

# DIVISION RESTRUCTURING TO SUPPORT THE JOINT OPERATIONAL ACCESS CONCEPT

A Monograph  
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## ABSTRACT

DIVISION RESTRUCTURING TO SUPPORT THE JOINT OPERATIONAL ACCESS CONCEPT, by MAJ Sidney A. Knox, United States Army, 60 Pages.

Doctrine and the methods of employment within the strategic, operational, and tactical context of conflicts drive changes to the methods in which the Army structures and employs its elements to meet these emerging and developing trends. Form follows function; the Army adjusts its organizational structure to conform to doctrinal requirements for force structure and capabilities.

Updates within Army doctrine under the Doctrine 2015 concept focusing on Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) and Wide Area Security (WAS), as well as the Joint strategic “Rebalance to the Pacific” and the development of the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) to counter anti-access and hybrid threat capabilities provides the ideal example of a tectonic shift in doctrinal concepts. With this tectonic shifts in the fundamental Army and Joint doctrine, the Army’s responsibility is to identify what, if any, structural changes are mandated to the division and subordinate units to support emerging doctrine.

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## ACRONYMS

A2AD	Anti Access Area Denial
ACCB	Air Cavalry Combat Brigade
ADP	Army Doctrinal Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrinal Reference Publication
AOE	Army of Excellence
ASBC	Air-Sea Battle Concept
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BSB	Brigade Support Battalion
CA	Civil Affairs
CAB	Combat Aviation Brigade
CAM	Combined Arms Maneuver
CAS	Close Air Support
DISCOM	Division Support Command
DIVARTY	Division Artillery
DOD	Department of Defense
DRS	Division Restructuring Survey
DSCA	Defense Support of Civil Authorities
EAB	Echelons Above Brigade
EAD	Echelons Above Division
FM	Field Manual
FMI	Field Manual Interim
GPS	Global Positioning System
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HIMARS	High Mobility Artillery Rocket System

IADS	Integrated Air Defense System
JOAC	Joint Operational Access Concept
JP	Joint Publication
JTF	Joint Task Force
LTG	Lieutenant General
MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MCRP	Marine Corps Reference Publication
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MP	Military Police
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OEB	Operational Exploitation Brigade
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
ROAD	Reorganization Objective Army Divisions
SBCT	Stryker Brigade Combat Team
STB	Special Troops Battalion
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TRICAP	Triple Capability
WAS	Wide Area Security
UA	Unified Action
ULO	Unified Land Operations
US	United States

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## Introduction

Future joint forces will organize tactically into tailored joint formations able to deploy, operate, and survive autonomously. For land forces especially, this suggests smaller units and platforms that are rapidly deployable yet lethal.

—*The Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)*<sup>1</sup>

The challenge of the new era of instability and uncertainty where the inherently complex environment of warfare is transforming with new, technologically adept enemies is not a new problem. History provides ample examples of transformation being driven by changing operational conditions that require new methods of employment and organizational structures to achieve desired objectives. Within the doctrinal and organizational context of the United States military, form follows function. The conceptualization of doctrine and the methods of employment within the strategic, operational, and tactical context of conflicts drive changes to the methods in which the Army structures and employs its elements to meet these emerging and developing trends. Throughout the modern history of combat, defined within this monograph as World War I through present day, the Army has faced numerous challenges from a diverse set of opponents that has required the evolution of Army doctrinal concepts from previous forms to counter enemy tactics, exploit opponent weaknesses, and maximize its own strengths. These tectonic shifts in doctrine, born through strategic direction, operational conceptualization, and tactical requirements, and facilitated through technological developments and capabilities, have necessitated changes within the physical structure of the units that have been called to conduct the conflict. The division has often been both the subject of and the driving force behind this restructuring process. The division, as the unit principally associated with the translation of operational requirements into tactical directives, has been the focus of much of these restructuring efforts throughout the modern era. The recent updates within the Army doctrine under the Doctrine 2015 concept focusing on Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) and Wide Area Security

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<sup>1</sup>Headquarters, Joint Staff, *The Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)*, Version 1.0, 17 January 2012, 21.

(WAS), and the strategic “Rebalance to the Pacific” with the development of the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) to counter anti-access and hybrid threat capabilities provides the ideal example of a tectonic shift in doctrinal concepts. With this tectonic shift in the fundamental Army and Joint doctrine, the Army’s responsibility is to identify what, if any, structural changes are mandated to the division and subordinate units to support the emerging doctrine. This monograph explores the process of structural change within the division as a result of changes in doctrine within the modern era and examines current and emerging doctrine in order to answer the question, “What structural changes must be made to the division to maximize its effectiveness within emerging Army and Joint doctrine?”

This monograph asserts that a bold structural shift to the composition and method of employment of the division is both warranted and required to meet the requirements established within new and emerging Army and Joint doctrine. This assertion is based on three basic concepts. The first concept is the historical process of structural development that links doctrinal shifts to structural change requirements. The history of modern warfare provides numerous examples of this principle through the doctrinally driven organizational shifts in the divisional structures within the twentieth century. The second concept is the fundamental change in nature of the enemy forces described in the hybrid threat model as opposed to traditional opponents as the foundation of doctrine. The Army is structured based on legacy threat models and high intensity conflict scenarios, which is not a maximized force structure when considering the incorporation of asymmetrical threats and the means to counter them that have been developed within the Army’s Doctrine 2015 and the JOAC employment for joint forces. The third concept is the requirement for a leaner, more rapidly deployable, but equally lethal Army force structure. The fiscal constraints of a post-Global War on Terror (GWOT) period require a smaller, more economical force with a comparative return to pre-war budget level but with the expectation of the operational capabilities it currently possesses. The elimination of excess or inefficient forces and headquarters structure in echelons above brigade (EAB) lends itself to a division-based

operational force with a synchronized and integrated tactical execution force composed of modified brigade combat teams (BCTs).

These three concepts mandate an organizational change to the divisional structure in order to meet the fundamental operational requirements that both Doctrine 2015 and the JOAC place upon the Army. To remain within its current structure and operational limitations would reduce the Army's ability to fulfill requirements for both Army and joint doctrine.

To justify the conclusion that a structural shift is mandated for division and below organizational structures, this monograph analyzes the question through four sections. The first section establishes the historical trend of doctrine driving organizational structure at the division level since the development of modern warfare. This section begins with the World War I era square divisional structure and proceeds through the twentieth century to examine how doctrinal changes in the operational concept of the Army drove structural changes within the division. Once this link between doctrine and structural change is established, the second section analyzes the current modular force structure and doctrine as it was employed within the GWOT concept in the conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan. This sets the stage for the third section, where both emerging Army and Joint doctrine for future operations is analyzed under the contextual hybrid threat model, freedom of access, and fiscal limitations imposed upon a post GWOT force. After examining the requirements of these doctrines, an analysis of the current force structure determines the strengths and weaknesses of this force structure under the requirements of the emerging doctrine. Finding the current structures lacking in capability to operate effectively under emerging doctrine, the fourth section develops a potential divisional structure concept that modifies current organizational structures to meet the operational requirements for both Doctrine 2015 and the JOAC. The recommendations within section four are focused on shifts to current structure within the current equipment and organization construct of the Army and the fiscal and manpower limitations imposed upon it.

The recommendation for a composite division structure presented within this monograph is one potential solution among many. The recommendation presented is intended to provide an operationally viable, financially and organizationally feasible solution to the research question. While the recommendation is a possible solution, the essential assertion is that an organizational shift within the Army is required regardless of the form that is developed. The Army cannot meet operational requirements of joint and Army doctrine under current structure and fiscal limitations and must change how it organizes to meet the needs of the nation.

### THE EVOLUTION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE DIVISION

In the early twentieth century, the development of the modern division established it as the primary tactical unit of military employment. The modern day division contains organic combat, support, and administrative functions and is the first unit capable of operating independently and employing combined arms to defeat enemy forces in battle. The Field Service Regulations of 1918, the early form of modern field manuals, established the division as the basis of the army and includes within the organic divisional structure the maneuver, fire support, administrative, and logistical structure to support independent operations under normal conditions.<sup>2</sup> The concept of the division established in the 1918 Field Service Regulations as the base level tactical unit, resonated throughout American warfare during the Twentieth Century.

While the purpose of the division remained intact as a concept over the last century, little else remained the same. Driven by the development of doctrine, technology, and financial concerns, the division structure has undergone numerous modifications throughout the twentieth century in terms of size, subordinate unit structure, and lethality. This evolution continues today. This chapter analyzes the link between the division structure modifications and the doctrine, technology, and fiscal constraints of the modern era.

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<sup>2</sup>War Department, United States Army, *Field Service Regulations*, January 15, 1918 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1918), 10.

Doctrine is defined in Joint Publication 1-02 as “Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”<sup>3</sup> Therefore, doctrine is a baseline for the conduct of operations, is guided by the established national objectives, and requires specific capabilities and composition of forces to be available, with consideration of the anticipated enemy to be encountered. Doctrine establishes requirements for capability which in turn drives the force structure, size, and organization of forces in general, including the division.

Technological advances during the twentieth century expanded the lethality and capability of armed forces exponentially. The development of guided munitions, jet aircraft, communication and navigation systems, armored vehicles, nuclear weapons, and digital computer systems, to name a few, greatly increased military effectiveness and destructive capability. From rudimentary aircraft and tanks utilized during World War I to the modern day stealth bombers, GPS guided munitions, main battle tanks, and integrated digital networks of Operation Enduring Freedom, growth in technology required necessary changes in the fundamental structure of the military forces employed.

Although it is less dramatic than conceptual developments in doctrine or technological advances in weaponry, the financial requirements associated with changes in the structure of the military cannot be ignored. For example, much of the restructuring during Eisenhower’s ‘New Look’, was affected by financial constraints imposed upon the Army through a limited budget.<sup>4</sup> Considering the financial expenditure required for restructuring military formations and the exponentially increasing cost of technologically advanced weaponry, financial constraints impacted the structure of the division throughout the twentieth century as well.

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<sup>3</sup>Headquarters, Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary for Military and Associated Terms*, 8 November 2010 (Washington, DC: 2011), 114.

<sup>4</sup>Glen R. Hawkins, *United States Army Force Structure and Design Initiatives 1939-1989* (Washington: Center of Military History, US Army, 1991), 8.

### Square Division (Circa 1918)

The division was modified in 1917 from the early triangular concept to the Square Division concept. The new organization came as a result of the observations of allied combat experiences during the early stages of World War I. General John Pershing, the American Expeditionary Force Commander in World War I, played a key role in the adoption of the square division concept as he was concerned with the ability of troops to conduct sustained attacks with divisions that were capable of absorbing casualties and continuing to attack effectively, and the capability of renewing maneuver focused warfare by conducting a penetration and breaking out of the trenches.<sup>5</sup>

After studying the war in Europe, General Pershing opted for the reorganization of divisions into two infantry brigades, each with two infantry regiments of three battalions each, an artillery brigade, an engineer and a machine gun battalion, and associated support units. Under this square divisional structure, the size of the regiments nearly doubled and the division ballooned to over 28,000 organic soldiers, more than twice the size of its typical European counterpart.<sup>6</sup> The massed formation that the square divisional concept provided proved effective in breaking the trench lines and restoring mobility in operations such as the Saint Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives, though at a high cost in terms of casualties as was expected. At the victorious conclusion of World War I, the continued existence of the square division would remain in place until maneuver focused doctrine emerged in the late 1930s.

