U.S. GOVERNMENT SECURITY RESPONSE TO ATTACKS ON ITS DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, 1979-2012: HOW EFFECTIVE?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Homeland Security Studies

by

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Endeavoring to determine the effectiveness of the United (U.S.) Government’s security response to attacks on its diplomatic missions, this thesis examined 11 attacks that occurred between 1979 and 2012. As a result of the researcher’s analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data, conclusions were made that addressed the significance of: the capability of a receiving nation’s government to provide for the protection of a U.S. mission; the willingness of that government to provide for the protection of the mission; and consistent levels of funding for the Department of State. The researcher recommends: the U.S. Government assess the capability and willingness of a receiving nation to provide for the protection of a U.S. mission; the inclusion of Department of Defense assets to help secure missions in situations where the receiving nation is incapable or unwilling; serious consideration be given to closing U.S. missions in countries where the governments are either incapable or unwilling to provide security, and Department of Defense assistance is not feasible; Congress provide consistent levels of funding for the Department of State; and a comprehensive review of Department of State personnel and resource allocations, and the closing of missions that do not achieve an acceptable risk to reward assessment.
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

Endeavoring to determine the effectiveness of the United States (U.S.) Government’s security response to attacks on its diplomatic missions, this thesis examined 11 attacks that occurred between 1979 and 2012. As a result of the researcher’s analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data, conclusions were made that addressed the significance of: the capability of a receiving nation’s government to provide for the protection of a U.S. mission; the willingness of that government to provide for the protection of the mission; and consistent levels of funding for the Department of State. The researcher recommends: the U.S. Government assess the capability and willingness of a receiving nation to provide for the protection of a U.S. mission; the inclusion of Department of Defense assets to help secure missions in situations where the receiving nation is incapable or unwilling; serious consideration be given to closing U.S. missions in countries where the governments are either incapable or unwilling to provide security, and Department of Defense assistance is not feasible; Congress provide consistent levels of funding for the Department of State; and a comprehensive review of Department of State personnel and resource allocations, and the closing of missions that do not achieve an acceptable risk to reward assessment.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Islamabad to Benghazi

An angry mob storms and sets fire to a U.S. embassy. Diplomats barricade themselves in an inner room as Marine security guards hold the fanatical rioters at bay. Americans die in the service of their country. The scene is not the Boxer Rebellion at the turn of the century. It is Islamabad, Pakistan, in 1979. And it is a situation that has become increasingly familiar in recent years: U.S. diplomats under attack. Since the 1970s, embassies have faced new and growing dangers as terrorism has become increasingly international, traditional respect for diplomats and diplomatic installations has eroded, and weak governments have failed to fulfill their responsibilities for protection. At the same time, the means of violence available to terrorists and mobs have greatly increased, along with their ability and inclination to use violence. This volatile combination of circumstances makes for a highly dangerous period for U.S. embassies and their personnel.¹

This brief description of the attack on the United States (U.S.) Embassy in Islamabad and the explanation of the global security threats facing American diplomatic missions and personnel are from the jacket summary of a book published in 1995. Unfortunately, the security related hazards confronting U.S. diplomatic facilities and staff have not decreased in the years since this book was published. In fact, when one removes the words “Marine Security Guards” from the three sentence account of the attack in Pakistan and inserts “Diplomatic Security Special Agents” or “Assistant Regional Security Officers,” the reader can easily fast forward them to a period of time 33 years later. The date is September 11, 2012, and a large group of violent individuals initiated attacks on the U.S. Special Mission compound and Annex located in Benghazi, Libya. Those involved in these attacks utilized “arson, small arms and machine gun fire, rocket-

propelled grenades, grenades, and mortars” against U.S. Government personnel at the two separate facilities. At sunrise on September 12th, four Americans serving their country abroad lay dead; John Christopher Stevens, American Ambassador to Libya, was among those that were killed and the first U.S. Ambassador to be slain since 1988.\(^2\)

**International Face of Terrorism**

As most nations today have adapted to and benefited from globalization, so too has terrorism. Advancements brought about as a result of this globalization, specifically the modernization and transformation of the international travel and communication systems, have benefited both the citizen and terrorist. Present day terrorists use the conveniences of modern society in order to expand operational reach and effect in ways that were never before possible. Terrorist groups have also been able to rapidly expand and enhance the capabilities of their membership through increased training opportunities, and real world operational experience. This training and operational experience has been made possible as a result of the 12 year Global War on Terrorism which has been waged in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries. In addition to experiencing the rapid progression of the tactics in use by terrorists and the lethality of their weapons, the world community has also witnessed the heightened desire of terrorists to showcase these deadly capabilities. Terrorism is no longer an issue that is localized and dealt with by the individual countries affected. It is also no longer a matter that is easily contained within one or two regions of the world. What the international

community has witnessed, specifically since 1979, is the evolution of terrorism into a phenomenon of global significance and concern.

### Diplomatic Missions, Traditions, and Responsibilities

On April 18, 1961, the United Nations convened an international convention related to “diplomatic intercourse, privileges, and immunities” in Vienna, Austria. The result of this gathering of nations was the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Articles 1, 3, 22, and 29 of the Convention are key to understanding diplomatic relations, traditions, and responsibilities as they relate to the topic of this thesis.

The first article of this Convention identifies various expressions common within the diplomatic community. Of particular relevance to this thesis is the phrase “premises of the mission.” The article identifies the premises as “the buildings or parts of buildings and the land ancillary thereto, irrespective of ownership, used for the purposes of the mission including the residence of the head of the mission.” This definition will assist the reader with comprehension of incidents and topics that will be addressed throughout this thesis. Within the U.S. Government, some examples of property that would fall within this definition include: the group of buildings located on an embassy, consulate, or consulate general compound; an ambassador or chief-of-mission’s residence; an embassy warehouse; a Marine Security Guard residence; a United States Agency for International Development compound; and an American Cultural Center.

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4Ibid., 3.
Article 3 of the Convention names the functions of a diplomatic mission; although these functions are not all that pertinent to this thesis, what is significant is that in their entirety they provide the reader with a solid appreciation of what constitutes a diplomatic mission. The article designates the following as functions of a diplomatic mission: “representing the sending state in the receiving state; protecting in the receiving state the interests of the sending state and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law; negotiating with the government of the receiving state; ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving state, and reporting thereon to the government of the sending state; promoting friendly relations between the sending state and the receiving state, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations.” These functions are resident, either in their entirety or piecemeal, in any of the multiple types of diplomatic missions. The most common missions include embassies, consulate generals, permanent missions, and consulates. Embassies and consulate generals are full service facilities, providing the full range of diplomatic functions identified in the Vienna Convention. Location is the only difference between the two; as embassies are located within the host country’s capital city and consulate generals are situated in one of the receiving country’s other major cities. Permanent missions are those that diplomatically represent the sending state at an international organization. Examples of permanent missions include the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, and the Organization of American States. The location of permanent missions varies; however, typically they are located in a major city of the organization’s host country or countries. Finally, a consulate is a

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5UN, *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*, 3.
mission that provides a limited number of diplomatic mission functions and is normally located in one or more of the receiving country’s major cities.⁶

The 22nd article provides information that is most relevant to the topic of this thesis, as it spells out the responsibilities of the host government or receiving state. Article 22 stipulates: “the premises of the mission shall be inviolable; the agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission; the receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity; and the premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution.”⁷ Of particular relevance to this thesis is the article’s stipulation that the receiving state has a duty to protect the diplomatic mission of the sending state. This internationally recognized duty is one that requires the host government to provide all of the security resources necessary to protect a diplomatic mission’s premises. Unfortunately, as this thesis will highlight, the requirement to protect the diplomatic missions of sending states is not always met by the host government.

In order of relevance to this research, Article 29 of the Convention is second only to Article 22. The article states: “the person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable; he shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention; the receiving State shall treat him


⁷UN, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 7.
with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.” Significant to this thesis is the provision that the receiving state has an obligation to protect the diplomatic agents of the sending state, one that for a variety of reasons is often not met. With that being said, the responsibility of protecting individual diplomatic agents from attack is probably one of the most significant challenges imposed by the Vienna Convention on the receiving country.

Target—Diplomatic Missions

In reviewing the functions and types of diplomatic missions it becomes readily apparent that these missions, in addition to their identified purpose, can also serve as a symbol of the sending state’s power, prestige, and influence. Furthermore, in much the same way as a U.S. aircraft carrier battle group, diplomatic missions permit many nations to project this power, prestige, and influence into other nations or regions of the world. Although this projection is of enormous strategic and operational value to the mission’s sending government, it is not always welcome and often serves as a point of tension or conflict between the sending state and the host nation or a regional non-state actor. As a result, these diplomatic missions frequently become the focus of demonstrations and in some cases are targeted for attack.

Not only are these diplomatic missions powerful symbols of the sending states, and, therefore, attractive targets for individuals with a grievance against those states, they are staffed by citizens of the sending state or locally hired employees who make appealing targets themselves. The American diplomatic target is quite sizeable, as the

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8Ibid., 9.
U.S. Government maintains diplomatic relations with approximately 180 countries. When one includes the permanent missions to international organizations, the U.S. Department of State (DOS) has a global presence at more than 250 posts. Staffing for these overseas posts is provided from the 58,000 total employees of the DOS. This total includes 12,000 Foreign Service Officers and Specialists, 9,000 Civil Service personnel, and 37,000 Foreign Service National employees. The Foreign Service Officers and Specialists comprise the American diplomatic corps serving at U.S. missions. Civil Service personnel provide U.S. based support for their Foreign Service colleagues, and typically do not serve at overseas missions. Foreign Service National employees are citizens of the country hosting a U.S. diplomatic mission or citizens of a third country who have been hired by that mission. As these personnel statistics highlight, citizens of a foreign country staff an overwhelming majority of positions within American diplomatic missions. It is important to note that this staffing majority also includes those positions that are tasked with providing security for the mission.

**Statement of the Problem**

There is no question that American diplomatic missions are high value targets for the host nation government, groups, or individuals who are displeased with the policies, actions, or philosophy of the U.S. Government. This reality not only affects U.S. Government personnel assigned to the missions, but also the many foreign national
employees of the embassies, consulates, and permanent missions. Additionally, innocent individuals who are unfortunate enough to be located near a targeted American diplomatic mission are often seriously injured or killed in the event of an attack.

This thesis will begin with an examination of the February 14, 1979 attack on the embassy in Tehran, Iran and conclude with the September 11, 2012 attack on the U.S. Special Mission compound and Annex located in Benghazi. In addition to these two attacks, this thesis will review the November 4, 1979 attack on the embassy in Tehran, the 1979 attack on the embassy in Islamabad; the 1983 bombing of the embassy in Beirut, Lebanon; the 1984 bombing of the embassy annex in Beirut; the 1998 bombings of the embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; the 2004 attack on the consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; the 2006 attack on the embassy in Damascus, Syria; and the 2008 attack on the embassy in Sana’a, Yemen. As a result of the sheer number of attacks on American diplomatic missions between 1979 and 2012, this thesis will focus exclusively on these 11 attacks; concentrate specifically on the U.S. Government’s security response to these incidents; and attempt to determine to what extent this response has been effective. This list includes many of the most serious attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions, and provides for representation in each of the decades covered in this thesis.

Thesis

When responding to attacks on its diplomatic missions, the U.S. Government fails to adequately consider the significance of three key factors: the capability of a receiving nation’s government to provide for the protection of the U.S. mission; the willingness of a receiving nation’s government to provide for the protection of the U.S. mission; and the importance of consistent levels of funding for the DOS. This thesis endeavors to answer
the following primary research question: “Has the U.S. Government’s security response to attacks on its diplomatic missions between 1979 and 2012 been effective?” In order to answer this primary research question; the following secondary questions must be answered:

1. How many attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions occurred between 1979 and 2012?

2. What was the political environment in the U.S. at the time of the attacks in Tehran, Islamabad, Beirut, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Jeddah, Damascus, Sana’a, and Benghazi?

3. What did the security environment look like in Tehran, Islamabad, Beirut, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Jeddah, Damascus, Sana’a, and Benghazi at the time the U.S. diplomatic missions in these cities were attacked?

4. What was the U.S. Government’s response to the attacks on its diplomatic missions in Tehran, Islamabad, Beirut, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Jeddah, Damascus, Sana’a, and Benghazi?

5. What was the increase in total number of DOS security personnel from 1979 through 2012?

Significance of the Study

Increasingly since 1979, the DOS has been called upon to open, or continue operating, diplomatic missions in countries that in the past were viewed as far too dangerous for American diplomats. This strategic shift has not only resulted in DOS personnel conducting diplomacy in countries where the U.S. Military was involved in major combat operations, but also remaining in countries where the risk of terrorism was
assessed by the Department as a critical or high threat. Prior to this shift, American diplomats would have been recalled or evacuated from these countries.

Over the past 33 years, there have been a significant number of attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions as well as an equal number of security responses to these attacks. If the September 11, 2012 attack on the U.S. Special Mission compound and Annex in Benghazi, resulting in the deaths of an American Ambassador and three additional U.S. Government personnel, has proven anything, it is that this thesis has current relevance. By analyzing the effectiveness of the U.S. Government’s security response to attacks on its diplomatic missions, while considering the significance of several key factors that influence the effectiveness of the government’s response, this thesis strives to provide insight into what if anything can be done better. If the U.S. Government remains committed to being diplomatically engaged in countries deemed to be high risk, then it is imperative that an appropriate and effective level of security be provided to American diplomats and diplomatic facilities. The following quote from Sir Winston Churchill is quite relevant to the topic of this thesis, and worthy of the reader’s consideration: “the exertions which a nation is prepared to make to protect its individual representatives or citizens from outrage is one of the truest measures of its greatness as an organized state.”

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11Sullivan, Epigraph.
Delimitations

Afghanistan and Iraq

Information concerning post September 11, 2001 attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions in Afghanistan and Iraq was not considered, nor included in this thesis. When compared to a typical U.S. diplomatic mission, the presence of these missions in active combat zones makes them unique in several categories that would distort the results of this research. These categories include: the number and lethality of weapons readily available for use by individuals or groups wishing to target a mission; the concentration of those who seek to carry out attacks against U.S. interests; and the level of funding, security equipment, and security personnel that the U.S. Government provides to these diplomatic missions.

Classified Information

The U.S. Government information obtained for use in this thesis came exclusively from unclassified and publicly available sources. This was done so that the results of this research would be available to the widest possible audience. The researcher acknowledges that there is a sizeable amount of classified material concerning attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions during the time period covered by this thesis. It would be vastly beneficial for those who possess the appropriate security clearance to review this material for the broadest understanding of the topic of this thesis.

Focus

The researcher’s review focused exclusively on attacks that targeted U.S. diplomatic missions; it did not take into account attacks on individual American
diplomats, military personnel, U.S. Government dependents, American businesses, religious organizations, or private American citizens.

**Summary**

Chapter 1 has introduced the reader to the international face of terrorism; diplomatic missions, traditions, and responsibilities as stipulated in the 1961 Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations; and the diplomatic mission as a target. This chapter has also identified the statement of the problem, the thesis, primary and secondary research questions, the significance of the study, and the delimitations. Chapter 2 is a review of literature relevant to the topic of this thesis. Specifically, the researcher utilized both U.S. Government and commercial sources, including reports, books, and websites. Chapter 3 discusses the study’s methodology, chapter 4 is an analysis of the information obtained from the sources identified within chapter 2, and chapter 5 contains the researcher’s conclusion.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review provides a venue for the examination of unclassified U.S. Government reports and websites, as well as commercial books, journals, magazines, and websites, related to the thesis’ primary research question: “Has the U.S. Government’s security response to attacks on its diplomatic missions between 1979 and 2012 been effective?” Although there has been a significant amount of writing related to attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions and security at these missions; there has been little written specifically about the effectiveness of the U.S. Government’s security response to attacks on its diplomatic missions. This chapter is divided into the decades relevant to the years encompassing this thesis, and will concentrate on the sources that are most significant to the topic of this thesis.

