Iraq Crisis and U.S. Policy

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Summary

The offensive in northern and central Iraq led by the Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group the Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIL/ISIS) has raised significant concerns for the United States and precipitated new U.S. military action in Iraq. U.S. concerns include a possible breakup of Iraq’s political and territorial order; the establishment of a potential base for terrorist attacks in the region or even against the U.S. homeland; the potential for a humanitarian catastrophe; and direct threats to the approximately 5,000 U.S. personnel in Iraq.

The crisis has raised several questions for U.S. policy because it represents the apparent unraveling of a seemingly stable and secure Iraq that was in place when U.S. combat troops departed Iraq at the end of 2011. The Islamic State offensive into Kurdish-controlled territory in early August has caused the United States to become reengaged militarily in Iraq. The Administration has said its intervention will remain limited and will not result in a deployment of U.S. ground troops back into Iraq. The Administration also has engaged in humanitarian air drops to members of minority communities in northern Iraq that fled the IS onslaught.

The 2014 crisis has been several years in the making. Some months after the U.S. departure from Iraq, the uprising in Syria among some elements of the Sunni Arab community there facilitated the reemergence of the Islamic State in areas of Syria and in its original base in Iraq. After 2011, the Sunni community grew increasingly restive as Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki marginalized senior Sunni leaders, and the skills and capabilities of the Iraq Security Forces deteriorated as defense cooperation with the United States languished. Many Sunnis in Iraq oppose the Islamic State’s tactics and attempts to impose Islamic law, but support it as a vanguard against what they characterize as an oppressive Shiite-dominated national government.

U.S. officials assess that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) or the peshmerga militia of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) will not be able to recapture lost territory without outside help. In June, President Obama announced several steps to help the Iraqi government confront the IS threat, but the Administration had made additional action contingent on Iraqi leaders’ rebuilding a political consensus. The newly elected Iraqi parliament convened on July 2 and has selected new parliamentary speakers and a new President, but has not reached consensus on the prime ministership. Maliki is seeking another term as Prime Minister but several Iraqi factions say he is likely to be replaced. The Administration had not set any preconditions for action on behalf of Iraq’s Kurds, who maintain their own separate regional government.

An aspect of the U.S. response could potentially involve working with Iran to reform the Iraqi political structure and to try to roll back the IS gains. However, many Sunnis in Iraq and elsewhere in the region view any U.S. engagement with Iran with suspicion and hostility. U.S. officials have generally dismissed prospects for direct military cooperation with Iran.

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Overview: The Situation in Iraq

On June 29, 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, aka ISIS) changed its formal name to simply “the Islamic State” (IS) and declared the establishment of a caliphate in areas under its control in Iraq and Syria. The IS advances within Iraq since June 2014 raise questions about the future of Iraq and the region and pose U.S. policy challenges. The sections below analyze the Islamic State-led offensive, its implications, the U.S. response, and related issues. Previous events and developments, which provide background information potentially relevant to understanding the causes of the offensive and the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) collapse in northern Iraq, are analyzed in greater detail in CRS Report RS21968, *Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL33487, *Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response*, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard; and CRS Report R43612, *Iraq Crisis and U.S. Policy*, by Kenneth Katzman et al.

Islamic State June 2014 Offensive and ISF Retreat

Many observers assessed that the Iraqi government contained an earlier IS-led insurrection that began in Anbar Province in January 2014, even though the government had been unable to regain control of the city of Fallujah from IS-led forces. Such assessments were upended on June 10, 2014, when the Islamic State captured the northern city of Mosul amid mass surrenders and desertions by ISF officers and personnel. According to one expert, about 60 out of 243 Iraqi army combat battalions could not be accounted for.1 In its offensive, the Islamic State reportedly has been either joined, supported, or enabled by Sunni tribal fighters, former members of the late Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party and military, and other Sunni residents.2 Their enabling of the offensive, despite reservations among many Sunnis about the Islamic State’s brutal tactics against opponents and its intention to impose their version of Islamic law, appears to reflect broad Sunni dissatisfaction with the government of Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki.3 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 18, 2014, that “ISIL [now IS] is almost undistinguishable from the other groups” currently fighting the Maliki government.4

After taking Mosul, the IS-led fighters advanced to Saddam’s hometown of Tikrit and other cities, and into Diyala Province, which has roughly equal numbers of Sunnis and Shiites. In the course of the offensive, IS and allied fighters looted banks, freed prisoners, and reportedly captured a substantial amount of U.S.-supplied military equipment, such as HMMWVs (“Humvees”) and artillery equipped with Global Positioning System (GPS) targeting systems.5 Islamic State-led fighters captured the city of Tal Afar west of Mosul on June 16 and reached the outskirts of Baqubah, capital of Diyala, about 38 miles northeast of Baghdad, by June 17. Islamic State-led insurgents in Anbar, with the support of some tribal allies, reportedly seized additional cities along the Euphrates River in that province, including Haditha. In mid-July, IS members in Mosul reportedly ordered remaining Christians there to leave the city, and most apparently complied.6 After initially establishing a relatively quiet front line with territory controlled by

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4 Testimony of Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Martin Dempsey, Senate Armed Services Committee, June 18, 2014.
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and its peshmerga militia fighters, IS-led fighters went on the offensive against Kurdish-controlled territory in early August, as discussed in a separate section below.

Islamic State-led militant attacks on the country’s main oil refinery at Baiji have caused gasoline shortages in northern Iraq, including in the KRG. However, the effect of the fighting on Iraq’s overall oil production and exports has been limited, in large part because about 75% of Iraq’s oil is produced and exported from Iraq’s south, where Sunni insurgents are far fewer in number.

