respect for the expertise of these other entities, recognize what they know and do, and work through their local contacts to set things in motion. It is also important to learn how the U.S. Department of State and NGO field offices and representatives operate on a daily basis, the challenges they face and the objectives they seek to accomplish. Knowing the basics of international humanitarian law, and how humanitarian NGOs operating in the region view (or interact with) military forces can be useful in facilitating mutually beneficial relationships when deploying to remote areas of Africa. (More on relationship management is provided in Chapter 6 of this report).

Summary

To sum up, having a strong grasp of the local operating context is central to any effective preparation and logistics planning. While this general statement is well understood by most, many of the complex nuances of the “local context” highlighted here could be overlooked. There are so many “terrains” that SOF teams must navigate—physical, political, cultural/social, etc.—to ensure the success of their mission. Preparing for context-specific challenges in all these terrains takes considerable time and expertise, requiring teams to be selected and prepared for the mission months in advance of deployment.
5. Perceptions and Expectations Management

A frequently overlooked dimension of preparing for successful deployments is managing expectations—our own expectations and those of our partner nations. To begin with, one must recognize the speed (or lack thereof) at which things can get done in Africa. It is unreasonable for U.S. policymakers or military planners to expect that something significant can be accomplished in Africa in a short timeframe. Time is perceived differently here—as many interviewees in this report noted, nothing happens quickly in Central Africa.

A recent report on C/LRA operational logistics confirmed this sentiment: “Whatever the underlying cultural implications, it is important to recognize that punctuality in a Western sense is not as strictly adhered to in Africa ... Understanding the relative nature of time is a crucial first step toward cultural competence on the African continent.” Delays in contracting, transportation, local authority approvals, and in many other areas should be anticipated and planned for, rather than building operational assumptions around false expectations. Further, U.S. decision makers must set aside notions of how we think things should get done; succeeding in the African operating environment requires studying and adapting to what is, not what should be. As one interviewee put it, “Don’t get overly focused on seeing the perfect solution; get used to ‘Africa good enough’—in other words, if it’s good enough for the host nation’s forces, get comfortable with it being good enough for you.”

Managing our own expectations also involves understanding how the militaries of partner nations function. For example, NCOs in the U.S. are highly disciplined, graduates of high school (and many have college degrees), and are universally viewed by senior officers as essential partners in effective military operations. In comparison, NCOs in many African countries may be partly illiterate, and are often looked down upon as inferior by their officer corps, who tend to view themselves as elite and special (even if in truth some became officers not by merit but by family/tribal connections or other such means). In several countries, young men join the military because it is the only source of employment available; expectations of strong professionalism
are unwarranted, and in some instances corruption is rampant. Several interviewees in this report recommended that we must be prepared for behavioral differences among some of our foreign military counterparts. Specific comments obtained in the interviews for this report include: they may not be as attentive as we’re used to; don’t expect them to show up promptly at a certain early morning hour because they won’t; in some cases you will see a lack of desire to improve, but in other cases you will see a strong desire but a lack of means to improve; some leadership development may be needed for the officer corps, but an additional challenge is convincing them that they need that kind of training.

Figure 10. A UPDF Base Camp in Central Africa.¹¹⁴

Further, interviewees in this report noted that African militaries in general do not maintain the kind of constant training tempo that U.S. troops are accustomed to. Sometimes the caloric quality of food available to the soldiers may be low, detracting from the kind of physical training they could be expected to do. Their weapons may be old and frequently malfunctioning. They may go for lengthy periods without pay. Local civil-military relations may be tepid at best, with some negativity stemming from a legacy of colonial oppression, brutality, and corruption.

As a result of these challenges, overall morale (and loyalty to the government) among the country’s military may be low. Within this operating environment, SOF units must tailor their expectations for what can be done,
and prepare a variety of contingency plans accordingly. A U.S. military presence may have a modestly positive influence on local military forces, but we must recognize the limitations of what can be accomplished in even the most permissive environment where it is necessary to rely on others to help you get things done. One interviewee offered the following advice to future deploying SOF teams: “Avoid the Iraq/Afghanistan mindset that this kind of deployment has something to do with ‘ops’... Keep in mind that in these cases of security collaboration you are in a permissive environment.”

In general, interviewees emphasized that we must be honest about what the U.S. can and cannot achieve in a deployment to sub-Saharan Africa. One of the issues often raised in the interviews for this report involved false expectations about what U.S. forces would be doing once they arrived. Some politicians and media in the U.S. portrayed “visions of Abbottabad” (a reference to the Special Operations Forces that located and killed Osama bin Laden) when describing the mission to assist UPDF and AU units in locating and apprehending Joseph Kony and other senior LRA leaders. At the very outset, this mission was never meant to be a lethal one—in fact, a broad range of constraints were placed (both by the U.S. Government and by collaborating nations in Africa, as described further in Chapter 7 of this report) on what U.S. forces could do in theater.
During interviews with SOF officers conducted both in Uganda and at USAFRICOM headquarters, personnel who were deployed on this mission expressed frustration about “waiting around for something to happen” and wanting “to go out there and kick some butt.” They appeared to have been given the wrong impression about what the mission would and would not be. While historically, SOF culture has been one of “we go in, we get the job done … period,” the SOF teams deployed to Central Africa are there to assist AU and Ugandan forces in successfully carrying out their mission.

Further, it is critical that any successes derived from these collaborative operations must be “owned” by these local military forces and their governments, in large part because of the legacy of post-colonial sensitivities. Frequently, interviewees interviewed for this report noted that the very last thing U.S. forces should do is give the impression that “we parachuted in, took care of the problem for you because you weren’t able to do it yourselves”—clearly, that would not be the way to lay the groundwork for future successful deployments in sub-Saharan Africa.

U.S. policymakers and senior leaders must recognize the nation’s limitations at the outset and adjust expectations accordingly. Raising false expectations of a relatively low-cost deployment to Africa in which the mission can be successfully completed within a short timeframe reflects a dangerous level of ignorance about the operating environment. It is equally dangerous to give our partner nations’ government, military forces, and general public false expectations of what we might achieve in this sort of collaborative deployment. Former USAFRICOM Commander General Carter Ham reflected on the critical need for expectations management in an April 2012 interview, noting:

There’s a little bit of the—what I call the ‘man on the moon’ effort here, you know, that—you, the U.S., you’re able to put a man on the moon. What do you mean, you can’t find this guy, you know, wandering around in Central Africa? But it is very, very complex. All we can try to do is—and what I try to do in my engagement with senior leaders—is to lay out as clearly as I can what our role is, what we think we can bring to assist the Africans who are committed to this mission, and again, and establish realistic security—realistic expectations."
From the outset, there were certainly high expectations of benefits to be derived, with some locals expressing the sentiment “here come the Americans, they are world-famous fighters, they’ll get the job done quickly.” Locals thought that the U.S. would build bases in their area that would then bring jobs and money. According to a May 2012 NGO report,

The U.S. military advisors have been well received by local communities in the southeastern parts of the CAR, though it should be noted that expectations about the capabilities and the mandate of the advisors are unrealistically high. Several people in Obo continue to believe that the United States will bring hundreds of soldiers, planes, and tanks to finish the LRA.\textsuperscript{118}

Meanwhile, some local military personnel thought they would be receiving goodies (equipment, advanced technologies, and so forth). In Obo, a particular UPDF senior officer was noticeably adamant that instead of sending SOF teams to assist him, the U.S. should just provide money, helicopters, and other equipment to his soldiers. Of course, an immediate response from many observers is how to ensure that “stuff” provided to the UPDF is not used to violate human rights, as has happened in the past. But it is also true that no country’s military wants to rely on someone else (even the U.S.) for anything.

