

Wall-papering Fog: How the United States' Africa Command (AFRICOM) Can Counter the Threat of Radical Islamic Fundamentalism in North Africa.

**A Monograph
by
MAJOR Joseph A Bowman
United States Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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Abstract

WALL-PAPERING FOG: HOW THE UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND (AFRICOM) CAN COUNTER THE THREAT OF RADICAL ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN NORTH AFRICA by MAJOR Joseph A. Bowman, USA, US Army, 63 pages.

Throughout history, terrorist organizations have attacked nation-states using increasingly more sophisticated methods of destruction. The attacks on 11 September 2001, demonstrated a higher level of commitment by state and non-state actors to destroy nations that refuse to submit to their radical Islamic view of the world. On 6 February 2007, President Bush directed the establishment of US Africa Command, or AFRICOM.

The question that this monograph will answer is the following: How can the AFRICOM counter the threat of radical Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa? The United Nations Statistical Division definition of North Africa includes the countries of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and Western Sahara. However, this monograph will address Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and the disputed territories of Western Sahara. Egypt will remain in the US Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). This paper will use a comparative analysis approach to evaluate the social, political, and economic issues that are resident in each country. This monograph will investigate some of the primary issues that AFRICOM will have to address in North Africa such as governmental structure, finance reform, the disputed Western Sahara region, the availability of equal education for all citizens, and the rights of women and Berbers.

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Why Is Africa Important to the United States?

Throughout history, terrorist organizations have attacked nation-states using increasingly more sophisticated methods of destruction. The attacks on 11 September 2001, demonstrated a higher level of commitment by state and non-state actors to destroy nations that refuse to submit to their radical Islamic view of the world. In that attack, more than 80 countries suffered losses as four planes plummeted from the skies into the Pentagon, the World Trade Center, and the Pennsylvania countryside. Immediately after the attack, over 136 countries offered assistance to the United States. In his address to the nation 100 days after the terrorist attacks, President Bush presented his strategy for the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

Stephen Biddle, an associate professor of National Security Studies at the United States Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, defined grand strategy as “the integration of military, political and economic means to pursue states ultimate objectives in the international system.”¹ In his 100th day Address to the Nation speech after 11 September, President Bush delivered his grand strategy against international terrorism.² He warned both nation-states and non-state actors that the United States would not tolerate any nation that harbors or supports terrorism in any form. His address outlined eight ways in which the United States would combat terrorism: employing diplomatic means, disrupting terrorist finances, initiate the military campaign, enhance/restore law enforcement, humanitarian assistance, increase homeland security, helping survivors of 9/11, and respecting those that practice the Islamic faith.³ Law enforcement,

¹Stephen D. Biddle, “American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment” (Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2005), 1-7.

²The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “The Global War on Terror: The First 100 Days,” December 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/100dayreport.html> (accessed 15 September 2007).

³Ibid.

homeland security, and helping the survivors of 9/11 are domestic solutions and will not be addressed in this monograph.

As the Global War on Terror entered its sixth year, it became evident to the Department of Defense that the United States needed to focus on Africa. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated in the 30 September 2001, *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report*, “that key geopolitical trends included increasing challenges that were emanating from the territories of weak and failing states such as nations in North Africa.”⁴ Although the *QDR* was written prior to the attacks of 11 September, it focused on an area in the world that habitually did not receive significant resource allocation from the United States. Historically, the United States divided responsibility for Africa under three different commands: the European Command, the Central Command, and the Pacific Command. On 6 February 2007, President Bush directed the establishment of US Africa Command (AFRICOM).⁵

The purpose of AFRICOM, as stated in President Bush’s press statement directing the establishment of AFRICOM, “is to strengthen the United States’ security cooperation with Africa and to help to create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa.”⁶ The United States’ goal is to reduce conflict, improve security, defeat terrorists, and conduct non-kinetic missions such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, stability operations, and capacity building.⁷ AFRICOM will be responsible for the entire continent of Africa with the exception of Egypt, which will remain under the US Central Command (CENTCOM).

⁴Lieutenant Colonel Paul P Cale, *African Command--The Newest Combatant Command* (Research Report, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 18 March 2005), 3.

⁵The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “President Bush Creates a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa,” 6 February 2007, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070206-3.html> (accessed 18 September 2007).

⁶Ibid.

⁷Barbara Nakaio, “AFRICOM,” Africa Command Transition Team, 26 April 2007, <http://www.africom.mil> (accessed 16 February 2008).

It is of historic significance that a combatant command was established that focuses on Africa for the United States. As stated earlier in the 2001 *QDR*, Africa has long been an unwilling supporter of international terrorism because of the relative lack of concern given to the region by the rest of the world. Establishing a combatant command responsible for the region will greatly assist the United States and the international community in developing Africa into a stable and secure region able to interact with the rest of the world.

Why Should Anyone Read This Monograph?

The question that this monograph will answer is the following: How can the AFRICOM counter the threat of radical Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa? North Africa is a unique portion of Africa that does not view itself as African but as Arab Muslim.⁸ It has unique cultural differences that allow and sometimes foster the spread of radical Islamic ideology. The United Nations Statistical Division definition of North Africa includes the countries of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and Western Sahara.⁹ However, this monograph will address Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and the disputed territories of Western Sahara. Egypt will not be a part of AFRICOM, as it will remain in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). Although Sudan is considered part of North Africa and is experiencing genocide, it will not be addressed in this monograph, as its depth of issues requires it be a case study itself. North Africa is not the only concern of AFRICOM but, due to its proximity to primary trade routes throughout the Northern Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, should be of primary importance to the planning staff as they prepare to take over this region from US European Command.

⁸Raphael Patai, *The Arab Mind*, rev. ed. (New York: Hatherleigh Press, 2002), 11-12.

⁹United Nations Statistical Division, "Composition of Macro Geographical (Continental Regions), Geographical Sub-Regions and Selected Economic and Other Groupings," <http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm> (accessed 11 March 2008).

United States History of Foreign Policy

To address the formation of AFRICOM, one must first start with the events that led to the formation of the Unified Command Plan (UCP). During World War II, the United States and Great Britain understood there was a requirement for the concept of unified command and worked successfully to achieve a combined United States-British command structure.¹⁰

Operations such as Husky, Market Garden, and Overlord are all examples of the successful integration of a single allied commander responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and assisted by a joint staff, in the prosecution of military objectives to achieve the desired military aim as directed by the Allied powers. This example does not suggest that coalition commanders such as British General Bernard Law Montgomery were responsible to United States commanders but underscores the importance of a single commander responsible for all actions in a given operation.

The United States dropped one atomic bomb at Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, and a second at Nagasaki on 9 August 1945. Six days later, the Japanese signed the Instruments of Surrender on the deck of the *USS Missouri* and officially ended the war in the Pacific.¹¹ These events and the ensuing wars of peace contributed greatly to the rise of the United States as a world power. Few of the previous presidential administrations had to deal with the pressures of being a world power in the midst of such international turmoil. The Soviet Union was in the process of securing resources in an attempt to further communism and to counter the effects of continued occupation of Germany and Japan by the United States. Great Britain was realizing that the sun might very well set on the British Empire as the deck was being reshuffled. France was

¹⁰Ronald H. Cole, Walter S. Poole, James F. Schnabel, Robert J. Watson, and Willard J. Webb, *The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1999* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003), 11.

¹¹John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat, Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton and Company, The News Press, 1999), 34.

starting to realize that its holdings in the Middle East, North Africa, and Southeast Asia were in the beginning throes of revolution.

It can be argued that the concept of dividing the world into military spheres of influence is a uniquely Wilsonian idea. President Woodrow Wilson, the nation's 28th President, an avid believer in predestination and a champion of the American view of the world, has been credited with the view of American values being so great that the rest of the world needed to emulate them. A renowned racist whose comments, supporting racism and refusal to admit blacks into Princeton, are well known but not well published. Wilson believed that the job of the United States was to extend democracy and fairness to the rest of the world. He shared his generation's condescension toward "lesser races" like Negroes and those in Africa and believed it was the responsibility of Anglo-Saxons to lift them up.¹² His policies went beyond his belief that non-whites were inferior, however, since he believed that all races, when properly taught, could be fit for self-governance and used this belief in the white man's calling to support the annexation of the Philippines and Puerto Rico.¹³ It is ironic that outside observers of United States foreign policy may see the policies that propelled the United States into a more ambitious and ultimately a global hegemonic role as inherently racist and hubristic in origin. The author contends that this view may not be the most popular in the United States military but offers it as insight into the foundations of United States Government (USG) policy trying to influence the North African region.

However, some of the forces that shaped the Wilsonian view of foreign relations actually took place in the years preceding the Wilson Administration. It has its roots, in the Greek city-states and the Roman empires of old, with the idea that competition of powers ultimately can be

¹²Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997), 126.

¹³*Ibid.*, 126-127.

traced to a competition of ideas. As the British view of diplomacy was declining around the world, the Wilsonian view of American power was ready to fill the void. President Wilson, a devout Presbyterian, supported missionary work and this action had an enormous impact in shaping the architecture of American hegemony.

The American missionary tradition has been labeled as the greatest and most sustained effort by a group of Americans and has been seen as a form of cultural and economic imperialism.¹⁴ Its target was social injustice and the movement played a significant role in the development of a United States-centric international civil society. The missionaries opened the world to the American culture and received considerable pushback from areas in the world that did not view fairness and equality as being uniquely American.

The American missionary tradition led to the USG providing Americans the right of entry into another country, protection of American rights while in the other country, and ultimately, the protection of converted Christians in that country. The demands for diplomatic and military protection and support continued as American missionaries believed that the United States should have a Human Rights agenda that espoused the Christian ideas in the Book of Genesis in the Bible. The belief held among missionaries was “human beings of all races and nations were descended from common ancestors, shared a common and universal heritage and were all possessed of equal and inalienable rights.”¹⁵ The Human Rights agenda the United States adopted and forced on others at the expense of their local culture and traditions were deemed okay as long as it furthered the progress of “them” looking and acting like “us.”¹⁶

The result of this line of thinking was that the United States felt that it had the right and duty to change the world’s behavior and that it should concern itself with the international as well

¹⁴Ibid., 140.

¹⁵Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World* (New York: Rutledge, 2002), 146.

¹⁶Kevin Shillington, *The History of Africa*, rev. ed. (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1995), 290-294.

as domestic policies of other nations. To do so, it had to be able to divide the world into spheres of influence as it saw fit and project power when necessary to promote, protect, and defend those ideals wherever needed. Though the reasons why power was projected throughout the world changed drastically throughout the years because of the devastation of World Wars I and II, the concept of projecting that power has remained a focal point of United States strategy. The ability to project power anywhere in the world in less than eighteen hours is one primary example that the United States can lay claim and protect its standing as the only superpower in the modern world. The next portion of this monograph will seek to explain the origin of the UCP and the rise of AFRICOM as the newest combatant command.