### Triangular Division (Circa 1941)

The Triangular Division structure evolved from the perceived need for increased mobility and flexibility within the division and an adjustment in force structure to include and counter

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<sup>5</sup>Virgil Ney, *Evolution of the U.S. Army Division, 1939-1968*, United States Army Combat Developments Command (Washington: Combat Observations Research Group, January 1969), 26.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, 26.

evolving technological advances in weapons and equipment.<sup>7</sup> After testing in the late 1930's, the Triangular Division concept was adopted for regular army elements in 1940 and National Guard divisions after Pearl Harbor, reducing the size of the infantry division from over 28,000 to approximately 15,000 men.<sup>8</sup> The Triangular Division first appeared in the 1941 *Field Service Regulations*, newly designated as *Field Manual (FM) 100-5*. The Triangular Division model altered the basic structure of the division by removing the brigade level headquarters in favor of the regimental level headquarters in order to streamline the command structure and transmission of orders. The division organization was expanded from two into three infantry regiments with each regiment consisting of three infantry battalions. The four artillery battalions fell under centralized divisional control to provide fire support to maneuver elements.<sup>9</sup> With minor adjustments to personnel and equipment authorizations, the Triangular Division would continue to be the standard divisional structure throughout World War II and Korea until the mid 1950s, when budgetary constraints and nuclear proliferation combined to mandate an adjustment to the basic division structure.

#### Pentomic Division (Circa 1956)

The primary concern for the Army in the post Korean War era was the Soviet Union. Now with a nuclear capable enemy, the Army struggled to determine the best formation to retain survivability on a nuclear battlefield while maintaining and increasing the maneuverability of the divisional formation.<sup>10</sup> The Pentomic Division structure increased the number of major

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<sup>7</sup>Combat Studies Institute, *Sixty Years of Reorganizing for Combat: A Historical Trend Analysis* (Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Combat Studies Institute, 1999), 4.

<sup>8</sup>Ney, *Evolution of the U.S. Army Division, 1939-1968*, 37.

<sup>9</sup>War Department, United States Army, *Field Service Regulations, Operations FM 100-5*, May 22, 1941 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1941), 253.

<sup>10</sup>Combat Studies Institute, *Sixty Years of Reorganizing for Combat*, 19.

subordinate commands from three regiments in the Triangular Division to five battle groups of five companies each in the Pentomic, reducing the overall strength in terms of manpower and equipment of each of these commands to allow further dispersal across the battlefield to deal with the threat of nuclear employment.

With the backdrop of the ‘New Look’ policy of the Eisenhower administration that focused on nuclear deterrence and air power rather than ground combat capabilities, the mid 1950s were a time of uncertainty for the Army as it struggled to reorganize its primary warfighting element structures. Suffering large scale reductions in both budgetary and manpower authorizations, with funding decreasing by half and manning authorizations by a third, the Pentomic Division structure was the Army’s attempt to remain relevant in the age of deterrence and nuclear warfare.<sup>11</sup>

The offensive employment of and defensive measures against nuclear weapons, particularly tactical nuclear employment and exploitation of post blast effects to achieve tactical objectives, became the focus of Army doctrine in the Field Service Regulations of the 1950s.<sup>12</sup> However, even before the completion of the reorganization of the Army to the Pentomic structure in 1960, numerous issues were being identified in the limited capabilities of the force. Complaints ranged from insufficient supply, artillery, and staff structures to a lack of staying power and poorly equipped maneuver elements that could not sustain an attack or conduct an aggressive defense.<sup>13</sup> Senior leaders lamented the shortfalls of the Pentomic Division and with the close of the ‘New Look’ and establishment of the ‘Flexible Response’ initiatives when the Kennedy

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<sup>11</sup>A.J. Bacevich, *The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986), 19.

<sup>12</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Service Regulations, Operations FM 100-5*, September 1954 w/change 1-3, 24 January 1958 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1958), 40.

<sup>13</sup>Hawkins, *United States Army Force Structure and Design Initiatives 1939-1989*, 37.



administration came into power, the Army rapidly dropped the concept and began restructuring itself anew.<sup>14</sup>

#### Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD) (Circa 1961-1965)

President John Kennedy announced the ‘flexible response’ concept in 1961. This new concept reinforced a series of major reorganization studies initiated within the Army in 1960 to develop a flexible, maneuverable, and lethal force capable of operating in both nuclear and non-nuclear battlefields. The new ROAD Divisional structure emphasized permanent headquarters elements, with the capability to plug in semi-permanent maneuver battalions within the divisional structure to tailor the force to the needs of the mission. While capable of conducting operations in a nuclear conflict, the Army focused on the much more likely limited conventional conflict in line with the Korean conflict.<sup>15</sup> Stressing simplicity, the ROAD Division basic structure was identical for infantry, mechanized infantry, and armor units. Each consisted of a headquarters with three brigade level subordinate headquarters, a Division Artillery to employ fire support, and a Support Command to provide synchronized logistical support, with a base building block of the battalion replacing the Pentomic Battle Group to simplify command and control structures.<sup>16</sup> The ROAD Division established many of the structures that are in use today and was a major departure from the anemic Pentomic Division it replaced. Standard additions of organic divisional enablers, regardless of the division type, which included a division cavalry squadron, engineer, signal, and aviation battalions, and a military police (MP) company, expanded the flexibility of the division

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<sup>14</sup>Bacevich, *The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam*, 142.

<sup>15</sup>Hawkins, *United States Army Force Structure and Design Initiatives 1939-1989*, 42.

<sup>16</sup>John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades* (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 1998), 296.

and simplified the structure and returned the ROAD Division to essentially the Triangular Division with three primary subordinate brigades under the control of the division.<sup>17</sup>

Concerns regarding battlefield mobility and the growing capability of air mobility with technological developments in aviation, particularly helicopters, introduced an entirely separate new variant to the available ROAD divisional structures, the airmobile division. In the spring of 1962, the Howze Board, named for the president of the board LTG Hamilton Howze, proposed an additional structure that increased the aviation element from a battalion to a brigade, allowing movement of up to a third of divisional assets by air at a time.<sup>18</sup> The airmobile division was designed specifically for the new airmobile doctrine made possible by the increasing numbers and capabilities of helicopters. After testing, the airmobile division was first implemented in the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division in 1965 and saw extensive combat in Vietnam. As a completely air transportable force, this organization provided an extremely versatile and maneuverable element with an extended operational reach over other ROAD divisional concepts, but it required greater support due to the lack of staying power against a heavier force. Nevertheless, the shortfalls were mitigated through increased firepower and air support coordination.<sup>19</sup>

The ROAD Division represented a major shift in capability and flexibility over the problem-ridden Pentomic Division. The ROAD Division would soon see extensive combat in Vietnam and prove to be an effective organization for that war. Despite military tactical success, the ending of the Vietnam conflict was seen as strategic defeat. The struggle to understand the lessons of Vietnam and the massive strain placed on the Army after eight years of conflict and social upheaval created an environment that required a new way to organize the Army and meet

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<sup>17</sup>Ney, *Evolution of the U.S. Army Division, 1939-1968*, 76.

<sup>18</sup>Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, 314.

<sup>19</sup>Ney, *Evolution of the U.S. Army Division, 1939-1968*, 95.

emerging doctrine. The post-Vietnam era contained a flurry of reorganizational initiatives to cope with new doctrine and a shift in the purpose of the Army.

#### Triple Capability (TRICAP) (Circa 1971-1974)

The TRICAP Divisional concept was developed in the post-Vietnam era as a desire to apply lessons learned from airmobile tactics combined with armor and attack helicopter capabilities to a mid to high intensity conflict in a Soviet against NATO conflict scenario.<sup>20</sup> An interesting concept that combined two completely different doctrines into the same unit, TRICAP was a radical shift in fundamental operating concepts and the development of new doctrine, but was never fully implemented past the test phase of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division (TRICAP) because of concerns of lethality in higher intensity conflicts and the determination to increase armored forces within the Army.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division (TRICAP) formed in 1971 and began testing the new concept in 1972, organized as a three brigade structured division with an armored brigade, airmobile brigade, and air cavalry combat brigade (ACCB).<sup>21</sup> This concept intended to form a new doctrinal model with an armored ground combat capability as well as the anti-tank and strike capability of attack helicopters for traditional high intensity conflicts, and the mobility and flexibility of airmobile operations and lessons of light infantry operations in Vietnam. Results from testing were mixed, with TRICAP inflicting higher casualties on enemy forces but also taking more casualties and ceding more ground faster than traditional armored divisions.<sup>22</sup> Based on the refocused emphasis in the mid-1970s on armored formations in Europe to counter the perceived

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<sup>20</sup>Combat Studies Institute, *Sixty Years of Reorganizing for Combat*, 33.

<sup>21</sup>Hawkins, *United States Army Force Structure and Design Initiatives 1939-1989*, 53.

<sup>22</sup>Ford, Patrick and Burba, Edwin H. Jr., *Review of Division Structure Initiatives* (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1994), 8.

Soviet threat and the impressive Israeli victory in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Army shifted focus away from TRICAP to a heavier formation.

#### Army of Excellence Division (Circa 1978-1986)

With the abandonment of the TRICAP concept and the shift to a heavier NATO- focused divisional structure, the Army conducted a series of modernization surveys and initiatives throughout the late 1970s and 1980s. The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was established in 1973 with a mission to coordinate and integrate Army organization with doctrine and under the command of individuals such as General William E. DePuy and General Don Starry, initiated a series of studies and development efforts to modernize both the doctrine implemented and the force structure for the NATO conflict scenario.<sup>23</sup>

Doctrine development is the cornerstone of the TRADOC mission. General DePuy led the effort to refocus the doctrine of the Army to one with a NATO focus against a Soviet adversary initially under the Active Defense doctrine. The 1976 *FM 100-5, Operations*, outlined the basic tenets of Army doctrine and focused on technologically advanced and lethal weapons with a backdrop of the European battlefield. It emphasized readiness, mobility, and concentration of forces to counter and defeat the massing tactics of the enemy.<sup>24</sup>

The Division Restructuring Survey (DRS) was initiated in 1976 at the direction of General DePuy and focused on shifting the divisional structure to meet the Active Defense doctrine. The DRS targeted the heavy division and proposed large increases in anti-tank capability, increased the number of battalion-sized elements per brigade to five but decreased the size of these elements, and increased the firepower available through expansion of artillery and

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<sup>23</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, *Transforming the Army: TRADOC's First Thirty Years, 1973-2003* (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC Military History Office, 2003), 3.

<sup>24</sup>John L. Romjue, *From Active Defense to Airland Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982* (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC Military History Office, 1984), 3.

attack aviation assets.<sup>25</sup> Demonstrating the rapid pace of evolution of tactics and organization occurring in the late 1970s, before testing was complete the DRS was assimilated into the new concept of Army 86, which absorbed the DRS base concept in 1979.<sup>26</sup>

The Army 86 concept, again focused primarily on the heavy division with the Soviet threat model as an adversary, developed in conjunction with the evolution of a new Army doctrine, Air-Land Battle, which was published in 1982.<sup>27</sup> General Starry, who succeeded General DePuy as TRADOC Commander, managed an extensive effort to integrate doctrine and organization of forces. The basic development concept focused on tasks and functions assigned to the division in the new doctrine, assigning appropriate unit structures to achieve these tasks, and then integrating the combined arms into a coherent structure to enable the division to achieve its required missions.<sup>28</sup>

The Army 86 concept for heavy divisions was approved in late 1979, with personnel numbering almost 20,000 and the retention of the three brigade structure with a balance of armor and mechanized infantry, and a focus on firepower through artillery, anti-tank, and attack aviation intended to blunt successive waves of a Soviet attack.<sup>29</sup> However there were lingering concerns of the light division concept, which despite several testing phases for a suitable division structure for light forces, would not be fully resolved until further testing and adoption of yet a new divisional concept in the 1980s, the Army of Excellence.

