



FINALIST ESSAYS FROM THE CENTER FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SECURITY'S SEVENTH ANNUAL ESSAY COMPETITION, 2014

ESSAY QUESTION

Peter Drucker emphasized the importance of continually challenging one's assumptions. He said "Make yourself capable of doing this by building organized abandonment into your system. By asking yourself every few years, If we weren't doing what we now do, would we want to start doing it? And if the answer is 'probably not,' then maybe it isn't the right thing to do anymore." How would you apply Drucker's guidance to homeland security?

WINNING ESSAY

[A Hemispheric Approach to Homeland Security: Bring Mexico Fully into the Fold](#)
Richard Taylor, Executive Liaison to USNORTHCOM, William J. Perry Center

FINALISTS

(listed in alphabetical order by last name)

[Out with the Old, In with the New: Embracing Dual Status Commanders in the Future of Homeland Defense and Security](#)
Ryan Burke, Ph.D. Candidate, University of Delaware

[Viewing the Terrorist as Warrior: A Bitter, But Necessary, Pill to Swallow](#)
*Scott Snair, Adjunct Professor, New Jersey City University,
Department of Professional Security Studies*

[Challenging Assumptions: Time to Redefine Homeland Security](#)
Richard White

ABOUT THE COMPETITION

The Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) essay contest, now in its fourth year, is aimed at stimulating original thought on issues in Homeland Security and Homeland Defense. CHDS launched the contest in 2008 to provide people from around the country the opportunity to express their opinions on homeland security issues and to suggest new ideas. The variety of the essay topics submitted, as well as the backgrounds of the authors, highlights the vast scope of the impact that homeland security policies, programs, and challenges have on our communities and professions. This year's contestants were asked to answer the following question:

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Congratulations to this year's winners. We hope reading their essays will accomplish the contest objective of stimulating thoughts and ideas and promoting discussion and debate on homeland security and defense issues.

More information about the competition, including the question and guidelines for the current competition and an archive of questions and finalist essays from previous competitions can be found at the following web address:

<http://www.chds.us/?essay/overview>

A HEMISPHERIC APPROACH TO HOMELAND SECURITY: BRING MEXICO FULLY INTO THE FOLD

Richard Taylor

Executive Liaison to USNORTHCOM, William J. Perry Center

The United States lies squarely in the middle of the Western Hemisphere, with a country to the north and dozens to the south. Imagine an alternate history of a post-WWII Europe where the United States and allies worked toward the goal of isolating a country or two in Western Europe for the sole benefit of ensuring their security. What if, for example, we had promoted a strong security posture for France without adequately considering the inextricable role of Spain as a vital partner in that security? Smart? No, ridiculous, yet that's what we are doing today in the Western Hemisphere.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This essay suggests that the U.S. and Canada need Mexico as a long-term equal partner in the defense of North America and that the current U.S. national defense strategy does not get us there. Evolving military-to-military and military-to-civil engagements, while great tools to build relationships in the short term, are focused primarily on countering narcotics and countering transnational organized crime (TOC) that itself is centered on the narcotics trade. This myopic approach is a distraction from the long view. Current and planned security assistance efforts do not support a long-term strategy, particularly on the part of Mexico. While tactically and perhaps operationally useful, they help enable Mexico to “chase the shiny object” in training, equipping, and exercising without fully incorporating the totality of efforts into long-term national military and national security strategies that lend themselves to North American continental defense in the common interests of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The U.S. laser focus on the supply side of the drug trade combined with handshakes at the highest levels of Government, have led

Disclaimer: *This essay is generated from the mind of the author alone. It is an uncoordinated think piece from a person who has been studying and living the Mexico/U.S./USNORTHCOM military-to-military relationship for over a decade. This does not reflect the opinion of WJPC, USNORTHCOM, any other entity of the Department of Defense (DOD), or any other institution, or person.*

continental security strategy down a rabbit hole that will not necessarily improve long-term hemispheric security in the face of emerging threats.

Imagine if European continental security was focused on countering drugs instead of terrorism or nuclear non-proliferation. The U.S. Government has permitted the narcotics trade to steer not only the discussion, but the national strategy in the Western Hemisphere. History might show that was the wrong approach. Paraphrasing Peter Drucker: *Given the chance, would we want to start doing this again? -- 'probably not.'*

If the U.S. policy-makers agree that long-term continental security is a worthy objective, then a holistic U.S. Government approach to discretely work with Mexico to gain agreement on the character of that long-term partnership is needed. Do we seek eventual inclusion of Mexico in NORAD? Do we enter into a Western Hemisphere cooperative defense treaty, NATO-like, that includes other partner nations? Once a path is agreed upon, the U.S. should discretely engage Mexico strategically to propose U.S. assistance in the realization of a national military strategy and all supporting plans that will become a roadmap to assist in navigating to the long-term destination. The resulting roadmap would guide all future U.S. government security assistance efforts. It would result in a 21st century partner that sustains a military capability on par with others on the world stage, thereby enhancing U.S. national security and homeland security.

CULTURALLY, WE DIFFER

Mexico shares a history with the United States that goes back prior to U.S. independence. It is beyond the scope of this essay to recount the details of that relationship, but it is important to know we are neighbors who share a history, but we do not share much culture. It could be argued that with the growing percentage of Americans who are first-generation immigrants or prior generational descendants, our cultures are becoming more shared. However, the bottom line: as a nation, we do not share a common language, nor do we understand, nor culturally relate to Mexico. One of the greatest manifestations of our many differences is found in the relationship between our armed forces. We laugh about it, but in a very real sense, many Mexicans see the U.S. military through the lens of an occupying and conquering force and world exporter of hegemony. An inward-looking nation, culturally Mexico does not support the U.S. in its global reach. Some Mexican military officers anticipate the day when Mexico is the next country to be invaded. As ridiculous as that sounds to a U.S. military officer, it is very real in the minds of some Mexicans. The Mexican Army and Navy still war-game a coming invasion in their professional military education.

The concept of the United States as an aggressor is ingrained. One cannot speak long with a Mexican officer before he reminds you that the United States “took” half of Mexico. By some measure there are three camps in the Mexican military: US supporters; those who are ambivalent; and those who are strongly anti-US. Supporters tend to be young, while those who are anti-US are older both in age and in thinking. As a measure of seriousness with respect to a preoccupation with invasions, note that Mexico has a fascinating National Museum of Interventions. Every US military leader should take a tour.

This sentiment is a core of the cultural military-to-military difference that persists to this day. So how does the U.S. as a nation overcome it? We dropped two atomic bombs on Japan nearly 70 years ago and sustain a better defense relationship with Japan today than with Mexico. Other examples around the world abound where our former enemies have suffered enormous harm, but have “gotten over it.” We need to join hands with Mexico in such a way that they see the wisdom of looking forward into the 21st century and stop nostalgically looking back to the 19th. It’s time we recognized that along with Canada, we all live on the single continent of North America. It is in the long-term national interest of the United States to develop and build a long-term relationship with Mexico where three countries, Canada, the United States, and Mexico, are partners (perhaps allies) in its defense. Again, think Europe. Why not North America?

