Iraq: U.S. Military Operations and Costs

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Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi long-range missile development and support for al-Qaeda terrorism, were the primary justifications put forward for military action. On March 17, 2003, President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq within 48 hours. On March 19, offensive operations began with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions. By April 15, after 27 days of operations, coalition forces were in relative control of all major Iraqi cities and Iraqi political and military leadership had disintegrated. On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared an end to major combat operations. There was no use of chemical or biological (CB) weapons, and no CB or nuclear weapons stockpiles or production facilities have been found.

The major challenges to coalition forces are now quelling a persistent Iraqi resistance movement, restoring civil order, and providing basic services to the urban population. U.S. troops continue to come under increasingly frequent attacks. Though initially denying that these attacks were the work of an organized resistance movement, DOD officials have now acknowledged there is regional/local organization, with apparently ample supplies of arms and funding. CENTCOM commander Gen. Abizaid, has characterized the Iraqi resistance as “a classical guerrilla-type campaign.” DOD believes the resistance to comprise primarily former regime supporters and foreign fighters; however, others are concerned that growing resentment of coalition forces and resurgent Iraq nationalism, independent of connections with the earlier regime, are contributing to the resistance. According to DOD, as of November 19, 2004, 1,217 U.S. troops have died in Iraq operations, with 946 owing to “hostile fire.” Of these “hostile fire” deaths, 837 have occurred since May 1, 2003. 8,956 U.S. personnel have been wounded or injured since military operations began.

U.S. forces in Iraq were to be reduced to about 110,000, with about 20,000 additional support personnel in the region; however, the insurgency has led DOD to increase the in-country troop level to currently about 141,000. Troop strength is expected to increase to about 160,000 for the January 2005 Iraqi elections. About 25,000 non-U.S. troops are also in theater, with Britain, Poland, the Netherlands, Italy, and the Ukraine being the largest contributors. Other nations contributing troops include Australia, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Georgia (Gruzia), Hungary, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, and Thailand.

Congress has approved three supplemental appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan operations: $62.37 billion for FY2003; $87.4 billion for FY2004; and $25 billion for FY2005. An additional FY2005 supplemental request is expected in early 2005, with press reports indicating it could be as much as $70 billion.

This report will be updated as events warrant.
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Background

Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi long-range missile development, and Iraqi support for the al-Qaeda terrorist group were the primary justifications put forward by the Bush Administration for military action. Since Iraq originally ended cooperation with U.N. inspectors in 1998, there was little information on the state of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal; however, Administration officials were convinced that Iraq had reconstituted significant capabilities. Initially, leading Administration officials, most notably Vice-President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz, stressed “regime change” or the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Later in 2002, WMD disarmament was emphasized as the primary objective. Expanding on this theme President Bush, in his speech before the United Nations on September 12, 2002, specified the following conditions for Iraq to meet to forestall military action against it:

- Immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all related material.
- End all support for terrorism and act to suppress it.
- Cease persecution of its civilian population.
- Release or account for all Gulf War missing personnel.
- End all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program and allow United Nations administration of its funds.¹

On March 17, 2003, President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq within 48 hours. On March 19, offensive operations commenced with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions.

Military Planning & Combat Operations

The Department of Defense released only limited official information concerning war planning or preparations against Iraq prior to the onset of offensive operations. There were, however, frequent and significant news leaks which provided a range of details. News reports indicated that the military options that were under discussion varied significantly in their assumptions regarding Iraq military capabilities, the usefulness of Iraqi opposition groups, the attitude of regional governments, and the U.S. military resources that would be required.

¹ President Bush’s Address to the U.N. General Assembly, Sept. 12, 2002.
Options Considered

In the wake of the successful operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban, some Administration officials advocated a similar operation, entailing use of special operations forces in cooperation with indigenous Iraqi opposition forces, coupled with an extensive air offensive to destroy Hussein’s most reliable Republican Guard units, command & control centers, and WMD capabilities. This approach assumed that the regular Iraqi army would prove unreliable, and could even join opposition forces once it is clear that defeat was imminent. To encourage this, significant emphasis would be placed on an intensive psychological warfare or “psyops” campaign to undermine the morale of Iraqi soldiers and unit commanders, persuading them of the hopelessness of resistance.2

While having the advantage of not requiring large staging areas (though some regional air basing would be required) or months to prepare, this was generally considered the riskiest approach. The weakness of Iraqi opposition military forces and their competing political agendas placed their effectiveness in question, and predicting the behavior of regular Iraqi Army units under attack was problematic. This option also did not address the possibility of stiff resistance by Republican Guard units in the environs of Baghdad, nor the troop requirements of a post-conflict occupation.