The Origin of the Unified Command Plan

The UCP initially started out as Outline Command Plan, a comprehensive plan approved by President Truman on 14 December 1946, which ultimately led to the formation of seven unified commands.¹⁷ This first plan was a compromise due to the Navy's dissatisfaction over the presence of two separate commands in the Pacific theater of war during WWII and the reluctance of the United States Army to relinquish control of its forces to the Navy. Once approved, the Outline Command Plan divided the world into six regions and one fleet responsible for the seventh region. Those commands were the Far East Command, the Pacific Command, the Alaskan Command, the Northeast Command, the Atlantic Fleet, the Caribbean Command, and the European Command.¹⁸

It is not important for the purpose of this monograph to detail the different transformations the UCP has undergone over the last sixty-one years. It is sufficient to state the initial aims of the UCP and some of the more important changes that have taken place. It is

¹⁷Cole et al., 16.

¹⁸Ibid., 17.

important that the reader understand that the approval of the UCP did not establish each of the seven commands. Since the UCP specifically stated that the unified command of United States forces worldwide would fall under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it took a separate directive to establish each command. Other provisions in the initial UCP included the requirement for forces assigned to each command consist of more than two components, that each component is commanded by an officer from that component, that each component is represented on the combatant commander's staff in key positions, and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff determines the assignment of forces.¹⁹

Establishment of the seven unified commands was the first step in a long process to get the United States Armed Forces to the command structure it presently uses throughout the world. The current definition of unified command is “a command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant components of two or more Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”²⁰ Component chiefs that fall under the unified command are responsible to both the Geographical Combatant Commander (GCC) for operational requirements and to the parent component for routine administration, personnel support, training, logistics, and other component related activities to include Service intelligence operations.²¹

The UCP has undergone twenty-one major revisions since 1946. The initial seven unified commands have expanded with the threats throughout the years to cover the entire world. The current UCP has six geographical combatant commands: US Northern Command (NORTHCOM); US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), US European Command (EUCOM),

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), GL 32.

²¹Ibid., II-12.

US Central Command (CENTCOM), US Pacific Command (PACOM) and the newest command announced in February 2007, US African Command (AFRICOM). Additionally there are four functional combatant commands that perform functional responsibilities such as transportation, special operations, training, and strategic operations across all geographical regions and provide supporting forces and capabilities directly to the GCC.²² Those functional commands are US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). These commands can, when directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, conduct operations as a supported commander as is the case with SOCOM and the Global War on Terror.

As stated earlier, there have been twenty-one major revisions to the UCP since 1946. Additionally, there have been significant strategic documents signed over the last sixty-one years that have shaped the structure of the military and enhanced the military's contributions as one of the national instruments of power. Joint Publication 1 defines the national instruments of power as diplomatic, information, military, and economic.²³ It is the role of the United States presidential administration to coordinate all elements of national power in pursuit of its grand strategy. In order to achieve those aims, each element must organize itself internally so that it can rapidly respond to the requirements placed upon it by its political leaders. In the case of the United States Armed Forces, that reshaping took place with the *Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986*.

The *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* has been credited with reshaping the military and giving more powers to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The initial UCP was organized in such a way that interservice rivalries present during World War II continued to hamper operations in Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, and even Panama. Forces that were required to fight together did not train together, nor did they

²²Ibid., II-10.

²³Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), I-8.

collectively research and develop systems that would allow the military to direct all operations toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal. One of the most important peacetime principles of war for joint operations, as defined in Joint Publication 3.0, is that of unity of command. The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.²⁴ The *Goldwater-Nichols Act* streamlined the operational chain of command from the President of the United States through the Secretary of Defense directly to the combatant commanders. This allowed for more direct communication and facilitated a joint approach to development, procurement, and employment of military resources without the added burden of interservice rivalry.

The concept of AFRICOM has been the focus of numerous studies over the last fifteen years. Prior to 1 October 2007, Africa was divided among three combatant commands, EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM. After 2001, each of the combatant commands were responsible for large portions of territory that presented each GCC with competing interests in the Global War on Terror. According to LTC Paul Cale, EUCOM has been entrenched in the NATO expansion in Eastern Europe, CENTCOM is, and will be, focused in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom for the foreseeable future, and PACOM's focus has always remained on the Asian continent, specifically the growing threat of Islamic extremism from the Philippines and Southeast Asian countries.²⁵ While each combatant commander conducted coordination with their respective African nations, the division of responsibility for Africa created bureaucratic divisions and operational seams in which coordination among combatant commanders superseded action, often causing delays. LTC Cale argues that owing to competing interests in each region, it was necessary to create AFRICOM in order to provide a single headquarters responsible for coordinating actions to address the myriad of opportunities and challenges that lay ahead as the

²⁴Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-0, A-2.

²⁵Cale, 9.

African Union and individual African nations figure more prominently in African security affairs.²⁶

AFRICOM, the Newest Combatant Command

So far, the monograph has explained the history of United States foreign policy and the UCP with an emphasis on how AFRICOM came into existence. The next logical question is how will this headquarters be organized, where will it be positioned on the continent, what kinds of missions can it be expected to accomplish, and where will all of the people come from to fill the newest combatant command in the United States Department of Defense (DoD). AFRICOM has been referred to as a combatant command “plus,” since it is expected to have all the staff of a traditional combatant command while using non-lethal approaches to problem solving and crisis prevention.²⁷ As AFRICOM looks to establish a footprint on the continent, it will work through the issues of command and control presented throughout the formation of this command. Currently, there is no approved structure for the headquarters nor has any nation formally agreed to host the combatant command headquarters once it moves from its temporary post in Stuttgart, Germany. That move will not take place for a number of years as status of forces agreements (SoFA) and other bi-lateral arrangements between the host nation(s) and the USG are developed. This monograph will focus on identifying what agencies should be represented in the headquarters owing to their subject matter expertise as well as which agencies are critical for AFRICOM to establish a liaison capability to better serve the African continent. Those questions will be addressed after a series of discussions on the importance of Africa, the history and issues that link North Africa together as a region, as well as terrorist motivations.

²⁶Ibid., 9-11.

²⁷Lauren Ploch, *Africa Command U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress and Congressional Research Service, 2007), 6-7.

“AFRICOM, We Have a Problem!”

There are many different reasons that terrorist groups conduct the violent actions that they execute. These reasons vary from economic, political, and religious issues, to seemingly irrational motives such as a need for status and recognition, as was the case for many males during the violent uprisings in Algeria in the late 1980s to present date.²⁸ These root causes allow terrorists to sow the seeds of rebellion, resistance, and revolution into their followers. To understand how AFRICOM can staunch the spread of Islamic radical fundamentalism, it is important to look at some of the principle issues affecting the North African region. This monograph shall investigate some of the primary issues that AFRICOM will have to address in North Africa such as governmental structure, finance reform, the disputed Western Sahara region, the availability of equal education for all citizens, and the rights of women and Berbers.

To understand the problems AFRICOM will face, it is important to understand North Africa. AFRICOM will have to consider many factors that make North Africa similar to and different from the United States. It will help USG planners if they first understood the history of Africa and its influence on the identity and culture of North Africans. The first known contact between Africans and the rest of the world took place between the Romans, the Greeks, and the indigenous people of Northern Africa. Trade along the Mediterranean coast flourished and history is flush with the exploits of various European nations that struggled for power and influence as they colonized Northern African and pushed southward and eastward in the search for untapped resources at the expense of the continent. Newt Gingrich wrote in his doctoral dissertation, “Belgium ran the Congo as a profitable business. It wanted the largest possible profit from the

²⁸Baya Gacemi, *I, Nadia, Wife of a Terrorist* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 59.

minimum investment of capital and manpower.”²⁹ It has been the source of famine and feast, contrast and controversy, as well as dynasty and diversity.

As many aspects of Africa join it together as those that divides it. Names such as North Africa, Black Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, or Tropical Africa are points of division due to geographical definition and have been used to portray the country as nothing more than a sea of dark nations bound together by one common land mass. However, a study of trade, diplomatic ties, military alliances, and economic pacts tells a different story. Stereotypical portrayals of jungle inhabitants, ignorant tribesmen and third world conditions dominate Western media while stories of day-to-day life, technological advances, and successful cooperation rarely make the news. It is no wonder that the habitually slow international response continues for natural disasters and genocide in African nations. A study of the nations that are most able, but least willing, to assist Africa in her time of need are often those same nations that less than a generation ago used racist policies and re-written history to dominate and subjugate her children. France was a colonial power and currently supports the region by way of multiple non-governmental organizations (NGOs). However, France is not the only nation that had contributed to the decline of the North African region within the last two centuries. Other nations such as Great Britain, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Spain, and Italy divided up the region with little regard to ethno-linguistic groups or long time adversaries.³⁰

Africa enjoyed a long history of freedom and prosperity as a continent. Only within the last two hundred years of history has it experienced colonialism and subjugation by Western nations. History shows that slaves were sold to European and American trading companies; however, this practice was largely controlled by the African ruling parties. European powers did

²⁹Yale Richmond and Phyllis Gestrin, *Into Africa: Intercultural Insights* (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, Inc., 1998), 19.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 17.

not have the approval or power to freely travel and subjugate Africans from the continent and largely relied on African slave traders to bring captured slaves to West Africa. According to W. E. Burghardt Du Bois in his book, *The World and Africa*, Great Britain led the charge to end the slave trade after the successful slave revolt in Haiti and replaced that income with a more lucrative practice of colonial exploitation and market manipulation owing to its sea dominance.³¹

From the African's point of view, the colonial period meant land alienation, the exploitation of raw materials, forced labor, racism, as well as Western education and technology.³² It is interesting to note, however, that there are still strong ties with certain African nations and former colonial powers that are by choice and not chance. These ties are mutually beneficial and cut across economic, social, and military strata. France is credited with creating a system of African leaders, molded in the French form of government and education, that both prepared the nations it colonized for nationhood as well as establishing permanent ties and cultural identities with mainland France that exist to this day.³³

The colonization of Africa began in 1870, but received its formal sanction in 1885. The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 legitimized the "Scramble for Africa" by formally sanctioning the partition of the continent among several European powers.³⁴ Political power and economic advantage were the two main reasons European nations colonized Africa.³⁵ The impact of that act continues to be felt to this day. However, there are additional ties that bind the region of North Africa, and this monograph will attempt to discuss them in the subsequent sections.