The Army of Excellence (AOE) structure was generated from the concept of a balance between a heavy force capable of conducting major combat operations in Europe against a Soviet threat with the requirement for a lighter, contingency focused force able to respond to security

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<sup>25</sup>Ford and Burba, *Review of Division Structure Initiatives*, 17.

<sup>26</sup>Combat Studies Institute, *Sixty Years of Reorganizing the Division*, 39.

<sup>27</sup>John L. Romjue, *A History of Army 86, Volume I* (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC Military History Office, 1982), 26.

<sup>28</sup>Hawkins, *United States Army Force Structure and Design Initiatives 1939-1989*, 64.

<sup>29</sup>Romjue, *A History of Army 86, Volume I*, 128.

challenges outside of Europe. The concept, introduced in 1983 by the newly appointed Chief of Staff of the Army General John A. Wickam, Jr., retained the basic design for heavy forces from the Army 86 initiative fielding new equipment such as the M1 Abrams, M2 Bradley, and the AH64 Apache, while restructuring the light forces into a 10,000 man infantry division construct capable of rapid deployment.<sup>30</sup> Solidly rooted in Air-Land Battle doctrine, the missions for the light divisions mirrored those of the heavy divisions, within specific employment guidelines to maximize the technological advantages of the force in consideration to terrain and opposing enemy forces. Constructed to be triangular to the lowest level, the AOE divisions maintained three brigades each with three battalions consisting of three companies, enabling flexibility and maneuverability and integrating firepower to increase effectiveness against a numerically superior opponent.<sup>31</sup>

The adoption of the AOE concept enabled the full implementation of the Air-Land Battle concept, first codified in the 1982 *FM 100-5 (Operations)*, which focused on synchronization of air and ground forces to enable the defeat of a numerically superior foe. Air-Land Battle formally introduced the concept of operational art and stressed the importance of basic tenets of operations, including indirect approaches, speed and violence, flexibility and initiative, rapid decision making, clearly defined objectives, a clearly organized main effort, and deep attacks.<sup>32</sup>

The AOE concept was developed under a time of expansion of both military funding and personnel cap restrictions under the Reagan administration. With a larger budget and an increased amount of available manpower, the AOE was able to be fully implemented across the force. In conjunction with Air-Land Battle doctrine, this produced an effective and efficient fighting force capable of rendering devastating effects on opponents in rapid succession as observed in the

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<sup>30</sup>John L. Romjue, *The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army* (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC Military History Office, 1993), 23.

<sup>31</sup>Romjue, *The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army*, 46.

<sup>32</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 100-5, Operations*, 20 August 1982 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), 7-2.

defeat of Iraq during the Persian Gulf War. Air-Land Battle formed the basic doctrinal concept for the Army employment into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and with modification, is still employed today during the Global War of Terror (GWOT) missions across the globe.

## CURRENT DOCTRINE AND STRUCTURE AND THE FUTURE

Doctrine has played a major role in the structure of the division over the last century. Throughout this period, each change in doctrinal focus brought with it a corresponding divisional structure modification that enabled the division to execute its assigned missions. Air-Land Battle doctrine was the epitome of efficiency and capability when the U.S. Army was pitted against another conventional army, in open high intensity conflict. Realizing the shortfalls of Air-Land Battle doctrine when applied to other than high intensity conflicts, the Army modified doctrine under the Unified Action concept in the late 1990s and into the early 2000s. Modularization and the focus on BCT rather than divisional deployment and combat operations during the Global War on Terror (GWOT) era strained employed doctrine to its limits. Air-Land Battle doctrine and its evolution into Unified Action (UA) doctrine has been extensively applied to a counterinsurgency problem that, while the basic tenets can be adequate for the current war, it was not designed for. Realizing the need for the shift in doctrine for counterinsurgency operations, the Army updated and implemented *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations*, under the direction of LTG David Petraeus. With the shift to the BCT rather than the division as the primary tactical combat unit for synchronizing and integrating effects to produce the desired endstate, which has typically been a divisional function, the division now has a reduced capability that seems to lack the defined purpose it has had in the past under Army doctrine. The Army is in the process of determining just what it is that a division is responsible for and how it should be employed. Emerging Army doctrine, called Doctrine 2015, is focused on simplicity, clarity, and conciseness down to the lowest levels, and while maintaining the basic tenets of Air-Land Battle doctrine in this new model, organizes operations to optimize simultaneity and synchronization that was

lacking in older doctrine. While attempting to be forward thinking and get ahead of the doctrinal updates with the early publishing of Doctrine 2015, the Army may have fallen into a trap of assuming that future operations will maintain the strategic and national focus they retain today, requiring large modular formations that are scalable in size and composition. A shift in the essential elements of the national security strategy has placed a heavier emphasis on Asia, freedom of movement, and area access under development at the Department of Defense level as Air-Sea Battle doctrine, and may be the final nail in the coffin for Air-Land Battle and require a complete shift in focus by the Army in its approach and doctrine; with such a shift in the basic formation of doctrine, and analysis of the structure of the forces employed is warranted to increase capability and meet the requirements for national policy.

#### Current Doctrine

Air-Land Battle doctrine was the culmination of over a decade of restructuring and reshaping of the Army following the Vietnam War. The origins of Air-Land Battle can be seen in the extensive emphasis on the analysis of modern weapon systems in the 1976 *FM 100-5*, devoting chapter two in its entirety to the effects of these modern weapons on the way in which war would be fought in the future. The eye opening events of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the destructive power of modern weapons were of great concern to Army leaders.<sup>33</sup> This understanding provided the reasoning to develop a new doctrinal approach, designed to counter the Soviet threat presented by the Warsaw Pact in Europe, which was finally codified in the 1986 *FM 100-5, Operations*. Designed to integrate land and air power and synchronize efforts across the spectrum of conflict to maximize lethality and effectiveness, Air-Land Battle was grounded by four basic tenets: initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization.<sup>34</sup> Through the application of

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<sup>33</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 100-5, Operations*, 1 July 1976 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 2-2.

<sup>34</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 100-5, Operations*, 5 May 1986 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986), 14.



these tenets and the employment of the force along a focused line of effort, the Army employed maximum efficiency and lethality to achieve its objectives. The synchronization provided by this concept is best demonstrated in the campaign against Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, where the fourth largest army in the world was decimated with minimal casualties by the coalition forces.

Air-Land Battle's outstanding success in the Persian Gulf War solidified it as the cornerstone for any future development of doctrine. The basic foundation of the Air-Land Battle doctrine is sound, and easily molded to fight many different tactical scenarios. Developments in the 1990s in Air-Land Battle doctrine continued with the same basic tenets with efforts to expand its application to conflicts and scenarios outside of high intensity conflicts, with then Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan arguing that any development of the doctrine must retain a balanced, adaptive, and realistic approach.<sup>35</sup> Modifying Air-Land Battle doctrine continued during the late 1990s, expanding the concepts into a new doctrine called Unified Action.

Unified Action maintained the same basic tenets of operations as Air-Land Battle, but provided further emphasis on the integration of non-military elements into the overall effort and recognized the potential for military employment in operations that did not constitute warfare. These non-warfare activities, which include actions such as humanitarian assistance, peace keeping and enforcement, was synchronized with combat actions to provide a scaled level of military employment captured in the integrated concept of Full Spectrum Operations. FM 3-0, which replaced the FM 100-5 series as the doctrinal operations manual to signify this major change in focus, detailed Full Spectrum Operations to address Army operations across the full spectrum of conflict, from peace to war.<sup>36</sup> This doctrine incorporated the great success of Air-

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<sup>35</sup>Gordon R. Sullivan, "Doctrine: A Guide to the Future," *Military Review*, February 1992, 8.

<sup>36</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 3-0, Operations*, 14 June 2001 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), 1-14.

Land Battle during the Persian Gulf War as well as the multitude of military operations other than war (MOOTW) and low intensity conflicts that occurred in the 1990s such as Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti to build a coherent, all encompassing doctrine that was adaptable enough to be tailored to any scenario. This new focus introduced a large range of concepts that depended on integration and synchronization to achieve decisive results. Decisiveness was apparent in the doctrine's application during the major combat operations such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003, where limited forces were able to defeat in detail the regular and irregular forces of Saddam Hussein in only a month of combat. However, the post major combat operations phase signified a complex and unclear method of execution in the months following regime collapse. Regardless of arguments citing far too few soldiers deployed to maintain control of Iraq following the collapse of the regime, with the force dependant on so many agencies outside of its control to achieve the desired end state, confusion and desynchronized efforts caused major problems in the occupation phase of the war.

### Return to Counterinsurgency Doctrine

Shortcomings in Air-Land Battle doctrine were identified early after its inception, noting that it was primarily designed for major combat operations and, while adaptive by nature and capable of shifting to meet the challenges of irregular warfare, was not optimized for this form of conflict.<sup>37</sup> The need for a more integrated approach to doctrine that incorporated both high and low intensity conflicts was attempted in the Unified Action doctrine of the 2001 *FM 3-0*, but with mixed results. Complications from political decisions and the inability of the employment of Unified Action doctrine to prevent the rise of an insurgency within Iraq became obvious shortly after the fall of Saddam's regime and exemplified the need for a focused irregular warfare doctrine that was nested within traditional warfare doctrine. It is likely that these irregular forms

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<sup>37</sup>Steven Metz, "Air-Land Battle and Counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, January 1990, 40.

of conflict will become the far more common employment form for military action, as fewer and fewer militaries can compete with U.S. dominance on the conventional battlefield, demanding that non-traditional forms of warfare play a greater influence in doctrine.<sup>38</sup>

To counter the threat posed during irregular warfare, development of a new counterinsurgency doctrinal manual, *FM 3-24*, in late 2006 reintroduced into doctrine the concepts of counterinsurgency operations, which had been largely eliminated from consideration after the purges in the 1970s and 1980s. This purge of doctrinal concepts with links to irregular warfare or insurgency and the defeat in Vietnam was freely admitted by senior leaders including former Army Chief of Staff General John Keane, due to links with the perceived failure in doctrine during that era.<sup>39</sup> In reality the new *FM 3-24* was essentially the same concept employed in Vietnam, but modernized to coincide with Unified Action Doctrine and employed in a mixed manner between counterinsurgency and Unified Action methods. Shortly after the invasion of Iraq, the beginnings of the insurgency developed from long time ethnic and religious underpinnings that were repressed under the regime of Saddam Hussein. The toppling of the Saddam Hussein government freed these elements to manifest themselves through violence, coercion, and extortion. The Army realized it lacked an insurgency doctrine within Unified Action doctrine. Hastily reviewing and updating counterinsurgency concepts from the Vietnam War, the Army published *Field Manual – Interim, FMI 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations*, to fill the capability and doctrine gap. While focused on Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN), *FMI 3-07.22* heavily relied on the Unified Action concepts of *FM 3-07, Stability and Support Operations*, with little change to operating concepts.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>38</sup>Huba Wass de Czege, “Traditional and Irregular Warfare,” *Army Magazine*, March 2006, 16.

