AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES BORDER PATROL STRATEGIC PLANS, 1994-2013

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Homeland Security Studies

by

JEFFREY D. STALNAKER, FIELD OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR, USBP
B.A., American Military University, Manassas, Virginia, 2011

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An Analysis of the Development and Effectiveness of the United States Border Patrol Strategic Plans, 1994-2013

As threats against the United States (U.S.) evolved over time, so did the strategy of the United States Border Patrol (USBP) in an effort to keep unlawful persons from crossing into the U.S. at locations other than at designated ports of entry. This thesis analyzes the three strategies that the USBP developed since their inception in 1924. It reviews the themes of the three strategies and identifies their variations as the environment along the southwest border and the USBP as an organization changed over time. In order to assess the environment along the southwest border, the author examined the following variables: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII). In order to assess the USBP, the author analyzed the following variables: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF). The use of these two methods of analysis throughout the three time frames during which each strategy was implemented, assisted to provide a similar research and comparison basis for each strategy.

Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, Border Patrol, Strategic Plans, Border Protection, Southwest Border

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Approved by:

__________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Allan S. Boyce, M.S.

__________________________, Member
O. Shawn Cupp, Ph.D.

__________________________, Member
Eric F. McMillin, M.A.

Accepted this 14th day of June 2013 by:

__________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


As threats against the United States (U.S.) evolved over time, so did the strategy of the United States Border Patrol (USBP) in an effort to keep unlawful persons from crossing into the U.S. at locations other than at designated ports of entry. This thesis analyzes the three strategies that the USBP developed since their inception in 1924. It reviews the themes of the three strategies and identifies their variations as the environment along the southwest border and the USBP as an organization changed over time. In order to assess the environment along the southwest border, the author examined the following variables: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII). In order to assess the USBP, the author analyzed the following variables: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF). The use of these two methods of analysis throughout the three time frames during which each strategy was implemented, assisted to provide a similar research and comparison basis for each strategy.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The Border Patrol encounters numerous individuals on a daily basis who have unlawfully entered the country. The majority of the time, Border Patrol agents work alone in grueling terrain and weather, and encounter numerous individuals from many different countries, to include some people from countries known to have strong ties with terrorist organizations (Gambler 2012b, 20-58). Additionally, some individuals that the Border Patrol encounters possess prior convictions of criminal or administrative charges. However, when a Border Patrol agent encounters an individual along the border who has unlawfully entered the United States (U.S.), that agent is unable to always positively identify the subject and the extent of that person’s criminal history. In fact, a Border Patrol agent does not know with whom exactly they are dealing with until the agent receives the detained individual’s complete record checks. Frequently, individuals caught unlawfully crossing the border do not have record checks performed on them until they arrive at the station’s processing center. While being held at the processing center, agents roll all incarcerated person’s fingerprints and compare them against numerous databases to check for any prior arrests or convictions (Haddal, Kim, and Garcia 2010b, 10-11). In many cases, it is not until this point that the Border Patrol, or the arresting agent, knows the extent of that individual’s criminal history or from what country the apprehended individual is a citizen.

The events that took place on September 11, 2001 prompted the need for the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Shortly thereafter, the President of the United States, George W. Bush, determined that a requirement existed to establish
an organization with the responsibility for protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks and lead the coordination of efforts in response to future acts of terrorism (The White House 2002b, 1). The establishment of the DHS created a centralized department that merged 22 different agencies, each with a distinct role in protecting and securing the homeland. The organizational chart in figure 1 depicts the organizational structure of the DHS. The thought process behind forming the DHS was to bring together the different agencies under one overarching department in order to more effectively and efficiently communicate, plan, coordinate, operate, and share information (Department of Homeland Security 2012b). Furthermore, on November 25, 2002, just over a year after the terrorist attacks took place in New York, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia; President Bush signed into law, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (The White House 2002a). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 specified the missions that the DHS is responsible for, namely:

1. Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States.
2. Reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism.
3. Minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States.
4. Carry out all functions of entities transferred to the Department, including by acting as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning.
5. Ensure that the functions of the agencies and sub-divisions within the Department that are not related directly to securing the homeland are not diminished or neglected except by a specific explicit Act of Congress.
6. Ensure that the overall economic security of the United States is not diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland.

7. Monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate efforts to sever such connections, and otherwise contribute to efforts to interdict illegal drug trafficking (U.S. Congress 2002).

These missions entrusted to the DHS acted as a guide to identifying the agencies to transplant and incorporate into the DHS.

![DHS Organization Chart](http://www.dhs.gov/organizational-chart)

**Figure 1. DHS Organization Chart**

On March 1, 2003, the establishment of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) came as a result of incorporating 22 agencies into a single component under the jurisdiction of the DHS. The merging of the United States Border Patrol (USBP), the United States Customs Service, and the United States Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service formed CBP. As outlined in CBP’s Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan, CBP’s mission is to “protect the American public against terrorists and the instruments of terror . . . enforce the laws of the United States while fostering our nation’s economic security through lawful international trade and travel” (Department of Homeland Security 2009, 4). Additionally, CBP is the component within the DHS that serves as America’s first line of defense to detect and prevent terrorist and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) effect from crossing more than 8,000 miles of the U.S. international land, air, and sea borders. As the largest federal law enforcement agency in the U.S., CBP has a force of more than 60,000 employees stationed at many locations throughout the interior of the U.S., as well as in various countries around the world (Department of Homeland Security 2012d). Fourteen different offices make up the organization of CBP. There are three operational offices within CBP, which encompass the majority of the employees; the remaining 11 offices assist in a supporting capacity. At the beginning of 2012, there were 45,741 uniformed, sworn agents and officers considered as part of the group of individuals that are deemed operational (Customs and Border Protection 2012b). The remaining individuals are those that work in a supporting role and assist with daily operations. The organizational chart in figure 2 depicts CBP’s organizational structure. The three operational CBP offices are the Office of Border Patrol, Field Operations, and Air and Marine. At the end of fiscal year 2012, the Office of
Border Patrol employed 21,394 Border Patrol agents (U.S. Border Patrol 2012). The Office of Field Operations employed 21,186 officers, and the Office of Air and Marine employed more than 1,200 agents (Department of Homeland Security 2012f). The USBP divides their areas of responsibility up into 20 different sectors across the southern, northern and coastal borders of the United States. Within these 20 Border Patrol sectors, there are 139 separate Border Patrol stations and a total of 31 permanent checkpoints (Customs and Border Protection 2012b). The Office of Field Operations also divides up their area of responsibility into 20 Field Offices comprising the entire United States. Within these 20 Field Offices, there are 329 ports of entries where Officers conduct their daily duties (Customs and Border Protection 2012a). As the world’s largest maritime and aviation law enforcement organization, the Office of Air and Marine conducts their missions out of 80 locations throughout the United States. The Office of Air and Marine deploys their agents along the coast and land borders, and has a fleet of more than 270 aircraft and over 300 marine vessels (Customs and Border Protection 2012c).
Figure 2. CBP Organization Chart.


The numbers depicted in table 1 shows the total number of personnel that CBP, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration, United States Marshals Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives employed in 2012.
Table 1. Size of Five Federal Government Agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Size</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Customs and Border Protection</td>
<td>More than 60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
<td>36,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Enforcement Agency</td>
<td>8,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Marshal Service</td>
<td>5,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and Explosives</td>
<td>5,101</td>
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Source: Created by author with data from Department of Homeland Security 2012, Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice U.S. Marshal Service, and Department of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives.

The agency that employs the next closest number of personnel to CBP is the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In 2012, the FBI reports that they employed a total of 36,074 employees, of which 13,913 were field agents and the remaining individuals were support personnel (Department of Justice 2013c). In 2012, the total enacted amount of personnel that the Drug Enforcement Administration could hire was 8,304 positions. Of this number, there were a total of 4,053 available agent positions (Department of Justice 2013b). The enacted amount of employees for the U.S. Marshal Service totaled 5,544 in 2012, of which 4,134 were authorized to be Deputy U.S. Marshals (Department of Justice 2013d). Finally, the enacted personnel hires for 2012 for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives were 5,101, of which 2,485 were agents (Department of Justice 2013a).

The USBP is the organization that conducts the majority of its duties between official ports of entry along the international land, air, and sea borders of the United States. Prior to the USBP becoming a part of CBP in 2003, the USBP resided within the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), under the Department of Justice. During
the period of time that the USBP was a part of the INS, their concentrated efforts focused on individuals unlawfully entering the U.S., especially smugglers of humans and drugs. The USBP’s concentration of efforts and resources shifted to preventing terrorists and their weapons from entering the country, once the USBP transitioned into CBP (Haddal, Kim, and Garcia 2010b, 2). These tasks are challenging because of the thousands of border miles the U.S. shares with its neighboring countries, and the many miles of coastal waters that surround the United States. The challenging aspects of conducting their assignments are the large volume of people that seek to unlawfully enter the U.S., and the rugged and expansive terrain that lies along the borders (Gambler 2012b, 20-58). These factors make it extremely difficult for agents to detect every entry made into the U.S. and maneuver resources to promptly reach locations where illicit activity may be occurring.

In order to be able to secure the many miles of border, the USBP utilized their larger post 9/11 budget to deploy and buildup more resources along the borders. The increased resources that the USBP acquired over the last decade ranges from hiring more personnel, obtaining unmanned aerial vehicles, communication equipment, and day and night cameras; to acquiring and building infrastructure, such as fencing and vehicle barricades (Haddal, Kim, and Garcia 2010a, 6-10).

In order to mitigate some of the challenges that face the USBP, they embraced the whole of government approach to assist with the protection of the U.S. borders (Department of Homeland Security 2004). This includes working along the southwest border in a coordinated effort with federal, state, local, and tribal entities with the intention of keeping the U.S. safe from unlawful entries across the southwest border. The
USBP also works closely with the Government of Mexico, for the purpose of facilitating efforts to impede the unlawful entry of people across the southwest border.

**Purpose**

It is common for an organization to eventually reach a point in time when they need to alter their strategy to ensure that the organization is working as one cohesive team, or to refocus the organization due to changes (Miller and Turner 2012, 1). The USBP created their first strategy in 1994 because of the Commissioner’s recognition (as well as that of the Clinton administration) that numerous concerns present at the time required a response (U.S. Border Patrol 1994, 1).

The strategy that the USBP created in 2012 was only the third strategic plan created since their inception in 1924. The USBP decided that they required a new strategy because of the many changes that they experienced since 2004. The USBPs increased amount of personnel, technology, and infrastructure since the establishment of the 2004 strategic plan created a need for the USBP to modify its strategic approach for securing the nation’s borders (Department of Homeland Security 2012f). Furthermore, the increase of personnel over the years and an automatic step increase to a GS-12 for all nonsupervisory agents increased the size of the personnel budget and caused a smaller operational budget. The significance of the smaller operational budget means, that the USBP will not be able to dedicate as much money to the build up of the organization’s technology and infrastructure as they were able to do in previous years. In May of 2012, the Chief of the USBP, Michael Fisher, presented the organization’s new strategy during a hearing before the House Subcommittee of Homeland Security. The Chief explained the modifications and improvements made to the strategic plan and how the new strategic
plan builds upon the successes of the previous USBP strategies (Department of Homeland Security 2012f).

Since a large portion of the safety and well being of our nation rests upon the ability of the USBP to successfully conduct their daily duties, it is necessary to analyze its current strategy, with the purpose of determining if they are focusing their organization in the right direction to secure the nation’s borders. Additionally, analyzing the USBP’s objectives within their present strategy will provide a better understanding of what their focus is, in order to achieve their mission. Finally, examining the USBP’s first strategy created in 1994, and their second in 2004, will be beneficial in providing a better understanding of what the USBP has developed and employed in past years, and represents the foundation that the USBP’s current strategy is built upon.

Primary Question

The primary question for this research study is: Does the 2012 Border Patrol Strategic Plan provide a more effective means to avert, detect, and react to unlawful entries into the United States?

Secondary Questions

The following are secondary questions that will assist in answering the primary question: Was the Border Patrol’s 2004 strategy effective? What caused the need for the Border Patrol to create a new strategy in 2012? In creating the 2012 strategy, what did the Border Patrol carry over from the 2004 strategy, and what did they newly craft to build upon it?
Limitations

The limitation of this research is that it will only encompass examining the three USBP strategies developed since the mid 1990s, and exploring literature that has a nexus to the strategies during the same time frame. Researching the two strategies created prior to the 2012 USBP Strategic Plan will help to provide insight and a better understanding of how the USBP utilized these prior strategies, to build upon during the construction of their new strategy. Additionally, it will allow the possibility to assess what the USBP’s focus, theme, objectives, goals, and missions were prior to, and after the tragic events that unfolded on September 11, 2001, and how those events affected the USBP’s mission and strategy since those attacks. Lastly, the concentration of effort will be limited to assessing and determining if the new USBP Strategic Plan is more effective through the use of a qualitative analysis and using quantitative measures, with the aim of providing an unbiased conclusion to the primary and secondary thesis questions.

The qualitative research and analysis contained in this study to describe the operational environment along the southwest border specifically focuses on the USBP. Additionally, analyzed information describing the environment along the southwest border focuses on the changes that the USBP caused due to its construction of infrastructure and deployment of technology. Furthermore, although there are many other organizations that operate along the southwest border that have a mission that relates to securing the U.S. from threats, as well as groups that threaten the U.S. or smuggle unlawful people and drugs across the southwest border, this study does not analyze these organizations or other aspects of the operational environment.
Defining Terms

The following is a list of defining terms used in the context throughout this study.

**Area of Operations.** These are defined locations that are assigned to a subordinate entity by higher command, within which they are authorized to conduct their mission (Department of the Army 2011b, 12).

**Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue Team.** A team within the USBP that provides a rapid response law enforcement search, rescue, and tactical medical capabilities for individuals in need of help. The composition of the team comprises a small percent of Border Patrol agents that receive numerous hours of medical training, in addition to learning search and rescue techniques. Furthermore, these individuals can immediately deploy to any national or international emergency situation (Customs and Border Protection 2009a).

**Border Patrol Tactical Unit.** A team within the USBP that provides a tactical rapid response capability to resolve emergent, high-risk and unusual law enforcement situations employing specialized skills, weapons, and tactics. This unit is capable of responding to incidents both nationally and internationally. Furthermore, this team consists of a small percentage of Border Patrol agents that receive many additional hours of training to conduct these particular duties (Customs and Border Protection 2009b).

**Change Detection Capability.** An approach to utilizing resources in low threat areas with the aim of attempting to identify and make a determination, based on gathered information, regarding whether or not the threat in that specified area has changed. The methods and resources used to verify whether or not a change occurred in threat activity in an area by exploring and surveying the environment, conducting fly overs with
aircraft, and through collaboration with civil and enforcement partners (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 14).

**Information, Integration, and Rapid Response.** The USBPs new fundamental approach used in the 2012 to 2016 strategic plan to secure America’s borders. “Information” is raw data that is processed with the purpose of identifying whether or not that data can be exploited to assist in securing the nation’s borders. “Integration” consists of an organized partnership conducting shared efforts to secure the nation’s borders and keep the American public safe. “Rapid Response” provides the ability to quickly plan and utilize a capability, with the intention of alleviating a threat (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 4).

**Office of Air and Marine.** The office within CBP that has the primary mission of utilizing air and maritime assets to prevent and interdict terrorists and WMD from entering the United States. Furthermore, the Office of Air and Marine tremendously supports the USBP in their efforts to secure the border by providing countless hours of air support through the numerous air platforms that the Office of Air and Marine maintains (Customs and Border Protection 2012c).

**Office of Field Operations.** An office within CBP that holds the prime responsibility of preventing the entry of terrorists and WMD by securing the nation’s ports of entry, and simultaneously ensuring the secure flow of trade and travel of goods and people through the U.S. ports of entry (Customs and Border Protection 2012a).

