INSTITUTIONALIZING IRREGULAR WARFARE CAPABILITIES

HEARING

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OF THE

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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 2011

INSTITUTIONALIZING IRREGULAR WARFARE CAPABILITIES

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
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The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

Mr. THORNBERRY. We will call the hearing to order. Let me welcome our witnesses and guests. You all please have a seat.

We appreciate everybody being here for this hearing on a topic that I think will play a significant role in the security of the country moving ahead. It seems to me the basic question is to what extent we learn from our experience and build on it, and to what extent we assume that the past was just an aberration and now we can, quote, “get back to normal.” I am not sure that the conventional wisdom about normal is quite right.

Dr. Sebastian Gorka and David Kilcullen found that of the 464 conflicts since 1815 recorded in the Correlates of War database, 385 of them involved a nonstate actor. That is 83 percent. Dr. Bernard Fall’s research, cited in the “2006 Marine Corps and SOCOM Multiservice Concept for Irregular Warfare,” found there were 48 small wars in the first 65 years of the 20th century, which, taken together, involved as many people and as many casualties as either of the two World Wars. A review of U.S. military activities over the last 20 years in places like Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Colombia, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Uganda confirms this trend.

The tight defense budgets ahead of us means strategic choices must be made. The United States must, in my view, maintain a full spectrum of capability. But the odds are that we are going to be involved in some form of irregular warfare in the future, just as we always have been in the past. We have learned or relearned much about it in the last decade at a tremendous cost of blood and treasure. It would be incredibly shortsighted of us not to ensure that those lessons are taught, and ingrained, and applied going forward. That is the reason for this hearing today, and it is the reason for our continued monitoring of this issue in the days ahead.

Let me turn to the ranking member Mr. Langevin for any comments he would like to make.

(1)
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to welcome our witnesses here today. Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before us and for your service to the Nation.

We shouldn't let the term “irregular warfare” confuse us. It is not an obscure challenge understood and practiced by a few specialists; rather it is becoming the norm for our country. If the military history of the last two or three decades tells us nothing else, it teaches us that when the United States finds ourselves in a conflict, it is irregular more often than not. In fact, although we prepared for a war with the Soviet Union, in truth our forces have rarely met a similarly arrayed enemy, and we have, as in the case of the opening second war with Iraq, we saw that conflict quickly evolve into an irregular war.

We have learned, or rather relearned, the hard way that these conflicts are not just for Special Operations Forces, but really require the entire General Purpose Force working jointly with the interagency if we are to be successful.

Now, with this in mind, I look forward to learning from our witnesses today how much their respective services and the Department of Defense policy have really taken to heart the lessons of the recent past. Are you prepared to deter and defeat future conventional threats? Have you also incorporated the need to train, man, and equip for irregular warfare across our force, and across your force, to the same extent?

Many of the capabilities required for traditional warfare are critical parts of an irregular campaign. Ultimately the trick is having service members who are mentally agile, flexible, and innovative enough to recognize when the character of conflict changes and move seamlessly and successfully between the two types of conflict. This will be a challenge as we grow our force to meet future conventional and unconventional threats. I am looking forward to hearing how we are doing in that regard.

I would like to ask each of you for an example of the capability that is critical for success in irregular warfare, but not particularly useful in traditional conflict. Next I am interested to hear how well we are integrating irregular warfare efforts with our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies, particularly with regard to Special Operations Forces, in counterterrorism efforts.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing and look forward to hearing from our witnesses. I yield back.

Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentleman.

I am pleased to welcome our witnesses here today. Without objection, your complete written statement will be made part of the record.

And let me introduce now Major General Peter Bayer, Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy for the U.S. Army; Rear Admiral Sin-

Again, thank you all for being here. And as I said, your statement will be made part of the record, but we would appreciate any comments you would like to make or summarizing of it first.

General Bayer.

STATEMENT OF MG PETER C. BAYER, USA, DIRECTOR OF STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY, U.S. ARMY

General BAYER. Chairman Thornberry, and Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the committee, on behalf of our Secretary, the Honorable John McHugh; and our Chief of Staff, General Ray Odierno; and the more than 1 million soldiers in uniform, thank you for the opportunity to be here before you today.

As you know, in 2002, our Nation went to war with two armies, one comprised of conventional forces. It was prepared to prevail against traditional adversaries in direct combat. And the second, composed largely of Special Operation Forces, was prepared to excel in an irregular environment. Our Army quickly learned that success in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the other battlefields of this decade required adaptation of both General Purpose and Special Operations Forces, and that they must work together as part of the joint force and the interagency team.

In the past decade the Army has captured that adaptation by institutionalizing irregular warfare across the entire force, and today irregular warfare is part of the Army’s DNA. We have trained our soldiers and leaders, adjusted our doctrine, adapted formations, and developed world-class education and training centers which integrate irregular warfare capabilities. Even more importantly, our soldiers successfully employ the skills critical to victory in irregular warfare every day in combat. Irregular warfare mission set is at the very heart and core of Army expertise, the ability to operate decisively, delivering precise and discriminate lethal, and nonlethal effects among the people.

However, our work is not done. The Army continues to learn from current operations, develop capabilities, train leaders, and adapt doctrine as we look forward to secure the gains from the last decade. As we look to the future, our Army will seek to ensure that a smaller force remains fully capable of decisive operations in all domains against hybrid threats.

We believe the future operational environment demands irregular warfare competency. To do this, we must optimize the balance between soldier, structure, readiness, and modernization, and continue to focus on the professional military education of our leaders and soldiers. Through competent, adaptive, versatile, and creative leaders in formation, the Army ensures its ability to continue to be the strength of the Nation, America’s force of decisive action.

With the continued support of the American people and Congress, our Army will remain the world’s preeminent land power.
Again, on behalf of the Army and our leadership, thanks for the opportunity to be here today, and I welcome your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Bayer can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

Admiral.

STATEMENT OF RDML SINCLAIR M. HARRIS, USN, DIRECTOR, NAVY IRREGULAR WARFARE OFFICE, U.S. NAVY

Admiral HARRIS. Good morning, sir.

Chairman Thornberry, Congressman Langevin and other distinguished Members, it is an honor for me to be here with you today to update you on the Navy's efforts to institutionalize irregular warfare.

The Navy's efforts are vital to our national security as part of a comprehensive approach to address complex security challenges. Our Sailing Directions, recently authored by CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] Greenert, emphasize that our mission is to deter aggression, and, if deterrence fails, to win our Nation's wars. Today the Navy is engaged around the world conducting preventative actions and activities to stabilize, strengthen, and secure our partners are providing reasonable deterrence against state and nonstate actors.

The Navy at the same time continues to fight and win our Nation's wars in concert with United States Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Army. We expect the demand for the Navy to increase in the future security environment as combatant commanders seek offshore options as a part of joint solutions.

The Navy and the Marine Corps and Coast Guard continue to use our maritime strategy to guide us in our efforts to secure the maritime domain and encourage global partnerships. Again, our Sailing Directions coupled with our enduring maritime strategy underscore the Navy's focus on multimission platforms and highly trained sailors conducting activities across the full spectrum of operations in and from the sea. And our forward presence allows us to better understand and respond to the underlying causes and conditions of regional instability, while actively evolving our proficiency to prevent and counter irregular threats.

As part of our efforts to institutionalize irregular warfare competency and capacity, the Navy's “Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges” was released in January of 2010. It provided focus for the Navy on mission areas of irregular warfare as well as maritime activities to prevent, limit, and interdict irregular threats and their influence on regional stability.

Navy efforts to institutionalize and provide proficiency in confronting irregular challenges are in accordance with the “DOD Directive 3000.7.” Navy's irregular warfare missions include counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, security force assistance and stability operations, and maritime security operations. These are underpinned by the need for a backbone of information dominance.

To meet the demands in a mission consistent with the maritime strategy, the Navy has leveraged the whole of the fleet to meet irregular challenges. Navy intelligence and strike capabilities sup-
port counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, maritime partnership stations, maritime headquarters, and operation centers provide unique skills that directly address irregular challenges.

There are many examples of how the Navy meets global operational commitments and responds to crises as they emerge. Overseas contingency operations continue while 11- to 12,000 Active and Reserve sailors serving are preparing to deploy in order to support ground operations around the globe. Navy carrier strike groups provide up to 30 percent of the close air support for troops on the ground in Afghanistan. Navy/Marine Corps pilots fly almost 60 percent of the electronic attack missions. And as our national interests expand or extend beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, so do the operations of the Navy.

The Navy will meet uncertain global challenges as a forward force, ready, present, and persistent in areas critical to our national interests. To do this, we must ensure our Navy remains the finest, best trained, and most ready in the world to confront irregular challenges while retaining the ability to face more capable adversaries.

The Navy looks forward to working with Congress to address our future challenges. I thank you for your support of our Navy, and I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Harris can be found in the Appendix on page 58.]

Mr. THORNBERY. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF BGEN DANIEL J. O'DONOHUE, USMC, DIRECTOR, CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General O’DONOHUE. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today. On behalf of the Marines and their families, thank you for your support.

The Marine Corps is the Nation’s expeditionary force in readiness. As such, we are a fully deployed, scalable, crisis response force ready to meet the complex irregular challenges of the future. Irregular warfare is deeply interwoven into our past, present, and future. It is in our DNA.

We continue to learn, innovate, and adapt in the course of our main effort operations in Afghanistan. At the same time, we are in stride building a post-OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] force. That force is designed not for protracted counterinsurgency, but rather for targeted forward engagement, crisis response, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, security force assistance, and stability operations in support of our allies.

We have prepared for irregular warfare with a premium on readiness; rapid adaptation; precise application of all aspects of national power; strategic, operational, and tactical mobility; and an integrated capability with Special Operations, joint, interagency, and allied partners.

It was 10 years ago today under circumstances no one could predict that 2 Marine expeditionary units of 4,400 marines and 6 am-
phibious ships were assembling to strike Al Qaeda after the hor-
ific acts of 9/11. This task force on short notice rapidly con-
centrated from wildly dispersed forward engagement missions to
decisively attack across hundreds of miles from the Arabian Sea,
to Kandahar, and then on to Kabul. Using the flexibility at sea
base, they could attack at a time and place of their choosing, were
self-sustaining, and required no forward basing or supporting infra-
structure, and they had only a minimal footprint ashore. Notably,
with no time for special preparation and in an underdeveloped the-
ater, Task Force 58 conducted a full range of irregular operations
against Al Qaeda and in support of the Northern Alliance. These
operations were completely integrated with SOF [Special Opera-
tions Forces], interagency, and our allies.

This dynamic ability at a moment’s notice to shape, deter, and
defeat and deny our enemies sanctuary is emblematic of the irreg-
ular warfare capabilities that we continue to improve on in our cur-
rent and future force. We build on 113 irregular warfare operations
since 1990 to include, most recently, humanitarian assistance oper-
ations in Japan, Pakistan, and Haiti; counterpiracy operations in
the Arabian Sea; and operations in Libya. We provide insurance
against the unexpected with an adaptive, multicapable force that
has a global reach to defend American citizens, commerce and our
vital national interests.

As with Task Force 58 10 years ago, we are ready today to re-
pond to all manner of crises and contingencies to include espe-
cially irregular warfare.

I thank you for the opportunity to testify.

[The prepared statement of General O’Donohue can be found in
the Appendix on page 67.]

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

General.

STATEMENT OF BRIG GEN JERRY P. MARTINEZ, USAF, DIREC-
tor for Joint Integration, Directorate of Operational Capability Requirements, U.S. Air Force

General MARTINEZ. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member
Langevin and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to discuss irregular warfare with you today.

Winning today’s fight with our joint and coalition team is a top
priority. As almost 40,000 deployed airmen can attest, the Air
Force is engaged in irregular operations supporting combatant
commander objectives worldwide. I could not be more proud of the
work our airmen are doing. They are trained and dedicated profes-
sionals.

The Air Force has capitalized on the lessons learned over the last
10 years and incorporated them into policy, doctrine, operating con-
cepts, and educational programs. These elements are continuously
updated with the most current concepts, tactics, techniques, and
procedures, thus empowering our airmen who are agile and adap-
table, and who are ready to succeed in today’s diverse environments.

The Air Force has not only taken action in training and edu-
cation, we also continue to make adjustments in how we project air
power in our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well
as mobility, personnel recovery, information operations, command
and control, armed overwatch, close air support, and aviation secu-

rity force assistance. In doing so, we have created an adaptable cul-
ture and airmen with an understanding of irregular warfare, using
the tools at hand to overcome the challenges we face.

We expect irregular warfare to remain relevant for some time.
We are prepared to meet those future challenges.

Thank you very much for your time and for your continued sup-
port of our Air Force and our Nation's military.

[The prepared statement of General Martinez can be found in the
Appendix on page 75.]

Mr. THORNBERY. I believe you all have given the briefest open-
ing statements I have ever seen in my time here, but that is all
right because I think this is a topic that demands a conversation,
and so I appreciate the opportunity to have one.

Let me just briefly begin with kind of a background question.
General Bayer, you had a statement in your opening statement,
and you repeated it here today, that caught my attention, that the
Nation effectively went to war with two armies in 2002: General
Purpose Forces that were prepared to excel against traditional ad-
versaries in direct combat, and Special Operations Forces that were
prepared to prevail in an irregular environment.

Looking back, before 2002, would you agree that our Nation has
a history of not ingraining the lessons of irregular warfare in our
military education, and training, and so forth?

General B AYER. Mr. Chairman, you ask a great question, and I
think the answer is yes, we tend to focus on the war we just fought
as we look to the future. And I think one of the things that is dif-
ferent about now for the U.S. Army after a decade at war is that
we recognize, as we look forward, war among the people is the fu-
ture, and as you look across our doctrinal kind of construct, as we
look to the future, our “Army Capstone Concept” into our recently
published “Army Doctrinal Publication 3.0, Unified Land Oper-
ations,” we describe the enemy of the future as a hybrid enemy
that will have regular, irregular, criminal, and terrorist compo-
nents of it; that will operate in manners that we can’t always de-
scribe. And what it demands is a force who has competence in this
irregular warfare skill set ranging from counterterrorism all the
way over to stability ops.

As one of the first soldiers in Baghdad on the conventional side
of the house, I was the operations officer for the 3rd Infantry Divi-
sion, I will tell you that we planned two separate operations to get
to Baghdad. There was a conventional force plan and a Special Op-

erations Force plan. I had limited knowledge of what they were
doing, and when we both arrived in Baghdad to begin to coordi-
nate, we had a lot of great people, but we were not prepared to op-
erate together amongst the people. I don’t believe that is the case
now, sir.

Mr. THORNBERY. Let me ask, does anybody disagree with that,
that in our history we have not really—I hate this word “institu-
tionalized,” but institutionalized the lessons of irregular warfare?
And does anybody disagree with the proposition that we are going
to have a lot more of this sort of stuff in the future?

I will get to you in a minute. But none of our witnesses?
Okay. I think it is important to kind of just lay some groundwork to see we don't have a very good track history of this, and yet it is likely to be much of what we do in the future.

I will be anxiously awaiting Mr. Gibson’s questions in just a minute. But right now I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Langevin.

Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and again thank the panel for their testimony here today.

I would like to go back to my question in my opening statement. I would like each of you to give an example of a capability that is critical for success in irregular warfare, but not particularly useful in traditional conflict.

General Bayer. Sir, I will start. I think for the Army that is a really tough question, because the core of our expertise and what we have learned most importantly in the last decade, it is about our soldiers. So if you look specifically at how we have prepared soldiers to operate effectively in the irregular warfare spectrum, it is about increased language capabilities, it is about increased culture capability, and it is about equipping them with the tools that can be utilized to deliver, you know, precise effects among the people. Sometimes those effects are on the counterterrorism side of the house, where we need to go kill somebody, and we need to kill select people, not innocents. And sometimes those effects are operating amongst the population and utilizing biometrics to be able to identify friend from foe, so to speak, over a period of time so that we are precise in our application.

And then ranging all the way over to stability effects, arming them with the capabilities, such as civil affairs, military information support operations, lawyers who are trained in rule of law, so we can enable them to build capacity in both their security forces and their governance.

So for us I think it is about the soldier, sir, which is applicable in both, and it is the skill sets we give that soldier for operations in irregular warfare.

Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.

Admiral.

Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. I have to agree with my Army partner here that it is very hard to find the dividing line where a technology or a training or a capability is only used in a conventional campaign vice used in the irregular, because, quite frankly, there is a very gray area in war. War is war, and you have to flex between the two, it seems like, seamlessly from one day to the next.

Some of the sensors that we were working towards in support of SOF operations that we will put on unmanned platforms are targeting individuals vice things, and those tend to be more toward the IW [irregular warfare] spectrum than the conventional, so in terms of that as one example, the sensors that we will put on unmanned platforms that look for cell phone or other type of communication devices to target specific individuals.

In terms of integration with SOF, the Navy for a number of years now has done something called Agile Quest, which prepares our deploying ships and their crews to operate in support of SOF operations. But we have been doing more integration between the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command and SOF, to try to relieve
the stress on Special Forces so they can go off and do those high-profile missions.

So, again, it is a full spectrum of activity. The equipment has to be multimissioned because from one day to the next, maybe even inside the same day, we will be operating on both sides of the spectrum.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Admiral.

General.

General O’DONOHUE. Sir, just to pick up the theme, and to get back to the chairman’s question, ever since Desert Storm we have been developing irregular warfare capability. We saw future warfare as not being the son of Desert Storm, but as being the step-child of Chechnya. And this was the concept of the “three block war” that Marines have to operate both in establishing peace, in outright conflict, or in humanitarian assistance, all within the same conflict.

So our lessons since Desert Storm have really led us to more one of emphasis rather than distinction. And so as we look at a capability as purely IW, really not in the way that we are thinking. This idea of hybrid threat, the idea that even a state power would be able to use an irregular tactic against a conventional force is not one that we see any explicit distinction.

So the force to prepare has to look at the full range, it has to be able to operate, and if there is any definition about irregular warfare, it is the aspect of it is without pattern; that we have an adaptive enemy, the population will always be relevant, and what we need to do is push down the ability of combined arms, lethal, nonlethal, all the elements of state power, so we can establish not just perhaps the 10-minute firefight or the 1-hour firefight, but the fundamental conditions that led to the conflict that started it.

So, again, irregular warfare is inextricably linked with the force structure, and especially the one we have recast to the future with the 186-8 [186,800] force is fundamentally different than pre-OEF, it is one of emphasis, though, not really one of distinction.

Mr. THORNBERRY. General.

General MARTINEZ. Sir, one of the areas that I think is definitely with irregular warfare that we never used in conventional wars was our new Air Advisor program that we have implemented in the Air Force. Throughout my years growing up in the Air Force, we were taught simply to go out and destroy an enemy’s air force. That was our job: to go defeat the enemy, not to build an air force. And as we started getting into irregular warfare operations, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, you clearly see the need that those foreign countries, they need a developed air platform, they need a developed capability to help ensure stability in their region. And in order to do that, we have done several things in the Air Force to promote that.

First, we established Air Expeditionary Wings in both countries, where we put advisors over there to help the locals learn about air power. And those areas are not just strictly skills of flying an airplane; it is everything from security of an airport, to the logistics, to the maintenance, and the many other facets that go with air power. Right now in Afghanistan we have 515 of those advisors helping over there.
In addition, we changed our organizational structure and developed two Mobility Advising Squadrons. We have a squadron on each coast, and within those squadrons we have a lot of different skill sets, some of which I just discussed. And their role is now at a moment’s notice to go somewhere and help whoever is in need of building a better air platform, again to provide stability in their region. In the past we didn’t do this. We recognized it was a need in this irregular warfare, and we made the changes in our Air Force.

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank you all for your insights. My time has expired. Hopefully we will get to a second round, and I will have additional questions. But with that, thank you for your input here today, and I will yield back.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I have got a specific question for the Marines and a broader question.

General O’DONOHUE, can you give us some insight as to what the utility of amphibious operations will be? The Marine Corps excels at that in irregular war. You mentioned a little bit of that in your opening statement, but the broader post-landing kind of thing that the Marine Corps has traditionally looked as being the premier force.

General O’DONOHUE. The most stressing condition could be an imposed landing. The most common one is not. So day to day marines are doing operations related to regular, most often with Navy/Marine team, from a platform that gives us strategic mobility. We can move, in the case of Libya, before the National Decision Authority has decided what they want to do, but we can provide—without an incursion ashore—provide an offshore presence that serves as a deterrence and gives options and decisions base for our national decision makers.

It allows us to put in TAC [tactical air control] combat power ashore, and not just against traditional targets, but irregular. If you had to scale against a terrorist network, you had to go after counterproliferation targets of high priority, the Marine Corps has the ability, the command and control, the sustainment from an amphibious platform to be able to do that. And in many areas we complement SOF day-to-day with their specialized missions, but there are ones again that we are the supported commander, as was the case in Task Force 58.

So, again, it is the ability of sustainment from sea, it is that strategic projection, to pick a time and place of your choosing, to enter the environment, and to do so in the case of a strike or raid without a destabilizing presence. You can moderate the amount of force that would go in. You don’t have to seize a port or airfield or a base for your own sustainment. You can really target how much you want to reinforce an ally or how much you want to affect the conditions in a very measured way from that platform.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you.