In this kind of “advise and assist” mission, overly ambitious expectations among partner militaries and locals were clearly unfounded. In recent large-scale deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military built an infrastructure to make things happen: budgets, authorities, logistics chains and so forth were put in place and used to optimize mission effectiveness. Thousands of locals were hired to support various aspects of the mission. In contrast, for the kinds of small team deployments to Africa represented by the C/LRA mission, it is inherently necessary to rely on others to help get things done, and they will inevitably move at a slower pace than we would hope. Bureaucratic delays on the part of U.S. Government agencies or contractors only make things worse.
The previous chapter of this report discussed the importance of cultural competence in the preparation and training of SOF deploying to Africa. A similar argument can be made about developing cultural competence among the key constituencies of our partner nations as well. Any foreign military with whom we partner (along with the government and the broader population of that country) should be educated about U.S. customs, culture, capabilities, intentions, policies, self-imposed ethical and moral constraints and so forth. This is something that several interviewees felt the U.S. Department of State presence in the country should take the lead on. Their objective here should be to help manage expectations among the locals and partner militaries before U.S. troops arrive. Topics that could be addressed include U.S. history; U.S. involvement in that country and/or neighboring countries (as well as the broader region) historically, and why; our common political objectives, emphasizing America’s longstanding concerns for human rights, justice, and the rule of law; and constraints (e.g. policy, legal, moral) on what U.S. forces can and cannot do on this mission.

This kind of public education should also focus on the accountability of U.S. military personnel to legal authorities—a concept that may be anathema to the locals in some African countries. Of course, it is also important to emphasize to U.S. forces how a single mistake could be counterproductive for an entire generation; the worse the mistake, the more likely it will taint perceptions of the U.S. and its military for decades. The incident at Abu Ghraib, or a rogue U.S. soldier shooting up a village in Afghanistan, are probably the worst case examples of how the actions of uniformed personnel can produce negative stereotypes of Americans and undermine the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy and security. U.S. forces need to constantly reinforce positive perceptions about how we hold ourselves accountable to the rule of law.

Partner militaries should also be encouraged to develop a clear understanding about U.S. policy interests, especially why the U.S. is taking on a particular mission. One interviewee in this report suggested that local military officers who have spent time in the U.S., or have worked with the U.S. on past exercises or other such things can play a lead role in educating their local countrymen about what to expect before a U.S. team is deployed to that country. Another idea would be to engage alumni of the U.S.-sponsored Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) in this capacity. This program brings together senior and mid-level officers from countries around the world to discuss best practices in combating terrorism, and to build a global
network of practitioners. Overall, briefings and written materials provided to our partner nation’s personnel prior to the arrival of USSOF teams could pay huge dividends.

It should be mentioned here that in general, many Ugandans are pro-American, and recognize that we share a common view toward the junior cadres of the LRA as victims. Interviewees in this report described a significant level of support for the U.S. among Uganda’s military elite, particularly since many of their senior officers are graduates of U.S.-sponsored international military education and training (IMET) or War College programs. In general, the UPDF admire U.S. training and equipment (though they can’t afford it themselves, particularly the maintenance of it). They also respect the many years of COIN experience earned by U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.

However, a few interviewees interviewed for this report noted that among some African military personnel, an individual’s perceptions and willingness to collaborate may be impacted by issues of status and pride. For example, many times the USSOF team leader is junior in rank to the partner nation unit’s commanding officer. The SOF advisor must maintain an appropriate level of decorum to prevent misunderstandings. We must keep in mind that in many African countries, people were colonial subjects (ruled by white Europeans) just one generation ago; it may not take much for them to feel that the U.S. views them as inferior. As noted earlier, many militaries throughout Africa consider themselves to be the defenders of their countries’ independence and may be overly sensitive to such things as peer-to-peer status. Being aware of these kinds of perceptions and incorporating an appropriate response should be part of SOF deployment planning and training.

It is also important for U.S. forces to recognize that even in a permissive environment like this, where the general public is supportive of the overall mission, our every move will be watched, very closely. In this instance, some locals grew overly frustrated when U.S. forces were not allowed to go on joint patrols with AU RTF units, expressing the sentiment of “Hey, when are you going to go out and find, capture or kill Kony and the LRA bad guys? Are you really serious about this mission? Or is this a public relations stunt for your president?” Some locals had unreasonable expectations – as a U.S. Department of State officer in the region noted recently, “When they see one American soldier, they think their prayers are answered and their
problems are solved. To them, American soldiers represent safety and security.” One Ugandan officer interviewed for this report asked whether the U.S. was afraid of taking any casualties during this mission, noting that the UPDF has been fighting the LRA for a very long time, and has taken many casualties. Other locals voiced negative perceptions about overly machismo soldiers, “Rambo-types” who seemed to want people to fear him rather than collaborate with him.

Further, if our local military partners (and the general public) feel that the U.S. commitment is short-term and temporary, that will impact their level of interest in working with us. There is a need to impress upon them that U.S. forces will be here until the job is done; if they don’t believe that, it will be much harder for the SOF team to get what they need from them. The one-year extension of the deployment (signed by President Obama in October 2013) and the March 2014 decision to deploy an additional 150 SOF troops and aircraft have surely helped mitigate this to some degree. However, several U.S. interviewees in this report noted that their AU counterparts often voiced concerns about the nature of the U.S. commitment, and constant reinforcement was needed to build the kinds of confidence and trust that underpins healthy relationships. If the U.S. were to withdraw its forces from the region before Kony is captured and/or the threat of LRA attacks is virtually gone, this would have a huge and negative impact on local perceptions toward the U.S.—not just in Central Africa, but throughout the entire sub-continent. Some interviewees expressed confusion about U.S. goals and commitment, with questions like “How long will you be here? Why? How will you assess the success or failure of this mission—complete removal of the LRA and the capture or death of Joseph Kony? Will you leave if you get a sense that Kony and the LRA are ‘contained’? Is containment enough for you, and if so, how will you assess that? What are the criteria for a successful end to this adventure?” Awareness of, and dealing appropriately with, these kinds of questions and perceptions should be an important component of any U.S. deployment to Africa.

It is also important to recognize how local perceptions can be influenced by other entities that have nothing to do with the mission. Are foreign elements fueling existing levels of paranoia throughout post-colonial African nations about U.S. intentions and objectives? For example, are agents of other countries spreading rumors about the U.S. like “don’t accept anything electronic from the Americans, because it’s all embedded with spying
devices”? Further, it is important to recognize that to the local population in this region, the LRA is merely one of several militant groups roaming the countryside and leaving destroyed lives in their wake. For the U.S. to commit troops and other resources to deal with the LRA, and yet not deal with other groups that are also engaged in atrocities against local villages, impacts how the local population (and their government) views the SOF mission and its importance.

Finally, attention must also be given to influencing enemy perceptions. Surely the reputation of SOF (and the U.S. military in general) is a concern to LRA members, and they will be watching very closely to gain an understanding of the threat to their operations. Often, insurgent groups like the LRA will enlist (or more often, coerce) the assistance of others in gathering this information. Even the seemingly innocent villager could be an informant. For example, one interviewee described noticing a child sitting on the ground in a village near a forward operating base with a notebook, just watching trucks go by and flights come and go. It was unclear whom this information was being collected for, but it certainly reflected the reality that any SOF deployment to sub-Saharan Africa will be watched closely by many—and especially by adversaries.