**Operational Environment.** “A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.” (Department of Defense 2011, GL 14).
**Operational Offices.** The specified offices that primarily focus their efforts on conducting operations along the nation’s borders and ports of entry, versus focusing the majority of their efforts in a supporting position (author’s definition).

**Port of Entry.** A designated official port of entry used by individuals that seek entry into the U.S. from another country, whether by land, sea, or air, to present themselves to federal officers (Department of Homeland Security 2012c).

**The Posse Comitatus Act.** A federal law, United States Code, Title 18, Section 1385, that prohibits active duty military personnel from conducting the duties of law enforcement within the U.S., unless authorized by the Constitution, or approved by Congress. However, this law does not apply to individuals that work within the Coast Guard or National Guard in a Title 32 status (Brinkerhoff 2009).

**Risk-Based.** An approach that focuses on identifying areas along the border that present the greatest risk to the nation and deploying the proper combination of assets to mitigate that risk (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 7).

**Transnational Criminal Organizations.** Three or more people who act together across international borders, with the goal of committing a criminal act and intending to directly or indirectly receive any kind of benefit from those actions (Martinez 2012, 60).

**Delimitation**

Immigration is and has been an important political subject in the U.S., and a topic of concern with regard to the safety and well being of the American people and the country as a whole. This study will not conduct a deep inquiry into current or past immigration policies, nor will it discuss how to obtain proper documentation to legally enter the United States. Additionally, this study will not include any research or
discussions regarding missions, goals, or objectives that the USBP held prior to the development of their first strategy in 1994. Moreover, the emphasis of the research in this study focuses on the southwest border region of the United States. Furthermore, the research and discussions conducted on the USBP’s different strategies will not entail any research on strategies of any of the other offices within CBP.

**Assumptions**

An assumption of this research is that the USBP is going to remain the agency charged with securing the border between the U.S. ports of entry. The only other department that is equipped and large enough to take on the responsibilities of the USBP is the Department of Defense. Both the Bush and Obama administrations approved the use of the National Guard along the U.S. and Mexico border in the past; however, it is highly unlikely that a permanent militarization of the border will occur. Furthermore, Title 10 USC, Section 375 states that the Army and Air Force cannot conduct law enforcement activities, unless approved to do so by Congress (U.S. Northern Command 2012). Due to the immense task of being responsible for detecting and apprehending all people and things that unlawfully enter the country between designated ports of entry, and the large budget they are provided by the American taxpayers, the USBP is going to be in the political and public eye for years to come. Therefore, it will need to provide the American public and political leaders its strategy to substantiate and illustrate what they are doing to protect and secure the borders.

An additional assumption is that as the USBP’s 2012 strategy becomes outdated, and-or the political and-or economic environments change, the need for the USBP to produce a new strategy will become necessary. Possible reasons the USBP may need to
alter their strategy could be to adapt to a new President’s vision, or if Mexico’s economy significantly improved, or if the U.S.’s economy considerably declined. Now that the USBP has a new strategy in writing that specifies how the organization will proceed forward with accomplishing their mission, that strategy will possibly be altered or completely revamped if the government decides to handle the immigration problems that are present within the U.S. by granting amnesty to those currently residing in the United States. Therefore, if there is an alteration to the strategy in any way, it will have to undergo research and analysis to determine how it affects the security of the southwest border.

Summary

It is imperative for the U.S. to have an organization responsible for keeping the nation safe, by preventing people and things from unlawfully crossing the borders at locations other than an officially designated port of entry. Given that the USBP is responsible for this mission, they recently generated a new strategy that postures them to work towards their identified goals with the purpose of successfully accomplishing this responsibility. Furthermore, the creation of this strategy is one way for the USBP’s Chief to communicate his vision for the organization and how he sees the organization proceeding forward to accomplishing their mission. An analysis of the USBP’s present strategy, as well as their two previous strategies, along with other means of research provided ample information to answer the thesis question presented in this study and to provide the best, well researched conclusion. The next chapter provides a literature review, displaying the literature reviewed pertaining to the research on this topic.
Introduction

The USBP works along the nation’s borders to prevent unauthorized access of individuals across the nation’s land, air, and sea borders, and to apprehend those who do illegally enter the country between designated ports of entry. The USBP witnessed a major overhaul within their organization and experienced a major change in their operational environment, due to the technology and infrastructure they obtained over the years. A method in which the current Chief of the USBP, Michael Fisher, elected to communicate how he intends the organization to proceed forward was to develop a new strategic plan. The creation of the 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan became necessary because of the many changes made and accomplishments achieved since the previous strategy created in 2004, and because CBP and the USBP senior executives recognized the need for a more specified approach to defending against the threats that exist along the nation’s borders (Department of Homeland Security 2012f). The primary question that this research intends to answer is: Does the 2012 Border Patrol Strategic Plan provide a more effective means to avert, detect, and react to unlawful entries into the United States? The secondary questions requiring answers in this study are: Was the Border Patrol’s 2004 strategy effective? What caused the need for the Border Patrol to create a new strategy in 2012? In creating the 2012 strategy, what did the Border Patrol carry over from the 2004 strategy, and what did they craft to build upon it? This chapter is an overview of researched and analyzed literature, which supports answering the primary and secondary questions in this thesis.
The boundaries of time of the reviewed material that assists with answering the primary and secondary questions is from the creation of the USBP’s first strategy in 1994 to the end of March 2013. The reason for this time frame is that it provides for a substantial and contextually accurate understanding of the 1994, 2004, and 2012 USBP strategies, which are the main focus of this study. Additionally, using this time frame allows for the analysis of the USBP’s first strategy, to explain what strategies, goals, and objectives were in place prior to September 11, 2001, and if any of those same strategies, goals, and objectives are still present in the new USBP strategic plan. Furthermore, since the USBP built their present strategy upon the basis provided by the challenges and accomplishments of their preceding strategies, it is important to obtain a general grasp of the two previous strategies as well as substantive information. The reason for not seeking information after March 2013 was so that the author had enough time to successfully complete this study. There was no historical literature utilized that dates back prior to 1994 because the USBP did not create its first strategy until that year.

2010 National Security Strategy

It is important to understand that some of the priorities and ways of protecting the homeland that are found within the President’s 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) directly pertain to the roles and responsibilities that are carried out by individuals that work within the DHS, CBP and more specifically, to the USBP. In 2010, the Obama administration released their first NSS, which outlines the President’s priorities and concerns and his conceptual approach to mitigating these areas of interest. The U.S. law requires the President to submit a NSS to Congress annually, when the President submits the budget (Cornell University Law School). Within this document, it addresses the U.S.
current status and states different ways for getting the U.S. to a position where the
President believes the U.S. would be more secure, and economically stable. Some of the
specific challenges that the President’s strategy focuses on are security, prosperity,
values, and international order. Among these important topics covered within the
President’s strategy, there are several points within the strategy that delineate duties that
ultimately are the responsibility of the DHS to carry out, but more precisely they apply to
the daily duties that employees of CBP conduct, and more specifically to the duties that
employees of the USBP perform. The major points within the NSS that specifically aligns
with the duties that the USBP performs are keeping terrorism and WMD from crossing
the nation’s borders, and to disrupt and halt transnational criminal organizations from
entering and operating along the U.S. borders (The White House 2010, 15). Additionally,
it mentioned the use of a whole of government approach to enhance security efforts and
to utilize this approach to conduct information operations in targeted areas, with the
intention of informing individuals across our borders regarding the risks and
vulnerabilities they will face, if they attempt to unlawfully enter the U.S. (The White
House 2010, 15).

Department of Homeland Security 2012-2016 Strategic Plan
Since the DHS is ultimately responsible for the protection and safety of the U.S.,
it is important to recognize and comprehend their strategic plan, with the purpose of
becoming familiar with how the DHS views creating a country that is safe and protected
from those who seek to cause the U.S. harm. Further, this provides an understanding of
how the DHS’s strategic plan translates into the strategic plans that both CBP and the
USBP created, and how CBP fits into this plan of securing the homeland. In February of
2012, the DHS released their new 2012 strategic plan, which describes the department’s mission, goals, and objectives. This strategic plan is the third strategic plan that the DHS created since their inception. The DHS receives their overarching direction from the President of the U.S. within a document called the National Strategy for Homeland Security. Additionally, the DHS also uses the information reported in the *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report* to assist in the development of their strategic plan. Of the five missions identified within their strategic plan, three of them prominently relate to the duties performed by the USBP. The three missions that directly pertain to the USBP, but also have a nexus to the other offices within CBP are: “Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security, Securing and Managing our Borders, and Enforcing and Administering our Immigration Laws” (Napolitano 2012, 3-10). The goals described in the DHS strategic plan further define how the Secretary of the DHS conceptually envisions how the different offices within the DHS will perform their jobs with the aim of working towards achieving the goals, which will lead towards mission success.

**Quadrennial Homeland Security Review**

This report identifies the strategic framework used by components in homeland security and other agencies with a similar undertaking. This report is a guide that exhibits the DHS vision, mission priorities, and goals for the priorities so that homeland security components can ensure that they are working towards the same desired end state, and to make necessary changes to their visions and missions not in alignment. Furthermore, this document identifies challenges that fall in the realm of homeland security and provides a structure of how to alleviate the challenges. This document pertains to this thesis because it served as a guide for the Border Patrol in the creation of their new strategy and in their
attempt to secure the nations borders (Department of Homeland Security 2010).

Furthermore, several of the missions and goals that are within the *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report* are in the new USBP strategy.

### 1994 U.S. Border Patrol Strategic Plan

It is important to now view the USBP strategies from oldest to newest to comprehend what the missions, goals, and objectives have been in the past and to follow the changes to their plan and thought process over the years through the succeeding USBP strategies. The 1994 strategy was the first the USBP ever developed. At this time, the USBP was apart of the INS, Department of Justice. The mission statement focus’ on detecting individuals crossing the border without the proper documentation to be in the U.S., those who assist individuals illegally crossing the border, and individuals that conducted other violations (U.S. Border Patrol 1994, 5). Within this strategy, it discussed the environment of both the U.S. and Mexico. It recognized that due to a large population of poverty, poor living conditions, and a struggling economy in Mexico, there will continually be a mass of persons desiring to unlawfully cross our borders with the purpose of seeking better opportunities. In the mid 1990s, the USBP arrested slightly more than one million people per year with just over forty thousand individuals from countries other than Mexico (U.S. Border Patrol 1994, 2-3). Furthermore, during this same time period, the North American Free Trade Agreement was implemented, which eliminated taxes to import and export goods between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. The USBP believed that the implementation of this agreement between the countries would enhance Mexico’s economy, resulting in fewer people wanting to illegally cross into the U.S. to pursue better job opportunities (U.S. Border Patrol 1994, 3). Another point of
interest within the USBP’s 1994 strategy was to bolster relationships between the 
Government of Mexico and the United States. More specifically, the USBP aspired to 
enhance the transnational relationships between the U.S. and Mexico in an attempt to 
decrease the violence along the southwest border, by decreasing the time it took for U.S. 
and Mexico authorities to respond to areas of concern along the southwest border. 
Another way the USBP envisioned experiencing a reduction in illegal entries was through 
the use of a coordinated border enforcement effort. Enforcing immigration laws within 
the interior of the U.S. and holding companies legally responsible who knowingly hired 
illegal aliens would be a positive step forward in the effort of keeping unauthorized 
people from entering the country. However, during this time, there were not significant 
measures or resources in place that focused on interior immigration enforcement. It was 
not until 1999 that the INS implemented an interior border enforcement strategy targeting 
those that are illegally residing in the U.S. (Stana 2003, 3). This lack of interior 
enforcement acted as incentive for illegal aliens already in the U.S. and offered incentive 
for those contemplating illegal entry into the country. If undocumented immigrants made 
it past the USBP near the international border and into the interior of the U.S. where there 
was minimal immigration enforcement, the possibility of their detection greatly 
diminished. Several major operations conducted by the USBP during this time focused 
specifically in areas on the border that experienced very high volumes of individuals 
seeking to illegally enter the U.S. between designated ports of entry. The two major 
deterrence operations that began in the early 1990s were Operation Gatekeeper, which 
took place in San Diego, California; and Operation Hold the Line, which transpired in 
El Paso, Texas (Nevins 2010). The USBP recognized the need to erect fencing along the
border to prevent and deter unlawful access across the borders in heavily populated locations. Additionally, during these operations, the USBP focused on forward deploying their agents and resources along the border, to not only detect individuals unlawfully crossing the border between the ports of entry, but to also serve as deterrence measure (Rosenblum 2012a, 5).

2004 U.S. Border Patrol Strategy

In this study, a large portion of the research concentrates on the 2004 National Border Patrol Strategy. The examination of the 2004 National Border Patrol Strategy identified what this strategic plan is comprised of. Additionally, the analysis of quantitative and qualitative data that exists evaluates the USBP’s performance during the time that this strategy was in effect. These findings and their comparison to the new 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan contributed toward answering the primary research question.

The significant change to this strategy is the USBP’s change from their previous primary focus, which was to prevent and detect undocumented immigrants unlawfully crossing into the U.S., to specifically focusing their efforts on the prevention of terrorist and terrorist weapons from entering the U.S. (Department of Homeland Security 2004, 2). This led to some of the most significant changes the organization had ever seen in its 80 years of existence, and led to the creation of a strategy that caused many changes to radiate throughout the entire organization (U.S. Congress 2012). The 2004 strategy focused on establishing a centralized headquarters to more quickly respond to operational and support decisions throughout the organization. This strategy also emphasized obtaining additional resources to build up USBP capabilities in order to accomplish the
mission (Department of Homeland Security 2004). The recurring theme throughout the strategy was the utilization of personnel, technology, and infrastructure to secure the U.S. borders (Department of Homeland Security 2004, 15). An additional noteworthy element of this strategy is the identification of the successes of the 1994 strategy, and the implementation of those successful approaches into the 2004 strategy. This is particularly relevant because many of these same successful elements are in the USBP’s 2012 Strategic Plan.

*The 9/11 Commission Report* discussed in depth the events that unfolded on September 11, 2001. Additionally, the report described Osama Bin Laden’s rise to power and his calls for Muslims to kill Americans. Important aspects of the report that relate to this study are the recommendations to begin disseminating and sharing intelligence between all levels of enforcement agencies to reduce confinement of information. Another important aspect that this report discussed was the implementation of the collection and utilization of biometrics to identify exactly who people are, resulting in better detection of imposters. A final recommendation stated the need to establish better relationships with state and local enforcement agencies and to integrate and collaborate in an effort to more effectively and efficiently protect the American public from heinous acts (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S. 2004, 384-390).

Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade, reported in the Government Accountability Office (GAO) document called, *Drug Control: U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but the Flow of Illicit Drugs into the United States Remains High*, that there remains a sizeable amount of drugs that are crossing the southwest border that is not being interdicted by any U.S. authorities. Further, it
mentioned that in 2006, Congress mandated the Office of the National Drug Control Policy to create a strategy that addressed the continual flow of drugs into the United States. The document also mentioned corruption challenges that the Government of Mexico experiences within their ranks and that corruption is a contributing factor to the flow of drugs into the U.S. (Ford 2007).

After visiting Mexico in 2008, General McCaffrey conveyed in his after action report that the violence in Mexico remained significant and that the drug trafficking organizations were primarily responsible for the extreme violence. He further stated that the drug trafficking organizations were intimidating local citizens of Mexico and that they fostered the corruption of many law enforcement officers in Mexico. Additionally, there were numerous deaths related to the drug problem in Mexico and that drug production and smuggling is extensive. The mentioning of the Merida Initiative is to accentuate the need to continue the initiative to assist in fighting against organized crime, which the U.S. provides $400 million a year (Council on Hemispheric Affairs 2008, 4-8). This memorandum created by McCaffrey supports other documents in the literature review, regarding drug cartel violence in Mexico and how it is a recurring problem.