The broader question is, just by way of kind of fleshing out the question in terms of challenges to making this happen, I have recently watched some village stability operations in Afghanistan, northern Afghanistan, in which a Special Forces A Team matched
up with a—General Purpose Forces are conducting those operations led by the A Team and the Special Forces. It seems to be working well.

One of the issues is, can you get to scale across the country with the concept? You don’t have enough A Teams to make that happen, so how do you blend and bring in a technique that is generated out of the A Team background broadly across? So what are the challenges to blending the conventional forces and the irregular warfare concepts on the fly to make things happen that we want to? Anybody can pitch in on that.

General Bayer. Congressman, I will jump in. I think the first is doctrine. And we believe our doctrine generally as we have advanced it has described the requirement for Special Operation Forces and General Purpose Forces to work together.

Clearly the village stability operations being practiced in Afghanistan right now are at the front edge of kind of new concepts. So the challenges, we bring that back. You are limited right now by, you know, the density of forces that are forward deployed and the other missions in their ability to do it.

But I think the longer-term challenge for us is how do we integrate that in training? And in our training centers we are moving to what we call full-spectrum kind of scenarios that portray this hybrid threat and require a unit commander at the brigade level to deal with a multitude of problem sets, so to speak, during their training. So I think our challenge is, how do we have both Special Operations Forces and General Purpose Forces [GPF] present in that training rotation and work together prior to employment? And we have some work to do to ensure that. Part of it is density of their utilization for operational missions and how many folks are left behind in the training.

Mr. Conaway. Has the Joint Forces Command that stood down, has that impacted your ability to do those kinds of things?

General Bayer. From an Army perspective, no, sir. That has not impacted our ability to do the things I described.

Mr. Conaway. Anybody else?

General Martinez. Sir, from an Air Force perspective, it has been minimal impact. The Joint Staff has absorbed most of those duties, actually, the J7, handling doctrine, training and irregular warfare aspects; as well the J8, who currently does the joint requirements. So we have seen really no impact at all.

Mr. Conaway. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General O’Donohue. Sir, just on your first question on the integration of SOF, Marine is inextricably linked. One characteristic of the force we project for the future was a growth of Marine MARSOC [Marine Special Operations Command], about a little over 3,000 to 3,500 Marines that give us obviously an organic connection with SOC [Special Operations Command]. We operate with them every day.

We started with the first conceptual doctrinal piece was a multi-service concept for irregular warfare, which was a companion piece with the Marines and SOF. And then the complementary capability of the highly trained small units that operate in that battlefield using the unique capabilities and authorities that SOF has in combination with the Marine high training is one that is operating
today in Afghanistan, afloat as we go with the MEUs [Marine Expeditionary Units], and we will continue in the future.

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I could add one more example for both of the questions you had. The first was utility of amphibious forces, and being an amphib officer for the past 10 years, I have had a firsthand chance to work with the Marine Corps/Navy team doing this.

And one example I would use is that on the same day that we were doing humanitarian assistance in Pakistan during the floods in 2010, delivering water and delivering food, we also had the take-down of the *Magellan Star* in the middle of the Gulf of Aden, again leading the Marine Corps team, operating from amphibious ships, working with the general force, had a cruiser in support, doing IW-type mission.

At the same time the USS *Peleliu* was flying missions in support of ground troops doing counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. One arc, one Navy-Marine Corps team that shows you on one day, and this was not an uncommon day, how valuable amphibious forces are.

In terms of the integration with SOF and GPF, I mentioned Agile Quest, which is trained out of Fleet Forces Command, are doing to a greater extent. What we do in the Navy is before we continuously train and modify the training depending on the COM and the fleet commander demand signals as they go forward, to make sure that our sailors are prepared to operate not just in a conventional way, but operate also with Special Operation Forces. *Maersk Alabama* is a good example where on the fly we are able to seamlessly integrate.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Ms. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of you for your service and your leadership. I wanted to turn to the issue of language and cultural training, and as you may know, the GAO [Government Accountability Office] stated recently that both the Army and the Marine Corps should—must better document the results of their language and culture training programs to make them more effective. And basically what they were saying is they need to better leverage language and cultural knowledge and the skills so they can make better individual assignments assessing operational needs as well.

Could you speak to that? Do you think that there is enough emphasis that has been placed on pre-deployment training to your General Purpose Forces on language training, regional and cultural expertise? How do you meld those in terms of IW and conventional forces?

General BAYER. I will be happy to start. The answer is we in the Army, we still have work to do. One of our lessons learned is, to enable soldiers to effectively operate in the environments we have the last decade, which are center mass of the IW spectrum, we have to have increased cultural and language capability. So we have initiated a number of programs to do it.

One of the limiting factors for our units that are employed in the counterinsurgency fights in Iraq and Afghanistan quite honestly has been the pace. When you are gone a year and you are home a year, to try to create the kind of language capacity we are talking
about in the general purpose formations is quite challenging, to get them to what we would refer to as kind of a 1/1 level of proficiency, conversational. So we have utilized a number of training aids, some shorter courses, done things like our 09 Lima, bringing in foreign nationals into the force to be interpreters assigned—in Army uniform assigned with the forces.

As we look forward, we are institutionalizing a program we call a Regionally Aligned Brigade, and it is the utilization of a brigade, a general purpose brigade, aligned to a combatant command and a U.S. Army service component command to go do Phase Zero prevent-type activities, so security force assistance, pre-conflict to shape the environment. And one of the programs we have lined up is to give an increased amount of cultural capability and language capability to that formation pre-deployment. But we also recognize it is only feasible to do that if you have a longer preparatory time, as I stated.

So we think the GAO report, it is not untrue in terms of there is work to do, but we believe we have grown substantially and recognize the importance of it.

General O’DONOHUE. We stood up our Center for Advanced Operational Culture and Language in 2004, with a recognition of the challenges ahead of us. It has had a very particular and sharp focus obviously in Iran and Afghanistan. The language skills in particular are difficult and long to build. We put them and integrate them into each one of our units in the PTP, our Pre-deployment Training Program.

Probably the broader aspect of it that is relevant especially is really to the future where we don't know where we are going to go, and we have to have the ability to have a language capability that is targeted, and we will the increase in our foreign affairs and regional affairs expertise of both now—the officer and now newly in the enlisted level.

But the idea is, how do you adapt to a culture, and how do you, again, without notice, in an area that you perhaps weren't predicting, you have to address a threat. A lot of that is related to how do you adapt, the idea of how you look at the human training, the cultural training, your understanding. Now, this is true of SOF forces where language is just one component, but the other one is your awareness, and be able to operate, and be able to look at patterns and recognize things as you start going into a fresh one, and that will be the new challenge.

So we have had many issues focused on Afghanistan, and then we have to look and address a broader one. We give marines as they join a particular area they are going to focus on that they have to develop through the course of their career, the education and training piece. All of this is ingrained. It is a moving target, and we have to look at shifting to the future one where we won't have an established theater or forewarning of where we are going to actually be.

Mrs. DAVIS. Do you see any of this going by the wayside because of budget constraints? Will there be a continuing emphasis as far as you can see?

General O’DONOHUE. I can say explicitly, and I was part of the force structure review that the Commandant took as he recasts the
Marine Corps for the future in terms of capabilities, and we were forced with making trades between what you categorize irregular capabilities and what would be standard as conventional. And we have about 8,000 Marines even at a smaller force than we had pre-OEF to give us that kind of capability. So senior leadership has looked at the problem and made most decisively in how we allocate our scarce Marine Corps at 186-8 and how we are going to do it, and there was that regular piece——

Mrs. DAVIS. I was also partnering, of course, with some of the universities around the country, San Diego State, and my colleague here from San Diego knows this well also, has done a very good immersion program utilizing the residents in the community as well to help and assist with that. So I think that is certainly important for the future.

And my time is up. I will come back for another round, Mr. Chairman, if you are doing it.

Sir, do you have one more.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Go ahead.

General MARTINEZ. Ma'am, in terms of language, the Air Force has recognized a need as we are involved in deployments throughout the world for language training, and our Chief of Staff directed a very aggressive program for airmen to start becoming better linguists out there in the world. We started a program called the Language-Enabled Airmen Program, or we call it LEAP. LEAP is basically, we take folks who have a minor understanding of a language, and then we put them through a very heavy immersion to get them better qualified to speak that language. It increases their language capability, but the important piece is that it is amongst the general population of the airmen, it is not our special forces folks that do this.

We recently had a board that met just in September to pick the next wave of folks that would go through this training, and 329 people were selected in 46 different languages. So right now in the program the Air Force has 772 people doing this training.

Admiral HARRIS. Very quickly, ma'am, the Navy has got the LREC program, which is our Language and Regional Expertise and Cultural program, which again goes to the general purpose for sailors. I actually have an LREC course back at home so I can learn Spanish to add to my German.

Additionally, our Office of Naval Research has the Human and Social Cultural Behavior Modeling program, which tries to get at that awareness, how they are trained to be more aware of their cultural surroundings for sailors and obviously for marines, because ONR works for both Navy and Marine Corps team.

Mr. THORNBERRY. If I could interrupt and follow up for just a second. As I read the GAO's comments, again they were looking at the Army and Marine Corps, one of the points they make is that the information about what training has been completed in the language proficiency is not captured in the personnel records or within service-level training. So it is kind of like we don't know who we have got to do things—who had this capability. Something breaks out somewhere, and there is not a database to go and say, oh, we have got these 20 people who speak such and such. Doesn't that
get to whether irregular warfare skills are institutionalized within the services?

General O’DONOHUE. Sir, the Marine Corps has just started a database. To do that, it tracks not just language, it tracks operational and analytical capability if you are trying to look at patterns and analysis in an environment, so all relevant skills. We still have to get those who have experience in terms of the training, advisors. So it is new, it has started, we have addressed the problem, and we have a little way to go in terms of getting the full gamut of skills, not just language, that might be relevant.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Again, part of what we are doing is looking for evidence, looking for signs, is this sort of capability really getting ingrained in the services, and I thought it was an interesting point that the GAO found as one piece of evidence, not end-all, be-all.

Mr. Gibson.

Mr. GIBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and also to our ranking member, for calling this hearing. I think this is a very critical area that indeed we do need to have dialogue on the way forward. I thank the panelists for their leadership, for their service. And, in fact, General Bayer is somebody I served with in Mosul in some of the toughest times, and he was a distinguished soldier and leader, and it was an honor to serve with him.

You asked the question, Chairman, earlier on about the future of our country and irregular warfare, and you asked the question broadly, does anybody disagree with the statement that you put forward. And clearly there is going to be a need for a competency or capability with irregular warfare. My nuanced view on this really has to do with the level of political and strategic, not any qualms. In fact, anything that has been presented here today, I agree with. I think there has been some good testimony already put forth.

To me, it is fundamental to take a look at who we are as a people, and what does it mean to defend a republic, and how do we then organize our Armed Forces to do that, to protect America and our cherished way of life? I am of the mind that we ought to take a hard look at our commitments overseas, the requirements we levy on the Armed Forces. And I think if we do that, we will reorganize in a way that will actually make us safer and save money. We just came through a very difficult decade and couldn’t be more proud of our service men and women and their families, deployment after deployment after deployment, and not complaining, just getting it done with great sacrifice and hardship. We can’t go through another decade like the one we just came through, or on the other side we won’t be the same republic. So I think that is really incumbent on us, and that is why I applaud the chairman calling the hearing today.

But even with the world view that I lay out that is certainly a minority viewpoint right now, and I know I have got a lot of work on that score, there is still going to be a need for the strongest military in the world right here and deterrence that goes with it; all the maritime comments made as far as shared access and having a capable force here, prepared—a joint force prepared to go anywhere on a moment’s notice. And then there is also the threat, the existential threat, that we face: Al Qaeda. Undeniable, and we
have to rise up to that challenge, so that is where irregular warfare is front and center.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, we are working this in our committee, and we have a provision in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] right now for Special Operation Forces about the way we are going to relook that. I am of the mind, based on my experiences, that fusing intelligence and operations is key to this in actually elevating that capability to a global response in terms of our allies and friends. I think that will help make us safer and more effective in the war against Al Qaeda. And towards that end, that goes to some of what General Bayer was mentioning in terms of the two armies and us having that capability going forward.

But even in the world view that I lay out, I can’t say that the probability is zero that general forces could get involved in this again. I can imagine some circumstances close to home here where we may have to be involved in such activity.

So really this gets me to my question, and it has to do with balance. It has been mentioned here in some of the testimony full-spectrum capability and how an institution—and how the institutions prepare for this, how you strike out, how do you prioritize. In the Army we used to call it DTLOMS [Doctrine, Training, Leadership Development, Organization, Materiel, and Soldier] we used to organize across, and recognizing that even before the war, we did make investments toward irregular warfare.

I can think of a time when I was in the box at JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center] in the fictional country of Cortina; 5 of the 11 days in the box, it was on low-intensity conflict. It is just we weren't doing as well as we know that we need to do it now. So how do we then rise to that challenge, looking across the functions, doctrine, leader development, materiel, training, including home station unit training and joint training? How do we do that?

General BAYER. Congressman, I will jump in. Tough question. I think the first thing you start with is if you use that kind of DTLOMPF [Doctrine, Training, Leadership Development, Organization, Materiel, Personnel and Facilities] structure, is your doctrine right? We think that we have got a correct expression of doctrine as we look forward in describing the environment and the type of threats our Nation may ask us to face.

The second is your organization. You know, one of the things the Army—or both Secretary McHugh and General Odierno have affirmed their commitment to completing the build-out of Special Operations Forces. So we recognize that as we become a smaller Army, a larger percentage of our operating force will be Special Operations Forces. And that is a deliberate decision to enable us to have those capabilities on the higher end of the irregular warfare spectrum, recognizing skills like counterterrorism, et cetera, or require some advanced capabilities.

The next piece is in the training base, how do we get to the point you are making of how do we integrate these two together in the training base? And it really is a—you got to want to do it, and I think that our leadership does. One of the things I have heard General Odierno tell the staff here a couple times recently is if we are the same Army 10 years from now that we are today, it means
we failed, and we haven’t learned anything from where we have
been.

So the guidance and the desire from the senior leaders in terms
of looking forward across all of doctrine, organization, how we train
leaders, et cetera, is pretty solid, but proof is in execution, as you
know. And as resources come down, and we have a smaller Army,
we recognize we have some challenges to make it happen for our
Nation, but we are committed to them.

I know I have only scratched the surface of your question.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. If I could follow up, I would agree with
using the DOTMLPF structure. You could address each of these,
and I could address each of these in areas where the Navy is con-
tinuing to institutionalize that. But that balance question is huge,
because there is such a materiel-intensive force, our ships, and our
planes and our submarines. And, of course, our mission set does
portend us to be prepared for that high-end of operations. We have
to be; that is our charter. But we are also fully recognized through
our training that we are going to operate as we have always done
since the inception of the Navy in an irregular environment. They
have to have those sailors that are able to walk across a full spec-
trum.

I will just take a couple of quick examples. In our leadership
training we have in our postgraduate school, and our Naval Acad-
emy and our war college, irregular warfare is part of that cur-
riculum. I think there are two majors, in fact, at postgraduate
school in California, just to highlight the importance of it amongst
our sailors.

In terms of the materiel, we continue to look at innovative tech-
niques on how we can take our high-end platforms and make sure
that they can support either SOF operations or other irregular op-
erations by not just targeting things, but being able to target peo-
ple as needed.

General O’DONOHUE. The Commandant reported back to Sec-
retary of Defense based on the results of a force structure review,
capability review, based on a threat really expressed by the chair-
man at the beginning of this hearing. In that force we had a for-
ward-deployment engagement where we are going to have to take
some risk where we can’t take the combatant demand. It is essen-
tially in a Marine Corps of a 24-battalion base that allows us day-
to-day, and then shift in terms of prioritized focus, specific—the
Middle East or areas, not that we are not globally responsive, but
there is a less capacity to do that, and there is a prioritized method
of doing so.

So those 24 battalions, essentially a sizing construct for the force.
This idea of being crisis response, we can aggregate those forces
that are distributed often with the Navy team. Single ships can
come together, as I displayed an example given with CTF 58, to go
to a more substantial operation.

And then you get the higher end, the MCO [Major Combat Op-
erations], which, again, a commitment of about 20 battalions. The
point here and the efficiency of it is these are the same battalions,
so they are trained at a high level, they can operate IW, and they
can aggregate, they can distribute—distribute operations with pla-
Toons operating 39 miles separate. Applying the full instruments of national power, they can combine and concentrate if need be.

Took risk not just in forward engagement in meeting combatant demand, but also in the phase 4 and 5 operations, the sustained operations ashore. We can't do them, it is lesser included, but the force we have now of 22k is the force to do that. The force of the future, the 186-8k, accepts risk in that area. And then we use what we call the enablers. We have a very highly trained force, and we had those 8,000-some others, intelligence, EOD [explosive ordnance disposal], civil affairs, FAOs [foreign area officers], that you can combine together to apply to a problem. And just, for example, we had a tank battalion, a little bit of training, high-training status of any marine, they were able to go into a Black Sea rotation and satisfy most of the theater security cooperation needs of a COCOM [combatant command]. So force design for a conventional high-end threat, but, given the high level of training of some enablers, able to satisfy others.

General Martínez. Sir, I think probably one of the most important pieces in your question is as we move in this irregular warfare arena, it really has to start from a commitment from the senior leaders of the service. And I think each service has to recognize the type of warfare that is probably expected of us in the near future.

Some time back the Air Force made a very strong commitment to irregular warfare, realizing that this really is the way we fight now and probably will be in many respects in the future. And some of the actions that we took was, one, first organizing our force differently to include establishing an office in the Pentagon under the Air Force that works irregular warfare, doctrine, training, etcetera; also implementing training programs. We started a three-tier training program that is purely about expeditionary training and how we go to those different arenas and fight. We actually started an Air Force Expeditionary Center, which teaches courses, I think it is somewhere around 80-plus courses, on different things that our airmen need to know to work in those environments, as well as putting them in our professional military education, and most importantly is taking lessons learned. I think that is really crucial in this area is that we have to understand what we are doing, and then where we are not doing it well, and then where we could do better, and putting in a process to do that, we incorporate it as well.

And then I think the last piece is, that we haven't mentioned yet today, is we have a generation of airmen growing up, especially our young ones, that they know nothing but this type of warfare. You know, we call it irregular. It is irregular to the old guys, because this isn't how we are used to fighting. To our young airmen this is the way they fight, this is what they know. So it is just as important as we focus on irregular warfare that we are also keeping our younger folks in the military in tune to conventional warfare.

Mr. Gibson. So, Mr. Chairman, I know I am out of time here. Let me just sum up by saying I am encouraged by the responses, the agility, the commitment to facing and rising up to our challenges and threats. And in view of your comment about dialogue, you know, I think it is important going forward that we find ways that the Congress helps and not harms this vision. Thank you.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Shuster.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.

Over the past several years, when the leadership comes to—the military comes before us, they talk about how language is a game changer, and you talked a little bit about that. One of the quick questions, just real briefly, I heard the Air Force has a program that is going across the force to the airmen to offer language training. Do the other branches have the same sort of program? Please be brief. A yes or no answer would be good. I don't need the details.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. LREC is our program.

Mr. SHUSTER. Army?

General BAYER. Not mandatory for all soldiers.

General O’DONOHUE. We have a broad, targeted program, sir.

Mr. SHUSTER. I would think that this would be important. The GAO report says you are not inventorying who is getting the training. I think it is also equally important to go out there and offer it across the force and test people for the aptitude, because there may be a guy that is a logistics officer, and you got to have logistics people in Afghanistan, and Iraq, and other places in the world. So I encourage you to look at that, to go across the force to find a guy, a private who may be a genius when it comes to speaking several languages that we don’t know about.

So, as I said, that being so important that I heard from Petraeus to McChrystal, to McRaven saying it is so important, we should really be focusing on that.

Second question I have is our allies, as we—the world is a big world, they are out there, and I know they have irregular forces. Are we able to use them as a multiplier force working together, because we operate well together? You don’t have to point out country-by-country, but certainly are there other forces out there as capable as ours that we can work extremely well with and insert them when we can’t be somewhere, or help them get to places we can’t——

General BAYER. Congressman, our Army experiences, there are a select number of armies around the world that we can truly operate seamlessly with. This happened with our most senior partners in NATO, others to varying degrees.

One of our challenges, quite honestly, is that most of the nations of the world have divested themselves of support for security at a rate faster than our Nation. So what we see amongst our allies is vastly and rapidly declining capabilities, which makes, as we look to a future world, the assumption that some would make that we can get greater cooperation from our allies challenging, I think. But there are some we work very, very well with.

Mr. SHUSTER. Anybody else?

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. Probably the clearest example happens in our 5th Fleet, where we have got a number of coalition operations that go on for our countering piracy, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that may go by sea. That is with, again, coalition navies from around the world.

Mr. SHUSTER. I think I got a good enough answer on that to get an idea.
To shorten the prep time with cultural and language training, some folks that I have talked to and in SOCOM [Special Operations Command] have advocated for—there are about 90 countries out there that are on the brink or could be failed states soon, and we may be asked to come in and help. And they have advocated a strategy of inserting today, countries that want us, an 8- to 12-man team in that country so that if things go bad, that we shorten the prep time, and we have half a dozen, dozen people on the ground that can help us.