Enemy forces are of course seeking their own forms of intelligence and situational awareness. For example, a recent NGO report describes an interview with a Mbororo herder in the Obo region, who stated:

They [the LRA] looted all our food and we were not allowed to move for a long time. They asked us many questions about the U.S. military. Where are the U.S. troops? How many are they in Obo? Are they in other villages? How many are they? How many arms do they have? Do they also have helicopters? How are they working together with the Ugandan army? Is it true that they will also go to the bush and hunt for us?\textsuperscript{121}

Clearly one must never underestimate one’s enemy. SOF teams should develop a profile of the kinds of information the enemy would most likely want to learn, and where possible respond with deception and misinformation to throw the enemy off-base. For example, even if they are not really effective, being seen using high-tech gizmos that nobody else has can have an important psychological impact on the enemy’s perceived vulnerabilities. Further, if the enemy believes that there are radios everywhere, and rapid
response teams can come get them at a moment’s notice, they are naturally risk averse and will relocate to where they think they can be safer. In other words, if the enemy believes U.S. support includes high-tech capabilities, SOF can capitalize on that belief by finding appropriate ways to reinforce it.

The point to make here is that in the realm of managing perceptions, it is also important to influence how the enemy perceives the SOF deployment. Further, influencing perceptions among LRA fighters has been a key component of the overall C/LRA effort. AU RTF units have developed and disseminated “come home” leaflets for several years, leading to thousands of defectors looking to take advantage of the 2000 Amnesty Act. Messages have been printed in both Acholi and, more recently in French (for the DRC and the CAR), saying “come home, get medical treatment, you will be taken care of.” Similar messages have been broadcast via loudspeakers on aircraft flying over areas known to have LRA operatives. U.S. military advisors have also recently helped to transport MONUSCO leaflets encouraging LRA defections for distribution in the CAR. Further, as described in Chapter 3, radio broadcasts have led to a significant number of defectors from the LRA, particularly when they feature a former LRA fighter who assures his listeners of good treatment received back home. Clearly, these kinds of “influencing perceptions” activities are critical to the success of this mission.

Summary

To sum up, perceptions and expectations are a central motivator of human behavior. Not only must SOF teams understand the perceptions and expectations of all those involved (including their own), it also important to find ways to influence those perceptions and expectations in ways that can be most beneficial to the success of the mission. Nowhere is this more important than in the area of partnerships and relationships with the militaries and civilian populations of our partner nations, as described in the next chapter.
6. Partnerships and Relationship Management

While expectations and perceptions must be managed appropriately, it is equally important to focus attention on establishing and nurturing trusted working relationships. SOF work with and through others to achieve security objectives. Clearly, money and resources alone do not guarantee success in these kinds of missions. Knowledge and interpersonal relationships are key—including relationships with our partner countries’ military forces (and the communities they seek to protect), other entities in the theater of deployment (e.g., NGOs, neighboring countries’ military forces and intelligence services), and among our own government organizations within the interagency process. In truth, SOF advisors deployed for Operation Observant Compass are viewed as valued partners by many Ugandan, Congolese, South Sudanese and the CAR soldiers and officers in the struggle to locate and apprehend Kony; some of them feel that “the presence of the U.S. advisors has demonstrated that they are not alone in the fight against the LRA, thereby boosting their morale.”

As Janice Burton noted in Special Warfare, “The U.S. mission in Africa is definitely not a lethal one. Rather it is one of long-term relationship building, shoring up capability and helping partner nations solve their own problems.” Building long-term relationships in Africa requires person-to-person interaction on the ground, with competence in cultural differences and understanding human behavior. These relationships are critical for succeeding in a mission like C/LRA. As U.S. Army Special Forces officers Darrin Tangeman and Jonathan Lindsley recently explained,

No matter where you deploy or what type of operation you conduct, people and social networks matter. Building and leveraging social capital is one of the most important tasks in achieving [success] on the continent of Africa ... you must master the human domain and expand your social network so that you are better positioned through formal and informal ties to influence the operational environment.

The C/LRA mission represents the kind of SOF deployment that will be most common in the future. Admiral McRaven’s vision for USSOCOM is
one of “a force capable of carrying out a range of missions short of combat—including training foreign militaries to counter terrorists, drug traffickers and insurgents, gathering intelligence and assessing pending risk, and advising embassies on security.” Recent USSOCOM and USAFRICOM mission statements also reflect this view of the future, emphasizing the importance of working with and through foreign military partners to achieve U.S. national security objectives. As Rear Admiral Losey notes:

We are supporting and enabling an African-led effort. We have to do business in a manner that is acceptable and digestible to their ways of doing business. We have to be sensitive, too, to the dynamics in the region as we work with four adjacent states on a problem that’s easy to line up on but less easy to actually implement multilateral actions.\textsuperscript{128}

It is thus unsurprising that the topic of interpersonal relationships was raised frequently in the interviews conducted for this report. A common theme emphasized by many interviewees is that relationships are only fruitful with the right kind of people. This speaks to the importance of carefully selecting personnel to be deployed on collaborative security missions to sub-Saharan Africa. As Fernando Lujan, a U.S. Army Special Forces officer, noted:

The wrong man can do more harm than the right man can do good ... the most critical resource is human capital—talented, adaptable professionals who are not only fluent in language, culture, politics and interpersonal relationships but also willing to wade into uncertain environments and influence outcomes with minimal resources.\textsuperscript{129}

Dr. Harry R. Yarger notes that “SOF personnel attributes are the key distinguishing feature of special operations.”\textsuperscript{130} He argues that the success of these missions depends on the creativity and flexibility of the individual SOF team member, and explains how:

SOF seek to understand, operate in, and exploit the human domain ... Human interaction and relationships of all kinds matter in special operations. SOF focus on the human interaction involved to achieve success. In part this explains a SOF preference for Sun Tzu, whose approach to warfare focuses on human interactions. SOF seek
relationships to enhance their own capabilities but also to leverage the capabilities of others or favorably influence them—individuals, militaries, indigenous populations, indigenous political elites, allies, neutral parties and adversaries.\textsuperscript{131}

The importance of interpersonal relationships in the African context cannot be overstated. Perhaps more than any other environment, here is where success in special operations is rooted in the human aspects of conflict.\textsuperscript{132}

Several interviewees suggested that a significant amount of aptitude assessment is needed in the selection process, not just regarding skills and abilities, but attitude as well. Some people just do not have the right attitude for dealing directly with locals in the African context. SOF leaders must be honest with themselves and with those under their command, and avoid selecting for these missions individuals who would clearly not be a good fit for this environment. For example, being judgmental is very counterproductive—individuals chosen for these deployments need to be flexible, mature and open-minded, and need to respect the fact that African military partners (and local villagers) have valuable experiences and knowledge. In the case of Uganda, the country has been fighting wars of one kind or another for nearly 30 years. UPDF officers and soldiers respect U.S. combat experience, but they expect and deserve respect for their own experience as well. The same can be said for other AU Regional Task Force troops. Building up rapport and trust at the unit level is straightforward—U.S. soldiers should share combat stories with African counterparts, eat their food, get to know them, learn about them and their experiences. One interviewee emphasized that SOF teams should demonstrate the value of developing a capable enlisted corps who are treated respectfully, thus leading by example.

The mindset of forces deployed on these missions needs to be much more than “I’m going to go teach them how to shoot a rifle.” SOF must be committed to listening carefully and actively. What do local communities, and local forces really need from us? Clearly, the SOF team can’t just parachute in and think they bring the answers. Deployments like these will require a continual learning process, and the learning needs to be documented carefully and transferred comprehensively and effectively to the newly arriving teams upon rotations. Otherwise, each unit will be learning from scratch each time, and constantly trying to build new relationships. Further, several
interviewees mentioned short-term deployments being unhelpful, and possibly detrimental, to the long-term success of the mission.