1970s
U.S. Government Sources

_Lethal Terrorist Actions Against Americans 1973–1985_ is a U.S. Government report produced by the DOS’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security Threat Analysis Division. The Threat Analysis Division defined lethal terrorist actions as: “acts of violence committed by terrorists in which Americans are killed or where there is a demonstrable intention to kill or seriously injure American citizens.” Additionally, the report provided clarification that an American citizen or foreign national must be injured or killed during an attack for the event to be included within the report. The report provided a multi-year statistical analysis that was utilized in determining the total number of attacks that
occurred at U.S. diplomatic missions during 1979, and synopses of attacks throughout the
world that was useful in describing the events that took place during the first attack on the
U.S. Embassy in Tehran that occurred during 1979. The Budget of the United States
Government Fiscal Year 1979 provided DOS’s total budget authority for that fiscal year.
This information was utilized, along with the totals from the other fiscal year budgets, to
show the department’s budget authority from 1979 through 2012. History of the Bureau
of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State contained several
important assertions regarding a shift in terrorism that began in the late 1970s. The source
also provided concise summaries of the two attacks that took place at the U.S. Embassy
in Tehran and the one attack at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, as well as the U.S.
Government’s response to the three attacks. The official U.S. White House, U.S. Senate,
and U.S. House of Representatives websites provided historical information concerning
those who held positions of power within the executive and legislative branches of the
federal government. This information was useful in describing the U.S. political

Commercial Sources

Chronicle of the 20th Century provided valuable information concerning
significant world events that had an influence on the U.S. political environment. Iranian
Hostage: A Personal Diary Of 444 Days in Captivity provided an eyewitness account of
the second attack that took place at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran during 1979, and the
lengthy hostage ordeal that followed. The author offered information that was useful in
understanding the actions and motivations of the students who seized the embassy. Ghost
Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet
Invasion to September 10, 2001 contained relevant information concerning the 1979 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. The author discussed the events that transpired during the attack, the willingness of the Pakistani Government to protect the embassy, the background of the conservative Islamic political party that most of the attackers belonged to, the embassy casualties, and the U.S. response to the attack. The Public Broadcasting Service’s American Experience website article “The Iranian Hostage Crisis,” provided specific information concerning the U.S. Government’s response to the second attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.

1980s

U.S. Government Sources

*Lethal Terrorist Actions Against Americans 1973-1985* provided statistical information concerning lethal attacks on diplomatic missions during the early to mid 1980s, and was utilized in determining the total number of attacks that occurred at U.S. diplomatic missions during that time period. This report also presented relevant information related to the attack that took place during 1984 at the U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut. *Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans,* with expanded reporting criteria that removed the requirement for the action to be lethal, also provided statistical data that was used in ascertaining the total number of attacks that occurred at U.S. missions from 1987 through 1989. The *Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security* provided detailed information concerning the specifics of the two attacks in Beirut. This report also contained the panel’s findings and recommendations related to security at U.S. diplomatic missions. The U.S. Government budgets for fiscal years 1980 through 1989 provided DOS’s total budget authority for
each fiscal year. This information was utilized, along with the totals from the other fiscal year budgets, to show the department’s budget authority from 1979 through 2012. *History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State* presented relevant information related to the attacks that took place at the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut, a new tactic utilized by the attackers of both missions, and the U.S. Government’s response to the attacks. The official U.S. White House website identified the president who held office for a majority of this decade, while the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives websites provided information about which political party held a majority of the seats in each chamber during the same period of time. This proved valuable in understanding the U.S. political environment during the 1980s.

**Commercial Sources**

*Chronicle of the 20th Century* supplied a timeline of world events that took place during the 1980s. Information obtained from this source was useful in describing the world events that impacted the U.S. political environment during this decade. *Embassies Under Siege: Personal Accounts by Diplomats on the Front Line* provided detailed information concerning the 1983 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, as well as the U.S. Government’s response to that attack. The Public Broadcasting Service’s Frontline website article “Terrorist Attacks on Americans, 1979-1988, Bombing of U.S. Embassy in Beirut” provided specific information related to the perpetrators of that attack.
1990s

U.S. Government Sources

*Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans* provided statistical data that was used in ascertaining the total number of attacks that occurred at U.S. missions from 1990 through 1997. Although the reporting criteria remained the same as the one utilized for *Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans*, the DOS renamed the report in 1998 to *Political Violence Against Americans*. This report also provided statistical information that was used in determining the total number of attacks that took place at U.S. diplomatic missions from 1998 through 1999.

Additionally, *Political Violence Against Americans* offered synopses of the attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The official U.S. White House, Senate, and House of Representatives websites identified who the president and leaders of each Chamber of Congress were during the 1990s. This information was useful in describing the political environment for this decade. *History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State* discussed the property damage caused by the attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, as well as the U.S. Government’s response to these attacks. The *Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam* provided detailed accounts of both attacks, offered findings concerning the attacks, and recommendations related to security at U.S. diplomatic missions. DOS’s total budget authority for this decade was obtained during a review of the U.S. Government budgets for fiscal years 1990 through 1999.
Commercial Sources

 Chronicle of America, Chronicle of the 20th Century, 20th Century Day By Day, and America's Best History website article “The 1990s-Prosperity as the World Turns” all provided descriptions of world events that had an impact on the political environment in the U.S. during the 1990s.

2000s

U.S. Government Sources

Political Violence Against Americans provided statistical data that was used in ascertaining the total number of attacks that occurred at U.S. missions during this decade. This report also offered useful information concerning the events surrounding the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a. The official websites for the U.S. White House, Senate, and House of Representatives provided information that was relevant to understanding the U.S. political environment during the 2000s. Specifically, these websites identified the president who held office for a majority of this decade, and which political party held a majority of the seats in each Chamber of Congress during the same period of time. The Report of the Accountability Review Board for Benghazi offered a detailed account of the attack on the U.S. Special Mission compound and Annex, as well as findings related to the attack in Benghazi, and recommendations related to security at U.S. diplomatic missions. The U.S. Government budgets for fiscal years 2000 through 2012 provided DOS’s total budget authority for each fiscal year.
Commercial Sources

*America’s Best History* website article, “The 2000s-The War on Terrorism,” offered synopses of world events that had an impact on the U.S. political environment during the 2000s. The ABC News website article “Exclusive: Tapes Show Terror Attack on U.S. Consulate” provided an overview of the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah, while the article “U.S. Consulate Jeddah,” obtained from the Global Security website, offered information concerning casualties suffered by Saudi security forces during the attack. The article “Four Armed Men Attack U.S. Embassy in Damascus,” obtained from the *Washington Post* website, provided details of the embassy attack and statements released by the U.S. and Syrian Governments following the incident. The Stratfor website article “Syria: The Poorly Executed Attack” offered information related to the vulnerability of the U.S. Embassy in Damascus. This article also described the security forces that the Syrian Government deployed to provide protection for the embassy compound.

**Summary**

Chapter 2 was a review of literature relevant to the topic of this thesis. Specifically, the researcher identified the sources utilized and provided a general description of the information obtained from each source.

Chapter 3 will discuss the study’s methodology, chapter 4 is an analysis of the information obtained from the sources identified within chapter 2, and chapter 5 contains the researcher’s conclusion.
Overview

This thesis considered specific instances of attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions between 1979 and 2012. There were 11 attacks reviewed in detail: three that occurred during 1979, two in Tehran and one in Islamabad; two that took place during the 1980s, both in Beirut; two that happened during the 1990s, Nairobi and Dar es Salaam; and four that transpired between 2000 and 2012, Jeddah, Damascus, Sana’a, and Benghazi.

Information relevant to these attacks was collected, reviewed, and then organized into the appropriate decade, the first level of categorization for analysis. The 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s categories contain subcategories of information: (1) Number of Attacks on U.S. Diplomatic Missions, (2) U.S. Political Environment, (3) Concurrent World Events, (4) DOS Budget, (5) Case Studies, (6) Terrorist Tactics, (7) U.S. Response, and (8) Decade Analysis. These eight subcategories provide a common framework for analysis of each decade, and for comparing decades. The information was analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively to determine if the data revealed any patterns or evidence useful in answering this thesis’ primary research question: “Has the U.S. Government’s security response to attacks on its diplomatic missions between 1979 and 2012 been effective?” Additionally, the researcher utilized this methodology in an attempt to answer the following secondary research questions:

1. What was the U.S. Government’s response to the attacks on its diplomatic missions in Tehran, Islamabad, Beirut, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Jeddah, Damascus, Sana’a, and Benghazi?
2. How many attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions occurred between 1979 and 2012?

3. What did the security environment look like in Tehran, Islamabad, Beirut, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Jeddah, Damascus, Sana’a, and Benghazi at the time the U.S. diplomatic missions in these cities were attacked?

4. What was the political environment in the U.S. at the time of the attacks in Tehran, Islamabad, Beirut, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Jeddah, Damascus, Sana’a, and Benghazi?

5. What was the increase in total number of DOS security personnel from 1979 through 2012?

Quantitative Analysis

This quantitative analysis addresses one of three assertions embedded in the original thesis statement: that when responding to attacks on its diplomatic missions, the U.S. Government fails to adequately consider the importance of consistent levels of funding for the DOS. It also addresses the following secondary research questions:

1. How many attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions occurred between 1979 and 2012?

2. What was the increase in total number of DOS security personnel from 1979 through 2012?

The data for this analysis was obtained from official U.S. Government sources. In determining the total DOS budget authority for fiscal years 1979 through 2012, the U.S. Government budgets for those specific years were examined. Concerning the analysis of the total number of attacks on U.S. missions from 1979 until September 11, 2012, there
was a review of a government report that included synopses of events that occurred from 1973 through 1985, and yearly reports that covered the period of time 1986 through 2011. At the time of this thesis’ completion, the U.S. Government had not yet published the 2012 report. Finally, *History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State* and government reports were reviewed in order to determine the increase in DOS security personnel from 1979 through 2012.

**Qualitative Analysis**

*Transforming Qualitative Data: Description, Analysis and Interpretation* provided a method for presenting the qualitative analysis portion of this thesis. Wolcott states that qualitative data should include three distinct components: description, analysis, and interpretation. The author’s description component of qualitative analysis provided a means of explaining the U.S. political environment at the time of the 11 attacks, providing the details of each attack, and offering the U.S. Government’s response to these attacks. These details then afforded an opportunity to, as Wolcott states, conduct an “analysis” and “interpretation” of the information contained within the descriptive component. This qualitative analysis addresses the two thesis assertions not addressed by qualitative analysis: that when responding to attacks on its diplomatic missions, the U.S. Government fails to adequately consider the significance of the capability of a receiving nation’s government to provide for the protection of the U.S. mission, and the

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13 Ibid.
willingness of a receiving nation’s government to provide for the protection of the U.S. mission. It also addresses the following secondary research questions:

1. What was the U.S. Government’s response to the attacks on its diplomatic missions in Tehran, Islamabad, Beirut, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Jeddah, Damascus, Sana’a, and Benghazi?

2. What did the security environment look like in Tehran, Islamabad, Beirut, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Jeddah, Damascus, Sana’a, and Benghazi at the time the U.S. diplomatic missions in these cities were attacked?

3. What was the political environment in the U.S. at the time of the attacks in Tehran, Islamabad, Beirut, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Jeddah, Damascus, Sana’a, and Benghazi?

Summary

Chapter 3 provided the reader with a description of the methodology used to analyze the information discovered during the research. The data analyzed will be presented in the final subcategory of each decade, which will be further divided into quantitative and qualitative sections. Both of these sections will contain a brief introduction to the method of analysis, followed by a figure that provides a snapshot of the data collected, and finally an expanded discussion of the data contained in the figure.

Chapter 4 follows the outline of presentation and analysis presented in chapter 3, expanding on sources identified in chapter 2. The final step in synthesis leading to the conclusions presented in chapter 5 is to combine the results of the analysis conducted in chapter 4, comparing and contrasting those results by decade and by subcategory to identify patterns and trends—especially those that appear to be related to outcomes.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

1970s

This paper’s examination of the attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions begins during the final year of the 1970s, with a review of what occurred in Tehran and Islamabad. Events that took place in these countries comprise three of the 11 attacks that are the focus of this research paper. The 1970s has been further organized into the following categories: Number of Attacks on U.S. Diplomatic Missions, U.S. Political Environment, Concurrent World Events, DOS Budget, Case Studies, Terrorist Tactics, U.S. Response, and Decade Analysis.

Number of Attacks on U.S. Diplomatic Missions

*Lethal Terrorist Actions Against Americans 1973–1985* identified three attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions during 1979. The first attack of this year was reported on February 14, 1979, and the third on November 21, 1979. Specific details concerning the individual attacks have been included in the Case Studies subheading.

U.S. Political Environment

Table 1 is a summarized presentation of data concerning the leaders of the U.S. Government’s Executive and Legislative Branches for 1979.

Table 1. 1979 Leadership of the Executive and Legislative Branches of Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Senate Majority Leader</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Speaker of the House</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


After defeating incumbent President Gerald R. Ford in the 1976 elections, James Earl Carter, Jr. was sworn in as the 39th President of the U.S. on January 21, 1977.

Domestically, the Carter Administration was focused on record high inflation and interest rates, as well as high unemployment and a nationwide energy shortage. Internationally, President Carter concentrated on issues related to human rights, Middle East peace, establishing full diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, and a nuclear arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union. The final 14 months of his term was consumed with the 1979 seizure of American diplomatic personnel in Iran. Democratic Senator Robert C. Byrd was Senate Majority Leader in 1979, a position that he had assumed in 1977, and one that had been continuously filled by a senator from the

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Democratic Party since 1955. Thomas Philip O’Neill, Jr., a Democratic congressman, was Speaker of the House in 1979, a role he had undertaken in 1977, and a position filled uninterruptedly by a Democratic congressman since 1949.

Concurrent World Events

*Chronicle of the 20th Century* contained the following events worth consideration when contemplating the overall political environment within the U.S. during 1979: the resumption of formal diplomatic relations, following a suspension of approximately 30 years, between the U.S. and China on January 1, 1979; the forced departure from Iran of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, following a 37 year rule, on January 16, 1979; Ayatollah Khomeini’s return to Iran, after a 16 year exile, on February 1, 1979; the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, signed by Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and U.S. President Carter on March 26, 1979; the U.S. and Soviet Union Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II, signed by U.S. President Carter and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, on June 18, 1979; the former Shah of Iran’s


19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., 1150-1151.

21 Ibid., 1152.

22 Ibid., 1156.
arrival in the U.S. for medical treatment on October 22, 1979; the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979; and the former Shah of Iran’s U.S. departure, for exile in Panama, on December 15, 1979.

DOS Budget

The Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 1979 stipulated that the total estimated DOS budget authority for fiscal year 1979 was $1,239,826,000. Out of this total, $766 million was allocated for the domestic and international administration of foreign affairs. This was an increase of $92 million from the fiscal year 1978 budget. The administration of foreign affairs portion of the budget included the necessary funds to operate the 132 U.S. Embassies and 119 consulates that existed at the time of the 1979 fiscal year budget. Additionally, this portion of the Department’s budget authority provides funding for DOS security programs.

Case Studies

The first of two attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Tehran occurred on February 14, 1979, at 10:30 a.m. local time, and two weeks following the Ayatollah Khomeini’s return to Iran from exile. The 12 months of protests directed against Shah Rezi Khan Pahlavi,  

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23Ibid., 1161.

24Ibid., 1164.

25Ibid., 1165.


27Ibid., 85-86.
who was a U.S. ally and had ruled Iran repressively for almost 40 years, resulted in the Shah’s forced departure and Khomeini’s return. Unfortunately, Shah Pahlavi’s departure did nothing to suppress the anger felt by many Iranians toward him and the U.S. Government. As a result of this anger, 75 armed Iranians seized the mission after gaining access to the facility by climbing over the walls surrounding the embassy compound. Prior to the attack, senior embassy officials had anticipated an attack and had minimized the risk by reducing the number of official U.S. Government personnel and classified documents remaining in country. At approximately 1:00 p.m. local time, the Iranian security forces that had been removed from the embassy by their government two days before the attack, returned to restore order.28 Lethal Terrorist Actions Against Americans 1973-1985 reported that one Foreign Service National employee of the embassy was killed, and two Marine Security Guards were injured in this attack.29

The second attack on the embassy in Tehran took place on November 4, 1979, at approximately 9:30 a.m. local time, when a large group of students armed with shotguns and pistols scaled the compound’s perimeter wall and took control of the mission. This attack occurred 13 days following Shah Pahlavi’s admittance into the U.S. for medical treatment, and turned out to be the culmination of an anti-American sentiment that had been steadily on the rise within Iran since the Shah’s departure, just over 10 months prior to the incident. Upon gaining entry onto the compound, the attackers succeeded in taking


U.S. diplomatic personnel hostage in spite of the fact that a sizeable contingent of Iranian security forces was present just outside the mission’s walls. Rocky Sickmann recounts being told by his captors that the students had seized the embassy and taken hostages because the American Government had granted the former Shah permission to enter the U.S. The author further related that he and the other hostages were advised by the students that they would not be released until Shah Pahlavi was returned to Iran in order to be executed for his crimes. The 52 official Americans taken hostage during this incident were held for 444 days.30

On November 21, 1979, around noon local time, the embassy in Islamabad was attacked by hundreds of young rioters who were dropped off by bus in front of the mission. The attackers penetrated the perimeter of the embassy compound by climbing over, or pulling down the fence that surrounded the compound.31 Some within the large group of rioters were armed with pistols and rifles, and at least one of the attackers discharged a firearm at a lock that was securing an embassy gate. The bullet from this firearm ricocheted and struck one of the rioters, which caused the attackers to mistakenly believe that they were being fired on by Marine Security Guards. There were six Marines who had been assigned to the mission as part of its security force; however, the large group of well armed rioters rapidly overwhelmed them. In response to the gunshot, the rioters began firing their weapons at buildings located on the grounds of the embassy


One of the bullets from this volley of fire struck a Marine Security Guard, Corporal Stephen Crowley, who had been assigned to a rooftop observation post. This Marine had been assigned a rooftop post because there were only two security cameras providing coverage of the compound, and they were deemed insufficient to provide security personnel with a comprehensive assessment of the situation. Corporal Crowley later died as a result of the injury he sustained. Approximately 139 U.S. diplomatic personnel and Foreign Service National employees adhered to DOS emergency procedures and secured themselves inside the mission’s communications vault. This action was intended to impede the attackers’ momentum, protect the Americans, and provide the Pakistani Government’s security forces with enough time to restore order on and in the area immediately surrounding the embassy compound.