I just wanted your general view of that. You think that is a smart thing to do? Is that something we should in Congress be trying to push forward to get those senior leadership the assets and the ability to do those types of things?

General O’DONOHUE. Sir, that happens every day, both in small teams and on a persistent basis, working with the COCOM, who comes up with the theater security engagement process. So it is not exclusive to SOCOM. There are standing relationships. And obviously, we have deployments with the Marines and the Navy, with the MEUs that go out and operate as well to reinforce those.

General BAYER. Congressman, our experience has been that that is a worthwhile investment, and its developing capacity relationships are critically important as you look to the future. So those are worthwhile investments, and I concur with my Marine counterpart. We do it all the time.

General MARTINEZ. Sir, an important program that we have right now in the Air Force—it is actually the Air National Guard that is doing it—we have a State Partnership Program, where Air National Guard units are getting, basically, in a bilateral relationship between countries around the world and a State. Right now, there are 63 partnerships that occur. And those National Guard units with the members of that country will provide mentorship, they build crucial relationships, they ensure dialogue is flowing.

Recently traveling with the Capstone Program, every country I stopped in, the locals from the country were extremely positive about their relationships with the Air National Guard and how they felt that actually really helps keep them linked to the United States.

Mr. SHUSTER. That is great.

I see my time is running out, but if I could just submit a question for the record that maybe you could answer me in writing. In the times we face now with tight budgets, I certainly am an advocate for not cutting the Defense Department any more. In fact, let us figure out a way to make sure we fund you at higher levels. But from your positions of looking at irregular war, looking at budgets and planning, what are the top priorities that we absolutely cannot touch to make sure that you can do the important work that you do?

So if you could submit that in writing over the next week or two, I certainly would appreciate that.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 93.]

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Hunter.
Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I don’t really have a question. I am a little bit curious, though. I know the Navy and Marine Corps have an answer to this. The Army probably does, too. I wasn’t indoctrinated in Army history, so I don’t know. But the Marine Corps had a Small Wars Manual in 1940; the banana wars; 1890 to 1930. None of this is new, literally. None of what we are talking about right now is new. The materiel is, and the new gizmos, and the sensors, and the UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], but the rest of this stuff is old.

When we went into Fallujah, it was the same thing. In fact, I was a SASO [Stability and Support Operations] guy. They call it SASO now. It is a stability and support operation guy.

None of this stuff is new. The Navy and the Marine Corps have been doing this for over a century, going to little places, getting with the local population, getting the guerillas on our side. The Army has probably done the same thing.

So I don’t know, I don’t know if I even have a point besides this is nothing new. It is doctrinal. It has been around for over 100 years. It just seems like it is a new iteration, it is a different language, it is a different place, it is a different continent, maybe, than we have been in the past, but it is not new. And I think we have adapted extremely well.

With that, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. West.

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member. Thanks to the panel for being here. I want to try to dovetail off of what my colleague Mr. Gibson and also what Mr. Shuster was talking about.

Back in the mid- to late 1980s, we saw that the Army then made Special Forces a dedicated branch instead of how they had been doing it previously. Just recently, within the last 5 to 7 years, MARSOC has come onboard. So my question really is this: As we look at the irregular warfare threats—because I think the most important thing is that we have to start matching our capability and capacity to the threats that are out there. So when we go across the geographic AORs [areas of responsibility], and we look at the irregular warfare threat—because, sir, as you said, General Martinez, you are right. To the young people now, this is regular warfare. For us that grew up once upon a time having the Fulda Gap, this may be irregular warfare.

But how do we make sure that we have the capability and requirements to—I mean, the capacity to meet these requirements? Because my biggest concern is that there is a shortfall out there because the enemy is seeking to fight in this manner. And I don’t want to see us be caught much so and with our pants down. As our colleague Mr. Hunter said, this is just a repeat of things that we have seen previously.

So the question is: Where do you see the shortfalls out there with our Special Operations Forces contending with the irregular warfare threat throughout these geographical AORs? And then are we looking at means by which we can retrain some of our conventional forces to fulfill some of those shortfalls and gaps?

General BAYER. Congressman, I will start. As I mentioned, the Army leadership remains committed to completing the growth of
SOF, which means about a 30 percent growth, give or take, in the last decade. So proportionately they are a bigger part of a smaller Army.

What we have recognized really is that the GPF can do some of the mission sets that are commonly associated with irregular warfare, and it is not the exclusive domain of Special Operations Forces.

As you gentlemen both know, both you and Congressman Gibson, you know, we have General Purpose Forces that actually can do counterterrorism missions in a counterinsurgency environment. So part of it is we have to blend those forces together in terms of mission profiles, so to speak.

The other thing, I think, as we look forward, it is Phase Zero activities: prevent; it is being able to commit to the combatant commanders' forces, General Purpose Forces, to augment the Special Operations Forces that have very finite levels of languages, cultural, advise-and-assist type capabilities, but to take some of the burden off development of security capacity and use General Purpose Forces to do security force assistance, you know, basic skill transference 101. And our Regionally Aligned Brigade concept will field the first of those, generate the first of them, in fiscal year 2013 is aimed at trying to do that in the “Phase Zero, shape the environment” type of timeframe.

So I hope that answers part of your question, sir.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. Great question. And, again, I agree with my Army colleague, quite frankly, in the same type of approach. How the Navy does it, quite frankly, is through our partnership stations, which are General Purpose Force sailors on general ships that have operated in the Africa AOR since 2007; in the Pacific since 2004 with the Pacific Partnership; with the Southern Partnership Station, which has been going on since 2007; and Continuing Promise in about the same area as well.

Now, in these partnership stations we bring together not just Navy, but also other services, interagency, and NGOs [non-governmental organizations] in a number of these operations in order to, as we talk about Phase Zero, trying to shape the area. And that provides for stability operations, which is, of course, part of IW.

In addition, we are looking to take some of the burden off of our special operators. NECC, our Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, has done a number of missions in the training and the security force assistance missions that have been transitioned from the SOF, from NSW [Naval Special Warfare], to NECC.

General O’DONOHOE. We try to mitigate risk. Again, I explained before about how the Marine Corps is going after it. But the idea of being multicapable, and being able to aggregate from a forward-deployed posture where you are influencing, shaping, and then be able to respond to a crisis, for that strategic mobility is critically important. We can't predict, as we didn't with Afghanistan, where the next fight might be. We need to be able to get there to affect the initial conditions, reinforce a partner at the right time to do it, and then allow for a more considered response. That is a focus that the Marines have taken.

There is a readiness aspect of it; again, a very efficient way to keep our units ready across the spectrum to be able to do this. The
...way we mitigate the risk as well is the Reserves. The Reserves have a tremendous capability—both in specific capabilities and resources and talents—that we can draw on to the Active Force both to augment or to mitigate risk as well. The force structure we designed at 186-8k has those elements and assumes that the Reserves can mitigate some of the risks that the Active Force has taken.

General MARTINEZ. Sir, I think an important point to make when you look at this conventional versus the irregular warfare and Special Ops operators out there is, what can we do to take the burden off them? Our country has asked a lot of Special Ops Forces, and, wow, have they delivered in the last 10 years.

One of the things that we do in the Air Force is we are looking for ways to transfer some of those duties. First, you can do it by training your general populace to better understand language, region, culture, and the things that traditionally in the past Special Forces members have been extremely good at.

The other is looking at actual missions. Earlier I mentioned an air advisor course, where we teach people to go out and basically teach other countries how to set up an air force. That role actually started and was done by Special Ops Forces. It was not general populace that did that; it was the Special Ops people who owned that mission. And within the Air Force we have migrated it over time through this Air Academy and taught our general forces how to contribute to those missions and let Special Ops go on and do other things.

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess I will yield back the rest of Mr. Hunter’s time.

Mr. THORNBERRY. We are being a little more flexible today because there is obviously a lot to talk about here and a lot of good questions and answers.

I want to go back a little bit, because in the last few exchanges there has been discussion about the doctrine, how it is not new, and so forth. I think the concern is that while the doctrine may be on paper, the reality of it, when it comes to promotions and dollars spent and so forth, may be somewhat different. Let me just cite some examples and invite the appropriate one of you to make any comments you would like.

So, for example, I guess for the Army, I have a study from the Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Christopher Lamb, et al., wrote, and it is titled: “MRAPs, Irregular Warfare, and Pentagon Reform.” And basically it goes through the history of resistance in the Pentagon to MRAPs [Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles]; how this committee actually was a key instigator in getting some up-armored Humvees first and then tried to push the MRAPs. But he makes some statements which may or may not be true about the cultural resistance within the Pentagon to irregular warfare and to spending money on equipment which has, as its primary use at least, irregular warfare. It goes on to say the problems with irregular warfare go well beyond the acquisition system.

So I don’t know. General, is this something in the past, this problem, or are they at least in a vein of concern here that will extend...
beyond our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and inhibit our ability to prepare for the future?

General Bayer. Sir, from my perspective, I think it is a thing of the past. But I acknowledge that for some people, change is uncomfortable, and it is something we see in every aspect of life. When faced with a different future and where you are, some people will have a hard time adapting.

I will tell you that the guidance of our current set of leadership, Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, is crystal clear to me as an Army staff officer. And I would just echo the words of General Odierno: If we are the same Army 10 years from now that we are today, then we have not learned a thing, and shame on us, essentially. And he is absolutely right. And I don't sense amongst my peer group of leaders and those that I work with every day in the Pentagon a mentality that is similar to what was expressed relative to, you know, bringing the MRAP into duty.

What I would tell you as a previously conventional forces soldier raised as an armor officer in armor formations, who has now been to Iraq multiple times, I believe the culture of the Army has changed to accept that, and the probability of future conflicts says it is going to be among the people and look strikingly similar to what we have seen in the last decade, and I think our culture has changed to accept that, sir.

Mr. Thornberry. I think that is a fair point, let me just say. And I think General Martinez mentioned it a while ago. People who have been through this over the last decade are not going to go back to the way we were. I think that is a point well taken.

General O'Donohue, Marines are primarily responsible for nonlethals, correct?

General O'Donohue. They are the executive agent, yes, sir.

Mr. Thornberry. This has been an issue for me for some time. I requested a GAO study, I don't know, some time ago, and the results of what the GAO found are similar to what we were just talking about about the MRAPs; that there is cultural resistance to nonlethals. Obviously, it is not exclusively an IW sort of equipment. But they go and talk about how many research and development efforts basically amounted to nothing. And part of it is not having the priority, not having the oversight, but also cultural resistance. Is this another example of something where, you know, the Building, if you will, resists spending money on things that are primarily IW-oriented?

General O'Donohue. Sir, I can only speak to the Marine position. So not to confuse with the joint program and joint evaluation that is an executive agent versus a Marine program, so within that context there is a very strong push within that joint nonlethal environment for programs that have actually been successful. The requirement was conceived, a program was devised, and it has been brought home. So within that context, separating the executive agent responsibility that is joint, to the Marine Corps programs themselves, there is success within there.

Some of the systems there are very focused on very specific situations. They are not a widely capable—capability that gives a marine forward, say, a spectrum of effects that he needs. So if you give a marine, for instance, a shotgun, it might not be the weapon
he needs to be carrying in an environment where he needs a full-spectrum of range.

So I think the next development in nonlethals is to give them a scalable response. It is not exclusively nonlethal, but allows them to range up to the area of effects that he needs. That has really been one of technology and being able to integrate it, and not one of desire.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Somewhere I have read in these materials that it is better to get something 75 percent within months than 99 percent within years. If we wait on the technology to have the dialable deal here on your weapon, we may be waiting a long time. On the other hand, it seems to me if we are going to be operating within populations, having capability such as nonlethals provide is an important capability.

Admiral, let me just toss one to you. This is a little bit different. But I notice yesterday in the Wall Street Journal, Dr. Krepinevich had an article that talked about the enormous amount of infrastructure we have underseas, but also the growing capability of nonstate actors in underwater vehicles and the potential dangers that that presents. It is kind of a different sort of threat than what the Navy has traditionally been looking at.

Is that sort of thing, protecting our underwater infrastructure—you know, oil stuff, mainly—and dealing with these somewhat crude, but effective underwater vehicles part of what you all are looking at, and what is the role of the Coast Guard in doing that as well?

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. That is an area of emphasis, quite frankly, inside of my office, inside the Navy and other parts of the Navy, to look at unmanned vehicles that can be used to detect deleterious actors that might use either personnel or equipment to target infrastructure or target ships. A lot of cyberspace is on the bottom of the water, quite frankly. That is another area where I know that our 10th Fleet has got interest. But we certainly are looking at the right investments to use systems to monitor that underwater space as well.

Mr. THORNBERRY. It is a little different from the traditional Navy role, so I think that is something we will be interested in, too.

Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thanks to the panel for a second round.

I wanted to touch on a question Mr. Shuster had raised. That is what I was planning to do for my second round. There is obviously a variety of things that go into making up our national security, making sure that our Nation is protected; obviously, our military capability, diplomacy, and other such things. One of those is, obviously, our fiscal security. Right now, obviously, the Nation is challenged in that we have a weak economy, and we have exceptionally high budget deficits.

So as we are looking across the range of what we need to do to get our fiscal house in order, and given the current fiscal environment, what aspects of irregular warfare capabilities right now do you feel are most at risk, and how are each of the services prioritizing irregular warfare as funding decreases?
General BAYER. Congressman, what is most at risk for the Army are soldiers, because we recognize that our fair share of handling or addressing the Nation’s fiscal requirements is a smaller Army. And our prime weapon system is a soldier. So we recognize that we will have a smaller Army that has to stay balanced.

So the second part of that is, really, we know that in irregular warfare none of those mission sets is one we can divest ourselves of. They must remain inherently part of our core competencies. What it really comes down to is we have reduced capacity to offer to the Nation to go execute missions in defense of our national security, from the Army's perspective.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. I think similarly the Navy, the biggest concern in terms of what is at risk as our fiscal pressures happen on our defense capability and our infrastructure is the fact that as our force structure is pressurized and manpower is pressurized, we are going to have to choose what areas we will be there to prevent crisis and do preventative activities, and in other areas we won't be able to have that forward presence that acts in a preventative way to stop crises.

The other part is going to be the time to respond. With fewer forces spread farther out, it is going to take longer to respond to crises as they show up.

So the pressure on the whole of the force, both from the infrastructure—the ships, planes, submarines—and the personnel, is going to increase our time of response.

General O’DONOHUE. I concur. The issue is primarily capacity. Irregular warfare is embedded in what we do. As we come down, as we looked at the capability, the base review, is it balanced, and we are not coming down to a pre-OEF force, so there are drivers in the future fight that are related to irregular that have to be honored in the force structure. There would be a concern, again, about strategic, operational, and tactical mobility. This gives us a range to apply influence across a battlespace, and a breadth and depth an enemy can't cope with, in all areas of national power. Those assets—amphibious shipping alike—and other means, the tactical connectors that we use at the high-end are also the ones we use at low-end. If you look at Haiti and the like, a replacement for the EFV/ACV [Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle/Armored Combat Vehicle], those type of things. So mobility, I think, is an aspect of the problem as well.

General MARTINEZ. Sir, I think the piece that is going to be really important in this is it is going to come down to prioritization, and I think each of us as a service needs to make sure that we are doing the best that we can to prioritize the needs. When you are in a fiscally challenged environment, you are going to have to make tough decisions, and those decisions need to really keep in mind the warfighter. They also need to keep in mind the conventional warfare that we could face in the future.

In the Air Force, some of the things that we have done is we have recently implemented a prioritization change within our Air Force Requirements Oversight Council to help get a good, solid grasp on that. And I think the one advantage that we may have in this is by nature of the mission of the Air Force, conventional versus irregular is not necessarily zero sum for us. If we invest in
good ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] with our Predators or our Reapers, our overhead watch, those platforms are usable in irregular warfare just as much as they would be useful in a conventional battle. We could easily watch a single home in an irregular environment, or we could be watching a mass army approaching in a conventional.

Mr. LANGEVIN. With that, I will yield back. Thank you. Thank you for your answers.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I appreciate the fact that you are talking about prioritization. I think that is also managing talent. And if I could just refer to General Odierno’s comments recently regarding the role of women in the services, he spoke to the fact that it is not just about allowing women to have the opportunities that they should be allowed, but it is about managing that talent in the services. And we know that the Army now is training elite women soldiers, female soldiers. Certainly, the Marines have had the FETs—the female engagement teams—in Afghanistan.

Where do you put women’s role in the military in that future that we are looking at? Odierno, again, as you quoted, the military shouldn’t look the way it is today. If 70 percent of jobs in the services are barred to women, where do you take this discussion? I am going to put you on the spot a little bit, perhaps, because this is a sensitive issue to a lot of folks. But I am just wondering what your comments are about that.

General BAYER. Congresswoman, I will happily jump in. My personal opinion is that there should be no boundaries for women. I believe that women soldiers have acquitted themselves exceptionally well in everything we have asked them to do. And the reality for soldiers over the last decade is we find ourselves doing things we never expected to be doing. And they, like their male counterparts, have performed fabulously.

So I personally believe we should remove those boundaries. And the reality of the environments we fight in, there are no neat divisions of the battlefield that say a certain sex or type of person can operate, you know, in this little segment of the battlefield and be safe or apply their skills only there. The battlefield is 360. It is all around us.

And I looked at and I have read and interfaced with some of our peers from allied nations who have integrated women into combat formations, and they have done it successfully.

Admiral HARRIS. Ma’am, I will just give you a quick example. I relieved Michelle Howard as the Commander for Expeditionary Operations in 5th Fleet, and I was relieved by Peg Klein. So from my vantage point, women have gotten pretty much an equal footing in a number of areas and an increasing role in our Navy, and it is seamless. And it is probably more of a generational thing of us who are 50 and older, we can remember when it wasn’t that way, but when you talk to the young sailors now, officers or enlisted, they don’t see a difference.

Mrs. DAVIS. I particularly see that in the Navy, of course.

General O’DONOHUE. We are part of a comprehensive OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] review with an open mind to look...
at the facts already that were beyond the policy for women. I was a battalion commander in OEF, and we had a female convoy commander who ran a road that was arguably more dangerous than anybody in terms of giving us supplies based on the old rules and conventions. My previous aide now is in a female engagement team that you mentioned with MARSOC, and she will be at the leading end of operations in Afghanistan. So we are beyond the bounds of current policy of geographic collocation.

Are there metrics and standards that you go with things into entry force where there are physical aspects of it, again, a complete open mind to an understanding of not a presumption or assumption about what can be done, but is there a rational reason why you couldn't?

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

General MARTINEZ. Ma'am, I am very proud of our Air Force and the fact that our women are in fighter aircraft as we speak all over the world defending our country. They have a tremendous record of success. They have been shot at, they have been hit, and they have performed magnificently.

Having just returned in March from a year in Afghanistan, I was very privileged to travel throughout the country and see airmen pretty much everywhere. And, you know, the roles that our women take now, they have changed so much from the past. They are out there in the fight, and, you know, you can look and see that we have lost women to combat debts over there.

So I am proud of our Air Force. I think we do a great job. I personally could never understand why we would tell somebody they can't do something because of their gender. That is a personal opinion.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. I appreciate your comments on that.

And just quickly—and you can actually do this for the record if you would like—we have had a lot of talk about whole-of-government approaches, and certainly when we come to the area that we are discussing today, it is very important in terms of the interaction and the interdependence in many ways with the State Department, with other government entities.

Would you, when you have a chance, take a moment to just—how, specifically, are you doing things differently in your service with the State Department today, and what do you see is lacking? You know, is there something that would make a difference in terms of being more successful at that relationship and as we move forward in the role that is played as we talk about irregular and conventional forces? What would you like to see that look like, and what do you think we ought to be doing to ensure that that is a reality?

I know the chairman and I have spoken about this before, and we know we are not there, that there is a great deal to be done. Different people have suggested something more akin to a jointness kind of document, if you will. I am not sure if that is the right answer. But what is it that would actually push this in the direction that you think would be better for the country and would fit in more with the discussion that we have today?

I would appreciate that when you have a chance to do that. Thank you very much.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Great question.

Mr. West.

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Mrs. Davis, hopefully I can get a front-row seat to the next GI Jane, Part 2. I will agree with you that the modern battlefield is totally different than the battlefield that we originally saw, and we have to look at how we can integrate all people on that battlefield.

With that being said, Mr. Chairman, I have one last question. I just found out I have a phone call coming from the Administrator of FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], so I am going to have to run out.

But, you know, when we look at irregular warfare, and we look at how this enemy set is, I think there is one thing that we see as a commonality, except for Afghanistan, and that would be the littorals. So my question is: How are we developing that capability to once again make sure that we can contend with an enemy in this littoral environment, and also making sure that we keep those sea lanes of commerce and trade open? Because as we saw a few years ago, who would have ever thought once again that we would be dealing with piracy at sea?

Also, an addendum to that question is: As General Odierno said, we don't want the Army to look like 10 years from now as it is today. Is the Army taking into account that once again it may have to get involved in those type of operations as well?