This “lite” option stood in contrast to the operations plan originally offered by U.S. Central Command. This option, often called the “Franks Plan,” after Army Gen. Tommy Franks, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander who first briefed it to the President, called for a large-scale ground force invasion. News reports initially indicated, however, that this “heavy” approach did not receive the support of the DOD civilian leadership or White House advisors. Questions over the reliability of the regional support that would be necessary for staging areas and the length of time required for deployment were the major concerns.3 However, the White House rejection of the “Franks Plan” came prior to the decision to take the Iraq issue to the United Nations Security Council. When it became clear that Security Council deliberations and the re-introduction of U.N. inspectors to Iraq could delay the possibility of military action for several months, it was apparently decided that this interlude would allow time both to negotiate regional cooperation and to deploy more substantial forces to the Persian Gulf region, and military operations appeared to adhere closer to CENTCOM’s original recommendations. As the ground force offensive slowed, however, there was increasing criticism of DOD’s civilian leadership for not permitting the deployment of even more ground forces prior to onset of operations.4

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Combat Operations Prior to May 1, 2003

Offensive operations combined an air offensive and simultaneous ground offensive, in contrast to the 1991 campaign which saw weeks of air attacks to soften Iraqi resistance. U.S. Central Command’s operational plan employed a smaller ground force than the 1991 Desert Storm operation, reflecting an assessment that Iraqi armed forces were neither as numerous nor as capable as they were ten years ago, and that U.S. forces are significantly more capable. This option depended upon the continued cooperation of regional nations for substantial staging areas/airbases and required months to deploy the necessary forces.

Though press reports differed somewhat, reportedly over 340,000 U.S. military personnel were in the Persian Gulf region (ashore and afloat). The 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the 7th Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force formed the bulk of the U.S. ground offensive. The 4th Mechanized Infantry Division arrived late in theater. Ships bearing its equipment remained off Turkey for weeks awaiting the outcome of negotiations to permit establishing a northern front attacking from Turkey, and then were diverted to the Persian Gulf when these negotiations fell through. The U.S. Navy deployed five of its twelve naval aircraft carrier battle groups. The Air Force had approximately 15 air wings operating in the region. Strategic bombers operated from the British airbase at Diego Garcia, and airbases in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. The United Kingdom deployed over 47,000 personnel, including a naval task force, a Royal Marine brigade, a parachute brigade, a Special Air Service regiment, and a Special Boat Squadron. The majority of these British forces were engaged in southeastern Iraq, securing the Umm Qasr and Basra region. Australia deployed approximately 2,000 personnel, primarily special operations personnel, and one F/A-18 attack aircraft squadron. Poland had 200 special operations personnel, and one F/A-18 attack aircraft squadron. (For more detailed information, see CRS Report RL31763, Iraq: A Summary of U.S. Forces and CRS Report RL31843, Iraq Foreign Stances Toward U.S. Policy)

The invasion of Iraq was expected to begin with a 72-96 hour air offensive to paralyze the Iraqi command structure, and demoralize Iraqi resistance across the military-civilian spectrum. Intelligence reports indicating the possibility of striking Saddam Hussein and his immediate circle led to an acceleration of the operations plan, and an almost simultaneously onset of air and ground offensive operations. CENTCOM air commanders stressed that significant efforts would be made to minimize civilian casualties and damage to Iraqi physical infrastructure, and they were mostly successful in this effort.

With twenty-five days of offensive operations, coalition forces had relative control of all major Iraqi cities, including Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tikrit. CENTCOM pursued a strategy of rapid advance, by-passing urban centers when possible, pausing only when encountering Iraqi resistance. CENTCOM spokesmen characterized Iraqi resistance as sporadic and uncohesive. Oilfields and port facilities throughout Iraq were secured, as have all major air bases in Iraq. Though a few oil wells were set afire, all were quelled, and there has been no widespread environmental sabotage. Allied forces did not encounter the mass surrenders characteristic of the 1991 campaign, however DOD reported that over 6,000 Iraqis
were taken prisoner, and believes that many more have simply deserted their positions. Iraqi paramilitary forces, particularly the Saddam Fedayeen, engaged in guerrilla-style attacks from urban centers in the rear areas, but did not inflict significant damage. Nevertheless, greater attention than anticipated had to be paid to protecting extended supply lines, and securing these urban centers, particularly around an-Nasiriyah and Najaf, and in the British sector around Umm Qasr and Basra.