<sup>39</sup>John A. Nagl, “Let’s Win the Wars We’re In,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 52, 1<sup>st</sup> QTR, 2009, 21.

<sup>40</sup>Austin Long, *Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand National Defense Research Institute, 2008), 21.

As LTG Petraeus assumed the position of the Commander for the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, he also assumed responsibility for the development of *FM 3-24* to replace *FMI 3-07.22*. Many of the base concepts remained the same; however the new *FM 3-24* placed a heavy emphasis on understanding the insurgency and the dynamics of warfare in a counterinsurgency scenario. Where *FMI 3-07.22* established the "how to" for military operations, *FM 3-24* furthered the concept of counterinsurgency not only by modernizing the 'how to' by adding the "why" and "what if" through implementation of counterinsurgency paradoxes and establishment of the predominance of intelligence to drive operations.<sup>41</sup> *FM 3-24* introduced the soon to be famous Clear-Hold-Build concept for defeating insurgencies.<sup>42</sup> Additionally, *FM 3-24* placed far more emphasis on the development of Host Nation services, government, and economic capabilities to defeat the insurgency and it dedicated an entire chapter to the development of Host Nation forces capabilities to allow an end of US operations and an exit of U.S. forces.

It is under the umbrella of this combined and modified counterinsurgency doctrine that the Army currently operates, blending the warm security blanket of an updated Air-Land Battle concept with both new and old concepts of counterinsurgency operations to produce a hybrid offspring that is effective under the Global War on Terror concept of operations, but is relatively one dimensional and incapable of performing adequately in a high intensity conflict. As always, these changes in doctrine yielded structural shifts and changes in authorizations at the divisional level, which in fact are far more radical than most within the history of doctrinal changes in the modern era; some of these changes produced a fundamental shift in employment methods shifting from divisional to BCT primacy for contingency operations.

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<sup>41</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations*, 15 December 2006 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 1-26.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, 5-18.

## Current Force Structure

Since the development of the modern divisional structure during World War I, it has been the primary warfighting unit capable of integrating combined arms functions and synchronizing joint operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives. The trends for smaller conflicts requiring more deployable forces from the Army was underway even prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, to change the fundamental base fighting unit from the division to the smaller, nimbler Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in lieu of the large divisional formations required under Air-Land Battle to combat Soviet tactics. General Dennis Reimer and General Eric Shinseki had both experimented with adjusting the force structure, with Shinseki beginning the process under the concept of Army Transformation.<sup>43</sup> These changes focused on the development of the BCT as the primary warfighting element enabled by modern technology to provide increasingly flexible, responsive, and deployable forces to meet modern challenges. After 9-11 and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the resulting large scale counterinsurgency forces needed to counter the resulting insurgencies, General Peter Shoomaker implemented these developmental changes during his tenure as Army Chief of Staff under the modularity concept.<sup>44</sup> Modularity essentially transferred primary capability for conducting combined arms operations from the division to the BCT, greatly increasing the size, staff structure, and responsibilities of the BCT at the expense of the division.

The intent behind the modularity concept was to provide a deployable force with a standardized combat unit that could be plugged in to an existing divisional structure based on operational requirements to tailor the force to meet the needs of any perceived mission, based on concerns of the Army's ability to deploy and sustain multiple combat operations in different

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<sup>43</sup>Richard W. Stewart, *The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2008*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2010), 455.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, 513.

theaters of combat.<sup>45</sup> This modular design decreased the line combat units within the BCT by a third, while increasing the support and sustainment capability to provide necessary combat support and combat sustainment capacity to enable independent deployment.<sup>46</sup> In order to achieve this restructuring, the Army sought and attained an increase of 30,000 Soldiers to the Army end strength, and increased the total number of BCTs within the Army. This increased the number of deployable combat brigades available to the Army from 33 to 48 active duty BCTs by decreasing the size of the combat forces within these elements.<sup>47</sup> Where under the Air-Land Battle concept each division had three organic combat brigades, modularity increased the number of BCTs in a division to four but changed the command relationship between the BCTs and the division, even when not deployed, to attached rather than organic. The division no longer retained a fixed structure, and had no organic combat units.<sup>48</sup> The division became a headquarters element that was provided combat power only through the attachment of BCTs for a specific mission, its previously organic BCTs were attached in garrison for administrative purposes only and the division retained no operational authority over these BCTs. BCTs could be employed independently or plugged into any deployed division to increase its capability, which in essence maintained the combat effectiveness of the Army while increasing its deployability and responsiveness.<sup>49</sup>

The pre-modularity composition of the BCT consisted of three combat battalions, a field artillery battalion, a support battalion, and various platoon or company enablers to facilitate operations. These brigades maintained the minimum support elements for short term operations

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<sup>45</sup>Douglass Holtz-Eakin, *Options for Restructuring the Army* (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, May 2005), 4.

<sup>46</sup>Holtz-Eakin, *Options for Restructuring the Army*, 8.

<sup>47</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FMI 3-0.1, The Modular Force*, 28 January 2008 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 1-2.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*, 2-5.

<sup>49</sup>Stewart, *The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2008*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., 514.

and required heavy reinforcement for any form of independent or extended operations. In pre-modular design, which was essentially the Army of Excellence divisional structure, the division would provide any additional support elements from within its own structure. For example, if a brigade was assigned a mission that required it to perform a mission outside its capabilities, the division could assign additional fires assets from the DIVARTY, support assets from DISCOM, or engineer assets from the divisional engineer units. Under pre-modularity, staff structures were likewise unbalanced, with the division staff having organic all planning and support functions to enable independent extended operations, while the brigade was structured for planning short term and limited combat operations only.

With the implementation of modularity, this structure was inverted. The primary focus for capability and execution became the BCT and the division was relegated to primarily a coordination and enabling function. The BCT now had a full set of support elements to coordinate and deliver supplies, fires, and mobility organic to its structure. The modular BCT reduced the combat battalions to two, replacing one of these combat units with a cavalry battalion to provide its own reconnaissance and security. The fires and support battalions, where previously attached to the brigade from the divisional elements, were now organic to the BCT and capable of planning and providing all required support. The headquarters restructuring increased the BCT staff to provide subject matter experts across the range of military operations to include stability functions. These changes came at the expense of the division. The modular division no longer had organic fires, support, or mobility units to reinforce brigades; these were stripped from the division to provide the required personnel to the BCTs, as was the divisional staff, where many of the specialty staff now resided in the BCTs. The size of the Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for BCTs greatly increased through these additional elements, growing to

3,500 Soldiers in an IBCT, 3,700 Soldiers in an HBCT, and 4,200 Soldiers in a SBCT organic to these elements with proportional growth to the staff structures.<sup>50</sup>

The effects of modularity greatly increased the combat capability of the BCT, at the expense of the capacity of the division to provide support and apply emphasis to the divisional main effort through organic combat and combat support assets. Divisions no longer deploy as a divisional pure unit with the formally organic BCTs it traditionally operated with at its home station. Instead, the divisional headquarters would receive BCTs allocated for the deployment from across the available BCTs in the Army, often with widely diverse and distinct capabilities that might not be in line with the divisional construct. During the course of operations, the division was limited to the amount of additional combat power it could allocate to its main effort without inhibiting the operational capabilities of attached BCTs without receiving additional support from echelons above division (EAD), as most of the enabler support units were organic the BCTs. These changes, while essential to the way the Army approached and sustained two protracted simultaneous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, minimized the capabilities and structure of the division.

### Doctrine of the Future

Having analyzed current doctrine and the resulting shifts in the divisional structure, an analysis of the emerging doctrine that is under development is imperative to determine the major impacts on the requirements for future divisional restructuring initiatives. The newest development in Army Doctrine seeks to maximize the best practices of the highly successful Air-Land Battle Concept and its modifications with the hard fought lessons learned after a decade of counterinsurgency. Doctrine 2015 retains the concepts from previous doctrine of Unified Action and Decisive Action. The concept's shift in focus is the development of the concepts of

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<sup>50</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Fort Knox Supplemental Manual (FKSM) 71-8, Reference Data for Brigade Combat Teams* (Fort Knox, KY: Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development, 2010), Annex A-C.



employment Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) and Wide Area Security (WAS) and the means of achieving the goal of Unified Land Operations. This doctrinal shift employs previously separate fundamental concepts, with CAM equating to high intensity and WAS to low intensity conflicts, into a combined and synchronized doctrine focused on simultaneity and synchronization.

*Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0* is the newest evolution of Operations Doctrine for the United States Army, replacing *FM 3-0*. The central operating concept is Unified Land Operations, the purpose of which is to “seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.”<sup>51</sup> In the Foreword of *ADP 3-0*, General Raymond T. Odierno, the Army Chief of Staff, discussed the concept of Unified Land Operations as a natural outgrowth of Air-Land Battle Doctrine, further stressing the need for integration with joint, interagency, and multinational partners to fully realize successful operations.<sup>52</sup> Unified Land Operations is the Army’s role within Unified Action, the joint doctrinal operations concept. To execute Unified Land Operations, *ADP 3-0* maintains the previous concept of Decisive Action from *FM 3-0*, outlining offensive, defensive, stability, and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). This large operational framework maintains the continuity that is developed through the new concept of execution through Army Core Competencies CAM and WAS, as well as the newly focused emphasis on Mission Command that emphasizes commander centrality to all operations.

The Core Competencies of Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security initially do not seem to be ground breaking concepts. Taken literally, these two categories have long been

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<sup>51</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations*, October, 2011 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 1.

<sup>52</sup>*ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations*, Foreword.

a part of Army doctrine. Army units have conducted Combined Arms Maneuver throughout its history integrating fire and maneuver to seize objectives. Wide Area Security has been practiced in areas under Army control and during counterinsurgency operations throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century. These concepts have often been seen as sequential; with high intensity Combined Arms Maneuver occurring first and Wide Area Security conducted after the enemy forces have been defeated. It is the *ADP 3-0* intent behind the concepts that warrants examination. The critical idea in *ADP 3-0* is that Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security are conducted simultaneously. Combined Arms Maneuver is the application of all elements of combat power to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy, while Wide Area Security is intended to deny the enemy the ability to gain a position of advantage over Army forces.<sup>53</sup> Combined Arms Maneuver provides defeat mechanisms, while Wide Area Security provides Stability Mechanisms.<sup>54</sup> This critical distinction requires specific, specialized, and trained forces that are not readily available under the current TOEs for Army BCTs and divisions. Conceptually, the Operational Framework within Doctrine 2015 is far more descriptive than previous doctrinal publications. Emphasizing the centrality of the unit commander to the operations process, *ADP 3-0* allows for much more leeway in the framework of operations in order to tailor to the specific needs of the commander, in fact *ADP 3-0* specifically states that there is no boundary to what type of framework may be used, be it deep-close-rear, main effort-supporting effort, or any other framework that the commander deems and best describing his vision of the operational environment.<sup>55</sup>

The other major evolutionary concept within Doctrine 2015 is the concept of Mission Command. Replacing the previous concept of Command and Control, Mission Command implies the employment of the Art of Command with the Science of Control to empower subordinate

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<sup>53</sup>LTG David G. Perkins, Doctrine 2015 Brief to AMSP 13-01 at Arnold Conference Room, Fort Leavenworth, KS, on 28 November 2012.

<sup>54</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations*, 16 May 2012 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 2-10.