When considering the critical importance of relationships for collaborative security operations in sub-Saharan Africa, an honest appreciation for the learning process needs to be built in at the policy level when discussing the length of a particular deployment. Confidence, trust, and healthy interpersonal relationships take time to develop—there are no easy shortcuts. We must invest an appropriate amount of time to establish and nurture relationships, and this must be built into the mission timeline parameters and expectations. In most cases, these relationships require face-to-face communication; e-mails will rarely get a response, and phone calls may not even work. As several interviewees noted, we have to sit down with people, share a meal or a beer; go for a walk and talk about things that have nothing to do with the core mission objectives. This is how you get things done in Africa—you first build the relationships with those who know what’s going on, learn the human and physical terrain, etc., and then you share the adventure with them. SOF advisors have held community meetings, shared meals with local community leaders and AU RTF units, and overall have recognized the importance of investing time in building relationships. As noted in the previous chapter, expectations among policymakers and bureaucratic leaders that a relatively low-cost, short-term deployment to Africa will achieve something significant are wholly unreasonable and reflect a level of ignorance about the operating environment. This must be remedied at the policy level before future teams of U.S. forces are deployed to Africa.

Other suggestions offered by interviewees include never making promises that you cannot keep, as this is a sure way to damage or destroy relationships. There is also a need to ensure accountability for all military personnel—U.S. and our African counterparts. It is not enough for U.S. forces to be on their best behavior; local militaries must also come to recognize the impact of their behavior on the success or failure of the mission. Developing an ethos of greater professionalism among partner nation militaries may be an important—and certainly beneficial—byproduct of the relationships established on these kinds of small unit collaborative security engagements. Similarly, effective partnerships have to be two-way; that is, the militaries of partner nations must be flexible and accepting of the USSOF way of doing things. As noted in previous chapters of this report, some education and training
should be provided to a host country military prior to the deployment of
U.S. forces to their country.

SOF teams should also avoid physical barriers to relationship building: for
example, in one location, the USSOF base and AU RTF base are co-located,
virtually door-to-door. In another location they are about a 10 minute drive
apart from each other. It may be worthwhile to study this more closely: Does
the proximity of base location have an impact on relationship formation
and maintenance? Does distance inspire distrust? Also, several interviewees
described the need to be consistent in what you say and do; actions speak
louder than words, but be sure your actions (positive actions) are seen and
recognized as such. Finally, a “doctrine of no surprises” should be adhered to:
relationships built on predictability and common knowledge are far stronger
than relationships built on secrecy or lapses in communication.

SOF teams should also make every effort to avoid involvement in clan,
tribal, or ethnic politics. Relationships among local populations throughout
Central Africa are heavily influenced by ethnic or tribal background (as
described in Chapter 2), and ethnic differences have contributed to political
violence and insurgency in the country. These relationships are informed
by long-standing historical and cultural grievances that may have very little
(if anything) to do with the current SOF mission. Furthermore, in many
multi-ethnic and tribal environments in Africa, it is common for one ethnic
group to seek an edge over competitors, and powerful outsiders often present
such an opportunity. Research on the colonial history of Africa reveals how
British, French, Belgian and other foreigners were rapidly caught up in these
internecine rivalries, often choosing sides or favorites. SOF teams must rec-
ognize that when operating in these kinds of environments, individuals will
try to use them to further their own (and their clan or ethnic group) interests.
This is particularly important when considering the kinds of trusted relation-
ships needed for quality HUMINT gathering and analysis. Playing ethnic
or clan favorites can undermine your ability to get broad-based, objective
intelligence—indeed, one of the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan
has been that several times an intelligence report about a particular terrorist
threat was nothing more than an attempt by the informant to get U.S. forces
to eliminate an ethnic, tribal, or clan rival.

Of course, quality HUMINT is critical to the success of any SOF mis-
son, and is essential for the AU’s efforts to locate and apprehend Joseph
Kony and LRA units. As General Ham noted, “human intelligence in this
mission will probably prove decisive.”133 Gathering, analyzing, and sharing intelligence with African military counterparts can become one of the most vital components of a successful partnership in these kinds of collaborative deployments. Conversely, failure to share intelligence effectively can quickly undermine the kind of trusted relationships that are essential for any collaborative SOF deployment like this to be successful.

Naturally, SOF personnel will recognize that there are many different kinds of entities operating within a given region, from the benign or potentially helpful (including NGOs, UN missions, foreign government aid agencies, local military and security forces, tour operators, pastoral herders, tribal leaders, and so forth) to the potentially harmful (e.g., traffickers in small arms and light weapons, drugs, humans, counterfeit medicines, consumer goods, and many other commodities of the global illicit marketplace). Any of these could be a valuable source of intelligence for SOF teams. For example, in the effort to track LRA fighters in the bush, pastoral Mbororo herders in Obo have been important sources of information. These herders have met up with LRA columns frequently over the years; usually these are brief encounters, and the herders are left alone, but not always. In some cases, they may be interrogated by LRA fighters (for example, to see if any UPDF units are in the area). This treatment can naturally lead the Mbororo to be more willing to collaborate with AU RTF in the hopes of eradicating the threat of LRA.

But compared to formal peer-to-peer military exchanges of information, trusted relationships with locals will require a greater investment of time and patience. One must sit down, share a meal, talk about things of mutual interest that have

Figure 12. Sharing a mid-day meal with Mbororo herders.134
nothing to do with the operational information you may be seeking. One interviewee for this report suggested that when a SOF team first arrives in theater, they should buy a bunch of goats, slaughter them and have a huge communal feast as a way to begin interacting with the locals and giving something to the community. At the very least, one must take the time to meet with village elders and tribal leaders upon arrival, invite them in and share information with them, and more importantly, ask for and listen to their ideas. Legitimizing and respecting their ideas and opinions can produce significant dividends when it comes time to call upon them for assistance.

Further, sharing certain kinds of information with local communities can help ensure better awareness of potential threats, and in the process demonstrate our concern for their security. As LRA attacks in the CAR, the DRC and South Sudan intensified in 2008 and 2009, informal local early warning systems sprang up. A cross-border network of HF radios operated by Catholic institutions and other religious groups, hospitals, and local businesses facilitated the sharing of security information. The U.S. Department of State and USAID have funded projects in the DRC to expand existing early warning networks to remote communities, and have begun installing low-cost cell phone towers in LRA-affected areas of the DRC, the CAR, and South Sudan. However, as a recent NGO report noted, local communities often respond in kind by sharing information about LRA attacks with UN, civil society and military actors, but few mechanisms exist for these actors to share information and risk assessments with local communities. It is important that SOF personnel do not view locals as hostiles, nor as beneficiaries of U.S. largesse. Often, they are also not neutral bystanders—in this instance, they are victims of LRA violence, and therefore have a vested interest in helping get rid of it. They should be viewed and treated as smart, resourceful partners. The objective here, as Ambassador Johnnie Carson notes, is to “empower communities to make decisions related to their own safety.”

An important point should also be made about partnering with NGOs. On several occasions, interviewees for this report noted the importance of meeting with, and learning from, representatives of NGOs working in the
area. Often, these representatives had been in the country for many years, and had both a unique perspective on cultural and social dimensions of the environment, as well as trusted relationships with locals that could become conduits for valuable HUMINT. At the same time, however, it was noted that SOF personnel should try to keep a visible separation from NGO counterparts, in order to avoid potentially impacting the legitimacy of the NGO as neutral entities. In some cases, humanitarian groups have been leery of engaging with military forces; they may be under very strict rules about how they can interact with military forces, and some members of these organizations may be skeptical of (or even hostile to) the military.

Certainly, the military and NGO communities often have a different mindset and approach to the situation, and use a different kind of language, which can lead to frustration at a perceived lack of understanding across both communities. One suggestion for fostering and maintaining good working relationships is to emphasize shared objectives and common goals (in this instance, the protection of the civilian population, and the apprehension of those who have caused such grievous harm to their communities). Another is to invite NGO representatives to give pre-deployment briefings to SOF teams about international humanitarian law, how humanitarian groups think about the military, things you should not say when talking to International Red Cross, and so forth.