Though CENTCOM commanders expressed confidence in the adequacy of their force structure in theater, the Iraqi attacks in rear areas and the length of the supply lines to forward units led some to suggest that insufficient ground forces were in place to continue the offensive while securing rear areas and ensuring uninterrupted logistical support. These critics faulted DOD civilian leadership for overestimating the effectiveness of a precision air offensive and curtailing the deployment of more ground troops, suggesting that an ideological commitment to smaller ground forces and greater reliance on high-tech weaponry had dominated military planning.5

Without permission to use Turkish territory, CENTCOM was unable to carry out an early ground offensive in Northern Iraq. However, Special operations forces, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and air-lifted U.S. armor, operating with Kurdish irregulars seized Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tikrit. Cooperation with Kurdish militias in the north has been excellent. Even a mistaken air strike against a allied Kurdish vehicle convoy, killing or wounding senior Kurdish leaders, did not adversely affect this cooperation.

Post-May 2003 Operations

With the onset of widespread looting and the breakdown of public services (electricity, water) in the cities, coalition forces were confronted with the challenges of restoring public order and infrastructure even before combat operations ceased. Though U.S. forces have come under criticism for not having done more to provide security, the transition from combat to police roles is a difficult one, particularly when an important objective is winning popular support. Harsh reactions risk alienation of the population, yet inaction reduces confidence in the ability of coalition forces to maintain order. Indicative of the seriousness of the civil disorder, U.S. officials in Iraq authorized U.S. troops to shoot looters if necessary.6 In addition to looting, coalition forces also have to ensure that factional violence and does not derail stabilization efforts. There is emerging, nevertheless, a significant body of criticism that DOD’s leadership’s assumptions about the ease of the post-war

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transition led to inadequate planning within the department, and the disregard of extensive State Department planning efforts prior to the war.  

U.S. forces, however, are spread relatively thin throughout Iraq, and many argue that additional troops in theater could improve the pace and breadth of stabilization operations. DOD initially rejected this argument, stating that rather than adding more U.S. troops, the increased number of Iraqi security forces could be counted on to assist more extensively in stability operations. Indeed, CENTCOM’s intent was to reduce the U.S. contingent to 110,000 by the end of May 2004. However, in April, 2004, localized uprisings in central and southern Iraq led CENTCOM to alter its plan, and to raise the number of U.S. troops to 141,000 by delaying the scheduled return of some units and accelerating the deployment of others.

In late April, coalition forces suspended offensive operations against the Iraqi insurgents in central and southern Iraq, pending negotiations with local leaders to obtain the insurgents’ surrender and disarmament. In Najaf, the Shiite insurgency led by radical cleric Moktada al-Sadr was ended through negotiation and the area has remained relatively quiet. Many of al-Sadr’s supporters, however, are believed to have moved to the poor Baghdad suburb of Sadr City and to continue sporadic attacks against coalition forces.

In Fallujah, U.S. Marine offensive operations were halted and an Iraqi security brigade was intrusted with restoring order. This failed, with a significant number of the security forces joining the insurgents, and Fallujah became an insurgents’ stronghold. Insurgents also gained control of other cities in the Sunni Triangle, including Ramada and Samarra. This fall, U.S. counterinsurgency offensives regained control of these cities, with the largest operation (12,000 U.S. Marine and Army troops, with 2,500 Iraqi troops) occurring in Fallujah. It is believed that many of the insurgents, and particularly the leadership, exfiltrated Fallujah prior to the U.S. offensive and dispersed to other locations in central and northern Iraq. Regaining control of these insurgent strongholds has not appeared to have an effect on the number of attacks on coalition and Iraqi security forces, which, in fact, increased during the Fallujah offensive. CENTCOM officials believe, however, that the recapture of Fallujah has removed the major command and control center for the insurgency, and that the seizure of large arms caches and explosive device manufacturing facilities will degrade insurgent capabilities. During the Fallujah offensive, a major insurgents’ attack in Mosul required the deployment of additional U.S. and Iraqi forces to that region, including Kurdish militia units, to restore order.