<sup>55</sup>*ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations*, 11.

leaders to utilize initiative within a well understood commander's intent through the use of mission orders. The concept requires clarity and understanding without imposing rigid requirements that prevent initiative.<sup>56</sup> The intent behind the shift to Mission Command was twofold, first to ensure commanders are adequately involved in the mission planning process and execution to ensure unity of command and common understanding of a clear intent, and secondly to provide flexibility to seize the initiative that is critical to Unified Land Operations. Command and Control implied more of a staff function and lacked the emphasis on the commander in the planning and execution process. Empowered by a clear understanding of the higher commander's intent, subordinate commanders could use initiative within this understanding to achieve objectives and exploit the advantage.

Perhaps one of the most interesting, and most significant, changes within Doctrine 2015 is identification of a new threat model. Prior to its introduction, all major doctrinal publications concerned themselves with a large conventional force threat model that had remained predominantly unchanged since the introduction of Active Defense and Air-Land Battle using the Soviet Threat Model. Doctrine was based off countering large armored formations regardless of terrain or location, which was considered the *most dangerous* threat model. The new threat model concept, called the Hybrid Threat Model, which had origins in the study of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006, is based on the *most likely* threat model. This fundamental shift in thinking is a result of the analysis of Israel's involvement in Lebanon, America's own experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the realization that, at least in the near future, there is a lack of any near-peer opponent that could represent a Soviet style threat. Lacking a most dangerous threat that the Army can plan on countering and understanding the operational environment the U.S. finds itself in during this era of global instability, the option to focus on most likely threat is far more practical than creating a mythical Soviet enemy out of any potential opponent. The Hybrid Threat

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<sup>56</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command*, 17 May 2012 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1.

Model is a combined enemy force of regular, irregular, and terrorist forces, as well as criminal elements, and accounts for the full range of potential adversaries of the United States, including state and non-state actors.<sup>57</sup> Increasing potential employment along the concepts included within the Hybrid Threat Model are likely, the simple truth is that few nations could hope to match the conventional military power of the United States. The success of insurgent groups to frustrate the American military during the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, where conventional opposition was rapidly annihilated but insurgencies proliferated and lasted years, offer potential opportunities for opposing elements to exploit weaknesses in American forces, much akin to what Israel's endured in Lebanon. It is highly likely that a combined regular and irregular force will be the primary opponent faced by American forces in the near future.

The final element of discussion for doctrine must include the Air-Sea Battle Concept (ASBC) development within the Department of Defense. This concept is outside of the Army doctrinal process yet has significant impacts on the missions and therefore the composition, funding, and size of Army forces. Developed jointly between the Navy and the Air Force at the direction of Secretary Robert M. Gates, the Air-Sea Battle Concept focuses on countering anti-access and area denial (A2AD) capabilities.<sup>58</sup> Air-Sea Battle is the method by which joint forces will counter potential adversaries from preventing the global deployment of U.S. forces to areas to conduct contingency operations. Anti-access capabilities include the proliferation of high technology weapons that include integrated air defenses (IADS), space surveillance and strike capabilities, anti-ship weaponry, and long range ballistic and guided missiles; in essence all capabilities that prevent or potentially hinder the deployment, synchronization, and employment of U.S. military forces.<sup>59</sup> The ability that only the United States retains today among all nations is the power projection capability to deploy, sustain, and employ forces on short notice globally

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<sup>57</sup>*ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations*, 1-3.

<sup>58</sup>Department of Defense, *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February, 2010, 32.

<sup>59</sup>*Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)*, 9.

with sufficient combat power to provide a significant threat to any state or non-state organization. The concern addressed within Air-Sea Battle is the ability to maintain this capability in the face of growing technological advances that are becoming more accessible and affordable to potential opponents. If the U.S. is no longer able to project forces, U.S. credibility as a security stabilizer would be diminished.<sup>60</sup> In the Joint Concept of Air-Sea Battle, Army forces, while still having a role to play, are far less critical and lack priority with funding and appropriations.

Air-Sea Battle is a limited concept focused on the ability to counter anti-access capabilities under a “Shift to the Pacific” concept. This limited concept has been incorporated into the truly joint doctrine represented by the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC). The JOAC integrates the strengths and capabilities of all the joint force to provide the synergy to counter the hybrid threat. It is within this context that the Army must restructure forces to meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

#### DIVISION RESTRUCTURING TO SUPPORT THE JOINT OPERATIONAL ACCESS CONCEPT

The historical precedents for the evolution of the division structure based on newly developed doctrine are clear; form follows function. Each modification to the divisional structure can be directly related to support some portion of the doctrine under which the division operated. The preceding chapters explored the evolution of the division throughout the twentieth century to support the contemporary doctrine and established this as a pattern, and also analyzed the current doctrinal updates to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the shift in the emerging doctrine to meet the challenges of the future. Unlike throughout much of its history, the United States finds itself without a near-peer challenge; there simply is no one entity that can

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<sup>60</sup>General Norton A. Schwartz comments during a round table discussion forum with The Brookings Institution on the development of Air-Sea Battle doctrine. *Air-Sea Battle Doctrine: A Discussion with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations*, [http://www.brookings.edu/~media/events/2012/5/16%20air%20sea%20battle/20120516\\_air\\_sea\\_doctrine\\_corrected\\_transcript.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/events/2012/5/16%20air%20sea%20battle/20120516_air_sea_doctrine_corrected_transcript.pdf) (accessed 9 December 2012), 7.

provide for an enemy conceptual and operational structure to shape the development of U.S. doctrine to counter a specific threat. This lack of an identifiable foe has resulted in the evolution of doctrine to focus on likely conflict scenarios in the context of the operational environment the United States now finds itself operating within; specifically the development of the Hybrid threat model and the Joint Operational Access Concept of the Department of Defense, as well as the Army's emerging doctrine, entitled Doctrine 2015. Efforts to integrate these separate doctrinal concepts are underway through Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey's development of the *Joint Operational Access Concept*. This chapter analyzes how the Army must modify its current divisional structures under the constraints of manpower and fiscal resources reductions in order to optimize operational capability within its doctrine to support conflict under the new context established in the JOAC operational concept.

#### Air-Sea Battle and the Joint Operational Access Concept

The initial concept that that began the shift in the joint doctrinal focus was the development of the Air-Sea Battle concept. Air-Sea Battle supports the rebalancing efforts to the Pacific, as directed by the President through Secretary Gates in the 2010 QDR. This concept is focused on the integration of all operational domains, primarily air and sea, to defeat anti-access capabilities and support power projection capacity.<sup>61</sup> While the concept is not inherently Pacific Theater of Operations specific, the implications of the concept's focus on China's growing power within the Pacific region and concerns over its anti-access and area denial evident within China's expansion of its integrated air defense, anti-ship, and ballistic missile capabilities are evident. Finally, Air-Sea Battle addresses concerns of the limited ability to deploy forces and prepare for combat operations unhindered by opposing elements. Experience in recent combat operations within Iraq and Afghanistan, where U.S. forces were able to deploy and prepare for combat essentially unhindered by the opposing force, are likely to become less common. However, Air-

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<sup>61</sup>Department of Defense, *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February, 2010, 32.

Sea Battle is but one component of the integrated Joint Force Doctrine established in the JOAC, and is limited primarily to an air and sea operational concept focused on the anti-access/area denial threats.<sup>62</sup>

As stated above, General Dempsey molded the JOAC to incorporate not only the Air-Sea Battle concept that has been under development since 2009, but all branches of service. The JOAC seeks to optimize the employment of all the joint service doctrine, organization, and capabilities to achieve national objectives in a rapid, overwhelming, and comprehensive method of operations. It presents the concept of Cross Domain Synergy, which integrates all joint capabilities across the services in each of the domains, focused on the additive rather than complimentary employment of these capabilities.<sup>63</sup> Essentially, Cross Domain Synergy uses synchronized actions to maximize strengths within separate services to counter weaknesses in other services to establish freedom of action to accomplish the assigned mission. The JOAC places individual service strengths against enemy weaknesses within one or more domains to enable other services to fully exploit capabilities in other domains. Dependant upon each service and its strengths within each domain to support the holistic concept of operations, the JOAC seeks a joint application of capabilities within the domains that are mutually supporting and enabling, rather than one service bearing the majority of responsibility and capability.

The JOAC requires capabilities within each service and each domain to fully exploit joint capabilities and threat weaknesses. The JOAC addresses concerns of deployability, mobility, depth, and lethality, with information integration and dominance facilitating the maximum potential of each of these capabilities. The Army specifically, while capable of operating in and supporting actions in other domains, primarily operates in the land domain. This domain requires smaller, more rapidly deployable and mobile forces that can provide the lethality of far larger

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<sup>62</sup>*Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)*, 4.

<sup>63</sup>*Ibid.*, 14.

legacy formations.<sup>64</sup> This implies a requirement for a more capable command and control structure at a level subordinate to the traditional headquarters for a theater level operation, historically a corps or army headquarters. Within this concept the division seems to be the optimal solution for this function, as it possesses the capabilities to synchronize operations within the joint and interagency structure of the JOAC. The JOAC envisions future conflicts as encompassing deployment and combat as a single concept and not phased, requiring the capability to both conduct opposed early entry operations immediately followed by maneuver operations against the distant objective.<sup>65</sup> The requirements to accomplish the objectives established in the JOAC must drive both Army doctrine and the supporting divisional organization that will execute operations under the JOAC operational concept.

#### Army Doctrine and the Capabilities of Current Divisional Structure

The Army's Doctrine 2015 conceptually supports JOAC operations. The basic construct of Unified Land Operations (ULO) describes how the Army operates and the need to conduct a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations simultaneously.<sup>66</sup> This doctrine includes actions during early or forced entry operations to secure entry points and basing in a hostile area against a hybrid threat capable of both high intensity and low intensity opposition. Additionally, it addresses the need to conduct major combat operations, military engagement, and humanitarian assistance simultaneously while pursuing an assigned military objective through the concurrent application of the Army core competencies of Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security.<sup>67</sup> Each of the tenets of ULO and the Army's six War Fighting Functions all support the

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<sup>64</sup>Ibid., 21.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., 21.

<sup>66</sup>ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 1.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., 2.



joint, expeditionary and complex nature of operations within the concept envisioned by the JOAC.

While the Army's Doctrine 2015 supports the JOAC, the organizational structure of the current division and its subordinate BCTs fail to optimize capabilities and meet the requirements established within this doctrine. The most evident concern is that the current separate heavy and light divisional structures fail to fully achieve the requirements of simultaneous Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security. In the shift to the new doctrinal construct for these capstone concepts, the Army has made extensive efforts to modify the division headquarters to be able to conduct operations as a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters but paid almost no attention to the composition of the force structure the division headquarters will control. In fact, force structures for elements that comprise the division are not even addressed in the Army's Operating Concept, addressing current and future requirements of Army forces.<sup>68</sup>

Without providing too much generalization, a fair assessment of the current force structure is that heavy formations excel in Combined Arms Maneuver but finds itself lacking in the capability to fully achieve the manpower intensive aspects of Wide Area Security, while light structures experience the inverse problem providing large dismounted formations ideal for population control and security under the WAS concept but lacking the rapid and overwhelming ground based maneuver capability critical to CAM. This is not implying that these formations cannot perform both functions adequately, but that the required simultaneity of CAM and WAS provide problems for both formations and strain capabilities to be able to achieve it.