³¹W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, *The World and Africa: An Inquiry Into the Part Which Africa Has Played in World History*, ed. (New York: International Publishers Co., Inc., 1992), 67.

³²Phyllis Martin and Patrick O'Meara, *Africa*, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), 6.

³³Richmond and Gestrin, 19.

³⁴Martin and O'Meara, 122-123.

³⁵Thomas Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa: White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent From 1876 to 1912* (New York: Avon Books, 1991), 350-351.

What Is the Significance of the Maghreb?

North Africa is the focus of this monograph primarily because of its identification with Arabs and the Middle East. The Arabs that came from the Middle East to conquer new lands called the area west of Egypt, al-Maghrib.³⁶ As the reader will see, Islam is a common denominator owing to the efforts of the early Caliphates that swept across the northern portion of the continent. The region also shares a common identity with southern Europe since Spain and France colonized it starting in the early 20th century. That colonial influence extends to present-day business and foreign relations. The influence of all five nations and their proximity to the Strait of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean Sea make this region strategically important for trade and naval access. However, one of most significant issues that unifies but divides the region at the same time in this study is the cultural identity split between the indigenous Berber population and the ruling Arab classes. This cultural identify split will be addressed first.

Cultural Identity of North Africans

No paper on North Africa would be complete without first explaining the Berber clan and its importance in the development of the Maghreb region. Berber is the recognized name of the people in the Maghreb but it is not a name recognized in their language. The Barbary Coast, the Barbary States, and the term Barbary have been attributed to the native Berber clans. Their language is Tamazight and is not officially recognized in North Africa. Imazighen is translated as “free people.” The Berbers are the African clan most addressed by the Ancient Egyptians when they referred to North Africans.³⁷ Throughout history, Berbers have been mislabeled as Libyans or Nomads after the Numidian dynasty that once ruled a large portion of North Africa. Berbers are the herders, grazers, and desert dwellers that most people identify when discussing North

³⁶Shillington, 74-76.

³⁷Du Bois, 92.

Africa. Berber history intermingles throughout the history of North Africa and at times is the cause for friction.

The Berbers have never formed a nation with borders but have created powerful dynasties that have threatened Rome and thwarted European conquests for many years. The Numidian dynasty in Algeria during the 2nd Century B.C. so threatened Rome that they feared it would become the new Carthage. Two dynasties in the 11th through the 13th centuries, the Almoravids and the Almohads, controlled a large portion of northwest Africa and Spain.³⁸ During the French conquest of Algeria, Berbers successfully thwarted their actions for seventeen years, until they were finally defeated in 1847.³⁹

The Arabization of North Africa began with the arrival of Arab Muslims in the 7th century. The cultural identity problems started shortly after the Arab population overthrew the Byzantine forces in North Africa, Spain, and France. Once they established themselves, the Arab people systematically removed all languages except Arabic and strove to remove any cultural references that did not fit their religious view of the world. This attempt to destroy Berber culture, language, and heritage continues to be a major point of contention for the Berber people. After a period of abuses at the hands of the Arabs, the Berbers revolted and fought Arabization until well into the 16th Century B.C. Due to the migration of the Berbers along trade routes in the Maghreb; each country in this monograph has a significant Berber population with similar problems that will need AFRICOM attention.

When the location and disposition of the Berber population is traced, it is discovered that they have populated the North Africa landscape from the western coast of Morocco to the center

³⁸Hsain Ilahiane, *Historical Dictionary of the Berbers (Imazighen)* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2006), xxxiii-xxxviii.

³⁹*Ibid.*, xxviii.

of Egypt and from the northern tip of Tunisia south to the oasis in the southern Saharan desert.⁴⁰ The Arabization of North Africa also had an effect on the identity of North Africa. In terms of race, the Berbers make up 80 percent of the population of Morocco and Algeria, 60 percent in Tunisia and Libya, 2 percent of Egypt, and 4 million living in Europe for a total of more than 50 million people.⁴¹ However, the number of people actually claiming the Berber identity is significantly less because of the overwhelming numbers of Berbers that choose the Arab identity to escape the governmental and religious persecution of their native race.

Islamization took hold in the region shortly after the Arabs conquered vast portions of North Africa. The Berber tribes have fought to keep their collective identity. The Berbers follow customary law and, with few exceptions, do not follow sharia law. During the French colonial period, much of Berber law and customs received official recognition, contrary to the wishes of the Arab population.⁴² Because of this and the rise of a strict interpretation of strict orthodox Sunni Islam, all things Berber are repressed. Since the spring of 1980, also known as Berber Spring, Berbers have organized and demonstrated for cultural, linguistic, and economic rights and believe that they have been discriminated against by state policies in education, culture, and economic modernization.⁴³ This disparity, between the secular Berber population and ruling Arab class, continues to be a point of friction within each nation and, if not addressed, can lead to attacks by the Berbers against the ruling class in each nation. Though AFRICOM is not the lead agent for human rights violations, it is an issue that, if allowed to develop beyond the current level of tolerance, could erupt in national or region civil war requiring humanitarian or kinetic response by United States forces. .

⁴⁰Marvine Howe, *Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 59.

⁴¹Looklex Encyclopedia, *Berbers*, <http://i-cias.com/e.o/berbers.htm> (accessed 15 January 2008).

⁴²James Ciment, *Algeria, The Fundamentalist Challenge* (New York: Facts on File, 1997), 119.

⁴³Ilahiane, xxxvii.

The Mind of an Arab

The Arab mind is a very interesting thing. Cultural anthropologists do not try to stereotype people but strive to find the common understanding when they describe the overall view of a people or nation. This monograph will attempt to do the same as it seeks to explain the culture of Arab peoples and why North Africa deserves to be classified and addressed differently than Sub-Saharan or South Africa. Dr Alice Butler-Smith defines culture as “the totality of socially transmitted behavior patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions, and all other products of human work and thought.” She goes on to describe it as the patterns, traits of a community or population, and believes that it encompasses the predominating attitudes and behavior that characterize the functioning of a group or organization.⁴⁴ It is this definition that helps define the connectivity of the North African region to the Middle East.

Ralph Patai argues that Arabs are those who speak Arabic and they are the only people that linguistics defines their identity.⁴⁵ The Middle East is a cultural, not a religious mindset, even though religion in the form of Islam is the governing force. Another Arab tradition is the group aspect of the mind. They believe that family comes first, then extended family, then Arabs, and finally outsiders. This is best explained by the parable “I and my brother against my cousin, I and my cousin against a stranger.” Additionally, the Arab view of time and planning is different from the Western concept of time. “Inshallah,” or God Willing, is the term most Arabs give when planning to meet or working out issues. The author of this monograph has lived in many Middle Eastern countries for over three years and an additional two years in Turkey and has experienced firsthand the difficulty of dealing with the cultural importance of time between the Western world and Arab world and hopes to inform the AFRICOM staff of that cultural difference.

⁴⁴Dr. Alice Butler-Smith, quoted in Regional Studies Block, School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 2007.

⁴⁵Patai, 13.

The Arabic views on law and politics are centered on the Koran. Whereas, Christians primarily view the world from a self-centric approach where the practice of religion and personal shame is internal, Arabs see the world just the opposite. Islam is central and both practice and shame are external. As such, Islam is the only acceptable basis of authority and the traditions of the prophets and early practices are what guide the modern Arab. This belief is manifested in the conviction that there are inequalities between man and woman, master and slave, believer and non believer. The encroachment of the Western world caused the Arabs to review the religious reasons why their nation was defeated. The Koran promised a society that surrendered to God's Will, one could not fail, and the reason for their disaster had to be the result of a nation gone wrong and allowing secular influence to reign.⁴⁶ It is important to note that the Islamic world does not end in the Middle East or North Africa. It has its roots in Asia as well. The defeat of Arab forces by Israel and the loss of the third holiest city, Jerusalem, have been written in Islamic history as the "disaster."⁴⁷

The only limitations on the leader are those placed on him by the authority of God. This authority extends itself to political decisions such as the choice and succession of a ruler, the obligation of the ruler to his subjects, and the extent of his authority. The limit of that obedience is only necessary to the lawful rulers under sharia law. Bernard Lewis addressed the issue of religion and politics, particularly the view of those that believe and do not believe in Islam in his book, *The Political Language of Islam*. He writes that there are four types of people that believers in the Islamic faith are authorized to wage war against: "the unbeliever, the bandit, the rebel and the apostate."⁴⁸ Ultimately, the unbeliever that does not repent and accept Islam as the true

⁴⁶Karen Armstrong, *Islam: A Short History* (New York: Modern Library Press, 2002), 152.

⁴⁷John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 11.

⁴⁸Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (New York: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 77.

religion is the worst of the four and Christians fall in this definition.⁴⁹ As a political vehicle for a Christian nation, AFRICOM needs to understand the view of the North Africans regarding their religious duties in dealing with Christians.

North Africa normally follows the traditions of other Arabic nations in that males dominate the decision-making process, the tribe is the central point for leadership, and personal honor is external. In most North African nations, as in the rest of the Middle East, women are traditionally regarded as weaker than men in mind, body, and spirit, they do not make up a large percentage of the work force, are less educated through lack of opportunity rather than intellectual capacity, and are forced to enter into arranged marriages.⁵⁰ The honor of the group is linked to personal identity and the arranged marriages are seen as a way to strengthen the family versus sacramental obligations.⁵¹ These cultural differences are normally the starting point for sensitivity training of United States military forces before they deploy overseas. However, it will be more important for the planners in AFRICOM to understand how bigger social issues help create an environment ripe for radical Islamic teachings.

There needs to be an overt undertaking by the combatant command to understand Islam, their view of honor, and the role both play in the region. Honor is an interesting phenomenon for Muslims. The king of Morocco, during World War II, was asked by Marshal Petain of France to turn over his Jews for the Nazi death chamber. The king refused, stating that every single Jew in his country was his responsibility.⁵² Akbar Ahmed in his book, *Islam Under Siege*, states that the world is currently a post-honor world because the concept of honor has been replaced throughout the world with the need for revenge. The problem with the post-honor world, writes Ahmed, is

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Patai, 37-38.

⁵¹Ibid., 95-108.

⁵²Akbar S. Ahmed, *Islam Under Siege: Living Dangerously in a Post-Honor World* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2003), 103.

that the dialogue between and understanding of cultures that was prevalent in years past is gone. He further states that the current version of honor speaks of revenge that becomes dishonorable in its application when it replaces dialogue. He speaks of Morocco as an honorable nation that allows women in its schools that do not wear headscarves but frowns on France, which threw women out of schools that wear them.⁵³ It is this understanding of the culture and respect for the differences inherent in the two that will greatly assist AFRICOM in North Africa.

