FALUN GONG IN CHINA: REVIEW AND UPDATE

HEARING
BEFORE THE
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE
COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
DECEMBER 18, 2012

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China


U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
78-599 PDF
WASHINGTON : 2013
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House</th>
<th>Senate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman</td>
<td>SHERROD BROWN, Ohio, Cochairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANK WOLF, Virginia</td>
<td>MAX BAUCUS, Montana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois</td>
<td>CARL LEVIN, Michigan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDWARD R. ROYCE, California</td>
<td>DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIM WALZ, Minnesota</td>
<td>JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio</td>
<td>SUSAN COLLINS, Maine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICHAEL HONDA, California</td>
<td>JAMES RISCH, Idaho</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SETH D. HARRIS, Department of Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARIA OTERO, Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCISCO J. SÁNCHEZ, Department of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KURT M. CAMPBELL, Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NISHA DESAI BISWAL, U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Staff Director**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAUL B. PROTIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAWRENCE T. LIU, Deputy Staff Director</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(II)
CONTENTS

STATEMENTS

Opening statement of Hon. Christopher Smith, a U.S. Representative from New Jersey; Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China .......... 1
Brown, Hon. Sherrod, a U.S. Senator from Ohio; Cochairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China .................................................. 3
Chung, Bruce, Technology Manager in Hsinchu, Taiwan; Falun Gong Practitioner Arrested in China .............................................................. 5
Hu, Zhiming, Twice-Imprisoned Falun Gong Practitioner and Former People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force Officer ........................................ 7
Cook, Sarah, Senior Research Analyst, Freedom on the Net in East Asia, Freedom House ................................................................. 8
Xu, M.D., Jianchao, Assistant Professor of Medicine, Mt. Sinai School of Medicine; Medical Director, Doctors Against Forced Organ Harvesting ......... 11
Lee, M.D., Charles, Spokesperson, Global Center for Quitting the Chinese Communist Party ................................................................. 22
Tong, James, Associate Professor, University of California-Los Angeles .... 25
Ford, Caylan, Independent Scholar and Human Rights Consultant, Ottawa, Canada ..................................................................................... 27
Xia, Yiyang, Senior Director of Policy and Research, Human Rights Foundation ....................................................................................... 30

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS

Chung, Bruce ........................................................................................................... 42
Hu, Zhiming ............................................................................................................. 44
Cook, Sarah ............................................................................................................ 48
Xu, M.D., Jianchao ................................................................................................. 56
Lee, M.D., Charles ................................................................................................. 62
Tong, James ............................................................................................................ 99
Ford, Caylan .......................................................................................................... 106
Xia, Yiyang ............................................................................................................. 111
The hearing was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock a.m., in room 418, Russell Senate Office Building, Representative Christopher Smith, Chairman, presiding.

Also present: Senator Sherrod Brown, Cochairman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER SMITH, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY; CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

Chairman Smith. The Commission will come to order. Good morning to all of you.

In the early 1990s, the Chinese Government and the Communist Party welcomed the contributions of the Falun Gong spiritual movement: Its exercises and meditation had health benefits; its core teachings of truthfulness, compassion, and forbearance promoted morality in a society increasingly aware of a spiritual vacuum.

All that changed, however, in 1999, when several thousand Falun Gong practitioners peaceably assembled at Zhangnanhai Leadership Compound in Beijing. Chinese leaders were astonished that Falun Gong had grown so large and prominent outside of the Party's control; so large that Falun Gong practitioners might outnumber the Communist Party's 60 million members.

In the year afterward, the Chinese Government and the Communist Party began the campaign of persecution against Falun Gong that now has lasted more than 13 years. The persecution has been amply documented by the Department of State, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, and many other human rights non-governmental organizations [NGOs].

The campaign has been severe, brutal, ugly, and vicious. Many tens of thousands of Falun Gong practitioners have been detained and arrested. No one can count those sent to prison for long terms, and too many remain there. Many were sentenced to reeducation through labor, others just disappeared.

Those released have told of long and brutal interrogations, beatings, sleep deprivation, and other forms of torture. Their captors demand statements and confessions. They demand that those in custody name other practitioners, better to roll up the movement.
Rights movements have documented more than 3,000 deaths of practitioners from torture and mistreatment, and doubtless there have been many more who have died in custody, their stories yet untold.

Parallel to the treatment of practitioners was a comprehensive propaganda campaign designed to demonize the movement. From their radios and televisions, Chinese learned Falun Gong was a “heretical cult organization.” The schools taught the same dictated talking points to the young and the impressionable.

On September 12, Dana Rohrabacher of California and I co-chaired a joint hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and my subcommittee, the Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations Subcommittee. We heard horrific testimony on the issue of organ harvesting in China.

The witnesses touched on many issues: Transplants in Chinese medicine, transplant tourism, organ donors' reliance on death row prisoners, and disturbing testimony that Falun Gong practitioners and other prisoners of conscience may have been involuntary victims. For those interested in reviewing the evidence in full, I would recommend the transcript of that hearing. One of our witnesses today, however, will review this issue.

In addition to arrested practitioners’ imprisonment, sentences to reeducation through labor, and deaths, the Chinese Government and Communist Party have pressured Falun Gong practitioners to renounce their belief and practice. This “transformation” campaign has been documented by our Commission in its Annual Reports and by other human rights organizations.