On a similar note, effective communication was often mentioned in these interviews as an essential part of any successful relationship. Several interviewees discussed the need for more or better training on culturally appropriate communication (not just language, but understanding cultural context, linguistics, body language, and other nuances). One interviewee discussed the need for soldiers to be more self-aware, and have a solid appreciation for how they “come across to indigenous populations,” noting that some locals may have preconceived notions about U.S. soldiers as superheroes (or villains). Clearly, as noted earlier, arriving in a sub-Saharan African country with a mindset of “we know what you need, we know the right way to do things,” “we’re here to fix things that aren’t working” or “we’ll show you what you should really be doing,” may not be the best way to foster the kind of collaborative relationships that will be critical to the success of these kinds of missions. Instead, a more nuanced “We’re here to try and help you improve what you’re already doing,” is recommended, keeping in mind that these are prideful people who have valuable experiences (and
have endured many hardships in their fight against an elusive enemy) and we should legitimate that.

Several interviewees in this report described the need for humility in our approach. True partners don’t act superior to their counterparts. As one interviewee put it, the so-called “golden rule” applies here—treat others as you would like to be treated; this means respect your African counterparts and their cultural and social routines. While the U.S. is more powerful than any other country, our massive resources and strengths may be irrelevant when dealing with the situation at hand. SOF personnel are well-equipped to deal with hardships, and to innovate when things break down—attributes that will quickly earn them respect among their African military counterparts and local communities.

At the same time, it was also recognized that there is much that locals can learn from SOF, but that literacy may be very low among our partner nation’s forces. Thus, these missions will require a great deal of verbal knowledge transfer, reinforcing again the importance of clear and effective communication. Also, when briefing foreign military units, it should not be assumed that everyone in the room speaks the same language, even if they’re all part of the same country’s military force; some may speak French or some colonial legacy language, while others may not, and there will likely be huge differences in comprehension from one person to the next.

Further, when dealing with interpreters, it is important to be very judicious in your choice of words. Your audience (and your interpreters) may not understand military acronyms that you and your colleagues take for granted. Be sure to spell out everything, but do so kindly, not irritably—remember, they are not stupid, they are just unfamiliar with the lexicon that you have become accustomed to using. A great deal of patience is required, and active listening. Also, most foreign audiences will probably not appreciate your sense of humor; it was recommended that briefers do not even try to tell jokes unless they are absolutely sure (based on feedback from more than one source) that there is a very good possibility of eliciting the desired response at the attempted humor. The same caution applies to interpersonal interaction as well. What you say or do may seem innocent or even funny to you and...
your friends, but one must learn to recognize how our words and actions are perceived within the local context.

Efforts must also be made to ensure that all interviewees in a collaborative security mission like this are clear about the overall strategic goals and objectives. As noted in the previous chapters, managing expectations is an important lesson to keep in mind for future deployments. This includes articulating the metrics that will be used to measure success and completion of the mission. It also applies on a more tactical level as well regarding the training of African military units. Do you seek perfection? Don’t bother. Improvement is certainly possible, but relationships built on unreasonable expectations are destined to fail.

Within the U.S. Government, there are also interagency relationships that contribute to mission success. As David Yamamoto recently outlined,

The Department of State collaborates with AFRICOM on a long list of issues such as military professionalization; building counterterrorism capacity, disaster management; peacekeeping capacity building; humanitarian operations coordinated with USAID; demining and ammunition handling training; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; destruction of excess small arms and light weapons and unstable ammunition; reduction of excess and poorly secured man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS); Defense Sector Reform in Liberia, the DRC, and South Sudan; counter-piracy activities off the Somali coast; maritime safety and security capacity building; and civil-military cooperation.\textsuperscript{138}

The role for SOF in many of these activities is clear. Here, too, effective communication—horizontally and vertically—is essential to ensure all the various agencies participating in a specific mission feel like trusted partners in the effort.

Finally, some policy decisions can have an unintended effect on local perceptions about SOF, and in turn can impact efforts to build trusted relationships. When the first SOF team deployed to the region, they lived in small huts or tents, caught and cooked their own food, and generally lived very much like the UPDF units and local communities. But according to several interviewees, a significant mistake was made when the Pentagon assigned a contractor to come in and build a relatively large base camp (based on an Iraq/Afghanistan model), with air conditioned tents, generators, a huge
industrial kitchen, private cooks, tons of fuel, motorized trucks to move around the base, etc. From the standpoint of perceptions and relationships management, this was somewhat counterproductive. In the view of soldiers and local communities in the Central African region, tons of money was being spent on pampering U.S. forces with luxury, while at the same time U.S. personnel were prohibited from going on patrol or directly engaging the LRA fighters. It must be kept in mind here that Uganda, the CAR, the DRC and South Sudan are all countries that were colonized by Europeans who built large comfortable bases and insulated themselves from the local populations. The images of those colonial periods have faded, but are still palpable—many African nations achieved their independence just 50-60 years ago. In this context, having U.S. military contractors build expensive bases with various creature comforts did not make a positive impression on those individuals with whom SOF teams would need to build relationships.

Some interviewees in this report described how the presence of these new bases created a physical and psychological barrier between U.S. advisors and African military counterparts. Members of the surrounding communities (as well as the UPDF) would feel suspicion, jealousy, or resentment at the obvious discrepancies between haves (U.S.) and have-nots (locals), and these feelings are not helpful for building trust and mutually respectful relationships. One interviewee described an instance in which a unit of African troops on patrol was forced by circumstances to go 3 days without eating, and meanwhile U.S. forces were back in their air conditioned bases having food cooked for them. Another interviewee pointed to “how expensive it all looks to the outsider (e.g., a local villager or soldier), especially when considering how much fuel is spent to run those air conditioners.” Essentially, an approach whereby SOF teams are seen by locals and African military counterparts to be “roughing it, like us” may be more beneficial in this environment. As noted earlier, perceptions can have a significant impact (positive or negative) on one’s ability to establish trusted working relationships in these environments.

This was, according to those who spoke of it, a policy and budget decision made in Washington, D.C.—it was not something requested by SOF units, nor does there appear to have been much (if any) input from people who really understood the local context, or with SOF expertise. SOF advisors would have preferred to embed with local units and hire their own local cooks rather than have these relatively luxurious and large complexes with
air-conditioning and contractors cooking food for them. As Richard Shultz recently noted, the U.S. Marines were successful in the Anbar province of Iraq because “they lived among and shared risks with those whose trust they sought.” This is a lesson that must be considered for future USSOF deployments to sub-Saharan Africa, recognizing the impact on perceptions and relationships that a seemingly simple “living quarters” decision can have.

**Summary**

Obviously, there are many different kinds of relationships that contribute to success in these kinds of missions. Operational partnerships with militaries in the African security context are noticeably different than with European or other traditional U.S. allies, particularly owing to varieties of training, equipment, doctrine, and professionalism. The concentration of authority among most African militaries often leads to micromanagement, with general officers making decisions about training curriculum and other things that could be decided far below him. But beyond peer-to-peer military partnerships, we find a range of other important relationships that must be established and nurtured for the sake of achieving the mission. Community leaders, tribal and clan elders, NGO representatives, even nomadic herders can play an important role in a collaborative security mission in sub-Saharan Africa. A variety of working relationships must also be established with representatives of the U.S. Department of State, USAID, and other government agencies. Throughout all of these, trust and effective communication are critical. The wrong message (or the wrong attitude), or an overall lack of communication, can significantly undermine the relationships that are so essential to the success of SOF deployments to sub-Saharan Africa.
7. Policy and Politics

Of all the themes discussed in this report, “policy” and “politics” are the least likely areas for SOF to have a direct impact. If anything, SOF military advisors on the C/LRA mission see themselves as implementing U.S. Government policy, not influencing it. But to the degree that SOF leaders can influence policymakers and politicians, there is a need to educate them about the ways in which their policies can have a positive or negative effect on the issues described in the previous chapters—preparation, logistics, perceptions, expectations and relationships. One topic in particular that was mentioned frequently during interviews for this report is the need to establish reasonable timeframes for a mission like this. As noted in the previous chapter, an honest appreciation for the learning process needs to be built in at the policy level when discussing the length of a particular deployment. Confidence, trust, and healthy interpersonal relationships take time to develop—there are no easy shortcuts. An appropriate amount of time must be invested to establish and nurture relationships. Further, short-term deployment rotations may create unnecessary difficulties in achieving the mission. In many situations, personal relationships are not easily transferrable, and each new team that arrives has to try and rebuild relationships that were established and nurtured by the previous team. This relationship-rebuilding process then detracts from the time available to focus on the mission itself. Some interviewees felt it would better to have longer-term deployments, and if possible have key personnel overlap for a period of time so new arrivals can be brought into established relationships with locals, and some form of continuity can be facilitated.