The impact of these cultural differences will be addressed later in this monograph as it defines the impact that the Arab way of thinking has resulted in differences in financial reform, education, and equal rights.

Secular Versus Islamic Governance

The North African colonial history and internal governance problems are two links that bind the countries of North Africa together as a separate region in Africa. The colonial history of each nation is similar in that they all share a basic linkage with each other on the way they were colonized, as well as the nations that colonized them. As each past is a little bit different, this monograph will review the colonial history of each to show the significance of the past and how it relates to the future of the region. In the second part of each nation's narrative, the monograph will explain the different leadership styles and forms of government that the AFRICOM staff will have to understand as they work with the nations in the region to maintain peace.

The People's Democratic Republic of Algeria

Algeria, or the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, has been an inviting target for invaders throughout its history due to its geographical location. The earliest known evidence of life in Algeria began in the Paleolithic period, roughly 200,000 B.C. The Phoenicians controlled the region as early as 814 B.C. The Phoenicians traded heavily throughout the Mediterranean and

⁵³Ibid., 104.

Europe. Their great wealth soon brought the attention of Rome. After the Punic Wars of the 1st and 2nd Century B.C., Algeria enjoyed a brief period of Christianity under the Roman Empire.⁵⁴ Germanic Vandals conquered it around 400 A.D. only to lose it to the Romans. The Berbers then conquered the Romans and ruled until the Arabs defeated them in the 7th century.

Islamic Algeria remained Arab-controlled territory until Christian Spain threatened colonization. Fearing another Christian crusade, Algeria enlisted the aid of Turkey and became part of the Ottoman Empire in 1571.⁵⁵ One of Algeria's closet trading partners during this time was France. This proved to be a catastrophic mistake as France, long aware of the strategic implications of Algeria's location and resources, decided to colonize Algeria in 1830, under the guise of a diplomatic slight to the French consul.⁵⁶ Anticipating a great return on the natural resources in Algeria, France attacked the Algiers. After a long, bloody war, France defeated Algeria and governed it as a department of France. During this time, France gave citizenship to two classes of people, "pied noirs" and converts.⁵⁷ Pied noirs, or black feet, were Europeans whom relocated to Algeria and converts were Arab Algerians whom converted to Catholicism.

France ruled Algeria from 1847 until 1962. During this time, France assaulted Algerian tribal life in much the same way the United States dealt with the Native Americans, driving them into areas that were seen as suitable for their existence. Different rules for native Algerians that did not apply to the *pied noirs* created two separate and unequal classes of people, one being Algerians and the other being the more favored class gaining French citizenship. After the defeat of the French by the Nazi government in 1940, and the subsequent liberation by Allies in 1942,

⁵⁴Ciment, 26.

⁵⁵Ibid., 28.

⁵⁶Ibid., 30.

⁵⁷Sir Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (New York: Pan Macmillan, 2006), 51-58.

the Algerian nationalists became emboldened in their quest for independence.⁵⁸ After a series of failed negotiations with the French government, the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) embarked on a war of independence from 1954 to 1962. The Algerians finally won their independence from the French, and the French failure in Algeria became the catalyst for freedom of other colonial holdings in North Africa.

The power struggles of the late 1980s fueled the civil unrest in Algeria. Discontent was high with the FLN, the leading party in congress, owing to its contribution to securing Algerian independence in 1962. The Front Islamique Du Salut (FIS), a leading Islamic party whose stance was extremely critical of the corruption and secular nature of the FLN, won over 40 percent of the districts in the December 1991 elections. Because of this action and fearing the loss of power, the current administration voided the election, banned the FIS (also known as the Islamic Salvation Front), deployed the military to quell the unrest, and plunged the nation into a civil war that cost the lives of over 150,000 people.⁵⁹ Currently, the majority of the power lies with the chief of state, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. His office controls the appointments of the majority of the parliament, as well as key military and judicial appointments.

The Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

Libya, or the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, has been a critical link between Africa and Europe because of its northern border with the Mediterranean Sea. It was a land made up of tribes, regions, and cities until the turn of the 20th century. The name Libya came from a Berber tribe known by ancient Egyptians and used by the Greeks for most of North Africa and all the Berber inhabitants.⁶⁰ The Romans ruled Libya like Algeria in ancient times.

⁵⁸Ciment, 36.

⁵⁹Andrew J. Pierre and William B. Quandt, *The Algerian Crisis: Policy Options for the West* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1996), 8-9.

⁶⁰Helen Chapin Metz, ed., *Libya--A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1987), 3.

Libya can trace its archeological evidence to the same period as Algeria and the rest of the North African countries and shares a common lineage with the Phoenician traders. The Romans defeated Libya during the Punic War and ruled it until the Arabs and the Ottoman Turks gained power in the 16th century.

However, Libya is unique in that it was ruled by different nations at the same time due to its internal geographical separation. In ancient times, Libya consisted of three distinct regions called Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan. In 1911, the Italians defeated the Ottoman Turks and controlled Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.⁶¹ After a brief rebellion by the Sanusi, a pious Muslim religious order, Italy dominated Libya and allowed thousands of Italians to resettle the country. During World War II, Italy lost Libya to British and French rule. In 1951, Libya amalgamated its three regions into one and named its first king. He was Muhammad Iris and received his reward due to his identification as a hero of the Sanusi fight against the Italians before and during World War II.

Qaddafi's governmental form is the Jamahiyira, or the state of the masses.⁶² This political system espouses representation as a form of government and uses the principals of Islam to frame its views. In this governmental structure, the ruler, Qaddafi, is outside of the governmental structure and acts as a guide for the process. In reality, only a small, trusted band of leaders run Libya with the help of the military, special security police, and approved committees. Ultimately, Qaddafi approves all major decisions and appointments. The government runs the nation and Qaddafi is the government, a truly authoritarian state.

⁶¹Dirk Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 23.

⁶²*Ibid.*, 97.

The Kingdom of Morocco

The Kingdom of Morocco shares similar ancient history with its North African neighbors. Its original inhabitants were the Berbers, as one has already seen with Algeria and Libya. Morocco is different from the other nations in that it occupied and controlled large swathes of European land well into the 14th century. Additionally, Morocco was the first country to recognize the United States as a sovereign nation, establishing diplomatic ties with her in 1777, and entered into treaties with her in response to attacks against American shipping.⁶³ This level of support between the United States and Morocco continued throughout the years, and the attacks on 11 September 2001 strengthened the partnership.

In 1912 in spite of United States and Great Britain demands based on the Conference of Madrid in 1880 to maintain Moroccan sovereignty, France colonized the Kingdom of Morocco.⁶⁴ In 1921, Morocco defeated the Spanish army and recovered the northern portion of the country. However, the newly freed north attacked France for its independence and lost when France united with Spain and defeated Morocco in 1926. After a series of rebellions and uprisings, France negotiated with Morocco and granted her independence on 2 March 1956. The Spanish granted Morocco her independence on 7 April of the same year.

The Moroccan government is a constitutional monarchy with King Mohammed VI as its leader and Abbas el Fassi its prime minister. The 1996 constitution created a bicameral parliament, a prime minister appointed by the king to serve as the head of government and both a judicial and executive branch. It enjoys a parliament that is elected but the King has absolute powers and can dissolve the government as he wishes. As commander in chief, he can appoint cabinet ministers, Supreme Court judges, and deploy the military without approval from his

⁶³Thomas K. Park and Aomar Boum, *Historical Dictionary of Morocco*, 2nd ed., (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2006), 346-347.

⁶⁴Howe, 64.

parliament. At his whim, he can dissolve the government and issue decrees. Semi-authoritarianism, as defined by Marina Ottaway in her book, *Democracy Challenged*, “are ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal or authoritarian traits.”⁶⁵ This form of government, as with the other governments in North Africa, will pose an interesting dilemma with United States policy as it exports democracy to the rest of the world.

Al Jumhuriyah at Tunisiyah

The Tunisian Republic, or Al Jumhuriyah at Tunisiyah, is a small nation but plays a huge part in the commerce of North Africa. It is the home of Carthage, which possessed a mighty navy that was more experienced but technologically inferior to the Roman navy. That technological advantage allowed Rome to rebuild their navy after its initial defeat at the hands of the Carthaginians.⁶⁶ Rome conquered Carthage in 146 B.C. and destroyed every building in the city. Rome rebuilt Carthage as the administrative center of North Africa and relied on the region heavily for grain to feed its mighty empire. The reliance on grain from the region was so great that the region was referred to as the breadbasket of Rome. Tunisia holds a unique place in both Christian and Islamic religion for the continent. Carthage became the head of the Latin Christian church in Northern Africa and the city of Kairouan is the fourth holiest place in the world for followers of the Islamic faith after Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem. It is the fourth oldest Muslim city and is directly responsible for the spread of Arab culture throughout North Africa.⁶⁷

⁶⁵Marina Ottaway, *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), 3.

⁶⁶Kenneth J. Perkins, *Tunisia: Crossroads of the Islamic and European Worlds* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 17.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 31.

Tunisia was a part of the great Berber nation from the 12th through 15th centuries and fell under the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century. Tunisia became an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire and was ruled by dynasties of Turkish beys.⁶⁸ Tunisia was a primary participant in piracy during this period and assimilated a large number of Spanish Arabs and Jews. The Tunisians watched and waited as the French colonized Algeria. The Ottoman Empire held on to Tunisia until shortly after the Congress of Berlin.⁶⁹ In 1881, France invaded Tunisia from Algeria under the guise of chasing tribesmen whom had raided Algeria. France quickly occupied key ports and surrounded Tunis. After a brief bombardment, Tunisia surrendered and accepted French terms for colonization. Tunisia accepted this role for seventy years, conducting periodic uprisings until 1954, when France relinquished internal control of the country to Tunisian authority, similar to the agreement Tunisia had with the Ottoman Empire. After their defeat in Indochina and a bloody war in Algeria, the French soon tired of colonialism. In March 1956, Tunisia received its independence from France, shortly after Morocco had been given assurances that it would receive its independence as well.⁷⁰

The Tunisian government is a republic with a strong presidential system dominated by a one party system.⁷¹ It has a bicameral parliament and a judicial system where the prime minister, supreme court judges, and cabinet are nominated by the president. The government also appoints regional governors and local administrators. The parliament does not generate legislation and passes all bills originated by the executive branch. All power belongs to the executive branch and

⁶⁸Harold D. Nelson, *Tunisia--A Country Study, Area Handbook Series* (Washington, DC: American University, 1987), 23.