The question that remains is whether Sunni insurgents can be kept from re-infiltrating these cities, and whether Iraqi security forces can be relied upon to maintain order. One Marine Corps intelligence assessment has called for substantial U.S. forces to remain in the recaptured cities or risk their return to insurgents’ control. This report has been characterized as a “worst case” scenario by Brig. Gen. John DeFreitas, the Army’s intelligence chief in Iraq, but military planners are aware

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that the level of success in restoring order in Fallujah will be closely watched both in Iraq and abroad.\(^8\)

The attitude of the Iraq population remains the key element to stabilizing Iraq, and depends upon a variety of factors, such as the nature and extent of infrastructure damage and economic dislocation, the demands of ethnic and religious groups, and the speed with which a credible government can be established. A short-term post-war occupation was initially expected by some Administration officials, however it is now believed that a continued deployment of substantial military ground forces will be necessary for several years. For comparison, in the relatively benign environment and considerably smaller areas of Bosnia and Kosovo, after eight years of peacekeeping operations, NATO still maintains a deployment of about 24,000 troops.

### Iraqi Security Organizations

Iraqi security forces total about 111,000 fully or partially trained personnel, with an estimated 270,000 required. As of November 17, 2004, the State Department’s *Iraq Weekly Status Report* provided the following statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iraqi Security Forces</th>
<th>Trained/On Hand</th>
<th>Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>44,836</td>
<td>135,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Intervention Force</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Response Unit</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Enforcement</td>
<td>14,953</td>
<td>29,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highway Patrol</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Dignitary Protection</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>3,887</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Guard</td>
<td>43,445</td>
<td>61,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention Force</td>
<td>1,816</td>
<td>6,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Force</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>1,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Defense Force</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>110,930</strong></td>
<td><strong>270,089</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These organizations' performance during the April insurgencies was generally poor, with some refusing to oppose the insurgents, and a small percentage joining the insurgency. During November, the performance of Iraqi Special Operations and Intervention forces in counterinsurgency operations in Fallujah was praised by the Army Chief of Staff and Marine Commandant in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee.\(^9\) Overall, however, significant doubts remain about the reliability of the Iraqi forces. There are reports that the security forces have been

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\(^9\) House Armed Services Committee hearing, November 17th, 2004.
significantly infiltrated by insurgent informants. In addition, both active duty personnel and recruits for the Iraqi security forces have come under wide-spread attack by insurgents, with fatalities estimated to be over 2,200 since May 2003. To better organize the training of Iraqi forces, CENTCOM has established the Multinational Security Transition Command. Initial efforts have been hampered by delays in staffing U.S. personnel, lack of equipment and difficulties in retaining Iraqi personnel. However, DOD officials have expressed optimism that at least 145,000 personnel will be trained and equipped by January 2005. Independent estimates of the time required to develop a full complement of fully capable security forces range up to five years.

**Iraqi Resistance**

Coalition troops and civilian support personnel continue to come under frequent and deadly attacks, at first primarily in central Iraq, but then in southern and northern Iraq also. This constant potential for attack affects the pace and mode of reconstruction and stabilization operations. Troops must assume a potentially hostile environment, yet try to avoid incidents or actions that erode popular support. In addition to continuing attacks on coalition personnel, there have been attacks on infrastructure targets (e.g., oil/gas pipelines, electrical power stations and lines) hindering efforts to restore basic services to the civilian population. Attacks on oil pipelines also threaten to further delay the use of Iraqi oil exports to fund reconstruction programs. Though it is virtually impossible to fully protect these pipelines from sabotage, it is hoped that ongoing efforts to recruit a civilian Iraqi militia will provide coalition troops some assistance in this mission.