Shiite militias mobilized to try to help the government prevent IS forces from reaching Baghdad. The Iraqi capital is reportedly about 80% Shiite-inhabited, and many Sunnis there and from elsewhere volunteered for militia service—in part answering a call by Iraq’s leading Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani—to help the ISF. With support from these militias, the government forces regrouped to some extent, and U.S. officials expressed confidence that the IS-led offensive would not capture the city outright, although the ISF might yet lose parts of the city. Islamic State-led militants have been able to approach Baghdad International Airport to the southwest of the city. ISF-led forces have conducted some limited counterattacks on Tikrit and cities near Tikrit in Anbar Province, but General Dempsey stated on July 3 that the ISF would have difficulty recapturing any lost ground without external support.

As a consequence of the reliance on the Shiite militias, sectarian violence in Baghdad reportedly has escalated as Shiites retaliate against Sunnis for the IS-led offensive and Sunnis respond. The United Nations reported that June 2014 was the deadliest month in Iraq since 2008 with about 2,400 Iraqis killed, of which about two-thirds were said to be civilians and the remainder ISF personnel.

As the crisis has unfolded, Prime Minister Maliki—who seeks a third term as Prime Minister in the government formation process resulting from April 30, 2014, national elections—has worked with loyalist Iraqi commanders. Iraq’s small air force has been conducting air strikes on IS positions since June 12. Maliki’s emphasis on militarily countering the offensive—rather than on reaching out to the disaffected Sunni Arab community—appears intended to shore up his base in the Shiite community as Iraqi leaders try to determine his political fate. Maliki has maintained this stance despite a public call by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry for the Iraqi people “to find leadership ... that is prepared to be inclusive and share power.”

Iraq’s Kurds Take Advantage of ISF Collapse

The ISF collapse in the north enabled the Kurdish peshmerga to capture Kirkuk and large nearby oil fields abandoned by the ISF. The Kurds have long sought to control that oil-rich region, which they claim is historic Kurdish territory, and to affiliate the province with the KRG. On July 11, peshmerga reportedly seized control of two key oil fields near Kirkuk from a state-controlled company. Many experts assert that the Kurds are unlikely to willingly return control of Kirkuk and related areas to the central government. The KRG captures prompted renewed discussion among KRG leaders about seeking outright

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independence from Iraq, and in early July KRG President Masoud Barzani asked the KRG parliament to plan a referendum on independence. That step appeared to defy reported private U.S. official urgings for the Iraqi Kurds not to seek independence and to instead work with other factions to form an inclusive central government.

It is unclear whether the potential for Kurdish secession to trigger political and military responses from Baghdad or neighboring countries, coupled with the likely loss of its receipts of a percentage of Iraq’s nationwide oil revenue, might lead the Kurds to defer a decision on formal independence. The Kurds in Iraq already have a substantial degree of autonomy. KRG leaders might be using the independence issue, along with their newly controlled territory, as leverage in their disputes with Baghdad. KRG leaders strongly oppose a third term for Prime Minister Maliki, and they suspended their participation in Iraq’s current government in response to Maliki’s July 2014 accusations that Kurds were complicit in the June IS-led offensive. That same day, Maliki replaced Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari, a Kurd, with deputy prime minister Hussein Shahristani, a Shiite from Maliki’s coalition.

Islamic State Goes on Offensive Against Kurdish-Controlled Territory

The benefits the KRG accrued in the Iraq crisis were threatened in early August 2014 when IS-led forces advanced into territory controlled by the peshmerga. The relatively lightly armed Kurdish forces were overrun or fled numerous towns inhabited mostly by Christians and other Iraqi minorities, particularly the Yazidis. These towns included Sinjar, Zumar, Wana, and Qaraqosh, and IS-led forces advanced to the country’s largest dam, the Mosul Dam, as well. Fearing IS threats to execute them if they did not convert to Islam, tens of thousands of Yazidis fled to Sinjar Mountain, where they found themselves trapped by IS-led forces below. The Yazidis are mostly Kurdish speaking and practice a mix of ancient religions, including Zoroastrianism, which held sway in Iran before the advent of Islam. By August 8, IS-led fighters had advanced to within about 40 miles of the KRG capital of Irbil, causing substantial panic among Iraq’s Kurds who had long thought the KRG region fully secure, and causing U.S. concern about the security of U.S. diplomatic and military personnel there. The central government air forces and possibly Turkey’s jets responded by striking IS positions in the north. The U.S. response is discussed below.

Humanitarian Implications

Although the needs of all internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Iraq remain significant, civilians trapped in conflict-affected areas, whose access to basic services is curtailed or non-existent, are considered to be in urgent need of lifesaving humanitarian assistance. The sudden additional displacements in northern Iraq—an estimated 200,000 have reportedly been displaced by the fighting in Sinjar and surrounding areas—have resulted in a deterioration of the humanitarian situation there. Although the exact number is unknown, between 35,000 and 50,000 IDPs could be trapped on Sinjar Mountain, reportedly surrounded by armed Islamic State forces. There is an immediate need for food, water, shelter, and health services.

13 For more information on the Kurds and the potential for the Iraqi Kurds to declare independence, see CRS Report IN10105, The Kurds and Possible Iraqi Kurdish Independence, by Jim Zanotti and Kenneth Katzman.
The Islamic State reportedly controls the two roads on the mountain. In addition, there are reports of smaller numbers of IDPs trapped elsewhere in the area and surrounded by the Islamic State. Serious human rights violations by the Islamic State have emerged, including murder, kidnappings, forced conversions, and physical and sexual assault.¹⁸

National and international humanitarian efforts have been severely constrained in providing assistance and protection to these IDPs. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) is coordinating with the U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) to determine how best to facilitate a response. U.N. and humanitarian partners are ready to assist, but need guarantees of safe and unhindered access of humanitarian staff and relief supplies to those in need.