At the same time, several U.S. and Ugandan personnel expressed deep concerns that U.S. domestic politics or similar kinds of considerations may result in a premature closure of this mission. In their view, lots of positive developments would quickly crumble if this were to happen. Currently, the U.S. has committed an admittedly modest number of troops to this and a few other missions around sub-Saharan Africa, signaling to the UN, AU, Europe, and many others that even when our own national security is not directly at stake, the U.S. will come to the aid of others when requested. Withdrawing our presence before the mission is completed (defined in this mission as the removal from the battlefield of Joseph Kony and senior LRA leaders) would
send a powerfully negative message to hundreds of millions throughout Africa and elsewhere in the world. As noted earlier in this report, perceptions (ours as well as those of our partners) can have a significant impact on the success or failure of these kinds of missions. Thus, the October 2013 decision by President Obama to extend the SOF deployment for another full year, followed by the March 2014 decision to deploy an additional 150 SOF troops and aircraft, sent an important and powerful message about the U.S. commitment to the mission, a message which was welcomed throughout the region—except by Kony and his LRA fighters.

Comments and observations provided by interviewees in this report also focused on the need to understand the local political context of any collaborative security deployment to Africa. SOF personnel realized that the local military forces wanted to “own” the mission, and to own any “victory” they might achieve together. This makes intuitive sense—these are proud people, many of whom have been fighting the LRA for a long time, and they do not want there to be a perception of U.S. forces “coming in and mopping up their mess,” in essence making them look inferior. This same dynamic is likely going to be an issue for future U.S. deployments to Africa as well, so teams need to be mindful and sensitive to this. As Rear Admiral Losey noted, the C/LRA is, and will remain, an “African-led operation.”

This ‘indirect approach’—working with and through non-U.S. partners to achieve counterterrorism security objectives will be the primary form of U.S. military deployments in sub-Saharan Africa for the foreseeable future. Thus, an emphasis should be placed on pre-deployment SOF training about local and regional political dynamics. In many cases, these dynamics may have nothing to do with the specific mission objectives, but understanding the political context is an important dimension to achieving those objectives.

For example, several interviewees in this report mentioned a perception, shared by some locals they had encountered, that the Ugandan military may prefer to manage rather than to fully eradicate the LRA. They suggested that the UPDF benefits from the international attention and funding they receive in support of the C/LRA effort. Some locals also expressed the view that President Museveni wants to keep the military busy and relevant, justifying the government’s expenditures on the military (which as noted earlier, is a power base of his administration); better to have them occupied and paid, they argue, than sitting around ready and able to cause trouble in a country with a history of military coups. Further, many noted that Museveni may
actually feel he has benefitted from the historical pattern of LRA attacks against Acholi populations, because this reduces the likelihood that the Acholi will someday have the strength to rebel against his regime (a deep-seated fear based on the history described earlier in this report).

However, many interviewees for this research dismissed these perceptions as dark conspiracy theories, noting the many hardships that UPDF patrols continue to endure in the struggle to locate and apprehend Joseph Kony and LRA fighters, and praising their commitment and tenacity. Their view was generally that Museveni, and the UPDF, genuinely want an end to the conflict that has cost so much in lives and treasure, so that Uganda can focus its attention on other national priorities. Nonetheless, an understanding that this kind of perception exists actually enables the SOF leader to have a clear and nuanced vision of the political context in which the C/LRA operations are conducted. It must always be appreciated that some locals may be cynical or resistant to a mission like the C/LRA effort. If any policy lesson has been learned from the recent U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is that U.S. decision makers should not assume a warm welcome for doing what they think is in the local people’s best interests.

By extension, SOF leaders must also recognize the potential that American involvement in the fight against the LRA might be perceived among local populations as an effort to bolster Museveni’s regime. Given the history described earlier in this report—economic and political marginalization of northern Acholi tribes, internment camps, brutal military campaigns, political corruption—and the fact that Museveni has been in power for over 30 years, U.S. forces should be careful to avoid this kind of perception. Demonstrating a regional focus, as the U.S. effort does by operating outside of Uganda, may help to mitigate this perception.

Meanwhile, it should also be acknowledged that several interviewees in this report emphasized that most Ugandans do not view the LRA as a major security threat to their country. Some are even puzzled by the fact that the U.S. and other countries have become involved in the C/LRA effort several years after the group had been forced out of northern Uganda. To them (and too many UPDF troops), the major terrorist threat to Uganda today is al-Shabaab. The 2010 bombings in Kampala illustrated this threat most poignantly. For several years now, Uganda has contributed forces to AMISOM (Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Sierra Leone contribute as well) for the fight to secure Somalia. While a relatively minor political issue,
SOF teams should keep in mind that there are divergent opinions on the streets of Kampala about how ordinary Ugandan citizens benefit from U.S. involvement in the C/LRA effort.

Further, it should be remembered that suspicion about U.S. involvement in African Affairs is not uncommon. For example, when USAFRICOM was established in 2008, the Bush administration was startled to find negative reactions among African leaders and sparked widespread public debate. Local perceptions—often based more on speculation than facts or policy statements—began circulating in the media or by informal communications channels like Internet blogs. Journalists and media sources exploited African political sensitivities to fuel the perception that the United States wanted to base large numbers of troops and military equipment on the continent and play a more dominant role in the humanitarian and development realm. USAFRICOM’s leaders were confronted with newspaper headlines such as “Global Cop USA seeks more presence in Africa,” “The Americans Have Landed,” and “The Scramble for Africa’s Oil.” As a 2007 report to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations observed, “African sensitivity to colonial imperialism and suspicion of foreign intrigue to exploit resources runs deep.” While American engagement with Africa over the last half century has largely been defined by national security interests, whether the context has been Cold War or Global War on Terrorism, the existence of AFRICOM has fueled enduring perceptions about the militarization of American foreign policy toward Africa. These perceptions can post a critical challenge to a SOF unit’s ability to foster the kind of local collaboration and trust needed to successfully complete its mission. Appreciating and navigating these perceptions—and hopefully mitigating them through effective communication, trust, and respect—will be an enduring challenge of future SOF deployments to Africa.

Beyond the local level, an understanding of policy and politics throughout the region can also be necessary. In the case of Operation Observant Compass, the involvement of U.S. embassies in five different countries—Uganda, the DRC, the CAR, and South Sudan, and Sudan—brings a great deal of complexity, far more than would be evident in a bilateral military cooperation effort. Perhaps one of the most important untold stories in this entire C/LRA effort is the fact that the governments in this region agreed to work together toward a common goal, and has even accepted the assistance of a non-African partner in the mix. There is no real history of these neighboring
countries getting along well; cross-border suspicion and hostility have been more the norm throughout this region. Further, the personalities of leaders within each U.S. embassy, and their respective relationships with the host nation government’s leaders, have much to do with the acceptance of (or resistance to) the presence of U.S. advisors and/or UPDF units in their country. The White House must ensure a commitment to political heavy-lifting at all levels—domestic, bilateral, regional, multinational (including dealing with allies who have interests in the region)—in order to ensure the potential for success in these kinds of small SOF team deployments.