CROSSING THE DIVIDE

Two important words U.S. leaders need to remember when working with Mexico are *suspicion* and *dignity*. Mexico is fundamentally suspicious of U.S. intentions as we work to build the relationship. Why are we offering what we are offering? When will the next foot drop? Is the United States lulling us into a false sense of security in preparation for something else? Consider the word “partner.” There is no corresponding word in Mexican Spanish that properly communicates the English sentiment of “partnership.” The best we can come up with is *associate* or *confidant*. Some Mexican Government organizations recognize this disparity and have taken to using the word “relation,” which is the same in both languages. But “relation” does not equate to what a U.S. leader works to communicate with ‘partner.’ This single word is a source of consternation every time it’s translated in a meeting between our militaries.

Consider the word “cooperation.” Every U.S. program that deals with building the capacities of other countries to defend themselves contains the word “cooperation.” The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) manages all U.S. Government programs aimed at defense capacity

building. But in Mexican Spanish, the word "cooperation" is better translated as "help" or even worse, "charity." That is, we are 'cooperating' with you because this is something that you are incapable of doing on your own.

Americans fully comprehend that an automobile trunk in England is referred to as a bonnet, but we struggle with why Latin American countries blanch when offered "cooperation." Suspicion and skepticism are deep cultural sentiments across Mexico; origins are pre-Colombian. It's one reason Moctezuma II slow-rolled Hernan Cortés at the gates to Tenochitlan in 1522: suspicion. Once the face-to-face meeting occurred, it did not turn out well for the Aztec Empire. The resulting massacre is in the minds of every Mexican today and reinforces the cultural bent toward suspicion. It shaped culture. It persists today.

In 2014 as President Peña-Nieto's team builds a national security approach as the as U.S. policy toward Mexico shifts to rebalance away from a focus on security to the other instruments of national power, the U.S. government can nevertheless make enormous cost-effective strides, with the potential of huge strategic impact, that on the surface would not draw public attention.

This turns the discussion to dignity. The U.S. owes Mexico a security approach that encourages and builds dignity in the relationship. That is, treat Mexico like an equal member of the continent of North America by encouraging and facilitating the evolution of a security role commensurate with what would otherwise be expected of a G20 nation. G20 status is based primarily on economic indicators. A qualitative look at other G20 nations shines a light on Mexico as one with a respectable, but largely ineffective military when measured on the world stage. With an inward-focused mission, their armed forces serve their needs, but do not necessarily enhance continental security. Any security approach with Mexico has to incorporate a long-term modernization strategy that will lead to wider self-sufficiency. The best ways to achieve dignity and thereby reduce suspicion in the long-term is to:

1. Make Mexico believe that both Canada and the United States need them as a continental security partner
2. See Mexico in a security leadership role in the hemisphere
3. Recognize that there is some work to do to get there

This approach, done right, will provide Mexico dignity in the relationship. It will turn them from a military that habitually looks at the past to measure goodness, and makes them a military

that looks toward the future as an equal partner in the defense of their continent. In the short-term the U.S. can make major, non-threatening strides to enhance dignity in the minds of the Mexican Military. Example: Both the Mexican Army and Navy are global experts in the performance of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. It's a core mission area of both services. The U.S. should be asking their advice on how to execute HA/DR from a Defense Support of Civil Authority perspective. As a country, we often proselytize when asking help might just advance the ball.

When one discusses common defense, in this case, continental defense, talk of a common enemy surfaces. It is beyond to scope of this essay to discuss what or who would constitute a common future enemy. However, it does not take a rocket scientist (literal characterization) to discern that Cold War-era threats (bombers and missiles) in the 21st Century can reach the U.S. homeland from over the South Pole as easily as they could during the Cold War over the north. And any enemy with sea-based or under sea-based means has unimpeded access to the U.S. homeland in proximity to Mexico from the south. One of the earliest policy decisions of the Cold War was to embrace Canada in support of northerly defense of the continent. Is a northerly-directed strategic defense posture going to be adequate for U.S. national security into the long-term? The U.S. will need Mexico as a southern buffer. And, it's probable that asymmetric threats will become more prevalent, e.g. crime and terrorism as national security threats emanating from the south. If we believe that we do need an equal continental partner in the long-term future, then we need to work out how to get the Mexican military to a capacity level where they can operate on the world stage, at least on par with other G20 countries.

BUILDING ON CURRENT SUCCESS

Since 2006 the DOD has made some incredible strides with the Mexican Military. It's difficult to overstate this. For the 30 years prior to 2006 there was some interchange, some transfer of equipment and personnel exchanges in training and professional military education. That being said, with all the gains, it's important to recognize the capacity-building since 2006 has not yet done much except chip away at an ingrained, anti-U.S. military culture. The DOD approach can be summed up as "relationship building at high levels with building partner capacity at mid and low levels." While great advances have been made, the efforts from a military-wide and country-wide perspective have been largely symbolic. The sum of all security assistance (in dollars) to Mexico from all sources since 2006 represents a tiny fraction of Mexican internal budgets and barely a drop in the bucket compared to the resources available to our current common enemy: Transnational Criminal Organizations. While there is real capacity building, it's on a small scale

relative to the massive effort needed to redirect a country as large as Mexico. Some U.S. leaders have described Mexican efforts with a relevant analogy of ‘chasing a shiny object,’ or ‘kids playing soccer’ with all players running only after the ball. It’s appropriate. Mexico goes after the shiny object in ground-based tactical training, intelligence training, special operations training, information operations, military justice reform, the purchase and/or acceptance of aircraft (fixed and rotary wing), and major equipment upgrades. But, in a very real sense, we enable this G20 country to remain in a tactical mode by encouraging a smattering of disconnected security assistance efforts that do not necessarily fulfill a long-term strategy or end state. Ad hoc modernization, unit-by-unit looks good when we attend the delivery ceremonies, but it creates and exacerbates already troublesome training deficiencies, antiquated logistics systems, and interoperability (both domestic and international) issues.

DISTRACTION

If the U.S. (and Canadian) argument is that we need Mexico, then we need them to be interoperable with the U.S. and our allies. We should view all current security assistance in the counter crime fight as an interesting distraction that diverts attention away from the long view. The distraction of current operational missions is helping to prevent, or at least delay, development of long-term objective of tri-lateral continental defense. What will be left behind when this mission is won, lost, or transferred to others? The DOD is placing too much focus on the now and the near-term. We should be leveraging the new relationship now for long-term future benefit.

WHAT’S NEEDED?