Coll and Hillgartner highlighted the fact that many of the rioters were members of a conservative Islamic political party, Jamaat-e-Islami. The well publicized objective of this party was the establishment of a pure Islamic Government in Pakistan. Prior to the late 1970s, Jamaat-e-Islami had focused their attention and acts of violence on India; however, by 1979, the group had transformed into an organization that wanted to target America. Members of this party were allies of Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi branch of Sunni

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32 Ibid., 23.
33 Ibid., 24, 34.
34 Ibid., 24, 29-30.
Islam, and “favored political protégés of Pakistan’s new military dictator, General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq.”

While the embassy personnel were inside the embassy’s communications vault, rioters used Molotov cocktails and other accelerants to set multiple fires within buildings located on the mission’s compound. “Onlookers at the British embassy estimated that at the height of the action, 15 thousand Pakistani rioters swarmed the grounds.” Hours into the attack and with the exception of a Pakistani police officer, who drove U.S. Government personnel taken hostage by the attackers to safety, there was yet to be a response by the Pakistani Government. Pakistani troops were sent to the embassy following the widespread destruction of mission property, and the deaths of two American diplomats and two Foreign Service National employees of the embassy. These troops arrived at the mission more than five hours after the attack on the embassy compound began.

**Terrorist Tactics**

The shift in terrorism, discussed in *History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State*, was not a philosophical change; rather it was a shift in the operational tactics utilized by terrorist organizations. Prior to this shift,

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36 Ibid., 26-27.

37 Ibid., 30.

38 Ibid., 31.

39 Ibid., 34-35.

40 Ibid., 36.
terrorists were concentrating their efforts on the targeting of individual diplomats. The 1960s and early 1970s was a period of time when terrorist organizations focused on conducting kidnap for profit operations against diplomats. As a result of this motive, the victims were later “exchanged to obtain money or arms, to secure the release of jailed colleagues, or to draw public attention to a cause.” During the early 1970s, terrorists moved away from profit based kidnapping and began the targeted killing of individual diplomats. At the conclusion of the 1970s, the focus of terrorist organizations shifted away from individual diplomats. These organizations began concentrating their efforts on targeting U.S. diplomatic missions, “as symbols of the United States” and they “sought to wreak as much destruction, injury, and death as possible.” This shift to increasingly lethal and complex operations was made possible, at least in part, by state sponsors of terrorism, specifically Iran, Syria, and Libya.41

U.S. Response

Immediately following the February 14, 1979 attack on the embassy in Tehran, the U.S. Government focused on enhancing the embassy’s physical security. Those responsible for implementing these improvements within the DOS concentrated on the mission’s entrances, and ordered security personnel to install additional closed circuit television cameras, remote controlled tear gas dispensers, and heavy steel doors with automatic alarms.42 Subsequent to the November 4, 1979 attack and seizure of American diplomats that occurred in Tehran, President Carter ordered an embargo of Iranian oil and


42Ibid., 257.
froze all Iranian assets within the U.S. On April 11, 1980, the president approved the U.S. military’s plan to rescue the hostages. This rescue mission would later be aborted as a result of malfunctioning helicopters, a crash involving two other aircraft, and the deaths of eight U.S. military personnel.\textsuperscript{43} The U.S. Government’s response to the November 21, 1979 attack at the embassy in Islamabad included: the DOS publicly thanking Pakistani troops for their efforts in seeing to the safety of American diplomats; Carter personally thanking Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq for his assistance in resolving the crisis; and a meeting between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the ambassadors from 30 Islamic countries to discuss the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and its context.\textsuperscript{44}

Subsequent to the U.S. Government’s relatively quick reactions to attacks on its diplomatic missions, the DOS requested additional funding for an “extensive security enhancement program.” As a result of this request, Congress appropriated $6,100,000 for fiscal year 1980, October 1, 1979 through September 30, 1980, and $35,800,000 for fiscal year 1981, in order to fund the Department’s new Security Enhancement Program. Combined with other funding, appropriations for this program totaled approximately $200 million.\textsuperscript{45} There were four stated objectives of the Security Enhancement Program. The first objective dealt with the apparent ease of access to U.S. diplomatic missions, and sought the hardening of these facilities against attack. Secondly, the program addressed


\textsuperscript{44}Coll and Hillgartner, 34.

the need of the U.S. Government to provide adequate security for its missions regardless of whether or not the host government had met their duty to protect. The third and forth objectives focused on the protection of U.S. Government personnel and national security information. Accompanying the program was a plan to enhance security at 122 high-risk missions over a five year period of time. Those that formulated the Security Enhancement Program acknowledged that success would require “major funding by the Congress and a strong commitment by both the Congress and the DOS.” As a result of the Reagan Administration’s goal to reduce spending by the federal government, one-third of the funding for the Security Enhancement Program was cut during the first year of President Reagan’s term. Additionally, “between 1982 and 1984, the scope and emphasis of Security Enhancement Program projects were further scaled back, and expectations were downgraded.”

Decade Analysis

There are three specific reasons to choose 1979 as the starting point for this thesis. First, the research had to begin somewhere and an examination of 11 specific attacks, spanning a 33 year period of time, was adequate. Secondly, many readers will recall the November 4, 1979, attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tehran that resulted in the capture and long-term detention of American hostages. As a result, 1979 serves as a good beginning point of reference for this thesis. Third, during 1979, terrorist organizations shifted their

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46Ibid., 260.
47Ibid., 261.
48Ibid., 262.
focus away from individual diplomats and began concentrating their efforts on the targeting of diplomatic missions. This shift required a different security related response from the U.S. Government; a response that has endured for the past 33 years, and one that is the focus of this thesis.

Table 2 is a summarized presentation of the data collected for 1979. Although not specifically related to any one attack, the categories provide some overall context related to the environment that the 1979 attacks occurred in. Immediately following this table is an expanded discussion of each category.

Table 2. 1979 Attacks, Budget, and Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Attacks on U.S. Missions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS Budget Authority (estimate)</td>
<td>$1,239,826,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of DOS Security Personnel (approximate)</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


DOS reporting between 1973 and 1985 focused exclusively on lethal actions against Americans, and as a result these figures represent only lethal attacks. The DOS budget authority for fiscal year 1979 serves as a starting point for this thesis’ analysis of
DOS funding, and the total number of DOS security personnel serves as the starting point for an analysis of personnel resources. The total number of DOS security personnel includes federal law enforcement officers, technical security specialists, diplomatic couriers, and other support staff; however, it does not include the number of Marine Security Guards and Navy Seabees assigned to the DOS to assist with security at U.S. missions.

Table 3 presents a qualitative interpretation of receiving nation capabilities and willingness to protect U.S. missions, combined with a summary of the party affiliations for key U.S. Government leaders. Although the first two categories are related individually to the three attacks examined, the category associated with the U.S. political environment is specific to 1979 as a whole. Immediately following this table is an expanded discussion of each category.

Table 3. 1979 Qualitative Interpretation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tehran-------</td>
<td>Yes------------------------</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>President-Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehran-------</td>
<td>Yes------------------------</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Senate-Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamabad---</td>
<td>Yes------------------------</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>House-Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It would be difficult to make a case proving that the Governments’ of Iran and Pakistan were incapable of protecting the U.S. mission in their countries, as both possessed well established police, military, and intelligence forces. These forces were actually utilized by the Iranian Government in response to the February 14, 1979 attack on the U.S. mission in Tehran. Although the Iranian security forces had been removed from the embassy several days prior to the attack, they returned after the outbreak of violence and were able to restore order on and in the vicinity of the U.S. Embassy compound within two and a half hours.49 It is unlikely that the capabilities of the Iranian security forces degraded appreciably in the nine month period of time between the first and second attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. As such, the Iranian Government was capable of protecting the U.S. mission when it was attacked on November 4, 1979. Regarding the November 21, 1979 attack on the U.S. mission in Islamabad, Pakistani military forces successfully restored order at the embassy once the decision to deploy them was made; approximately five hours after the attack began.50


50 Coll and Hillgartner, 36.
The assessment of whether or not the Iranian and Pakistani Governments were willing to protect the U.S. Embassies in Tehran and Islamabad is based on a rather simple question: Did the Governments of Iran and Pakistan respond to the respective attacks that occurred in their country? In the case of the attack that took place in Tehran on February 14, 1979, Iranian security forces responded to the U.S. Embassy and restored order. Therefore, the Iranian Government displayed a willingness to protect the U.S. mission. This is in direct contrast to the November 4, 1979 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. During this attack, it was reported that Iranian security forces were present, on the perimeter of the embassy compound, while U.S. diplomatic personnel were being taken hostage.\footnote{Sickmann and Antrim, 1-5, 7.} Since there was no response by the security forces present at the U.S. mission, and none from other entities within the government, it is apparent that the Iranian Government was not willing to protect the U.S. Embassy on November 4, 1979. There are two primary reasons that support the assertion that the Government of Pakistan was not willing to protect the U.S. mission in Islamabad during the November 21, 1979 attack. First, there was a significant and unexplained delay in Pakistani security forces responding to the U.S. Embassy. Second, many of the individuals who participated in the attack on the mission were members of a conservative Islamic political party that was favored by Pakistan’s leader.\footnote{Coll and Hillgartner, 26-27.}

In 1979, the Democratic Party dominated the U.S. Executive and Legislative Branches of Government. The Democrats had also held a majority of the seats in the Senate for 24 consecutive years and in the House of Representatives for 30 successive

\footnote{Sickmann and Antrim, 1-5, 7.}

\footnote{Coll and Hillgartner, 26-27.}
years. Additionally, from 1953 through 1979, the Democratic Party held the presidency for 18 years, while a member of the Republican Party was president for 16 years.\textsuperscript{53}

During 1979, there were two world events, specifically concerning Iran that impacted the security environment of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The first event was Iranian leader Shah Pahlewi’s forced departure from the country, and Ayatollah Khomeini’s return from exile and replacement of the Shah.\textsuperscript{54} The second issue was President Carter’s decision to allow the Shah to enter the U.S. for medical treatment,\textsuperscript{55} a decision cited as a reason for the November 4, 1979 attack on the U.S. mission in Tehran.\textsuperscript{56}

\textbf{1980s}

The examination of attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions continues with a review of what occurred at the embassy and embassy annex in Beirut during 1983 and 1984 respectively. Events that took place at these facilities comprise two of the 11 attacks that are the focus of this thesis. This decade has been further organized into the following categories: Number of Attacks on U.S. Diplomatic Missions, U.S. Political Environment, Concurrent World Events, DOS Budget, Case Studies, Terrorist Tactics, U.S. Response, and Decade Analysis.

\textsuperscript{53} The White House, “The Presidents.”


\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 1161.

\textsuperscript{56} Sickmann and Antrim, 1-5, 7.
Number of Attacks on U.S. Diplomatic Missions

*Lethal Terrorist Actions Against Americans 1973-1985* listed no reported attacks specifically targeting U.S. missions from January 1, 1980 through April 17, 1983; and six attacks on DOS overseas facilities between April 18, 1983 and December 31, 1985.\(^{57}\)

There were no statistics reported by the Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security Threat Analysis Division for 1986. Beginning with 1987, the DOS expanded the reporting criteria to include not only the lethal actions, but also “bombings, attempted bombings, and violent demonstrations.” Additionally, the Department renamed the report *Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans.* This report stated that between January 1, 1987 and December 31, 1989, there were 100 attacks targeting U.S. diplomatic missions.\(^{58}\)

U.S. Political Environment

Table 4 is a summarized presentation of data concerning the leaders of the U.S. Government’s Executive and Legislative Branches for the 1980s.

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Table 4. 1980s Leadership of the Executive and Legislative Branches of Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Senate Majority Leader</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Speaker of the House</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


After defeating President Carter in the 1980 elections, Ronald Wilson Reagan was sworn in as the 40th President of the U.S. on January 20, 1981. Domestically, the Reagan Administration was focused on stimulating the economy, reducing inflation and
unemployment, and improving the nation’s military capabilities with a 35 percent increase in defense related spending. Internationally, President Reagan concentrated on issues related to improving U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, and in providing support to anti-communist rebels in Central America and Africa. His administration employed military force against Libya in retaliation for that country’s involvement in an attack targeting U.S. military personnel in West Berlin, Germany, and also utilized U.S. Navy warships to ensure open sea lines of communication in the Persian Gulf.\footnote{The White House, “The Presidents.”} The Republican Party held a majority of the U.S. Senate seats for seven years of this decade,\footnote{US Senate, “Majority and Minority Leaders and Party Whips.”} while Democrats enjoyed majority status in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1980 through 1989.\footnote{US House of Representatives, “Speakers of the House (1789 to Present);” US House of Representatives, “Majority Leaders of the House (1899 to Present),” http://history.house.gov/People/Office/Majority-Leaders/ (accessed February 3, 2013).}

Concurrent World Events

\textit{Chronicle of the 20th Century} contained the following events worth consideration when contemplating the overall political environment within the U.S. during the 1980s: the commencement of war between Iran and Iraq in September 1980;\footnote{Daniel, \textit{Chronicle of the 20th Century} (1987), 1180.} the destruction of an Iraqi nuclear reactor, which was nearing completion, by the Israeli Air Force on June 7, 1981;\footnote{Ibid., 1191.} the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat on October 6, 1981;\footnote{Daniel, \textit{Chronicle of the 20th Century} (1987), 1180.}
the Argentine military’s invasion of the Falkland Islands on April 30, 1982;\textsuperscript{65} the Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982;\textsuperscript{66} U.S. President Reagan labeling Soviet communism as “the focus of evil in the modern world” during a speech on March 8, 1983;\textsuperscript{67} the invasion of Grenada by U.S. military forces on October 25, 1983;\textsuperscript{68} the hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship and killing of an American citizen by members of the Palestinian Liberation Front on October 7, 1985;\textsuperscript{69} in response to Libya’s role in the bombing of a West Berlin nightclub popular with U.S. service members, U.S. Air Force bombers struck targets within Libya on April 15, 1986;\textsuperscript{70} 37 U.S. sailors were killed when an Iraqi launched Exocet missile struck the U.S.S. Stark in May 1987;\textsuperscript{71} the U.S. Navy disabled several Iranian oil platforms in response to Iranian attacks in the Persian Gulf on October 19, 1987;\textsuperscript{72} and President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev met and “signed the first treaty to reduce the size of their countries’ nuclear arsenals on December 8, 1987.”\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{64}Ibid., 1196.
\textsuperscript{65}Ibid., 1202.
\textsuperscript{66}Ibid., 1205.
\textsuperscript{67}Ibid., 1217.
\textsuperscript{68}Ibid., 1225.
\textsuperscript{69}Ibid., 1268.
\textsuperscript{70}Ibid., 1280.
\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., 1297.
\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., 1303.
\textsuperscript{73}Ibid., 1306.
DOS Budget

During the 1980s, the total DOS budget authority ranged from a low of $1,711,573,000 for fiscal year 1980, to a high of $4,866,323,000 for fiscal year 1987. The totals for the individual years of this decade are depicted in figure 1 below. Regarding the domestic and international administration of foreign affairs, the total DOS budget authority for fiscal year 1980 allocated $807 million, while fiscal year 1987 allocated $3,441,174,000.74

Figure 1. Total U.S. Department of State Budget Authority (estimate) 1980-1989


Case Studies

On April 18, 1983, at 1:06 p.m. local time, the embassy in Beirut was targeted with a truck bomb. Prior to detonating the explosive device, the driver maneuvered his vehicle into the embassy’s driveway and past Lebanese security forces assigned to the mission for protection. The attacker faced few obstacles, as the embassy’s physical security posture did not include vehicle access control barriers. Additionally, mission buildings had very limited setback from the main road. The bomb’s detonation resulted in significant damage to the entrance and ground floor of the embassy compound’s main building. Additionally, it caused the collapse of seven floors within the center section of this building. The Lebanese Government’s security force, assigned to provide 24 hour protection of the embassy compound and the U.S. Ambassador’s residence, consisted of a small contingent of police officers. In response to the known threat of bombs hidden in parked vehicles throughout Lebanon, police assigned to the embassy were instructed to prevent vehicles from parking on the streets adjacent to the embassy compound. The U.S. and Lebanese Governments were both unprepared for a suicide attack. The investigation of this incident later determined that the attacker utilized a pickup truck loaded with an explosive device comprised of 2,000 pounds of Trinitrotoluene (also known as TNT). U.S. Government officials also determined that the attack was planned and executed by Iranian and Syrian backed operatives of the militant Islamic group

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75 Sullivan, 91-92.
76 Ibid., 94.
Hezbollah. This attack resulted in the deaths of 17 U.S. diplomatic personnel as well as 69 other individuals. Furthermore, over 100 people were injured as a result of this incident.