In this regard, one cannot underestimate the importance of multinational diplomatic negotiations that eventually allowed UPDF troops to cross borders in pursuit of LRA units. Without this, the LRA would find safe routes and safe haven in neighboring countries, inhibiting the operational effectiveness of any effort to track down and apprehend them. The critical importance of border security in a neighboring country was most recently seen during the last 12 years of U.S. military involvement in the Afghan-Pakistan tribal regions. In future SOF team deployments, U.S. diplomatic leaders must ensure that all neighboring countries are committed to preventing cross-border safe havens.

The diplomatic effort here must also deal with things like potential jealousy in one country about U.S. resources being given to a neighboring country—especially if there is a history of animosity between those two countries. As noted earlier, longstanding resource scarcity and a colonial legacy fuels perceptions, expectations and behavior in African countries. An appreciation for political history and regional dynamics is necessary for effective policymaking and planning for future SOF team missions in sub-Saharan Africa.

Policymakers also can contribute to (or conversely, impose constraints on) establishing and nurturing relationships in the field. Interviewees for this report noted the importance of having the flexibility and autonomy to make their own decisions, and to share information and resources in response to a particular situation. SOF teams are accustomed to this level of autonomy, which is necessary for working with and through partner militaries and local communities. As noted in the previous chapter, establishing relationships is a very contextual process, requiring individuals to make decisions that are situational appropriate at the time. SOF team members must have the freedom to leave the base camp, go out and have a beer or a meal and get to know their partners on an informal basis. Policymakers must trust in
the professional judgment of these SOF team members in this regard. However, one of the most common frustrations expressed by those interviewed for this report was that policy and regulations prohibited them from doing much of anything for the first nine months of the mission. Restrictions on patrols, human intelligence gathering, sharing technology, and other issues constrained the ability of U.S. personnel to address the perceptions and relationships aspects described earlier. Policies and authorities were revised in late summer 2012, and by autumn things had begun to move in a positive direction, producing what one interviewee characterized as a spiral of increasing transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness.

...SOF teams need the flexibility and freedom “to do things that matter”...

The lesson here is that SOF teams need the flexibility and freedom “to do things that matter,” things that can really have a positive impact on local communities. Those responsible for planning and policy regarding the C/LRA effort also recognized that military activities are necessary but insufficient in responding to the LRA threat. As U.S. Ambassador Donald Yamamoto explains,

In partnership with USAID, the State Department is supporting projects to increase civilian protection, enhance early warning capabilities, deliver humanitarian relief, and strengthen the overall resiliency of communities. We also continue to encourage other international donors to increase their efforts in these areas. As we have seen in northern Uganda and parts of South Sudan, development can play a critical role in pushing out the LRA and keeping it from returning.147

However, some military interviewees for this report described instances where they proposed a development project for an isolated community (e.g., digging a bore hole, building a road, etc.), but were told by representatives of the Department of State that they could not proceed because this was not deemed to be their role. Development projects, even seemingly minor ones, can yield huge dividends in building communication channels and important relationships with locals that can then translate into key sources of intelligence. While USAID and the Department of State are obviously committed to the enormous tasks at hand, it seems disingenuous at best to deny SOF teams the ability to also contribute their own development
projects, particularly when meeting the needs of locals can have a positive impact on the overall success of their mission. Further, one must consider this from the perspective of a local villager: it does not matter at all to them that “policy guidelines” constrain the ability of a SOF team to do a development project. All they see in this instance are military representatives of a resource-rich country, living in air-conditioned tents, who say they are unable to help them dig a well or fix a damaged road. Further, these same military units are asking local communities to take risks—there have been several instances in which LRA fighters attacked a village in retribution for serving as a “safe reporting site” for defectors and escapees. Policymakers in Washington, D.C. need to take this into account when considering policies and guidelines that may constrain the capabilities of SOF teams to do what is needed when deployed on these kinds of small footprint missions in developing countries.

Similarly, there may be a difference in risk aversion between the SOF teams and policymakers. SOF are accustomed to being in harm’s way and effectively managing risk, but know that missions are never without it. Policymakers on the other hand are often concerned with public opinion and may have a lower threshold of acceptable risk. An earlier chapter of this report discussed the importance of perceptions. In this instance, as noted earlier, there is a suspicion among some AU RTF troops and local villagers that if any U.S. soldier is injured or killed by the LRA, it would create a political backlash that would result in a pullout of all American forces from the region (some interviewees referred to the events in Mogadishu of 1993 as an example). Perhaps, it is felt, such an event would even undermine USAFRICOM’s ability to deploy SOF teams in the future to other trouble spots in Africa. While these suspicions may be based more on speculation than on fact, they can be largely mitigated by a SOF team that has fewer operational constraints and more freedom to do what is needed, and by a Congress and American public that is visibly and vocally supportive of the mission.

Finally, Congress must resource USSOCOM and the Combatant Commands appropriately for these kinds of missions. Some interviewees in this report expressed frustration that USAFRICOM staff appeared overburdened. Over the past four years the number of personnel deployed to Africa has expanded over six-fold yet the size of the staff at USAFRICOM has remained roughly the same despite the exponential growth in operational tempo and responsibilities. Similarly, there are too few Defense Attachés or others
within the DOD who can offer significant Africa-relevant knowledge and experience. Earlier, this report discussed the need to manage expectations. If we expect USAFRICOM to support SOF teams deployed on missions like this in sub-Saharan Africa, there needs to be a thorough review and, if necessary, redress of this combatant command’s budgetary and personnel resources.

Summary

While these issues of policy and politics impact the other themes discussed in earlier chapters of this report, it is recognized that they will have only limited relevance for SOF education and training programs, a primary audience for the report. But they are based on observations and comments provided by professionals and others in the field, and thus can be useful for developing a sensitivity and appreciation for these issues among future SOF teams deploying to sub-Saharan Africa. To the degree that this report is read by senior SOF decision makers or policymakers in Washington, D.C., it is hoped that consideration of these issues will inform future policies governing the nature of future SOF team deployments—especially regarding expectations and timeframes.
8. Conclusion

According to Ambassador Yamamoto, “Ending the LRA threat is not an easy mission. The LRA operates in very small groups across vast territory roughly the size of California, much of it densely-forested.”\textsuperscript{148} The U.S. has contributed a relatively small team—approximately 100 military and civilian personnel in the original deployment, with an additional 150 SOF personnel deployed in March 2014—responsible for accomplishing or supporting a broad spectrum of tactical, operational, and strategic objectives indirectly through four regional partner nations and their security forces.\textsuperscript{149} This is an example of what makes SOF “special”—their ability to work indirectly through local allies and embedded in foreign cultures.\textsuperscript{150} As Fernando Lujan observed, SOF are “talented, adaptable professionals who are not only fluent in language, culture, politics and interpersonal relationships but also willing to deploy for long periods and operate with little guidance.”\textsuperscript{151} This kind of human capital is the most critical resource in meeting the kinds of security challenges we face today and in the foreseeable future.