In June 2011, the 82nd Texas Legislature directed the Texas Department of Agriculture to evaluate the effects of illegal cross border activity along the Texas international border, and to identify methods to mitigate these matters. The Department of Agriculture chose retired Army General McCaffrey and retired Major General Robert Scales to provide a holistic review of the Texas international border from a military perspective and provide probable strategic, operational, and tactical solutions to securing the Texas international border. Their report addressed local, state, and federal law
enforcement agencies that specifically dealt with securing the border, and with the effects of cross border violence and activity. Additionally, the report discussed the problems that are occurring in south Texas, such as the high number of illegal immigrants from numerous different countries and the frustration of local residents and ranchers. Specifically relating to the USBP, both McCaffrey and Scales identified a number of problems to include corrupt CBP and law enforcement officers and limited integration efforts between federal, state, and local agencies to disrupt human and drug smuggling. Other identified topics of interests included the challenges of the SBInet program, the construction of fence along the border, challenges of working along the Rio Grande River, and the frustrations of local residents regarding the efforts of the Border Patrol in securing the Texas international border (McCaffrey and Scales 2011, 10-16).

In a report by Richard Stana in 2011, titled *Border Security Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures for the Southwest Border*, he reported that the USBP measured the secureness of the borders based upon various levels of operational control for their 2004 strategy. Further, the measures that the USBP used to assist in their measurement of operational control are in this document. However, it also mentioned that the DHS is no longer using these factors as a way to determine the control of the nation’s borders. The document also identified CBP’s efforts to develop an improved quantitative approach to better measure border security and their intended release date of this approach was to be in 2012 (Stana 2011a, 5-8).

**2012 U.S. Border Patrol Strategic Plan**

The days of the USBP primarily focusing their efforts on catching individuals that unlawfully enter the U.S. took a back seat to the new urgent threat, which is to combat
terrorism and to keep the American people and borders secure and safe. The attacks of September 2001 still have an enormous affect on the new 2012 strategic plan. However, the USBP formed a strategy that resulted from the successes from the previous 2004 strategy with the aim of addressing current needs and changes to the environment. In the USBP’s new 2012 strategy, it also acknowledged that their main effort is to secure the border and to keep terrorists from entering the country, as did the 2004 strategy (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 4). However, within the USBP’s 2012 strategy, the focus shifts from utilizing personnel, technology, and infrastructure to accomplish their mission, to utilizing information, integration, and rapid response. The Chief of the Border Patrol, Michael Fisher, stated that the organization experienced a growth of Border Patrol agents, technology, and infrastructure, which required them to reevaluate their strategy (Myers 2012). Additionally, Fisher stated in a hearing, that the 2004 and 2012 strategies are similar in that the organization still seeks to keep terrorists from crossing the border. The difference is that the USBP is now going to utilize the resources that they obtained over the years and apply them in a risk-based manner to conduct their duties (Kimery 2012b).

**Environment**

Along with a new mission in 2004, the USBP benefitted from a larger budget than they received prior to September 11, 2001, which allowed them to obtain personnel, equipment, technology, and infrastructure to more effectively secure the U.S. borders (Haddal, Kim, and Garcia 2010a, 5-6). Furthermore, the USBP began to search, evaluate, and acquire new innovative technological suites to enhance their ability to find unauthorized individuals crossing, or attempting to cross the international border. The
DHS decided to dedicate billions of dollars in order to establish a solution to assist with
securing the nation’s borders called the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) (Stana 2010, 4).
However, the SBI experienced many difficulties throughout its existence. A
subcomponent of the SBI was called the SBInet. The responsibility of the SBInet
program was to integrate personnel, technology, and infrastructure into a seamless system
that best used each aspect in an effective and efficient manner (Rosenblum 2012a, 7-8).
The report, *The Rise and Fall of the Secure Border Initiative’s High-Tech Solution to
Unauthorized Immigration*, discussed many of the problems that the program dealt with from its beginning in 2005, until the freezing of the program’s money in 2010 (Immigration Policy Center 2010, 1-7). After conducting a thorough assessment of the SBI program in 2010, the DHS determined that they would not continue with their contract because it was not cost effective. Therefore, the DHS elected to solicit a new contract with the aim of expanding on technology that had already proven its effectiveness along the border (Stana 2011b, 3). This SBI program, and the fact that it was not a complete success is significant to point out in this study, because it is one of the programs that did not fully achieve the results that the USBP or the DHS hoped to achieve.

The GAO report, *Information on Training New Border Patrol Agents*, highlighted information regarding President Bush’s policy on Immigration Reform. Specifically, it discussed the hiring of 6,000 additional Border Patrol agents with the intention of assigning them to the southern border, and the cost associated to train one Border Patrol agent (Stana 2007, 1). Not long after the President informed the nation of the additional personnel that he desired for the USBP to hire, the USBP quickly began hiring numerous
individuals and sending them to the USBP Academy, so that they could meet this ambitious goal.

In Bush’s immigration reform speech, he presented a plan that included a proposal to deploy 6,000 National Guard troops to the southern border to assist with the prevention and detection of individuals unlawfully crossing the nation’s borders. The support of the National Guard is relevant to this study because it helped the USBP to accomplish their mission, while the USBP hired more Border Patrol agents. This approach was one of the major themes in the 2004 USBP Strategic Plan that they envisioned to help accomplish their mission. The evidence that supports this claim is available on CBP’s website, which stated that the help of the National Guard allowed the USBP to deploy more of their agents to the border (Customs and Border Protection 2006). It also became clear that the National Guard’s role would be limited to providing logistical and administrative support to USBP agents (Customs and Border Protection 2011b). Additionally, it stated in this document that the Posse Comitatus Act forbids Active Duty Military soldiers to act in a law enforcement role, such as to be able to make arrests and seizures, unless approved to do so by congress (Brinkerhoff 2009).

Summary

As an agency that is one of the nation’s first lines of defense to keeping America safe and secure, it is essential to examine the Border Patrol’s new strategy. The importance of examining the USBP’s new strategy helps to identify and understand the changes, and to examine their goals and how they lead to a more safe and secure border. In this chapter, the described literature focused on the strategic plans of the President, the DHS, CBP, and past and present USBP strategies. Some philosophical positions gleaned
from this reviewed literature are the USBP’s shift of focus from illegal immigrants to terrorists, and the need for additional resources to secure the border and act as a force multiplier to achieve the USBP’s mission. The next chapter provides information regarding the methodology used to develop a comprehensive research study, and a reasonably unbiased conclusion that addresses the problem statement and answers the thesis question.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter explains the steps taken in order to answer the primary and secondary thesis questions of this study. More specifically, this chapter identifies the method of gathering research material for this case study, the methodology and approach chosen to best research, examine, and present the information, and the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology. The selected methodology and approach permitted a comprehensive and in-depth examination concerning the effectiveness of the USBP’s past and present strategies in reducing the unlawful entry of people crossing the borders, and their facilitation of ultimately securing the U.S. international borders.

Methodology and Approach

The methodology used in this research study is qualitative analysis. The qualitative research methodology approach for this thesis is case study research. This methodology and approach allowed for a comprehensive, methodical review and understanding of a subject within a defined time frame (Creswell 2007, 40). Furthermore, this approach allowed for a thorough analysis of current and historical literature pertaining to this thesis (Creswell 2007, 40). There is abundant documentation relating to the first two USBP strategies because of various federal agency and institutional inquiries regarding the USBP, and the amount of time passed since their introduction. However, there is not as much literature pertaining to the USBP’s 2012 strategy since it has only been in existence for approximately one year. Although a limited amount of literature is
available pertaining to the USBP’s 2012 strategy versus the USBP’s two prior strategies, the quantity of existing literature is sufficient to evaluate the new USBP strategy.

**Strengths and Weaknesses**

The strengths associated with a case study approach include the ability of the researcher to perform a plethora of research on a particular topic and become very close to the occurrence that is under study, without being directly involved with the event (Merriam 2009, 51). Another advantage of utilizing a case study approach to answer the primary and secondary questions of this study is that this method allows the researcher to investigate subjects consisting of multiple facets of complexity (Merriam 2009, 50). Additionally, this approach provides the author a vast knowledge of the subject, and enables the ability to identify and recommend further research inquiries (Merriam 2009, 51).

A challenge associated with a case study approach is selecting a specific case (or cases) for study can be difficult. Additionally, if analyzing more than one case the potential exists to dilute the case study because it reduces the depth of attention any one of the cases receive, as opposed to the depth and breadth of a study an individual can perform on a single case (Creswell 2007, 76). Furthermore, determining how the case is bound in time and how to analyze the same themes in the different cases are additional challenges in using a case study approach (Creswell 2007, 148). In order to mitigate these challenges, this study focused on the relevant cases requiring analysis for the purpose of answering the questions in this thesis. In an attempt to maximize the depth of the analysis performed on each case, the use of computer software assisted in synthesizing researched and analyzed documents pertaining to the study. The challenge that John W. Creswell...
mentions in his book, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*, regarding how to
determine the specific time frames of each case was not a problem in this study, because
each case is bound in time, from one strategy to the next (Creswell 2007, 76). The
timeline boundaries for this case study are divided into three segments. The first segment
starts in 1994, when the USBP created their first strategy, and continues through to the
creation of their second strategy, in 2004. The second segment runs from 2004, when the
USBP created their second strategy and continues through to the beginning of fiscal year
2011, when the USBP began to transition from their 2004 strategy to the latest strategy.
The final case study begins at the beginning of fiscal year 2011 and continues through the
end of March 2013, the cutoff date for seeking any new information in order to complete
this study.

To mitigate the challenge of assessing and analyzing the same themes in each of
the different cases, this study provides a set standard of chosen themes to utilize
throughout the three case studies (Creswell 2007, 75). In an effort to ensure a similar
assessment and analysis of the same themes through each of the three cases, this study
analyzed each case using two military conceptual frameworks. The first framework
involves a technique that the military utilizes to examine the strategic and operational
environment within an area of operation (Department of the Army 2005, 6). The
technique consists of assessing the environment through the lens of the following
domains: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII)
(Department of the Army 2005, 6). The second military method used is the process that
the military uses to assess an organization in order to evaluate its capabilities, and
identify strengths and weaknesses that can be exploited (Department of the Army
The tenets that the military uses to conduct this assessment is by assessing the domains of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) (Department of the Army 2005, 6).

**Operational Environment**

One method utilized in this study that provides an answer to the primary and secondary questions is a military approach that describes the strategic and operational environment of a desired locality (Department of the Army 2008, 1-5). The military approach involves assessing the nature of the operational environment’s following domains: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (Department of the Army 2008, 1-5). The use of this methodology by the military is crucial in determining what capabilities are required when forces are deployed to a region (Department of the Army 2008, 1-5). The use and analysis of these variables along the southwest border helped to determine and understand the USBP’s operational environment along the international border, and how the USBP engineered their strategies to exploit and mitigate these specific factors since 1994. Presently, the USBP is in the process of developing methods to identify and manage risks along the borders in each different USBP sector. These methods or tools under development are known as the Operational Implementation Plan, and the Integrated Mission Analysis Tool. The purpose of the Operational Implementation Plan is to be “a qualitative process that prioritizes sector evaluations of border security threats and identifies potential responses” (Government Accountability Office 2012, 35). The USBP’s Integrated Mission Analysis Tool “uses a systematic and comprehensive methodology to track, assess, and forecast vulnerabilities, consequences, and capabilities of CBP (and, by extension, the U.S.
Border Patrol) and matches these with known or potential threats” (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 6). The military definitions below of PMESII provide a clear understanding of each variable. Additionally, after the definition of each military domain, an explanation describes which aspects of the USBP fall under the purview of each domain.

The military definition of the political domain is government and non-government organizations that have an influence over the people that live in the area that you plan to operate in (Department of the Army 2008, 1-6). The leaders of these organizations are capable of influencing others in order to gain power or control in the area. They are also capable of positively or negatively portraying an organization to the media and local residents, and persuading citizens and other leaders in the region to attempt to affect the way that the organization intends to operate in its area of responsibility (Department of the Army 2008, 1-6). For this study, the definition of political domain assisted to identify information provided by major governmental and non-governmental organizations that have an influence over Border Patrol operations along the southwest border.

The Army defines the military domain as all armed forces that operate within its area of responsibility (Department of the Army 2008, 1-6). More specifically, this includes not only the actual military, which is responsible for the safety and protection of the nation, but also paramilitary organizations, and other organizations that influence the military’s actions (Department of the Army 2008, 1-6). For the purpose of this thesis, the USBP is the primary focus of the research. Therefore, the decision to not include this domain in the analysis was made because there is no intention to identify other organizations that operate along the southwest border.
The economic domain describes how the economy plays a role in affecting the operational environment in an area of operation (Department of the Army 2008, 1-6-7). This means that there are economic indicators that can assist in explaining why a population acts in the manner that they do. In regard to this study, an examination of the economic domain provides information to identify some economic challenges during the time frame of this study, and how those challenges play a role in the unlawful crossing of people into the United States.

The social domain refers to social aspects that the military assesses regarding individuals and societies that are present in their area of operation, and among those who influence the societies within their operational environment (Department of the Army 2008, 1-7). Further, the military’s assessment of this variable identifies the social relationships among the societies within their area of responsibility and their cultural beliefs (Department of the Army 2008, 1-7). For this study, the determination was made to not analyze this domain because it did not specifically relate to answering the primary and secondary questions within this study.

The military definition of the infrastructure domain states that it entails the assets that are rudimentary to a city’s establishment (Department of the Army 2008, 1-8). These include standard amenities and installations that cities possess to properly function. Additionally, infrastructure includes improvements to an area, such as technological improvements (Department of the Army 2008, 1-8). For the purpose of this study, the infrastructure aspect consisted of examining the technology that the USBP installed along the southwest border, in an effort to accomplish their mission.
The Army’s definition of the information domain is a person, institute, or database that gathers, collects, distributes, analyzes, and conducts operations based upon the examined information (Department of the Army 2008, 1-8). The military uses information operations to assist with shaping the operational environment and to provide information to the population, so that the populace concisely understands the why and what, regarding military activity in their region (Department of Defense 2012b, GL-3). In the context of this thesis, the examination of the information domain assessed the USBP’s emphasis on the collection of information, and how they act upon that information.

Institutional Review of the U.S. Border Patrol

One of the research methods used to assist in answering the primary and secondary questions in this study was through the examination of the Border Patrol’s institution. The explored aspects of the Border Patrol’s institution were DOTMLPF. The U.S. military utilizes this domain to evaluate their organizations’ capabilities and to identify strengths and weaknesses that need to be further explored (Department of the Army 2005, 6). Additionally, the assessment of the DOTMLPF construct explores and evaluates a plethora of challenges, with the intention of breaking those challenges down into more manageable issues for further examination (Army Force Management School 2011, 6). Within this study, the examination of the Border Patrol’s institution provided evidence to answer all questions within this study. Additionally, after each domain’s definition, an additional explanation ensues regarding how each domain correlates to the assessment of the USBP.
The military defines doctrine as the philosophies and ideologies that steer U.S. soldiers in a coordinated effort towards common objectives (Department of Defense 2012a, 95). Further, doctrine acts as a diagram for military leaders to reference and employ, unless a particular situation does not allow an implementation of the preferred or doctrinal method (Department of Defense 2012a, 95). For the purpose of this study, the use of the domain of doctrine provided the ability to analyze information relating to all three of the Border Patrol’s strategies.

The Army’s definition of organization is how the military structures their components to fight (Department of the Army 2011a, 11). It is the ability of a component to assemble their soldiers in a manner, to work together in a coordinated effort towards accomplishing their mission (Department of the Army 2011a, 11). For this study, the domain of organization provided the ability to analyze the USBP’s organizational structure, and how they arrange their forces to keep America’s borders secure.

The military defines training as the act of teaching their soldiers’ critical skills and techniques (Department of the Army 2011a, 11). The purpose of teaching these skills and techniques are for the purpose of enhancing the soldiers’ abilities and decision making, to better execute their specific individual responsibilities, and collective duties (Department of the Army 2011a, 11). In this study, the tenet of training included the exploration and examination of the training requirements to become a member of the teams that provide a rapid response for the USBP.