Though initially denying that these attacks were the work of an organized resistance movement, DOD officials have now acknowledged there is at least regional/local organization, with apparently ample supplies of arms and funding. CENTCOM commander Gen. Abizaid, has characterized the Iraqi resistance as “a classical guerrilla-type campaign.” Though many attacks have been made with improvised explosives, the resistance also has access to mortars, rocket launchers, and surface-to-air missiles looted from Iraq army depots. The President’s quarterly report to Congress on Iraq operations noted that only 40% of Iraq’s pre-war

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13 Barry Renfrew, “Report Says Iraqi Forces May Take 5 Years To Build,” *Associated Press*, October 20, 2004  
munitions inventory was secured or destroyed by April 2004. The resistance has also moved from solely guerrilla-style attacks to utilizing suicide bombers. DOD believes the resistance to comprise primarily former regime supporters such Baathist party members, Republican Guard soldiers, and paramilitary personnel. However, others are concerned that growing resentment of coalition forces and resurgent Iraq nationalism, independent of connections with the earlier regime, may be contributing to the resistance. This view was reinforced by an insurgency led by a Shiite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, in several southern Iraqi cities. In the assault on Fallujah, of the 1,100 prisoners taken fewer than 15 were not Iraqis. There are also reports of bounties of from $1,000-$5,000 being offered for killing coalition troops, taking advantage of the severe economic dislocation which has many Iraqis with no regular income. Captured documents have given some indication that preparations for a resistance movement were made prior to the war, including the caching of arms and money.

**Equipment Issues**

Two equipment issues have attracted considerable public and congressional attention: the availability of “up-armored” High-Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs or Humvees) and the availability of the most modern body armor for individual soldiers. With most heavy armored vehicles being withdrawn after major combat operations ceased, the HMMWVs are the primary vehicles for patrols and transportation. While they can fitted with a variety of weapon systems for defense, the standard HMMWVs offer little protection against the roadside bombs and rocket-propelled grenades favored by the Iraqi resistance. This created an unanticipated demand for the “up-armored” version. There were relatively few of these in theater, and indeed relatively few (2%) in the Army HMMWV inventory. In response, the Army has transferred available “up-armored” vehicles from other theaters, and ordered ramped-up production from the vehicle’s one manufacturer. Funding for this effort has come from re-programming and from DOD emergency supplemental appropriations. Currently, the army has established a requirement for 8,500 “up-armored” vehicles in Iraq, up from the May 2003 requirement of 235 vehicles. Although production has now ramped up to 450 vehicles per month, this requirement may not be fulfilled until summer 2005. In the last year, the Army has reportedly revised its estimate of the service’s overall “up-armored” HMMWV requirement from 1,000 to 11,000. As an interim measure, add-on armor kits are being added to conventional HMMWVs and other vehicles in theater. Over 12,800 kits have been

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installed to date, and 12,500 more will be installed. By spring 2005, CENTCOM intends that all U.S. military vehicles in Iraq have some armor protection.

The issue of modern body armor also arose in the period after major combat operations ceased. Initially, only dismounted, frontline combat troops were issued the most modern body armor which can be upgraded with Small Arms Protective Inserts, or so-called SAPI plates, which can stop most small-arms bullets and shrapnel. Combat support personnel, tank crews, and most National Guard and Reserve troops were issued older Vietnam-era “flak jackets” with less protective capability. As it became clear that the security environment in Iraq made almost all personnel vulnerable to attack, the demand for the SAPI plate armor increased dramatically. Press reports of soldiers’ families purchasing the armor to ship to Iraq, and reports that National Guard units were being sent to Iraq with equipment inferior to that of regular Army units exacerbated both public and congressional concern. Again, the Army responded with orders for ramped-up production funded through reprogramming ($310 million) from DOD’s Iraqi Freedom Fund and $40 million in the FY2005 DOD appropriations request. According to Army Chief of Staff Schoomaker, all personnel deployed to Iraq are now equipped with up-to-date body armor.

**Force Level Debate**

The question of how many military personnel are required for stabilization operations has been a subject of controversy since well before the onset of operations. This controversy reflects the great difficulty in predicting how the political and military situation in post-war Iraq will evolve, and how long a military presence will be required before an acceptable and stable Iraqi government can be established. The continued Iraqi armed resistance has reinvigorated the debate over whether the United States has committed sufficient troops to the Iraqi operation. (For detailed coverage of U.S. forces currently deployed, see CRS Report RL31763, *Iraq: Summary of U.S. Forces*.