Admiral HARRIS. In terms of littoral warfare, I say that the Navy and Marine Corps team is taking great strides to increase our ability to operate in the littoral. One of the examples is our stability operations doctrine that we are working right now. The Marine Corps is the lead. The Coast Guard and Navy work in support of that doctrine. But even beyond that, how we do our partnership stations, again, to make sure we have that cultural awareness in those areas in Phase Zero to try to keep it from getting past that or into Phase One or into a higher level of warfare. So we are continuing to emphasize our expeditionary knowledge inside the Navy as part of the Navy-Marine Corps team.

I will give the balance of my time to my Marine Corps counterpart, which I am sure has more examples.

General O'DONOHUE. Again, you would have to ask the Marines about the importance of littorals, sir. But 75 percent of the world population, the large aspect of the problems they face in the future are related to littorals. We are a maritime nation. How do we project power; how do we deny sanctuary to the enemy; and how do we provide options from a sovereign base, a U.S. naval ship that doesn't need basing rights? As we start coming back from our forward presence and basing, and with the anticipation of an unpredictable future, it is unstable, what gives us the strategic mobility to allow us to influence the action?

Working with the Navy on significant exercises, Bold Alligators continue with partner nations; working with the Australians, who are developing two amphibious ships; and obviously the Pacific, an area of interest, economic and every way—security—with a key
chokepoint in the Straits of Malacca; the influence of extremism, not yet a predominant factor in the Pacific, but potential, and the idea when the Marine Corps comes out of Afghanistan, our prioritization will be the Pacific; and then, obviously, with the global reach, to affect other littorals.

So you will see a rebalancing—in fact, came today—both of us will be at a littoral maneuver war game jointly between the Marines and Navy—in fact, all the services—to look at the problems you address, sir.

General BAYER. Congressman, just briefly, the Army role is really part of the joint operational access concept, which is currently under development. So we recognize as part of the joint team we have a role. And we think we have a very heavy role in the Phase Zero shaping engagement operations because predominantly security forces around the world are land-based. So that is part of our role, to help give us access in the littorals.

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

Let me ask each of you to address organization for a second, because, you know, I somewhat stumbled over introducing each of you with your various titles. It is only the Navy that has someone who is Director of Navy Irregular Warfare Office, not that titles necessarily limit the scope. But I am struck by the fact that to really deal with what we are talking about today, ingraining throughout the services this capability, skill set, way of thinking, you are talking about not only doctrine, but the organizational structure, training, the acquisition, leadership development, personnel assignments.

And I guess my question is how do you—and let me acknowledge it has got to come from the top, absolutely—but how does somebody other than the one at the top, whether it is you all's positions or somewhere else, keep a watch on this every day? How do you ensure that somebody is there kind of raising the hand, saying, well, how does that affect irregular warfare; or, is this a capability good for irregular warfare?

I am not interested in a flow chart, but I am interested more in the practical. In your organizational structures for each of the services, how does that work? Who is the advocate?

General.

General BAYER. Sir, at the department level, it is me. I am delegated through my boss, the G–3/5/7 in the Army, by the Secretary of the Army, as our lead for irregular warfare, in accordance with Department of Defense guidance. So from an Army policy proponent strategy perspective, it is me. Colonel Andrew Dennis, who is a U.K. officer who sits behind me, leads our division that does that on a day-to-day basis. We partner predominantly with our Training and Doctrine Command for concept development, material development, et cetera. We have a number of institutions. The Irregular Warfare Fusion Center that is out at our Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, so soon-to-be-Lieutenant General Perkins has that. Our Peacekeeping and Stability Ops Institute at Carlisle does stability operations.
So we have a defined network. I am the Army staff officer that is responsible for it, and we partner with our Training and Doctrine Command.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Let me just ask a follow-up, and then each of you all can address the follow-up, too.

So if you think that irregular warfare capabilities are being shorted in acquisition decisions, or that there is—the personnel decisions are not being made appropriately for people with that skill set, can you influence that, or at least bring it to somebody's attention?

General BAYER. Yes, sir. We have a number of forums as we look forward both through concept development on the training/doctrine side of the house. And then on the resource allocation side of the house, you know, we have a set of regularly prescribed forums that help us develop on, you know, an annual basis that 5-year program where I inform my boss. So we vote, so to speak.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Admiral.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. As you already pointed out, I am the Director for Irregular Warfare for not just the Chief of Naval Operations, but also the representative for the Secretary of Navy as well. And, believe me, I get asked constantly what are we doing, are we doing enough, how can we do more, from my chain of command.

I engage quite often with OSD/SOLIC [Office of the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict] on the policy side, also with Irregular Warfare on the capability side on what our capacities are. At the fleet level we have got, again, fleet forces and PAC fleet, who we integrate and we talk to and work with daily. Doctrine commands and schools I have already mentioned.

Beyond that, we have established a network we call our Confronting Irregular Challenges Community of Interest, which has got about 30 or more different organizations not just from the Navy, but from academia and other services as well that highlight and bring up irregular warfare capabilities and needs to confront these challenges. We have been meeting now for several months as we have been implementing the instruction division from our CNO.

General O'DONOHUE. Sir, I am responsible for capability development writ large for the Marine Corps. We are in a process of transition. The Commandant has given clear guidance about the emphatic importance of irregular warfare to the future, and his guidance was in his transition point: How do we strengthen and consolidate numerous efforts to the urgent need of the current war; how we rationalize them for the future?

We had stood up a Center for Irregular Warfare in 2007, which has custody for all aspects of irregular warfare. It was a stand-alone center. It is maintained at center status. It has now been brought into my organization. So just as we look at fires, maneuver, irregular warfare is represented in every aspect and every move related to combat development across all aspects of DOTMLPF.

So, again, I think it is a mark of the maturation of how we look at irregular warfare that it has been brought in so tightly to the institution.
General MARTINEZ. Sir, I mentioned earlier that in the Air Force we actually established an office in the Pentagon to oversee irregular warfare. This was a big shift in transition for us as we moved into this new type of fight. And we recognize that, and we now have that office in place, and they are working with things like doctrine, and tactics, and training, et cetera.

Your question about then who is your advocate, well, certainly they are an advocate. I will tell you, in my opinion, I think our real advocate is our airmen that are out there in the field every day. I think it is fair to say, just as like our fellow services here, they have deployed so much, that I don't think they would accept anything less than good training, than good equipment, and all the things that go with it. I know personally I have deployed four different times already to the Middle East, and I am amazed at the level of where I was on my first deployment and, on my most recent deployment, the level of training, equipment, and preparation that I was provided by our service to go do that job.

Mr. THORNBERRY. General, does the new office in the Pentagon have the ability to weigh in on personnel decisions and acquisition decisions?

General MARTINEZ. The office is not under the acquisition realm, but they certainly have an input to it. They are under what we call our A3/5, which basically runs our operations and plans for the Air Force. And the A3/5 has inroads to acquisition. We work with them every day, working requirements and the things that the Air Force needs. In addition to that, they have inroads to the A8, which runs our money. So they are absolutely connected to it, they have a voice, and they have an advocate as our A3/5, our three-star general.

Mr. THORNBERRY. I just think that is key to go from doctrine to the hard decisions that are made every day about people and money, which is kind of where the rubber meets the road.

Another example might be, if one were to—I think nearly all of you all have mentioned professional military education, which I would argue may be even more important in a time of declining resources than it is at any other time, if you look historically. But I just wonder if you looked at the courses that are currently offered kind of cumulatively in all the schools, how many would be irregular warfare-connected courses, and how many would be more of what we think of as conventional warfare-connected courses? Again, there is no one piece of evidence that tells us anything definitive, but I just wonder if that is a piece of evidence that might enlighten us as to where our emphasis is being put.

Anybody have a comment?

Admiral HARRIS. I will go ahead and jump on that first, sir. I will start with Newport, the Naval War College and their Center for Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups. It has hosted our irregular warfare conference the past 2 years. It has become part of their curriculum to a greater extent.

Go to the National Defense University, which Admiral Rondeau runs, and their Center for Complex Operations. There is great work there that looks across all the services.

The Naval Academy I have already mentioned. We have irregular warfare incorporated into their curriculum.
And then to the Naval Postgraduate School, which has got two majors, I believe, there in irregular warfare.

Mr. THORNBERRY. I guess my question really is—I mean, no question, there are specific things going on in each of the services. I am just kind of trying to sit back and look at the cumulative total. Where is the greater emphasis? Are these kind of ones and twos, these sorts of programs and courses? Or, when you take a look at the whole PME [professional military education] complex, how does the emphasis fit?

General O’DONOHUE. Sir, I can give you for the Marine Corps representative. Our Command and Staff College is one-third specific to irregular warfare. Again, it is hard to tease it out. For instance, our Marine Corps planning process, we used to look at mission analysis. Now we do problem framing, which takes all aspects of irregular warfare. So that is not specific to irregular warfare in this part of the curriculum, but a third of the curriculum is absolutely specific to irregular warfare, and the rest, obviously, relates. And this is in the context of the Commandant’s guidance. In a period of declining resources, we will increase education and training to the Marines.

General MARTINEZ. Sir, in our School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, which is really a graduate-level PME that we have in the Air Force, it is a short anecdote, but just to give you a number, information warfare lessons are now in 6 of the 11 courses, so over 50 percent.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. That is helpful.

Let me ask one more thing, and then I will yield to Mr. Langevin.

Somebody—Conaway, I think—asked earlier whether the abolishment of Joint Forces Command made any difference to what you all are doing. And it turns out just this morning I see in a magazine called Training and Simulation Journal, and the title is: Modeling Irregular Warfare.

You know, one of the things the Joint Forces Command was tasked to do was to be a Center of Excellence for simulation and modeling. This article goes on to talk about, of course, how difficult it is to have simulations for irregular warfare; all of the different variables, and so forth. But basically it says we are better than we used to be, but still not very good at doing that.

I am wondering, in that case—thinking, again, about training and education efforts, how do you all see where your service is as far as modeling and simulation when it comes to these sorts of—these types of engagements?

Admiral HARRIS. I will go ahead and jump on this one again.

One of the areas that our Office of Naval Research is pushing is efforts on human, social, cultural, and behavioral modeling program. It has been going on for some time now. Code 30 and 34 in ONR [Office of Naval Research] are the ones who are leading that effort. Again, that is for both the Navy and Marine Corps, and other services as they see utility in that type of model simulation.

Additionally, from the campaign level, our assessment division, N81, also works toward how to model that irregular warfare to a greater extent. So we are trying to do it from the campaign level down to the individual training of individual sailors and marines.
General O’DONOHUE. Just to build on that, again, the companion is obviously training and exercises that are not strictly modeling, if you will. The high-fidelity exercises that approach that and are supported by the modeling are ones that we participate and host regularly.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, it just seems to me this is an area, kind of going back to something Mrs. Davis was talking about, where this has to be not only joint among the services, but interagency. And without a Joint Forces Command to do that sort of modeling and simulation, I think it is something I would expect would fall off somewhat because it is not—it is going to be unlikely, I think, any of the individual services would do that kind of broad look. So it is something I am kind of interested in.

Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Internet obviously has changed the world in so many ways, not the least of which is our Nation’s sense of use of it in the military and how it has affected modern warfare. It is obviously a very powerful tool for our military. So it is for both peer adversaries as well as asymmetric actors. So because of that dependence, obviously we will never see modern conflict again where we don’t have a major cyber component as a part of it.

How does our use of cyberspace impact irregular warfare, and how are we making use of that capability?

General BAYER. Sir, probably if we really wanted to have an honest discussion about it, it probably needs to be a classified discussion. I will say at the unclassified level, based on my personal experience in irregular warfare, we know our adversaries all use cyber. They use it to organize. They use it to transfer resources. They use it to pass propaganda. So it goes without saying that we have to develop then the tools to counter that in that domain in order to be able to, you know, prosecute both counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, et cetera.

The services are all beginning to invest significant—I can speak for the Army—significant additional resources into cyber. We are working with Army Cyber Command and U.S. Cyber Command to try and define what it is we are exactly looking for as we look forward. But as we look at a smaller Army, one of the things we know is going to grow is cyber. We have kind of put a bill on the table as a placeholder that said over the next 5 years or more, cyber is going to grow by hundreds of spaces to develop the capabilities we need. We haven’t necessarily defined them finitely yet, but we recognize it is increasingly important.

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I would completely agree with General Bayer that cyberspace is a contested domain. To have a real in-depth conversation about it, you have to go classified. But we have established recently our 10th Fleet, which is our cyber fleet, again, working with U.S. Cyber Command.

I mentioned in my opening statement the word “information dominance,” which is our phrase for talking about the activities, and the personnel, and the systems that are needed to dominate that space, just as we do the maritime, the air, and the land, in order to win our Nation’s wars, and hopefully prevent us from having to get into war.
General O’DONOHUE. Sir, the same. Air, land, sea, the electronic spectrum, and in cyber are aspects that we integrate and need to dominate not just at the strategic level, but at the tactical. We have created a Marine Forces Cyber Command that has both the mission to support marines forward, and also one that directly corresponds to irregular warfare and its larger mission.

We have at the tactical level—before we had a fire support coordinator, who did kinetic effects. We have nonkinetic effects we are looking at. And we are looking at integrating cyber, electronic warfare, IO [information operations]—in fact, these areas are all converging—so you have an integrated capability, not just one, but integrated both with nonlethal fires and maneuver, with marines forward.

General MARTINEZ. Sir, without doubt, in this day and age, you have got to have an offensive and a defensive cyber capability. The actual capabilities that we have are mostly classified, but in generic terms, you can certainly see that using our space assets and cyber assets, we use them for things as simple as navigation, weather, intelligence, communications, and many other things. I would be happy to get into specifics, if you needed to, in a classified forum.

Mr. LANGEVIN. I know this is something that the chairman and I spent a lot of time on and cyber space, cyber security is an issue that obviously is growing in importance and presents unique opportunities, but also great challenges to our Nation and our Nation’s military. Thank you for your perspective on that.

With that, I will yield back.

Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentleman.

Where I would add, that evolution and maturation of doctrine is really critical and not just within the services, but within the country as a whole. Enormous challenges. More than the technical, I think, the law, and the policies, and doctrine and so forth.

Admiral, let me just follow up. If you would like, you may certainly want to follow up with a written answer. But would you just make a brief overview about the relationship between you all and the Coast Guard when it comes to irregular warfare? Seems to me they have some law enforcement authorities that complement, hopefully, what you all do.

Can you just comment on that briefly?

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. I would be glad to, because my last operational tour, the PATFORSWA [Patrol Forces Southwest Asia], which was operating in the Arabian Gulf, came under Expeditionary Strike Group 5, so I worked with the Coast Guard on a daily basis.

What we find with the Coast Guard, quite simply, is this. While the Navy maybe has capacity out to here in the number of ships, and sailors, and planes and the things we have to go out and do our mission, our authorities are fairly narrow because we are Title 10. On the other hand, the Coast Guard has got a culture and has got capability and has a way of doing these things, and they have got a lot of entryway with the Departments of Interior in a number of nations that really hit the home of what the preventive actions that have to happen.
Unfortunately, the Coast Guard only has capacity out to here, so it is trying to marry those two up, and we have been successful with our LEDET [Law Enforcement Detection] operation. We have been successful with the forward-deployed Coast Guard that has operated in the 5th Fleet of operations, working with the nations inside that area. We have been successful in the MOTR, the Maritime Operational Threat Response, again working with the Coast Guard.

And then going back to our strategy that is signed off by our Chief of Naval Operations, by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, by the Commandant of the Coast Guard. So we have gotten stronger and stronger and better and better in working together to try to fill those gaps.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I just offer that as you look at that interworking relationship, if there are authorities issues that we can help clarify, then let us know, because I think your description of the situation is very good, but maybe we can help marry those up a little bit if there is a need to do that.

The last question I have is I think General O’Donohue mentioned hybrid warfare. And mostly when we think about irregular warfare, it is what other people are doing to us. In a general sense, are we working on the doctrine of how we may want to use irregular warfare against others?

General O’DONOHUE. Yes, sir. Again, everything is about an asymmetric advantage. The relevance of the population is something that we assume almost in every context. We have the ability to distribute. Again, we talked about platoons that were operating 39 miles at distance. They can combine. And really it is about giving options to commanders at the lowest level with the broadest sense of combined arms, both lethal and nonlethal, so he can use the tools to the best advantage against an opponent that now is presented with a dilemma. We can attack across the breadth and length of the operating environment. We can use all the instruments of national power. So incredible flexibility.

If there is one definition for irregular warfare, it is that it is without pattern. The next threat will be different than the other one. So the idea of training and education, for forcing adapt very quickly, and now he has all the tools in the echelon, from the tactical to the operational and then to the strategic. Signals intelligence. EW [electronic warfare] is one example of that. It has freed up a tremendous amount of maneuver in the battlespace. Cyber is potentially another in that category.

General BAYER. Sir, I would just echo those comments. Absolutely. And for the Army it is about what we call one of our core competencies, Combined Arms Maneuver. But it is the application of all the resources you have in a manner that gives you a decisive advantage. And what we recognize is there is no pattern necessarily, so it is how we aggregate these resources. So we absolutely are focused on it.

Mr. THORNBERRY. From my standpoint—and you mentioned it—from the tactical to the strategic level, and sometimes I think we are better at the tactical, maybe, than looking at irregular warfare from a strategic level, which also deserves our attention.
I think that is all the questions we have for now. Again, thank you, each of you, for being here and for your answers. This was helpful to me, and I think it was to other Members, too. This is obviously an issue that we want to continue to follow in the months ahead.

But with that, again, with our thanks, the hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Opening Remarks of
Chairman Mac Thornberry
for the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee Hearing:
Institutionalizing Irregular Warfare Capabilities

November 3, 2011

Let me welcome our Members, witnesses, and guests to this hearing on a topic that will, I think, play a significant role in the security of our nation.

The basic question is to what extent we learn from our experience and build on it, and to what extent we assume that the past was an aberration and now we can “get back to normal.”

I am not sure that the conventional wisdom about “normal” is quite right.

Drs. Sebastian Gorka and David Kilcullen found that of the 464 conflicts since 1815 recorded in the Correlates of War database, 385 of them involved a non-state actor. That’s 83%.

Dr. Bernard Fall’s research cited in the 2006 Marine Corps and SOCOM Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare found that there were 48 “small wars” in the first 65 years of the twentieth century, which taken together involved as many people and as many casualties as either of the two world wars.

A review of U.S. military activities over the last 20 years in places like Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Columbia, Philippines, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Uganda – confirms this trend.

The tight defense budgets ahead of us mean strategic choices must be made. The United States must maintain, in my view, a full spectrum of capability. But the odds are that we will be involved in some form of irregular warfare in the future, just as we always have in the past. We have learned – or relearned – much about it in the last decade at a tremendous cost of blood and treasure. It would be incredibly short-sided of us not to ensure that those lessons are taught and engrained and applied going forward.

That is the reason for this hearing and for our continued monitoring of this issue.
Opening Statement of Ranking Member James R. Langevin for the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee Hearing: Institutionalizing Irregular Warfare Capabilities

November 3, 2011

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to welcome our witnesses here today. Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before us, and for your service to the nation.

We shouldn’t let the term “irregular warfare” confuse us—it is not an obscure challenge, understood and practiced by a few specialists. Rather it is becoming the norm for our country. If the military history of the last two or three decades tells us nothing else, it teaches us that when the United States finds ourselves in a conflict, it is irregular more often than not. In fact, although we prepared for a war with the Soviet Union, in truth our forces have rarely met a similarly arrayed enemy. And when we have, as in the case of the opening of the second war with Iraq, we saw that conflict quickly evolve into an irregular war. We’ve learned—or rather, relearned—the hard way that these conflicts are not just for special operations forces but really require the entire general purpose force, working jointly, and with the interagency, if we are to be successful.

With this in mind, I look forward to learning from our witnesses today how much their respective Services, and Department of Defense policy, have taken to heart the lessons of the recent past. As you prepare to deter and defeat future conventional threats, have you also incorporated the need to train, man and equip for irregular warfare across your force to the same extent?

Many of the capabilities required for traditional warfare are critical parts of an irregular campaign. Ultimately, the trick is having Servicemembers who are mentally agile, flexible, and innovative enough to recognize when the character of conflict changes, and move seamlessly and successfully between the two types of conflict. This will be a challenge as we grow our force to meet future conventional and unconventional threats. I’m looking forward to hearing how we’re doing in that regard.
STATEMENT BY

MAJOR GENERAL PETER C. BAYER
DIRECTOR, STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3/5/7
UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FIRST SESSION, 112TH CONGRESS

ON

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF IRREGULAR WARFARE

NOVEMBER 3, 2011

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, on behalf of our Secretary, the Honorable John McHugh, our Chief of Staff, General Ray Odierno, and the more than one million Soldiers who serve on active duty, in the National Guard, and Army Reserve, thank you for the opportunity to report to you on the Army’s institutionalization of irregular warfare. I pledge to provide forthright and honest assessments. Thank you for your steadfast support and commitment to our men and women in uniform. The American people’s support, through you, sustains us in the current fight and allows us to reset returning Soldiers and equipment for the next mission, wherever that may be.