On September 20, 1984, a vehicle bomb detonated approximately 40 feet from the U.S. Embassy Annex in East Beirut. This incident resulted in the deaths of two American employees of the embassy annex and 11 Lebanese nationals. At least 54 other individuals were injured in the blast that caused extensive structural damage to the annex building. Investigators later determined that the explosive force of the blast was equivalent to 3,000 pounds of TNT. It was also concluded that the explosive device had been transported in a registered diplomatic vehicle, and that the driver had successfully maneuvered through the annex’s traffic control features while being engaged by embassy security forces with small arms fire. In the months leading up to this attack, the DOS had decided to transition embassy operations in Lebanon to this East Beirut location. The Department’s security officials believed that the site of the embassy annex in East Beirut presented a “substantially lower” threat of terrorism than the embassy’s location in West Beirut. Although not all of the annex’s security upgrades had been installed, U.S. Ambassador to

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Lebanon Reginald Bartholomew had insisted that the embassy’s move to East Beirut take place before the end of summer 1984. At the time of the attack, security gates designed to protect the entrances to the embassy annex, were waiting to be installed.  

Terrorist Tactics

The 1980s brought about another shift in the operational tactics utilized by terrorist organizations, one that is much more difficult to protect against. Following the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, security officials within the DOS acknowledged that they had not anticipated this new tactic. Although terrorists remained focused on targeting diplomatic missions, they moved away from the “storming” tactics that were commonly used toward the end of the 1970s. The 1983 and 1984 attacks on the U.S. diplomatic missions in Beirut were committed by individuals whose weapon of choice was a vehicle laden with explosives. To make this shift in tactics more complex, these vehicles were driven by individuals who understood that they were an integral part of the weapon system, and that they would die during the execution phase of the attack.  

U.S. Response

There was an immediate response by the U.S. Government to the 1983 embassy bombing. In Lebanon, U.S. Marines from the multi-national force located at Beirut International Airport deployed within an hour of the attack in order to secure the embassy compound’s perimeter. This was done to protect surviving personnel, assist with the

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82 Ibid., 279-281.
83 Ibid., 269.
84 Sullivan, 92.
recovery of victims, protect and recover classified material, and install temporary physical security features that limited access to the damaged compound. In Washington, DC Senate Foreign Relations Committee member Arlen Spector stated, “I would like to see us have whatever force is necessary to protect our embassies. If it takes a small army in places like Iran and places like Beirut, my sense is that Congress would support whatever it costs.” This congressional support came in the form of an appropriation for the DOS, which led to significant progress in the physical security posture of U.S. diplomatic missions by the end of 1983. Additionally, those responsible for security at these missions were instructed by the Department to work closely with host governments to enhance security related to pedestrian and vehicular access to embassy compounds. The missions were also the beneficiaries of improved Department wide security measures related to the mitigation of the risks associated with vehicle bomb attacks.

The U.S. Government response to the 1984 attack on the embassy annex included an immediate requirement by the DOS for all diplomatic missions to review, update, and modify the security measures in place at the individual facilities. Following this review, the missions were instructed to notify the Department of their security related requirements and vulnerabilities. Congress also passed a $55 million supplemental appropriation for the DOS’s fiscal year 1984 security budget. This appropriation, titled the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, increased the total funding appropriated

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86 Ibid., 271.

87 Ibid., 281.
for security at the Department during that year to $110 million. Two years prior to the passage of this act, the DOS’s security budget was $27 million. This act made it possible for the Department to increase the number of its security personnel, conduct some reorganization within the office tasked with providing security, and expand security related training.\textsuperscript{88} In addition to these results, the supplemental appropriation led to the creation of the DOS’s Antiterrorism Assistance and Rewards for Information programs. The Antiterrorism Assistance program was established to provide law enforcement training to other nations in order to increase their counterterrorism capabilities. The Rewards for Information program provided funding for the Department to offer financial incentives to individuals willing to provide information that assisted with the prosecution or prevention of terrorist activity.\textsuperscript{89}

In June 1985, the \textit{Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security} was submitted to Secretary of State George P. Schultz. This panel had been formed in March 1984, between the first and second attacks on the diplomatic missions in Beirut, and was tasked with reviewing the DOS’s security programs, and, where necessary, making recommendations for improvement. The panel was chaired by retired Admiral Bobby R. Inman and included members who represented groups having an interest in the security of U.S. missions. The Inman Panel was comprised of eight members representing the Senate, House of Representatives, Departments of State and Defense, intelligence community, and private sector.\textsuperscript{90} As a result of their review, the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{88}Ibid., 282-283.
\item \textsuperscript{89}Ibid., 284-285.
\item \textsuperscript{90}Ibid., 274-275.
\end{itemize}
panel submitted multiple recommendations to the Department. There are three of the panel’s recommendations that are directly relevant to this thesis and include the:

1. Reorganization of the offices within the DOS that are responsible for security and counterterrorism.\(^\text{91}\)

2. Revision of the DOS’s physical security standards.

3. Institution of a robust building program to remedy vulnerabilities in the DOS’s security posture at its overseas facilities.\(^\text{92}\)

The Inman Panel’s recommendation concerning the reorganization of the offices responsible for security and counterterrorism resulted in the reassignment of several counterterrorism related programs, and the creation of a new bureau within the Department. Responsibility for U.S. Government diplomacy related to international terrorism was taken away from the Department’s Under Secretary for Management and reassigned to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Additionally, the Under Secretary for Management’s responsibility for the DOS’s Emergency Action Planning and Antiterrorism Assistance programs was reassigned to the Assistant Secretary of the newly


\(^{92}\text{Ibid., 2.}\)
created Bureau of Diplomatic Security.\textsuperscript{93} Several offices within the Department that had operational security responsibilities were merged into this new bureau.\textsuperscript{94}

The panel believed that a revision of the DOS’s physical security standards was necessary in order to deal with the new threats posed by terrorists, and that the Department could take advantage of more up-to-date methods, materials, and equipment to improve physical security at its missions. Regarding these physical security standards, the panel recommended that:

1. The revised physical security standards take into account ancillary facilities and security at the residences of U.S. diplomatic personnel.\textsuperscript{95}

2. The DOS identify minimum physical security standards that all U.S. diplomatic missions must meet, and specify more stringent requirements for facilities located in countries considered to be a higher threat.\textsuperscript{96}

3. The Department publishes the revised physical security standards in a format that is accessible to all within the interagency community who may need them.\textsuperscript{97}


\textsuperscript{95}Ibid., 2.

\textsuperscript{96}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{97}Ibid.
The Inman Panel recommended that the Department institute a robust building program with the goal of alleviating the security vulnerabilities at its missions. Panel members acknowledged that vulnerabilities at some facilities could be improved through renovation, while other diplomatic missions would have to be relocated in order to achieve the desired results.98 As a result of their work, panel members were able to draw the following conclusions relevant to the DOS’s building program:

1. The Department must control the buildings that contain U.S. diplomatic missions.

2. The security provided by the site of a diplomatic mission is the most important factor to consider when deciding on a location for that mission.99

3. There is considerable risk associated with collocation of diplomatic missions with, or in proximity to, individuals who pose a threat to the mission and its occupants.

4. When planning for the security of a diplomatic mission, the DOS must consider the age and design of buildings, as it is often more challenging to secure structures that lack modern design.

5. The DOS overseas construction program must be provided with adequate levels of funding.100

98Ibid.


100Ibid., 2.
Decade Analysis

The 1980s was a significant period of time for those responsible for security within the DOS. During this decade, and as demonstrated during the two attacks on the U.S. missions in Beirut, terrorists increased the lethality of their attacks with a shift in tactics. In response, the U.S. Congress passed supplemental appropriations that significantly increased the DOS’s security related funding. This increased funding led to the birth of the Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance and Rewards for Information programs. Furthermore, the Inman Panel was established in order to conduct an independent review of the DOS’s security programs. Recommendations made by this panel resulted in the creation of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the establishment of physical security standards that endure to this day within the DOS.

Table 5 is a summarized presentation of the data collected for the 1980s. Although not specifically related to any one attack, the categories provide some overall context related to the environment that the attacks of the 1980s occurred in. Immediately following this table is an expanded discussion of each category.
Table 5. 1980s Attacks, Budget, and Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1980s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Attacks on U.S. Missions</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average DOS Budget Authority</td>
<td>$3,279,713,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(estimate)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of DOS Security</td>
<td>600 - 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel (approximate)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As did 1979, the 1980s also presented uncertainty regarding the total number of attacks on U.S. missions. This was due to the fact that DOS statistics for the years 1980 through 1985 focused solely on incidents that were deemed lethal actions against Americans. Adding to the uncertainty is the absence of DOS reporting for 1986. Upon instituting expanded reporting criteria during the last three years of this decade, DOS reported a significant increase in attacks on U.S. missions. There were 25 attacks recorded for 1987, 37 during 1988, and 38 in 1989. This is in contrast to the six attacks reported by DOS during the first half of the decade. Even when one takes into account

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the disparate reporting criteria used by DOS in this decade, it is evident that the number of attacks targeting U.S. missions is trending upwards during the late 1980s.

The total DOS budget authority for the 1980s increased consistently between fiscal year 1980 through 1982, from $1,711,573,000 to $3,023,937,000. There is a $351,082,000 decrease in DOS’ total budget authority for fiscal year 1983. The total budget authority once again increased consistently between the fiscal years 1984 through 1986, from $2,907,170,000 to $3,693,206,000. There is a $1,173,117,000 increase in DOS’ total budget authority between fiscal years 1986 and 1987, before the Department’s total budget authority decreased consistently between fiscal year 1987 through 1989, from $4,866,323,000 to $3,837,410,000. The April 18, 1983, attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut took place during fiscal year 1983, a year that saw a significant decrease in the total budget authority for the DOS. Fiscal year 1984, which was a base

year for a three year consistent increase in total budget authority for the DOS, included the September 20, 1984 attack on the U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut.

During this decade, the DOS increased the total number of its security personnel by approximately 200. Although this is an approximate 33 percent increase over the 600 total security personnel that DOS had during 1979, it is well below the recommendation made in the June 1985 Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security. In this report, the panel estimated that the DOS would need a total of 1,156 security personnel in order to carry out all of the recommendations contained within its report.

Table 6 presents a qualitative interpretation of receiving nation capabilities and willingness to protect U.S. missions, combined with a summary of the party affiliations for key U.S. Government leaders. Although the first two categories are related individually to the two attacks examined, the category associated with the U.S. political environment is specific to the 1980s as a whole. Immediately following this table is an expanded discussion of each category.

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104 Ibid., 12.
Table 6. 1980s Qualitative Interpretation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut--------</td>
<td>No-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>President–Republican Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut--------</td>
<td>No-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Senate–Republican Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>House–Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There is convincing evidence that suggests the Government of Lebanon was incapable of protecting the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut, during 1983 and 1984 respectively. First, a 17 year conflict between various Lebanese factions,
Syria, Israel, and other outside actors resulted in political instability in Beirut.\textsuperscript{105} Second, there had been United Nations or multi-national military forces present in Lebanon for several years prior to the 1983 and 1984 attacks on the U.S. missions.\textsuperscript{106} Finally, prior to the attacks the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation had developed “a plan to retrain and equip a Lebanese army capable of meeting Lebanese national objectives.”\textsuperscript{107} These three reasons provide strong evidence in support of this thesis’ assertion that Lebanon was a country in crisis at the time the U.S. missions were attacked, and that the government was incapable of securing their own country, let alone providing protection to the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Embassy Annex.

There is evidence that demonstrates a willingness on the part of the Lebanese Government to protect the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Embassy Annex. Concerning the attack that took place on April 18, 1983, the U.S. Embassy was protected by a small contingent of Lebanese police officers that provided 24 hour protection to the mission.\textsuperscript{108} In regards to the attack that occurred on September 20, 1984, a Lebanese Army unit supported the U.S. Embassy Annex’s security force.\textsuperscript{109} Although unsuccessful, the security related support provided by the Government of Lebanon demonstrated a willingness to protect both U.S. missions.

\textsuperscript{105}Sullivan, 89.

\textsuperscript{106}Ibid., 90.

\textsuperscript{107}Ibid., 95.

\textsuperscript{108}Ibid., 94.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the Democratic Party was closing out a period of four consecutive years of dominating both the Executive and Legislative branches of government. Upon Ronald Reagan’s swearing in, a Republican held the presidency for the remainder of this decade. Additionally, the Republican Party held a majority of U.S. Senate seats for six years, while the Democratic Party dominated the U.S. House of Representatives, holding majority status for the entire decade.

The 1980s contained two world events, specifically concerning Lebanon that affected the security environment of the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut. The first event was the June 6, 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.110 The second event was the deployment of U.S. Marines to Beirut as part of a multi-national peacekeeping force.111 There is no doubt that these two events aggravated certain groups within Lebanon and the region, and more than likely provided motivation for those involved in the attacks on the U.S. missions in Beirut.

1990s

This thesis’ examination of the attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions continues with a review of what occurred at the embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The incidents that took place in these countries comprise two of the 11 attacks that are the focus of this thesis. This decade has been further organized into the following categories: Number of Attacks on U.S. Diplomatic Missions, U.S. Political Environment, Concurrent


111Sullivan, 92.
World Events, DOS Budget, Case Studies, Terrorist Tactics, U.S. Response, and Decade Analysis.

Number of Attacks on U.S. Diplomatic Missions

*Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans* identified that there were 154 attacks targeting U.S. diplomatic missions from January 15, 1990 through October 5, 1997.\(^{112}\) *Political Violence Against Americans* indicated that between April 10, 1998 and December 24, 1999 U.S. missions were targeted with violence 59 times.\(^{113}\) Considering the data provided by both sources, diplomatic missions of the U.S. were targeted 213 times during the 1990s.

U.S. Political Environment

Table 7 is a summarized presentation of data concerning the leaders of the U.S. Government’s Executive and Legislative Branches for the 1990s.


Table 7. 1990s Leadership of the Executive and Legislative Branches of Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Senate Majority Leader</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Speaker of the House</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>William Jefferson Clinton</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Trent Lott</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Newton Leroy Gingrich</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>William Jefferson Clinton</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Trent Lott</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Newton Leroy Gingrich</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>William Jefferson Clinton</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Trent Lott</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>John Dennis Hastert</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After defeating President Bush in the 1992 elections, William Jefferson Clinton was sworn in as President of the U.S. on January 20, 1993. Domestically, the Clinton Administration’s focus on the nation’s economy led to record low unemployment and inflation rates, lower crime rates, and a reduction in the number of individuals receiving public welfare. Additionally, the number of Americans who owned homes was at the highest level in the nation’s history. President Clinton also “proposed the first balanced budget in decades and achieved a budget surplus.” Internationally, the Clinton Administration concentrated in achieving a peaceful resolution to the Bosnian conflict, and forcing Saddam Hussein to comply with United Nations nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons inspection teams. Clinton was also an advocate for expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership, as well as global counter drug operations.\footnote{The White House, “The Presidents.”}

There was no dominant party in the Congress during this decade, as majority status was equally split between the Democratic and Republican Parties. The Democratic Party held a majority of the seats in the Senate during the first half of the 1990s, while the Republican Party enjoyed majority status during the second half.\footnote{US Senate, “Majority and Minority Leaders and Party Whips.”} Democrats were the majority party in the House of Representatives for the first half of the decade, and Republicans finished out the 1990s as the party holding a majority of the seats.\footnote{US House of Representatives, “Speakers of the House (1789 to Present).”}
Concurrent World Events

Chronicle of the 20th Century, Chronicle of America, and 20th Century Day By Day contained the following events worth consideration when contemplating the overall political environment within the U.S. during the 1990s: the beginning of Operation Desert Storm, a U.S. led military operation to force Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait, on January 17, 1991;\textsuperscript{117} the September 5, 1991 breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;\textsuperscript{118} the arrival of U.S. military personnel, sent to support ongoing humanitarian assistance operations, in Somalia on December 9, 1992;\textsuperscript{119} the February 26, 1992 detonation of an explosive device at the World Trade Center in New York City;\textsuperscript{120} following years of apartheid, Nelson Mandela becoming South Africa’s first black president on May 10, 1994;\textsuperscript{121} Yasir Arafat’s return to the Gaza Strip, following 27 years of exile from Palestine, on July 1, 1994;\textsuperscript{122} the United Nations Security Council backed invasion of Haiti by U.S. troops on September 19, 1994;\textsuperscript{123} the September 28, 1995 signing of a peace treaty, related to Palestinian self-rule of and Israeli troop withdrawal from the West Bank, by Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization Yasir Arafat

\textsuperscript{117}Clifton Daniel, Chronicle of America (Emeryville: J L International Publishing, 1993), 910.