The bottom line recommendation in this essay is that the U.S. needs to secure highest-level agreement from Mexico to fully develop a long-term military strategy with supporting plans of action and milestones that leads to an agreed-upon “security destination;” an end state, that benefits the U.S., Canada and Mexico in the long view. Once agreement is reached on the end state, the U.S. needs to discretely offer sponsorship, ‘security cooperation’ in development of a roadmap that incorporates full respect for Mexican sovereignty and enables them primacy in its development.

A SECURITY DESTINATION

An elephant in the room when any Mexican senior officer visits USNORTHCOM is the “in-your-face” presence of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Mexican leadership is painfully conscious of two facts:

1. NORAD professes to provide aerospace defense of North America.
2. Mexico is geographically part of North America, yet is not considered in, nor covered by, the agreement.

Vocalization of this issue is very rare in any official visit because while it may grate on the Mexican psyche, they likely understand that as a military they are not capable of standing up to inclusion even if a formal role was offered. With respect to certain Canadian concerns over the historical nature of this unique bi-lateral relationship, inclusion in NORAD, at some future date (say 2035) is just the kind of “security destination” that may get the Mexican government to agree to long-term continental defense.

The destination does not have to be NORAD. If not NORAD, then the U.S. and Mexico (and perhaps Canada) need an “Ogdensburg-like Agreement” that creates a cooperative continental security arrangement – a North American continental identity, at some point in the future.

AGREEMENT

Step one is eliciting Mexican agreement, in principle, to a future continental security arrangement. Then the U.S. government will need to gain acknowledgement on the panoply of concerted effort that will be required to get there. From the U.S. perspective a planning group must be formed; a group of exceptionally-well qualified individuals from a doctrine, strategy, and planning standpoint. DOD would provide discrete oversight and tutelage to ensure efforts align with U.S objectives. Resulting work would continue for periodic update and eventual complete hand off to Mexico. It would become a long-range roadmap for future security assistance and security cooperation efforts between the United States and Mexico. It would enable flexibility for Mexico to seek other global suppliers, but would focus most efforts on eventual military parity and interoperability (with the U.S. and Canada).

If the U.S. and Mexico agree on the future “security destination,” planning could lead to acquiescence on U.S. security objectives such as civilian leadership of the military and creation of a

joint staff for hemispheric interoperability. It might include separation of the Mexican Air Force from the Army, creation of a military civil service and contractor corps to reduce “brain drain” when highly-capable Mexican officers retire and/or separate. It could incorporate creation of a requirements-driven acquisition system, integrated logistics management; and personnel, manpower, and training methodologies that maximize utilization of the force. Perhaps Mexico could use Canada as a model in the creation of a right-sized, efficient, and effective military that is respected on the world stage. ...legal reform, modernized programming processes, hemispheric and global interoperability. Every area needs help.

CONCLUSION

This essay suggests that the U.S. needs Mexico as a long-term partner in the defense of North America. The current evolving counter narcotics engagement, while a great tool to build the relationship in the short-term, is a distraction from the long view. Current and planned security assistance efforts do not support long-term strategy. While operationally useful, they enable Mexico to accept ad hoc training, equipping, and exercising without fully understanding where the efforts are leading in a strategic sense. With recent rapid evolution in the relationship between the militaries of the U.S. and Mexico, the time is right to take the gains and invest them in the next step: agreement of development of a long-term continental security arrangement. Even if agreed to, Mexico by itself is incapable of building a roadmap to achieve that end. A DOD effort would discretely work with Mexico to gain accord on what that long-term partnership is. Once agreed, the U.S. would discretely engage Mexico on U.S.-assisted development of a national military strategy and all supporting plans; a roadmap to get to the agreed-upon “security destination.” The resulting roadmap would guide future security assistance efforts. It would lead to a 21st century North American security partner who sustains a military capability on par with others on the world stage while dramatically improving overall homeland security in the United States in specific and continental security in general.

OUT WITH THE OLD, IN WITH THE NEW: EMBRACING DUAL STATUS COMMANDERS IN THE FUTURE OF HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SECURITY

Ryan Burke

Ph.D. Candidate, University of Delaware

“For managers, the dynamics of knowledge impose one clear imperative: every organization has to build the management of change into its very structure” (Drucker, 1992, p. 97).

INTRODUCTION

In the post 9/11 world, homeland security has been propelled to the forefront of the conversation in industries from academia to corporate America. As homeland security knowledge continues to expand, we continue to generate more (and not always better) ways of doing things. In the years since the creation of homeland security, both as a Department and as a concept, we have seen the many benefits of emphasizing mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. In contrast, we have also experienced some inefficiencies and challenges. The challenge with homeland security, as with any other concentrated effort, is ensuring continuous improvement of processes, programs, and overall work efforts. Failing to recognize underperforming, ineffective, or inefficient elements simply strengthens the likelihood of repeated poor performance. With the threat of terrorism, natural, and/or man-made disasters ever present, failure with regard to homeland security often entails loss of life, property, and well-being. These are unacceptable failures which we must take prudent steps to avoid; the first of which involves the identification and abandonment of antiquated practices. There are many such areas where we can apply Peter Drucker’s principal of organized abandonment to improve homeland security. However, this essay focuses specifically on improving the role of the military during domestic support operations by advocating for the abandonment of the parallel command and control model in favor of the dual status command (DSC) arrangement for limited and no-notice events.

Drucker’s principal of organized abandonment implies the structured and systematic removal of inefficient or under-performing programs, policies, or practices. Applying this guidance to the current homeland security landscape begs the question of “what do we want to change?” The

size and scope of homeland security in the United States, in addition to the current culture of fiscal austerity and budget reductions, serves as a catalyst for change. According to Drucker (1992; 1996), in order to succeed, organizations must regularly engage in continuous improvement efforts. By defining objectives, setting priorities and targets, assessing results, and abandoning unproductive activities, organizations better position themselves to sustain performance. Within the homeland security and defense spectrum, some may advocate for the organized abandonment of controversial programs and practices such as the use of aerial drones and/or domestic surveillance programs. While compelling and logical arguments can be made for and against both of these issues, among many others, these programs are likely resistant to change in the near future. Unlike some homeland security practices, certain aspects of the military's role in homeland security can be changed to facilitate improvement. Due to recent legislative and policy actions in Washington within the past ten years, the dual status command concept has gained a great deal of traction in the homeland defense and security conversation.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ISSUE