The U.N. Secretary-General issued a statement on August 7, 2014, condemning the attacks in Iraq and the impact on vulnerable minority communities.¹⁹ The members of the U.N. Security Council also issued a statement condemning the situation in Nineveh and urging the international community to provide support to those in need. The Security Council reiterated that widespread or systematic attacks directed against a civilian population because of their ethnic background or political or religious beliefs could constitute a crime against humanity, and further, that all parties must abide by international humanitarian law. It urged the parties to stop human rights violations and enable humanitarian access and the delivery of assistance.²⁰ UNAMI announced possible plans for a humanitarian corridor to enable those under threat to reach safe areas.²¹

The Crisis’s Implications for Iraqi Government Formation

The crisis has the potential to produce major change in Iraq’s leadership—in part to address stated U.S. concerns that Maliki is largely to blame for the crisis by alienating the Sunni community. Elections were held on April 30, 2014, for the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR), which has yet to fully form a new government. Several Iraqi factions—as well as some within Maliki’s core coalition—oppose a third term for Maliki as Prime Minister in spite of the dominant performance of the Maliki-led “State of Law” coalition in the election. The new COR convened July 2 and several times thereafter to begin the government formation process, and succeeded on July 15 in selecting as COR Speaker Salim al Jabburi (a Sunni Arab), and two deputies: Haidar al Abbadi, a Shiite who belongs to Maliki’s Da’wa Party, and Aram al Sheikh Mohammad, a Kurd from the Gorran (Change) party. On July 23, 2014, the COR selected another member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Fouad Massoum, as President. He replaced PUK leader Jalal Talabani, who had returned to Iraq earlier in July after nearly two years of treatment in Germany for a 2012 stroke. Within two weeks of his selection, the president is constitutionally required to tap the candidate of the “largest bloc” in the COR to be Prime Minister by forming a government (within 30 days).

Massoum did not ask any figure to form a government by the August 7 deadline, and there still is no clear indication of who will hold the powerful executive post of Prime Minister. By informal agreement, the COR speakership is held by a Sunni Arab; the largely ceremonial presidency is held by a Kurd; and the

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¹⁸ UNAMI, Public Information Office, “UN Gravely Concerned about Situation in Northern Iraq; Calls for Urgent Response,” August 7, 2014.
²¹ Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, “Highlights of the Noon Briefing,” August 8, 2014; UNAMI, “UN Prepares Humanitarian Corridor as Envoy Calls on Leaders to Put Iraq’s Interests Ahead of their Personal Aspirations,” August 8, 2014.
Prime Minister is a Shiite Arab. Maliki is arguing that he should retain his post because his coalition won far more seats in the April 30 election than did any other bloc, and, running in Baghdad Province, he won by far the most votes of any single candidate in the election. Maliki’s chances of securing a third term appeared to fade after June 20, when Ayatollah Sistani issued a statement that the major factions should form “an effective government that enjoys broad national support, avoids past mistakes, and opens new horizons toward a better future for all Iraqis.”

Potential candidates to replace Maliki include two other figures from his Da’wa Party (the core of his State of Law coalition): Tariq Najm al Abdullah and acting Minister of National Security (intelligence) Falah al Fayyad. State of Law coalition member, foreign minister, and deputy prime minister Hussein Shahristani also may be a candidate. Some observers assert that Shiite factions might turn to former Prime Minister Ibrahim al Jafari, whom Maliki displaced in 2006.

Other Possible Outcomes

Some of the longer-term possibilities, which are not mutually exclusive, include

- **An IS-led seizure or siege of Baghdad or Irbil.** These developments could cause the central government or the KRG government to fall and the Islamic State to expand the boundaries of the “caliphate” that it has declared. The outright seizure of Baghdad and/or Irbil are considered unlikely, but sieges of either city are possible. The fall or siege of Baghdad could prompt large-scale Iranian ground intervention. The fall of Baghdad or Irbil would raise the likelihood of U.S. ground intervention as well.

- **De facto federalism or partition of Iraq.** Another possible outcome could be that the Islamic State fails to take Baghdad, but the Maliki government, the ISF, and Maliki’s Shiite allies are unable to push the insurrection back. That could produce a new, accepted but informal, political structure in which each of the major communities—Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds—administers areas under its de facto political and military control.

- **Long-standing civil war.** Another potential outcome is that the situation in Iraq devolves into a long-term outright civil war, in which forces loyal to the various parties—to the Sunni insulation, the KRG, and the Maliki government and its Shiite militia supporters—alternately gain and lose territory in a long struggle for power.

- **A restoration of the pre-2013 situation.** It is possible that Shiite militias, the ISF, and the Kurdish peshmerga could, by working together and with some outside assistance, recapture the territory gained by the IS-led offensives. That could calm the current crisis but might not necessarily quiet Sunni unrest over the longer term.

U.S. Response

President Obama and other U.S. officials attributed the June ISF collapse largely to the failure of Iraqi leaders, particularly Maliki, to build an inclusive government that could hold the allegiance of Sunni citizens or Sunni ISF personnel. Citing the legacy of the U.S. intervention in Iraq and the potential IS
 threat to U.S. interests, President Obama stated on June 13, 2014, that the Iraqi government “needs additional support to break the momentum of extremist groups and bolster the capabilities of Iraqi security forces.”