\textsuperscript{119}Daniel, Chronicle of America, 919.

\textsuperscript{120}Ibid., 920.

\textsuperscript{121}Daniel, Chronicle of the 20th Century (1995), 1406.

\textsuperscript{122}Ibid., 1408.

\textsuperscript{123}Daniel, Chronicle of America, 927.
and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin; the decision by 170 nations to indefinitely extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on May 11, 1995; the November 4, 1995 assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin; the bombing of Khobar Towers, an apartment complex housing U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia, on June 25, 1996; the July 8, 1997 North Atlantic Treaty Organization invitation to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to join the alliance; Osama bin Laden publishing a “fatwa that announced a jihad against all Jews and Crusaders” on February 23, 1998; and the U.S. Congress passing the Iraq Liberation Act, which stipulated a desire to remove Saddam Hussein and install a democracy in Iraq, on September 29, 1998.

DOS Budget

During the 1990s, the total DOS budget authority ranged from a low of $2,131,107,000 for fiscal year 1993, to a high of $17,727,000,000 for fiscal year 1999. The totals for the individual years of this decade are shown in figure 2 below. Regarding the domestic and international administration of foreign affairs, the total DOS budget

124 Ibid., 930.


127 America’s Best History, US Timeline-1990s.

128 Ibid.

129 Ibid.

130 America’s Best History, US Timeline-1990s.
authority for fiscal year 1993 allocated $2,131,107,000, while fiscal year 1999 allocated $1,691,000,000.\textsuperscript{131}

![U.S. Department of State](image)

**Figure 2.** Total U.S. Department of State Budget Authority (estimate) 1990-1999


Case Studies

On August 7, 1998, at approximately 10:36 a.m. local time, a truck carrying an explosive device and two occupants was stopped by security personnel at the rear entrance to the U.S. Embassy compound in Nairobi. In an effort to disperse the mission’s security guards and gain entry to the compound, the passenger exited the truck to deploy non-lethal explosive distraction devices and the driver engaged security personnel with small arms fire. Upon being denied entry into the embassy’s underground parking garage, the driver detonated the explosives concealed within his truck. This resulted in 291 people being killed, including 12 American and 32 Kenyan nationals who worked at the embassy. Additionally, there were approximately 5,000 individuals injured in the explosion. The detonation also resulted in extensive property damage to include: the destruction of the entire rear portion of the embassy’s main building; the collapse of a multi-story office building located adjacent to the U.S. mission’s compound; and the shattering of windows within a one and a half mile radius of the blast seat. The investigation into this attack later determined that the bomb contained somewhere between four and five hundred pounds of explosives.

Prior to the attack in Nairobi, there is evidence of a tense relationship between the U.S. Government and Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, one that was described by David H. Shinn as being “cool.” Shinn attributed this to concerns that U.S. officials had

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“over corruption and the pace of democratization” within Kenya.\textsuperscript{134} Also prior to this attack, the \textit{Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam} identified difficulties that the U.S. mission experienced in obtaining approval from the Kenyan government for security related equipment upgrades; specifically, the utilization of additional radio frequencies for the embassy’s radio network, and the installation of a fence to secure one of the parking lots at the mission.\textsuperscript{135}

On August 7, 1998, at approximately 10:39 a.m. local time and just three minutes following the attack on the embassy in Nairobi, a truck bomb exploded at the front entrance to the U.S. Embassy compound in Dar es Salaam. Upon his arrival at the entrance to the compound, the driver of the explosive laden truck had perceived that he would be denied entrance to the compound by mission security personnel, and an embassy water truck that was in front of him. This perception led him to detonate the bomb, which was located between 10 and 12 feet from the embassy building. The explosion resulted in the deaths of 10 individuals. There were 77 people, including one American employee of the embassy, who were injured in the attack.\textsuperscript{136} The blast also resulted in extensive damage to the front portion of the embassy compound’s main building, and damage to residences throughout the neighborhood where the mission was


located. At the time of this attack, the Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam found that there was no Tanzanian Government security forces assigned to provide protection for the embassy.138

Prior to August 7, 1998, there were issues related to stability, the economy, and the government security forces in Kenya and Tanzania. Regarding stability, it was well documented that both countries endured high rates of property and violent crime.139 Additionally, the Kenyan and Tanzanian coastline, the “unusually porous” land borders common in that region of Africa, and the two country’s proximity to source countries of Islamic militants, all contributed to Kenya and Tanzania being desirable areas of operation for terrorist organizations.140 Related to the economy, it is well known that crime thrives in communities that are economically challenged. It is a “fact that East Africa and the Horn are home to some of the poorest countries in the world,” including Kenya and Tanzania, a fact “frequently cited as a reason why the region has become a breeding ground for terrorism.”141 Recent reporting on government security forces in both countries was less than optimistic. One of the sources cited evidence of Kenyan

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140 Shinn, 38.

141 Ibid.
police involvement in crime;\textsuperscript{142} while another source reported that Tanzanian police response to crimes is “extremely slow,” they “lack the proper resources and manpower to properly investigate crime,” and that “many police officers supplement their low wages through robbing and extorting money from Tanzania’s population.”\textsuperscript{143} Additionally, regarding countries located in “East Africa and the Horn,” Shinn opined, “that the security and intelligence services in all of the countries are underfunded and ill-equipped to counter terrorist tactics by local organizations or international terrorists.”\textsuperscript{144}

Leading up to the 1998 attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, there were some positive actions taken by both governments against terrorists that were operating within their countries. In a report produced by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, there is mention of Kenyan and Tanzanian law enforcement utilizing information provided by U.S. intelligence to take action within their own borders “against suspected terrorist groups.” This source also references two Kenyan law enforcement operations that targeted an Al Qaeda cell operating in Nairobi, one of which was executed jointly with U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies.\textsuperscript{145} The Report of


\textsuperscript{144}Shinn, 38.

the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam also mentioned Kenyan counterterrorist operations targeting Al Qaeda affiliated organizations; as well as the willingness of the Government of Kenya to meet with the U.S. embassy’s security officer, who requested additional support from Kenyan security forces in response to threat reporting, received by the embassy prior to the August 7th attack.146

Terrorist Tactics

The 1990s played host to the continuing evolution of the tactics utilized by terrorist organizations. It became quite clear, following the attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam that terrorists had began focusing their efforts in regions of the world where they did not typically operate. Since the threat of terrorism was perceived to be lower in these areas, the diplomatic missions located there were usually the most vulnerable to attack. There is no doubt that diplomatic missions remained the target of choice for terrorist organizations during the 1990s; however, the preferred weapon system was slightly modified. What did not change was the weapon itself, as the vehicle loaded with explosives had proven itself to be devastatingly effective during the 1980s. While the driver continued functioning as the weapon system’s triggering mechanism, as evidenced by the attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, terrorists were no longer willing to employ passive delivery systems. Although ultimately unsuccessful in breaching the outer perimeter of the embassy compounds in Kenya and Tanzania, the perpetrators of both attacks displayed a level of preoperational planning and preparation

related to the challenges associated with breaching the perimeter of a U.S. diplomatic mission that had not yet been observed. The explosive laden vehicles were not delivered to their targets in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam by a lone terrorist, as was common during the 1980s; they were delivered by two terrorists who were prepared to fight their way through the embassy’s perimeter defenses, so that their explosive payload could be detonated in the location of their choosing.

U.S. Response

The U.S. Government reacted quickly to the near simultaneous attacks on the embassies in east Africa. Acting on intelligence that implicated Osama bin Laden in the planning of the bombings, President Clinton authorized the August 20, 1998 release of 79 cruise missiles against al-Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. In addition to this military response, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright sent additional DOS security personnel to Tanzania and Kenya, requested the deployment of United States Marine Corps Fleet Antiterrorism Support Teams to Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in order to assist with securing the damaged facilities, established Accountability Review Boards, and requested $1.8 billion in emergency appropriations for security improvements at the Department’s overseas facilities. Furthermore, in response to warnings of further al-Qaeda attacks, the DOS temporarily closed its missions in Kampala, Uganda; Kigali, Rwanda; and Tirana, Albania.147

Supplemental funding from Congress enabled security upgrades at U.S. diplomatic missions and allowed the DOS’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security to increase

the number of its personnel by one-third. The appropriation also permitted the establishment of surveillance detection programs at the Department’s overseas missions. Creation of these programs was the beginning of a philosophical shift within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and extended the focus of security personnel. The Bureau no longer had to concentrate exclusively on what could be done to improve a mission’s security posture internally; they were now able to become more proactive and focus their attention outward.\textsuperscript{148}

Immediately following the attacks, the DOS included Kenya in its Antiterrorism Assistance program with a goal of creating a “more self-sufficient police force.” As of 2011, this program was reported to be the largest that the DOS has in Africa, with an annual budget of $8 million.\textsuperscript{149} After the attack on the U.S. mission in Nairobi, the Kenyan government established a number of security related agencies and units tasked with improving the country’s ability to counter terrorist organizations operating within its borders. Many of these agencies and units were established with Kenya’s portion of a $100 million grant from the U.S. Government’s East African Counterterrorism Initiative.\textsuperscript{150} This same grant also provided funds for the Tanzanian Government to improve its capabilities related to countering terrorists, specifically within the agency

\textsuperscript{148}Ibid., 354-355.


\textsuperscript{150}Ibid.
responsible for immigration and border control, as well as the country’s law enforcement.\textsuperscript{151}

On January 8, 1999, retired Admiral William J. Crowe submitted the combined Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam to Secretary of State Albright. In addition to Crowe, who served as chairman, each board consisted of five members.\textsuperscript{152} In his introduction letter to Albright, Crowe identified the following two issues that the boards were “most disturbed” with finding:

1. The “inadequacy of resources to provide security against terrorist attacks.”
2. The “relative low priority accorded security concerns throughout the U.S. Government.”\textsuperscript{153}

Crowe went on to explain that both boards believed that responsibility for failing to invest in adequate security resources for the diplomatic missions in Kenya and Tanzania should be shared by “several Administrations and Congresses over the past decade.”\textsuperscript{154} In the report, the boards noted the following observations that are pertinent to this thesis:

\textsuperscript{151} Shinn, 42.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.
1. Many of the security related issues presented in the 1985 Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security had remained unchanged at the time of the bombings in Africa.

2. Instead of receiving the necessary funding to fully implement the recommendations provided by the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, the DOS had been subjected to “drastic cuts” in its budget.\(^{155}\)

Additionally, the boards raised the possibility of shrinking the Department’s overseas presence through the use of “modern technology” and consolidation into regional missions, and indicated that the U.S. Government should prioritize safety and security concerns over all others when choosing the location for diplomatic facilities.\(^{156}\)

As a result of their review of the bombings, the boards determined that there were two main issues with the physical security related systems and procedures in effect at both embassies. They went on to explain that these two issues were not unique to Nairobi and Dar es Salaam; rather they were systemic throughout the DOS. The first issue highlighted the failure of the Department’s physical security standards to provide adequate protection against “large vehicular bomb attacks.” Secondly, the boards found fault with the way in which the DOS applied its physical security standards. They pointed out that the Department requires adherence to the standards “to the maximum extent possible,” and approves exceptions for its facilities that are unable to meet the standard.


\(^{156}\)Ibid.
The boards explained that at the time of the bombings, neither Nairobi nor Dar es Salaam met the standard requiring missions to have a minimum setback distance from the street; however, they had received automatic exceptions since both embassies had opened prior to implementation of the standard.157 They also cautioned the “intelligence and policy communities” against over reliance “on tactical level intelligence” in assessing the risk of terrorism related attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions. Additionally, they reminded these communities that the Inman Panel had reported that attacks perpetrated by terrorist groups had often occurred prior to detection by the intelligence community.158 Finally, board members noted that for a period of 10 years the U.S. Government had failed to provide the resources necessary to secure the DOS’s facilities from terrorist attack.159

The boards organized their 21 key recommendations to the DOS into two categories, “Improving Security Systems and Procedures” and “Better Crisis Management Systems and Procedures.”160 Of the 15 recommendations contained in the first category, seven are relevant to this paper and include those associated with:

1. Revised emergency planning.
2. Updated physical security standards that acknowledge the threat posed by vehicle bombs.
3. The immediate upgrading of all overseas Department facilities not meeting the physical security standards recommended by the Inman Panel.

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157 Ibid., 3.
158 Ibid., 4.
159 Ibid., 5.
160 Ibid., 6.
4. The closing and relocation of missions the Department is unable to adequately secure.

5. Regularly reminding host country governments of their responsibility to provide protection to U.S. diplomatic missions.

6. Revised and more inclusive rating system for evaluation of the threats posed to the Department’s overseas facilities.\textsuperscript{161}

7. The DOS working with Congress to obtain the necessary funding to secure its diplomatic missions and personnel.\textsuperscript{162}

The second category contains the boards’ final six recommendations; however, they are beyond the scope of this thesis and will not be discussed.\textsuperscript{163}

Decade Analysis

During the 1990s, the continued evolution of the tactics of terrorist organizations created new challenges for those tasked with securing U.S. diplomatic missions. These challenges came at a time when the DOS was still in the process of adjusting to the shift in tactics that occurred in the 1980s. In essence, the DOS was trying to play catch up with organizations that were capable of evolving faster than it could adjust, and during a decade when the Department’s budget was inconsistent. The 1990s also saw the DOS playing catch up with the key recommendations presented in the 1985 \textit{Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security}. When the U.S. Embassies in

\textsuperscript{161}\textit{Ibid.}, 7.

\textsuperscript{162}\textit{Ibid.}, 8.

\textsuperscript{163}\textit{Ibid.}, 9.
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were attacked on August 7, 1998, the DOS had yet to fully implement this panel’s recommendations.

Table 8 is a summarized presentation of the data collected for the 1990s. Although not specifically related to any one attack, the categories provide some overall context related to the environment that the attacks of the 1990s occurred in. Immediately following this table is an expanded discussion of each category.

Table 8. 1990s Attacks, Budget, and Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Attacks on U.S. Missions</strong></td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average DOS Budget Authority (estimate)</strong></td>
<td>$5,939,823,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Number of DOS Security Personnel (approximate)</strong></td>
<td>800-1200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Regarding attacks on U.S. missions, the DOS maintained and published statistical data for each of the years 1990 through 1999. Additionally, the DOS utilized consistent reporting criteria for this decade. As a result, it was possible to determine the total number of reported attacks on U.S. missions during the 1990s. There were 37 attacks
targeting U.S. missions during 1990 and 48 reported attacks during 1991. These numbers are comparable to the number of attacks on U.S. missions during each of the last three years of the 1980s. The number of attacks decreased significantly during 1992 with 22 reported attacks, and continued a downward trend during 1993 with 19 total attacks. There were four reported attacks in 1994, nine during 1995, seven attacks in 1996, and eight during 1997. During 1998 the DOS reported 18 attacks, including the two attacks that targeted the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The number of attacks increased significantly during 1999 with 41 reported attacks. This decade began with a relatively high number of attacks on U.S. missions, dropped to a mid single digit number during 1994, and then closed out the 1990s with another rather high number of attacks.

When one considers the possible aggravating factors for the two attack reporting peaks that occurred in 1991 and 1999, it is impossible to ignore the initiation of Operation Desert Storm in early 1991, and Osama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa. The first event, Operation Desert Storm, took place in 1991; the year that had more reported attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions than any other year of the decade. The year with the second highest number of reported attacks on U.S. missions, 1999, was the year immediately following bin Laden’s announcement of Jihad.

The total DOS budget authority for the 1990s increased consistently between fiscal year 1990 through 1992, from $4,436,872,000 to $5,672,534,000. There was a significant decrease of $3,541,427,000 in the Department’s total budget authority for

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fiscal year 1993. The total budget authority remained just over $2 billion for fiscal year 1994, before it more than doubled during fiscal year 1995 to a total budget authority of $5.3 billion. The DOS’s total budget authority for fiscal year 1996 rose slightly to $5.5 billion and remained at that level through fiscal year 1998. There was a significant increase of just over $12.2 billion in the Department’s total budget during fiscal year 1999. The August 7, 1998, attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam took place during fiscal year 1998; the final year in a four year trend of relatively no growth in DOS’s total budget authority, and just three years following a two year span of the Department’s total budget authority being just over $2 billion.\(^{165}\)

During the 1990s, the DOS increased the total number of its security personnel by approximately 400.\(^{166}\) With this increase, the DOS reached the number of total security personnel.