As noted above, the United States military is an extraordinary asset capable of providing immediate assistance to civil authorities in order to "save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage within the United States" (DoD 3025.18, 2012, p. 4). As such, the Department of Defense and its resources continue to play a vital role in homeland defense and security. However, domestic military operations often encounter impediments. Recent events illustrate the need for abandoning the archaic, divided approach to defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) in favor of a coordinated, collaborative approach. The U.S. military's response to Hurricane Katrina was widely criticized for coordination failures between state and federal levels, procedural inefficiencies, gaps and redundancy in force allocation, administrative and legal failures, and overall response timeliness (Bowman, Kapp, & Belasco, 2005; Milliman, Grosskopf, & Paez, 2006; Tierney, Bevc, & Kuligowski, 2006; Gereski, 2006; Topp, 2006; Jensen, 2007; Schwabel, 2007; Teague, 2007; Tussing, 2007; Burkett, 2008; Osterholzer, 2008; Dunphy and Radel, 2009; Hall, 2009; Porter, 2010; Apte and Heath, 2011; Prendergast, 2011; Prosch, 2011; Schumacher, 2011; Tussing, 2011; Bentley, 2012; Blum and McIntyre, 2012; McHale, 2012; GAO 13-128, 2012). Since Katrina, practitioners and researchers have been working to develop a solution to the noted problems limiting DSCA operations. The proposed solution to these problems called for a command arrangement that would: simplify the orders process, reduce force redundancy, and close the operational gaps within the DSCA environment; all while simultaneously addressing the noted

tension between state sovereignty and federalism, the legality and constitutionality of using military forces for domestic response, and the financial barriers present when combining National Guard and federal military forces (Topp, 2006; Burkett, 2008; Gereski and Brown, 2010; Prendergast, 2011; Schumacher, 2011). The ongoing effort to improve these operations has resulted in changes to policies and new legislation outlining dual status command. Dual status commanders have been used successfully in previous years during planned events of national significance. However, the military response to Hurricane Sandy marked the first time in history dual status commanders received both Title 10 (federal military) and Title 32 (National Guard) forces to execute a limited notice DSCA response (OSD, 2013a). As such, there is a relevant and timely opportunity to learn and implement positive changes in the way the military conducts domestic civil support operations.

BACKGROUND CONTEXT

From the Whiskey Rebellion to Hurricane Sandy, military forces have been involved in supporting civil authorities in varying capacities since our nation's infancy. The history of military support to civil authorities (now referred as Defense Support of Civil Authorities; or DSCA), is deeply rooted in United States history. The original language of the Constitution includes sections governing the use of military forces on domestic soil. Clearly distinguishing between the Regular Army and Navy and the Militia (what we know today as the National Guard), the Constitution establishes a federalist construct identifying the boundaries between federal and state interests. The associated legislation, as it applies to domestic military force operations, is intended to provide the legal mechanisms for coordinating a combined military response between state and federal governments. However, as we have seen in past operations, most notably Katrina, the federal government's Constitutional authorities can conflict with the perceived rights and responsibilities of the individual states and territories. The issue of federal control versus state sovereignty presents a significant point of friction between the states and the federal government that continues to challenge the effective command and control of the military during domestic operations. Until the 2012 combined response to Hurricane Sandy in New York, past DSCA efforts operated under a divided model of parallel command and control separating National Guard forces in State Active Duty SAD or Title 32 status from federal military forces in Title 10 status. This issue is the chief reason for the design, development, and implementation of the dual status command concept and its use during DSCA missions, both pre-planned and unplanned.

PARALLEL MODEL

Balancing the divergent approaches to achieve a unified response is the desired endstate of civil support operations involving military assistance. Despite a unifying goal across Title 10 and Title 32 authorities, tensions remain constant. The parallel command architecture separates National Guard and federal forces under distinct chains of command and limits operational and tactical coordination between the two force structures (Teague, 2007; Burkett, 2008). The parallel command structure, in many cases, leads to gaps in operational coverage and force redundancy. According to both military and academic researchers, the state and federal government response to Katrina was plagued by failures largely due to the lack of communication and coordination between the parallel commands (Bowman et al., 2005; Milliman et al, 2006; Tierney et al., 2006; Gereski, 2006; Topp, 2006; Jensen, 2007; Schwabel, 2007; Teague, 2007; Tussing, 2007; Burkett, 2008; Osterholzer, 2008; Dunphy and Radel, 2009; Hall, 2009; Porter, 2010; Apte and Heath, 2011; Prendergast, 2011; Prosch, 2011; Schumacher, 2011; Tussing, 2011; Bentley, 2012; Blum and McIntyre, 2012; McHale, 2012; GAO 13-128, 2012). In the case of Katrina, the same objectives approached from different perspectives led to a conflicted operational response and the need for significant improvements in the DSCA command process. Drucker (1992) suggests that no organization has changed more over the last 50 years than the U.S. military. In keeping with Drucker's concept of organizational abandonment and the regular need to change, the military sought ways to improve these command relationships even before Katrina.

Research supports the notion that a coordinated, collaborative, approach is needed to execute effective response operations. While the parallel model of command and control may be appropriate for certain scenarios, larger events require more robust force structures and extensive coordination. The traditionally divided parallel command and control model often limits coordination between the National Guard and federal forces. Since Katrina, the conversation regarding the most effective command arrangement for civil support scenarios has shifted. While the legislative authority to use a DSC existed prior to Katrina, tensions between the state and federal government resulted in the employment of the traditional parallel command structure noted above. Given the diversity and range of scenarios encountered by military forces during domestic response, a "one size fits all" approach is not appropriate. However, recent events such as Hurricane Sandy illustrate the benefit of a coordinated model linking National Guard and federal forces under a unified command structure.

The successes during the Sandy response were evident; but so were the challenges. Given this, we should take the opportunity to learn from past events and focus our efforts on improving future response capabilities and capacities under the dual status command arrangement. One thing that is apparent based on recent events is the fact that the dual status command concept is here to stay. Circling back to Drucker's guidance: If we were not using the parallel command model now, knowing what we know today, we probably would not start using it. So, while this model does have merit in certain scenarios and should not be entirely abandoned, we should consider abandoning it specifically for more complex larger operations. Further, we should fully embrace the dual status command concept as the usual and customary command and control arrangement for future civil support scenarios.

DUAL STATUS COMMAND

According to the Government Accountability Office, dual status commanders are:

“military officers who serve as an intermediate link between the separate chains of command for state and federal forces—have authority over both National Guard forces under state control and active duty forces under federal control during a civil support incident or special event” (GAO 13-128, 2012, p. 2).