Over the last decade of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army has dramatically improved its capability and capacity for a range of military operations, including those under the operational theme of irregular warfare. The Army must prevail in these current fights while ensuring that we retain depth and versatility as the Nation’s force of decisive action across the spectrum of conflict. In recognition of these imperatives, the Army is determined to advance the gains made in irregular warfare capability over the last decade as a part of the flexibility we must provide to national decision makers in a complex operating environment.

In 2002, the Nation effectively went to war with two armies. One, comprised of general purpose forces, was prepared to excel against traditional adversaries in direct combat. The second, comprised largely of Special Operations Forces, was prepared to prevail in an irregular environment. The
Army quickly learned that success on the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq required adaptation in both general purpose and Special Operations Forces. In the past decade, the Army has captured that adaptation by institutionalizing irregular warfare capability and capacity across the force. We now possess a versatile mix of capabilities, formations and equipment capable of decisive action in a range of missions, including regular and irregular warfare against conventional and hybrid threats.

Our work is not done. The Army continues to assess its capabilities, train its leaders, and adapt its doctrine to ensure that we secure the gains from a decade of active operations. We will apply these gains to missions required to prevent conflict as well as prevail in war, and will continue to work closely with interagency and coalition partners to improve unity of action in all operations.

The following answers to your questions reflect a candid assessment of the Army’s efforts to institutionalize irregular warfare and identify specific areas for continued work across doctrine, organizations, training, materiel solutions, leader developments, personnel assignments and facilities (DOTMLPF).

**Question 1: Have the Services fully recognized that "irregular warfare is as strategically important as traditional warfare," and are current Service directives, doctrine, and frameworks developed, in place and aligned?**

Institutionalization of irregular warfare is evident in the Army’s foundational doctrine which identifies irregular warfare as critical to the Army’s ability to prevent conflict, shape the operating environment, prevail in war, and consolidate
The Army Capstone Concept, which articulates how we think about future conflict, establishes the premise that the Army must be prepared to operate in a dynamic operational environment rife with irregular and hybrid threats. The Army Operating Concept, which drives changes in DOTMLPF, identifies two core competencies: Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security. Both of require the Army to maintain an ability to perform the activities and missions of irregular warfare in order to defeat our enemies, consolidate gains, stabilize environments and ensure freedom of movement and action for the Joint force.

The activities and operations of irregular warfare as defined in Defense Directive 3000.07 (counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and stability operations) are reflected in Army doctrine. The Army’s lead doctrinal publication, ADP 3-0, elevates stability tasks as co-equal with combat tasks, in line with Defense Instruction 3000.05. ADP 3-0 also designates Inform and Influence activities, and cyber/electromagnetic activities as key tasks within mission command. Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, details tasks of stability operations and how they fit within a whole-of-government approach. Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, lays out a new and innovative approach to the conduct of counterinsurgency campaigns. Field Manual 3-05.2, Foreign Internal Defense Operations, update this fall, captures lessons learned from recent operations. Field Manual 3-13, Information Operations, is being updated to reflect lessons learned in current conflicts. Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance details the guidelines and specific tasks for operations that build partner capacity. This manual is also being
updated to reflect lessons learned, and addresses an array of activities required
to work with partners to prevent conflict and prevail in war.

The Army created specific proponents responsible for advancing the
institutionalization of irregular warfare. The Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell at
Fort Leavenworth coordinates irregular warfare activities within Training and
Doctrine Command. The Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations
Institute at Carlisle Barracks maintains doctrine on stability operations and
coordinates with other government agencies to facilitate interagency cooperation.
The U.S. Army Information Operations proponent at Fort Leavenworth maintains
doctrine on Inform and Influence activities and leads courses to train officers on
information operations. The Army’s Security Force Assistance proponent, co-
located with the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance at Fort
Leavenworth, drives doctrinal change for working by, with and through host
country security forces to increase our partners’ capability and capacity.

The U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg
leads the recruiting and training of civil affairs, military information support
operations, and Special Operation Forces Soldiers. By providing education,
informing doctrine, and integrating irregular warfare force-development capability,
the JFK Special Warfare Center is a leader in identifying gaps and developing
solutions for irregular related challenges. Additionally, the Army is developing
improved proponency for civil affairs to support Manning, training, and equipping
required for growth in both active and reserve component civil affairs capacity.
The Center for Army Lessons Learned, located at Fort Leavenworth, rapidly integrates lessons learned from current operations. Major works include the *Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines* handbook, which distills best practices and lessons learned from Special Operations Forces assisting Philippine Military and Police forces; and *The Army Security Force Assistance Handbook*, which collates best practices from Iraq, Afghanistan, Horn of Africa, Trans Sahel, and the Philippines. The information gathered by the Center for Army Lessons Learned informs new doctrine and tactics manuals.

To drive these advances in doctrine through our formations, our training must replicate the threats and conditions Soldiers are likely to face in their next mission. Scenarios at our collective training centers include stability operations, security force assistance, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism; testing our formations in realistic and challenging environments that replicate both current and future battlefields.

The most important thing the Army can do to advance the institutionalization of irregular warfare is to continue the professional military education of our leadership. By developing adaptive and creative leaders, the Army ensures its ability to respond to a wide range of future tasks. Maintaining a highly professional education system is crucial to institutionalizing the lessons of the past decade and ensuring that we do not repeat the mistakes of post-Vietnam by thinking that these kinds of operations are behind us.
**Question 2: What institutional and policy challenges remain given future operating environments and fiscal constraints?**

The biggest institutional challenge, given fiscal constraints, will be ensuring the right mix of capability to support our mission and requirements. The Army must maintain the full capability to conduct Unified Land Operations to seize, retain and exploit the initiative through the decisive action of offensive, defense or stability operations. Our nation demands we be prepared to operate successfully across this expansive mission set.

Future battlefields will be populated with hybrid threats: combinations of regular, irregular, terrorist, and criminal groups. The Army must retain the flexibility to operate both in missions requiring maneuver over extended distances, and in missions requiring the establishment of security over wide areas; whatever the threat. As pressures for cuts in defense spending and force structures increase, the Army must assess which capabilities to emphasize, how many of each, and at what level; finding the right mix will be a challenge.

To address this challenge, the Army developed numerous service wide initiatives that guide institutional adaptation in support of irregular warfare operations. Inside *The Army Campaign Plan*, the Army identified a major objective designed to adapt institutions for building partner capacity. This on-going process enables Army leaders to continuously monitor and direct progress that supports working by, with and through partner nations to improve their capability and capacity. The *Army Campaign Support Plan* identifies activities, resources and levels-of-effort that support ongoing operations, security
cooperation, and other shaping or preventive activities. *The Army Action Plan for Stability Operations* is the Army's foundational document for stability operations and informs the Army's efforts to identify progress and gaps in our ability to execute stability operations across all phases of operation.

An additional challenge will be refining the Army's ability to deliver a wide array of *prevent* activities using general purpose forces in support of national security objectives to develop the security capacity of partner nations. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the flexibility of modular brigades in allowing the Army to organize, train and equip for security force assistance activities. As requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan decrease, these brigades may be used to meet ongoing requirements for *prevent* activities across all combatant commands. Engagement in *prevent* activities is a cost effective way to increase the capability and capacity partner nations, enhance regional stability, and counter anti-access activities by potential adversaries. The Army will continue to assess these requirements, and work with Congress and the Department of Defense to ensure the resources and flexibility required to accomplish these missions are in place.

As we have learned from the last ten years, the military cannot succeed in today's operating environment alone. Full integration of U.S. Government capability in planning, training, and conduct of irregular operations is critical to success. The Army continues to partner with the U.S. State Department to formalize enduring civil-military integration across a range of steady state activities that support irregular warfare. One example is the partnership between
the Army, the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, and the DOD
Civilian Expeditionary Workforce to establish the Camp Atterbury Joint Maneuver
Training Center which provides training to over 20 government, public and
private organizations. The Army will work through the Department of Defense
and the interagency to develop a policy framework that enables a whole-of-
government approach for operations that support irregular warfare. Likewise, the
Army will continue to improve its ability to team with partners in support of
coalition operations in an irregular warfare context.

Question 3: Are our forces properly postured to deal with future irregular
warfare challenges?

The Army is properly postured to deal with future irregular warfare
challenges provided adequate time and resources to reset and refit at the
conclusion of current operations. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
demonstrate flexibility of modular brigades for a wide array of security force
assistance, stability operations, and other irregular warfare activities. In our
brigades, the Army has embedded a host of irregular warfare specialties,
including information operations, public affairs, civil affairs, military information
support operations, electronic warfare, and human terrain teams. Critical to the
Army’s capability to advance our capability for irregular warfare operations is
ready access to the Reserve Component as an operational reserve, where a
significant portion of civil affairs and other combat enablers reside.
To support the necessary flexibility, the Army rebalanced its force structure across all components to support irregular warfare, dramatically increasing specialties such as Special Forces, civil affairs, medical, and military police. The Army created a Combat Advisor Academy at Fort Polk, Louisiana run by the 162nd Infantry Brigade. This academy trains Army, joint and coalition partners for advise and assist missions and can be expanded to support missions beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Included in the cadre of trainers are coalition partners, drawing on a broad, multi-national base of experience in security force assistance.

Our division, corps and theater army headquarters have been given additional staff structure specifically to address inform and influence activities, support increased civil affairs capability, and enable engineer support infrastructure development and restoration of essential services. The Army also created the 1st Information Operations Brigade to assist units in the conduct of Inform and Influence activities, the Army Asymmetric Warfare Group to support rapid adaptation to the activities of hybrid threats, and U.S. Army Cyber Command to execute cyber/electromagnetic activities for the Army.

To capture the experience resident in the Army from the last decade, we created mechanisms to identify, track, and manage those with experience in training teams, provincial reconstruction teams, and those who serve as mentors in brigades that partnered with Iraqi and Afghan security forces. The Army expanded its translator and recruiting programs, instituted a retiree recall program for those with high demand, low density skills, and grew its Foreign Area
Officer corps, providing expanded regional and cultural expertise. The Army continues to work with the Department of Defense to identify those irregular warfare related capabilities that need to be captured in order to improve our ability to meet future requirements.

The key to advancing the Army’s ability to respond to irregular threats will be to ensure the necessary force structure to support a versatile mix of capabilities in an uncertain future. As stated before, this will be challenge. The Army can maintain our doctrine and lessons learned databases fairly easily, but the Army will require continued Congressional support to secure the resources necessary to retain capability and readiness for a wide array of contingencies. The Army is committed to getting this right and we look forward to working with Congress and the Department of Defense to ensure that we continue to provide depth and versatility to the Joint Force.

With the continued support of the American people, expressed through the will of the Congress, the Army will maintain balance in the force, build the readiness necessary in an era of persistent conflict, and remain prepared for the challenges of today and tomorrow. Again, thank you for the opportunity to report to you on behalf of the Army and our American Soldiers.
United States Army

Major General Peter C. Bayer, Jr.

Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7
United States Army
400 Army Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310-0400
Since: Jul 2010

SOURCE OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE: ROTC

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES
Lehigh University – BS – Commercial Marketing Methods
United States Army War College – MS – Strategic Studies

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED
Armor Officer Basic Course
Infantry Officer Advanced Course
Canadian Land Forces Staff Course
United States Army Command and General Staff College
United States Army War College

FOREIGN LANGUAGES: None recorded

PROMOTIONS

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FROM TO ASSIGNMENT

Apr 85 Mar 88 Tank Platoon Leader, later Support Platoon Leader, later, Executive Officer, Company C, 1st Battalion, 64th Armor, redesignated 69th Armor, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Apr 88 Aug 88 Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia
Sep 88 Apr 89 Battalion Maintenance Officer, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
May 89 Oct 91 Commander, C Company, Italy Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Jan 92 Jun 92 Student, Canadian Land Forces Staff Course, Canadian Command and Staff College, Kingston, Ontario
Jun 92 Jan 94 Combat Training Analyst, later Assistant Company Combat Trainer and Observer/Controller, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California
Aug 94 Jun 95 Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Jul 95 Jul 96 Chief of Training, G-3, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas
Jul 96 Jul 97 S-3 (Operations), 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas
Jul 97 Jul 98 Deputy G-3, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas
Jul 98 Jun 00 Plans Officer, Plans and Strategy Division, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, United States European Command, Germany
Jun 00 Jun 02 Commander, 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, 2d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Benning, Georgia and OPERATION DESERT SPRING, Kuwait
MG Peter C. Bayer, Jr.

Jul 02 Jun 03 G-3 (Operations), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
Jul 03 Jun 04 Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
Jun 04 Aug 06 Commander, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Irwin, California, dual-hatted as Chief of Staff, Multi-National Force-Northwest, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
Aug 06 Jul 07 Executive Officer to the Commanding General, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia
Jul 07 Jul 08 Deputy Commanding General/Assistant Commandant, United States Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, Kentucky
Jul 08 Apr 09 Chief of Staff, I Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington
Apr 09 Mar 10 Chief of Staff, I Corps, United States Forces-Iraq, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
Mar 10 Jul 10 Chief of Staff, I Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington
Jul 10 Present Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy, G-3/577, United States Army, Washington, DC

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<td>Major/Lieutenant Colonel</td>
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<td>Commander, 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Benning, Georgia and OPERATION DESERT SPRING, Kuwait</td>
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<td>Commander, 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq</td>
<td>Jul 02-Jun 03</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Irwin, California, dual-hatted as Chief of Staff, Multi-National Force - Northwest, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq</td>
<td>Jan 05-Dec 05</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff, I Corps, United States Forces-Iraq, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq</td>
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US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

- Silver Star
- Legion of Merit (with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Bronze Star Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal
- Meritorious Service Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Army Commendation Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Army Achievement Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Combat Action Badge
- Parachutist Badge
STATEMENT OF
REAR ADMIRAL (LOWER HALF) SINCLAIR HARRIS
DIRECTOR, NAVY IRREGULAR WARFARE OFFICE
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

NOVEMBER 3, 2011
Chairman Thornberry, Congressman Langevin, and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, it is an honor for me to be here with you today to address the U.S. Navy’s efforts to institutionalize and develop proficiency in irregular warfare mission areas. These efforts are vital to our national interests and, as part of a comprehensive approach for meeting complex global challenges, remain relevant in a time of uncertainty and constant change. To meet these challenges Admiral Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, recently provided his Sailing Directions to our Navy emphasizing the mission to deter aggression and, if deterrence fails, to win our Nation’s wars. Today, the Navy is engaged around the world conducting preventive activities that stabilize, strengthen, and secure our partners and allies providing regional deterrence against state and non-state actors, while at the same time fighting, and winning, our Nation’s wars. We expect the demand for these activities to increase in the future security environment as a capacity constrained Navy seeks to maintain access and presence. Emphasis on increased training and education will enable our continued readiness to effectively meet global demand.

As demand for our Navy continues to grow, we continue to leverage our Maritime Strategy with our partners, the Marine Corps and Coast Guard. The maritime domain supports 90% of the world’s trade and provides offshore options to help friends in need, and to confront and defeat aggression far from our shores as part of a defense in depth approach to secure our homeland. CNO’s Sailing Directions, coupled with an enduring Maritime Strategy, underscore the Navy’s focus on multi-mission platforms and highly trained Sailors that conduct activities across the operational spectrum. Key tenets of the force are readiness to fight and win today while building the ability to win tomorrow; to provide offshore options to deter, influence, and win; and to harness the teamwork, talent and imagination of our diverse force. While the
Maritime Strategy spans the spectrum of warfare, the Navy’s Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges (CIC), released in January 2010, addresses mission areas of irregular warfare as well as maritime activities to prevent, limit, and interdict irregular threats and their influence on regional stability through, insurgency, crime, and violent extremism.

The CIC Vision is derived from our Maritime Strategy with the intention to implement steps towards increasing the Navy’s proficiency in supporting direct and indirect approaches that dissuade and defeat irregular actors who exploit uncontrolled or ungoverned spaces in order to employ informational, economic, technological, and kinetic means against civilian populations to achieve their objectives. The CIC Vision is guiding the alignment of organizations, investments, innovation, procedures, doctrine, and training needed to mainstream CIC capabilities within the Fleet. These efforts are focused on outcomes of increased effectiveness in stabilizing and strengthening regions, enhancing regional awareness, increasing regional maritime partner capacity, and expanding coordination and interoperability with joint, interagency, and international partners. These outcomes support promoting regional security and stability and advancing the rule of law allowing good governance and promoting prosperity by helping partners better protect their people and resources. In addition to preventive activities, the Vision guides efforts to inhibit the spread of violent extremism and illicit, terrorist, and insurgent activities. To achieve these outcomes, the Navy is actively reorienting doctrine and operational approaches, rebalancing investments and developmental efforts, and refining operations and partnerships to better support a comprehensive approach to U.S. efforts. These efforts will provide a Navy capable of confronting irregular challenges through a broad array of multi-mission capabilities and a force proficient in the CIC missions of security force assistance,
maritime security, stability operations, information dominance, and force application necessary
to support counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense missions.

In line with its strategy for confronting irregular challenges the Navy has leveraged key
force providers, such as the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, and established Maritime
Partnership Stations, and Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Centers to meet the
demands and missions consistent with its strategy and vision. The evolution of intelligence and
strike capabilities has enabled the Navy to meet urgent Combatant Commander requirements for
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations and highlighted further opportunities for the
Navy as an important joint partner. While these operational organizations and activities deliver
Navy capabilities in theater, the Navy Irregular Warfare Office, established by the CNO in July
2008, has guided the implementation and institutionalization of the CIC Vision. The Navy
Irregular Warfare Office, working closely with USSOCOM, other Combatant Commanders,
Services, interagency and international partners, has rapidly identified and deployed Navy
capabilities to today’s fight, and is institutionalizing confronting irregular challenges concepts in
the Navy’s planning, investment, and capability development.

The Navy Irregular Warfare Office operates under three primary imperatives consistent
with the Maritime Strategy, CNO’s Sailing Directions, and the Navy’s Vision for Confronting
Irregular Challenges. They provide integration and institutionalization in CIC mission areas and
are; (1) improve the level of understanding concerning the maritime contribution to the joint
force; (2) increase proficiency of the whole of Navy to confront irregular challenges; and (3)
drive maritime and special operations forces to seamless integration in addressing irregular
challenges. These three imperatives focus the Navy’s implementation efforts and mainstream
the concept that preventing wars is as important as winning them. Our Navy must be ready to
transition seamlessly between operational environments, with the capability and training inherent in the Fleet.

Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 directs the services to “improve DoD proficiency for irregular warfare, which also enhances its conduct of stability operations” and directs reporting to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff annually. Navy efforts to institutionalize and provide proficiency in confronting irregular challenges, includes proficiency in irregular warfare missions along with missions of maritime security operations and information dominance, a key enabler for CIC. Currently, the Navy leverages its access and persistent presence to both better understand and respond to irregular challenges and is actively evolving its proficiency to prevent and counter irregular threats while maintaining its ability to conduct the full spectrum of naval warfare. Its access, presence, and emphasis on maritime partnerships enable broader government efforts to address underlying conditions of instability that enhance regional security. Through its mix of multi-mission capabilities, the Navy provides political leaders with a range of offshore options for limiting regional conflict through assurance, deterrence, escalation and de-escalation, gaining and maintaining access, and rapid crisis response. In addition to its inherent ability to protect the maritime commons, its effectiveness in building maritime partner capability and capacity contributes to achieving partner security and economic objectives. Operating in and from the maritime domain with joint and international partners, the Navy is enhancing regional security while dissuading, deterring, and when necessary, defeating irregular threats.

The Navy acknowledges the complexity of the future security environment and continues to explore balanced approaches. Following are the Navy’s current focus areas:
Fleet-SOF Integration: Navy’s afloat basing support to special operations forces has extended their reach into denied or semi-permissive areas enabling highly successful counterterrorism missions. Navy provides inherent combat capabilities, multi-mission ships and submarines collecting mission critical information, approval for 1052 support billets for Naval Special Warfare, two dedicated HCS squadrons, and shipboard controlled UAV orbits supporting counterterrorism operations. The Navy is aligned to improve this integration through pre-deployment training, mission rehearsals, improvements to fleet bandwidth allocation, shipboard C4I enhancements, and C2 relationships needed to prosecute time sensitive targets.

Maritime Partnerships: Establishing enduring maritime partnerships is a long-term strategy for securing the maritime commons. Legal, jurisdictional, and diplomatic considerations often complicate efforts to secure the maritime commons, especially from exploitation by highly adaptive irregular actors. In recognition of these considerations, the Navy is emphasizing partnership engagements with U.S. and international maritime forces to strengthen regional security.

Information Sharing Initiatives: In an information dominated environment, initiatives that link joint warfighters, the technology community, and academia are crucial to rapidly fielding solutions to emerging irregular challenges. These initiatives are the basis for longer-term efforts to adapt and improve proficiency of Navy platforms to address irregular challenges.

Doctrine: Development of Tri-Service (Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard) Maritime Stability Operations doctrine that will enable a more effective response to instability in the littorals.
Organization: Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, which continues to provide in-demand capabilities such as Maritime Civil Affairs Teams, Riverine Forces, Maritime Security Forces, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams, and Expeditionary Intelligence Teams.