The heavy division structure is centered on the rapidly moving, highly lethal armored formations that can overwhelm any enemy formation, the primary strength of the formation relies on applying combat power against an organized enemy force. The concept relies on the combination of armor and mechanized infantry that are mutually supporting. To conduct WAS

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<sup>68</sup>Department of the Army, *TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028*, 19 August 2010 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 24.

simultaneously would require the removal of requisite forces primarily from the infantry formations that are best suited for it, which would be highly detrimental to the ability to maximize the accomplishment of CAM. The same is true for light division structure; lacking the firepower and mobility of heavy formations, the light division conducts CAM through the integration of fires and maneuver and is a manpower intensive operation. The requirement to remove one or more of its combat elements to simultaneously conduct WAS greatly weakens the overall ability of the formation to conduct CAM.

Heavy and light forces are currently constructed for a high intensity conflict scenario, and are assigned forces to enable them to accomplish this mission without redundancies or additional forces. As currently structured, units are incapable of conducting simultaneous CAM and WAS without a task organization of forces and a serious degradation to one or the other of these Army Core Competencies.

#### Limitations of Current Divisional Structures for Operations under the JOAC

While both heavy and light Army divisions provide a wide array of capabilities to the joint force supported commander, several limitations specific to each category exist that less than fulfill the requirements under the JOAC. For land based operations, the JOAC emphasizes lethality, mobility, depth and simultaneity of action, and deployability.<sup>69</sup> As structured under the current divisional constructs, Army divisions lack the full range of these capabilities based on the architecture of the heavy and light force divisions.

Heavy divisions provide massive firepower; they are the most lethal land based combat formations in history. Lethality is arguably the greatest capability of a heavy division, where these formations integrate fires with maneuver to provide a destructive capability that can overwhelm an opponent. The mobility of a heavy division is exceptional in ideal terrain,

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<sup>69</sup>*Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)*, 20.

evidenced by the rapid advances by armor elements in the attacks on Iraq both in 1991 and in 2003. Mobility degrades as the terrain becomes more difficult within mountainous or forested areas, and is severely limited by operations in large urban areas that provide little room to maneuver and confine heavy vehicles to roadways, exposing these vehicles to dismounted ambush at close range. In a linear context, heavy divisions have the capability to shape the environment with rapid maneuver and deep fires when they are adequately supported by logistics to provide depth to maneuver force operations, but require combat power to ensure that these supply lines remain open. Modern armored formations are inherently logistically intensive formations requiring massive amounts of fuel to maintain operational tempo. A M1A2 Main Battle Tank, the tank organic to Army heavy divisions, expends its 500 gallon fuel tank with an average of less than one mile per gallon.<sup>70</sup> Without the supply lines to support forward movement, the armored heavy formations have limited operational depth. Finally, perhaps the greatest shortfall of heavy divisions within the concept of the JOAC is deployability. With each tank or mechanized infantry battalion containing 58 M1 tanks or M2 infantry fighting vehicles, respectively, an armored division has several hundred combat vehicles and thousands of support vehicles that must be deployed to an operation. This massive amount of vehicles and equipment requires transportation by ship and a lengthy loading times and travel durations to the location of employment. Pre-positioning of equipment may assist in the deployability context, but limited pre-position stocks are available based on fiscal constraints. A heavy division alone does not meet the requirements for operations of the JOAC.

Light divisions provide a critical capability to the joint commander under the JOAC, but suffer from the same issue as heavy forces in that it is unable to fully employ the concepts within the JOAC. Light divisions are inherently deployable; with limited cargo requirements a light force can rapidly deploy and conduct combat operations. They are ideal for the future potential

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<sup>70</sup>Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m1-specs.htm> (accessed 13 January 2013).

short notice conflicts that are likely under the JOAC construct for operations. Light forces can maximize depth just as the heavy forces can given adequate supply methods, and employ vertical envelopments through parachute or helicopter assaults coupled with the integration of fires to strike across a wide depth in the enemy rear areas. While capable of operating in every environment sufficiently, including heavily forested, swampy, and urban areas, light forces do not possess the tactical mobility and speed that is inherent in heavy forces and critical to operations under the JOAC, and are more vulnerable to enemy small arms and indirect fire systems. Organic lethality of the light division lacks the overwhelming firepower that the heavy division brings to bear on an enemy. While it retains some capabilities through enablers such as attack aviation and artillery, the destructive capability of a dismounted rifleman in general is far less in comparison to what a main battle tank or an infantry fighting vehicle brings to bear on the enemy.

While there are currently no official medium divisions within the Army, there are several medium brigades aligned under current force structures. These brigades provide important capabilities that are compatible within the JOAC and assist in an understanding of where the future of the divisional structure should progress. The medium brigades, equipped with motorized combat vehicles in troop carrying, reconnaissance, fire support, and anti-armor variants, were designed to meet the specific problems that are addressed in the JOAC. The medium BCT concept intended to provide the mobility and firepower inherent in a heavy force while reducing the speed of deployment and logistical requirement to that of a light force, but was never intended to be established as a divisional level formation. While the concept, regardless of the vehicle employed, has significant merits and fits the JOAC model, the reality of the current equipment is that while it can meet the requirements for JOAC operations, it does not perform any function to the extent desired. Medium brigades are more easily deployed than heavy brigades, and have far more firepower than light forces, but fail to achieve the capability of either in terms of the intent of the JOAC. Medium brigades can counter some limited enemy armor formations, but lack the staying power and survivability of heavy formations. Likewise, while the medium brigades are

more easily deployed than their heavy counterparts, they are large formations that still have a significant logistical tail that is far larger than light forces. This does not imply that the medium brigade is an invalid concept, but rather that it is incapable of attaining the level of capability that heavy and light forces can within their respective strengths under the JOAC.

Both heavy and light divisions bring specific capabilities to the conflict that are critical to the whole but are lacking in other areas that must be mitigated. An examination of what a divisional level force must be able to perform under the JOAC will both highlight strengths and identify the limitations inherent in the current divisional structures, and provide a framework for modification to the divisional structures to meet these requirements.

#### Operational Requirements for the JOAC

The JOAC establishes three basic categories of functions that ground forces must be able to perform. The first is to shape the Operational Environment to facilitate access. Second, the Army must establish and gain access when opposed. Finally, it must defeat a hybrid threat. Each of these categories must be synchronized with other joint forces across all domains to attain the synergy required by the JOAC. The Army as currently structured is capable of achieving the requirements in the first two categories, however the countering of hybrid threats poses a problem to the current divisional formation and requires restructuring to facilitate accomplishment through synchronized CAM and WAS operations.

Shaping the Operational Environment to facilitate access is an ongoing process that the Army has been performing for years. This category includes regional partnerships and training exercises with U.S. allies across the globe as well as security cooperation efforts against adversarial forces. The regionally aligned force concept is currently planned for implementation and will greatly support shaping the environment in pre-conflict phases.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>71</sup>TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, *United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028*, 56.

The establishment of operational access has long been a capability of the Army, and is one of its critical functions. Early and forced entry capabilities are provided by forward positioned elements that already occupy staging bases in vicinity of a conflict, or by parachute, air assault, or amphibious landings to secure initial operational and logistical forward basing to facilitate the flow of follow on exploitation forces. This operational access is driven by the nature of the operation and whether it is a shorter notice mission such as in Operation Just Cause or longer notice missions as in Operation Desert Storm/Shield. Regardless of the method, the Army has the capability to establish operational access within the integrated efforts of all joint forces employed within the JOAC.

The final functional category, defeat of the Hybrid Threat, provides several points of consideration that require modification to force structure and employment. The Hybrid Threat Model entails a combination, in varying degrees, of regular, irregular, criminal, and terrorist elements working in mutually supporting efforts to counter U.S. military strengths.<sup>72</sup> The Hybrid Threat Model accounts for a dynamic battlefield and can either be a naturally progressing method of opposition to U.S. military success or a pre-standing organizational structure designed to operate independently or together. Based on the conventional conflict superiority of the U.S. military, the hybrid threat model is a likely employment method for any opposing entity to form to counter U.S. strengths and attack weaknesses. The Army is structured for a high intensity conflict against an opposing state actor, with massed armor and infantry formations supported by overwhelming integrated firepower. While there are countless influences that affected the development of conflict in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the conflict is a useful example of future potential hybrid threat scenarios. Iraq employed a vast regular force supported by limited irregular elements in the Saddam Fedayeen, and although not directly coordinated by the Iraq political leaders, developed an extensive terrorist and criminal element opposing force that drove the country into civil war and turmoil. Another example includes the Hezbollah organization that

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<sup>72</sup>*ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations*, 1-3.

proved exceptionally effective in countering the armor heavy elements of the Israeli army in the 2006 Lebanon incursion, where Israeli Defense Forces failed to achieve victory against the hybrid structure of Hezbollah. Supported by the local populace, a weak and easily manipulated local government, and an outside power in the form of Iran, Hezbollah established a defense in depth focused on observation, ambush, and deception, designed to attrit Israeli forces as they attacked into Lebanon.<sup>73</sup> Conflict in the ungoverned or weakly governed spaces of the world where non-state actors play a major role in influencing the populace will likely place U.S. military elements in the same dilemma that the Israelis faced in Lebanon.

The question of the correct force structure to deal with both high intensity regular warfare and low intensity irregular warfare and insurgency simultaneously deals directly with the means of employment of these forces. As witnessed in the shortcomings of both the 2003 invasion of Iraq that failed to deal effectively with an insurgency, and the Israeli failure in Lebanon against Hezbollah, the current force structure, emphasis on mass, and firepower does not maximize the potential benefits of integration of forces under a modified structure to counter the irregular threats likely to confront forces in future conflicts. A fundamental shift in force structure is needed to provide highly deployable forces that maximize both firepower and mobility for high intensity operations and manpower intensive operations to counter threats in low intensity conflicts and stability operations focused on population control.

#### Legacy Structure Requirements

Operations under the JOAC are considered the most likely form of employment for U.S. forces in the foreseeable future. However, this does not preclude the requirement for traditional legacy force structures to be maintained in the event of the emergence of a peer or near-peer threat to U.S. interests. This near-peer threat, however unlikely in the near term, could manifest

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<sup>73</sup>Andrew Chadwick, "The 2006 Lebanon War: A Short Story," Small Wars Journal online, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-2006-lebanon-war-a-short-history> (accessed 19 January 2013).

itself in the form of a resurgent Russia, a transition from Chinese military regional to global power and capabilities, or from potential large force adversaries such as Iran or North Korea. However unlikely these scenarios are and the probability that the U.S. would enter into full scale combat operations against them, the capability currently inherent in both the large size armor divisions and the specialty light divisions with airborne and air assault capabilities must be retained as both a capability and as a deterrent toward aggression from one of these entities. Any shift from the current force structure must retain at least several division sized combat organizations geared directly towards large scale high intensity conflicts to maintain the global land force dominance currently possessed by the United States.