25 He announced several actions on June 19, 2014, and, in response to the encroachment into Kurdish-controlled parts of northern Iraq, several additional actions on August 7, 2014.

- **Advice, Training, and Intelligence Gathering.** In his June 19 statement, President Obama announced that he was sending up to 300 U.S. military personnel to serve as advisers and to assess the ISF and gather intelligence on the Islamic State. An additional 500 forces were sent to help secure the U.S. Embassy and other U.S. facilities in Baghdad and Irbil, as well as to protect evacuation routes such as the international airport in Baghdad, and to operate surveillance aircraft. As of early August, almost all of the military personnel authorized had arrived and the advisers had formed “Joint Operations Centers” in Baghdad (U.S.-ISF) and Irbil (U.S.-peshmerga). The advisers submitted their assessment of the ISF to U.S. Defense Department officials, which reportedly concluded that only about half of all ISF units are sufficiently capable for U.S. advisers to help them regain captured territory, were the President to decide on such an expanded mission. 27 Such a mission, if successful, would presumably reduce the geographic and political space available to the Islamic State. On the other hand, a combat advisory mission to assist the ISF could potentially contradict President Obama’s statement on June 19, 2014, that the United States “will not pursue military actions that support one sect inside of Iraq at the expense of another.”

28 Some commentators further argue that an advisory mission creates a potential for expanding U.S. involvement beyond what President Obama announced.

- **U.S. combat troop deployment.** President Obama has repeatedly ruled out this option, including in his August 7 statement authorizing limited airstrikes on the Islamic State. 29 There may be several reasons for ruling out this option, including public opinion within the United States as well as the view asserted by the Administration that U.S. troops would not solve the crisis in Iraq. Were this an active option, one potential complication is that there is no active “Status of Forces” Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq that would give U.S. military personnel legal immunity from Iraqi law. The advisers discussed above are operating under a temporary SOFA specific for their mission. For further information on presidential authorization to use force in Iraq, see CRS Report IN10106, *Use of Force Considerations in Iraq,* by Matthew C. Weed.

- **Airstrikes.** The U.S. advisers discussed above, as well as stepped-up manned and unmanned surveillance flights (50 such flights a day as of late July, according to testimony by Defense Department personnel on July 24) were tasked with gathering intelligence for potential U.S. airstrikes against IS leaders and bases in Iraq. 30 No decision on strikes was announced until the IS-led offensive in northern Iraq in early August that brought the militants close to Irbil. U.S. officials and outside experts had initially asserted that airstrikes alone would not defeat the IS-led insurrection and could

29 White House, op. cit.
conceivably further harden the Sunni-tribal-Islamic State alliance of convenience. Former top U.S. commander in Iraq General David Petraeus expressed an additional pitfall to significant airstrikes, saying: “This cannot be the United States being the air force for [Shiite] militias or a [Shiite] on Sunni Arab fight.” Citing as an objective stopping the IS-led advance on Irbil and the threat to American diplomats and advisers there, on August 7, 2014, President Obama stated that he had authorized “targeted airstrikes against [IS] terrorist convoys should they move toward the city.” Using that authorization from President Obama, on August 8, U.S. combat aircraft and armed unmanned aerial vehicles struck an IS mobile artillery piece, a convoy, and a mortar position—all near Irbil and all purportedly attacking Kurdish forces defending the city. Administration officials added that U.S. airstrikes could be used in support of KRG forces to enable the Yazidis on Sinjar Mountain to descend and safely move to other areas of northern Iraq. Despite Administration assertions to the contrary, the start of airstrike activity in Iraq raised questions among some experts about whether the United States would get drawn into renewed major involvement in Iraq.

- **Arms Deliveries.** An option is to sell additional military equipment, such as tanks and armored vehicles, to forces in Iraq, or to accelerate deliveries of arms already purchased. The United States has approved the delivery to Baghdad of 36 F-16 aircraft and the sale and lease of Apache attack helicopters. However, as of early August 2014, only one of the F-16s has been delivered. The United States has been delivering additional HELLFIRE missiles that Iraq’s small air force is using against IS targets. On July 29, the Defense Department said it is selling Baghdad 5,000 additional HELLFIREs. However, the capture of U.S.-supplied weaponry by IS fighters in the June offensive raises the risk that new and more sophisticated U.S. weapons could fall into IS hands. Moreover, U.S. officials and Members of Congress have previously expressed concerns about the potential for the Iraqi government to use sophisticated air assets against protesters and civilian opponents rather than IS targets.

- **The IS-led offensive had led the KRG to seek to purchase U.S. arms, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery. Until the IS-led offensive against the KRG in early August, the Administration had rebuffed the request, on the grounds that all arms sales must go to the central government, and not any regional governments. Because the peshmerga’s lack of heavy weaponry had affected their performance against the IS-led offensive, the Administration in early August authorized the direct supply to the KRG of munitions and, with Baghdad’s agreement, the shipment of some Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program weapons to the Kurds.

- **Humanitarian Airdrops.** On August 7, 2014, under the direction of U.S. Central Command, the U.S. military conducted a humanitarian assistance operation in Northern Iraq to airdrop food and water to those trapped near Sinjar. U.S. officials report that the Iraqi government requested the assistance and also conducted its own airdrops earlier on

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The Islamic State (IS)\(^{37}\)

On June 29, 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, aka ISIS) formally declared the establishment of an Islamic caliphate extending from Aleppo province in Syria to Diyala province in Iraq. The declaration named ISIL’s leader Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al Badri al Samarra’i (aka Abu Bakr al Baghdadi)\(^{38}\) as imam and caliph and noted that the group would henceforth be known as the Islamic State (IS)\(^{39}\).