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personnel that the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security had estimated would be required in order for the Department to carry out all of the panel’s 1985 recommendations.\textsuperscript{167} The total number of DOS security personnel did not arrive at 1200 until 1999, or 14 years after the \textit{Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security} was released.\textsuperscript{168}

Table 9 presents a qualitative interpretation of receiving nation capabilities and willingness to protect U.S. missions, combined with a summary of the party affiliations for key U.S. Government leaders. Although the first two categories are related individually to the two attacks examined, the category associated with the U.S. political environment is specific to the 1990s as a whole. Immediately following this table is an expanded discussion of each category.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>President–Democrat Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Senate–Equal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>House–Equal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is convincing evidence that supports the contention that the Governments of Kenya and Tanzania were incapable of protecting the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam when they were attacked in 1998. Information relevant to the security environment in both countries before and after the attacks proved useful in conducting a general assessment regarding the capabilities of the Kenyan and Tanzanian Government security forces. Although most of the sources utilized for this assessment were written at least six years after the attacks on the U.S. missions, it is unlikely that the information presented would have been any more optimistic in the late 1990s, as U.S. aid to Kenya and Tanzania for their security forces has been substantial since the 1998 attacks. As a result of this general assessment of the Kenyan and Tanzanian security forces, the following conclusions were made:

1. The high crime rates and desirable conditions for terrorist organizations found in Kenya and Tanzania challenge the capabilities of both countries’ security forces.

2. The poor economy in both countries not only contributed to the high crime rates and desirable conditions for terrorists, but also played a role in the reported corruption within the ranks of the Kenyan and Tanzanian police.

3. As evidenced by the continuing level of U.S. Government security related aid to both countries, the security forces of Kenya and Tanzania lacked appropriate levels of funding, personnel, equipment, and training at the time of the attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.

The evidence regarding the Governments of Kenya and Tanzania taking action against terrorist organizations prior to the August 7, 1998 attacks on the U.S. missions in
their countries is without a doubt encouraging. Additionally in broad terms, these actions support those who might say that the Kenyan and Tanzanian Governments were willing to protect the diplomatic missions in their countries. Although it is also encouraging that Kenyan Government officials were willing to meet with the U.S. embassy’s security officer prior to the attack on the mission, the researcher was unable to determine if the embassy ever received the additional support that was requested during the meeting. It is unlikely however, as this fact would have undoubtedly been documented in the Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Although there is some evidence that suggests that the Governments of Kenya and Tanzania were willing to protect the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the preponderance of the available evidence supports a conclusion that neither government demonstrated a willingness to protect the U.S. missions prior to the attacks that occurred in their respective countries during 1998.

The inauguration of President Clinton in 1993 brought about an end to 12 consecutive years of Republican domination of the Executive Branch of government. In addition to the presidency, the Democratic Party controlled the Senate and House of Representatives for Clinton’s first two years in office. The conclusion of Clinton’s second year in office also marked the end of eight consecutive years of Democratic control of both Chambers of Congress. Republicans held the majority of Senate and House seats for the remainder of the decade.

2000s

The examination of attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions continues with a review of what occurred at the embassies in Jeddah, Damascus, Sana’a, and Benghazi. Events
that took place at these facilities comprise four of the 11 attacks that are the focus of this thesis. The period of time covered in this section has been further organized into the following categories: Number of Attacks on U.S. Diplomatic Missions, U.S. Political Environment, Concurrent World Events, DOS Budget, Case Studies, Terrorist Tactics, U.S. Response, and Decade Analysis.

Number of Attacks on U.S. Diplomatic Missions

*Political Violence Against Americans* documented that there were 27 attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities from May 15, 2000 through December 3, 2002. The DOS did not produce the *Political Violence Against Americans* report for the years 2003 through 2007. Production of this report resumed in 2008, and from July 14, 2008 through November 30, 2011 the Department reported 21 attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions. Additionally, the 2012 edition of *Political Violence Against Americans* was not available for review prior to this thesis’ completion. As a result of the gap in reporting, it is impossible to determine the total number of attacks that took place from 2000 through 2012; however, for the period of time covered by *Political Violence Against Americans* the DOS documented a total of 48 attacks on its overseas facilities.169

U.S. Political Environment

Table 10 is a summarized presentation of data concerning the leaders of the U.S. Government’s Executive and Legislative Branches for the 2000s.

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Table 10. 2000s Leadership of the Executive and Legislative Branches of Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Senate Majority Leader</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Speaker of the House</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>William Jefferson Clinton</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Trent Lott</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>John Dennis Hastert</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Thomas A. Daschle</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>John Dennis Hastert</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Thomas A. Daschle</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>John Dennis Hastert</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>William H. Frist</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>John Dennis Hastert</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>William H. Frist</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>John Dennis Hastert</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>William H. Frist</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>John Dennis Hastert</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>William H. Frist</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>John Dennis Hastert</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Harry M. Reid</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Nancy Pelosi</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Harry M. Reid</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Nancy Pelosi</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Barack H. Obama</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Harry M. Reid</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Nancy Pelosi</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Barack H. Obama</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Harry M. Reid</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Nancy Pelosi</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Barack H. Obama</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Harry M. Reid</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>John Andrew Boehner</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Barack H. Obama</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Harry M. Reid</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>John Andrew Boehner</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following the elections in 2000, George W. Bush was sworn in as President of the U.S. on January 20, 2001. Domestically, the Bush Administration was forced to focus on national security related issues as a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington, DC. In response to these attacks, Bush created the Department of Homeland Security, and reformed the intelligence and military communities in order to address the terrorist threat that faced the U.S. His international focus was dominated by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.\textsuperscript{170} During the first 12 years of the 21st century, the Democratic Party enjoyed majority status within the Senate for a total of seven years.\textsuperscript{171} The Republican Party held a majority of seats within the House of Representatives for eight of the 12 years.\textsuperscript{172}

Concurrent World Events

The website, \textit{America’s Best History}, contained the following events worth consideration when contemplating the overall political environment within the U.S. from 2000 through 2012: the April 1, 2001 detention of U.S. military personnel by China following the collision of U.S. and Chinese military aircraft; the September 11, 2001 hijacking and subsequent intentional crashing of four U.S. airliners into the World Trade Center in New York City, a field in southwestern Pennsylvania, and the Pentagon in Washington, DC by Al Qaeda linked terrorists; the October 7, 2001 initiation of military action by the U.S. and United Kingdom on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan; the

\textsuperscript{170}\textit{The White House, “The Presidents.”}

\textsuperscript{171}\textit{US Senate, “Majority and Minority Leaders and Party Whips.”}

\textsuperscript{172}\textit{US House of Representatives, “Speakers of the House (1789 to Present).”}
May 21, 2002 release of a DOS report that identified Iran, Iraq, Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as state sponsors of terrorism; the November 21, 2002 membership invitation from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the former Warsaw Pact countries of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia; the March 19, 2003 commencement of military action against Iraq by the U.S. and coalition partners in response to Saddam Hussein’s refusal to comply with United Nations imposed disarmament resolutions; the January 10, 2007 U.S. troop surge in Iraq of 21,500 personnel; the December 1, 2009 announcement by President Obama of his intent to deploy an additional 30 thousand U.S. troops to Afghanistan; and the December 25, 2009 failed attempt by a Nigerian citizen to detonate an explosive device on an airliner approaching Detroit, Michigan.\(^\text{173}\)

**DOS Budget**

From 2000 through 2012, the total DOS budget authority ranged from a low of $6.4 billion for fiscal year 2000, to a high of $56,770,000,000 for fiscal year 2011. The totals for the individual years 2000 through 2012 are shown in figure 3 below. Regarding the domestic and international administration of foreign affairs, the total DOS budget authority for fiscal year 2000 allocated just over $3.6 billion, while fiscal year 2011 allocated $13,958,000,000.\(^\text{174}\)


Case Studies

On December 6, 2004, at 11:16 a.m. local time, five terrorists attacked the U.S. Consulate General in Jeddah. The attackers approached the compound’s side gate in a four-door sedan, and stopped in back of a U.S. Government owned vehicle that was waiting for security barriers to be lowered. Once stationary, the terrorists exited their vehicle and immediately began engaging host nation and consulate security personnel with small arms fire. At the start of the attack armed Saudi National Guard troops,
assigned by their government to provide protection for the consulate, ran away from the compound. As a result of the terrorists’ actions, they were successful in breaching the consulate’s perimeter security, and were on the compound within five seconds after exiting their vehicle. Once on the compound, the attackers fired their weapons at several of the buildings located on the grounds of the consulate and attempted to gain entry to one of the buildings with an improvised explosive device. The terrorists took down the American flag that was flying in front of the mission, and shortly thereafter seized five Foreign Service National employees of the consulate who had been hiding on the compound. At 12:30 p.m., one hour and 14 minutes after the attack on the consulate began; Saudi security forces assaulted the compound and killed the five terrorists. Although no Americans lost their lives during this incident, at some point during the attack, the five Foreign Service National employees of the consulate who had been taken hostage by the terrorists were killed. Additionally, there were 10 consulate visitors who were injured. The Saudi security forces reported that four of their personnel were killed and several injured while responding to the attack.

On September 12, 2006, shortly after 10:00 a.m. local time, four armed individuals attacked the U.S. Embassy in Damascus. Three of the attackers drove to the mission in a small car, while the fourth individual drove a small cargo truck containing several improvised explosive devices comprised of propane gas cylinders and pipe bombs. Upon exiting their vehicle near the embassy’s main entrance, the three attackers


immediately engaged Syrian security forces with small arms fire. They also threw hand
grenades over the mission’s perimeter wall and into the street in front of the embassy.
The driver of the cargo truck had positioned his vehicle against the perimeter wall of the
compound; however, the explosive devices that the truck contained did not detonate and
were later disarmed by Syrian officials. Witnesses estimated that the gun battle between
the attackers and Syrian forces lasted somewhere between 15 and 30 minutes. The
gunfire and detonation of hand grenades resulted in the deaths of three attackers and at
least one Syrian security official, while the driver of the cargo truck and 14 other people
were injured. There were no U.S. Embassy personnel injured in this attack.\textsuperscript{177}

At the time of the attack, the U.S. diplomatic mission in Damascus presented a
vulnerable target. Specifically, the embassy did not meet the physical security standards
that were recommended in the \textit{Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on
Overseas Security} that was submitted to the Secretary of State during 1985. Nevertheless,
the Syrian Government expended significant resources in protecting the U.S. mission.
Typically, Syrian authorities assigned a force of 30 armed security officers to provide
protection to the U.S. Embassy. Additionally, there was a large contingent of Syrian
intelligence officers; who were involved in counterintelligence operations in the area,
immediately surrounding the mission’s compound.\textsuperscript{178}

\textsuperscript{177} Washington Post, “Four Armed Men Attack U.S. Embassy in Damascus,”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/12/AR2006091200345
_pf.html (accessed March 6, 2013); Stratfor, “Syria: The Poorly Executed Attack,”

\textsuperscript{178} Stratfor, “Syria.”
Following the incident, several officials from within the U.S. and Syrian Governments released statements. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated, “the Syrians reacted to this attack in a way that helped secure our people, and we very much appreciate that.” Additionally, a DOS spokesman said, “we’re appreciative of their professional response in this effort.” While the Syrian government placed blame for the attack on Islamic militants, its embassy in Washington issued the following statement, “in accordance with the Geneva Convention, Syria performed its duties in the best possible manner to protect the U.S. Embassy.”

On September 17, 2008, at 9:13 a.m. local time, seven individuals in two separate vehicles initiated an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a. The first vehicle, made to look like a Yemeni Government vehicle, approached a checkpoint located on an access road that ran adjacent to the embassy compound. This vehicle transported five of the attackers, all of whom were disguised as officers with the Yemeni Ministry of Interior Central Security Force, and an improvised explosive device. Once stopped, an occupant of the vehicle shot and killed a member of the embassy’s guard force who was operating a vehicle access control gate. Additionally, three of the attackers exited the vehicle, utilized small arms fire to kill an officer with the Central Security Force, and remained on foot for the duration of the attack. This action left the checkpoint without protection, and allowed the first vehicle to proceed with its remaining two occupants. The second vehicle, occupied by two individuals dressed to look like officers with the Central Security Force, followed the first by approximately 20 seconds and also carried an improvised explosive device. Since the checkpoint had already been neutralized, the

second vehicle was free to advance toward the entrance to the embassy without being hindered by the checkpoint’s access control gate.\textsuperscript{180}

As the first vehicle was driven toward the embassy’s main gate, an occupant engaged Yemeni security forces, positioned at various points along the access road, with small arms fire. Prior to reaching the gate, the improvised explosive device that was being transported within the vehicle detonated. The second vehicle succeeded in maneuvering around what remained of the first vehicle before the explosive device that it carried detonated, approximately 50 yards from the embassy’s main gate. The three remaining attackers advanced on foot along the embassy’s perimeter wall while firing their weapons. All three died when they detonated the explosive vests that they were wearing. Although the attackers failed to breach the embassy compound’s perimeter wall, one American citizen and 10 other people died as a result of their attempt. There were no American employees of the embassy killed during this attack.\textsuperscript{181}

Benghazi is the largest city in the eastern region of Libya, is responsible for most of the country’s oil production, and has historically served as a center for revolutionary activity. In addition to being the base for the anti-Qaddafi Transitional National Council (also known as TNC) during the 2011 Libyan revolution, Benghazi was the birthplace of Qaddafi’s 1969 rebellion against the Libyan monarchy. The city also served as host to a violent group that attacked and burned the U.S. Consulate in 1967. Throughout Qaddafi’s tenure, eastern Libya’s infrastructure and standard of living had historically been below


\textsuperscript{181}Ibid.
that which could be found in Tripoli; conditions that proved ripe for a Salafist jihadist movement that began in that part of Libya. Jihadis from this region battled against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1970s, the U.S. military in Iraq during the 2000s, and were the leaders of anti-Qaddafi militias during the 2011 Libyan revolution.\textsuperscript{182}

On February 25, 2011, and in response to increasing levels of violence between Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi and rebel groups fighting to overthrow him, the DOS suspended operations at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli and evacuated all of its personnel from the country. During the month that followed, the U.S. Government made the strategic decision that an official American presence was once again necessary in Libya. On April 5, 2011, this presence was re-established in Benghazi by John Christopher Stevens, who was sent as the U.S. Government’s Special Envoy to the Libyan TNC.\textsuperscript{183} Initially, Stevens operated from a hotel in downtown Benghazi; however, in early June and as a result of concerns regarding the security of the Special Envoy mission, Stevens and DOS security personnel relocated to the Special Mission Annex and later to what would become the U.S. Special Mission compound, both of which were also in Benghazi.\textsuperscript{184}

The U.S. Government officially recognized the TNC as the legitimate Government of Libya on July 15, 2011, Tripoli fell at the end of August, and the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli reopened on September 22, 2011. Since many of the TNC’s


\textsuperscript{183}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{184}Ibid., 13-14.
influential leaders remained in Benghazi, the Special Envoy to the TNC remained; however, Stevens left that position on November 17, 2011. Although the DOS’s “Under Secretary of Management approved a one-year continuation of the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi in December 2011,” the mission was never formally declared to the Libyan Government and therefore, never accredited as a diplomatic mission by the Libyans. On May 26, 2012, Stevens returned to Libya as the U.S. Ambassador.185

On September 10, 2012, Ambassador Stevens and two Diplomatic Security special agents traveled to the U.S. Special Mission compound in Benghazi from the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. They joined Information Management Officer Sean Smith and three additional Diplomatic Security special agents who were serving temporary duty assignments to the Special Mission.186

In the absence of an effective central government security presence, the Special Mission’s Libyan security contingent was composed of four armed members of the February 17 Martyrs’ Brigade—a local umbrella organization of militias dominant in Benghazi (some of which were Islamist) and loosely affiliated with the Libyan government, but not under its control.187

In addition to the protection provided by the February 17 Martyrs’ Brigade, the U.S. Special Mission had a round-the-clock, seven days per week, contract guard force that provided five unarmed security guards per eight hour shift. Furthermore, the Special Mission had requested that the Libyan Government’s Supreme Security Council permanently assign a “marked police vehicle” to the perimeter of the mission; however,

186Ibid., 18.
187Ibid., 19.
coverage by the police vehicle was sporadic.\textsuperscript{188} During the eight months prior to September, the DOS’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security provided additional funding for the contract guard force, the February 17 Martyrs’ Brigade, and various physical security related upgrades.\textsuperscript{189}

On September 11, 2012, at approximately 9:42 pm local time, one of the Diplomatic Security special agents on the U.S. Special Mission compound heard gunshots and an explosion. This agent then observed, “via security camera dozens of individuals, many armed,” entering the compound through the facility’s main gate.\textsuperscript{190} This marked the beginning of an attack that lasted approximately nine hours, and involved an enemy who utilized “arson, small arms and machine gun fire, rocket-propelled grenades, grenades, and mortars” against U.S. Government personnel at both the Special Mission compound and Annex. On September 12, 2012, at approximately 6:30 a.m., all U.S. Government personnel were evacuated from the Annex, with the assistance of a “quasi-governmental Libyan Militia,” to the airport in Benghazi.\textsuperscript{191} The attack resulted in four U.S. Government personnel being killed, serious injury to a Diplomatic Security special agent and an Annex security officer, and injury to three of the Special Mission compound’s contract guards. Additionally, the U.S. Special Mission


\textsuperscript{189}Ibid., 33.