⁶⁹Ibid., 30. At the Congress of Berlin, Britain agreed to allow France a “free hand” in Tunisia in exchange for French acquiescence to the leasehold on Cyprus that the British had acquired from Turkey. It was accepted among the European Powers that France planned to occupy Tunisia but no excuse presented itself until 1 April 1881.

⁷⁰Perkins, *Tunisia: Crossroads of the Islamic and European Worlds*, 114-115.

⁷¹US Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Background Note Tunisia,” <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5439.htm> (accessed 11 March 2008).

the current president is only the second president in Tunisia history since its independence from France. He will run for his fifth and last term as president due to his age and new constitutional reforms approved in 2002.⁷² Those reforms also grant judicial immunity for the president during and after his term of office. Though Tunisia is slowly becoming democratic, it still imposes severe limits on civil freedoms such as freedom to associate, freedom of the press, and freedom of speech. It is a semi-authoritarian system of government much like that of President Bouteflika's government in Algeria and Leader of the Revolution Gaddafi in Libya.

The Disputed Western Saharan Territories

Western Sahara has a very different history from the other North African nations. The Bafours, a dark-skinned people, settled in this seemingly inhospitable area when it was still lush and tropical.⁷³ They left the region in 2500 B.C. around the time the Almoravid Berbers wandered into the region along with the people called the Moorish Saharawis. They were the next to populate the Sahara and extended their kingdom well into the 14th century when they were defeated and humiliated into paying taxes to Arab rulers. This situation was short-lived, however, when the Moorish Saharawis became the dominant power in the region. The Saharawis successfully fought off Spanish and Moroccan attempts to colonize them until the 1880s.⁷⁴

Spain established coastal settlements in Western Sahara but it did not affect the nomadic lifestyle of the Saharawis since they did not come into regular contact with foreigners. Spain eventually set up governance in the Western Saharan interior in 1946. In 1956, when France gave Morocco its independence, Western Saharans, Mauritians, and Moroccans formed an army of

⁷²Kenneth J. Perkins, *A History of Modern Tunisia* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 212.

⁷³Tony Hodges, *Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1983), 1.

⁷⁴Hodges, 40-54.

liberation to rid Western Sahara of French and Spanish rulers.⁷⁵ The rebellion failed and changed the nomadic lifestyle of the Saharawis by making many of them refugees in other countries. However, while searching for oil deposits, Spain made a mineral discovery that would change the nomadic lifestyle of the region. Spain discovered great deposits of phosphates. This discovery provided jobs for the normally nomadic Saharawis and brought them under the economical and legal rule of Spain.⁷⁶

The Spanish united the Western Sahara colonies into one nation in 1958, and it became known as the Spanish Saharas. In 1975, Spain granted the Saharans its independence after the United Nations requested the right of self-determination for that region.⁷⁷ King Hassan II of Morocco, in an attempt to shore up support for his monarchy, organized the Green March that effectively annexed the northern two-thirds of the country for Morocco. Mauritania annexed the southern one-third. According to Erik Jensen, author of, *Western Sahara, Anatomy of a Stalemate*, “In 1973 the Frente Polisario came into being with its leadership drawn principally from Sahrawis who had been studying or living in Morocco, and it evolved rapidly as a force to be reckoned with.”⁷⁸ The Frente Polisario became the freedom movement for the Saharawis. They led an insurgency against both nations and effectively forced Mauritania to grant independence to the southern portion of the land in 1976. The Frente Polisario claimed the region and called it the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).⁷⁹ The SADR is listed by the United Nations as a government in exile, but in settlement documents and the cease-fire declarations, it is the Frente Polisario that is listed as the legal representative of the Saharawis.⁸⁰

⁷⁵Ibid., 74-83.

⁷⁶Ibid., 122-132.

⁷⁷Erik Jensen, *Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 25.

⁷⁸Ibid., 26.

⁷⁹Ibid., 30.

⁸⁰Ibid., 123-163.

Morocco immediately seized the rest of the country and now claims the entire nation as part of its own territory.

As the previous sections have shown, North Africa received its independence from its colonial masters in the 1960s. The region, having already experienced Islamization through Arab and Ottoman conquests, were ripe for exploitation by those groups seeking to fill the power vacuum with ideology that would further their aims. More often than not, authoritarian or military regimes took control of inefficient state machineries that were incapable of creating nations out of heterogeneous, often hostile tribes and territories plagued by epidemics, war, hunger, desertification, and international indifference.⁸¹ This was the recipe that created a level of abject misery to which Islamization was poised to exploit.

As stated earlier, there are seven recognized nations in North Africa but this monograph will only address the five nations previously mentioned. Sudan, long considered a part of North Africa is undergoing ethnic cleansing at a rate that would make the modern world shudder if not for the location. Whatever the political or social argument that can be made for or against United States intervention, it has been determined by the author that that nation deserves to be written about in a separate monograph. Egypt, on the other hand, is the seventh nation the United Nations classifies as part of North Africa but it also sees itself as part of the Middle East. Whatever the official or recognized classification, it will not become part of AFRICOM and will not be addressed in this monograph.

Everyone Has Issues, What Are North Africa's Problems?

The issues addressed are not unique to the Middle East but are of primary concern for the AFRICOM as it achieves full operational capability in October 2008. The focus of AFRICOM is to build the capacity of the African partners to be able to reduce conflict, improve security, defeat

⁸¹Peter R. Demant, *Islam vs Islamism The Dilemma of the Muslim World* (Westport CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 60.

terrorists, and support crisis response.⁸² To meet that focus, AFRICOM should partner with United States governmental institutions such as the United States Department of State (DoS), International Organizations (IO), Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), the United Nations, other actors in the region, and African agencies such as the African Union and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU).

The *Quadrennial Defense Review* states that the United States “anticipated goal is to prevent problems from becoming crisis and to prevent crisis from becoming conflict.”⁸³ To do that, AFRICOM is positioning itself to prevent threats by diminishing the areas without legitimately recognized governance, particularly in outlying areas away from central government. AFRICOM sells itself as different from other combatant commands as it plans to focus on non-kinetic approaches to problem solving such as humanitarian assistance (HA), medical operations, stability operations, and other means of capacity building. While AFRICOM’s primary mission is non-kinetic, it still needs to be able to respond in a kinetic manner when required since its draft mission statement states, “As directed, US AFRICOM conducts military operations to deter aggression and respond to crises.”⁸⁴

To that end, the primary issues that AFRICOM will have to address are governmental structure as addressed in the previous section, finance reform, the disputed Western Sahara region, the availability of equal education for all citizens, and the rights of Berbers and women in the region. Religion will play a large part in this equation as the region is predominantly Sunni Muslim and AFRICOM will have to work within that construct, not try to change it. It is

⁸²U.S. Congress, Senate, Foreign Service Relations Committee, Theresa Whalen, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Service Relations Committee (SFRC), Subcommittee on African Affairs, 1 August 2007.

⁸³Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 17.

⁸⁴Center for Technology and National Security Policy, “Transforming National Security Seminar Series,” Proposed Mission Statement delivered by VADM Moeller at the AFRICOM Emerging Command Seminar, http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/NCW_course/AFRICOMpercent20Completepercent20Presentations.pdf (accessed on 11 March 2008).

important to understand that AFRICOM is not an unthinking reaction to the Global War on Terror and should be seen as a long-term combatant command to support other USG agencies in implementing USG security policies and strategies.

Finance Reform

Algeria's economy is driven primarily by the sale of oil. Oil receipts make up roughly 60 percent of its revenue, 30 percent of its gross national product, and 95 percent of its export earnings.⁸⁵ Algeria has been able to improve its financial and economic situation over the last ten years due to soaring oil prices. As a result, Algeria owes less in external debt now than in any other time in its history. With only 3 percent of its land being arable and the oil industry does not afford all an opportunity to work, Algeria still suffers from a high unemployment rate of 22.5 percent.⁸⁶

One of the main problems Algeria has is the state directs the economic system and controls more than 450 state-owned enterprises. Algeria invested heavily in the oil industry and left its other industries, such as the agrarian market, severely underinvested. According to Misagh Parsa in his book, *States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions*, "hyperactive states intervene extensively in capital allocation and accumulation and this action both limits the scope of the market's cooperation and render themselves more vulnerable to challenge and attack."⁸⁷ Recent history has shown that Algeria's state control of the economic situation has repeatedly opened its government up to attacks from the disenfranchised population.

⁸⁵CIA World Factbook, "Algeria," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html> (accessed 10 January 2008).

⁸⁶Infoplease.com, "Algeria: History, Geography, Government and Culture," <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107272.html> (accessed 10 January 2008).

⁸⁷Misagh Parsa, *States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge, UK: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 2000), 13-14.

Libya's economy is largely supported by its oil exports, which count for roughly 30 percent of its gross domestic product. Like Algeria, Libya became a world economic influence once petroleum was discovered within its borders. However, Libya has experienced a great squandering of its natural resources and economic gain by the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Qaddafi has also given large economic gifts to other African nations to buy influence, and Libya has a long history of widespread corruption. Libya imports over 80 percent of its food requirements and has been suffering from high inflation, high import prices, and a general decline in their standard of living.⁸⁸ Additionally, Libya has not experienced growth in the private sector and is recently recovering from economic sanctions imposed by the United States and the rest of the international community for its part in state-sponsored terrorism.

Unlike other North African nations, Morocco does not receive a substantial amount of money from the sale of oil. Its principal exports are phosphates and other minerals. However, like other less industrialized nations, it receives a significant portion of its income from family members that live abroad and send money home. Tourism is the third source of income as it has doubled in the last five years due to an international interest in its history, music, and cuisine.⁸⁹ Morocco suffers from a high unemployment rate and is poorer than Tunisia and Algeria. In urban areas, the unemployment rates can soar up to 26 percent with the majority of those affected being young people. Morocco has a small, relatively underdeveloped oil industry, but its over reliance on agriculture and mining has stymied its economic growth and paved the way for illegal crops such as marijuana and hashish.

Tunisia enjoys a very prosperous economy with strong economic ties to Europe. It is more economically stable than its North African neighbors and employs over 50 percent of its population in agriculture endeavors. Tourism, textile, and a large expatriate population all make a

⁸⁸Library of Congress Federal Research Division, "Country Profile Libya," <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Libya.pdf> (accessed 19 January 2008).

⁸⁹Park and Boum, 339.

very significant contribution to the governmental coffers. The Tunisian government controlled virtually the entire national business sector at one time but has since relinquished control of non-strategic areas of its economy. It still retains control over the finance, hydrocarbon, power generation, and water resources.