The Islamic State is a transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that has expanded its control over areas of northwestern Iraq and northeastern Syria since 2013. The group’s ideological and organizational roots lie in the forces built and led by the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq from 2002 through 2006—Tawhid wal Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad) and Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers (aka Al Qaeda in Iraq, or AQ-I). Following Zarqawi’s death at the hands of U.S. forces in June 2006, AQ-I leaders repackaged the group as a coalition known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). ISI was weakened, but not eliminated, by the time of the U.S. withdrawal in 2011. Under the leadership of Baghdadi, ISI rebuilt its capabilities. By early 2013, the group was conducting dozens of deadly attacks a month inside Iraq. The precise nature of the relationship between ISI/IS and Al Qaeda leaders from 2006 onward is unclear. In recent months, IS leaders have stated their view that their group “is not and has never been an offshoot of Al Qaeda,”\(^{40}\) and that, given that they view themselves as a state and a sovereign political entity, they have given leaders of the Al Qaeda organization deference rather than pledges of obedience.

ISIL was formed in April 2013, when Al Baghdadi announced his intent to merge his forces in Iraq and Syria with those of the Syria-based Jabhat al Nusra (Support Front). Nusra Front and Al Qaeda leaders rejected the merger, underscoring growing tensions among Sunni extremists in the region that have since erupted into conflict. In July 2013, ISIL attacked prisons at Abu Ghraib and Taji in Iraq, reportedly freeing several hundred detained members. ISIL continued a fierce wave of attacks across northern, western, and central Iraq, while in Syria the group consolidated control over the city and province of Raqqa and expanded its presence in northwestern areas then controlled by other rebel forces. Late 2013 saw the Iraqi government seeking expanded counterterrorism and military assistance from the United States, ostensibly to meet the growing ISIL threat. Inside Syria, ISIL alienated its rebel counterparts further, and an anti-ISIL campaign erupted there in early 2014, expelling the group from some areas it had controlled and unleashing a cycle of ongoing infighting. In Syria, ISIL remains strongest in Raqqa, Dayr az Zawr, and Hasakah. ISIL’s attempts to assert control over the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi in Iraq’s Anbar province and its June 2014 offensive in northern Iraq underscored the group’s lethality and ability to conduct combat operations and manage partnerships with local groups in multiple areas over large geographic distances. The durability of the Islamic State’s partnerships is questionable: it remains at violent odds with Islamist and secular armed groups in Syria, and tribal, Islamist, and Baathist armed groups in Iraq have a history of opposing IS’s previous incarnations.

Statements and media materials released by IS figures reflect an uncompromising, exclusionary worldview. Statements by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and ISIS spokesman Abu Mohammed al Adnani feature sectarian calls for violence and identify Shiites, non-Muslims, and unsupportive Sunnis as enemies.\(^{41}\) The group describes Iraqi Shiites derogatorily as “rejectionists” and “polytheists” and paints the Iraqi government of Nuri al Maliki as a puppet of Iran. Similar ire is aimed at Syrian Alawites and the government of Bashar al Asad, although some sources allege that ISIL operatives have benefitted from evolving financial and security arrangements with Damascus dating back to the time of the U.S. presence in Iraq.

Senior U.S. officials have stated that the Islamic State poses a serious threat to the United States and maintains training camps in Iraq and Syria, but presently lacks the capability to carry out operations on U.S. territory.\(^{42}\) In July 2012, Al Baghdadi warned U.S. leaders that “the war with you has just begun.” In January 2014, he said, “Know, O defender of the Cross, that a proxy war...
will not help you in the Levant, just as it will not help you in Iraq. Soon, you will be in direct conflict —God permitting—against your will.”

Figure 1. Iraq, Syria, and Regional Unrest

Notes: Clash symbols in Syria and Iraq denote areas where recent clashes have occurred, not necessarily areas of current control.
Figure 2. Evolution of IS/ISIL and Extremist Groups in Iraq and Syria, 2002-2014


OCT 2004 Zarqawi pledges allegiance to Al Qaeda, changes name of organization to Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers (AQ-L).

NOV 2005 AQ-L bombs hotels in Amman, Jordan.

OCT 2008 U.S. forces raid Abu Kemal, Syria to target IS foreign fighter support network.

AUG-DEC 2009 U.S. officials describe ISL as having moved Iraq support. High profile attacks signal resurgence.

MAR 2011 Syrian uprising begins.


JUN 2011 ISIL launches offensive in north-central Iraq, seizes Mosul, advances southward as some Iraqi forces collapse. ISIL declares establishment of caliphate, changes name to The Islamic State (IS). ISIL expands operations in north-east Syria, asserts jurisdiction, tensions with other rebel forces rise.

JAN-FEB 2014 Clashes erupt between ISIL and members of I, other groups in Syria. ISIL rejects mediation offers, launches offensives in Syria and Iraq. ISIL seizes parts of Ramadi and Fallujah, Iraq. AQ General Command suspends ISIL in statement.

MAR 2013 ISIL attacks Iraq and Syrian troops transit Iraq’s Anbar province.

APR Baghdadi announces formation of Islamic State of Iraq and Al Sham (ISIL). JN rejects Baghdadi’s statement and recognizes Zarwahiri.

JUN Zarwahiri rejects ISIL merger.

JUL ISIL attacks prisons in Iraq, frees hundreds.

NOV Some ISIL/SIF members form Islamic Front (IF).


JAN 2006 AQ-I allies form Mujahideen Shura Council to fight “polytheists”, “infidels”, and “secularists.”

FEB AQ-I bombs Shia Golden Mosque in Samarra, Iraq.