Today, the Navy continues to meet planned global operational commitments and respond to crises as they emerge. Overseas Contingency Operations continue with more than 12,000 active and reserve Sailors serving around the globe and another 15,000 at sea in Central Command. Navy's Carrier Strike Groups provide 30 percent of the close air support for troops on the ground in Afghanistan and our Navy and Marine Corps pilots fly almost 60% of electronic attack missions. Yet, as our national interests extend beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, so do the operations of our Navy. Over the last year, more than 50 percent of our Navy has been underway daily; globally present, and persistently engaged. Last year, our Navy conducted counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean and North Arabian Sea with a coalition of several nations, trained local forces in maritime security as part of our Global Maritime Partnership initiatives in Europe, South America, Africa and the Pacific and forces in the Sixth Fleet supported NATO in complex operations in Libya. Navy responded with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to the earthquake in Haiti, the flooding in Pakistan, and the earthquake and tsunami in Japan; and, conducted the world’s largest maritime exercise, Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), which brought together 14 nations and more than 20,000 military personnel, to improve coordination and trust in multi-national operations in the Pacific. Our Sailors continue to deploy forward throughout the world, projecting US influence, responding to contingencies, and building international relationships that enable the safe, secure, and free flow of commerce that underpins our economic prosperity and advances the mission areas that address irregular challenges.
The future vision of the Navy in meeting the uncertain challenges around the globe remains a force forward, present, and persistent in areas critical to the national interests of the United States. CNO, in previous testimony\(^1\), stated: *Our Navy continues to conduct a high tempo of global operations, which we expect to continue even as forces draw down in Afghanistan.*

Global trends in economics, demographics, resources, and climate change portend an increased demand for maritime presence, power, and influence. *America's prosperity depends on the seas... and as disruption and disorder persist in our security environment, maritime activity will evolve and expand.* Seapower allows our nation to maintain U.S. presence and influence globally and, when necessary, project power without a costly, sizeable, or permanent footprint ashore. *We will continue to maintain a forward-deployed presence around the world to prevent conflict, increase interoperability with our allies, enhance the maritime security and capacity of our traditional and emerging partners, confront irregular challenges, and respond to crises.* To continue as a global force in the preventive and responsive mission areas that confront irregular challenges, including those of irregular warfare, the Navy will be faced with increasing demand in a fiscally induced capacity constrained environment. Constrained capacity requires a prioritization of areas requiring persistent presence, to include those regions of current or forecast instability. Also required is an understanding of the risk incurred to mission, and to force, if we do not get that priority correct. We must ensure our Navy remains the finest, best trained, and most ready in the world to sustain key mission areas that support confronting irregular challenges, and has the ability to face a highly capable adversary. The Navy looks forward to working with Congress to address our future challenges and thank you for your support of the Navy's mission and personnel at this critical crossroads in U.S. history.

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\(^1\) ADM Jonathan Greenert, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, statement before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Readiness, July 26, 2011
Rear Admiral Sinclair M. Harris
Director, Navy Irregular Warfare Office

Rear Admiral Sinclair M. Harris is a native of Washington D.C. He is a 1981 graduate of James Madison University in Harrisonburg, Va., where he received a Bachelor of Science degree in Economics. His early sea assignments include tours in USS Long Beach (CGN 9), USS Vincennes (CG 49), USS Jarrett (FFG 33), USS Coronado (AGF 11), and as commissioning executive officer in USS Bentfold (DDG 65). He commanded USS Comstock (LSD 45) during Operation Enduring Freedom and Amphibious Squadron 4/Two Jima Strike Group during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief - Hurricanes Katrina/Rita in 2005 and non-combative evacuation operation of Lebanon in 2006.

Ashore, Harris' assignments include tours in the Washington-area at the Institute for National Strategic Studies in the National Defense University; the Navy staff in the Assessment Division (OPNAV N81) Campaign Analysis, Modeling and Simulation branch; and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-5) Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate as the Global Security Affairs Division chief for Security Assistance. He was a senior fellow in the chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group (SSG 300). In May 2008, Harris returned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as the deputy director, Expeditionary Warfare Division (OPNAV N85B). He was assigned as the commander, Expeditionary Strike Group 5 from 2009 to 2010 providing Foreign Disaster Relief during the Pakistan Floods of 2010. Harris now serves in the chief of Naval Operations staff as the director, Navy Irregular Warfare Office.

Harris earned a Master of Science degree in Operations Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1989 and is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Va. He also earned a Master of Arts degree in Defense and Strategic Studies from the University of Madras, India's Defense Services Staff College in Tamil Nadu, India.

Harris' decorations include the Legion of Merit, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal, Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal, and various other unit and campaign awards.

Updated: 01 November 2011
STATEMENT OF

BRIGADIER GENERAL DANIEL J. O’DONOHUE
DIRECTOR, CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE
COMBAT DEVELOPMENT & INTEGRATION

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

CONCERNING

INSTITUTIONALIZING IRREGULAR WARFARE CAPABILITIES

ON

NOVEMBER 3, 2011
Introduction

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished members of this Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today. On behalf of all Marines and their families, I thank you for your continued support. I also appreciate the opportunity to discuss irregular warfare with you.

Today’s testimony will answer the three questions that this Subcommittee posed:

- Has the Marine Corps fully recognized that irregular warfare is as strategically important as traditional warfare and are current directives, doctrine, and frameworks developed, in place and aligned?

- What institutional and policy challenges remain given future operating environments and fiscal constraints?

- Are our forces properly postured to deal with future irregular warfare challenges?

The bottom line is that the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Amos, has given clear guidance on the vital importance of irregular warfare that guides our combat development. Irregular warfare is woven deeply into Marine Corps past, current and future capability.

Overview

The Marine Corps is the nation’s expeditionary force in readiness. As such it is prepared for all manner of crises and contingencies. In the broadest sense, irregular warfare is warfare without pattern. It recognizes the complex, highly adaptive threats that we face. In the future, as in the past, multiple regional powers and a host of lethal groups will exploit numerous seeds of instability, proliferating increasingly lethal technology and extremist ideology while leveraging the advantages of networks hidden amongst the population. Marines are prepared to meet that challenge with our Navy, Special Operations, Army, Air Force and interagency partners.

In an unpredictable, unstable and uncertain future security environment, there is an emphatic trend in warfare—the dynamic combination of conventional and irregular warfare by state, non-state and criminal threats. The Marine Corps is manned, trained and equipped to continuously adapt to, deter and defeat these adversaries with increasingly discriminating and precise full spectrum operations. Through a comprehensive force structure review, we designed a post-Operation Enduring Freedom force in readiness that mitigates this hybrid threat, creates options and provides decision space for senior leadership while, when necessary, setting the conditions for a comprehensive joint, interagency and allied response.

As we look to the future, the post-Operation Enduring Freedom Marine Corps is fundamentally different from the current and pre-9/11 force. It draws on a rich history of innovations in irregular warfare but is recast as a scalable crisis response force ready to counter complex irregular, conventional and hybrid threats—and the gray areas in between. We have substantially invested in relevant organizations such as Marine Special Operations, intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, partnering, civil affairs, electronic warfare, cyber, regionally oriented command and control, and information operations. Tasked organized with our highly trained line units, these enablers provide versatile, scalable capability for a broad range of missions to include deterrence, counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, partnering, reinforcement to our allies, humanitarian assistance, and assured access for the joint force under any condition our national interests require.

Above all we prepare to operate in and adapt to unpredictable, uncertain, complex environments at a moment's notice. In doing so, we adapt from considerable operational experience.

- In 2001, just one month after the horrific events of 9/11, 4,400 combat ready Marines launched 400 miles from a naval amphibious task force of six ships and conducted decisive counter-terror operations with our Special Operations and Navy partners.

- Since 1990, as a matter of course, Marines have conducted 137 separate operations of which 113 were irregular in nature. Most of these were conducted as a Navy and Marine Team that exploited the versatility and strategic reach of amphibious ships by projecting power without forward basing or potentially destabilizing presence ashore. For the last ten years Marines have engaged in counterinsurgency, stability operations and foreign internal defense in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

- In just the past five months, amphibious forces conducted strikes against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and loyalist forces in Libya; conducted counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden; responded to national disasters in Japan; conducted numerous security cooperation activities with the forces of our partner nations; reinforced combat operations in Afghanistan; and stood off the coasts of several countries in crisis - ready to rescue American citizens if called upon to do so.

In the sections below we describe the strategic importance of irregular warfare for the Marine Corps and how we will meet future demands for a stabilizing forward presence and scalable crisis response in an irregular environment.

Strategic Importance of Irregular Warfare

As demonstrated by our rich history and doctrine, there is nothing new about an irregular warfare focus for the Marine Corps. Our still referenced Small Wars Manual of 1940, is a notable example of Marine Corps participation in both regular and irregular conflicts and reflects a time in our Nation's history, similar to today, when the Marine Corps codified its experience in the current conflict while preparing for the future. Our recent doctrine continues that theme.

Irregular warfare is defined as: “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.”
The Marine Corps emphasizes the focus on the “relevant population” and has developed the capabilities necessary to influence that critical popular support. The Small Wars Manual states: “In a major war, the mission assigned to the armed forces is usually unequivocal—the defeat and destruction of the hostile forces. This is seldom true in small wars. More often than not, the mission will be to establish and maintain law and order by supporting or replacing the civil government in countries or areas in which the interests of the United States have been placed in jeopardy.”

As a highly trained, infantry centric force, supported by the broad capabilities of the Marine Air Ground Task Force, the Marine Corps is ideally suited for interacting with the relevant population.

Current Directives, Doctrine, and Frameworks

The Marine Corps acknowledged the importance of irregular warfare long before the Department of Defense began to codify the elements of irregular warfare in 2008. Our Center for Operational Culture and Learning was established in 2005 and our Center for Irregular Warfare was established in 2007. Our doctrine already includes 24 current or draft publications that directly address topics of an irregular warfare nature. Additional Marine Corps irregular warfare initiatives include:

- Led the development of Tri-Service Maritime Stability Doctrine in coordination with the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard.

- Institutionalized law enforcement professionals to assist in host nation police training, identifying dominance/biometrics efforts, and increasing capability to systematically attack insurgent networks.

- Streamlined security cooperation components into a single organization - the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group – to improve capability and capacity of security cooperation activities across the Marine Corps.

- Expanded the Foreign Area Officer/Regional Area Officer program by increasing the number of opportunities, as well as adding enlisted personnel to serve as Foreign Area Specialist/Regional Area Specialist.

In his 2010 planning guidance, General James Amos, provided specific guidance for strengthening and consolidating irregular warfare functions. We have increased the size of the Center for Irregular Warfare Integration Division and tasked them to deliberately assess our capabilities for future irregular warfare. This is intended to integrate joint and interagency practices with our current guidance and insights in order to ensure a holistic approach to identifying and implementing necessary changes.

Institutional and Policy Challenges

Above all, regardless of fiscal constraints, the Marine Corps must meet the challenge to be ready and adapt to a dynamically changing irregular threat. Investments in training, education
and experimentation will complement our prioritized forward engagement so that we can shape, deter and defend at a moment’s notice. Irregular warfare is fluid by nature, so as Marines and as an institution we must operate and rapidly adapt across all domains and with a broad array of combined arms as an integrated force.

We are also increasing unit manning above pre-9/11 levels to increase unit readiness, cohesion and the time to train for a broad range of irregular missions. Our excellence in small unit leadership is a continued focus with many initiatives to include the development of a more experienced and highly trained squad leader. We also require Defense Officer Personnel Management Act relief and increased senior enlisted leaders to provide for the higher proportion of more experience leaders demanded by irregular operations.

We will also work closely to integrate our complementary capability with special operations, other joint forces, interagency and partnered nations.

We must continue to modernize and maintain a technological advantage within a responsive and streamlined acquisition process.

Finally, increased access to our combat experienced, reserve forces will enable us to leverage a talent pool with capabilities rich in relevance to irregular warfare.

**Posturing for the Future**

Marines are trained to operate in ambiguity and achieve dominance across multiple dimensions: air, sea, land, cyber, and the electronic spectrum. We provide lethal and non-lethal combined arms to increasingly smaller tactical units that operate on an increasingly distributed battlefield.

The Marine Corps Force Structure Review plan positions the Marine Corps to respond to the most likely missions while preserving the capability to project punishing combat power when required. The cornerstone of the future Marine Corps rests on the quality and flexibility of our Marines, which allow us to support the joint force commanders’ diverse requirements. The future force will include enhanced irregular warfare capabilities enabled by:

- Reorganizing our intelligence collection and exploitation capabilities to enhance readiness by directly linking deployed forces, garrison support, and the intelligence community;
- Increasing capacity for cyber network defense, exploitation and attack operations by augmenting our communication and radio battalions, and by increasing the structure of Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command;
- Enhancing capabilities to conduct and manage battlefield biometric, forensic, and law enforcement operations by creating a law enforcement support battalion within each Marine Expeditionary Force;
- Retaining and better integrating the training, advising, and assistance organizations designed to enable and enhance irregular warfare capabilities, partner-nation engagement, and cultural understanding; and

- Strengthening the capabilities of Marine Special Operations Command through a 44% increase in critical combat support and combat service support Marines.

**Training and Education**

Key to adaptation are our training and educational initiatives that affect every grade and unit. Platoons now operate over 30 miles from their closest units in a fight for influence and legitimacy or concentrate when required to meet a more conventional threat. In doing so, today’s sergeants and lieutenants operate at the level of pre-2001 lieutenants and majors in enabling the employment of the full range of our nation’s power. Our training and education will continue to reinforce this capability to operate in a distributed environment against a hybrid threat at every level of the Marine Air Ground Task Force.

Marine training and education reflects both the Service’s historical ability to conduct irregular warfare and recent operational experience. Marines are specifically trained and broadly educated to understand cultures and populations, to thrive in chaotic environments, and to recognize and respond creatively to demanding situations. The Marine Corps realizes that as forces transition out of Afghanistan, training will become less theater and threat specific. However, the Marine Corps is dedicated to retaining the irregular warfare skills and experience within the Service. Though future training will develop a wider range of capabilities to conduct operations across the military range, counterinsurgency and stability operations will continue to be an integral part of a Marine’s training and education. A few of the training and education initiatives include:

- The Basic School, Expeditionary Warfare School, Command and Staff College and the War College incorporated key elements of irregular warfare into the training and curriculum. During the irregular warfare training, students explore the theory and principles of counterinsurgency, transnational threats, stability operations and reconstruction, policing in irregular operations and future war during the instruction. In addition, Marine officers receive instruction in operational culture, language, and interagency issues.

- The Marine Corps Operations and Tactics Instructors Course is heavily focused on stability operations. The curriculum includes irregular warfare, human terrain, interagency, nongovernmental organizations, civil affairs, information operations and counterinsurgency.

- The Combat Hunter leader courses cultivate tactical skills to enable Marines to be more effective in the challenges faced in irregular operating environments. In addition, the program teaches law enforcement skill sets which enable Marines to better exploit information obtained on the battlefield.
Conclusion

To meet the demands of the national interest in the future, increasingly irregular, security environment, the Marine Corps will: engage forward to forge partnerships, prevent crises, promote diplomatic access, reassuring allies and friends of our commitment, build partner capacity, and facilitate the security and stability of our allies; respond rapidly and effectively to protect national interest, contain disruptions to global stability, overcome access challenges by operating from the sea base, reinforce U.S. credibility, solidify relationships with international partners and forge new ones; and project power in order to assure access and deny sanctuary to our adversaries. As appropriate we can rapidly transition across the “three block war” from the open hand of humanitarian assistance, to peacekeeping, and to the closed fist of versatile power projection to impose our nation’s will, reinforce our partners and defeat our adversaries.

With the support of the Congress and the American people we can ensure our Navy and Marine Corps team is ready for the current fight and is well prepared to secure our Nation and national interests in an uncertain future. Again, I thank you for the opportunity to discuss irregular warfare.


He and his wife, Rani, have been married 27 years. They have 7 children: Erin, Sara, Dunny, Michael, John, Mark, and Peter.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

PRESENTATION TO THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBJECT: Institutionalizing Irregular Warfare Capabilities

STATEMENT OF: Brigadier General Jerry P. Martinez
            Director for Joint Integration
            Directorate of Operational Capability Requirements
            Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements

November 3, 2011
Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for calling this hearing, and for the opportunity to provide an update on Air Force efforts to institutionalize capabilities for Irregular Warfare (IRREGULAR WARFARE) and other matters important to our Air Force and to the Nation. In particular, I will address the following questions:

1) Has the Air Force fully recognized that "irregular warfare is as strategically important as traditional warfare"?

2) What institutional and policy challenges remain, given future operating environments and fiscal constraints?

3) Are Air Force forces properly postured to deal with future irregular warfare challenges?

4) Are current Air Force directives, doctrine, and frameworks developed, in place, and aligned?

The importance of irregular warfare and the level of institutionalization can be gauged by the changes made and frameworks put in place to ensure relevant and enduring capabilities. The simple answer to both is “yes.” To quote the Air Force Chief of Staff, “We listen. We evaluate. We learn. We adapt.”

Our Chief notes that Airmen and Air Force capabilities provide additional strategic alternatives to national leaders and combatant commanders. When the U.S. engages in irregular warfare, the Air Force is a part of the larger joint, coalition, interagency effort. In this context, strategic maneuver room supports a preferred solution in irregular warfare that is organic to the nation in question through its police or security forces. Failing that, the next best solution is to

1 Gen Norton A. Schwartz, CSAF, "Airpower in Irregular Warfare, " Lessons Learned Report, 8 September 2008
bring in external, but regional, support. When U.S. forces and "allied or coalition forces" are
called upon, it is best if they are employed to improve host-nation or regional capabilities.
Airpower directly contributes by establishing a secure environment in which the partner nation
can flourish, ultimately without direct assistance. By assessing, training, advising, assisting, and
equipping a troubled partner air force, Airmen can contribute to that nation's sovereignty and
legitimacy while creating opportunities for economic growth, political development and stability.

Our primary challenge going forward is to balance those requirements for essential
irregular warfare capabilities with those needed for other potential conflicts. The Air Force does
not view this "balancing" as a zero-sum, either-or proposition of irregular vs. traditional warfare,
but as an opportunity to optimize the force for efficiency and effectiveness while minimizing
risks across the full spectrum of military operations. The Air Force recognizes that an increase in
capabilities relevant to irregular threats may also result in an overall increase of efficiencies in
major combat capability, especially acknowledging we organize, train, and equip forces to be
adaptive and agile for operations against varied threats in multiple and diverse environments. In
any postulated security environment, Airmen must also be statesmen and citizens who are
capable of operating independently, semi-autonomously, and as an integral part of a military,
interagency or international team to accomplish diverse missions.

While the Air Force has a long history of adaptation for irregular warfare, beginning with
General Pershing's employment of the 1st Aero Squadron and continuing through the present
day, airpower is most often associated with its classic use—direct confrontation to disrupt and
defeat the enemy. Nevertheless, while we have achieved some success throughout our history in
building capability and conducting irregular warfare, significant capabilities and capacities were
lost in the aftermath of each major conflict as budgets and missions contracted. Some of the
pioneering labors in aviation foreign internal defense (FID) within the USAF date back to the Greek civil war immediately following World War II. These efforts were closely followed with assistance to the South Korean Air Force in the early 1950s. In parallel with President John F. Kennedy’s establishment of the U.S. Army Special Forces in 1961, General Curtis E. LeMay, then the Air Force Chief of Staff, established the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS). Nicknamed “Jungle Jim,” the squadron was based at Hurlburt Field, Florida, with a twofold mission: counterinsurgency training and combat operations. After the Vietnam War, the air advisory units faded away and multiple special operations wings were dispersed to Air Mobility Command and Tactical Air Command. The advisor skill sets languished on the periphery of USAF missions until the standup of the 6 SOS in 1994 under AFSC, and funded by USOCOM. Reinvigorated after 2001, the Air Force implemented lessons learned from Vietnam and from experience gleaned in two decades of AFSOF engagement in Foreign Internal Defense to establish and employ these capabilities in the General Purpose Forces (GPF) for Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Air Force has demonstrated further agility and adaptability of our traditional aviation capabilities for irregular warfare. The asymmetric advantages of projecting airpower into the irregular environment have proven invaluable in the areas of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, mobility, combat search and rescue, information operations, command and control, armed overwatch, and close air support. Furthermore, adaptations of B-1 and B-52 employment, availability of remotely piloted aircraft, and introduction of new capabilities, like the MC-12W, have responded well to operational requirements. They are minimizing response time to troops in contact, expanding the number of combat air patrols, shortening the find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess chain, and enhancing prosecution of targets while minimizing
collateral damage and the associated negative public reactions and perceptions. The Air Force has also made significant gains in adapting to the requirement for precision, low-collateral damage, and low civilian casualty fires with investment in additional joint terminal attack controllers, as well as research and development in relevant third-generation munitions.²

Additionally, to satisfy the appetite for relevant and actionable information, intelligence units now integrate all-source intelligence and distributed common ground system capabilities to meet combatant command requirements via rapid and global intelligence dissemination—often from distributed locations in the United States. Other notable materiel solutions providing full-spectrum effects and capabilities include: the Joint Direct Attack Munition, the Small Diameter Bomb, the Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver (a situational awareness game-changer), advanced targeting pods, the Joint Precision Aerial Delivery System, and a host of specialized sensors. These kinds of capabilities allow for precise methods to defeat irregular threats while positively influencing populations to create outcomes that benefit U.S. strategic objectives.