#### Divisional Structures for a JOAC Division

In order to meet the critical requirements for operations under the JOAC, a division requires a mix of combat forces. This new structure must provide the firepower and lethality of a heavy force, the mobility and depth of a medium force, and the deployability of a light force. The structure of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) provides a solid start point for structure and composition that meets the requirements to fully achieve the goals of JOAC operations. The MAGTF is a composite unit that contains the ground, aviation, and logistical elements, allocated as required based on the assigned mission, necessary to deploy and conduct operations as directed. These tasks include deploying to an area of operations and seizing by force if required access points, conducting sustained combat operations integrating firepower and maneuver utilizing armor, motorized, and air mobile capabilities, and manpower requirements necessary to counter hybrid threat capabilities while providing enough combat power to maintain population control and security requirements. The MAGTF consists of a ground element, which is variable in size and may include heavy, medium, or light force structures or a combination thereof, an aviation element with rotary wing attack and lift capabilities as well as close air support (CAS)



aircraft, and a logistical element charged with maintaining and sustaining the combat elements.<sup>74</sup> While the Army may not have organic fixed wing aircraft to provide the CAS role, it does have the capability to include larger ground formations and rotary wing elements to maximize offensive capacity and can rely on CAS provided by Air Force elements tasked to support the ground forces. To fulfill the requirements for the JOAC model for operations, a divisional structure consisting of a number of ground maneuver brigades with organic elements of heavy, medium, and light capabilities and an increased attack aviation element to increase lethality and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities is needed. In addition, the logistical support needed to sustain this formation must be organic to the division, which adds flexibility to the divisional capabilities to deploy formations and augment internal logistical capacity of brigades as required. This mix of heavy, medium, and light forces must be tailored to balance the need for lethality and mobility while reducing the logistical requirements for deployment of a full heavy force structure.

In order to meet the concept of operations and maximize capabilities to meet JOAC requirements, a shift in the organizational structure of the current tactical units of employment is needed. Using this basic force structural concept, the next chapter will recommend a divisional structure that meets both the requirements for the capabilities described in the JOAC and that is feasible to achieve within the current force structure manning authorizations, on hand equipment, and fiscal limitations for the force.

## RECOMMENDED DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE

A new divisional structure is required. A composite divisional structure, named for the integration of multiple combat systems from across the Army inventory within a single organic command, should be developed to focus on countering hybrid threat capabilities and meeting the

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<sup>74</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Navy, *Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 5-12, Marine Corps Organization*, 13 October 1998 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), 2-1.

operational requirements outlined within the JOAC. The composite division is focused on providing the maximum flexibility to the division commander to prioritize efforts based on the mission, opposition, and operational requirements. The composite division is a shift away from the BCT focused modularity concept that limited the ability of divisional commanders to adjust forces to meet the requirement of the mission and provide a tailored, mission specific formation to achieve the operational objectives. Counter to the modularity concept where the majority of combat and combat support elements were organic to the BCTs, the composite division construct re-establishes a core capability within divisions that deploy and provides mission command over a tailored force package of organic composite BCTs comprised of heavy, medium, and light ground elements with habitually aligned combat and combat support elements, task organized to support the assigned mission. Where the mantra of modularization is unit standardization and empowerment at the BCT level, under the composite division this mantra is operational flexibility and empowerment at the division level. While modularity is ideal for large scale and rotational deployments, the composite division is focused on specific, hybrid threat scenarios where flexibility and ability to mass combat power at a specific place and time is critical.

This fundamental shift in divisional structure, while extensive, is feasible under the current equipment and manning authorizations. The equipment structure of the composite division draws from current force equipment allocations, and requires no additional purchase of weaponry or vehicles. Taking into account the likely reductions in force structure and fiscal limitations for the near future, the composite division will actually reduce the overall force manning requirement and provide additional equipment for expansion of the pre-positioned equipment stocks by eliminating one BCT per composite division.<sup>75</sup>

Before further discussing the composite division structure and total divisions at endstate of transition within the force, relevant to the entire discussion is the concept of the composite

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<sup>75</sup>Tom Vandenbrook, "Defense Secretary Leon Panetta defends a leaner military," USA Today Online, January 26, 2012. <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-01-26/panetta-military-defense-cuts/52805056/1> (accessed 12 February 2013).

division as discussed within this monograph is focused on the active force. No adjustments are recommended to the reserve component units, and based on the nature of the hybrid threat and the JOAC, these reserve elements should stay focused on their fundamental criteria for employment. The activation of reserve elements for federal employment signifies a major national requirement that requires either additional combat power or critical specialty functions not resident within the active force and the requirement to structure reserve elements under the composite structure to support JOAC is not covered within the context of this monograph. This is not to say that an eventual shift in the reserve component structure will not be necessary in the future, but that within the confines of the argument presented in this monograph the reserve force should be maintained in the modular structure until further research is conducted on activation and employment criteria under the JOAC to determine any shifts in structure and capability.

As stated earlier, the composite division is intended to maximize flexibility within the JOAC operational construct and is focused on countering the hybrid threat most likely in future conflicts. However, the current force structure does provide some capabilities not present in the composite division structure that should be retained in the form of legacy units. These legacy units, in the form of two heavy divisions and two light divisions, would provide the capability to retain current U.S. dominance in high intensity conflict and the manpower needed for large scale early or forced entry operations. The remainder of the force would be shifted to the composite divisional structure to provide the necessary capability to support the JOAC.

While outside the scope of this monograph, an assessment of the total force structure is germane. In terms of total active divisions, an optimal solution would be a one for one shift from modular to composite division, and with the retention of two heavy and two light divisions as discussed above would provide six composite divisions for operational employment to support JOAC operations. This structure would maximize the available composite divisions for employment worldwide and retain a reset, train, and ready cycle to ensure continuous availability of highly trained and capable units. In a worst case scenario for fiscal limitations and potential

reduction requirements to the force, the minimum recommended structure would retain the heavy and light legacy divisions and reduce the number of composite divisions to four, reducing the total active divisions to eight. These four composite divisions would still be able to employ the reset, train, and ready phasing and provide ample combat capability to the JOAC concept while reducing the overall force structure but at a far larger operational tempo that would limit employment in multiple or long term conflicts. Reduction of the composite force structure below four divisions would impact the ability to conduct and sustain combat operations under the JOAC.

The optimal shift in divisional structures, which introduces six composite divisions, would effectively reduce the number of active BCTs from 45 currently down to 39 assuming no other reductions in separate BCTs or legacy force structures.<sup>76</sup> In addition to these outright reductions in BCTs, the composite structure would require shifts in supporting arms structures, likely in the form of consolidation of several Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs) to provide the requisite attack aviation assets critical to increasing the lethality, depth, and mobility of the composite divisions, as well as potential shifts in personnel allocations to facilitate increases in Civil Affairs (CA) requirements. These shifts in structure provide an immediate reduction of over 20,000 personnel solely from the decrease in active BCTs and place the Army in a far more sustainable manning structure based on future fiscal restrictions.

#### Proposed Divisional Constructs

As described above, three divisional structures are required to meet the operational requirements for the JOAC. The first two, the heavy and light legacy units, retain much of the current structure and capabilities under the modularity concept, and will be only minimally discussed here to address the critical capabilities they provide the total force. The third structure,

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<sup>76</sup>2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 46.

the composite division, will be examined in depth to analyze the recommended structure, manning, and equipment needed to meet the requirements for operations under the JOAC.

The heavy modular division provides a critical capability for the total force. The heavy division provides the firepower and tactical maneuverability to counter near-peer capabilities in a high conflict scenario, with support from composite and reserve structures as the Army component within the context of a joint operation with supporting branches operating within the context of all five domains. However unlikely the scenario of a near-peer high intensity conflict is, the capability cannot be removed completely from the force. Maintaining two heavy divisions within the Army force structure will provide the requisite combat force to engage in sustained, high intensity conflict. The heavy legacy division should retain the four BCT structure but transition the current structure from three heavy and one light BCT to four heavy BCTs, and should contain a balanced armor and mechanized infantry capability.

Likewise, the light modular division provides specific specialized capabilities that should be retained in the total Army force. As in the heavy modular division, the light modular division should retain the current formation of four BCTs and the associated combat support and combat service support structures. Maintaining a divisional level airborne and air assault capability provides the means to conduct large scale early or forced entry operations that may be critical to facilitating JOAC operations. The strategic depth provided by airborne and air assault forces are applicable to both high and low intensity conflicts and are a critical asset to U.S. military capabilities. Retaining two divisions, one focused on airborne and one focused on air assault missions, provides the flexibility across the spectrum of conflict to facilitate traditional and hybrid scenarios.

The model for divisional structure for the remaining divisions will transition to the composite division. The composite division balances capability within the four critical functional requirements for JOAC operations, that of lethality, mobility, depth and simultaneity of action, and deployability. A reduction from four to three BCTs and a mix of heavy, medium, and light

forces provides the balance needed to maximize employment options within the four fundamentals of JOAC operations. The restructuring of the division headquarters with a more robust staff, the increase in the size and capability of the aviation brigade and the reconstitution of the divisional engineer and artillery brigades provide the division commander with the flexibility to weight the main effort based on a fluid and dynamic operational environment to achieve mission critical objectives.

### Composite Division Structure

The composite division re-establishes the divisional flexibility that was lost under the modular division, where the majority of specialty staff and critical capabilities were transferred from the division to the BCT level. The introduction of intermediate brigade level headquarters for artillery and engineer elements, in addition to the already established aviation brigades, in order to maintain the training proficiency, manage employment, and synchronize efforts within the divisional operations concept provides an increase in the flexibility of the division as a whole and limits impacts on the BCTs through re-tasking of organic BCT assets to support divisional requirements. With this increased flexibility and synchronization, the commander of the composite division is able to adjust task organization to counter the dynamic issues presented within a hybrid threat environment and achieve JOAC requirements with far less additional support than the current modular division. The composite division headquarters must be expanded in order to provide effective mission command functions for operations under the JOAC. Under modularity, much of the critical staff functions at the divisional level were placed under the organic BCT structure. While this greatly increased the effectiveness and capability of the BCTs, the division was stripped of much of its functionality and flexibility. In order to manage forces at the divisional level at more than a basic level, this required BCTs to detach organic capabilities if the division commander chose to weight the main effort. Additionally, critical staff functions were under strength to truly provide mission command at the divisional

level. The composite division must seek a balance between meeting divisional level staff manning and subject matter expertise at the BCT level. The physical structure of the composite division is similar to the pre-modularity divisional structure, however the composite division composition of forces and method of employment greatly differ from previous constructs.




Figure 1. Composite Division Organic Structure.<sup>77</sup>

The basic BCT structure under the composite division provides the expansion of capability required to conduct operations under the JOAC at the tactical level. BCTs consists of three maneuver battalions. However instead of a pure BCT with like equipment, composite BCTs have one heavy combined arms battalion with a balanced armor and mechanized force, one medium infantry battalion utilizing the Stryker combat vehicle, and one light infantry battalion. The Special Troops Battalion (STB) retains the current organizational structure with engineer, signal, and intelligence assets for organic support to the BCT. The Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) retains the current organizational structure as well, but must expand maintenance and logistical functions to facilitate the array of equipment that is organic to the composite BCT.

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<sup>77</sup>Figures 1-8 listed within this section are created by the author as a visual representation of recommended organizational structures.




Figure 2. Composite BCT Organic Structure.

The composite BCT organization for combat features the organic structure reinforced with habitually aligned artillery and aviation assets that are attached to the composite BCT as well as the augmentation of maintenance, logistical, and combat support elements to the STB and the BSB. The habitual alignment of these elements allows for personal relationship development and training during normal operations prior to operational employment but provides the division commander the flexibility to change task organization for combat based on the tactical situation and to mass supporting combat arms elements on the main effort to facilitate mission accomplishment. The command relationship of attached also provides senior artillery and aviation commander oversight on the training, readiness, and maintenance status of these elements both in training and operational employment to ensure they are both able to function as required for the supported commander and receive the necessary specialized maintenance and logistical support to facilitate operations. For the STB, the augmentation of an additional heavy equipment equipped combat engineer company from the engineer brigade provides the mobility, countermobility, and survivability capabilities to facilitate breaching, obstacle emplacement, and force protection capacity. The BSB is augmented by the forward support companies from the artillery and aviation elements as well as a general support maintenance company from the sustainment brigade to facilitate maintenance and logistical functions for specialized equipment and units.