The military definition of materiel is assets and resources available to the military (excluding actual property and buildings) to provide their forces the basic and mandatory means to perform their responsibilities (Department of Defense 2012a, 195). The location
of acquired technology discussed in this study is in the infrastructure domain. The
decision to not research this domain was made because information was not found to
precisely determine how much materiel the USBP acquired during the time frame of each
strategy.

The military describes the leadership domain as entailing a variety of different
aspects. These aspects include experiences, formal training and learning, and
development of oneself (Department of the Army 2011a, 11). The decision to not
research and analyze this domain was made because the location of this information is in
goal number two of the USBP’s strategy, which is outside the purview of this study.

According to the Army, the definition of personnel is the soldiers and civilians
that are necessary to achieve the desired end state (Department of Defense 2012a, 241).
The exploration of the USBP’s personnel was critical in determining how much the
USBP grew over time, during the development of the three strategies. Furthermore, the
personnel domain specifically identified the time periods of when the USBP nearly
doubled the size of their organization.

The Army definition of a facility is land that includes an erected structure, or road
surface (Department of Defense 2012a, 113). No further exploration in the domain of
facility was necessary in this study, due to the research conducted, in order to evaluate
the domain of infrastructure in the previous approach of PMESII. The variables of
infrastructure in the previous approach of PMESII, and facilities in DOTMLPF were
closely related and this did not need to be two separate research topics.
Computer Use in Qualitative Data Analysis

Nvivo is a software program that assists users to gather, organize, and examine non-numerical information (Bazeley 2007, 2-4). This software supports users conducting many methods of research, including qualitative research studies (Bazeley 2007, 2). This software thoroughly examines documentation and allows the user to arrange, categorize, and identify themes and relationships within the information that is input into the program (Edhlund 2009, 11).

The purpose of utilizing this software is to distinguish relevant information within documentation that is input into this program, with the aim of substantiating findings that will answer the primary and secondary questions in this thesis. There are several benefits to using this software to support answering the primary and secondary research questions. One such benefit is that it allows the quick detection of specific information within the document through the search engine (Creswell 2007, 165). Certain information can be located through a simple search using a phrase or word (Edhlund 2009, 161-163). Additionally, this software allows the operator to concentrate on critically analyzing documents, once they have been sorted by the program, due to its effectiveness in finding pertinent data regarding your search criteria (Edhlund 2009, 137). The programs effectiveness helps to minimize the amount of time the researcher spends reading through numerous documents, to identify the level of relevancy of the material to the research topic. Finally, a computer program such as Nvivo that supports qualitative research studies benefits a researcher because of its ability to quickly identify trends in a multitude of documentation (Creswell 2007, 165). There are also disadvantages to using computer based software to assist with your research study. One of the disadvantages of utilizing
this program is that the researcher spends time becoming familiar with how to properly use the software, becoming accustomed to the intricacies of the procedures used in sorting information (Bazeley 2007, 7). Some software programs are known for not supplying a thorough instruction manual to enable the user to quickly and comfortably begin using the software (Creswell 2007, 165). Some people may also not be comfortable with placing a machine between themselves and the documentation that they are making use of to conduct research (Bazeley 2007, 8). In order to mitigate, to a degree, the disadvantage of the time it took to become familiar with utilizing Nvivo in this research study, dedicating an appropriate amount of time to the program’s instructions allowed for familiarization prior to plunging into the program with data. The use of the Nvivo online instruction manual provided accurate directions to properly tread through the computer program and appropriately operate it. The final disadvantage of being uncomfortable with data on a computer versus having data in hard copy did not factor in to this study.

**Statistical Data**

Statistical data provided by the USBP assisted to answer the primary and secondary questions within this study. The statistical data covers a broad spectrum of data that the USBP collected over time. The statistical data used in this thesis dealt with apprehensions of unlawful citizens of Mexico, total personnel employed each fiscal year, and individuals apprehended from special interest countries. Additionally, statistical data included marijuana and heroin seizures, and the increased cost that smugglers charged to smuggle people into the United States.
Summary

Within this chapter, the described processes allowed the author to research and develop unbiased answers to the primary and secondary thesis questions. The research of historical and current data provided answers to develop an unbiased conclusion to the questions in this study. The qualitative research methodology chosen allowed for the research and examination of a wealth of information that was available on the thesis topic. Additionally, the approach selected in this study allowed for a thorough, nonbiased interpretation of the literature, regarding whether or not the USBP’s 2012 strategy is better focused to impede the flow of people and things unlawfully crossing into the U.S. from Mexico. Lastly, literature gathered and researched provided pertinent information relating to answering the primary and secondary thesis questions in this research study.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter provides an analysis of researched literature and necessary evidence to answer the primary and secondary questions of this study. The primary research question of this study was: Does the 2012 Border Patrol Strategic Plan provide a more effective means to avert, detect, and react to unlawful entries into the United States? The secondary questions in this thesis were: Was the Border Patrol’s 2004 strategy effective? What caused the need for the Border Patrol to create a new strategy in 2012? In creating the 2012 strategy, what did the Border Patrol carry over from the 2004 strategy, and what did they craft to build upon it? This research study used two rubrics to present the analysis of the three strategies and relevant material concerning the strategies. The first rubric assessed the operational environment along the southwest border by evaluating the following domains: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (Department of the Army 2008, 1-5). Analyzing these variables along the southwest border assisted with describing and understanding the USBP’s operational environment and how the USBP designs their strategies to address and mitigate identified challenges. The second rubric explored specific aspects of the Border Patrol’s institution, which were Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (Department of the Army 2005, 6). The U.S. military evaluates these domains in order to understand organizational capabilities and to recognize strong and weak points within their organization (Department of the Army 2005, 6). Within this chapter, the
examination of the Border Patrol’s institution provided evidence to assist with answering the primary and secondary questions of this study.

**Operational Environment**

Information provided in the operational environment analyzed some of the domains of PMESII to assist in describing the operational environment along the southwest border. Analysis of the political, economic, infrastructure, and information variables best assisted to describe the changes that occurred along the southwest border in regards to the operational environment. Finally, information contained in this section pertained to the time frames of the three USBP strategies from 1994 through 2012.

**Political**

The political domain analyzed information pertaining to government organizations that relate to the USBP. This domain examined information within the 1994, 2002, and 2010 NSSs. Additionally, this domain included discussions regarding the DHS and CBP strategies, as well as the USBP’s 1994, 2004, and 2012 strategies.

The release of the *1994 NSS* occurred during the same month as the release of USBP’s first strategic plan. Noteworthy subjects mentioned in the *1994 NSS* that correlate with the duties that the USBP was responsible for in securing the nation’s borders were counterterrorism, narcotics trafficking, WMD, and flow of illegal immigration into the U.S. (The White House 1994, 6). President Bush subsequently presented his first *NSS* one year after the attacks against the U.S. on September 11, 2001. Although there were many similarities between this strategy and its predecessors, this strategy focused to a greater extent on terrorism and WMD, both domestically and
internationally. This strategy mentioned a plan to restructure the government, in an attempt to posture the U.S. to be more capable of defending against numerous and diverse threats (The White House 2002b, 6). Furthermore, there was an even greater emphasis on the importance of establishing and fostering relationships with other nations and on sharing the responsibility of defeating terrorism, creating democracy, and stimulating economic growth (The White House 2002b, 21-23).

The DHS released their most recent strategy in February of 2012. Within their strategy, the DHS continued to stress the importance of identifying and managing potential threats to the U.S. involving people unlawfully entering the country (Napolitano 2012, 8). Three of the five missions and associated goals and objectives of the DHS’s strategy directly related to the duties that the USBP performs on a daily basis. The three missions were “preventing terrorism and enhancing security, securing and managing our borders, and enforcing and administering our immigration laws” (Napolitano 2012, 3-10). Some goals associated with their missions worth noting are integration of management, and improving information sharing and resilience (Napolitano 2012, 24-27).

CBP created their last strategy in 2009. This strategy contained two goals. The first was securing the nation’s borders, and the second was ensuring the efficient flow of trade into the U.S. (Department of Homeland Security 2009, 11). Of these two goals, the primary focus of the USBP was goal number one, securing the nation’s borders. This strategy strongly emphasized the use of a risk-based approach to securing the nation’s borders. Additionally, the strategy pointed out the need for continued enhancement to appropriate technology and rapid response capabilities to react to threats along the borders (Department of Homeland Security 2009, 13-16). Finally, the strategy mentioned
the importance of gathering and sharing intelligence, establishing and maintaining partnerships, and establishing and improving upon training for employees (Department of Homeland Security 2009, 21-25).

The USBP’s 1994 strategy stated that the purpose of its creation was to position the USBP to better secure the borders by establishing a mission and goals; an additional reason for its creation was the government’s decision to reform immigration (U.S. Border Patrol 1994, 1). The INS acknowledged that in order to progress with the administration’s vision to reform border security in the early 1990s, the USBP needed to develop a strategy, in order to focus the agency in a synchronized effort to achieve the desired political aim (U.S. Border Patrol 1994, 1). Through the planning of this strategy, the USBP “accepted that absolute sealing of the border is unrealistic . . . however, the planners found legitimate reason to believe that the border can be brought under control” (U.S. Border Patrol 1994, 1).

The USBP created the 2004 strategy several years after merging from the INS to CBP. In this strategy, their focus shifted from deterring individuals from unlawfully crossing the border to deterring and detecting terrorists from entering the U.S. (Department of Homeland Security 2004, 2). Additionally, this strategy focused on increased personnel, technology, and infrastructure in order to assist with accomplishing the USBP mission (Department of Homeland Security 2004, 15). During the implementation of this strategy, the number of personnel almost doubled, the USBP installed over 600 miles of fence, and the amount of fixed and mobile surveillance technology significantly increased (Rosenblum 2012a, 14-19).
The 2012 USBP strategic plan transitioned from a resource-based approach to a risk-based approach (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 7). The USBP intended to utilize the resources that it gained over the years and apply them in a risk-based manner to target terrorists and smuggling organizations (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 4). Although the USBP allocated money to continue increasing technology across the border, the likelihood that they will receive the same amount of funding for technology as they did in the past is slim. In this newest strategy, the USBP placed a greater emphasis on collecting and disseminating intelligence, identifying and targeting threats along the border, and appropriately responding to those threats (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 16). This strategy also followed the precedent set by the researched NSSs and previous USBP strategies, in discussing, integrating, and coordinating efforts between international, federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and departments (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 18).

Analysis of the political domain assisted in answering all thesis questions. This domain answered whether the changes in the 2012 strategic plan provided a more effective means to avert, detect, and react to unlawful entries, by identifying the change in focus in the USBP’s 2012 strategy. The 2012 strategic plan placed a greater emphasis on the use of gathering and sharing intelligence, targeting threats along the border, and providing the proper response to threats to better utilize its resources. Furthermore, this section presented how the 2012 strategic plan aligned with the missions and objectives of the current NSS, and the DHS and CBP strategies. This domain also provided information to answer whether the USBP’s 2004 strategy was effective. Analysis identified that the progression between the USBP’s 1994 and 2004 strategies, as well as the alignment
between the USBP’s 2004 strategy and the NSS of its time, resulted in its success. Additionally, presented information demonstrated some of the successful concepts carried over from the 1994 strategy (personnel, technology, and infrastructure), to the 2004 strategy and some of the achievements made during the implementation of the 2004 strategy. This section also helped answer why the USBP needed the 2012 strategic plan. This was due to the progression of the NSSs and the changes in the USBPs focus. This domain also assisted in answering what the USBP carried over from their 2004 strategy into their 2012 strategy. One such similarity between the strategies was the continued focus on deterring and detecting terrorists entering the United States. Some differences between the two strategies were the three pillars presented in the 2004 strategy, personnel, technology, and infrastructure, versus the three pillars presented in the 2012 strategy, information, integration, and rapid response. Additionally, the 2012 strategy shifted from a resource-based approach, to a risk-based approach in order to better utilize the resources obtained during the time frame of the 2004 strategy.

Economic

The economic domain included an analysis of information pertaining to the U.S. and Mexican economies, as well as the amount of funding the USBP received throughout the time frames of the three USBP strategies. One aspect discussed in this domain was the American view of the effects that illegal immigration created for taxpayers. Additional discussion included the reduction in the value of Mexico’s peso in the mid 1990s, the downturn of the U.S. economy from 2007 through 2009, and the increases in the budget the USBP received throughout the duration of the three USBP strategies.
There are several different views on whether illegal immigration is detrimental or beneficial to the U.S. economy. Some individuals believe that illegal immigration places a drain on the economy and costs taxpayers more money (Mansfield 2010). In a Gallop Poll, 66 percent of Americans believed that illegal immigration increases costs to taxpayers because illegal immigrants do not pay taxes and exploit the education and medical systems (Robinson 2006). Others, such as large companies enjoy the benefits of hiring cheap labor and their lower costs of production and increased profits are theoretically passed along to the American consumer (Robinson 2006).

In late 1994, the Government of Mexico reduced the value of their currency, the peso. Due to the reduction of the peso’s value, it is unclear whether the increase of arrests the USBP experienced in 1995 resulted from the implementation of the 1994 strategy and increased border enforcement, or the poor economic circumstances in Mexico (Stana 1997, 32). Furthermore, it is difficult to draw a correlation between the decreased value of the peso and the increase in arrests because arrests did not increase uniformly along the southwest border.

In August 2007, the U.S. faced the beginnings of a financial crisis and recession, which continued into the beginning of 2009 (Baily 2010, 4-8). The impact of the recession made many large companies either go bankrupt, or seek a financial bailout from the government (Baily 2010, 13-15). Additionally, during this time period, unemployment increased from 5 percent in 2007, to a peak of 10 percent in 2009 (U.S. Department of Labor 2013). During this time frame, the number of illegal immigrants residing in the U.S. declined. The DHS stated that in 2007, 11.8 million illegal immigrants resided in the United States. In 2008, this amount decreased to 11.6 million,
and in 2009, the total number of illegal immigrants residing in the U.S. decreased to 10.8 million (Hoefer, Rytina, and Baker 2012). The Center for Immigration Studies points to both the decline in the economy and the increase of enforcement as reasons for the decrease in the number of illegal immigrants residing in the U.S. (Camarota and Zeigler 2009). However, the USBP experienced a decline of over one hundred thousand apprehensions each year from 2007 to 2009 (Customs and Border Protection 2013c).

Almost every year since 1994, the costs incurred by the U.S. to secure its borders increased due to the importance placed on border security and the need to keep terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States. In fact from 1994 to 2004, the cost to secure the border more than tripled. Table 2 depicts the USBP’s fiscal year budget from 1994 to 2012. In 1994, the USBP received a budget of nearly four hundred million dollars, which was the largest budget they received up to that point in time (Customs and Border Protection 2013b). The USBP also experienced gradual increases in their budget from 1994 through 2003. Additionally, the USBP nearly continued to receive increased budgets, each fiscal year from 2004 to 2012 (Customs and Border Protection 2013b).
Besides allocating funds to build barriers along the border, the USBP also used funds to improve the detection of illegal entries along the border. The USBP spent money expanding their computer automation systems and procuring additional technology. Some of the technologies that the USBP acquired were night vision optics, and underground sensors to enhance the agent’s capabilities to detect individuals who unlawfully entered the U.S. (Stana 1997, 5). During the 2012 strategy, the USBP continued to seek improvements to their capabilities by investing in additional integrated fixed towers along the border, to increase their ability to deter, and detect individuals unlawfully

crossing the border. Further, in the 2013 budget request, CBP budgeted nearly ninety-two million dollars towards increasing integrated fixed tower capabilities through procurements and deployment of the capability along the southwest border (Kimery 2012a). Finally in 2012, the USBP received funding to maintain their workforce at a level of not less than 21,370 agents, as set by public law 112-74 in 2011 (U.S. Congress 2011).