The rapid success of the combat offensive initially quieted critics who argued that a substantially larger ground force should have been deployed, but the question is now being raised whether a more robust military presence in Iraq is needed to bring stability. Secretary Rumsfeld and out-going CENTCOM commander Gen. Franks both maintained in congressional testimony that the number of troops in Iraq is adequate for the mission, though the new insurgencies has changed this view. The increased troop requirements present a challenge to the Army. Of its 33 combat brigades, 16 are already deployed in Iraq, and three of the remaining brigades have other assigned missions (e.g., Afghanistan, the Balkans, Korea) or are in strategic reserve. Thus, even at current levels, troop rotation has proven problematic. This was demonstrated when two brigades of the 3rd Infantry Division had their return to the United States twice postponed in 2003. DOD has announced that at least one brigade will be transferred from South Korea to Iraq in the course of the next rotation.

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20 House Armed Service Committee Hearing, November 17, 2004
DOD prepared a rotation plan for Army duty tours in Iraq, which called for units to spend a one-year tour of duty in the region, however new operational requirements prevented holding to this plan and several units will have spent more than one year in Iraq by the time they return to home bases. The Army examined the possibility of instituting seven-month tours similar to the rotations maintained by the U.S. Marine Corps, but the Army’s larger force presence in Iraq makes it unlikely that shorter tours can be accomplished.21

The controversy over additional troops in Iraq has rekindled the debate over whether the U.S. Army personnel end-strength should be increased. Currently, the congressionally mandated end-strength is 480,000. In reporting the FY2004 Defense Authorization Act, the House Armed Services Committee noted the “inadequacy of military manpower, especially active component end-strength, as indicated in the need to activate 33,000 reservists annually.” The report further noted that the Army had estimated its manpower shortfall to be between 41,000 to 123,000 personnel. DOD’s civilian leadership intends to address shortfalls in specific functions by moving personnel from lower priority assignments, and by increasing the use of civilians in some functional areas to free up active duty military personnel. The Congress has approved a temporary increase of 30,000 to the Army’s end-strength which is being funded through supplemental appropriations. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Schoomaker has voiced concern that adding to the Army’s permanent end-strength would create financial burdens on the service that would reduce the funds available for equipment modernization. (For additional information, see CRS Report RS21754, Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United States Army?)

Non-U.S. Forces

A key element in the Defense Department’s consideration of troop requirements in Iraq is the willingness of other nations to contribute ground forces. DOD has reported that about 25,000 non-U.S. troops from 34 nations are in Iraq, but has not released a nation-by-nation breakdown of these contributions. Press reports indicate that Britain, Poland, the Netherlands, Italy, and the Ukraine are the largest contributors. Most nations, however, have deployed relatively small numbers of troops, and questions remain about their operational capabilities.22 Some nations that the United States has approached for assistance (e.g., Turkey, Pakistan, India) have indicated that their participation would be dependent upon, at a minimum, a United Nations resolution authorizing operations in Iraq. However, since the United Nations Security Council passed such a resolution, there still appears little enthusiasm for contributing military forces. For these nations, significant domestic political resistance to participation in Iraq operations remains a consideration. Reflecting this, national elections in Spain resulted in a new government that withdrew the Spanish contingent from Iraq immediately. The contingents from Honduras and the Dominican Republic, which were dependent upon Spanish forces for command and logistic support, also withdrew. Press reports indicate that Thailand is also

reconsidering its deployment, and that Hungary and the Netherlands will withdraw their troops in March 2005.23

Though many NATO nations have unilaterally contributed troops, the Bush Administration’s efforts to obtain an institutional NATO commitment to providing troops have proven unsuccessful. During the June NATO summit in Istanbul, a NATO statement encouraging its members to assist in the training of Iraq security or army forces was issued and planning for this mission is underway. The number of personnel to be involved and the timetable for their deployment has not been decided officially, though it is expected personnel will not exceed 2,000. NATO officials have noted that its on-going operations in Afghanistan, where it commands the International Security Assistance Force with a contingent of 6,500 troops, remain its primary focus.