\textsuperscript{190}Ibid., 20.

\textsuperscript{191}Ibid., 1, 27.
Terrorist Tactics

During the period of time 2000 through 2012, terrorist organizations once again modified the tactics they employed. What they did not do was alter the interest associated with the targeting of diplomatic missions, nor the appeal of utilizing explosive devices triggered by individuals who were willing to die as part of the attack. The attacks on the U.S. missions in Jeddah, Damascus, Sana’a, and Benghazi highlighted the terrorist organization’s different use of explosive devices, as well as a new focus on dispatching additional personnel to the target. Terrorists no longer intended for the explosive devices to be the attack, their plans now called for the utilization of explosives to breach the perimeter defenses of the facilities they targeted. These explosives would also not be confined to vehicles, as the terrorists who perpetrated the above attacks wore explosive vests or carried military grade or improvised explosive devices. The additional personnel that now participated in the attacks provided the terrorist organizations with greater flexibility once the attack was initiated, and increased the odds of successfully neutralizing the security forces protecting the targeted diplomatic missions. Once there was a successful breach of the perimeter, the additional terrorists could then enter the compound and cause as many casualties as possible before being confronted by a superior force. As a result of this evolution of the tactics utilized by terrorist

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organizations, defense of diplomatic missions became a much more complex undertaking.

U.S. Response

There is limited relevant and specific unclassified data available concerning the U.S. Government’s security response to the attacks that occurred on the U.S. diplomatic missions in Jeddah, Damascus, and Sana’a. Since there were no American citizen employees of the missions killed in these attacks, it is quite possible that there was far less public interest in information related to the incidents. There was an Accountability Review Board established by the Secretary of State for the attack on the consulate in Jeddah; however, the report submitted by this board is classified. Those readers with the appropriate U.S. Government security clearance are encouraged to review the report for a thorough understanding of the government’s security response to the attack. The Secretary of State was not required by law to convene Accountability Review Boards for the attacks on the embassies in Damascus and Sana’a. Although these incidents met the law’s first requirement by taking place at a U.S. Government mission abroad that was not under the control of a U.S. military commander, they did not meet the second requirement that stipulates the incident must involve at least one of the following: serious injury, loss of life, significant destruction of property, or a serious breach of security involving intelligence activities of a foreign government.193

Although not entirely relevant to the topic of this thesis, the November 2009 U.S. Government Accountability Office report *Diplomatic Security’s Recent Growth Warrants Strategic Review* contained some information pertinent to this thesis and the period of time covered in this section. Specifically, the report discussed the budget of the DOS’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and the number of security personnel employed by the Bureau. Additionally, the report identified a particular security response to the attack that occurred in Jeddah. Finally, the report offered the recommendations of the Government Accountability Office. The report reviewed the budget of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security from 1998 through 2008. It drew attention to the fact that the Bureau’s budget of $200 million in fiscal year 1998 had grown to $1.8 billion during fiscal year 2008. The Government Accountability Office attributed most of this growth to the “new security procedures” implemented in response to the 1998 attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, and the DOS’s security operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.\194\ This report stated that from 2004 through 2009, approximately 40 percent of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s budget for all security operations went to securing DOS interests in Iraq and Afghanistan.\195\ In their report, the Government Accountability Office found that the total number of direct hire DOS security personnel had more than doubled between 1998 and 2008. The total number of DOS security personnel includes federal law enforcement officers, technical security specialists, diplomatic couriers, and other support staff.\196\ 


\195\ Ibid., 18.

\196\ Ibid., 19.
The report also identified how the DOS adjusted its physical security measures in response to a vulnerability that was exploited by the perpetrators of the attack on the consulate in Jeddah. Although the DOS installed vehicle access control barriers, which prevented the attackers from driving their vehicle onto the compound in Jeddah, there were no measures in place that prevented the attackers from entering the compound on foot. In response to this vulnerability, the Government Accountability Office reported that the DOS began incorporating “man-traps in conjunction with the vehicle barriers at vehicle entry points at most high and critical threat posts.” These “man-traps” segregate a vehicle within a fenced in area, where it can be searched by security personnel without the threat of individuals gaining access to the compound along with the vehicle.197

The Government Accountability Office made five recommendations to the Secretary of State in their report; the two that follow are relevant to this thesis:

1. Ensure adequate staffing of both domestic and international operations.
2. Secure DOS facilities that do not meet “all physical security standards.”198

There is no shortage of unclassified information concerning the U.S. Government’s security response to the attacks that occurred at the Special Mission compound and Annex in Benghazi. Additionally, there were a number of investigations, inquiries, and hearings into the circumstances surrounding the attacks that were ongoing at the time this thesis was completed. As a result, this thesis will focus on the report of the Accountability Review Board for Benghazi. The Board reported a total of five

198Ibid., 38.
findings, and made 24 key recommendations. There were two findings and three
recommendations relevant to the topic of this thesis.

Concerning the finding related to the “adequacy of security systems and
procedures prior to September 11, 2012,” the Board noted “systemic failures and
leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels within two bureaus of the State
Department resulted in a Special Mission security posture that was inadequate for
Benghazi and grossly inadequate to deal with the attack that took place.” Related to this
finding and relevant to this thesis are the following overriding factors:

1. The existence of an environment in Washington, DC that lacked a sense of
“shared responsibility” for security of the mission in Benghazi between the
DOS bureaus responsible for policy and security, an issue that was also
identified in the report submitted by the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam
Accountability Review Boards in 1999.199

2. The decision to consider the mission in Benghazi a “temporary, residential
facility” which exempted it from the physical security requirements for office
buildings, and the accompanying funding.200

3. The decision to not officially notify the Libyan Government of the Benghazi
mission’s existence as a U.S. diplomatic mission.201

199 US Department of State, Report of the Accountability Review Board for
Benghazi, 29.

200 Ibid., 30.

201 Ibid.
4. The decision to rely on the February 17 Martyrs’ Brigade to protect the mission from attack was “misplaced,” as this group lacked the “requisite skills and reliability to provide a reasonable level of security.”\(^{202}\)

Regarding the finding related to the “implementation of security systems and procedures on September 11-12, 2012,” the Board found “notwithstanding the proper implementation of security systems and procedures and remarkable heroism shown by American personnel, those systems themselves and the Libyan response fell short in the face of a series of attacks that began with a sudden penetration of the Special Mission compound by dozens of armed attackers.”\(^{203}\) Related to this finding the Board noted that at the time of the attacks there was a “weak capacity and near total absence of central government influence in Benghazi.”\(^{204}\)

The three key recommendations made by the Board that are relevant to this thesis include:

1. The development of minimum physical security standards for temporary facilities in high-risk operational areas, and more expedient availability of funding in order to upgrade these facilities to the set standards.\(^{205}\)

2. The “collocation of newly constructed State Department and other government agencies’ facilities” when they are located “in the same

\(^{202}\)Ibid., 32.

\(^{203}\)Ibid., 34.

\(^{204}\)Ibid., 36.

\(^{205}\)Ibid., 9.
metropolitan area,” as recommended by the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam Accountability Review Boards.206

3. The DOS working with Congress to “restore the Capital Security Cost Sharing Program to its full capacity,” as recommended by the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam Accountability Review Boards.207

Decade Analysis

During the period of time 2000 through 2012, terrorist organizations continued evolving the tactics they utilized in order to adapt to the security measures in place at the facilities they targeted. The increased number of terrorists sent to attack the U.S. diplomatic missions in Jeddah, Damascus, Sana’a, and Benghazi presented new challenges for DOS security personnel. These new challenges accompanied those that had come as a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S. They also came during an era of unprecedented growth in the DOS’s budget authority, as well as the total number of DOS security personnel.

Table 11 is a summarized presentation of the data collected for the period of time 2000 through 2012. Although not specifically related to any one attack, the categories provide some overall context related to the environment that the attacks of this period occurred in. Immediately following this table is an expanded discussion of each category.

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206 Ibid., 9.
207 Ibid.
Table 11. 2000-2012 Attacks, Budget, and Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000-2012</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Attacks on U.S. Missions</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average DOS Budget Authority (estimate)</td>
<td>$33,169,230,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of DOS Security Personnel</td>
<td>1200 - 2500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As was the case in 1979 and the 1980s, the period of time 2000 through 2012 presented uncertainty regarding the total number of attacks on U.S. missions. The primary reason for this uncertainty was the 2003 through 2007 absence of DOS statistical reporting on violent acts that targeted Americans who were overseas. Additionally, the 2012 edition of the DOS report concerning these violent acts was not available for review prior to this thesis’ completion. Although this six year gap in statistical data made it impossible to determine the total number of attacks for this 12 year period of time, there were two interesting observations noted. The first observation is related to a comparison of reported attacks on U.S. missions during the last three years of the 1990s, and the first three years of the 2000s. The DOS reported eight attacks against U.S. missions during 1997, 18 in 1998, and 41 attacks during 1999; however, this upward trend did not continue, as the DOS reported five attacks targeting its overseas facilities in 2000, 13
during 2001, and nine attacks in 2002.\textsuperscript{208} The second observation concerns the available DOS statistics for the years 2008 through 2011, during which a consistent upward trend in attacks targeting U.S. diplomatic missions was noted. This reporting included two attacks against U.S. mission in 2008, three during 2009, five attacks in 2010, and 11 in 2011.\textsuperscript{209}

Although the total DOS budget authority of $6.4 billion for fiscal year 2000 was a decrease of more than $11 billion from fiscal year 1999, the fiscal years 2001 through 2012 included substantial increases in the DOS’s budget authority. Additionally, the total DOS budget authority increased relatively consistently between fiscal year 2001 through 2009, from just under $21.5 billion to just under $38.3 billion. There was a significant increase of more than $13 billion in the DOS’s budget authority for fiscal year 2010, and an additional increase of just over $5 billion for fiscal year 2011. The DOS’s total budget authority for fiscal year 2012 was just over $50.9 billion, a decrease of more than $5 billion from fiscal year 2011.\textsuperscript{210} The attacks that targeted the U.S. missions in Jeddah,


Damascus, Sana’a, and Benghazi occurred during fiscal years 2005, 2006, 2008, and 2012 respectively; a period of unprecedented, and consistent growth in the DOS budget.

During the period of time 2000 through 2012, the DOS more than doubled the total number of its security personnel. This increased number of federal law enforcement officers, security engineers and technicians, couriers, and management support staff accounts for the largest growth in security personnel experienced by the DOS between the years 1979 through 2012. In addition to this direct hire staff, the mission of securing U.S. diplomatic facilities is supported by approximately: 350 Foreign Service National employees, 1,300 Marine Security Guards, 166 Navy Seabees, 2,000 private security contractors, 33,491 security guards and surveillance detection personnel, 1,300 support

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contractors, and 775 uniformed protective officers.\footnote{US Government Accountability Office, \textit{Diplomatic Security’s Recent Growth Warrants Strategic Review}, 10-11.} These numbers appear robust; however, they seem much less so when one considers how the mission for those responsible for security at the DOS has evolved since 1979. Although the number of U.S. diplomatic missions has hovered around 250 since 1979,\footnote{Office of Management and Budget, \textit{The Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 1979}, 85-86; US Department of State, “Department Organization.”} the type and number of threats that these missions confront has increased substantially over the past 33 years.

Table 12 presents a qualitative interpretation of receiving nation’s capabilities and willingness to protect U.S. missions, combined with a summary of the party affiliations for key U.S. Government leaders. Although the first two categories are related individually to the four attacks examined, the category associated with the U.S. political environment is specific to the period of time 2000 through 2012 as a whole. Immediately following this table is an expanded discussion of each category.
Table 12.  2000-2012 Qualitative Interpretation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jeddah-------------</td>
<td>Yes------------------------------------------</td>
<td>No---------------------------------</td>
<td>President—Republican Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damascus-----------</td>
<td>Yes------------------------------------------</td>
<td>Yes--------------------------------</td>
<td>Senate—Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sana’a-------------</td>
<td>Yes------------------------------------------</td>
<td>Yes--------------------------------</td>
<td>House—Republican Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benghazi----------</td>
<td>No------------------------------------------</td>
<td>No---------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
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</table>


The fact that the Governments of Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen were functioning and supported by well established police, military, and intelligence forces, helps corroborate a conclusion that these three governments were capable of protecting the U.S. missions in their country at the time that they were attacked. Additionally, all three governments had security forces assigned to the U.S. missions at the time of the attacks. Although those forces provided by the Saudi Arabian Government initially ran away from the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah when the attack on that facility was initiated, the government eventually responded with forces that were successful in securing the U.S. mission. The security forces deployed by the Government of Syria to protect the U.S.
Embassy in Damascus successfully engaged and disrupted the 2006 attack on the U.S. mission. Yemeni security forces were also successful in their disruption of the 2008 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a. At the time of the attacks on the U.S. Special Mission compound and Annex in Benghazi, Libya was a country in crisis with a government that possessed limited capability to control events that occurred within its borders, especially in areas outside Tripoli. As a result, it is this thesis’ contention that the Government of Libya was incapable of protecting the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi.

The evidence of Saudi security forces running away from the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah, and the fact that it took the Government of Saudi Arabia over an hour to respond with an appropriate force to secure the consulate, both support a conclusion that the government was not willing to protect the U.S. mission when it was attacked. It is a fact that the Syrian and Yemeni Governments were willing to protect the U.S. Embassies in their countries, as the security forces assigned to both missions successfully reacted to the attacks. The determination of whether or not the Libyan Government was willing to protect the Special Mission compound and Annex in Benghazi was slightly more challenging, as they were neither officially declared diplomatic missions by the U.S. Government, nor officially accredited as such by the Libyan Government. However, the fact that the government had assigned a police vehicle to the Special Mission compound shows that the Government of Libya acknowledged that this facility needed protection. That said, the reported sporadic coverage by this police vehicle, along with the Libyan Government’s tacit agreement that a militia
“loosely affiliated” with the government\textsuperscript{213} was adequate protection for the U.S. Special Mission compound, supports a conclusion that the Government of Libya was not willing to provide adequate resources to protect the U.S. mission in Benghazi when it was attacked.

The inauguration of President Bush in 2001 brought about an end to eight consecutive years of Democratic domination of the Executive Branch of government. During his first two years in office, Bush had a Democrat controlled Senate and a Republican dominated House of Representatives. This changed during the second two years of Bush’s first term, and first two years of his second term in office. During these four years, the Republican Party dominated the Executive as well as the Legislative branches of government. For the remaining two years of Bush’s second term, the Democrats controlled both Chambers of Congress. The Democrats remained the dominant party in both the Senate and House of Representatives during President Barack Obama’s first two years in office. During the last two years of Obama’s first term in office, the Democratic Party maintained control of the Senate and the Republicans held the majority status in the House of Representatives.

**Summary**

The years 1979 through 2012 were a critical period of time for both U.S. diplomatic personnel and those responsible for security within the DOS. These 33 years hosted numerous attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions, 11 of which are the focus of this thesis; major world events, with some impacting the security environment in the

countries where U.S. missions were attacked; significant increases in the DOS’s total budget authority; noteworthy shifts in the tactics of terrorist organizations; enduring recommendations from three DOS Accountability Review Boards; considerable increases in the total number of DOS security personnel; and contrasting levels of capabilities and willingness of receiving nations to protect the U.S. diplomatic mission in their countries.

Table 13 is a summarized presentation of the data collected for the period of time 1979 through 2012. This data has already been presented within decade specific tables. The table below provides the reader with an opportunity to view the entire 33 year period of time. Although not specifically related to any one attack, the categories provide some overall context related to the environment that the attacks of this time period occurred in. Immediately following this table is an expanded discussion of each category.