The information provided in this domain assisted with answering all three secondary questions. This information answered whether the 2004 strategy was effective, by discussing how the increased funding provided to the USBP since 2004 directly correlated to the success of their 2004 strategy, as it enabled them to acquire a plethora of personnel, technology, and infrastructure. This information also addressed the USBP’s need for the 2012 strategy. The acquisition of resources that occurred during the implementation of the USBP’s 2004 strategy highly influenced the thought process behind the development of the 2012 strategy. This resulted in the transition from the 2004 resource-based approach to the 2012 risk-based approach to securing the U.S. borders. Analysis provided in this domain also discussed what the USBP carried over from their 2004 strategy into their 2012 strategy and what they crafted to build upon it. This section pointed out the USBP still sought to purchase technology with the funding they received under the 2012 strategy, despite the fact that the focus of the new strategy deviated from the 2004 strategy in regards to spending.

Infrastructure

The infrastructure domain allowed for an analysis of information pertaining to the technology and infrastructure the USBP acquired throughout the time frame of each USBP strategy. Information presented in this domain assessed literature provided by the
GAO that identified key measures the USBP took during their first strategy to better mitigate the illegal flow of people across the southwest border. Additionally, the analysis examined literature pertaining to the construction of fencing along the southwest border, as well as a program called the Secure Border Initiative and its role in arraying technology along the southwest border.

In 1994, the General Accounting Office (now called the Government Accountability Office) released a document titled, *Border Control: Revised Strategy Is Showing Some Positive Results*, in an effort to report the effects of the USBP’s 1994 strategy along the southwest border region. This document stated that in 1991, the Office of National Drug Control Policy tasked the Sandia National Laboratories to conduct a study. The study focused on identifying methods to better secure the southwest border from unlawful entrants into the U.S. (Ekstrand 1994, 12). In 1993, the Office of National Drug Control Policy released the findings identified as being key measures that the USBP could take to prevent the entry of people across the southwest border. Findings recommended by the Sandia National Laboratories suggested that the USBP focus their efforts on preventing the unlawful entry of people between designated ports of entry, rather than focusing on the apprehension of individuals once they were unlawfully in the U.S. (Ekstrand 1994, 3). Sandia National Laboratories recommended two approaches. The first approach, the USBP needed to impede the ease of movement through designated areas by implementing barriers along the border (Ekstrand 1994, 12). In the second approach, the USBP needed to further establish an in depth defense by increasing the amount of interior checkpoints, to impede the ease of movement through the southern border region (Ekstrand 1994, 12). The USBP immediately began to implement these
recommendations in the San Diego, California and El Paso, Texas sectors. A decrease in apprehension numbers in San Diego and El Paso during this time suggested that this technique had noteworthy results. Additionally during this time frame, the USBP began to create their very first strategy by taking the suggestions made by the Sandia National Laboratories and embedding them into the 1994 strategy. Table 3 depicts the total number of apprehensions by sector from 1994 through 2012. In fiscal year 1994, the El Paso Sector observed a reduction of 179,093 individuals apprehended and the San Diego sector experienced a decrease of 81,537 arrests (Customs and Border Protection 2013c). However, El Paso and San Diego did not experience the same results in fiscal year 1995 both experienced an increase in apprehensions, although neither sector ever again reached the amount of arrests in 1993 (Customs and Border Protection 2013c). Between the implementation of the first USBP strategy, in 1994, and the second, in 2004, El Paso’s peak year of arrests was 1996. By 2003, the year prior to the implementation of the USBP’s second strategy, El Paso witnessed an overall reduction of 57,113 arrests compared to their peak year, 1996 (Customs and Border Protection 2013c). Additionally, during the time frame of the first strategy, San Diego’s peak year of arrests was in 1995. By 2003, San Diego experienced a reduction of 412,716 arrests (Customs and Border Protection 2013c).
Table 3. Southwest Border Patrol Sector Apprehensions by Fiscal Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Big Bend (San Ysidro)</th>
<th>El Rio</th>
<th>El Centro</th>
<th>El Paso</th>
<th>Laredo</th>
<th>Rio Grande Valley (Parral Sector)</th>
<th>San Diego</th>
<th>Tucson</th>
<th>Yuma</th>
<th>Southwest Border Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>3,954</td>
<td>21,720</td>
<td>23,918</td>
<td>9,678</td>
<td>44,872</td>
<td>57,762</td>
<td>28,461</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>6,900</td>
<td>366,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>4,054</td>
<td>16,144</td>
<td>20,191</td>
<td>16,945</td>
<td>50,055</td>
<td>59,243</td>
<td>42,447</td>
<td>123,285</td>
<td>5,833</td>
<td>327,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5,288</td>
<td>14,694</td>
<td>32,542</td>
<td>12,251</td>
<td>39,287</td>
<td>59,766</td>
<td>68,565</td>
<td>212,239</td>
<td>7,118</td>
<td>447,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>8,360</td>
<td>17,082</td>
<td>35,521</td>
<td>14,996</td>
<td>49,508</td>
<td>60,986</td>
<td>118,721</td>
<td>241,675</td>
<td>6,951</td>
<td>549,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5,397</td>
<td>20,781</td>
<td>40,981</td>
<td>30,107</td>
<td>43,608</td>
<td>75,473</td>
<td>162,805</td>
<td>317,695</td>
<td>8,385</td>
<td>769,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5,509</td>
<td>22,922</td>
<td>55,823</td>
<td>75,656</td>
<td>58,714</td>
<td>73,433</td>
<td>152,165</td>
<td>375,239</td>
<td>7,992</td>
<td>859,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>7,520</td>
<td>42,036</td>
<td>61,485</td>
<td>122,256</td>
<td>74,846</td>
<td>110,526</td>
<td>142,164</td>
<td>392,674</td>
<td>118,548</td>
<td>1,071,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>10,598</td>
<td>68,506</td>
<td>55,725</td>
<td>122,873</td>
<td>72,316</td>
<td>134,166</td>
<td>126,804</td>
<td>435,079</td>
<td>138,438</td>
<td>1,171,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>10,530</td>
<td>53,774</td>
<td>74,467</td>
<td>104,397</td>
<td>74,706</td>
<td>92,947</td>
<td>130,009</td>
<td>431,771</td>
<td>98,062</td>
<td>1,139,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>10,319</td>
<td>50,145</td>
<td>92,030</td>
<td>98,816</td>
<td>79,527</td>
<td>77,749</td>
<td>111,819</td>
<td>342,283</td>
<td>56,638</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>12,087</td>
<td>104,875</td>
<td>172,852</td>
<td>112,807</td>
<td>90,066</td>
<td>107,044</td>
<td>110,075</td>
<td>449,675</td>
<td>76,385</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>13,689</td>
<td>157,178</td>
<td>238,125</td>
<td>115,686</td>
<td>169,973</td>
<td>133,343</td>
<td>151,081</td>
<td>616,346</td>
<td>106,747</td>
<td>1,643,679</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>14,502</td>
<td>156,653</td>
<td>225,279</td>
<td>110,807</td>
<td>114,904</td>
<td>169,151</td>
<td>182,267</td>
<td>470,449</td>
<td>93,368</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>14,509</td>
<td>131,059</td>
<td>226,695</td>
<td>125,035</td>
<td>103,433</td>
<td>204,267</td>
<td>245,092</td>
<td>387,436</td>
<td>76,195</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>12,092</td>
<td>113,280</td>
<td>146,210</td>
<td>124,375</td>
<td>141,061</td>
<td>243,793</td>
<td>230,889</td>
<td>272,297</td>
<td>39,177</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>13,214</td>
<td>121,137</td>
<td>66,673</td>
<td>145,920</td>
<td>131,841</td>
<td>210,583</td>
<td>493,816</td>
<td>355,348</td>
<td>23,310</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>11,562</td>
<td>76,490</td>
<td>37,317</td>
<td>110,971</td>
<td>93,305</td>
<td>169,101</td>
<td>524,231</td>
<td>227,539</td>
<td>20,694</td>
<td>1,271,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>13,494</td>
<td>50,038</td>
<td>27,654</td>
<td>78,888</td>
<td>73,142</td>
<td>124,251</td>
<td>450,152</td>
<td>350,473</td>
<td>21,211</td>
<td>979,101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The first fence installment along the southwest border began in San Diego, California, prior to the 1994 strategy. The intention of building the fence along the border was to deter and encumber individuals from unlawfully crossing into the U.S. in one of San Diego’s busiest areas of illicit activity. The fence, standing 10 feet tall and constructed out of sheets of corrugated steel, stretched along the southwest border beginning at the Pacific Ocean and proceeding 14 miles inland (Nuñez-Neto 2005b, 2).

In 2006, Congress authorized enhancements be made on existing fences and barriers and the erection of additional fencing along the southwest border (Rosenblum 2012a, 16). This allowed for a triple layered fence to be built in San Diego from the
Pacific Ocean inward 14 miles, parallel to the original 10-foot metal fence built in the early 1990s (Rosenblum 2012a, 16). This enhancement to the fence in San Diego was necessary, because the location of these 14 miles of fence contributed to mitigating one of the two busiest illicit activity locations along the southwest border at the time (Rosenblum 2012a, 16). The positive results observed from the fence in San Diego, in 2008, prompted an amendment to the Secure Fence Act, which required the Secretary of the DHS to build a minimum of 700 miles of fence along the southern border (Haddal, Kim, and Garcia 2009, 5). However, after several more amendments to the act, and the unforeseen rise in the cost of building the fence, the total number of required miles of fence the Secretary originally called for was decreased (Haddal, Kim, and Garcia 2009, 9).

In early 2012, CBP posted on their website that the fence construction project was nearly complete and that they only needed to build one more mile of fence. The total miles of constructed fence reached 651 miles of the intended 652 miles (Customs and Border Protection 2012e). The design and construction of 352 miles of fence make it problematic for pedestrians to cross into the U.S., and the design and intention of the other 299 miles of fence make it extremely difficult for vehicles to cross into the U.S. (Customs and Border Protection 2012e).

In 2005, the DHS introduced a program called the Secure Border Initiative. A subcomponent of the SBI, called the SBInet, aimed to assist with securing the U.S. international borders and decreasing unlawful entries into the U.S. by integrating personnel, technology and infrastructure into a seamless system. Additionally, the SBInet intended to help secure the southwest border by providing a mix of new and improved
technology suites, communication towers, barriers, avenues for vehicle passage, and lighting along the border. Over the years, the initiative encountered environmental problems with the functionality of the cameras and radar systems (Stana 2009, 1-2). Even with these programs, agents from both the Tucson sector and Border Patrol Headquarters stated in 2010 that the capabilities that they received from the SBI provided them with much better technology than what they had previously (Stana 2011a, 4). Furthermore, the SBInet provided the USBP the ability to better survey the border to identify individuals unlawfully crossing, and the ability to continually survey unauthorized entries, which allows the capability of selecting the best location to apprehend individuals (Stana 2011a, 4). In January 2011, after an assessment of the SBI program concluded, the Secretary of the DHS decided to cease the SBI program. Also at this time, the Secretary stated that the SBI program enhanced the USBP’s ability to deter and detect unlawful entries into the U.S. (Stana 2011a, 5). The DHS then developed a new approach, but with similar types of technological capabilities that the SBI program provided. The new DHS technology plan is called Alternative Border Technology, and depending on the current budget situation, its deployment along the southwest border will be in 2013 (Stana 2011a, 7). Although the DHS intended to install more integrated fixed towers along the border under the new plan, the key difference between the SBI and the Alternative Border Technology is that the DHS intends to complement integrated fixed towers with remote video surveillance systems, mobile surveillance systems, and hand held devices (Stana 2011a, 8).

This section supported answering all of the questions in this study. The information provided in this domain assisted to answer whether the changes in the USBP
2012 strategic plan provided a more effective means to avert, detect, and react to unlawful entries. Analyzed data determined that the USBP’s new strategy, to better utilize the resources gained throughout the time frame of the USBP’s 2004 strategy in a risk-based manner, is a more effective way to approach accomplishing the USBP mission. The information in this section also helped to answer whether the 2004 strategy was effective through the discussion about the SBInet program. Even though the SBI program encountered delays and challenges, the technology that did operate without issues provided the USBP increased capabilities to detect and deter unlawful entrants. The information presented in this domain also addressed the USBP’s need for the 2012 strategy; they needed to create a new strategy that did not specifically focus on acquiring technology and infrastructure to accomplish their mission. This domain also discussed what the USBP carried over from their 2004 strategy into their 2012 strategy. A similarity identified in both strategies was the USBP’s intention to further increase their technological capabilities to detect and deter unlawful entrants across the southwest border.

Information

This domain analyzed literature pertaining to the way the USBP shared information throughout each of their strategies, as well as the importance of this effort stated within several NSSs. This domain analyzed data pertaining to information and intelligence sharing within the 1994, 2002, and 2010 NSSs. Additionally, this domain included analysis of literature contained in each of the USBP strategies regarding the importance placed on sharing information and intelligence between a variety of agencies, and some examples of how information sharing took place.
Every NSS written since 1994 mentioned the importance of gaining and utilizing intelligence to become more aware of the operational environment and to deter and detect threats to the United States. In the 1994 NSS, President Clinton stated the importance of streamlining intelligence throughout organizations to gain awareness and effectiveness (The White House 1994, 14). Specifically related to the USBP, the 1994 NSS discussed the importance of utilizing intelligence to provide early warning of potential threats to the homeland, and its use in countering terrorism, WMD, and trafficking (The White House 1994, 14). By the time President Bush presented the 2002 NSS, it was apparent that individuals could successfully attack the U.S. on U.S. soil. Accordingly, in the 2002 NSS, it not only mentioned the usefulness of intelligence, but it stated that the intelligence community must work closely with law enforcement agencies, so that agencies are aware of pertinent information and can adjust operations accordingly (The White House 2002b, 30). The 2010 NSS placed an even greater emphasis on the importance of intelligence and the need to work together to prevent terrorist attacks from occurring, specifically within the homeland. President Obama stated in the 2010 NSS that necessary improvements made to networks now allowed local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies to share classified information with each other (The White House 2010, 20).

The USBP utilized intelligence provided by the INS to construct a portion of their 1994 strategy (U.S. Border Patrol 1994, 2). The 1994 strategy stated that information gathered on specific indicators would help to provide valuable information regarding the USBP’s progress. The USBP further made use of intelligence by collecting data regarding how their strategy worked and whether or not there were shifts of areas where illegal border activity took place (U.S. Border Patrol 1994, 8).
The USBP’s 2004 strategy contained a greater emphasis on the use of intelligence than their 1994 strategy. The 2004 strategy recognized that gathering and sharing tactical intelligence, and being capable of quickly responding to the information is critical to the success of their mission. The USBP emphasized that the gathering of intelligence, through the employment of state of the art technology along the border, also significantly increased their ability to identify illegal activity and make arrests (Department of Homeland Security 2004, 3). Additionally, the gathering and sharing of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the U.S. and counterparts in other countries, was a crucial approach that assisted the USBP in targeting smuggling and trafficking operations along the border (Department of Homeland Security 2004, 8-12). In 2006, the U.S. National Guard, under Operation Jump Start, deployed to the southwest border and assisted the USBP with collecting and sharing intelligence (Customs and Border Protection 2011b). This was an example of unity of effort, communication, and intelligence sharing. In 2010, CBP established the Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center, now called Joint Intelligence and Operations Center, in the same compound as the Border Patrol’s Tucson Sector Headquarters facility, in Tucson, Arizona. The development of this facility successfully brought together federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to integrate and coordinate operations (Customs and Border Protection 2010).