More simply stated: a DSC is “responsible for performing two separate and distinct but related jobs with two separate and distinct teams for two separate and distinct bosses, all at the same time” (OSD, 2013b). The DSC receives orders from the state Governor and U.S. President respectively during designated civil support operations. In doing so, the DSC commands federal and state assets in a simultaneous but mutually exclusive manner (Gereski, 2006; Jensen, 2007; Schwabel, 2007; Gereski and Brown, 2010; Prendergast, 2011; Prosch, 2011; McHale, 2012; Blum and McIntyre, 2012). This command arrangement provides a significant improvement in coordination and communication compared to the parallel command and control model. As an initiative with a goal of facilitating unity of effort through unity of command among National Guard and federal military forces, the DSC structure has been used during planned military support efforts since 2004 (Gereski, 2006; Topp, 2006; Jensen, 2007; Gereski and Brown, 2010; Prendergast, 2011; Schumacher, 2011; GAO 13-128, 2012). DSC's have commanded operations in support of National Security Special Events (NSSE) such as the 2004 national political conventions, the G8 Summit in Atlanta, GA, Operation Winter Freeze (border security exercise along the Canadian border), and the 2010 Scout Jamboree in Fort A.P. Hill, VA (Gereski, 2006; Topp, 2006; Jensen, 2007; Teague, 2007;

Schumacher, 2011; Blum and McIntyre, 2012; GAO 13-128, 2012, OSD, 2013b). Used for the first time during Hurricane Sandy to execute limited notice response operations, the DSC-led response was, by several DoD accounts, successful and a significant improvement over the parallel command and control model used in previous DSCA events (OSD, 2013a).

MOVING FORWARD

Multi-organizational response requires collaboration and coordination across all participating actors and agencies. Complex events spanning multiple states and territories often require a large force presence and a well-organized response effort. By abandoning, or at least reserving the parallel command and control model for smaller DSCA events, the dual status command arrangement can be improved with further implementation. Abandoning the stovepipe approach that divides forces while embracing recent legislative and policy changes will lead to the adoption of the dual status command arrangement as preferred approach for commanding large-scale civil support operations. Beyond this assertion, some of the most senior military commanders responsible for leading homeland defense and DSCA operations maintain that the concept works and should be improved for future operational situations. The top two generals during the Sandy response, Generals Jacoby and Grass, US NORTHCOM Commander and Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) respectively, affirmed this in an article following the Sandy response:

“While this inaugural use of Dual-Status Commanders wasn't flawless, in the end we can say with conviction that the concept works. It is simply the best command and control construct that exists for responding effectively and efficiently to complex disasters, because it can bring the full weight of the DoD response to the worst man-made or natural disasters while maintaining the authority of state and local governments” (Jacoby and Grass, 2013, p. 2).

As the Chief of the NGB during the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, Lieutenant General Blum (USA, Ret.) and Kerry McIntyre also note the benefit of the DSC arrangement compared with the parallel model:

“Dual status command works. It should be the rule, not the exception; and better methods must be developed for placing useful military capabilities under dual status command, when requested and if available, for homeland response” (Blum and McIntyre, 2012, p. 31).

Building on the above, national military strategy and procedural references must be updated to include DSC-specific guidance. Further, researchers and practitioners alike should work together to bridge the gap and develop ways to improve this command concept through systematic and analytically rigorous research. Drucker's guidance only begins to offer an azimuth to follow for improving the dual status command arrangement. Not only can we leverage policy and legislation to improve the DSC arrangement, we can apply the concepts inherent in performance management literature for which Drucker is known. By improving the complex processes in the DSC arrangement through the identification and application of management best practices, we can abandon the inefficiencies present and continue to improve the DSC structures moving forward.

CONCLUSION

The strategic rebalancing of defense priorities away from counter-terrorism/insurgency operations and back to the homeland will see the U.S. military continue to play an important role in domestic civil support and crisis response operations like Hurricane Sandy. Regardless of one's perspective supporting or decrying military involvement in homeland security and defense, the fact is that the military will remain a notable presence in domestic support operations. The reality is that when a large scale event occurs, the DoD and its assets can provide timely and extensive support beyond the capacity of any state or local government agency. The interpretation of authority and legality concerning the command and control of military forces in the homeland continues to create tensions between states and the federal government. The conflict between state power and federal authority facilitates confusion during response operations involving both federal military and National Guard force structures. Instead of furthering the tensions between state and federal response efforts that we know to be present, we should seek to embrace the dual status command concept as a solution to these challenges. DSC is gaining acceptance in the both the research and practitioner communities as the preferred command architecture during civil support scenarios involving both state and federal military force structures. To further avoid the challenges of past operations, we should seek to abandon the traditional parallel command and control model in favor of dual status command during large-scale civil support scenarios. In doing so, we can ensure a homeland security environment that effectively maximizes government resources during emergency response. The dual status command arrangement is the mechanism that will facilitate the collective strengthening of our military response forces and promote and sustain a safe, secure, and thriving livelihood in the face of disaster.

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VIEWING THE TERRORIST AS WARRIOR: A BITTER, BUT NECESSARY, PILL TO SWALLOW

Scott Snair

*Adjunct Professor, New Jersey City University,
Department of Professional Security Studies*

I remember learning, along with a group of fellow workers at my civilian job, that the 1995 Oklahoma City Bomber had been apprehended—and that he was both a U.S. citizen and a Gulf War veteran. As I, too, had served in Iraq during the liberation of Kuwait in the 1990s, my first response, admittedly, was one of sorrow for Timothy McVeigh. “That poor soldier,” I thought aloud to my colleagues. “I wonder what made his mind so sick as to kill all those innocent people.” I can assure you: I was the only one in the room wondering about this young man's mental suffering. In fact, just bringing it up produced reactions of distaste and disgust towards me. The conversation that quickly followed had more to do with how McVeigh the monster should be tried swiftly and executed. The United States, following the sentiment, did both.

Eventually, we all had a near-complete portrait of this terrorist: traumatized in combat; disillusioned by the botched federal raid on the Branch Davidian facility in Waco, Texas, in 1993; egged on by extremist friends with a talent for building huge bombs. However, the “near” in “near-complete” is worth exploring. Why, for example, did McVeigh give in to his lawyers and plead not guilty? He had written extensively about his revulsion for what he believed was the tyrannical nature of the U.S. federal government. Why not fess up and tell world, “Sure, I did it, and here's why.”? It would have offered this country an extremely useful look into the mind of a terrorist, free from language barriers and cultural differences. We might have been able to delve more into his disillusionment towards an institution he had only recently and proudly served; other social traits, such as his lack of success dating women (a trait common with that of U.S. Army major Nidal Malik Hasan, who, in 2009, killed thirteen people at Fort Hood, Texas); his penchant for writing diatribes (a trait common with that of Unabomber Ted Kaczynski); and so on.

What if McVeigh had been approached, in prison, by a U.S. Army officer in uniform—perhaps even one of his old commanders? Coffee might have been served, with McVeigh's attorneys as the only other people at the table. “Soldier,” the officer might have started, “the truth is, from a military standpoint, we're impressed with your operation. Your planning, tactics, logistics, casualty

counts, psychological impact—all pretty damned imposing, especially considering that only two or three people were involved. Here's what your government is offering. You plead guilty and face execution in three years. That will save many, many families the personal trauma of reliving their tragedy within the venue of a trial. In return, over those three years, we'll air and address your grievances against the United States.” If he had agreed, we would have had three years for U.S. interrogators (not of the torturing ilk, but the ones who know how to put POWs at ease and then tap them for all kinds of information) to work their magic and gain an invaluable psychological profile. And McVeigh would have been executed in half the number of years.