JUN Abu Musab al Zarqawi killed in a U.S. airstrike. Egyptian-national Abu Ayub al Masri assumes leadership.

OCT Al Masri announces formation of Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), names Abu Umar (Abdallah Rashid) al Baghdadi leader. Al Masri believed to have remained operational leader.

JAN 2012 Jalal al Nunna (JN) formed under leadership of Abu Mohammed al Jawlani.

SEP Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SIFL) formed.

DEC Syrian Islamic Front (SIF) formed.

MAR 2013 ISIL attacks Iraq and Syrian troops transit Iraq’s Anbar province.

APR Baghdadi announces formation of Islamic State of Iraq and Al Sham (ISIL). JN rejects Baghdadi’s statement and recognizes Zawahiri.

JUN Zarwahiri rejects ISIL merger.

JUL ISIL attacks prisons in Iraq, frees hundreds.

NOV Some ISIL/SIF members form Islamic Front (IF).

U.S. military presence in Iraq

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Syria Dimension

Since 2013, IS fighters have used Syria both as a staging ground for attacks in Iraq and as a parallel theater of operations. In early 2014, the Islamic State reestablished control in most areas of the northern Syrian province of Raqqah and reasserted itself to the east in Dayr az Zawr, a province rich in oil and gas resources bordering the Anbar region of Iraq. Since late 2013, the Islamic State has controlled several oilfields in Dayr az Zawr and reportedly has drawn revenue from oil sales to the Syrian government. With the proceeds, the group was able to maintain operational independence from Al Qaeda’s leadership and pay competitive salaries to its fighters. The Islamic State derived additional revenue in Syria by imposing taxes on local populations and demanding a percentage of the funds involved in humanitarian and commercial operations in areas under its control. The Islamic State also has operated north of Dayr az Zawr in Hasakah province, establishing a connection to Iraq’s Nineveh province that it was apparently able to exploit in its eventual advance towards Mosul.

IS gains in Iraq are likely to facilitate the flow of weapons and fighters into eastern Syria to the Islamic State and other groups, both because of the publicity from these gains and because of the supply lines they open. Captured U.S.-origin military equipment provided to Iraqi security forces has appeared in photos reportedly taken in Syria and posted on social media outlets. At the same time, the Islamic State’s expanding theater of conflict could subject it to overextension.

IS gains may also motivate the Maliki and Asad governments to cooperate more closely in seeking to counter the group. IS advances in Iraq could weaken the Syrian’s government’s ability to hold ground in contested areas, as some Iraqi Shiite militants who had previously fought alongside Asad forces return home to combat the Islamic State. In mid-June 2014, Syrian forces conducted air strikes against IS-held areas of Raqqah and Hasakah in coordination with the Iraqi government, according to the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Syria later struck IS targets near a border crossing between the two states. Maliki welcomed the strikes, which he stated occurred on the Syrian side of the border. U.S. and Iraqi military sources stated, however, that the Syrian strikes took place inside Iraq. IS fighters in late July and early August escalated attacks on government airbases in northeastern Syria.

Increased cooperation between Damascus and Baghdad against the Islamic State could alter the dynamics in both conflicts. It could also undermine ongoing U.S. efforts to encourage Iraqi leaders to support U.S. efforts to press Asad to step down in favor of a transitional government. Increased Iraqi-Syrian cooperation could also decrease the likelihood that Baghdad would comply with U.S. requests to crack down on Iranian overflights of weapons and equipment to Damascus.

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It is unclear what impact IS gains in Iraq would have outside of eastern Syria. At least half of Syria-based IS fighters are Syrian or Iraqi tribesmen, according to a Syrian IS defector. Like other segments of the Syrian opposition, Syrian tribes have at times been reluctant to expand hostilities against government forces beyond their own local areas. The Islamic State to date has concentrated its forces in Syria’s northeast, and has largely avoided regular confrontations in the country’s main urban areas in Syria’s western half. In early August, Syrian rebels that recently pledged allegiance to the Islamic State clashed with Lebanese Armed Forces for control of the Lebanese town of Arsal, 13 km west of the Syrian border. However, some observers note that there is no indication that the group coordinated its attack in advance with IS leadership.

Ongoing IS operations in Syria are focused in Dayr az Zawr, as the group fights to consolidate its supply lines to the city of Abu Kamal, a key node along the Syria-Iraq border. Press and social media reports suggest that the Islamic State, by mid-July, had seized large sectors of the provincial capital of Dayr az-Zawr, although some neighborhoods remain contested by the regime and other rebel groups. Following the IS declaration of a caliphate, many local and tribal rebel forces surrendered to the group and withdrew from their positions, further expanding the IS presence in the Dayr az-Zawr countryside. Any Iraqi or U.S. efforts to disrupt or sever IS supply lines through Abu Kamal or between Dayr az Zawr and Mosul could benefit Syrian military and Nusra Front forces also operating in the area.

Syrian Kurdish fighters from the People’s Protection Units (known as the YPG) continue to clash with IS fighters along the border with Iraq. YPG forces in early August established security corridors along the border, enabling some refugees fleeing IS violence in Iraq to cross into Kurdish-held areas of Syria, according to a Syrian Kurdish aid worker.