In the 2012 strategic plan, the USBP placed an even greater importance on the use of intelligence to increase their capability to detect, respond to, and interdict unlawful entrants into the United States. One of the three pillars of the USBP’s 2012 strategy was information (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 4). The USBP intended to gather
intelligence and utilize the analyzed data to determine the locations of greatest threat
along the border, incorporate planning with law enforcement partners, and respond to the
threats in a deliberate manner (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 6). The 2012
strategy also recognized the importance of sharing information and using intelligence to
drive operations targeting terrorist threats, smugglers, and traffickers (Department of
Homeland Security 2012a, 9-18). In 2012, CBP began building a Border Intelligence
Center in South Texas, in the same compound as the Border Patrol’s Laredo Sector
Headquarters facility. The purpose for the erection of this structure was to house
numerous federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, with the intention of
collaborating and sharing information and intelligence (Customs and Border Protection
2012g).

This domain assisted to answer all of the thesis questions. This domain assisted in
answering whether the changes in the 2012 strategic plan provided a more effective
means to avert, detect, and react to unlawful entries. The analyzed information identified
that the increased importance that the USBP placed on utilizing intelligence to drive their
operations, and the increased capabilities the USBP gained in identifying changes in
threat levels along the border increased the USBPs ability to deter and detect unlawful
entries. The information provided in this domain also assisted in answering whether the
2004 strategy was effective, through the discussion regarding the large acquisition of
surveillance technology that occurred during the USBP’s 2004 strategy. This increased
amount of surveillance technology greatly assisted to provide information and
intelligence to drive operations and to detect and deter unlawful entrants. Information in
this section also provided an answer to why the USBP needed the 2012 strategy. The
decrease in the amount of surveillance technology being acquired and military support created a need to find a better way to utilize resources already obtained. This domain also addressed what the USBP carried over from their 2004 strategy into their 2012 strategy. The USBP continued to place increased emphasis on utilizing information and intelligence to drive operations and the need to share information with other international, federal, state, local, and tribal partners.

Institutional Review of the U.S. Border Patrol

This section of reviewing the USBP’s institution analyzed information specifically pertaining to the USBP. The domains selected to analyze in this section were doctrine, organization, training, and personnel. The analysis conducted in these domains best assisted in answering all questions in this thesis, as well as describing the changes that occurred within the UBSP during the time frames of the three USBP strategies.

Doctrine

The doctrine domain analyzed information regarding the 1994, 2004, and 2012 USBP strategies. Information discussed in regards to the USBP’s 1994 strategy entailed its implemented approaches used to reduce the flow of unlawful entrants. Information discussed regarding the USBP’s 2004 strategy included the shift of focus from their 1994 strategy to their 2004 strategy, the three pillars used to accomplish the USBP mission and how the USBP measured border secureness. Analysis pertaining to the USBP’s 2012 strategy contained information regarding the shift in approach from the 2004 strategy to the 2012 strategy. Lastly, a comparison of objectives between both the 2004 and 2012 strategy distinguished similarities and the differences between the two.
The USBP’s 1994 strategy specifically focused on deterring people from illegally crossing into the United States. The USBP created a phased approach to control the illegal entries across the border beginning in the sectors that experienced the most illegal activity and progressing to the sectors with less (U.S. Border Patrol 1994, 7-14). Although, at the time, it appeared as though this approach seemed to be working, the General Accounting Office decided it was too soon to know or tell just how effective the new strategy would ultimately be (Ekstrand 1994, 27). However, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which required the General Accounting Office to measure, monitor, and report the degree of success the USBP had in implementing its 1994 strategy. The document labeled, *Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More Evaluation Needed*, pointed out several positive results stemming from the USBP’s 1994 strategy. Additionally, this document also identified several aspects of the 1994 strategy that still needed improvement. According to this document, the USBP experienced operational success by taking some of their resources from other areas and focusing them on San Diego and El Paso, in order to help mitigate the high influx of illegal entries into the U.S. that occurred in these two areas, the busiest along the southwest border (Stana 1997, 2). The USBP increased the number of personnel, technology, and infrastructure in these two areas and began to see desired effects within the first two years of the implementation of the 1994 strategy. Of the agents hired between 1994 and 1997, the USBP placed 43 percent of them in San Diego and 12 percent of them in El Paso (Stana 1997, 14). The increase of personnel, technology, and infrastructure contributed to the desired results that the USBP achieved with the decrease of unlawful entries in San Diego and El Paso sectors. They
accomplished this by making it difficult to cross in these two sectors so that individuals seeking unlawful entry had to travel to more distant and undesirable locations (Stana 1997, 14). This allowed other Border Patrol agents in other sectors to assist with making arrests, rather than one or two sectors dealing with the majority of the illegal entry of people across the southwest border.

The attacks of September 11, 2001 triggered a massive restructuring in the federal government and the establishment of the DHS in 2003. These events caused changes to the USBP’s mission and drove the development of the 2004 USBP strategy. The focus shifted from the prevention and detection of unlawful entrants, to preventing and detecting terrorist and terrorist weapons from transiting across the international borders (Department of Homeland Security 2004, 2). Five objectives outlined in the strategy stated how the organization planned to pursue securing the borders:

1. Establish substantial probability of apprehending terrorists and their weapons as they attempt to enter illegally between the ports of entry.

2. Deter illegal entries through improved enforcement.

3. Detect, apprehend, and deter smugglers of humans, drugs, and other contraband.

4. Leverage “Smart Border” technology to multiply the effect of enforcement personnel.

5. Reduce crime in border communities and consequently improve quality of life and economic vitality of targeted areas. (Department of Homeland Security 2004, 2)

In order to achieve these objectives, the USBP planned to acquire additional personnel, equipment, technology, and infrastructure and deploy the right combination of
these resources along the southwest border. The USBP also received significantly larger budgets due to the importance of their new focus and the need to obtain more personnel, equipment, technology and infrastructure to meet the USBP strategic objectives and better secure the U.S. borders (Customs and Border Protection 2013b). The USBP quickly hired more applicants and sent them to the USBP Academy, so that the country had more individuals providing protection along its borders. The USBP searched for, evaluated, and acquired new innovative technological suites, which enhanced the agencies ability to find unauthorized individuals attempting to cross the southwest border (Department of Homeland Security 2004, 15-16). Within the 2004 strategy, the USBP introduced other tactical and technological approaches to reaching the objectives. The first approach entailed fielding a better trained and more flexible force with a defined and centralized chain of command. In order to prepare the organization to effectively handle a terrorist situation, the USBP provided their employees antiterrorism training (Department of Homeland Security 2004, 12-13). Additionally, a direct, streamlined chain of command enabled the organization to make decisions more quickly, especially situations that required a rapid senior leadership decision, because of possible imminent threats along the borders. The second approach mentioned in the 2004 USBP strategy stated the intention of utilizing the Border Patrol’s Tactical unit, Search Trauma and Rescue team, and the Special Response Team to counterterrorism along the borders. The USBP planned to do this by deploying these teams to locations that presented the greatest threat, and being able to promptly reposition these teams throughout the U.S. or internationally, if necessary. The next approach focused on communicating and sharing information with other offices within CBP in an attempt to make the most informed decisions in deploying
resources and conducting operations. The USBP envisioned conducting operations based
upon national intelligence and CBP’s targeting system, to discourage and prevent
terrorists from crossing into the United States. The USBP also recognized that the rapid
increase in agents and technology required the organization to continuously reevaluate
and monitor the need to support and maintain the resources currently on hand or in the
acquisition pipeline. Lastly, the strategy discussed the necessity to maintain and refurbish
existing structures in order to keep the current infrastructure and technology working and
allow the USBP to conduct their duties against the ever changing threats to the country

Another development presented in the USBP 2004 strategy was a method to
classify areas along the border to determine their level of secureness. To do this, the
USBP established five different terms and meanings for the varying levels of control. The
five terms and their definitions are:

1. Controlled-Continuous detection and interdiction resources at the immediate
border with high probability of apprehension upon entry.

2. Managed-Multi-tiered detection and interdiction resources are in place to fully
implement the border control strategy with high probability of apprehension after entry.

3. Monitored-Substantial detection resources in place, but accessibility and
resources continue to affect ability to respond.

4. Low-level monitored-Some knowledge is available to develop a rudimentary
border control strategy, but the area remains vulnerable because of inaccessibility or
limited resource availability.
5. Remote/low activity—Information is lacking to develop a meaningful border control strategy because of inaccessibility or lack of resources (Stana 2011a, 8).

Since the perceived level of control rested on how much technology an area along the border possessed, the total number of border miles considered under control did not represent the actual number of border miles under control (Stana 2011a, 6). This is because the distribution of technology, infrastructure, and personnel went to those USBP sectors that experienced the greatest risk of unlawful actions (Stana 2011a, 6). This resulted in some sectors not receiving nearly as much technology, personnel, and infrastructure as others, because they were less of a priority based upon their small amount of unlawful activity. Therefore, this method created the impression that the sectors that observed the smallest amount of illegal activity were not under operational control. This was due to the fact that some sectors did not receive a significant increase in technology, personnel, and infrastructure (Homeland Security News Wire 2011). In 2010, the total number of miles considered under operational control was 875, which was 57 percent of the southwest border (Stana 2011a, 8). Of the remaining 1,120 miles of southern border, close to two-thirds received the classification level of monitored, while the remaining received the classification of low-level monitored (Stana 2011a, 10). The Yuma Sector experienced the greatest effects of the increased personnel, technology, and infrastructure and became the only sector classified as under operational control (Stana 2011a, 9-10). Between 2004 and 2010, the Yuma Sector experienced a peak in apprehensions in 2005 of 138,438, and the lowest apprehensions recorded in 2009 of 6,951 (Customs and Border Protection 2013c). In fiscal year 2011, the DHS decided that there needed to be a better way to measure border security and ceased using the terms and
definitions that the USBP created during the time frame of their second strategy (Rosenblum 2012a, 23). The USBP received the tasking by the DHS to create a better method to measure border security. The USBP anticipated that a new method to measure border security would be available in fiscal year 2013 (Homeland Security News Wire 2011).

The USBP’s 2012 strategic plan consisted of two goals with corresponding objectives, which contributed to accomplishing their mission. The first goal in the 2012 strategic plan was to secure America’s borders, while the second goal was to strengthen the Border Patrol. This review of the material in the strategy focused on the objectives that comprise the first goal, because they specifically deal with what the USBP is doing to keep America safe, by securing the nation’s borders. The five objectives enumerated within the first goal for the organization to work towards and accomplish are to:

1. Prevent Terrorists and Terrorist Weapons from Entering the United States.
2. Manage risk.
3. Disrupt and degrade Transnational Criminal Organizations.
5. Increase Community Engagement (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 8).

There are similarities between the objectives presented in the 2004 strategy and those in the 2012 strategy. The first objectives in both strategies are similar in that they both focus on preventing and apprehending terrorist and terrorist weapons from entering the United States. Both strategies state that the integration and cooperation of other federal, state, and local partnerships are necessary to accomplish this goal. Further, both
strategies state that the use of intelligence is necessary to combat terrorism (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 10).

However, for the first objective of the 2012 strategy, there was a greater emphasis on the use of intelligence to deter and prevent terrorists from entering the U.S. (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 10). The intelligence discussion is the largest section of the document, and goes into great detail regarding how intelligence will drive USBP operations, by describing the intelligence cycle, information sharing, and integration with other specific intelligence components (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 10). In the 2004 strategy, the location of the USBP’s intelligence driven operations are in the tactical and technological approaches section versus being in their own stand alone section (Department of Homeland Security 2004, 12-14). An additional difference between this aspect of the two strategies is that the 2012 strategy stated the importance of maintaining a liaison with international partners to deter people from entering the U.S. prior to them ever reaching our borders (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 11).

The second objectives aligned in both strategies, as they focused on improving enforcement capabilities and managing areas that posed the greatest threat to the United States. The 2004 strategy mentioned that this could be done through means similar to those that were successful in the past, by deploying an appropriate mix of resources and capabilities to areas known to have illegal activity (Department of Homeland Security 2004, 9). In both strategies the USBP mentioned using an analysis of known threats and patterns to steer their decisions, in order to properly guide the deployment of assets to highly trafficked areas (Department of Homeland Security 2004, 9).
A difference in managing risk between the 2004 and the 2012 strategy is the mentioning of the use of a new team called the Mobile Response Team (MRT), found in the 2012 strategy. The MRT is a trained team capable of rapid movement to locations with higher unlawful activity along the border, or in response to national incidents (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 13). The USBP increased their rapid response capability to be better prepared to respond and deploy to threats and incidents throughout the nation. Furthermore, this rapid response capability provided the USBP the ability to maneuver agents along the border to disrupt and deter illegal border activity (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 13).

Another difference between the two objectives covered in the 2012 strategy mentioned the USBP’s use of change detection capability to seek out and identify changes in methods and patterns used by individuals seeking unlawful entry in order to gain a better situational understanding of the different areas along the border (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 14). A greater situational awareness provided the USBP with the knowledge necessary to concentrate its resources in specific locations to counter unlawful actions in those areas. The USBP identified a change in the environment through means, which included the use of visual detection (flyovers, surveillance systems), intelligence (information provided by residents and detainees), and reports (apprehension data, sensor activations) (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 14).

The third objectives are comparable in that they both intend to deter, detect, and degrade Transnational Criminal Organizations from smuggling in drugs, people, and other illegal contraband. The 2004 strategy sought to do this by acquiring more technology, collecting and sharing intelligence, and cooperating and integrating with
other agencies and departments throughout the U.S. (Department of Homeland Security 2004, 9-10). The 2012 strategy similarly focused on accomplishing this objective by jointly working with other agencies and departments to target Transnational Criminal Organizations (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 16-17). However, the difference among the third objectives between the 2004 and 2012 strategies is that the 2012 strategy stated that due to the increased resources and reduction of apprehensions throughout the implementation of the 2004 strategy, the USBP could now concentrate on applying specific consequences to detainees. The USBP created a tool called the Consequence Delivery System, which is “a process designed to uniquely evaluate each subject and apply the appropriate post-arrest consequences to that individual to break the smuggling cycle and end the subject’s desire to attempt further illegal entry” (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 17).

The fourth objective of the 2012 strategy focused on a whole of government approach to confront and mitigate unlawful entries into the U.S., by working together with the Office of Air and Marine and Office of Field Operations along with other pertinent organizations (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 20). The 2012 strategy mentioned the integrated efforts of federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to work together to achieve a common goal (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 20). The 2004 strategy also mentioned the unity of effort between federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to achieve a common goal throughout the strategy, but not specifically in the fourth objective (Department of Homeland Security 2004, 7-16).
The fifth objective in both strategies focused on establishing and building relationships and reducing crime in border communities. Both strategies mentioned conducting outreach in border communities, primarily to deter crime and smuggling efforts, but also to build and improve the overall quality of life for residents (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 20-21). A minor difference between the two strategies is that the 2012 strategy goes into greater detail regarding the different programs already under implementation to build and foster relationships.

One similarity between the two strategies is found within objective one of the 2004 strategy, and within objective two of the 2012 strategy. The similarity is the use of the USBP’s trained teams Border Patrol Tactical unit (BORTAC) and Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue team (BORSTAR), which are capable of rapidly deploying to emergent situations. An additional subject mentioned in both strategies, but in different objectives (in objective four in the 2004 strategy and in objective two of the 2012 strategy) is the utilization of technology as a force multiplier.

In testimony that Chief Fisher gave at a hearing on the 2012-2016 strategic plan, United States Representative Candice S. Miller asked Fisher if there were any significant differences between the 2012 strategy and the 2004 strategy. The two differences Fisher quickly spoke about were change detection capability and optimizing current capabilities (U.S. Congress 2012). Fisher continued on to say that due to the resources and technology the USBP received over the years, they can now access and deter illicit activity in areas that previously were not accessible (U.S. Congress 2012). Additionally, Miller asked Acting Director Rebecca Gambler, of Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office, and Dr. Marc Rosenblum, Specialist in Immigration
Policy, Congressional Research Service, if they saw anything new in the 2012 strategy. Both agreed that the strategies are similar, but different in how the USBP is currently strategically utilizing the capabilities that they developed in previous years (U.S. Congress 2012).