In more than one conversation over time, I have heard terrorists referred to as “stupid cowards.” The notion goes that the terrorist is foolish for thinking that anything good will come of bombing civilians (or that he or she might reap rewards in Heaven for doing so). And the terrorist is a coward for using violence randomly (and, at times, anonymously), killing children along the way. For political reasons, such notions carry nicely in front of audiences and into professional circles. Portraying terrorists as less than human allows people to comfortably justify killing or torturing them, and it allows corporate and government bureaucrats to ask for huge sums of funding necessary to barricade them out, the way an elaborate ha-ha wall might be built to keep unwanted animals from ruining a town. But does it ultimately keep society safe? For consideration: Perhaps the terrorist-as-stupid-cowardly-subhuman perception, while convenient, is a notion accepted at society's peril. Perhaps, instead, accepting the terrorist as warrior places us in the proper mindset to examine, analyze, and defeat the terrorist.

The terrorist as stupid? On September 11, 2001, nineteen men managed to kill nearly three-thousand people, shut down world markets, and bring harm to many sectors of the U.S. economy. Their attacks indirectly grounded all of the nation's civilian airplanes for several days and even stalled ground transportation and U.S. companies' supply chains for weeks. From a military perspective, the operation was hugely successful—almost surreal. If one were to watch a movie about nineteen people shutting down an entire country, he likely would label the film fantasy-driven. But it happened, and it was hardly the work of idiots. They planned for months, with four of them learning to fly passengers jets in order to use them as deadly missiles.

The terrorist as cowardly? Maybe. It is hardly a brave thing to plant an explosive device with a timer, unconcerned for when it might go off and whom or how many it might kill. On the other hand, suicide bombers (to include the 9/11 attackers) must hold a certain degree of

fearlessness when completing the mission means certain death for themselves. During World War Two, *kamikaze* pilots were revered in Japan as noble warriors eager to give their lives for their country. The U.S. certainly respected the tactic, as dozens of American Navy ships were sunk and thousands of sailors were killed by *kamikaze* attacks. Although the actual (as opposed to the propaganda-claimed) willingness of these pilots has been questioned, no WWII text has implied that they were anything other than courageous. (As coincidence would have it, the U.S. initially dehumanized its view of Japanese soldiers during World War II, with artists rendering them as goofy, buck-toothed rats with thick glasses.) Just as *kamikaze* tactics have been examined over the years, the tactics of terrorist suicide bombers should be explored and picked apart from a military vantage point.

In a 1996 interview with the quarterly journal *Leader to Leader*, Peter Drucker—long considered the Father of Modern Management—was asked about the shape of things to come in the world of modern organizational leadership. His lengthy interview emphasized (as do most of his writings) the ability to purge old assumptions. He suggested that organizations should institutionalize the ability to question, to offer counter-intuitive suggestions—what Drucker referred to as “looking at the vase upside down” (*Issue 1*, Summer 1996, pdf.org). I offer this counter-intuitive suggestion. As distasteful as it seems, especially politically, national security experts in the United States must view the terrorists as warriors rather than dehumanizing them. Such a counter-intuitively respectful approach might help those who wish to defeat terrorists—in a number of ways:

Viewing terrorists as warriors allows us to better understand their psychological profiles.

If we begin our fight against terror with the idea that the enemy is a brain-washed, blank slate of a person, we ignore everything that has gone into this person's thinking and future actions. What are the terrorist's passions? What is his or her life experience? Is the terrorist a family person? What tragic thing happened that caused him or her to become a terrorist? What makes the terrorist tick? How might the terrorist be persuaded to flip and help the war on terror by serving as an agent?

Viewing terrorists as warriors allows us to better analyze their tactics.

Terror, as a military tactic, is so daunting because it provides maximum physical and psychological impact by using relatively few resources (personnel and materiel). Probing these clever methods as if they were, say, the work of experienced U.S. Army Rangers places the techniques in the context of respected plans of action—and helps us counter them accordingly.

Viewing terrorists as warriors allows us to better define what a terrorist is.

Hating one's government does not, in and of itself, make one a terrorist. (If it were, we would be a nation of terrorists every April 15th.) Nor does setting off an explosive. Nor does, as part of an insurgency, shooting the soldier of an occupying force. Terrorism involves invoking fear in a population, often the same population containing the terrorist. There is a randomness to it, but, oddly, a very specific point the terrorist is often trying to make. By observing terrorist activities through the lens of Psychological Operations, it better helps us distinguish the terrorist from the traditional rebel or the conventional soldier. It is worth mentioning that the partisan warfare used by the colony Militiamen of the American Revolutionary War could easily be placed under the definition of terrorism. But rarely, if ever, are our forefathers labeled “terrorists.” Why? Because history has appropriately viewed them as warriors and their tactics as those that an under-trained, under-supplied, under-manned militia of proud warriors might use.

By not setting a lower standard for the treatment of terrorists, we avoid scenarios where innocents are treated that way.

In the early years of the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, U.S. Army Chaplain James Yee (whom I attended West Point with) documented the alleged torturing of prisoners at the camp. In response, the U.S. Army promptly declared Yee, a Muslim, to be “one of them,” and, unbelievably, began the same sensory-deprivation torture on him (albeit in a different location—his cell in Jacksonville, Florida). Yee, who was cleared of all trumped-up charges, never received an apology from the Army, and his torturers were never charged. The merits of torture are the topic for another essay (or another thousand essays), but one thing is clear: If we, as a society, refuse to create a class of subhumans—even if terrorists initially seem suited for such a classification—and if we refuse to treat them sub-humanely, then we need not worry about one day being placed in that class and treated as such by our own government.

There are sure to be protests against viewing the terrorist from the perspective of warrior. Let us consider some likely, negative responses:

"Terrorists are not warriors, because they strike at random people and because they kill children."

This is a relatively strong argument, because it recognizes the way many terrorists tend to objectify their human targets. However, the line between "random" and "collateral" is somewhat blurry. Timothy McVeigh referred to the killed children in the Murrah Federal Building as collateral damage. Unfortunately, when the CIA sends a drone to kill a known terrorist, and children in the area are killed (sometimes by the dozens), almost certainly the term "collateral damage" is used in whatever report is produced. There may still be a moral high ground: if, say, twenty-five civilians lose their lives so that an assassinated terrorist cannot carry out his plan to kill one thousand, then perhaps the attack is justified. But it is surely a heartless argument to make. If we are to examine all warfare in order to gain the upper hand, why not include the terrorist's tactics in that study?