Table 13. 1979-2012 Attacks, Budget, and Personnel

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Attacks on U.S. Missions</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Average DOS Budget Authority (estimate)</strong></td>
<td>$1,239,826,000</td>
<td>$3,279,713,600</td>
<td>$5,939,823,700</td>
<td>$33,169,230,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Number of DOS Security Personnel (approximate)</strong></td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600-800</td>
<td>800-1200</td>
<td>1200-2500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regardless of the gaps in the DOS’s reporting of attacks on U.S. missions between 1979 and 2012, there are several identifiable trends worthy of consideration. First, from 1980 through 1982 the Department reported that there were no lethal attacks specifically targeting U.S. missions. As these three years are inclusive of the period of time where the DOS’s reporting criteria accounted for only those actions that were deemed to be lethal, this trend is not all that surprising. Next, for the period of time 1987 through 1991 there was a significant and consistent increase of reported attacks that targeted U.S. missions. The Department’s use of expanded reporting criteria, introduced during these years, no doubt impacted the statistics related to attacks on U.S. missions; however, it is unlikely that this was the sole factor that influenced this trend. It is quite possible that the end of the Cold War brought about a sense of complacency throughout the U.S. Government on issues concerning national security. This in turn may have resulted in a more desirable operating environment for terrorist organizations, and a consistent increase in attacks on U.S. missions. Additionally, it would be a mistake not to consider the implications of the U.S. Government’s participation in Operations Desert Shield and Storm on the number of attacks targeting U.S. missions during 1990 and 1991.
These two years respectively represent the fourth and first positions on a highest to lowest list of total number of attacks on U.S. missions during the time period 1979 through 2012. Third, the years 1992 through 1994, account for a significant decrease in the reported number of attacks targeting U.S. missions. Fourth, 1995 through 2002 is a period of time where the reported total number of attacks on U.S. missions varied significantly from year to year. The third and fourth trends identified during this thesis’ analysis of the total number of reported attacks on U.S. missions proved difficult to ascertain potential contributing factors. Finally, there was a consistent increase in the total number of attacks targeting U.S. missions between the years 2008 through 2011. As worldwide military operations against terrorist organizations had been in progress for a number of years during this time period, it is worth contemplating the affect that U.S. Government policies had on the motivation of groups angered by these policies.

From 1979 through 2012, the total DOS budget authority ranged from a low of $1,239,826,000 for fiscal year 1979, to a high of $56,770,000,000 for fiscal year 2011.\textsuperscript{214} The totals for the individual years 1979 through 2012 are shown in figure 4 below. The data for the DOS’s budget authority has already been presented within decade specific figures: the figure below provides the reader with an opportunity to view the entire 33 year period of time.

Figure 4. Total U.S. Department of State Budget Authority (estimate) 1979-2012


Regarding the data presented in figure 4, there are several identifiable trends worth noting. First, with the exception of the years 1983 through 1987 and 2001 through 2009, the DOS’s total budget authority was anything but consistent. Secondly, the data presented in the figure is even more poignant when one aligns the 11 attacks on U.S. missions examined in this thesis with the corresponding fiscal year. The three attacks in 1979, at the U.S. Embassies in Tehran and Islamabad, occurred during the base year of
this thesis. Subsequent to a decrease in the DOS’s total budget authority, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut was attacked in 1983, followed one year later by an attack on the U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut. These attacks on the U.S. missions in Beirut transpired during the first two years of a five year period of consistent growth in the DOS’s budget authority. At the conclusion of this five year upward trend, the DOS budget withstood two consecutive years of decreased budget authority. The 1998 attack on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam occurred during the final year of a four year period of stagnation in the DOS’s total budget authority. Immediately following the attacks in Africa, the DOS budget authority for fiscal year 1999 more than tripled. This substantial increase was followed by an almost equal decrease for fiscal year 2000. The attacks on the U.S. missions in Jeddah, Damascus, and Sana’a took place during a period of significant and consistent growth in the DOS’s total budget authority; however, the attack on the U.S. Special Mission compound and Annex in Benghazi occurred during a year where the DOS’s budget absorbed a decrease of just over $5 billion.

Regarding the total number of DOS security personnel, the data collected for the period of time 1979 through 2012 revealed significant growth. In fact, the total number of security personnel more than quadrupled during this period of time. However, between 1979 and the beginning of the 1990s, the DOS increased the number of its security personnel by about 200. That leaves the remaining two-thirds of the Department’s security personnel hired between the years 1999 and 2012.

Table 14 presents a qualitative interpretation of receiving nation capabilities and willingness to protect U.S. missions, combined with a summary of the party affiliations for key U.S. Government leaders. Although the first two categories are related
individually to the 11 attacks examined, the category associated with the U.S. political environment is specific to the period of time 1979 through 2012 as a whole. Immediately following this table is an expanded discussion of each category. This data has been previously presented within decade specific tables: Table14 provides an opportunity to view the entire period of time covered by this thesis.

Table 14. 1979-2012 Qualitative Interpretation

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>President-Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Senate-Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamabad</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>House-Democratic Party</td>
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<td>1980s</td>
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<td>Beirut</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>President-Republican Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>President-Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Senate-Equal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2012</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jeddah</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>President-Republican Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damascus</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sana’a</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>House-Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benghazi</td>
<td>No</td>
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</table>

When considering the overall outcomes of the 11 attacks that have been examined in this thesis, the information related to the capabilities and willingness of the receiving nations to protect the U.S. missions in their countries at the time they were attacked is
quite illuminating. During the first attack that occurred in Tehran during 1979, and the attacks on the embassies in Damascus and Sana’a, all three governments were capable of protecting the U.S. missions. Additionally, these receiving nations demonstrated a willingness to protect the U.S. Embassies when they were attacked. As a result, the outcomes of these attacks were significantly more positive. During the second attack on the Embassy in Tehran during 1979, and the attacks that took place at the U.S. missions in Islamabad, Beirut, and Jeddah, the four governments lacked either the capability of protecting the U.S. missions, or they lacked the willingness to protect the missions at the time of the attacks. The outcomes of these attacks were significantly less positive, and in fact were catastrophic in the attacks on the U.S. missions in Beirut. Finally, during the attacks that occurred in Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and Benghazi, all three governments lacked the capabilities to protect the U.S. missions when they were attacks. These governments also failed to demonstrate a willingness to protect the missions. As a result, all three attacks led to outcomes that were catastrophic.

Table 15 is a summarized presentation of data concerning the leaders of the U.S. Government’s Executive and Legislative Branches for the years 1979 through 2012. Although this data has already been presented within decade specific tables, the table below provides the reader with an opportunity to view the entire 33 year period of time. The red highlighted boxes within this table identify those years where one of the political parties dominated both the Executive and Legislative Branches of government.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Senate Majority Leader</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Speaker of the House</th>
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<td>Party</td>
<td>Senate Minority Leader</td>
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<td>Party</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>William Jefferson Clinton</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Trent Lott</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Newton Leroy Gingrich</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>William Jefferson Clinton</td>
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<td>Trent Lott</td>
<td>Republican</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>William Jefferson Clinton</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Trent Lott</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>William Jefferson Clinton</td>
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<td>Trent Lott</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
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<td>Thomas A. Daschle</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>John Dennis Hastert</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Thomas A. Daschle</td>
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<td>John Dennis Hastert</td>
<td>Republican</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>William H. Frist</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>John Dennis Hastert</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Speaker of the House</td>
<td>Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>Republican</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
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<td>John Dennis Hastert</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Harry M. Reid</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Nancy Pelosi</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Harry M. Reid</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Nancy Pelosi</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Barack H. Obama</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Harry M. Reid</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Nancy Pelosi</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Barack H. Obama</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Harry M. Reid</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Nancy Pelosi</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Barack H. Obama</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Harry M. Reid</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>John Andrew Boehner</td>
<td>Republican</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Barack H. Obama</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Harry M. Reid</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>John Andrew Boehner</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As shown in the figure, the Republican Party held the Presidency for 20 of the 33 years examined for this thesis. This six year disparity between the Republican and Democratic Parties appears to be fairly inconsequential, especially when one considers that 1979 and 2012 were the mid-point for the terms of two Presidents from the Democratic Party. During this same period of time, the Democratic Party held a majority of the seats in the Senate for 18 years and in the House of Representatives for 20 years. The figure also highlights five periods of time where the Republican or Democratic
Parties held the Presidency and a majority of the seats in both Chambers of Congress. The Democratic Party dominated the Executive and Legislative Branches of government for a total of six years, from 1979 through 1980, 1993 through 1994, and 2009 through 2010. Republicans dominated these two Branches for a total of five years, in 2000 and from 2003 through 2006. These intervals where one Party holds the Presidency and controls both Chambers of Congress are key specifically when dealing with budgets, as theoretically, there should be fewer obstacles to accomplishing the priorities of the Party.

Chapter 4 followed the outline of presentation and analysis presented in chapter 3, and expanded on sources identified in chapter 2. Additionally, the results of the analysis conducted were combined in order to compare and contrast the results by decade and by subcategory to identify patterns and trends. Chapter 5 will be a presentation of this thesis’ conclusions and the researcher’s recommendations.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

This thesis examined the U.S. Government’s security response to attacks on its diplomatic missions between 1979 and 2012, and endeavored to answer the question of whether or not this response has been effective. It also sought to answer the following secondary research questions:

1. How many attacks on U.S. diplomatic missions occurred between 1979 and 2012?

2. What was the political environment in the U.S. at the time of the attacks in Tehran, Islamabad, Beirut, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Jeddah, Damascus, Sana’a, and Benghazi?

3. What did the security environment look like in Tehran, Islamabad, Beirut, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Jeddah, Damascus, Sana’a, and Benghazi at the time the U.S. diplomatic missions in these cities were attacked?

4. What was the U.S. Government’s response to the attacks on its diplomatic missions in Tehran, Islamabad, Beirut, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Jeddah, Damascus, Sana’a, and Benghazi?

5. What was the increase in total number of DOS security personnel from 1979 through 2012?

The inspiration behind this thesis’ topic grew from the researcher’s desire to find an unbiased answer to the question regarding the effectiveness of the U.S. Government’s response to attacks on its diplomatic missions. It was important for the researcher to
locate an unbiased answer, as one becomes quickly confused when listening to the various pundits who claim to be experts on the issue, and who are rather adept at casting unsupported accusations of blame. At the beginning of this project, the researcher was fairly confident that research and analysis would lead to clear conclusions about cause and effect for U.S. mission security. Instead, the thesis led to a somewhat contradictory two-pronged conclusion. On the one hand, the researcher concluded that since 1979, the U.S. Government has made significant strides toward securing its diplomatic missions. In fact there are multiple success stories, to include some that were examined as part of this thesis. The other hand points to the government’s pace in taking these steps, a pace that has been erratic and unequal in application at all U.S. missions.

Although the researcher remained torn on the question of effectiveness, he was successful in answering the secondary research questions. As a result of several gaps in reporting by the DOS and modifications to the Department’s reporting criteria, the researcher was unable to obtain the total number of attacks that targeted U.S. missions between 1979 and 2012. However, during the examination of the years where DOS statistical data was available, the researcher discovered an apparent correlation between years that had a high number of reported attacks and certain concurrent world events. In identifying the leaders of the U.S. Government’s Executive and Legislative Branches, as well as the focus of the Presidents for the years 1979 through 2012, this thesis presented an overview of the U.S. political environment at the time of each attack. Regarding the documentation of the political environment, the researcher hoped to settle the argument put forth by political pundits from both the Democratic and Republican Parties. That argument being that the other political party was responsible for creating the conditions
that made the attack on particular U.S. diplomatic missions possible. During the 33 years that are the focus of this thesis, the Republican Party held the Presidency for six years more that the Democratic Party, while the Democrats had a two year advantage over the Republicans in the Senate, and a six year advantage in the House of Representatives. None of these advantages are substantial enough to support a claim that one party was more responsible than the other for creating conditions that put U.S. missions at risk. This thesis detailed the general security environment within Tehran, Islamabad, Beirut, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Jeddah, Damascus, Sana’a, and Benghazi at the time the U.S. diplomatic missions located in those cities were attacked. Particularly relevant to this thesis were the details that made it possible to assess the receiving nation’s capability and willingness to protect the U.S. mission in their country when it was attacked; factors that this thesis has revealed to be key to the outcome of an attack being significantly more positive. Regarding the U.S. Government’s response to attacks on its diplomatic missions, the researcher noted three themes of particular concern: (1) inadequate existing DOS physical security standards, (2) inadequate funding in the DOS budget, and (3) inadequate consideration of site selection for diplomatic missions. What caused this concern was that two of the three themes were common in the reports submitted by the Accountability Review Boards that were convened for the attacks on the U.S. missions in Beirut, Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, and Benghazi; a period of time spanning more than 27 years. These two themes address physical security standards and DOS funding. Concerning the first theme, all three Accountability Review Boards noted failures in the DOS’s physical security standards, and recommended that the Department develop minimum physical security standards for all U.S. diplomatic missions. The second theme
common in all of the reports focused on issues related to the DOS budget, and how the Department must be appropriated adequate funding to secure its missions. Although not common in the reports submitted by all Boards, the third theme addresses the selection of sites for diplomatic missions, and was discussed in the reports submitted by the Boards convened for the attacks in Beirut and Africa. In these reports, the Boards recommended that safety and security are the most important considerations when searching for property to be used for a U.S. mission. In addition to revealing that a majority of the DOS’s security personnel were added after 2000, the research related to the increase in total number of security personnel from 1979 through 2012 also revealed a more troubling discovery. It took the Department 14 years to reach the total number of security personnel recommended by the 1985 *Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security*.

### Recommendations

This research produced six recommendations, based on the conclusions identified previously:

1. Assess the capability of the receiving nation to provide security for a U.S. mission.
2. Assess the willingness of the receiving nation to provide security for a U.S. mission.
3. If the receiving nation is unable or unwilling to secure the U.S. mission, plan for Department of Defense assets to help secure the mission.
4. If the receiving nation is incapable or unwilling to provide security, and Department of Defense assistance is not feasible, seriously consider closing the mission.

5. Congress should provide consistent levels of funding for the DOS, in order for the Department to rationally and effectively manage security programs.

6. Conduct a comprehensive review of personnel and resource allocations; be prepared to close missions that do not achieve an acceptable risk to reward assessment.

These recommendations are related to this thesis’ key original assertions that when responding to attacks on its diplomatic missions, the U.S. Government: (1) fails to adequately consider the capability of a receiving nation’s government to provide for the protection of the U.S. mission; (2) fails to adequately consider the willingness of a receiving nation’s government to provide for the protection of the U.S. mission; and (3) has failed to provide consistent levels of funding for the DOS. The impact of these factors has been documented in this thesis, and should be the focus of the U.S. Government’s strategy related to the security of its diplomatic missions. In providing these recommendations, the researcher acknowledges the many challenges associated with appropriating adequate funding for all U.S. Government programs, and assumes that the number of current programs will not diminish in the near future.

The first two recommendations are essential to the overall security of U.S. diplomatic missions, and should be part of an ongoing security assessment process executed by the Regional Security Officer responsible for a particular U.S. diplomatic mission. Upon determining that a certain receiving nation is incapable or unwilling to
provide security for a U.S. mission, consideration should be given to the third recommendation; planning for the use of Department of Defense assets to assist with securing U.S. diplomatic missions during significant crises. This planning would necessitate the involvement of strategic level decision makers within the U.S. Government; however, utilization of these military resources would provide additional and necessary capabilities to the DOS’s organic security assets. The researcher acknowledges the presence of many variables associated with the fourth recommendation; however, when a Regional Security Officer assesses that a receiving nation is incapable or unwilling to provide security for a U.S. mission, and strategic level decision makers determine Department of Defense assistance is not feasible, the U.S. Government should seriously consider closing the mission.

Between 1979 and 2012, the U.S. Government has failed to provide consistent levels of funding for the DOS. As a result, the Department has been forced into becoming more reactionary versus proactive when it comes to security. The issues with funding have also forced the DOS into creating loopholes and waivers to their standards related to physical security, as well as delayed implementation of recommendations made by various Accountability Review Boards. Consistent levels of funding, as opposed to extreme peaks and valleys, will give the Department an opportunity to engage in much more effective long-term planning related to securing its overseas missions.

The researcher’s final recommendation involves the DOS conducting a comprehensive review of its personnel and resource allocation, particularly at those missions assessed by the Department to be at a critical or high threat risk of terrorism. This review should address the following questions:
1. Does the presence of this diplomatic mission nest with the strategic goals of the U.S. Government?

2. What is the minimum number of personnel necessary to accomplish the goals of this mission?

3. Can the Department accomplish the strategic goals of the U.S. Government, as they relate to the country where the mission is currently located, from a neighboring country that offers a more permissive security environment?

4. Does the Department have the necessary resources to adequately secure the facility that this mission seeks to operate from?

If the answer to the first question is no, the DOS should close its mission in that particular country. Determining the minimum number of personnel necessary to accomplish the goals of a mission is key, as there is no need to expend finite resources on securing personnel who are not mission essential. There is nothing new about question three, as the 1999 Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam raised the possibility of consolidation into regional missions.\(^{215}\) This is something worth consideration, particularly amid the fiscal challenges now facing the Federal Government. The fourth question speaks for itself, as the Department and the nation assume unacceptable risk in operating a diplomatic mission without the necessary resources to adequately secure it.

Further Study

There are many areas related to the focus of this thesis that would benefit from further study, from the effectiveness of current DOS physical security measures to the impact of world events on the security of U.S. diplomatic missions. However, when considering areas that would benefit from further study, one is drawn to the *Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam*; specifically, to the section of the report that introduced the possibility of consolidating DOS operations into regional missions. This is the topic that the researcher believes would benefit the most from further study.


Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Policy. The 1998 Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania: Failures of Intelligence or of Policy Priorities? Washington, DC: Georgetown University,