Tunisia is an importer of oil, as it does not yet have the refining capability to support its nation. Its industries are primarily located in Tunis and produces leather, textiles, food, beverages, and steel. Unemployment in Tunisia hovers around 14 percent in the city but reports a higher percentage in rural areas. Although Tunisia has invested heavily in education and family planning, it suffers from an inability to find technical jobs for its young, highly educated workforce. Marina Ottaway addresses this phenomenon when she addresses the economic effects of low income, stagnant economies, and shallow transitions. Tunisia, like Venezuela and Croatia, are classified as upper-middle-income countries but that classification does not reflect the true nature of the population.⁹⁰ This disparity in income generated by the nation versus living standards of its citizens can develop seams that are ripe for governmental change from within if the people do not feel that the government is taking care of them.

Meet Me at the Moroccan Wall of Shame...Trust Me, You Cannot Miss It

Western Sahara is a disputed land that continues to stymie the efforts of the international community. The Moroccans have built a 2,700 kilometer sand berm that divides the Western Sahara from northeast to southwest, effectively leaving the Saharawis with desert land and no access to the North Atlantic Ocean. The Frente Polisario continues to fight against Morocco and has found safe haven in Algeria, a nation that supports the right of Western Sahara to have self-determination.

⁹⁰Ottaway, 164.

Saharawi citizens currently live in many refugee camps in Algeria and east of the walled area with the Frente Polisario maintaining its headquarters in Tindouf, Algeria. The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) deployed to the region to monitor the cease-fire between Morocco and Frente Polisario forces in 1991.⁹¹ The United Nations has failed to broker an effective ceasefire that will grant self-determination to the region. The current dispute is over whom should be allowed to vote. The Moroccans believe that those whom currently reside in Western Sahara should vote and the Saharawis believe that the right to self-determination belongs to the people who lived in the Spanish Saharas in 1975 and their descendents. Any effort to bring peace to this region by AFRICOM will definitely result in an increased level of activity on both sides of the berm to ensure their goals are met.

Education and Rights of the Non-Male and Non-Arab

Education and educational opportunities are an important issue when trying to counter radical views, whatever the cause. Education is seen as important in Algeria and over 70 percent of the population over 15 years of age can read or write. Men hold a marked education advantage over women in the education arena since they hold a literacy rate of 79.6 percent to 60.1 percent for females.⁹² The official language of Algeria is Arabic with both French and Berber dialects being spoken by a vast majority of its citizens.

Education is seen as extremely important in Libyan culture. Libya enjoys the highest literacy rate in Africa and education is compulsory. Ninety-two percent of adult males and 69 percent of adult females (82 percent of total population) are literate.⁹³ In 1998, the budget for education was 38.2 percent of the national budget and 0.4 percent of the Gross National

⁹¹Jensen, 43.

⁹²CIA World Factbook.

⁹³Library of Congress Federal Research Division, "Country Profile Libya."

Product.⁹⁴ Culture in Libya follows other Muslim nations with a few exceptions. Women attend major universities and trade institutions in higher numbers than in any other North Africa nation. Qaddafi has written an entire section on the plight of women and children in his Green Book, the document that codifies his power base and acts as the nations Constitution. He called for more Libyans in Libya and as a result has one of the youngest nations in the world. His nation boasts of the notable progress they have made in youth and women's rights in the last three decades. The official language is Arabic since the government policy discourages the use of other languages. However, English is widely understood in Libya and ranks as a second language. French, Italian, and Berber languages are spoken to a lesser degree.

Morocco is not a highly educated country. It claims only 64 percent of men and 40 percent of women as literate. The rates are worse in rural areas with only 17 percent of the women able to read and write. The nation has established literacy centers in an attempt to educate its citizens. Women make up over 80 percent of the attendees at these centers and the reported literacy rates are becoming better but even graduates of four-year colleges have considered themselves ill prepared to face the international workforce when they graduate.⁹⁵ The official language of Morocco is Arabic. French is the accepted language of business, and the Berber language is taught in some school systems while Spanish is widely spoken in northern Morocco.

The official language in Tunisia is Arabic but both Arabic and French are spoken for trade and commerce. Most Tunisians, like the rest of North Africa, descended from the Berber race and follow traditional Arabic culture with a few notable exceptions. Tunisia was the first Arab country to grant women full legal status. This allowed women to conduct business, have bank accounts and get passports on their own without a male's permission. Tunisia outlawed

⁹⁴International Network for Higher Education in Africa, "INHEA: Higher Education Profiles," http://www.bc.edu/be_org/avp/soe/cihe/inhea/profiles/Libya.htm (accessed 11 January 2008).

⁹⁵Library of Congress Federal Research Division, "Country Profile Morocco," <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Morocco.pdf> (accessed 19 January 2008).

polygamy and requires families to send girls to school. It boasts literacy rate of 74 percent with 84 percent for men and 63 percent for women above the age of 15. The official language for the entire region is Arabic and, as stated earlier, is seen as a cultural tie for the region. It unifies the religion but is a divisive element when dealing with non-Arabs and will be an issue that AFRICOM will need to consider when addressing problems in this region.

Paradise Lies at the Feet of the Mother

Women have been honored in Islamic history. Khadijah, the first wife of the Prophet Muhammad, was given the privilege of being designated as the first Muslim.⁹⁶ Her daughter, Fatimah, plays a key role in Islamic history as the wife of Ali and the mother of Hassan and Hussein. They are the ancestors of the Sayyeds, the holiest lineage in Muslim society and revered in Shia tradition.⁹⁷ The colonization of Muslim lands by European powers ushered in a period of protective isolation by Muslim men. When that period of colonization was complete, tribal traditions continue the practice of subjugating women and keeping them from the rightful position the Koran has promised them, according to the monograph author's Western view of the Koran.

Traditional Islamists believe that the separation of the public (social) sphere from the private (family) sphere is along gender lines with the male role dominating the social aspect and the female role defined as subordinate to men.⁹⁸ In the next section, one will explore organizations and institutions that AFRICOM will coordinate efforts with in order to assist North Africa in redressing its problems with finance reform, the Western Saharan issue, as well as the equal status for all people in order to counter radical Islamic fundamentalism.

⁹⁶Ahmed, 116.

⁹⁷Ibid.

⁹⁸Demant, 179.

How Does this Monograph Plan to Advise AFRICOM on What to Do?

How can AFRICOM counter the threat of radical Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa? The first section of this monograph has already addressed the reasons why this region warrants a separate approach from the rest of the continent. Considerable effort has gone into addressing the problem background and significance of North Africa. Those links were the historical background of the region, the cultural ties to Islam, the Arab/Berber ethnicity issue, the similar colonial identification, and the influence the region has in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea. It is important to understand how the United States projects power and influence throughout the world, and what decisions came to be in the implementation of AFRICOM. Once this is explained, the planners in AFRICOM will need to understand what motivates a terrorist to act, and what triggers for that action are already evident in North Africa. After understanding the motivation for terrorists to act, the monograph will compare the primary issues identified in the preceding section and in the last section develop coordination recommendations focusing on non-kinetic action, civil-military cooperation, and military programs. Finally, the author will offer his conclusion.

Before continuing in the monograph, it is important to understand the criteria by which the actions recommended for implementation by AFRICOM in this monograph will be measured. Criteria are defined as standards, rules, or tests by which something can be judged--a measure of value.⁹⁹ The criteria used for this monograph will be suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Suitability is defined as “does the course of action solve the problem legally and ethically.”¹⁰⁰ It will be the responsibility of AFRICOM to ensure that all recommended courses of action are legal, ethical, and within their mandate as an instrument of the USG. Feasibility is defined as

⁹⁹Department of the Army, Field Manual 5.0, *Army Planning and Orders Production* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 2-9.

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

fitting within the available resources.¹⁰¹ AFRICOM will find that it will be competing for scarce resources as Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan presently warrant the lion's share of national resources for the near future. Finally, acceptability is defined as worth the cost or risk.¹⁰² The monograph will look at the risk to United States forces as part of the United States strategy as well as the acceptability of the actions to the host government.

Terrorism Motives and Rational

Terrorists have many different reasons to carry out their actions. Most feel that they have no other recourse because the powers that they are fighting against are stronger than they are, and terrorism is the only way to facilitate change. There are terrorist organizations that believe that social issues are the root cause of many terror attacks and changing the prevailing social conditions by violence will ultimately lead to peace with a favorable outcome. A third reason given as to why terrorist strike, is religion. Terrorists, since the ancient times, have believed strongly in their own religion and chopped off heads, burned people at the stake, and committed many other violent acts in the name of religion. Ultimately, however, the reason has been to invoke change in a governmental structure and religion has been used as a catalyst for the radical behavior associated with violent struggle. This section of the monograph will attempt to identify organizations in North Africa that use violence as a means to get their message across to the recipient.

Roll Call...Al Qaeda? Here!...US Haters?...Here!...Frente Polisario?...Here!

Algeria's current internal security concerns include domestic terrorist groups such as the banned Islamic Salvation Front and periodic unrest by the Berber population over restrictions

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Ibid.

placed upon their ethnic, cultural, and linguistic rights.¹⁰³ Algeria has two Islamic-inspired terrorist organizations that compete for power and influence within its borders. The first is the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Arme-GIA) and the second is the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat-GPSC). GIA enjoys a high level of support from Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden because of their less-extremist views as compared to the GPSC. Algeria offered amnesty to the rebels at the turn of the century.

Another can view a terrorist act as a fight for freedom. External threats from other nations are limited to the Algerian-Moroccan dispute over Western Sahara. Algeria has long supported the Frente Polisario, a Western Sahara military organization that is fighting Morocco for independence.¹⁰⁴ Algeria provides the Frente Polisario with food, arms, and access to refugee camps in the Tindouf region of Algeria. Algeria and Morocco have had very strained relationships with each other that culminated in severed diplomatic ties from 1976 to 1988. Currently Algeria and Morocco share a tense relationship and renewed diplomatic ties, but Algeria still supports the Frente Polisario in what it calls a fight for self-determination and international recognition.

Libya and Terrorism

Libya's current internal security concerns are minimal. In the 1990s, it suffered from an onslaught of militant Islamic groups, the most powerful focused on the destruction of the Qaddafi regime.¹⁰⁵ The two most powerful were the Fighting Islamic Group in Libya (El-Jamaat el-Muqatila fi Libyah--FIGL) and the Islamic Movement of Martyrs (Harakat el-Shadaa el-Islamiyya), which were made up of veterans of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

¹⁰³Library of Congress Federal Research Division, "Country Profile Algeria," <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Algeria.pdf> (accessed 19 January 2008).

¹⁰⁴Hodges, 190-195.

¹⁰⁵Vandewalle, 130.