Figure 3. Composite BCT Organization for Combat.

The divisional combat aviation brigade becomes more critical than ever in providing firepower and observation capabilities to increase the lethality and effectiveness of the composite division. The aviation brigade is increased in size to three attack aviation battalions (AH64), one reconnaissance squadron (OH58), one lift battalion (UH60), and one general support aviation battalion. The attack battalions are attached to composite BCTs to increase lethality and capabilities of these formations through synchronized efforts under the ground commander. The increased lethality provided by these battalions compensates for the decrease in ground based maneuver firepower and facilitate BCT operations. The reconnaissance squadron performs the function of the divisional reconnaissance element and increases the composite division's intelligence collection and deep engagement functions. The lift battalion provides air assault lift capability of up to a light infantry battalion-sized element to facilitate operations. The command relationship of the attack battalions as attached provides the division commander the flexibility to shift the weight of the main and supporting efforts and maintains training and logistical synchronization through the aviation brigade commander. The additional attack aviation assets for the CAB require a reduction or elimination of Corps level CABs and consideration of the impacts of a reduction from 3x8 structure to a 3x6 structure for attack battalions to facilitate the shift to the composite division combat element focus and requires no additional procurement of helicopters by the Army.




Figure 4. Combat Aviation Brigade Organizational Structure.

Similar to the concept of the CAB, the Fires Brigade provides the critical link between divisional intent for fires and battlefield employment. The re-establishment of a divisional level artillery headquarters provides the employment synchronization and training oversight that is critical to effective employment of indirect fire support, which has been lacking since the dissolution of the DIVARTY structure. The training and standardization oversight provided by the Fires Brigade ensures adherence to time and accuracy standards and enables the division commander to shift organizational structure to mass combat power based on the main effort. The habitual alignment of the direct support battalions with composite BCTs provides training and relationship building that is critical to successful combat operations. Each composite BCT has a habitually aligned direct support battalion that provides indirect fire support with Fires Brigade managing employment of the HIMARs battalions to shape composite division deep operations as well as the synchronization of the counterfire radar employment plan. The direct support battalions, like the division and the BCTs, must be restructured to provide composite unit capability with a three battery structure with one self propelled medium, one towed medium, and one towed light weapon system battery each.




Figure 5. Fires Brigade Organizational Structure.

The engineer brigade maximizes effectiveness of employment of engineer assets within the division commander's intent and synchronizes training effectiveness within the engineer specialties and branch functions. Much akin to the concept of the CAB and DIVARTY, the engineer brigade headquarters provides the training management and standardization that is critical to providing ready and tactically capable mobility, countermobility, survivability, and construction engineer assets. The engineer brigade consists of a sapper battalion with a heavy and light composite capability, a route clearance battalion to support freedom of movement, and a construction battalion to facilitate life support and meet light construction needs within the division. The engineer brigade manages both the training and synchronizes the employment of divisional route clearance and construction assets and task organizes engineer capabilities under BCT or divisional control dependant on the division commander's intent.




Figure 6. Engineer Brigade Organizational Structure.

The establishment of an Operational Exploitation Brigade (OEB) is intended to synchronize supporting operational capabilities that shape the conflict and provide critical enabling functions for the composite division. The OEB includes Military Police, Signal Support, Civil Affairs, and Military Intelligence battalions whose primary role is to enable both composite division exploitation capabilities and composite BCT operational capacity. This may require some restructuring or reduction of the organic size of these battalions to be feasible under Army manning restrictions, but the critical point is the capability these elements provide for the division. By grouping these critical functions under the unified headquarters of the OEB, the composite division is able to provide operational direction while tactical employment options are managed and synchronized by the supporting brigade headquarters. The critical functions performed by the OEB facilitate and augment the composite BCT execution of WAS, and the OEB may be utilized as a composite division rear area tactical headquarters to transition WAS operations from BCTs as they continue to maneuver upon the distant objective. The route security, detainee management, interrogation functions, and civil-military project capabilities are ideal for this function, but the OEB must provide critical communications and intelligence support to forward composite BCTs simultaneously. The OEB staff structure must be organized to support both of these functions effectively.




Figure 7. Operational Exploitation Brigade Organizational Structure.

Aligning a Sustainment Brigade to each composite division provides the critical logistical support to facilitate operations under the JOAC. The Sustainment Brigade structure must comprise all critical logistical functions necessary for independent divisional operations and augmentation of composite BCT capabilities. At a minimum the Sustainment Brigade must be comprised of three Combat Service Support Battalions with the ability to tailor attached support companies as required for any assigned mission to support JOAC operations. The composition of these battalions varies based on mission assignment but the organic battalion structures provide the basis for expansion of logistical support and maintenance capability.




Figure 8. Sustainment Brigade Organizational Structure.

#### Potential Operational and Logistical Issues with the Composite Division Structure

Operationally, the restructuring of the division away from both the legacy constructs of heavy and light forces and the modularity concept produce several operational concerns that may cause potential problems in future conflicts; any organizational structure will face some sort of issue when operating within the complex system that is warfare. The more prudent question is if these potential issues preclude the viability of the composite division structure and require another more preferable organization. The organization and structure of the composite division is optimized to support operations under the JOAC, and meet the primary requirements for operations as envisioned by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As in any system, the maximization of capability against one set of problems produces potential issues when that structure is employed against a different problem. In this case, these issues manifest themselves

primarily in a composite division that is given a traditional high intensity conflict mission. These concerns include a lack of ground based maneuver and firepower provided by heavy mechanized formations, a potential for a composite division to be not fully capable of performing equally well in all aspects of decisive action akin to the issues produced during TRICAP testing, and concerns of a heavy reliance on attack aviation assets in the face of an integrated air defense system.

The composite division is designed to dominate operations within the JOAC and against a hybrid threat model. In instances where the United States faces a near peer conflict against a developed and capable heavy force, the composite division could face challenges in conducting simultaneous CAM and WAS through its comparative lack of heavy forces. This potential shortfall in capability is mitigated in two ways. First, the retention of two modular heavy divisions under the Army structure provides the requisite armor forces, as part of an integrated joint force operating across all domains and augmented by composite divisions as required, to counter a near peer heavy ground force capability. Second, the composite division itself mitigates an opponent's armor capability through a robust attack aviation structure that is ideal in counter enemy offensive armor thrusts. The lack of any potential near peer nation that possesses the technological and tactical expertise to counter American capability is remote both currently and for the foreseeable future. A far more likely scenario will place America at odds with a hybrid threat foe, and a prudent course of action would be to maximize capability against this most likely threat to support operations under the JOAC.

Another operational concern is the risk of the issues identified in testing of the TRICAP model in the early 1970s. TRICAP focused on an armored, air assault, and attack aviation brigade divisional structure; while TRICAP was designed and tested against a Soviet threat model, it does have some operational similarities with the composite division that require addressing. TRICAP organization and testing focused on capabilities of armor, air assault, and attack aviation operations in a high intensity conflict. While the composite model maintains these capabilities, the method of employment is far different from the TRICAP employment method. Where

TRICAP focused on separate capabilities that functioned within specific roles, the composite model focuses on integration and task organized combat arms elements to achieve synchronized effects with integrated composite brigades containing all three of the TRICAP operational capabilities. The synergy of the composite division ensures the synchronization of operations that was difficult at best under the TRICAP model. In addition, TRICAP testing conducted under the Soviet threat model found that TRICAP elements were more lethal but suffered larger casualties and were unable to sufficiently perform defensive roles against that threat. These concerns are mitigated much the same as above, with the employment of composite divisions against near peer armored forces as a supporting element, operating in support of the retained heavy divisions within the Army. The composite division focuses on offensive capability and the ability to operate along multiple distinct lines of operation to overwhelm enemy formations. Lacking a near peer threat akin to the Soviet massed armor formations, the concerns of potential likeness with TRICAP shortfalls are limited within the composite division structure operating under the JOAC.

A final potential concern for the employment of the composite division structure centers around the reliance on attack aviation to increase overall lethality based on the reduction of heavy armored forces. This reliance could present a similar concern in the face of a developed integrated air defense. Senior U.S. leaders have eliminated the deep attack task from the missions for attack aviation, largely in part due to the heavy losses suffered in the March 2003 deep attacks by the 11<sup>th</sup> Attack Helicopter Regiment in Iraq attacking Republican Guard formations, where massed attack aviation assets suffered losses over acceptable levels due to lack of synchronization and disruption of air defense systems. The reliance on the lethality of the attack aviation assets within the composite division is focused on the close rather than the deep fight. The integration of ground and air operations, synchronized through a single commander to facilitate tactical maneuver, reduces the potential for heavy aviation losses. The nature of the enemy forces under the hybrid threat model in JOAC operations further reduces the potential for large scale air defense ambushes, but does not preclude the possibility. Any use of attack aviation requires an

integrated plan to suppress potential air defense assets and is not a systemic issue for the composite division but rather an overall operational concern.

The largest logistical concern presented through the shift to the composite division is the heavy strain placed on logistical capabilities caused by the large mixed formations. The increase in weapon platforms and equipment variants require a large sustainment capability that must be inherent within the composite formation. While this will undoubtedly increase the size of the logistical formations organic to the composite divisions, the logistical units and capabilities are present within the Army in its current structure. The shift to the composite division structure will reduce the overall size of the Army and size and number of combat brigades in the force, but will require the same level of logistical support to provide services and maintenance for the vast array of vehicle types that are organic to the composite BCT. The logistical structure exists currently to support the shift to the composite division.

## CONCLUSION

Since the inception of the modern division, the structure, organization, and composition of the division have shifted to meet tactical and operational requirements established by doctrine. As doctrine has shifted throughout the years, so has the divisional structure and organization shifted to meet these requirements. With the shift in U.S. doctrine from high intensity near peer conflict and low intensity counterinsurgency operations to focus on anti-access and hybrid threats that we are likely to face in the near term conflicts of the future, the time has come to reassess the organizational structure of the Army. The JOAC emphasis on deployability, mobility, depth, and lethality reveal critical limitations on the current force structure to maximize capability under this operations concept. Modular heavy and light units excel at several aspects of these JOAC requirements, but fall short in others. The JOAC emphasis on smaller unit deployments and execution place the composite division as the ideal operationally focused headquarters and requires tactically integrated and capable composite BCTs to rapidly deploy, fight, and win



conflicts in support of the national objectives. The overall goal of the composite division is to achieve maximum functionality to meet JOAC requirements within joint doctrine, execute operations under the Decisive Action concept conducting simultaneous CAM and WAS under Army doctrine, and counter the strengths and exploit the weaknesses of the hybrid threat. This restructuring must be achieved within the context of the fiscal constraints in operational, maintenance, and procurement funding placed upon the military due to the financial debate within the United States. A fundamental shift in the way the Army structures itself and employs its capabilities is required regardless of the form this transformation materializes itself in. Considering the doctrinal requirements for operational capacity, fiscal limitations preventing large scale acquisitions of new systems and manning, and turbulent operational environment the United States finds itself a leader in, a shift to the composite division is a viable and achievable solution.

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