As Dr. Yarger recently noted, special operations “are characterized by one or more of the following: subtlety and imagination in planning and execution, time and political sensitivity, low visibility, support of indigenous forces, discriminate use of violence, need for regional expertise, oversight at the highest levels, and a high degree of risk.”\textsuperscript{152} They require “special people, doctrine, organizations, technology and equipment.”\textsuperscript{153} Recently, Admiral McRaven set a goal for USSOCOM to develop greater capabilities in the areas of gathering intelligence and training foreign militaries to counter terrorists, drug traffickers, and insurgents, among other things.\textsuperscript{154} Certainly, experiences and lessons drawn from the C/LRA deployment can inform the development of these capabilities. SOF have now spent over 18 months working with UPDF and other regional military forces as they conduct operations against the LRA. U.S. military advisors have, as recently noted by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Amanda Dory, “established a good foundation and made initial progress, especially considering the complexity of the operating environment, the number of partners involved, and the remoteness of the operational areas.”\textsuperscript{155}

This research into their experiences of the last 18 months has identified four areas of particular interest for future SOF deployments to sub-Saharan
Africa: (1) preparations and logistics, (2) perceptions and expectations management, (3) partnerships and relationship management, and (4) policy and politics. Surely there are lessons from this deployment that future research will uncover as well. The report is meant to be useful for SOF training and education. If anything, the C/LRA experience indicates that future SOF deployments to sub-Saharan Africa require special kinds of training and preparation in order to be successful. Trainers should promote discussion about the critical importance of building and nurturing relationships with locals and managing expectations. SOF teams deploying to Africa should also be committed to understanding and influencing perceptions (of our intentions, our capabilities, our integrity and accountability, etc.). Certainly there will be a need for detailed discussions about logistics and preparing for the unique kinds of physical and cultural terrains found throughout sub-Saharan Africa. And SOF pre-deployment education should also examine the local drivers of conflict (for example, unequal resource distribution, or tribal/clan/ethnic political marginalization) and other historical aspects of the specific context to which the team will be deployed.

Identifying the right sort of individuals for these missions is critical. It is also clear that pre-deployment training must involve experts on the sub-region to which they will be deployed. In addition to sub-Saharan Africa foreign affairs officers within the U.S. DOD, other expert resources include NGO representatives, U.S. Department of State officers, and others with real on-the-ground experience in the country (or countries) to which they will be deployed. Of course, one should be wary of anyone who calls himself or herself an “Africa expert” —this is a continent that is four times larger than the U.S., with 54 independent countries and vast cultural, tribal, geographic, political, economic, and ethno-linguistic diversity. Each country has many tribes, languages, dialects, and religious differences. In some cases, a country’s borders are merely lines on a map, with no physical evidence on the ground. Even someone who has studied Africa for an entire lifetime, lived there and developed an encyclopedic base of knowledge can still only know a small percentage of what is knowable about Africa.
Beyond training, it is important that policymakers in Washington, D.C. are mindful of the issues raised in this report, particularly with regard to establishing unreasonable timelines and expectations for the African context. As this report has emphasized in several places, things take time in Africa, and expectations for mission completion based on how things get done in the U.S. are completely unreasonable and counterproductive. There are no shortcuts one can take when building trusted relationships, the cornerstone of activities throughout the African continent. This must be taken into account in budgeting decisions, logistics and rotation plans, and everything else surrounding a deployment of U.S. forces to Africa.

Equally important is the dimension of multinational and multi-entity collaboration. As U.S. Ambassador Johnnie Carson noted at the “Global Summit on the Lord’s Resistance Army” in November 2012,

One of the remarkable things about this effort is that it has brought together an unusual, non-traditional coalition—involving UN peacekeepers and civil affairs officers, former abductees, community radio operators, religious leaders, local self-defense groups, aid workers, international diplomats, peace mediators, philanthropists, and not to forget, all of you here today.\textsuperscript{157}

These kinds of collaborations can only happen through interpersonal relationships, a topic addressed in Chapter 6 of this report. Establishing and nurturing relationships is how things get done in Africa. SOF personnel must exercise patience, invest heavily in frequent and effective two-way communication, manage expectations (both among our own forces and among our partner forces and local communities), and share information and resources.

Finally, in addition to relationships and time, the third most common word that interviewees for this report used to describe U.S. deployments to Africa is humility. In many cases, individuals noted that U.S. personnel recognized the need to acknowledge what they did not know, which requires a great deal of humility and maturity. The same is needed among policymakers who set parameters, restrictions, and expectations for these kinds of deployments. These parameters must reflect the nature of the local context and a realistic appraisal of what U.S. military advisors can do in this context.

The effort to locate and apprehend Joseph Kony and members of the LRA is without doubt an important initiative on its own merits. It is one of Africa’s oldest, most violent and persistent armed groups.\textsuperscript{158} But the C/LRA
mission also serves as a useful model for future U.S. force deployments in collaboration with our partners on the African continent. Over the past year and a half, the U.S. has deployed military advisors and increased our logistical support to regional military operations. At the same time, we have deployed civilian officers and expanded programs to promote defections from the LRA, establish communications networks, and empower affected communities. Clearly there is much that can be learned from this security collaboration effort. This report hopefully makes a contribution to that learning.
Endnotes


7. Ibid.


AFRICOM is the combatant command within the Department of Defense that manages security cooperation initiatives with the militaries of African nations.


The source of all data cited in this paragraph is the 2012 CIA World Factbook, online at: http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook.


33. Basically, the LRA became a proxy for President Bashir in his fight against the SPLA.


35. Ibid., 12.

36. Ibid., 14-15.


42. However, Uganda allowed its Amnesty Act to expire in May of 2012.


45. Ibid., 322.
46. Ibid., 322. Some observers believe Kony never intended to sign any peace agreement, but was just stalling to buy time. According to one interviewee, he had even sent scouts to CAR early in the negotiations in order to identify a suitable area to relocate.


53. Ibid.


59. LRA Crisis Tracker, p. 5.

60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
71. For more discussion on the Obama administration’s efforts, see “Peace Can Be: President Obama’s chance to help end LRA atrocities in 2012.” Resolve, February 2012. Online at: http://www.theresolve.org/our-publications.
73. Ibid.
82. Earl W. Gast, “Countering the Lord’s Resistance Army.”
83. Ibid.


95. Ibid.


97. For more on this, see Fernando M. Lujan, Light Footprints, p. 27.

98. For example, see “Five Former LRA Escape to Mboki, Invisible Children, January 24, 2013. Online at: http://blog.invisiblechildren.com/2013/01/24/five-former-lra-escape-to-mboki/.


100. For more on this, see Janice Burton, “Special Operations in Africa,” p. 20.


104. Ibid., 29-30.


107. The copyright for this photo is held by an individual who agreed to allow its use, but requested to remain anonymous.

108. Ibid.

110. It should be noted that the UPDF do not have access to operate in DRC, however. Their presence would be a serious political problem for President Kabila, given the considerable history of hostilities between Uganda and DRC.


113. Interviewee #9, interviewed January 9, 2013.

114. The copyright for this photo is held by an individual who agreed in writing to allow their use for this report, but requested to remain anonymous.

115. Ibid.


123. See note #103.


129. Fernando M. Lujan, Light Footprints, p. 5.


134. The copyright for this photo is held by an individual who agreed in writing to allow its use for this report, but requested to remain anonymous.

135. Ambassador Johnnie Carson, “U.S. Efforts to Counter the Lord’s Resistance Army.”


137. Johnnie Carson, “U.S. Efforts to Counter the Lord’s Resistance Army.”


142. In fact, the U.S. and others have provided training on urban counterterrorism tactics and other topics to Ugandan Special Forces in support of this effort.


144. Mark Malan, “AFRICOM: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?”


151. Fernando Lujan, Light Footprints, 2013, p. 23.


153. Ibid., p. 53.


156. It is hoped that this report will also be of some use to AFRICOM, though it is understood that there is already a good deal of internal communication and discussion about most of the issues raised here.


159. Ambassador Johnnie Carson, “Global Summit on the Lord’s Resistance Army.”