These groups received strong backing in the east of the country owing to the fact that Qaddafi government failed to protect and adequately share the country's resources.¹⁰⁶

There are few reports of Islamic groups gaining a stronghold in government or any of the outlining regions with more than a local backing. The threat of Libyan terrorists returning from Iraq and joining the fledging groups, similar to the actions that took place after the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan ended, remains a valid concern. Additionally Libya is concerned with the spread of fighting and influx of terrorist organizations from neighboring countries such as Chad, Sudan, and the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt. Libya's external threats are also minimal as it has renounced the support of international terrorism, stopped its WMD research and procurement, and normalized relations with the rest of the world.¹⁰⁷ Since denouncing terrorism in a letter to the United Nations in 2003, no foreign terrorist groups are reported to be training in the country. Qaddafi's views on Islam have made his nation a target of Islamic fundamentalism, but his security apparatus does not allow the terrorists to gain a foothold in his country.

Morocco and the Wall

The Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain or GICM) is the biggest internal threat to Morocco. It is affiliated with Al Qaeda and has been implicated in the 2004 train bombings in Madrid.¹⁰⁸ Another Islamic Group, the Salafiya Jihadiya has participated in numerous terrorist attacks, most notably the 2003 Casablanca attack in which 12 suicide bombers blew themselves up in various Jewish locations around the city, killing 45 and wounding over 100 people. After these attacks, the Moroccan government launched a massive investigation and severely punished over one thousand suspected terrorists.¹⁰⁹ External threats to

¹⁰⁶Ibid, 128.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 183.

¹⁰⁸Howe, 353.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., 323-336.

Morocco have been limited to attacks from the Frente Polisario. Due to the level of support and basing rights granted by Algeria, Algeria is viewed by Morocco as a hostile nation and receives limited diplomatic interaction. Morocco has fallen from good graces with the United Nation, the AMU, and the African Union due to their determination to retain the contested land. A small United Nations contingent called the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, or MINURSO, has monitored the cease-fire between Morocco and the Frente Polisario but has failed to hold a referendum on self-determination.¹¹⁰ Algeria, Spain, and neighboring countries support self-determination as a way to resolve the crisis over the disputed territories but have not yet been able to convince Morocco to acquiesce to international demands.

Tunisia as a Starting Point

Tunisia's internal security concerns have been stifled due to its control over civil liberties and staunch opposition to Islamic fundamentalists. Its stance on women's rights and religious freedom puts it at odds with Al Qaeda and other fundamentalist groups but its real security concerns come from disenfranchised citizens requesting more civil liberties. Tunisia's external relations have been good with Algeria. Libya and Tunisia have had rocky relations in the past but they currently enjoy a brisk trading alliance. Tunisia, as part of the AMU, has stated that it will not host the AFRICOM headquarters but is a friendly partner to United States interests as long as they do not place Tunisia at odds with its neighbors, Algeria and Libya.

Is This an Issue for AFRICOM?

Muslims, like all people, must feel that they can participate in government. They must feel that they are able to elect their leaders and remove them when they are not doing the job. The Islamic government should uphold the tenets of Islam. These tenants are not just the five pillars of Islam but also the entire building constructed by justice, integrity, tolerance, and the quest for

¹¹⁰Jensen, 115-121.

knowledge. However, the government must be led by an Islamic instance that will have Islam's absolute truth and axiomatic supremacy as its starting point and will, in the name of the umma, enjoin respect of the rules of Islam.¹¹¹ This concept is possible when one looks at principle of *shura*, or consultation. It is the responsibility of the community leader to consult representatives of the faithful before rendering his decision.¹¹² Peter Demant explains in his book, *Islam versus Islamism*, that this religious norm can be extended to establishing rules that may become virtually indistinguishable from parliamentary democracy. This is most evident in countries such as Turkey, Bosnia, and Indonesia.

However, it is not safe just to say that it is enough to respect the rules of Islam and everything will be okay. Numerous books and countless articles have been written on exactly that topic and it is imperative that the USG, in general, and AFRICOM, specifically, seek to understand exactly what it means to be a Muslim. It can be argued that by putting comfortable monikers on what is acceptable in political speak would make it easy to understand who is a good Muslim and who is a "bad," "radical," or "extremist" Muslim by Christian definitions. It is much more difficult to understand what constitutes a good, bad, radical, or extremist Muslim if the reader does not understand what it means to be a Muslim. In his book, *Why I Am Not A Muslim*, Ibn Warraq [pseudonym] explains that "Islamic law has certainly aimed at controlling the religious, social and political life of mankind, the life of its followers without qualification and the life of those who follow tolerated religions without qualification and the life of those who follow tolerated religions to a degree that prevents their activity from hampering Islam in any way."¹¹³

¹¹¹Demant, 178.

¹¹²Ibid., 225.

¹¹³Ibn Warraq [pseud.], *Why I am not a Muslim* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003), 163.

When dealing with an Islamic country, the reader must understand that Islamic law does not allow interpretation except by an Imam. Islamic law is based on four principles: the Koran; the sunna of the Prophet, which is incorporated in the recognized traditions; the consensus (“ijma”) of the scholars of the orthodox community; and the method of reasoning by analogy (“qiyas” or “kiyas”).¹¹⁴ The Koran is seen as the very word of God and is not refutable by man. The sunna is the manner of life and traditions that the Prophet Muhammad lived as recorded by hadiths. The consensus of the scholars, once agreed upon, are irrefutable and have been quoted in various documents attributed to Al Qaeda and other insurgent organizations in Iraq and Afghanistan to legally support their attacks on infidels. This ties directly into the understanding of the effect illiteracy has on the region. A radical Imam can interpret the Koran to incite hatred or moderation that will influence the illiterate.

The role and transformation of government is not an issue that AFRICOM needs to address. AFRICOM will need to work within the constraints set upon it by the USG and coordinate closely with DoS when dealing with semi-authoritarian and authoritarian governments. This brings up an interesting issue that affects the DoD because of its size and budget when compared to DoS. AFRICOM, like other combatant commands, has the ability to define USG strategy in the region by sheer size and footprint. However, that is not their job. As noted in the Congressional Research Service report to Congress dated 7 December 2007, a 2006 Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee Report found that “as a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs . . . US defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the Secretary of State’s primacy in setting the agenda for United States relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense’s focus on

¹¹⁴Jensen, 164.

warfighting.”¹¹⁵ However, in their addresses to the Senate, both Senators Russ Feingold and Richard Lugar have publicly stated their support for AFRICOM and their reservations that DoD supports, rather than guides, the United States political, economic, and social objectives for the continent.¹¹⁶ It is with this congressional guidance in mind that this monograph will review the rest of its stated issues in North Africa and make recommendations on what AFRICOM should do to counter the threat of radical Islamic fundamentalism in the region.

With Whom Should AFRICOM Coordinate in the Region?

How can AFRICOM show the region that its military presence is not a pretext for oil? Currently the AFRICOM Commander, General William “Kip” Ward, and his staff have been actively promoting the combatant command across the continent. Countries such as Uganda and Liberia welcome the ability of AFRICOM to develop international capacity. Liberia has offered to host AFRICOM as it transitions from Germany to Africa.¹¹⁷

Democracy and education seem to be a good start; however, the reforms required to assist governments to peacefully transition to a democratic nation belong to DoS and USAID, not DoD. One way that AFRICOM can affect change in the region is to identify the goals of the country with respect to the region and stick to those pillars while working under the auspices of the USG. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia has been quoted as saying that “[the] democratic system that is predominant in the world is not a suitable system for the peoples of our region. . . . The system of free elections is not suitable to our country.”¹¹⁸

One reason for that, as already stated, is that Islam is the rule of law in Islamic countries. There can be no other form of government higher than the word of God, which is very different

¹¹⁵Ploch, 26.

¹¹⁶Ahmed, 27.

¹¹⁷Pascal Fletcher, “New African Command Viewed Warily By Some,” *Washington Times*, 4 October 2007, 13, <http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20071004549898.html> (accessed 13 February 2008).

¹¹⁸Warraq, 173.

from the democratic view of the separation of church and state. While this argument may seem elementary to the reader, it begs the question, that will not be answered here, of why try to democratize a nation when, by the very acceptance of man's law over God's law is considered apostasy in the Islamic faith and punishable by death? Throughout the author of this monograph's twenty years in the military, he has always been taught to study the adversary, enemy, or whatever politically correct term given to the opponent threatening the United States way of life, find the weakness and exploit it to the successful completion of the mission. For AFRICOM to be effective in the Maghreb, it must understand the role and function of Islam and where the United States fits in that equation. To not read the printings and teachings of such an all-encompassing religion but assume to know how to fix the region can be considered hubris.

Although AFRICOM's mission is to provide stability for the region, some believe that Africa is just another battlefield in the Global War on Terror. In his book, *World War IV*, Norman Podhoretz argues that the cold war against communism was World War III and the rise of Islamofascism is as much about World War IV as battling Nazism was about World War II.¹¹⁹ Dialogue seems to be the best start for AFRICOM as it sets its course in North Africa. Without dialogue, there becomes distrust and battle; and without hope for an impoverished and enraged Muslim world, there is a lack of justice, development, and democratization. AFRICOM will have to focus on strategic communications as it forges its way to full operational capacity and beyond. This is not an easy task as the current war in Iraq has shown.

Take the media's approach to the Iraq war. The United States Center for Media and Public Affairs made a nonpartisan evaluation of network news broadcasts and found that during the war against Saddam Hussein fully 50 percent of the reports about the conflict were negative.

¹¹⁹Norman Podhoretz, *World War IV-The Long Struggle Against Islamofascism* (New York: Doubleday Press, 2007), 200-202.

Six months later over 77 percent of the reporting was negative, and by the spring of 2006 over 94 percent of media reports were negative. This decline of media support was much faster than both the Korean and Vietnamese war.¹²⁰ AFRICOM will be operating in a continent that is wary of Western power and influence and does not share the same friendly view that surrounded the United States military at the start of Operation Enduring Freedom. Efforts such as the Arabic/English website Magharebia (www.magharebia.com) are a great start to understanding and getting an in-road into North African media.

Interagency coordination will be crucial in the success of AFRICOM throughout the entire African continent. AFRICOM has been compared to being more like SOUTHCOM in its primarily non-kinetic approach to operations. The headquarters will need to project an interagency approach different from that of EUCOM and CENTCOM, two combatant commands actively engaged in Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. This monograph understands the need for the AFRICOM to communicate individually with the seven nations that make up the North African region and the fifty-four nations that make up Africa but will not concentrate on the military-to-military engagements between AFRICOM and North Africa. The author feels that the interaction with continental and regional governing bodies is important to look at as AFRICOM creates its headquarters.