To counter ubiquitous improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the Air Force implemented numerous counter-IED capability efforts with both hardware and personnel solutions. Efforts are ongoing to publish counter-IED guidance in revisions to current publications, write an Air Force-specific counter-IED operations publication, make counter-IED additions to the Air Force Universal Task List and unit type code mission capability statements, and include counter-IED operations in the unit inspection process.

² Third generation refers to weapons with precision guidance and commensurate precision effects—first generation weapons were fragmentary munitions of WWII, and second-generation weapons were precision-guidance and fragmentary bomb munitions.
Air Force electronic, network, and information warfare personnel have been highly effective in defeating a variety of tools employed by our adversaries, and have achieved desired effects across the entire cyberspace domain and electromagnetic spectrum. These operations remain a vital precondition for the vast majority of military operations, often resulting in their own operational and strategic effects.

Beyond these more kinetic-type activities, the Air Force is building the capability to develop partner nation air forces. We are expanding capabilities for security force assistance and building partnership capacity with the central focus on our Airmen. The Air Force goal is to help partner nations develop a holistic and sustainable aviation capability that contributes to their security, government legitimacy, and stability by overcoming irregular adversaries, terrorist networks, drug cartels, and criminal organizations, and, as a consequence, prevents lethal threats from emanating from fractured or failing states. This effort focuses, first, on creating or improving the capability and capacity of the infrastructure supporting air operations. Airmen training and advising in capabilities like air traffic control, airfield management, logistics, supply, maintenance, command and control, and security, help create sustainable foundational capabilities for aviation operations to prevent or deter the types of threats listed previously. Because of the dual use of aviation, many of these efforts overlap with civil capabilities and lead to transportation options that create good governance, trade, and revenue. This is why development of aviation capabilities should be a whole-of-government effort. Air Advisor efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the benefits of developing holistic aviation capabilities. For example, the U.S. Air Force just transferred the management of the Baghdad/Balad Airspace Sector to the Iraq Civil Aviation Authority (ICAA) on the first of October. Iraq’s air traffic controllers are now directing the movement of all aircraft within the
area; the busiest and most complex airspace in Iraq. Organizationally, the Air Force has flexed to meet the requirement to build or rebuild the aviation enterprises in Iraq and Afghanistan with the 321st Air Expeditionary Wing Iraq Training and Advisory Mission and the 438th Air Expeditionary Wing NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan. As these units plan to draw down, the experience gained in the performance of these missions are being captured and incorporated into an enduring air advisor capability.

Aviation enterprise development is not a new idea; we have helped to develop aviation capabilities with a number of partners since World War II. In Colombia, the Air Force provided crucial support that significantly improved Colombia’s military capabilities, directly resulting in unprecedented recent successes by the Colombian military in its COIN campaign against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. These key aviation capabilities included command and control, ISR, information operations, air mobility, agile combat support, and combat search and rescue. Air Force assistance was wide-ranging and comprehensive, from tactical-level training by mobile training teams, to foreign military sales assistance for C-130 parts, to strategic-level initiatives such as the 10-year Plan Colombia program, which provided funding and training which represented a long-term commitment by the U.S. Government. Aviation enterprise development has proven to be applicable to the full range of willing partners, from emerging nation-states to near-peers. This example underscores the imperative for long-term, integrated and patient engagement.

An analysis of Future Capabilities Game 2009 (FG09), directed by the Air Force Chief of Staff and led by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans & Requirements, examined USAF Irregular Warfare strategy and associated documents for shortfalls in enabling IRREGULAR WARFARE force structure development. Among the study’s key findings was the
acknowledgement that to build and sustain irregular warfare proficiency requires fulfilling two competing mission sets. First, possessing the full capability to engage an asymmetric enemy directly, and second, assisting a partner nation to develop a credible air force and basic infrastructure. Furthermore, a recent Air Force Lessons Learned conference highlighted the need for further guidance on air advisor operations. In response, the Air Force has developed a draft air advisor operating concept; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and a standardized planning and assessment framework for building partner nation aviation enterprises.

The 2011 Budget Control Act poses an enormous challenge to the Air Force in the Air Force’s efforts to retain these capability advances. In the immediate future our focus will be on:

- Continuing to provide the air, space, and cyber control that combatant commanders have come to expect. Simultaneously, we will continue to defend our homeland while remaining fully prepared to protect American lives at home and abroad.
- Cultivating new partnerships that enhance our friends’ aviation enterprises and their ability to provide for their own security. Our air advisor program is a crucial step in that direction.
- Continuing delivery of remotely piloted combat air patrols to meet theater-level ISR demands, and solidifying our plan for steady-state, remotely piloted aircraft operations over the long term.
- Seeking broader global access to bases. We will expand our ability to operate from diverse airfields across the world to provide effective power projection in the future.
- Sustaining our Political and Regional Affairs Strategist programs, as well as foreign language programs to facilitate robust engagement with an ever-growing number of international partners.
Let me conclude my testimony with what, in my view, is the central question of the committee’s inquiry: "Are Air Force forces properly postured to deal with future irregular warfare challenges?"

The Air Force is prepared to conduct the full spectrum of missions associated with irregular warfare direct and indirect action, effectively and efficiently. As part of the FY12 budget, we exceeded our efficiency target by $5 billion and identified $33.3 billion in efficiencies in an effort to make resources available to better support warfighter and readiness programs across the FYDP. The realization of these efficiencies will allow us to reallocate funding to modernize and recapitalize weapons systems, improve capabilities and enhance warfighter operations. Many of these enhancements will improve our capabilities for irregular operations such as:

- Repurposing 5,600 active duty billets over the FYDP to support ISR capability, U.S. Pacific Command force structure requirements, Total Force Integration, the U-2 continuation, and building partnership capacity;
- Recapitalizing the aging special operations forces MC-130H/W aircraft;
- Improving the aircraft computer infrastructure of the B-52 to enable more rapid machine-to-machine retargeting;
- Transitioning MC-12/W Liberty Project from Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding into the Air Force baseline budget beginning in FY13;
- Continuing maximized production of the MQ-9 Reaper to ensure delivery of 65 combat air patrols by the end of FY13; and
- Extending U-2 operations through FY15 to ensure a smooth high-altitude transition.³

Beyond these enhancements the Air Force has demonstrated a commitment to sustained preparation for irregular warfare. The Air Force appointed a Senior Executive Service member to lead an organization at Headquarters Air Force to institutionalize irregular warfare-related doctrine and capabilities. Nested under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, the Irregular Warfare Directorate provides the Air Force a focal point for integrating a balanced operational approach to irregular warfighting that is congruent with doctrine, strategy, and policy to fully exploit Air Force competencies for the joint force and maximize the value of multiple use airpower capabilities.

Operationally, the Air Force is adding an additional mission to contingency response wings and groups in Air Mobility Command, Pacific Air Forces, and U.S. Air Forces Europe to build the security capacity of partner nations. Units will be habitually aligned with specific regions of the world to support building partnerships operations. Additionally, two mobility support advisory squadrons, forming the core of our general purpose force security force assistance capability, were established at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey and Travis Air Force Base, California. In addition to organizational changes, the Air Force has made training and education adaptations. The USAF significantly shifted its paradigm for employing Airmen after 2001. Our traditional operations, which were organized around the launching of aircraft and the posturing of forces to ensure aircraft sortie generation, evolved to include operations where Airmen were being required to operate “outside the wire” in higher threat environments, serving in roles traditionally filled by the land forces.

To meet these new requirements, Airmen needed to be trained with combat skill-sets which fully prepared them for these types of operations. Over the past decade, the Air Force has successfully institutionalized expeditionary skills training to meet this transformational
requirement. These skills are obtained through a tiered training approach, and have been continually evaluated and adjusted to ensure they remain relevant, synchronized, standardized, and integrated across the Air Force. Expeditionary skills training is incorporated across an Airman’s career and aligned with mission-tasking and deployments. To help implement this tiered training, and to provide advanced mobility skills, the Air Force established the Expeditionary Center at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, a center of excellence for advanced combat support training. The Expeditionary Center teaches over 90 courses to meet emerging theater entry requirements, and has established a disciplined training process that ensures the right skills are taught at the right time.

Seeing education as the gateway to change, Air University has actively adjusted its curriculum to reflect the dynamics of irregular warfare. The Air War College includes a significant exploration of irregular warfare across the core curriculum, as well as in specific elective courses. Courses on joint and interagency capabilities and planning considerations include a specific lesson on irregular warfare, with the objective of analyzing and assessing the nature of irregular warfare, the new joint counterinsurgency doctrine, current and future capabilities and limitations, and employment considerations of military and other instruments of national power in joint military operations. The Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) presents a robust series of lectures, seminars, and readings related to irregular warfare topics. All three ACSC departments address topics related to irregular warfare in their resident and distance learning programs. In a similar manner, the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, the Air Force’s graduate-level professional military education program, includes irregular warfare lessons in six of its eleven courses, comprising approximately 15% of the overall curriculum.
Additionally, AETC established an Air Advisor Academy and has trained over 2,000 personnel to fill the role of expeditionary advisors. The mission of the Air Advisor Academy is to provide a rigorous, relevant, and flexible continuum of education and training to Airmen, so they are capable of applying their aviation expertise to assess, train, educate, advise, and assist partners in the development and application of their aviation resources to meet their national security needs, in support of U.S. National Security Strategy objectives. The academy is permanently based at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, and is capable of producing 1500 students per year. While the initial graduates had been focused on air advising in Iraq and Afghanistan, The Air Advisor Academy is now developing a more robust curriculum to cover operations globally. In the past few months, the Academy has trained an initial cadre for the mobility support advisory squadrons aligned with the USAFRICOM and USSOUTHCOM areas of responsibilities. Examples of future air advisor academy curriculum include improved training for mobile training teams, Air National Guard State Partnership Program participants, and air component theater command planners. The Air Force’s goal is to create a more robust planning process in support of DOD-wide efforts to improve theater security cooperation plans.

In parallel with the effort in education, the Air Force has published and is updating relevant publications to address how the Air Force organizes, trains, equips, and conducts operations across the spectrum of conflict. This includes the Air Force Doctrine on Irregular Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense, the Air Force Irregular Warfare Operating Concept, the Global Partnership Strategy, the Air Force Irregular Warfare Strategy, the Air Force Air Advising Operating Concept, and the Building Partnerships Core Function Master Plan.

Recognizing that our personnel are our most valuable asset, and the vital role Airmen play in conducting successful irregular warfare activities working with, through, and by partner
nations, let me highlight the following: Rapid Engineers Deployable Heavy Operations Repair Squadron, Engineers, or RED HORSE, are engaged in humanitarian construction projects in every theater—building schools, clinics, well-drilling, and sanitation projects. Our Airmen lead and are members of provincial reconstruction teams, empowering Afghan local governments. A variety of Air Force specialists, including judge advocates, are deploying with the Army civil affairs teams, legal mentor teams, counternarcotics and law enforcement teams, and investigatory and forensics teams. The Air Force Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps offers support and advice on irregular warfare missions. International health specialists assigned to expeditionary medical groups provide state-of-the-art care to U.S., coalition, and partner nation militaries and civilians.

While all these capabilities have been developed, tried, and institutionalized in our policy, doctrine, budget, and organization, there is still room for improvement in retaining, building, and sustaining the capabilities required to work with, through, and by partner nations, regardless of developmental state, to ensure the security of U.S. national interests. We recognize this challenge and continue to assess all lessons learned and balance them against opportunity and resource constraints to ensure Air Force relevance in the future.

In closing, the Air Force flies and fights in air, space, and cyberspace—globally and reliably—as a valued member of our joint and coalition teams, with over 29,000 airmen in and around Afghanistan and Iraq, as we unwaveringly do whatever it takes to prevail in today’s wars. The Air Force stands ready to win today’s joint fight and plan for tomorrow’s challenges. We are committed to working together to institutionalize capabilities and capacities to meet the irregular challenges facing the military, coalition partners and our nation.
BIOGRAPHY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

BRIGADIER GENERAL JERRY P. MARTINEZ

Brig. Gen. Jerry P. Martinez is the Director for Joint Integration, Directorate of Operational Capability Requirements, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. He performs a key management role in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process as the Air Force representative on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Capabilities Board, which develops and evaluates uniformed services and joint modernization programs on behalf of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. General Martinez provides oversight to the Air Force representatives on the eight Functional Capabilities Boards and assists the Director of Operational Capability Requirements in leading six Air Staff divisions that develop and evaluate Air Force modernization programs.

General Martinez was commissioned in 1986 as a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy. He is a command pilot with more than 4,000 hours in the C-17A, C-5B, C-141B and KC-135R. The general previously commanded the 621st Airlift Wing, McChord Air Force Base, Wash., overseeing the Air Force's only prime nuclear air lift force. His staff assignments include Chief of the Joint Mobility Operations Center at U.S. Transportation Command; Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellow with the DuPont Corporation in Wilmington, Del.; and Inspector General, Headquarters Air Mobility Command.

Prior to his current assignment, he was Deputy Commander, Political-Military Affairs, Combined Security Transition Command, Afghanistan, U.S. Central Command, Kabul, Afghanistan.

EDUCATION
1986 Bachelor of Science degree in general studies, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
1991 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1994 Master of Arts degree in business administration, Webster University, St. Louis, Mo.
1996 Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
2001 Air War College, by seminar
2003 Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellow, DuPont Corporation, Wilmington, Del.
2005 Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.

ASSIGNMENTS
7. July 2001 - June 2003, Chief, Mobility Systems Division, and Chief, Joint Mobility Operations Center, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, III.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS
1. July 2001 - June 2003, Chief, Mobility Systems Division, and Chief, Joint Mobility Operations Center, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, III, as a lieutenant colonel

FLIGHT INFORMATION
Rating: Command pilot
Flight hours: More than 4,000
Aircraft flown: C-17A, C-5B, C-141B and KC-135R

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Defense Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters
Air Medal with oak leaf cluster
Aerial Achievement Medal
Air Force Commandation Medal
NATO Medal

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION
Second Lieutenant May 26, 1986
First Lieutenant May 26, 1988
Captain May 26, 1990
Major Aug. 1, 1995
Lieutenant Colonel July 1, 1999
Colonel July 1, 2006
Brigadier General Dec. 3, 2009

(Current as of May 2011)
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

NOVEMBER 3, 2011
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER

General MARTINEZ. Irregular Warfare has become even more important in dealing with global security threats. The Air Force must continue to maintain the ability to respond with kinetic capability as well as build partnerships with other air forces to bolster international cooperation, sustain powerful, global forces for stability, and ensure access to the global commons.

The FY12 PB continues to support the ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) personnel and infrastructure needed to successfully prosecute the irregular campaigns we have in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the foreseeable future, we expect this demand for ISR to continue. The Air Force will also continue to engage in aviation partnering activities with foreign nations in order to develop professional aviators, support staff and effective infrastructure. There are extremely difficult decisions the Air Force will have to make to prioritize limited resources and prepare for a wide range of evolving security threats the nation might face. These decisions must be based on strategic considerations, not compelled solely by budget targets. The Air Force will prudently evaluate the future security environment, deliberately accept risk, and devise strategies that mitigate those risks in order to maintain effective capabilities against those evolving threats. [See page 20.]

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS

General MARTINEZ. The interagency relationship between the US Air Force (USAF) and Department of State (DoS), as well as USAID, is very strong and growing stronger. Both in terms of philosophical recognition among Air Force leadership for the need for a closely-linked interagency team and in terms of formal programs and communications, the USAF and DoS are working together every day.

While we are making excellent progress building the interagency relationship, we are still striving to improve. First and foremost, we need to better communicate our current efforts, progress made, and continuing opportunities both inside and outside the departments to help improve interagency coordination and interaction. Second, we must continue to support our existing interagency training and outreach efforts with sufficient personnel, funding, and policy to ensure these activities will endure.

In terms of conventional, steady-state forces, USAF-DoS exchanges are well-supported on both sides of the interagency team. The USAF currently has 21 positions embedded within DoS, with plans to expand to 25 under the new draft agreement between the departments, including a Major General who serves as the Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Political-Military Affairs Bureau. DoS, in turn, provides up to 10 Foreign Policy Advisors to USAF commands. In addition, advisors are provided to warfighting commanders on an as needed basis to establish greater interagency cooperation in current planning and operations. In this way, future DoS leaders are gaining more experience working with their defense counterparts.

We have several programs that are aimed at improving the knowledge, capability, and integration between the USAF and DoS. In 2004, the Air Force initiated the Political-Military Affairs Strategist (PAS) program to develop interagency and international expertise among its future senior leaders. Each year, the program competitively selects up to 100 mid-level Air Force officers who have shown the potential for advancement to senior level positions and provides them formal education and on-the-job experience in a position with strong interagency and/or international engagement. Upon completion of the program, the officers are placed back on their primary career path for command, joint staff, and other career-developing positions. In addition, the Air Force has up to 5 field grade officers per year completing their intermediate- or senior-level service school through a fellowship at DoS. In these ways, the Air Force is developing a cadre of mid-level officers who will be tracked throughout their careers for their acquired political-military expertise and future senior-leader assignments. It should be noted that among these officers, promotion rates have exceed the Air Force averages to Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel. Beyond these dedicated political-military affairs specialists, interagency lessons have been built into the curriculums of our professional military education, and the interagency training opportunities being offered to both our Regional Affairs and International Health Specialist career fields are further expanding interagency awareness and opportunities throughout the force. [See page 29.]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

November 3, 2011
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER

Mr. MILLER. Following up on DOD Directive 3000.05, issued in 2005, DOD Instruction 3000.05, issued in 2009, states that it is DOD policy that Stability Operations "shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning." Despite this clear directive, and despite being fully-engaged in counterinsurgency campaigns for the past 10 years, our combat units devote only a fraction of their pre-deployment training to attaining proficiency in stability operations. What is being done to address this disparity?

General BAYER. The Army must prevail in current fights while ensuring that we retain depth and versatility as the Nation's force of decisive action across the range of military operations. Future battlefields will be populated with hybrid threats: combinations of regular, irregular, terrorist, and criminal groups. The Army must retain the flexibility to operate both in missions requiring maneuver over extended distances, and in missions requiring the establishment of security over wide areas; whatever the threat. During these campaigns, re-establishing security is an essential prerequisite for a return to civilian control. Until that is done, deploying forces must be prepared to protect themselves and defeat any threat they may encounter while performing their mission. As host nation security forces assume a larger role in maintaining the security environment, fewer U.S. security forces are required for that role—as is the case now in Afghanistan where an increasing percentage of U.S. Army personnel are required for security force assistance. The Army established the 162nd Brigade at Fort Polk, Louisiana, in May 2009 to train deploying advisory teams. In response to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Army increased the 162nd's capability to provide increased training support to stability operations. Beginning in February 2012, the U.S. Army Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk will integrate the training of a significantly increased number of Security Force Assistance Teams responding to Theater requirements. The Army requires all deploying forces/personnel to meet theater-specified counter-insurgency (COIN) qualification requirements. Furthermore, the leadership in all deploying combat brigades, division, and corps attend a COIN seminar conducted by the Army's COIN center of excellence at Fort Leavenworth. Stability operations are being internalized by the Army. Army Doctrinal Publication 3–0, Unified Operations, recognizes stability operations as integral to decisive action by Army units during unified operations. Rotations at U.S. Army Combat Training Centers for non-deploying forces are being redesigned to emphasize combined arms operations and wide area security, both of which are Army core competencies that enable return to civilian control. Additionally, the Army is developing a concept to regionally align a brigade with security cooperation capability/training to each geographic Combatant Commanders.

Mr. MILLER. Following up on DOD Directive 3000.05, issued in 2005, DOD Instruction 3000.05, issued in 2009, states that it is DOD policy that Stability Operations "shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning." Despite this clear directive, and despite being fully-engaged in counterinsurgency campaigns for the past 10 years, our combat units devote only a fraction of their pre-deployment training to attaining proficiency in stability operations. What is being done to address this disparity?

Admiral HARRIS. The Navy routinely conducts Stability Operations as part of its forward presence, as evidenced by humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR) operations from the sea in Haiti, Pakistan, and Japan, coalition counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, support to NATO forces operating in Libya, support to USCG law enforcement activities, and Partnership Station engagement in the Pacific, Africa, and Latin America. Over the past three years, the Navy has under taken a number of initiatives to enhance its capabilities in this mission area. Admiral Roughhead, as CNO, established the Navy Irregular Warfare Office (NIWO) in July 2008 as the Navy's advocate for actions subsequently directed by
DoDD 3000.07 and DoDI 3000.05. The Navy Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges, promulgated in January 2010, places special emphasis on Stability Operations and building partner capacity as a measure to prevent instability. NIWO works closely with the OPNAV staff, other Services, USSOCOM, geographic combatant commands, the Interagency and foreign partners to advance comprehensive approaches for preventing and responding to instability.