"Terrorists are not warriors, but, instead, better fit the term enemy combatants, not protected under the articles of the Geneva Convention."

Such a response is often meant to provide legal justification for torturing to garner intelligence. Again, as written above, the merits of torture are the topic for another essay. But it should be noted here that history is full of examples where captured officers were respected by their enemy and often lulled into a sense of camaraderie with their captors. Sometimes, they dropped their guard and, in seemingly mundane conversations, provided much valuable information to the other side. Treating terrorists this way might allow for the same transfer of intelligence. Plus, by offering them the same treatment as we do traditional warriors, we allow for the possibility that others may no longer lay claim to the moral upper hand.

"Terrorists are not warriors, because we don't negotiate with them, as we would with Bona fide military leaders."

Indeed, negotiating with terrorists has not worked out well for the U.S. in the past. During the Reagan Administration, when the U.S. offered arms for hostages being held in Lebanon by a military group with ties to Iran, the result was a plan gone amok, as well as that same group taking more Americans hostage. However, by closing the door to communication with all terrorists, we close the door to negotiating with soldiers who might not be terrorists, or with terrorist factions

who might take issue with the extremism of their larger organization. If nothing else, communicating helps one gain clearer information on where the terrorist is located. If the negotiations break off, we might still have a lock on the terrorist so that we might find him and kill him.

True enough, viewing and addressing the terrorist as warrior is a revolting endeavor. But the point of this recommended approach is not to serve as apologist for the terrorist or to give credence to his or her philosophies or tactics. It is to defeat the terrorist. Better still, it is to create a savvy—rather than an overly emotional—environment where the terrorist event is stopped before it happens. Or perhaps where would-be terrorists, perceiving the futility of their would-be efforts, opt to live as members of society rather than as scathers to it.

CHALLENGING ASSUMPTIONS: TIME TO REDEFINE HOMELAND SECURITY

Richard White

“The most serious mistakes are not being made as a result of wrong answers. The true dangerous thing is asking the wrong question.” – Peter F. Drucker

Peter Drucker is hailed as “the man who invented management”. His writings are highly regarded for predicting major business trends and influencing successful corporations through much of the 20th century [1]. Among his key insights was the need to continually reassess core assumptions and ensure that an organization’s missions are properly aligned with their objectives. It is fitting, therefore, as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) undergoes its second quadrennial homeland security review (QHSR), that we challenge the Department’s core assumptions and question whether its missions and priorities are properly aligned.

The most basic assumption underpinning DHS missions and priorities begins with the question “what is homeland security?” During its first QHSR in 2010, DHS answered the question by defining homeland security as “A concerted national effort to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards where American interests, aspirations, and way of life can thrive” [2]. This definition purports that terrorism (i.e., malicious human actions) and hazards (i.e., natural disasters and industrial accidents) are the homeland security problem. The challenge with accepting these causal factors is that they do not square with historical events. Homeland security was not thrust to the forefront of national concern until the attacks of September 11, 2001. If indeed terrorism is the root problem, then why did homeland security not become the concern it is today after the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center or the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing? Similarly, why didn’t Hurricane Andrew (1992) or Hurricane Camille (1969) also precipitate security concerns? What was different about 9/11 that prompted the largest reorganization in US government since the end of World War II?

According to the 9/11 Commission the difference was the “surpassing disproportion” of the attacks that made them unique. On September 11, 2001, nineteen men inflicted as much damage on the United States as the Imperial Japanese Navy on December 7, 1941. “It was carried out by a tiny group of people, not enough to man a full platoon. Measured on a governmental scale, the resources behind it was trivial. The group itself was dispatched by an organization based in one of the

poorest, most remote, and least industrialized countries on earth” [3]. 9/11 made manifest the unprecedented threat of asymmetric attack.

Prior to 9/11, most experts considered weapons of mass destruction (WMD) the primary means for asymmetric attack [4]. Such concerns were justified by the 1995 chemical attack on the Tokyo subway by Aum Shinrikyo. But instead of employing a weapon of mass destruction, the 9/11 attackers subverted the nation’s critical infrastructure turning airliners into guided missiles to achieve WMD effects. 9/11 exposed the vulnerability of critical infrastructure as a means for small groups or individuals to attain destructive power on a scale that once required the combined might of a nation.

Is this terrorism? Not necessarily. According to the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security, terrorism is “any premeditated unlawful act dangerous to human life or public welfare that is intended to intimidate or coerce civilian populations or governments” [5]. Terrorism is merely a motive, and to focus on it alone is myopic. If we are to truly secure the homeland by anticipating catastrophic attack, the nation must look beyond “terrorism” and motives, and view security as an effects-based challenge.

What about hazards? More Americans have been killed by natural disasters (~36.5K) and industrial accidents (~9.5K) than were killed in 9/11 (~3K). Regrettable as they are, these figures pale in comparison to the number of Americans who die each year from vascular disease (~1.5M) and traffic accidents (~35K). Yet the latter are not considered “security” issues. Arguments to distinguish them, such as “unavoidable” and “external” factors, cut both ways. The distinguishing characteristic in this case was the decision following 9/11 to include the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as part of the new Department of Homeland Security. The decision followed a trend begun under the Nixon administration to develop “dual use” capabilities that could be equally applied to natural as well as manmade disasters [6]. After the increased concern for manmade disasters appeared to impede FEMA’s response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the agency was elevated within the Department and the “all-hazards approach” introduced with the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security [7]. Hazards became a homeland security concern by proxy.

“There is nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done at all.”

— Peter F. Drucker

The preceding analysis suggests that the 2010 QHSR definition of homeland security misses the real problem. An examination of DHS' mission priorities supports the same. The 2010 QHSR identified five mission sets: 1) Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security, 2) Securing and Managing Our Borders, 3) Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws, 4) Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace, and 5) Ensuring Resilience to Disasters [8]. If, as the 9/11 Commission discerned, domestic catastrophic attack is the primary homeland security problem, then that should make Mission #1 priority #1 as indicated by the following objectives: 1.2) Prevent the Unauthorized Acquisition or Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials and Capabilities; and 1.3) Manage Risks to Critical Infrastructure, Key Leadership, and Events [9]. Mission priorities are typically reflected in organizational budgets. In 2014, DHS requested \$59.9B in funding from Congress. While the budget is organized by DHS offices and functions, the cross-mapping in Table 1 provides an approximate estimate how funding is allocated by missions. Admittedly the approximation is crude, but it is based on the justification DHS itself makes to Congress. The cross-mapping indicates that Mission #2 is priority #1, receiving 61% of requested funds. By the same measure, Mission #1 is priority #4, maybe priority #3 at best. Even by this crude measure, the order-of-magnitude difference between Mission #1, Mission #2, and Mission #3 is significant. Mr. Drucker might express some concern.