African Union in a Nutshell

One of the most critical institutions AFRICOM will have to interact with in Africa will be the African Union. It is understood that AFRICOM's efforts will need to be supportive of United States initiatives, and this will be discussed in the next section but it will not matter if AFRICOM does not integrate with the decision making processes of the premier coordinating body in Africa. As AFRICOM develops its command and control structure it will need to pay

¹²⁰Ibid., 113.

particular attention to the coordination it provides to existing African structures such as the African Union.

This confederation of 53 of the 54 states in Africa plays the largest role in coordinating multilateral actions in Africa. It has a number of official bodies that are responsible for virtually all the decisions that are made. Its has a three-fold mission in that it sees the short-term strategic objectives are to consolidate institutional pillars and build the human network that will enable relations in Africa. This was to be completed by 2007. The middle-term strategic objectives are to ensure convergence of virile regional economic communities by 2015, and the long-term strategic objective is to forge continental integration by 2050.¹²¹ On 9 November 2007, General Ward was warmly received by Professor Alpha Oumar Konare, Chairperson of the African Union Commission. After explaining the mission and intent of AFRICOM, Professor Konare recommended that the best way that AFRICOM could help Africa is by consulting the whole of Africa and not its constituent parts.¹²² The African Union envisions an integrated Africa, a prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena.¹²³

The African Union has a number of official bodies that are organized to address the issues that have been brought up in this monograph as well as those that were beyond the scope of this paper. The Pan-African Parliament is representative of all 53-member states and is organized to provide participation in democratic governance. It will be the role of this body to organize and

¹²¹Commission of the African Union, *Strategic Plan of the Commission of the African Union*, vol. 2: *2004-2007 Strategic Framework of the Commission of the African Union*, May 2004, <http://www.africa-union.org/AU%20summit%202004/volume%202%20final%20-%20English%20-%20June%202004.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2008).

¹²²African Union Division of Communication and Information, "Chairperson Konare Urge US Africa Commander General Ward to Partnership with Africa as a Collective Entity and Not Individually," Press Release, 9 November 2007.

¹²³Commission of the African Union, *Strategic Plan of the African Union Commission*, vol. 1: *The Vision and Mission of the African Union*, May 2004, <http://www.africa-union.org/AU%20summit%202004/VOLUM%201%20-%20STRATEGIC%20PLAN%20OF%20THE%20COMMISSION%20-%20last%20version-%E2%80%A6.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2008).

orchestrate governmental change throughout Africa. The Assembly of the African Union is made up of the ruling heads of all African Union member nations and meets once a year. The African Union Commission is run similar to the European Commission and is responsible for the day-to-day activities of the African Union. The African Court of Justice has jurisdiction on matters of human rights abuse, and the Executive Council rules on matter of foreign trade, social security, and acts as the secretary for the African Union. Other bodies include the Peace and Security Council, similar to the United Nations Security Council in that they respond to conflicts with an African military. Finally, there are committees that deal with education, environmental, and other matters that will decide, or help to decide, the fate of the African continent.

AFRICOM should create liaison partnerships as it strives to set up its headquarters and coordinate staff billets with the African Union. There is another regional organization, the AMU that was initiated in 1958, to assist North African nations in the fight for independence. It was founded in 1998, but has not been successful in becoming a functioning body. AFRICOM should continue to monitor the status of AMU and assist it in administrating change once the heads of state in North Africa determine that it is a viable coordinating body for the region. An advantage that AFRICOM currently enjoys is that the current commander, General Ward, was a former deputy commander in EUCOM and has had experience dealing with both the European Union and the African Union. Those relationships, as well as the good working relationship that EUCOM established with the African Union, will greatly assist AFRICOM as it works in the region to assist Africa in their quest for continental security.

Interagency Cooperation Is a Great Thing But How Does It Work?

General Ward has stated that it is his view that the DoD's role in Africa as part of a "three-pronged" USG approach, with DoD, through AFRICOM, taking the lead on security issues, but playing a supporting role to DoS, which conducts diplomacy, and USAID, which

implements development programs.¹²⁴ These three organizations currently have liaison officers between the three agencies and see the formation of AFRICOM as one ripe with opportunities and challenges that have not presented themselves in other combatant commands. As stated earlier, AFRICOM will have a larger non-DoD staff than traditional combatant commands.

However, having a significant non-DoD presence in AFRICOM may present different challenges in the way of statutory requirements and restrictions. For example, even though the organizational structure and chain of command are incomplete, there will be both a military and civilian deputy. According to General Ward, the two deputy commander positions will be the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs (filled by a senior DoS Foreign Service Officer) and Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO) (filled by a military flag officer) and each will have supervisory responsibility over both civilian and military personnel. Due to statutory restrictions, the Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations will exercise combatant command duties in the absence of the commander.

The Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs could very well be responsible for the coordination of multiple efforts across the civilian spectrum. Liaison elements with the Departments of Justice, Commerce, Transportation, and Education could be placed within this structure. Additionally, other agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Central Intelligence Agency, and other governments like Britain and France could also find a permanent presence if their governments desired.¹²⁵ Additionally, this section of AFRICOM could be responsible for the interaction with international bodies such as the United Nations, EU, and other agencies that have been created to assist with world governance and cooperation. This side of AFRICOM that could work with host nations, non-governmental and international organizations to better the education and human rights issues addressed in this monograph.

¹²⁴Ploch, 5.

¹²⁵Ibid., 18.

The Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations would be responsible for the security aspect of AFRICOM's operation. The types of operations that they could be expected to plan, prepare, and assist host nations in the region may include, but are not limited to, humanitarian relief (as an supporting element with USAID in the lead), peacekeeping, counter-narcotics, sanction enforcement, and de-mining in areas such as the disputed Western Saharan province, conducting non-combatant evacuations, and maritime interdiction operations.

AFRICOM will administer many United States programs such as Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Loans, and African Coastal and Border security programs. This is primarily owing to the fact that AFRICOM will focus entirely on the continent of Africa. This gives them better understanding as a single headquarters vice three different combatant commands sharing the continent. EUCOM has worked with the African Union in the past and established good working relationships that the DCMO will be able to continue through other military-to-military training opportunities with both conventional and special operating forces.

The European Sun Still Sets on AFRICOM Staff.

In this monograph, the question of how AFRICOM could counter the threat of radical Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa was addressed. In order to do that, it was first important to understand the reasons why this region warrants a separate approach from the rest of the continent. It was necessary to address the problem background and significance of North Africa such as the historical background of the region, the cultural ties to Islam, the Arab/Berber ethnicity issue, the similar colonial identification, and the influence the region has in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea. The author felt that it was important for the reader to understand how the United States planned to project its power and influence throughout the world and what decisions were made concerning implementation of AFRICOM.

After the explanation of the origin of AFRICOM, the monograph explained those activities and situations that currently motivate terrorist acts and could, if left unabated, lead to an

increase in terrorist activity in the region. After understanding the motivation for terrorists to act, the monograph compared the issues identified and developed recommendations that focused on non-kinetic action, civil-military cooperation, and military programs.

The criteria that were used to measure actions taken by AFRICOM in this monograph were suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Suitability is defined as, does the course of action solve the problem legally and ethically.¹²⁶ It will be the responsibility of AFRICOM to ensure that all recommended courses of action are legal, ethical, and within their mandate as an instrument of the USG. This monograph addressed the formation of the UCP and the presidential statement that directed the formation of AFRICOM. Non-kinetic approaches to the region are the most feasible course of action due to the current perception of the United States in the Global War on Terror. African nations are wary of the assistance provided by the USG and have adopted a wait and see attitude to the situation. Others, such as South Africa, have flatly refused to allow AFRICOM forces into the region. Current and future negotiations will dictate where the central and regional headquarters for AFRICOM are located.

Suitability as it applies to the North African region is similar in scope to the continental concerns. Algeria is perhaps the most vocal opponent to military bases on its soil due to the historic invasions that normally followed. All other North African countries share a similar belief in the suitability of non-kinetic approaches including more socio-economic programs like the humanitarian aid programs currently executed by DoS civil affairs teams.

Feasibility is defined as fitting within the available resources.¹²⁷ AFRICOM will be competing for scarce resources as Operations Iraqi Freedom in Iraqi and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan control the lion's share of resources for the near future. Additionally, with the lack of nations in Africa currently willing to provide real estate for a headquarters or series of

¹²⁶Department of the Army, 2-9.

¹²⁷Ibid.

headquarters, AFRICOM will have to rely on more innovative methods to assist the region. Funding and work force shortfalls, both within the military and in the governmental organizations that will make up the staff, preclude a large EUCOM-like footprint in the near future.

Finally, acceptability is defined as worth the cost or risk.¹²⁸ The President of the United States, members of Congress, and academia have all advocated the formation of AFRICOM. There are many economic, social, and humanitarian issues in the region that have gone under addressed due to more pressing issues. That lack of detailed focus has precipitated Africa to a position of prominence in the international community due to the belief that the region harbors terrorist. AFRICOM is seen, as worth the risk in terms of the amount of good it will do in the region and the low level of military personnel that will be stationed in the region. However, this will be tested when a situation requiring military intervention results in United States casualties similar in scope to that of Mogadishu. Currently the perception among African countries is that a non-invasion United States presence in the form of civil-military partnerships seems to be the most acceptable but all nations in the region are wary of permanent bases housing thousands of troops.

Ultimately, the success or failure of AFRICOM will rely on its ability to resist the urge to do it all themselves. Humanitarian assistance programs will demonstrate a level of concern from the USG that will dwarf the attempts by terrorist organizations to discredit AFRICOM. A civil-military approach to governments will show the true intentions of AFRICOM. Non-kinetic actions that assist the government in fixing its own problems are the best ways to approach the newest combatant command.

There are many questions that this monograph addressed but did not give a definitive answer. How can the United States stem the view of an extra-regional hegemonic power in Africa? How will it deal with the Berber problem? What can it do to affect the Western Sahara

¹²⁸Ibid.

problem? How will the United States get its troops in these nations? How will that affect the view of other African nations towards the United States? Should the United States try to force democratization on North Africa? How should the United States deal with semi-authoritarian regimes? Will the presence of United States military increase the number of attacks in the region and thwart the efforts of most nations to stem the flow of radical Islamic fundamentalism? Are AFRICOM planners accurately defining what radical Islamic fundamentalism is in the minds of the average Muslim? These questions require a more detailed study of the problems in Africa than can be adequately researched in this monograph. These questions will provide planners with a skeleton in which to frame the multitude of problems they will face as they forge ahead.

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