Besides the Operational Implementation Plan and Integrated Mission Analysis Tool discussed in chapter 3, another notable difference between the strategies was that the USBP moved away from a resource-based approach, to a risk-based approach. The USBP refocused their concentration from obtaining resources such as personnel, technology, and infrastructure to secure the borders, to utilizing information, integration, and rapid response to address illegal activity along the borders. The 2012 strategy capitalized on the capabilities that the USBP obtained in previous years in an effective and efficient manner to secure the international borders (Myers 2012).

This section provided greater detail regarding the USBP strategies (their doctrine) by displaying the change in importance of different approaches and focuses throughout them, which answered all of the questions within this thesis. Data discussed in this section regarding whether the changes in the 2012 strategy provided a more effective means to avert, detect, and react to unlawful entries included the use of a new approach to deter and detect individuals crossing into the U.S., which was to use information, integration, and rapid response in a risk-based manner. This approach allowed the USBP to better utilize the resources acquired throughout the 2004 strategy to mitigate threats along the border. Furthermore, the USBP also implemented a system that better allowed Border Patrol agents to apply consequences to individuals placed under arrest that best disrupts the smuggling cycle.
Information provided in this section also answered whether the 2004 strategy was effective through the discussion of the USBP’s incorporation of successful approaches from their 1994 strategy into their 2004 strategy, which were to increase personnel, technology, and infrastructure, but in a much larger scale. Furthermore, the example provided, regarding the success that the Yuma sector experienced during the time frame of the 2004 strategy, also assisted in illustrating the effectiveness of the 2004 strategy. Information entailed in this domain also helped answer why the USBP needed the 2012 strategy: the USBP desired to better utilize the resources they obtained throughout the 2004 strategy, also chose to terminate utilizing operational control to measure border security.

Analysis in this section also addressed what the USBP carried over from their 2004 strategy into their 2012 strategy and what they crafted to build upon it. The majority of the objectives and approaches in the 2004 strategy can be found in the 2012 strategy. However, the key difference between the two strategies is the change in approach from the 2004 resource-based approach to the 2012 risk-based approach. Other new aspects in the USBP’s 2012 strategy included the increase in the emphasis placed on utilizing information, integration, and rapid response to mitigate threats along the border, the use of the consequence delivery system, and the acquirement of better capabilities to identify changes in threat levels and patterns.

Organization

Analysis presented in this domain provided an understanding of the steps that the USBP took to improve coordination of operations within the organization. Furthermore, information within this domain related to how the USBP divided up their areas of
responsibility and improved their organizational structure. Information also discussed a
different organizational concept that CBP employed in order to improve the decision
making process regarding operations.

The USBP geographically divided their areas of responsibility into 20 different
sectors, of which nine are located along the southern border (Customs and Border
Protection 2012d). Within these 20 sectors, the USBP further divided each sector into
smaller geographic spaces and assigns a station the task of securing each of the smaller
areas of responsibility. Along the southern border are 73 stations (Customs and Border
Protection 2012d). Additionally, the USBP established checkpoints along routes of travel
in some areas in the southern border region, to reduce the ability of individuals to exploit
roadways near the border. There are currently 31 permanent checkpoints along the
southern border (Customs and Border Protection 2012d). As of the end of fiscal year
2012, the USBP deployed 18,516 of their 21,394 agents to the southern border (U.S.
Border Patrol 2012).

The USBP experienced some challenges during the time frame of their 1994
strategy, which were addressed in their following 2004 strategy. In 2001, the GAO
reiterated a point made in the early 1990s, namely that the INS operated under a
decentralized chain of command and did not successfully control the different sectors and
districts throughout its organizational structure (Stana 2001, 2). This problem led to
uncoordinated efforts, as well as duplication of efforts among operational offices within
the INS. In 1994, INS Commissioner Doris Meissner proposed a new organizational
structure. The purpose of the new structure aimed to provide operational offices the
flexibility to make more of their own operational decisions and oversee programs
specifically dealing with operations in each particular area of responsibility (Stana 2001, 2). However, many cumbersome layers of management remained that required attention in the 2004 strategy. For example, the Office of Border Patrol Headquarters answered to the Associate Commissioner of Enforcement rather than directly answering to and having a direct line of communication to the Commissioner of INS (Department of Justice 1994). Additionally, a Sector Chief reported to a Regional Director rather than to the Chief of the Border Patrol (Department of Justice 1994).

In 2004, with the transition of the USBP from the INS to CBP completed, the Chief of the Border Patrol, David V. Aguilar, proposed a centralized chain of command, with the aim of streamlining the organizational structure and communication process in order to respond to situations with quicker reactions and decisions (Department of Homeland Security 2004, 12). Aguilar stated that the flow of information would come from the Commissioner to the Chief of the USBP, and from the Chief to the Sector Chiefs.

More recently, in order to streamline the flow of information, CBP deviated from the standard practice of providing separate offices in the field to the USBP, Office of Field Operations, and Office of Air and Marine. In 2011, CBP established the Joint Field Command (JFC) in Tucson, Arizona, integrating officials from all three of the operational offices in CBP, as well as the Office of Intelligence and Investigative Liaison. The purpose of arraying the forces in this manner was to bolster the unity of effort between the operational offices. The JFC was responsible for planning and conducting all operations in Arizona and redistributing resources as needed (Customs and Border Protection 2013a). CBP stated that the creation of the JFC allowed all operational
components to work together, and that the construct serves best to confront and reduce the immigration challenges that Arizona faced (Customs and Border Protection 2011a). Since the establishment of this effort to house multiple components within one building, and due to its success, CBP also implemented a similar concept in south Texas.

This domain provided information that helped to answer the primary question as well as secondary questions two and three. Analysis answered whether the changes in the 2012 strategy provided a more effective means to avert, detect, and react to unlawful entries. Two of the themes mentioned in the USBP 2012 strategy, which were the use of information and integration to target threats in a risk-based manner, were put to use with the creation of the JFC. The establishment of the JFC addressed specific corridors in the U.S., and further integrated all CBP operational components together, allowing the USBP to more effectively target and apprehend threats along the border. Material discussed in this domain also answered whether the 2004 strategy was effective by showing the progress made from the challenges experienced with the organizational structure during the USBP’s 1994 strategy, to the improved organization of the USBP’s 2004 strategy. Information examined in this domain also answered why the USBP needed the 2012 strategy: the creation of the JFC allowed for better utilization of the resources that CBP and the USBP already had. The information also answered what the USBP carried over from their 2004 strategy into their 2012 strategy and what they crafted to build upon it. Integration of CBP personnel and other law enforcement partners was a concept in the USBP’s 2004 strategy that carried over into the USBP’s 2012 strategy. However, the concept of selecting and organizing CBP leaders within specific corridors and giving
them the responsibility of unifying efforts between CBP and other law enforcement agencies was a new concept in the 2012 strategy.

**Training**

Information provided in the training domain entailed data that showed how the focus of training progressed throughout the three USBP strategies. The researched material used also discussed aspects of the academies of the USBP’s specialty teams. Additionally, literature also identified three teams that the USBP utilizes to combat threats and what their training requirements are.

Training that agents can volunteer for, is to become a member of one of the USBP’s specialty teams. In order to become a member of the Border Patrol’s Tactical unit, Search, Trauma, and Rescue team, or MRT, an agent must complete the academy required by each team. In the 1994 strategy, the USBP acknowledged their limited ability to quickly shift resources to other locations throughout the U.S. (U.S. Border Patrol 1994, 6). Both the 2004 and 2012 strategies stated the importance of having mobile teams to respond and adjust to threats along the border. However, the 2012 strategy placed more emphasis on the USBP’s response capabilities, as they made rapid response a pillar within the strategy (Department of Homeland Security 2012a, 4).

The USBP established the Border Patrol Tactical unit in 1984. To become a member of BORTAC, an agent must successfully complete a demanding and exhausting four week academy. The BORTAC operator-training course consists of training in “small unit tactics, operation planning, advanced weapon skills, defensive tactics, and airmobile operations” (Customs and Border Protection 2009b). Upon completion of the BORTAC operator-training course, agents may volunteer to participate in additional training
courses to become specialized in particular mission essential tasks (Customs and Border Protection 2009b).

The Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue team was established in 1998. In order to become a member of BORSTAR, agents must successfully complete a physically and mentally demanding five week academy. BORSTAR training consists of learning and performing a variety of search and rescue techniques, such as “technical rescue, land navigation, communication, swift water rescue, and air operations” (Customs and Border Protection 2009a). Additionally, every member that successfully completes the BORSTAR Academy must attend and successfully complete a basic Emergency Medical Technician course (Customs and Border Protection 2009a). BORSTAR agents may also select to attend various courses to become specialized in different mission essential tasks, once they successfully complete the basic academy.

The Mobile Response Team, created in 2011, is the newest team that Border Patrol agents can join. The purpose of MRT was to provide the USBP rapid response capabilities to locations along the border that pose the highest threat to the U.S. (Kimery 2012b). Some of the training agents receive during their two week academy include: land navigation, advanced weapons, small unit tactics, medical training, operations planning, less lethal munitions, and mobile field force operations.

This domain assisted answering the primary question and secondary questions two and three. Information in this domain assisted to answer whether the changes in the 2012 strategy provided a more effective means to avert, detect, and react to unlawful entries. The 2012 strategy placed a much greater focus on available agents capable of rapidly responding to threats along the border, as well at to other significant events
throughout the nation. Information entailed in this domain also helped answer why the USBP needed the 2012 strategy. A new strategy was necessary to implement the Chief’s vision of utilizing rapid response capabilities to respond to threats along the border and throughout the nation. The third theme of the 2012 USBP strategy led to the creation of the MRT and its enhanced capability to provide a rapid response to threats along the border. This section also assisted in addressing what the USBP carried over from their 2004 strategy into their 2012 strategy and what they crafted to build upon it. The utilization of BORTAC and BORSTAR were aspects carried over from the 2004 strategy into the 2012 strategy. However, the development and utilization of MRT as another enhanced rapid response capability was a newly implemented characteristic in the 2012 strategy.

Personnel

The personnel domain contained information regarding the increase of personnel throughout each USBP strategy. Additionally, analysis discussed the reasons for the increased amount of USBP’s personnel. Lastly, a table depicted the total amount of Border Patrol agents that worked for the USBP at the end of each fiscal year.

In 1994, the USBP identified the need for additional personnel; however they did not receive the largest influx of personnel until between 2004 and 2011. Table 4 depicts the total number of agents at the end of each fiscal year. The USBP hired additional personnel during the first strategy, but more so as a result of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. The Act required the USBP to hire 1,000 Border Patrol agents each year from 1997 through 2001 (Stana 1999, 3). From 1994 to 1999, the size of the USBP nearly doubled. In 1994, the USBP had 4,287
employees, and at the end of fiscal year 1999, the USBP had 8,351 agents (U.S. Border Patrol 2012). Although the USBP nearly doubled in size in six years, it did so despite not meeting its goal of increasing personnel by 1,000 new agents in 1999 (Stana 1999, 7). In fact, the USBP only increased their personnel numbers by 364 agents in 1999, the reason being that even though the USBP hired over 1,000 Border Patrol agents that year, over 750 agents left the agency (Stana 1999, 7).

Table 4. Border Patrol Agent Staffing by Fiscal Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Agents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>21,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>21,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>20,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>20,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>17,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>14,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>12,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>11,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>10,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>10,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>10,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>9,821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>8,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>7,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>6,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>5,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>4,287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The hiring and deployment of additional Border Patrol agents along the border became a main focus of the 2004 USBP strategy. The 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act authorized the DHS to hire 2,000 agents each fiscal year from 2006 to 2010 (U.S. Congress 2004). In 2004, the USBP's total number of employed
agents was 10,819, and at the end of fiscal year 2010, the USBP employed a total of 20,558 agents (U.S. Border Patrol 2012). In 2010, the USBP received approval for their last significant increase in personnel due to the enactment of a bill that allowed the USBP to hire an additional 1,000 Border Patrol agents (National Immigration Forum 2010). At the beginning of fiscal year 2011, the USBP employed 20,558 agents, and at the end of fiscal year 2011, the USBP employed 21,444 agents (U.S. Border Patrol 2012).

Information in the personnel domain identified the required number of Border Patrol agents hired during specific years and the total number of employed agents during each fiscal year, throughout all three strategies. The analysis in this domain assisted to answer whether the changes in the 2012 strategy provided a more effective means to avert, detect, and react to unlawful entries. Due to the USBP not receiving approval to increase their personnel numbers since 2010, the USBP’s concept of shifting to a strategy that better utilized the resources gained throughout the 2004 strategy in a risk-based manner positioned the organization to be more effective. Information discussed in this domain also helped to answer whether the 2004 strategy was effective, because it explained the successes the USBP achieved in meeting the hiring requirements throughout the 2004 strategy.

**Statistical Data**

Statistical data depicted in tables 5 through 10 captured changes in activity that took place throughout the different years of the three USBP strategies. The tables present information by fiscal year regarding apprehensions of Aliens from Special Interest Countries (ASIC), marijuana seizures, and heroin seizures, smuggling costs, assaults against agents, and USBP effectiveness percentages along the southwest border.
Additionally, information stated how the examined material provided in this domain answered the questions of this study.

The information presented in table 5 depicts the apprehensions of ASICs. An ASIC is an individual who is from a country identified as having connections to terrorism (Nuñez-Neto 2005a, 20). The USBP did not begin to collect data on ASICs until 2005. Data showed that the lowest number of ASIC apprehensions occurred in 2012, during the 2012 strategy, and the most occurred in 2010, during the 2004 strategy.

Table 5. Apprehensions of ASICs by Fiscal Year Along Southwest Border

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Apprehensions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by the author with data obtained from the Office of Border Patrol, Headquarters, Washington, DC.

Data presented in table 6 depicts the amount, in pounds, of marijuana that the USBP seized during each fiscal year throughout the time frame of the three different strategies along the southwest border. Overall, the total amount of seized marijuana increased throughout the time frame of the three strategies, peaking in 2009.
Additionally, the USBP observed six instances of a decreased amount of annual marijuana seizures, along the southwest border during the same time frame.

Table 6. USBP Southwest Border Marijuana Seizures by Fiscal Year (lbs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Seizures (lbs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2,297,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2,518,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2,417,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,550,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,632,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,852,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,362,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1,194,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1,329,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1,334,301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1,223,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1,161,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1,309,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1,165,317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>860,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>731,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>645,651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>594,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>490,847</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Created by the author with data obtained from the Office of Border Patrol, Headquarters, Washington, DC.

Table 7 depicts the amount, in pounds, of heroin, that the USBP seized over the time frame of the three different strategies, along the southwest border. The changes in the amounts of heroin seized do not follow the marijuana seizure trend. Although the heroin seizures over the specified time frame increased and decreased several times over the years, overall the amount of heroin seizures increased, peaking in 2012.
Table 7. USBP Southwest Border Heroin Seizures by Fiscal Year (lbs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Seizures (lbs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>6,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>6,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by the author with data obtained from the Office of Border Patrol, Headquarters, Washington, DC.

The information in table 8 illustrates the percentage of increase in the price that individuals paid smugglers to get them into the U.S., from 1999 through 2008. The prices that individuals paid smugglers to help them illegally enter the U.S. increased from 1999 to 2006, where it peaked. The reason data began in 1999 is that all sectors did not collect these figures prior to 1999 (Roberts et al. 2010, 10). Similarly, information was not found after 2008. The portrayed data showed that as the USBP continued implementing their strategies, smugglers began to charge more money to smuggle people into the U.S. (Roberts et al. 2010, 10).
Table 8. Percentage of Increase in Price of Smuggling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to statistics provided in the GAO report, *Southwest Border Security Data Are Limited and Concerns Vary about Spillover Crime Along the Southwest Border*, violent crime in southwest border counties located along the international border declined from 2004 to 2011. Of the four states located along the southwest border, Arizona was the only state that showed a higher rate of violence in border counties than non-border counties. However, although Arizona’s border counties experienced a higher crime rate than non-border counties, the border county crime rate decreased 33 percent from 2004 to 2011 (Russell 2013, 43-44). The data showed that violent crime in Texas border counties decreased by 30 percent and in California’s by 26 percent (Russell 2013, 44).