Unlike stabilization operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, where contributing nations assume the cost of their troop deployments, in Iraq the United States is assuming much of the cost for non-U.S. force deployments. In July 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz estimated that maintenance of 15,000 foreign troops for six months would cost $276 million. The President’s FY2004 supplemental budget request included $1.4 billion for the support of non-U.S. forces, however this amount also includes funding for operations outside Iraq, and the Administration has not released a break-out of funding specifically for non-U.S. forces in Iraq.24 Additional funds dedicated to the transport and maintenance of non-U.S. forces may also be included in the Operations and Maintenance accounts of the individual armed services. The following estimates are from the CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: A Table and Chronology of Foreign Contributions, and are based upon press reports and foreign embassy statements. An asterisk (*) indicates countries that are withdrawing or reportedly considering withdrawing their forces from Iraq

Table 1. Countries Contributing Personnel to Iraq Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>360</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia (Gruzia)</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary*</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
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<td>Macedonia</td>
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<td>Mongolia</td>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand*</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Costs

Predicting the cost of military operations is a task that DOD did not undertake prior to the peace-keeping deployments to the Balkans, and it remains a somewhat conjectural exercise. Learning from the attempts to estimate costs for military operations in the Balkans and elsewhere, DOD has now developed a computer model based upon previous actual costs (Contingency Operations Support Tool). Though initially Secretary Rumsfeld expressed his opinion that “it is unknowable what a war or conflict like that would cost,” in early 2003 he estimated a cost of under $50
billion. Other DOD officials anticipated an $80-85 billion cost, assuming a six-month follow-on occupation.25

On March 25, 2003, the Administration submitted a $74.7 billion FY2003 supplemental appropriations request, of which $62.6 billion was for Department of Defense expenses related to the war in Iraq through September 2003. Specifically, this request included funds for preparatory costs incurred, costs associated with military operations, replenishing munitions, and funds to support other nations. The Administration stated that this supplemental request was “built on the key assumption that U.S. military action in Iraq will be swift and decisive.”26 Both the House and Senate approved the legislative conference report to H.R. 1559 (H.Rept. 108-76), which provided $62.37 billion.

On September 17, 2003, President Bush submitted an $87 billion emergency FY2004 supplemental budget request, of which $51.8 billion was for military operations in Iraq (Operations and Maintenance- $32.3; Personnel $18.5). (For a detailed discussion, see CRS Report RL32090, FY2004 Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terrorism: Military Operations & Reconstruction Assistance.) On October 30, Congress approved an appropriation of $87.4 billion, a $400 million increase over the President’s request. Congress has also approved an FY2005 emergency supplemental appropriation of $25 billion and indicated that an additional supplemental request will be made early in 2005. Unofficial estimates of the second FY2005 range up to $70 billion, though some observers believe this estimate to be too high.27 DOD now estimates that the combined military operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan are costing between $5-6 billion a month.28 (See also CRS Report RS21644, The Cost of Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Enhanced Security.)

Prior to the war, a number of cost estimates were put forward. Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution pegged a 250,000-strong invasion at between $40-$50 billion, with a follow-up occupation costing $10-$20 billion a year. Former White House economic advisor Lawrence Lindsay estimated the high limit on the cost to be 1-2% of GNP, or about $100-$200 billion. Mitch Daniels, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, subsequently discounted this estimate as “very, very high,” and stated that the costs would be between $50-$60 billion, though no specific supporting figures were provided for the estimate.29

In a March 2003 cost estimate, prior to the onset of the war, the Congressional Budget Office put deployment costs at about $14 billion, with combat operations

27 Ibid.
costing $10 billion for the first month and $8 billion a month thereafter. CBO cited the cost of returning combat forces to home bases at $9 billion, and the costs of continued occupation of Iraq to run between $1-4 billion.\textsuperscript{30} On October 28 2003, C.O. issued a letter report to Representative Spratt, ranking member of the House Budget Committee, estimating the cost of four scenarios for the Iraq occupation. Positing different troop levels, rates of withdrawal, and durations of the occupation, the cost estimates range from $85 to $200 billion during the 2005-2013 time frame. These estimates do not include funding for reconstruction or classified activities\textsuperscript{31}

The American Academy of Arts and Sciences published a much more wide-ranging report which covers the possibility of an extended occupation, in addition to potential long-term economic consequences and concludes that potential costs could range from $99 billion to $1.2 trillion.\textsuperscript{32} For comparison, the cost to the United States of the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91 was approximately $60 billion, and almost all of this cost was offset by international financial contributions.\textsuperscript{33}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}
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Additional Reading


For a more detailed list of CRS reports concerning Iraq, see [http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html].