With regard to pre-deployment training, deploying Navy units participate in Agile Quest, a Special Operations Force (SOF)-Fleet training exercise, Amphibious Task Group work ups, and leader training in Naval War College Maritime Staff Officer Courses. The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) established the Expeditionary Training Group (ETG) to conduct a range of Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESP), Riverine, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit (MDSU), Expeditionary Intel and Civil Affairs integrated training, focused on Phase Zero stability operations to build partner maritime capacity. This training emphasizes joint, Coalition and Interagency coordination to achieve partner nation security objectives. In addition, the ETG has been designated the executive agent by U.S. Fleet Forces and Pacific Fleet commands to conduct staff planning and mission rehearsal for Navy Partnership Station deployments to the Pacific, Africa, and Southern commands. These missions, conducted in cooperation with U.S. country teams, work closely with the navies and civilian authorities of developing nations to enhance stability. NECC has established, trained, and deployed crisis response Adaptive Force Packages (AFPs), consisting of staff and selected NECC forces, to respond to Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), Maritime Infrastructure Protection or other short fuse contingency missions. The Navy’s specialized ability to support Stability Operations exists in the NECC Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command (MCASTC). MCASTC provides Maritime Civil Affairs Teams for routine deployment in support of Fleet Civil Military Operations and when required, for specific support to Counterinsurgency, Counterterror, Foreign Internal Defense, and Security Cooperation missions. MCASTC maintains Maritime Civil Affairs Teams as an on-call surge capability for HA/DR efforts such as operation UNIFIED RESPONSE in Haiti. Additionally, specialized Civil Affairs Staff units are available to augment Fleet and Joint Task Force staffs planning Security Force Assistance missions. MCASTC provides Security Assistance detachments and tailored mobile training teams (MTTs) that conduct maritime security force assistance to bolster State Department led Maritime Security Sector Reform efforts.

Navy technology investments in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) (e.g. Fire Scout, STUAS, Scan Eagle), new UAV payloads, and information sharing and fusion techniques are enabling information dominance among fleet units, SOF, and coalition partners who respond to instability. Incorporating advanced technologies for mine hunting and neutralization on LCS will improve the Navy’s ability to conduct Stability Operations in contested waters. Additionally, the Navy is pursuing a number of initiatives to codify its doctrine and operating concepts for Stability Operations and IW-related activities. A forthcoming tri-service Navy-Marine Corps-Coast Guard doctrine for conducting maritime stability operations will acknowledge the importance of this mission area and improve planning and coordination of Stability Operations with interagency, NGO, and coalition partners. The Naval War College recently conducted a comprehensive maritime stability operations game involving U.S. government, NGO, industry, and coalition naval partners. The Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG), also at the Naval War College, conducts annual symposia related to irregular warfare and stability issues. The Navy maintains liaison at the Department of State and USAID to provide increased awareness and information sharing, which is key to future operations. The Naval Post Graduate School offers two masters programs related to IW (Special Ops/IW and Security Affairs and Reconstruction). Last summer, Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Lab (JHU/APL) conducted a collaborative study on Navy Roles and Capabilities in CIC. It analyzed capability gaps for stability operations, steady state security force assistance, and maritime security operations. The objective of each of these initiatives is to increase understanding of roles naval forces play in Stability Operations and to improve the Navy’s integration with the efforts of other agencies, organizations and foreign partners.

Mr. MILLER. Following up on DOD Directive 3000.05, issued in 2005, DOD Instruction 3000.05, issued in 2009, states that it is DOD policy that Stability Operations “shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.” Despite this clear directive, and despite being fully-engaged in counterinsurgency campaigns for the past 10 years, our combat units devote only a fraction of
their pre-deployment training to attaining proficiency in stability operations. What is being done to address this disparity?

General O’DONOHUE. Pre-deployment training is based on each unit’s approved mission essential task list (METL) and the pre-deployment training requirements established by the Marine forces component commander. Units preparing for deployment receive extensive pre-deployment training in irregular warfare, including the tasks and activities required in stability operations. This training uses a building block approach, beginning with individual skills such as cultural and language training, and progresses through increasing levels of collective training. Pre-deployment training culminates with a comprehensive 25-day exercise known as Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV). The final phase of EMV is a mission rehearsal exercise that provides a rigorous assessment of a unit’s ability to execute operations using culturally-relevant role players and realistic irregular warfare scenarios.

The Marine Corps also recognizes that interoperability with our joint, interagency and multinational partners is essential to success in the complex operating environments that characterize irregular warfare and stability operations. Our service-level pre-deployment training incorporates joint, interagency and multinational partners into a dynamic, capabilities-based training program in order to prepare our deploying forces for the full spectrum of military operations.

With regard to joint training, the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) provides the primary means to incorporate joint context into USMC training events. The Marine Corps currently has five accredited JNTC programs. In interagency training, our ongoing interagency (IA) initiatives are designed to:

• Expand and improve IA integration for both theater-specific and non-theater specific training.
• Improve coordination and increase IA participation in USMC training by aligning service requirements to the IA’s internal tasking process.
• Enhances our awareness of our IA partners’ roles and capabilities.
• Increase our forces’ participation in IA-sponsored training, such as the Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Development for Afghanistan Pre-deployment Training (ADAPT) and Afghanistan Field Orientation Training offered at the Foreign Service Institute.

In multinational training, our primary goal is to prepare our forces and their coalition partners to operate together in Afghanistan. Our training focuses on operational level interaction through reciprocal participation in mission rehearsal exercises with partner nations. We are also pursing improved interoperability at the institutional level through staff and instructor exchange programs. Looking ahead, our Training and Education Command is coordinating with selected coalition partners to explore future training opportunities in a post-OEF environment.

In summary, our pre-deployment training strives to prepare our forces for potential missions in the most effective and efficient manner possible. Our unqualified operational success, spanning more than 10 years of continuous operations, validates our approach.

Mr. MILLER. Following up on DOD Directive 3000.05, issued in 2005, DOD Instruction 3000.05, issued in 2009, states that it is DOD policy that Stability Operations “shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.” Despite this clear directive, and despite being fully-engaged in counterinsurgency campaigns for the past 10 years, our combat units devote only a fraction of their pre-deployment training to attaining proficiency in stability operations. What is being done to address this disparity?

General MARTINEZ. As directed by DoDD 3000.05, Stability Operations, the Air Force implemented Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10–43, Stability Operations, 16 May 2011, detailing Air Force support of stability operations. Stability Operations is a core US military mission and the Air Force provides tailored training to all deploying personnel based on mission requirements. Training for stability operations is incorporated into pre-deployment training for personnel deploying to Afghanistan and all units have been directed to comply with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness’ Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 11–002—Counterinsurgency (COIN) Training and Reporting Guidance for Preparing U.S. Forces to Succeed in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING

Mr. SCHILLING. How can the organic base help address the new challenges that the military faces with irregular warfare? How has it done to this date and how can it improve?

General BAYER. The Army's organic industrial base (OIB), consisting of manufacturing arsenals, ammunition plants, and maintenance depots, has the capability to respond quickly to support conventional and irregular warfare requirements. As an example of responding to irregular warfare, the Rock Island Arsenal counteracted the enemy's use of improvised explosive devices during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom by manufacturing specialized armor kits for tactical wheeled vehicles to protect the Warfighter from roadside bombs. Current OIB facility capabilities can also be expanded through the establishment of public-private partnerships with private industry partners to support emerging requirements to counteract irregular warfare tactics. The Army continually improves this process through enhanced communication with its private industry partners and through its assessment of current and anticipated irregular warfare techniques.

Mr. SCHILLING. We have continued to hear that the military will need to reorganize how it works in order to deal with the upcoming budget cuts. How will this reorganization affect the way in which you can address irregular warfare in the future? Are there ways that Congress can help, outside of funding, to ensure that any changes to the DOD will facilitate your ability to address irregular warfare now and in the future?

General BAYER. The biggest institutional challenge, given fiscal constraints, will be ensuring the right mix of capability to support our mission and requirements. The Army must maintain the full capability to conduct Unified Land Operations to seize, retain and exploit the initiative through the decisive action of offensive, defensive or stability operations. Our nation demands we be prepared to operate successfully across this expansive mission set.

Future battlefields will be populated with hybrid threats: combinations of regular, irregular, terrorist, and criminal groups. The Army must retain the flexibility to operate both in missions requiring maneuver over extended distances, and in missions requiring the establishment of security over wide areas; whatever the threat. As pressures for cuts in defense spending and force structures increase, the Army must assess which capabilities to emphasize, how many of each, and at what level; finding the right mix will be a challenge.

As we have learned from the last ten years, the military cannot succeed in today's operating environment alone. Full integration of U.S. Government capability in planning, training, and conduct of irregular operations is critical to success. In future operating environments it will remain critical that the Joint and Interagency community develop a policy framework that enables a whole-of-government approach for operations that support irregular warfare. Likewise, the Army will continue to improve its ability to team with partners in support of coalition operations in an irregular warfare context.

Mr. SCHILLING. How can the organic base help address the new challenges that the military faces with irregular warfare? How has it done to this date and how can it improve?

Admiral HARRIS. Navy forces are inherently agile, and their multi-mission capabilities enable them to operate across the full range of military operations. The same type of Sailors that supported Operation Tomodachi also supported Operation Odyssey Dawn. The same training to confront irregular challenges provided to Sailors deploying from San Diego is given in Norfolk as well. With growing emphasis on fleet-special operations forces (SOF) interoperability, the Navy's role in countering terrorism, piracy, and other forms of instability by, with, and through a variety of partners is rapidly expanding.

The Navy is also working to provide better equipment and tactics to the fleet. Among these improvements are expanded use of UAVs and new payloads to expand collection opportunities, new protocols for fusing intelligence at local levels, and information sharing protocols that will leverage the contributions of coalition partners. Expanded research and development of mine hunting and neutralization technologies will enable fleet forces to operate more effectively in littoral areas where irregular challenges must be addressed. The Navy's emphasis on building partner security capacity is reflected in the establishment of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command and its Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command (MCASTC). MCASTC provides Security Assistance Detachments; mobile training teams (MTTs) that conduct security force assistance with the navies of developing countries and support the Navy's partnership programs in the Pacific, Africa, and Latin America.
More Navy personnel are receiving Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) training and its Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program is expanding to meet new requirements. Notwithstanding many initiatives to enhance Navy irregular warfare capabilities, improving the Navy’s capacity to address dynamic security challenges through prevention and flexible response is wholly dependent on the size of its fleet.

Mr. SCHILLING. We have continued to hear that the military will need to reorganize how it works in order to deal with the upcoming budget cuts. How will this reorganization affect the way in which you can address irregular warfare in the future? Are there ways that Congress can help, outside of funding, to ensure that any changes to the DOD will facilitate your ability to address irregular warfare now and in the future?

Admiral HARRIS. As ADM Greenert stated during his House Armed Service Committee hearing on the Future of the Military Services and the Consequences of Defense Sequestration on 2 November 2011, “We do our best operating forward at what I call the strategic maritime crossroads. [...] We have to be prepared. We have to respond when tasked, and our challenge is to posture for that possibility.”

The strength of Navy forces resides in its multi-mission nature and the ability to operate across the full spectrum of naval operations in peacetime, combat, contingency, and pre-crisis conditions. The Navy’s ability to respond to security challenges, including those involving irregular threats, depends on its ability to sustain forward presence in regions key to U.S. national interests. The size of the fleet directly determines the level of that presence. A reduction in the Navy’s operating and procurement budgets may also have an adverse affect on our mission priorities, requiring the Navy to “buy risk” if forced to determine what it can accomplish and what it can’t with a reduced fleet (e.g., the need to choose between competing destabilizing threats due to reduced forward presence). If budget cuts reduce the Navy’s capacity to maintain its current level of forward presence, careful prioritization will be required along with possible greater emphasis on building partner capacity to offset reduced presence. Aside from contributing to stable maritime governance in regions of strategic importance, Navy efforts to build partner capacity can also help maintain the Navy’s core mission skills and enable the U.S. to peacefully compete for influence with rising regional powers.

If a smaller Navy becomes a reality with a shift in emphasis to bolstering maritime partner capacity, the Congress could adjust authorities to facilitate broader partner training roles for the Navy. However, operating under new authorities without additional funding will undoubtedly have a negative impact on the Navy’s readiness to accomplish its core missions (e.g. 10 USC 168 grants authorities for military-to-military contacts and comparable activities, but has yet to be accompanied by specific appropriations, resulting in a lack of ability to execute the functions enumerated in the statute under its authority).

Mr. SCHILLING. How can the organic base help address the new challenges that the military faces with irregular warfare? How has it done to this date and how can it improve?

General O’DONOHUE. The Commandant of the Marine Corps’ Planning Guidance states that the demand for military forces with irregular warfare (IW) capabilities will expand over the next two decades. With that in mind, the Marine Corps has taken aggressive steps to posture itself to meet the full spectrum of IW challenges. One of the key areas in which the Marine Corps has bolstered its ability to support IW operations is in the organic base. The Marine Corps maintains two organic depot-maintenance sites—one in Albany, GA, and one in Barstow, CA. Both sites are structured and designed to respond rapidly to the ever-changing requirements of the operating forces. In addition to the two U.S.-based sites, the Marine Corps has also established forward-deployed logistics nodes in the Central Command Theater to serve as hubs for a wide range of logistics functions. These logistics hubs routinely support Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) and Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) forces in the Central Command Theater by providing a robust forward-deployed maintenance capability and ensuring that worn equipment expeditiously enters the maintenance cycle in CONUS when required.

The Marine Corps’ organic base also supports the Urgent Universal Needs (UNS) process, acting as the choice source of repair to upgrade and maintain a variety of equipment sets, including the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) family of vehicles, the Ground Based Operational Surveillance System (G-BOSS), mobile trauma bays and gunner shields for special-operations forces, to name a few. All of these equipment sets directly support IW missions. Additionally, Marine Corps Logistics Command’s Innovation Lab has the capability to reverse-engineer, design and field various parts, components and platforms to meet the Marine Corps’ diverse range of IW requirements.
The Marine Corps’ recruit training depots at Parris Island and San Diego and Officer Candidates School at Quantico provide entry level training that is essential to the process of transforming young men and women from civilians into Marines. This training lays the foundation for developing the widely-varied skills needed to succeed in irregular warfare. Central to the transformation process is a rigorous values-based training program that strives to inculcate our core values in all Marines and provides an essential foundation for developing the ethical decision-making skills needed in the complex operational environments that characterize irregular warfare.

At the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 29 Palms, California, our MAGTF Training Command provides a rigorous, pre-deployment training program that serves as “graduate” level training for our units preparing to deploy to OEF. This training covers the entire irregular warfare spectrum from live fire, combined arms training based on kinetic counterinsurgency scenarios to non-live fire force-on-force training events that prepare our units for the subtler forms of influence used in stability operations, such as key leader engagements and training indigenous security forces.

To date, the Marine Corps has done an excellent job addressing emerging IW challenges. The Marine Corps’ middleweight force structure makes it the ideal force to support IW engagements, as the Corps is light enough to get there quickly, heavy enough to carry the day upon arrival, and fully capable of operating independent of local infrastructure. The flexibility, responsiveness and robust capabilities of the organic base will continue to be key enablers of the Marine Corps’ ability to counter IW threats in the future. Improvements and advancements in the areas of technology, specifically with regard to mission rehearsal systems and identity dominance will be necessary in order to keep the military ahead of the enemy. The organic base must stay healthy and resourced to maximize effectiveness and enable the best support to IW challenges of the 21st century.

Mr. SCHILLING. We have continued to hear that the military will need to reorganize how it works in order to deal with the upcoming budget cuts. How will this reorganization affect the way in which you can address irregular warfare in the future? Are there ways that Congress can help, outside of funding, to ensure that any changes to the DOD will facilitate your ability to address irregular warfare now and in the future?

General O’DONOHUE. The Marine Corps is the nation’s expeditionary force in readiness. As such it is prepared for all manner of crises and contingencies. It recognizes the complex, highly adaptive threats that we face. In the future, as in the past, multiple regional powers and a host of lethal groups will exploit numerous seeds of instability, proliferating increasingly lethal technology and extremist ideology while leveraging the advantages of networks hidden amongst the population. Marines are prepared to meet that challenge with our Navy, Special Operations, Army, Air Force and interagency partners.

As we look to the future, the post-Operation Enduring Freedom Marine Corps is fundamentally different from the current and pre-9/11 force. It draws on a rich history of innovations in irregular warfare but is recast as a scalable crisis response force ready to counter complex irregular, conventional and hybrid threats—and the gray areas in between. We have substantially invested in relevant organizations such as Marine Special Operations, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, partnering, civil affairs, electronic warfare, cyber, regionally oriented command and control, and information operations. Tasked organized with our highly trained line units, these enablers provide versatile, scalable capability for a broad range of missions to include deterrence, counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, partnering, reinforcement to our allies, humanitarian assistance, and assured access for the joint force under any condition our national interests require.

In his 2010 planning guidance, the Commandant, General James Amos, provided specific guidance for strengthening and consolidating irregular warfare organizations. We have increased the size of the Center for Irregular Warfare Integration Division and tasked them to deliberately assess our capabilities for future irregular warfare. This is intended to integrate joint and interagency practices with our current guidance and insights in order to ensure a holistic approach to identifying and implementing necessary changes.

We consolidated two organizations into the new Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG), which provides pre-deployment training and other support to operating forces that conduct training and advisory missions in each of the geographic combatant command areas of responsibility. The Marine Corps is further expanding the Foreign Area Officer/Regional Area Officer (FAO/RAO) program to the enlisted ranks in the form of Foreign Area Staff Non Commissioned Officers/Regional Affairs Non Commissioned Officers (FAS/RAS).
The Marine Corps has doubled the size of its Civil Affairs Groups, growing from two to four and increasing them in size. It has led DOD in the creation of an automated Irregular Warfare Manpower Skills Tracking system that enables commanders to easily identify Marines with documented civilian education, military skills and experience that could be useful in the conduct of IW.

Language, regional, and culture training and education efforts were developed in response to validated operational requirements. The overall regionalization and specialization effort extends across DOTMLPF. The Center for Advanced Operational Culture and Learning (CAOCL) provides standards-based training throughout the operating forces and has implemented the Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization Program (RCLFP) as a mandatory component of both resident and distance education throughout a Marine’s career. These programs are assisted by the creation of Language Learning Resource Centers at major bases.

Effectively countering irregular threats relies primarily on non-materiel aspects of preparing Marines for Irregular Warfare (IW) activities. Acknowledging upcoming reorganization, addressing irregular warfare operations capabilities does not rely solely on a specific organization or organizations. Addressing IW relies on the successful integration of IW-related capabilities across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities spectrum. The Marine Corps will maintain its focus on maximizing efficiency in these capabilities: institutionalization of IW training and education; train, advise, and assist foreign security forces; language and culture expertise; attacking the network; population based intelligence; interagency coordination and collaboration; non-lethal weapons engagement; identity dominance; and information operations.

The Marine Corps will continue to follow the guidance and orders of the President and the Office of the Secretary of Defense when training and equipping Marines to succeed in irregular warfare operations. Opportunities to further increase IW capability and readiness could include:

- Adapt collaborative frameworks to plan, act, assess, and adapt: Alignment of various interagency planning processes with Defense processes could avoid imbalances in assessment, planning, and execution.
- Support the development of National Security/Interagency professionals: Career paths which give career professionals incentives to pursue diverse interagency experience, education, and training. This could yield structures and personnel which are better able to coordinate and collaborate as national security partners.

Mr. SCHILLING. How can the organic base help address the new challenges that the military faces with irregular warfare? How has it done to this date and how can it improve?

General MARTINEZ. The “organic base” is not associated with any Air Force, force structure or Title 10 function. The term often referred to as the “organic base” is used to describe an assortment of arsenals, maintenance depots and ammunition factories which are operated, funded and modernized by the US Army.

Mr. SCHILLING. We have continued to hear that the military will need to reorganize in order to deal with the upcoming budget cuts. How will this reorganization affect the way in which you can address irregular warfare in the future? Are there ways that Congress can help, outside of funding, to ensure that any changes to the DOD will facilitate your ability to address irregular warfare now and in the future?

General MARTINEZ. Within our current organizational structure, the Air Force is prepared to conduct direct action irregular warfare effectively and efficiently. Indirect IW capabilities supporting building partner capacity are effective but less well developed. The Air Force has added an additional mission, building security capacity of partner nations, to contingency response wings and groups in Air Mobility Command, Pacific Air Forces, and U.S. Air Forces Europe. Units are aligned with specific regions of the world to support these operations. Additionally, two mobility support advisory squadrons recently established initial operational capability at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey and Travis Air Force Base, California, and form the core of our general purpose force security force assistance capability.

Between our traditional aviation and irregular warfare capabilities, the Air Force can provide joint force commanders tremendous capabilities for future irregular warfare operations. Upcoming budget cuts, however, will impact how many of those operations the Air Force may be able to respond to at any one time.

Building partnership capacity, a resource-intensive mission, requires adequate authorities and predictable funding. Legal authorities and funding for partner nations are complex, confusing, and restrictive—a vestige of the Cold War. For example,
Title 10 U.S.C. appropriations may not be used for the explicit purpose of building capacity in the DOD to train foreign partners. These restrictions inhibit Security Force Assistance air advising and aviation enterprise development. Further, single-year funding restrictions cause difficulty in developing long-range plans for countries of interest. However, USD(P) along with DoS have included a FY12 legislative proposal to establish the Global Contingency Security Fund that should streamline authorities and funding.