Furthermore, New Mexico’s border county violence decreased by 8 percent from 2005 to 2011 (Russell 2013, 44). Data from 2004 is missing because incomplete data submitted to the FBI in 2004 by New Mexico’s law enforcement, resulted in the FBI’s inability to use
the data (Russell 2013, 43). Additionally, this document also reported property crime statistics from 2004 to 2011. In Texas, property crime rates decreased by 28 percent, New Mexico’s decreased by 7 percent, and California’s decreased by 35 percent from 2004 to 2011 (Russell 2013, 48). Lastly, improper reports submitted to the FBI by Arizona border counties resulted in the FBI not being able to use property crime data in this report (Russell 2013, 48).

Table 9 depicts the total amount of assaults made against Border Patrol agents. The USBP did not collect data on the amount of assaults made against Border Patrol agents until 2006. Since 2006, the USBP recently observed the lowest amount of assaults made against them. In 2012, the USBP reported that they only experienced 549 assaults against their agents. This statistic is 117 less assaults than any previous year, and 536 less than the peak year, 2008, which was 1,085.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assaults</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>1,085</td>
<td>1,056</td>
<td>1,049</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>549</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Created by the author with data obtained from the Office of Border Patrol, Headquarters, Washington DC.

The USBP presently measures effectiveness by adding the total number of apprehensions and turn backs together and dividing the sum by the total sum of apprehensions, turn backs, and got aways from each sector (Gambler 2012b, 48). A turn back is when an individual unlawfully enters the U.S. and then turns back and returns to Mexico (Gambler 2012b, 60). A got away is when an individual unlawfully crosses into
the U.S. and continues traveling into the U.S. and is not apprehended by the USBP (Gambler 2012b, 60). The GAO obtained this information from the USBP from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. According to the information provided by the GAO report, the USBP continuously increased their effectiveness each year from 2006 to 2011. The author requested the same information from the USBP for years not provided in the GAO report, in order to depict the percentages throughout the entire time frame of the three strategies; however, the author was unable to obtain the information.

Table 10. USBP Effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Data presented in this domain assisted to answer the primary question and secondary question one. Information provided in this domain assisted to answer whether the changes in the 2012 strategy provided a more effective means to avert, detect, and react to unlawful entries. The reduction of ASIC apprehensions, marijuana seizures, and the USBPs increased effectiveness percentage assisted to answer that the 2012 strategy provided a better means to apprehend unlawful entries into the United States. Information contained in this domain assisted in answering whether the 2004 strategy was effective because of the information discussed depicting the increased price that smugglers...
charged to illegally bring individuals into the country throughout the time frame of the 2004 strategy.

**Summary**

Literature analyzed in this chapter provided evidence necessary to answer the primary and all secondary questions within this thesis. This chapter presented information during the three different periods of time that the USBP operated under a different strategic plan. Literature was presented in the context of the two military rubrics (PMESII and DOTMLP) in order to analyze the environment along the southwest border that the USBP operates within, and the institution of the USBP itself. Additionally, statistical data presented in this chapter assisted to provide evidence necessary to answer several questions in this thesis. The variables and domains selected to analyze were chosen based on the amount of information available to research and whether the variables and domains were related to the first goal of the 2012 USBP strategy. In chapter 5, an interpretation of the findings from this chapter is provided to explain what the information means, in relation to answering all questions in this thesis.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to answer the following primary and secondary research questions. The primary question of this thesis was: Does the 2012 Border Patrol Strategic Plan provide a more effective means to avert, detect, and react to unlawful entries into the United States? The secondary questions were: Was the Border Patrol’s 2004 strategy effective? What caused the need for the Border Patrol to create a new strategy in 2012? In creating the 2012 strategy, what did the Border Patrol carry over from the 2004 strategy, and what did they newly craft to build upon it? In order to answer these questions, the use of a qualitative approach allowed for the review of literature pertaining to this study. Additionally, the utilization of two Department of Defense analytical rubrics allowed for an assessment of the USBP’s changing impact on the southwest border from 1994 through 2013 and the USBP’s change as an organization. The first rubric allowed for an assessment of the southwest border, specifically relating to changes that affected the USBP by assessing the domains of PMESII (Department of the Army 2005, 6). The second rubric allowed for an evaluation of the USBP, as an organization, in order to assess their capabilities by evaluating the domains of DOTMLPF (Department of the Army 2005, 6).
Conclusions

Through the analysis of the three USBP strategies and other pertinent documentation relating to the thesis questions, the following conclusions answer the primary and secondary questions of this thesis.

Secondary thesis question one: Was the Border Patrol’s 2004 strategy effective? Overall, the USBP’s performance was positive during the time frame of their second strategy. The USBP learned from the successes they experienced during the implementation of the 1994 strategy and built upon its successful concepts in their 2004 strategy by developing and increasing the three pillars of the 2004 strategy: personnel, technology, and infrastructure. In 2004, the USBP focused efforts on increasing personnel, technology, and infrastructure along the border in order to detect, deter, and apprehend terrorists, terrorist weapons, and other individuals unlawfully crossing the border. The USBP’s increased budgets and the passing of several laws allowed them to nearly double the number of personnel, procure new technology, and build many miles of fence and other vehicle and pedestrian barriers along the southwest border. The increased resources the USBP deployed to the southwest border were one of the main reasons that they experienced reduced illegal entries and increased enforcement effectiveness.

One contributing factor to the success of the 2004 strategic plan was the improvement to its organizational structure. The 2004 strategy put in place a centralized chain of command to streamline the decision making process and make the organization more flexible and reactive. These changes eliminated cumbersome and unnecessary layers of management, in order to more effectively act on critical information and disseminate information to the field.
The USBP’s 2004 strategy also shifted focus from its predecessor, to align with the new areas of emphasis presented in the 2002 NSS, to deter and detect terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States. This change in focus primarily resulted from the events that unfolded on 9/11, which also led to the creation of the DHS, and CBP. The USBP’s 2004 Strategic Plan aligned in efforts with the 2002 NSS by utilizing other international, federal, state, local, and tribal agencies to further their interest in accomplishing the USBP mission. This helped to eliminate duplication of efforts. Additionally, working with partners acted as a force multiplier and increased efficacy. Furthermore, the use of gathering, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence between various partners to target enforcement efforts also aligned with the 2002 NSS. This allowed for the USBP to conduct intelligence driven operations and to better coordinate the planning and execution of operations. All of this contributed to the USBP’s ability to detect, deter, and apprehend terrorists and criminal organizations illegally entering the country.

Statistical data depicted in tables 3 and 10 further backs up the fact that the USBP performed effectively during the time frame of their second strategy because of the significant reduction of apprehensions observed along the southwest border over that time frame and the increase of effectiveness (based upon their current method of measuring effectiveness). In addition to the reduction in apprehensions, the increase in the price charged by smugglers to smuggle individuals into the U.S., as depicted in table 8, and the increase in assaults against Border Patrol agents as depicted in table 9 strongly implies that the USBP made it much more problematic for smuggling organizations to smuggle and for individuals to unlawfully enter the United States. Lastly, the increased
amount of marijuana and heroin seizures imply that the USBP’s 2004 Strategic Plan was successful, the USBP’s ability to make more overall narcotic seizures is evidence of a more effective campaign against drug smuggling organizations due to their increased manpower, technology, and infrastructure along the southern border. In conclusion, as discussed throughout the thesis and summarized in the above paragraphs, the USBP’s 2004 Strategic Plan was effective.

Secondary thesis question two: What caused the need for the Border Patrol to create a new strategy in 2012? During testimony given by the Chief of the USBP, Michael Fisher, he stated that the USBP needed a new strategy because of the significantly increased resources the USBP received since 2004 (Department of Homeland Security 2012f). The USBP received thousands of new Border Patrol agents, a plethora of additional technological surveillance capabilities, and hundreds of miles of fence and barriers along the southwest border. Another significant change that occurred in 2010 under the 2004 strategy was the termination of utilizing various levels of operational control as a way to measure effectiveness. This termination created a need to develop a new strategy, which reflected this change. Furthermore, taking into account that the USBP received its last approval to increase personnel in 2010, as well as the challenges faced by the U.S. government to reduce spending, it is unlikely that the USBP will make changes to their operational environment and organization like they made throughout their 2004 strategy. Therefore, the USBP created a strategy that focused on more effectively utilizing the resources they previously received in a risk-based manner to deter, detect, and apprehend terrorists, terrorist weapons and transnational criminal organizations.
Secondary thesis question three: In creating the 2012 strategy, what did the Border Patrol carry over from the 2004 strategy, and what did they newly craft to build upon it? The USBP incorporated many characteristics from their 2004 strategy into their 2012 strategy. This is because there were similarities between the operating environment in 2004 and 2012, and many approaches that were successful in 2004 continued to be successful. For example, the USBP still focuses their efforts on detecting, deterring, and apprehending terrorists, terrorist weapons, and transnational criminal organizations and utilizing intelligence to drive operations and manage risk. Additionally, the USBP’s 2004 strategy stated its use of rapid response teams, threat analysis, targeted operations, leveraging technology, reducing crime in border communities, and a whole of government approach to accomplish their mission, all of which are also stated in the 2012 strategy.

However, there are several newly developed aspects of the 2012 strategic plan, which include the use of the consequence delivery system to disrupt the smuggling cycle, implementation of a new rapid response team, and the use of change detection capabilities. The 2012 strategy places a greater overall emphasis on the utilization of information, integration, and rapid response capabilities to obtain strategic objectives. In conclusion, the overall variance between the two USBP strategies is their transition from a resource-based strategy to a risk-based strategy.

Primary thesis question: Does the 2012 Border Patrol Strategic Plan provide a more effective means to avert, detect, and react to unlawful entries into the United States? After conducting all of the research entailed in this thesis and answering the secondary thesis questions, the answer to the primary thesis question is that the USBP’s new
strategic plan does in fact provide more effective means to avert, detect, and react to unlawful entries into the United States. The 2012 strategy aligns with the missions and objectives of the current NSS, and the DHS’s and CBP’s strategies. The USBP’s 2012 strategy addresses the need to strategically deploy the resources obtained over the years to manage risk and provide intelligence driven operations through the use of information, integration, and rapid response. Additionally, the new strategy incorporates many fruitful aspects of the 2004 strategy, and their proven success has carried over.

Based on statistics, the USBP is already experiencing benefits from their risk-based approach to securing the border. The USBP’s effectiveness percentage increased through 2011, and there were significantly less assaults against agents. These improvements can be attributes to the new risk-based approach and intelligence driven operations of the 2012 strategy. As the USBP focuses more on gathering information and intelligence, they can better determine, plan, and prepare the appropriate response capability for an area. This allows them to be better prepared to manage risk in situations along the border, because of the appropriate deployment of resources to manage an area of illicit activity, therefore resulting in fewer assaults against agents. Additionally, the USBP seized more heroin in 2012 than they did in any single previous year, since 1994. The USBP’s marijuana seizures nearly peaked in 2011 and were also significant in 2012. The improvement of these statistics indicates that the risk-based approach and intelligence driven operations are effective.

In 2011, the USBP experienced the lowest number of apprehensions made throughout the time frame of all three strategies, and in 2012 the amount of apprehensions only increased slightly. This indicates that in 2012, the USBP successfully
targeted enforcement efforts to locations based upon intelligence driven operations, which resulted in their ability to keep apprehension numbers down. Additionally in 2012, the USBP experienced a decrease in the amount of ASIC apprehensions. In fact, 2012 saw the lowest amount of ASIC apprehensions observed since the USBP began tracking this statistic in 2005. The low apprehensions indicate that ASICs are recognizing the increased border enforcement efforts along the southwest border, and choosing not to attempt entry along this area.

The research and analysis conducted for the purpose of answering the thesis questions of this case study indicate that the USBP’s 2012 strategy is already creating positive results in averting, detecting, and reacting to unlawful entries into the United States. This is due to the USBP’s continued use of proven methods from its previous strategies as well as their newly implemented approaches. As more time passes, more information will become available to further assess the effectiveness of the USBP’s current strategy.

**Recommendations**

The USBP is currently in the process of developing new measures to improve upon their current method of determining effectiveness. Further research, conducted on the best measures for the USBP to utilize to determine their effectiveness, may prove beneficial to the USBP and to determining the effectiveness of the 2012 strategic plan. Additionally, once the USBP presents its new criteria for measuring effectiveness, further research may identify additional beneficial criteria that the USBP should consider. However, the USBP does not intend to have some of these processes available until later in fiscal year 2013 and 2014 (Gambler 2012a, 35).
Additional research that would assist to further describe the operational environment along the southwest border would include the analysis of other U.S. organizations besides the USBP, as well as smuggling organizations and terrorist organizations whose activities affect the operational environment. Analyzing how smugglers have changed their methods and techniques in reaction to the three different USBP strategies to carry out their illicit activities, would shed more light on the success of these strategies. Furthermore, analyzing terrorist organizations and their methods of circumventing the USBP’s efforts to mitigate terrorist threats against and unlawful entry into the U.S. would help the USBP design more effective antiterrorist components within their strategies. Research in both of these areas would increase the USBP’s situational awareness and improve their understanding of the operational environment along the southwest border.

Another research topic that needs to be investigated in order to fully understand the USBP’s 2012 strategy is the second goal of the strategic plan. The second goal of the 2012 strategy focuses on the importance of strengthening the USBP by improving its organization through investment in their employees, and improving procedures, processes, and techniques. The benefit of conducting a case study on the second goal would be the identification of how it’s five objectives plays a role in assisting the USBP to complete their mission.

Summary

The purpose of this study was to research and analyze whether the 2012 USBP strategy provided a better means to detect and deter people from unlawfully entering the United States. Two military conceptual frameworks identified specific variables to
analyze, in order to examine the operational environment along the southwest border as it specifically related to the USBP and the USBP itself. The use of the first military conceptual framework to analyze the strategic and operational environment, as it related to the USBP, consisted of examining some of the variables of PMESII. The use of the second military conceptual framework to analyze the USBP’s institution consisted of examining some of the variables of DOTMLPF. The use of these conceptual frameworks provided a better understanding of how these aspects affected the development of the USBP strategies. Furthermore, statistical data also provided insight as to how the strategies performed throughout the time frames examined in this research study.

The USBP began implementing their first strategy in 1994. Its approach of obtaining and deploying personnel, technology, and infrastructure along the border was successful. This approach became the main focus of the USBP’s 2004 strategy and was successfully implemented during its tenure. The USBP nearly doubled the size of the organization’s personnel, acquired new technology, and built hundreds of miles of fence and vehicle and pedestrian barriers. The USBP included successful aspects from the 1994 and 2004 strategies in creating their 2012 strategy. The primary difference between the 2004 strategy and the 2012 strategy is the transition from a strategy focused on obtaining resources for the USBP to use to accomplish its mission, to a strategy that better utilizes resources acquired throughout the 2004 strategy in a risk-based manner to mitigate threats to the United States. The USBP also changed their approach from increasing the amount of personnel, technology, and infrastructure, to increasing the use of information, integration, and rapid response to target and apprehend threats along the border. The Chief of the USBP, Michael Fisher stated in testimony that:
The Border Patrol Strategic Plan marks an important point in the growth and development of the U.S. Border Patrol and establishes an approach that is tailored to meet the challenges of securing a 21st-century border against the variety of dynamic threats and dangerous adversaries. Ultimately, leveraging all available actions, programs and techniques encompassed within our strategic plan will strengthen the Border Patrol internally, increase capabilities and our operations, and enhance border security and, ultimately, national security through information, integration and rapid response. (U.S. Congress 2012)

The USBP’s new focus better allows for the USBP to concentrate efforts on specific threats along the border and to identify the proper response to neutralize those threats.