Iran Dimension

The rapidity of the ISF collapse appeared to align the interests of Iran and the United States in preventing an IS seizure of Baghdad. Secretary of State John Kerry said in an interview that the United States was “open to discussions [with Iran on Iraq] if there’s something constructive that can be contributed by Iran.” U.S. diplomats reportedly discussed the situation in Iraq at the margins of the June 16 talks on Iran’s nuclear program, reportedly seeking Iran’s cooperation to compel Prime Minister Maliki to share power or be replaced outright. No decision on direct cooperation on Iraq was announced after that meeting. A U.S. State Department spokeswoman sought to refute criticism that the bilateral discussion on Iraq could provide Iran additional

56 OSC Report EUR2014080850721279, August 8, 2014.
58 Ibid.
leverage in the nuclear talks, saying on June 18 that U.S. officials insisted on maintaining a firewall between the ongoing nuclear negotiations and the crisis in Iraq.  

Many observers remain skeptical that the United States could or should cooperate with Iran on Iraq. Iran has been a staunch supporter of the Shiite-led government in Iraq and those in Iran who control policy toward Iraq do not necessarily share the U.S. goal of creating a broad-based, inclusive central government. Iran reportedly supports finding an alternative to Maliki as Prime Minister, and Tehran apparently expressed that preference in a July 2014 visit to Iraq by the Secretary General of the Supreme Council on National Security, Ali Shamkhani.

In actions that appear to further U.S. objectives in Iraq, Iran has reportedly been delivering arms and ammunition to Iraq since early in the crisis. In early July, Iran returned to Iraq about a dozen of the 100+ Iraqi combat aircraft that were flown to Iran at the start of the 1991 war between Iraq and the United States-led coalition. Iranian pilots apparently also are flying the aircraft: in July 2014 Iran announced that one of its pilots had died in operations in Iraq.

On the other hand, Iran has sought to put pressure on the KRG not to move toward outright independence. Tehran temporarily closed its border with the Iraqi Kurdish regions in July 2014 as part of that effort. However, the IS-led offensive against the KRG-controlled territories in August 2014 has apparently caused Tehran to shift toward a somewhat more supportive stance toward the KRG in an effort to help defeat IS.

Some experts assess, however, that Iran’s assistance to Iraq will be counterproductive to U.S. aims. Iran helped establish many of the Shiite militias that fought the United States during 2003-2011, and Iran reportedly has sent Islamic Revolutionary Guard-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) personnel into Iraq to help reorganize these Shiite militias to assist in the fighting. As discussed above, the revival of the militias is increasing tensions with Iraq’s Sunnis, including those who still live in Baghdad and fear Shiite sectarian violence. Many Shiite militia forces had gone to Syria to help President Asad but returned to Iraq after the fall of Mosul to help defend Baghdad.

Selected Additional Issues Raised by the Crisis

Humanitarian Impact and Response

According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) approximately 1.2 million people have been displaced by fighting in and around Mosul and in areas reaching south towards Baghdad. The actual displacement figures remain fluid and difficult to fully ascertain. More than 300,000 of those displaced have reportedly fled to the relatively secure KRG-controlled region or have formed ad hoc camps along its border. Others have scattered elsewhere—with the majority located in Western Anbar governorate as well as Dohuk, Nineveh, and Irbil governorates. This figure includes an estimated 500,000 IDPs who fled fighting in Anbar province earlier this year. In addition, there are more than 1.1 million Iraqis who were earlier displaced. Many had sought

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59 “U.S. is Exploring Talks with Iran on Crisis in Iraq.” op. cit.
60 Author conversations with experts on Iran. Washington, DC. June-July 2014
62 This section was prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy.
refuge in Syria between 2003 and 2011 and are thought to remain displaced. With 2.3 million displaced Iraqis inside the country, an urgent humanitarian crisis is emerging and humanitarian actors are scrambling to meet the needs of IDPs and conflict victims. There are also over 400,000 Iraqi refugees living in other countries. The humanitarian situation remains fluid and urgent in many parts of the country.

Priority needs include Core Relief Items (CRIs) such as shelter, food, clean water, and non-food assistance. IDPs are residing with relatives and in host communities, mosques, tents, schools, unfinished buildings, and in other government facilities. Various reports indicate that access to hospitals is limited, with some not functioning at all. Temporary transit facilities have been set up close to KRG border areas to provide medical assistance and drinking water. Humanitarian organizations are mobilizing teams to assess the situation further where possible and to coordinate a response. Access in the KRG reportedly remains stable and organizations are able to provide assistance. Access in areas of conflict in the rest of the country is limited. There are concerns about the impact of hostilities on minorities, particularly Christians. Freedom of movement—where IDPs are able to move to areas of safety and between governorates—has been complicated by conflict, causing some persons, particularly near Baghdad, to be stranded.

According to the U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), the KRG policy on establishing IDP camps has yet to be fully determined. Camps in Irbil and Dohuk already exist and the KRG authorities are working to find a way to address the needs of the displaced, including identifying a location for additional camps. However, there are reports that local authorities do not want to allow large numbers of IDPs into their territory. The region is already housing more than 220,000 refugees from Syria. According to UNHCR, due to renewed conflict in Iraq, approximately 6,000 Syrians have returned to Syria since early June 2014.

UNAMI is coordinating the response by the U.N. Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and some partner organizations. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA) launched a Strategic Response Plan (SRP) for Iraq in March 2014 for $104 million to support the Iraqi government in its efforts to meet the humanitarian needs of the people affected by fighting in Anbar Province. On June 24, UNOCHA launched a revised SRP, requesting $312.1 million in funding to include support for the significantly increased caseload of IDPs and a wider geographical focus. Funding from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), a multilateral funding mechanism administered through the United Nations, is also under consideration. As of early August, the HCT expects to revise the SRP again in mid-September based on information from additional needs assessments and analyses of situations in hard-to-reach or limited access areas.