"The greatest danger in times of turbulence is not the turbulence; it is to act with yesterday's logic." — Peter Drucker

	Office/Function	% Budget	M1/M4*	M2	M3	M5	Other
1.	A&O	0.52%					309,228K
2.	CBP	21.51%		12,900,103K			
3.	Dept. Ops.	1.35%					810,773K
4.	DNDO	0.49%	291,320K				
5.	FEMA	18.89%				11,327,685K	
6.	FEMA Grants	3.54%				2,123,200K	
7.	FLETC	0.45%		271,429K			
8.	ICE	8.91%			5,341,722K		
9.	NPPD	4.28%	2,568,543K				
10.	OHA	0.22%					131,797K
11.	OIG	0.24%					143,309K
12.	S&T**	2.55%	-	-	-	-	-
12.	TSA	12.34%		7,398,295K			
13.	USCG	16.33%		9,793,981K			
14.	USCIS	5.37%			3,219,466K		
15.	USSS	3.00%		1,801,389K			
		\$Funding	2,859,863K	32,165,197K	3,219,466K	13,450,885K	1,395,107K
		% Budget	5.39%	60.59%	6.06%	25.34%	2.63%
* NPPD manages DHS critical infrastructure protection & cyber programs							
** S&T provides support to all DHS missions							

Table 1: Cross-Mapping 2010 QHSR Missions & 2014 DHS Budget Request

If alignment of missions, priorities, and objectives are the key to an effective organization, then it would seem that a new definition of homeland security is in order. The following is proposed:

SAFEGUARD THE US FROM DOMESTIC CATASTROPHIC ATTACK.

This definition is carefully considered for what it does and does not say. By specifying “attack”, the definition clearly identifies deliberate human actions as the casual factor for the homeland security concern. The term has the advantage of disassociating actions from motives. It does not preclude terrorism, but it is not restricted by it. It also recognizes the historical significance of 9/11 and distinguishes the concern as a matter of security and not safety. Security is a protective function implying prevention. History proves that we cannot prevent all attacks. Thus the choice of “safeguard” as it implies a range of functions across all phases of a catastrophe including protect, prevent, mitigate, respond, and recover. The form of catastrophe is also not specified but may encompass both disruptive and destructive effects. The term is discriminant, however, implying a scope of damage that impacts the entire nation; 9/11 instigated a 47% drop in the economic growth rate¹ and registered as a 20% spike in homicide rates.² Damage on this scale may be inflicted by employing WMD or subverting critical infrastructure, but the definition does not specify this. That is because they are part of what former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld classified as “known unknowns”, cautioning that surprise stems from the “unknown unknowns” [10]. The proposed definition tries to avoid being unnecessarily restrictive. For this reason it also does not stipulate asymmetric attack by small groups or individuals. Domestic catastrophic attack, in some sense, has been a fundamental concern since the founding of the nation and forms the foundation for the Department of Defense (DOD). The distinction between the two departments is that DOD upholds US interests among nations while DHS upholds US law among individuals³. Far from being vague, the proposed definition reinforces the concept of homeland security as an enterprise requiring close coordination among federal agencies.

The exclusion of natural disasters from the proposed definition would seem a step backward from the lessons learned in Hurricane Katrina. The problem is inherent in the dual-use capabilities of FEMA after the Civil Defense Act was repealed in 1994. The quandary is whether to fit the definition of homeland security to a *problem* or an *organization*. The 2010 QHSR definition does the latter. As Peter Drucker suggests, an ill-defined problem is all but impossible to resolve, and that the better approach is to fit the organization to a well-defined problem. Perhaps DHS is not

a disaster management agency, suggesting that FEMA should revert, as it was before 2003, to an independent agency with a mission to respond to both natural and manmade catastrophes. This may complicate DHS coordination, but arguably no more than any other operational element of the homeland security enterprise.

How does the new definition re-align mission priorities? As already seen, Mission #2, border security, is the biggest priority by budget. Certainly, keeping hostile agents from entering the country is a homeland security concern as demonstrated by 9/11. And while illegal entries have fallen significantly every year since 2005, an estimated 384,314 people still entered the country illegally in 2009, the last year cited in a report by the Council on Foreign Relations⁴ [11]. Considering that it took only nineteen men to commit the 9/11 attacks, it quickly becomes evident that it is impossible to prevent malicious agents from entering the country. The new definition addresses this problem by redirecting attention from agents of destruction to the means of destruction. It's a question of numbers. Does it make more sense to search for malicious agents among 62.7 million people who enter the country annually [12], or to protect the known 11,018 infrastructure assets DHS deems "nationally significant" including 2,500 designated as "critical" [13]? If we deprive a criminal of means and opportunity, can we not prevent a crime, not just by external agents, but internal ones as well?

"Everybody has accepted by now that change is unavoidable. But that still implies that change is like death and taxes — it should be postponed as long as possible and no change would be vastly preferable. But in a period of upheaval, such as the one we are living in, change is the norm." — Peter Drucker

9/11 ushered in the unprecedented threat of domestic catastrophic attack by asymmetric means. The 2010 QHSR failed to capture the essence of that threat, and it does not appear to be reflected in current DHS mission priorities. Mr. Drucker might conclude that the organization is fundamentally flawed and doomed to failure. His prescription is clear: reassess assumptions and ensure missions and objectives are properly aligned. Now is the time, as DHS undergoes its second QHSR, to return to that most fundamental question, "what is homeland security?", and consider whether a new definition is due.

¹ The Drucker Institute; Claremont Graduate University, "About Peter Drucker," [Online]. Available: <http://www.druckerinstitute.com/link/about-peter-drucker/>. [Accessed 26 January 2014].

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- ² Department of Homeland Security, "Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland," Washington, DC, 2010, p. 13.
- ³ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2004, p. 339.
- ⁴ US House of Representatives, Testimony of the Acting DCI William O. Studeman, Washington, DC, 1995.
- ⁵ Office of Homeland Security, "National Strategy for Homeland Security," Washington, DC, 2002, p. 2.
- ⁶ Ibid., p. 41.
- ⁷ Homeland Security Council, "National Strategy for Homeland Security," Washington, DC, 2007.
- ⁸ Department of Homeland Security, "Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland," Washington, DC, 2010, p. x.
- ⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰ D. Rumsfeld, Interviewee, NATO Press Conference. [Interview]. 6 June 2002.
- ¹¹ B. Roberts, E. Alden and J. Whitley, "Managing Illegal Immigration to the United States," Council on Foreign Relations, 2013, p. 26&29.
- ¹² Department of Commerce Office of Travel and Tourism Industries, "International Visitation to the United States," Washington, DC, 2011, p. 3.
- ¹³ J. Moteff, "Critical Infrastructure: The National Asset Database," Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2007, p. 4&8.