Responses to Threats to U.S. Personnel, Facilities, and Citizens

On June 15, the Department of State announced that while the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad would remain open, a number of personnel would be “temporarily relocated” to Consulate Generals in

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63 Although this section is focused primarily on the situation in Iraq, the situations of displacement and movement of populations are intertwined with the conflict in neighboring Syria.


65 Prepared by Alex Tiersky, Analyst in Foreign Affairs. For more information on this issue, see: CRS Report IN10090, *Crisis in Iraq: Securing U.S. Citizens, Personnel, and Facilities*, by Alex Tiersky. This section was last updated on July 20, 2014.
Basrah and Irbil as well as to Department of State facilities in Amman, Jordan. The relocations were reportedly being carried out by non-military means. The announcement stated that a “substantial majority of the U.S. Embassy presence in Iraq” would remain in place and that, with an expected addition of security personnel, the Embassy would be “fully equipped” to carry out “its national security mission.”

News reports suggested that roughly 200 Marine Corps guards and contractors were in place at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad prior to the crisis to protect the Embassy. Since the crisis began, the White House has announced two deployments to reinforce that number. On June 16, the White House informed Congress that up to approximately 275 U.S. military personnel were being dispatched to Iraq to assist with the temporary relocation of diplomatic personnel, a deployment undertaken with the consent of the Government of Iraq. On June 30, the White House announced the deployment of up to an additional 200 U.S. Armed Forces personnel to provide increased security to the U.S. Embassy and its support facilities, as well as to reinforce the Baghdad International Airport. According to the White House notification to Congress, provided “consistent with” the War Powers Act, the deployed forces would be accompanied by helicopters and unmanned drones. The force “is deploying for the purpose of protecting U.S. citizens and property, if necessary, and is equipped for combat,” according to the statement, and may/will “remain in Iraq until the security situation becomes such that it is no longer needed.”

The State Department posted on June 16 an “Emergency Message for U.S. Citizens: Announcement of Relocation of U.S. Embassy Staff,” which urged “U.S. citizens to avoid travel to Iraq because of current safety and security concerns” and advised those concerned about their safety to “make plans to depart by commercial means.” The statement emphasized that the Embassy should not be contacted with requests for assistance with travel arrangements, and that the Embassy “does not offer ‘protection’ services to individuals who feel unsafe.” While the Embassy remained open, the statement said, Embassy services for U.S. citizens throughout Iraq would be limited due to the security environment.

On June 12, the Department of State confirmed that a number of U.S. citizen contract employees to the Iraqi Government, who were performing services in connection with the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Program in Iraq, were “temporarily relocated” by their companies due to security concerns.

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Possible Questions for Congressional Consideration

Can the U.S. government mitigate threats to U.S. interests in Iraq with available resources and authorities? Why or why not? If not, what additional resources and/or authorities may be required?

Should U.S. airstrikes alone not be sufficient to prevent wholesale slaughter of the Yazidis and other vulnerable minorities, what other options might be considered? What are the pros and cons of such options?

What are overall U.S. priorities in this situation, and how should these priorities shape the U.S. response? Is it realistic and worthwhile for U.S. officials and lawmakers to act in expectation that Iraq’s government can resolve or manage the country’s sectarian, ethnic, and regional differences? How is U.S. assistance to the Iraqi government affecting regional balances and perceptions?

How, if at all, should recent developments in Iraq shape congressional consideration of pending authorization and appropriations legislation for defense and foreign assistance? Should the United States provide more assistance, and/or condition foreign or military assistance to Iraq on the achievement of an inclusive national government?

To what extent are the Islamic State’s recent military advances a reflection of its organizational capabilities? To what extent do recent developments stem from a lack of capability or organizational shortcomings in Iraq’s security forces and the peshmerga?

Please assess the range of Iraqi Sunni views of the Islamic State and other armed anti-government groups. How likely is the Islamic State to face resistance from Iraqi Sunnis in areas it now controls? How have jihadist and tribal figures responded to the IS declaration of a caliphate in areas under its control?

To what extent do the interests of Iran and the United States in Iraq conflict or coincide? To what extent, if any, do efforts by Iran to support the Iraqi government contradict or support those of the United States?

What options are available for assisting locally organized forces in areas under IS control, or in areas threatened by the Islamic State, who may effectively resist or disrupt the group’s operations? How might such options affect the willingness of the Iraqi government to continue to cooperate with the United States? Should the governments of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey be encouraged to support anti-IS entities in areas adjacent to their territory? Why or why not? If such third-party government support is advisable, how might the United States encourage it, and are the governments in question likely to be receptive to such encouragement?

What might be the broader strategic implications of increased U.S. assistance to the Iraqi government? Might the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states object to increased U.S. support?

73 Prepared by Christopher Blanchard and Jim Zanotti, Specialists in Middle Eastern Affairs.
for the Iraqi government, which the Gulf leaders assert is closely aligned with Iran? How might Iran respond? How can the United States best pursue its immediate security interests and its objectives of preventing (1) regional sectarian war and (2) foreclosure of the possibility of a territorially integrated, democratically governed Iraq?

How are Kurdish efforts to control Kirkuk and its energy resources likely to affect the security situation in that area and in Iraq generally? What actions are the Islamic State and the Iraqi government likely to take vis-à-vis Kurdish forces and authorities?

What is the likelihood that the Kurds will implement a formal secession from Iraq in the near future? How should these considerations affect U.S. policy toward the KRG?

Are changes to U.S. global counterterrorism policies and practices necessary in light of developments related to the Islamic State?

What are the connections, if any, between this crisis and other key regional issues, such as international diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear program and the ongoing Syria conflict? Should the United States seek or avoid an approach to the Iraq crisis that also involves these other issues?

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