Amnesty International described the campaign as a “process through which individuals were pressured, often through mental and physical torture, to renounce their belief.”

An extralegal Party-run security apparatus created in June 1999 to eliminate the Falun Gong movement, the 6–10 Offices, spearheaded the campaign. The Commission observed this past year official Web sites providing education and training materials for local officials who continue to support their effort to suppress the Falun Gong.

The Chinese Government and Communist Party have also continued to harass and detain persons who attempted to assist Falun Gong practitioners, including human rights lawyers such as Wei Liangyue, Wang Yonghang, and Gao Zhisheng.

In the campaign against the Falun Gong, we see in high-relief so many features of governance in China. The Chinese people’s hopes are the ordinary hopes of mankind: To be free to work, to speak, to pray, to move, to enjoy healthy lives, to be free of poisonous pollution, to organize for better workplaces and better pay, and to find justice.

What do they get? It is repression, unchecked police powers, prisons and labor camps, arbitrary courts, pressure against defense attorneys, punishment of family members as well as individuals, control of the media, blindness to the human cost of the Party’s policies, indifference to life, and demonization of those who dare to disagree or speak out.
We see this in the repression of believers, be they Tibetan Buddhists, members of house churches, or Falun Gong practitioners. We see this in the rough and brutal resort to forced abortions and involuntary sterilization of Chinese women who dare to hope that they could enjoy the same rights as the world’s other women to decide on their own how many children they will have.

In this year’s 2012 Annual Report, the Commission urged the Chinese Government to permit Falun Gong practitioners to freely practice inside of China, to freely allow Chinese lawyers to represent citizens who challenge the legality of laws, regulations, rulings, or actions by officials, police, prosecutors, and courts that relate to religion; to eliminate criminal and administrative penalties that target religions and spiritual movements and have been used to punish Chinese citizens for exercising their right to freedom of religion.

In the Annual Report, the Commission also called for the elimination of certain articles of law. Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law criminalizes using a “cult” to undermine implementation of state laws. Article 27 of the PRC Public Security Administrative Punishment Law stipulates detention or fines for organizing or incenting others to engage in cult activities and for using cults or the guise of religion to disturb social order or to harm others’ health.

Today we repeat those recommendations. The purpose of this hearing is to allow a panel of experts on China and Falun Gong to review the persecution of the Falun Gong by the Chinese Government and the Communist Party and to update members of this Commission and the general public on recent developments.

Again, I look forward to our witnesses and thank them in advance for being here. I yield to my good friend and colleague, the Cochairman of our Commission, Sherrod Brown.

STATEMENT OF HON. SHERROD BROWN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO; COCHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL–EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

Senator Brown. Thank you, Chairman Smith. It’s been a pleasure working with Chris Smith during this Congress. I so appreciate his leadership on this issue. I want to thank the staff of the Commission, Lawrence Liu and Paul Protic especially, the two staff directors, and all of you who helped to put together the Annual Report that came out of these hearings and the work that you all do for human rights.

This is our last hearing for the 112th Congress. This Commission and others have well-documented the abuses committed by the Chinese Government and Communist Party against practitioners of Falun Gong. I would add to that my thanks for the work on the Annual Report and this hearing and other hearings, the work of the person on my staff, Doug Babcock, and the good work he has done on this.

In this Annual Report we describe the 13-year campaign that Chairman Smith just discussed against Falun Gong as extensive, systematic, and in some cases, violent. It is indeed one of the harshest campaigns against a group of believers in modern times. Countless practitioners of Falun Gong face arbitrary detention, tor-
ture, and psychiatric abuse, and in some cases death, simply for practicing their beliefs.

Unfortunately, the Communist Party apparently believes that the only way it is to survive is to stamp out diversity of opinion and belief wherever it occurs. For Falun Gong practitioners, this means renouncing your beliefs and being transformed—they use the word “transformed”—through reeducation. Those who seek to defend Falun Gong practitioners are harassed and detained.

All of us are aware of these abuses because of the many Falun Gong practitioners, a number of them in my State of Ohio, who possess the courage to speak out. That is why we are lucky today to have Bruce Chung with us. Bruce flew all the way from Taiwan on short notice to be here today. He traveled here with his brother because he believes, as I believe, that the truth must be told.

This summer—and Bruce will discuss this obviously in more detail as our first witness—Bruce was visiting relatives in the People's Republic of China when authorities there detained him. They held him for 54 days. He was monitored around the clock while in custody. He was subjected to long hours of questioning without access to a lawyer. His interrogators sought to force him to sign a confession.

For what? Authorities claim he threatened national security by trying to broadcast Falun Gong materials in China, but his real crime was trying to overcome China’s censorship and exercise his right—a human right—to free expression. I thank Bruce and other witnesses for being here today and letting the world know what is happening inside of China.

In the United States, we believe that our strength as a nation comes from the diversity of our people. China cannot keep responding to diversity as a threat to be suppressed. This is not an effective strategy. It’s not working on the Tibetan plateau, where a policy of repression has led to a series of terrible tragedies. Nearly 100 Tibetans have committed self-immolation in protest of policies against their religion and against their culture.

It’s not working on the Internet, where hundreds of millions of Chinese thirst for a place where they can share uncensored and diverse views about their society and their government. It’s not working against the Uyghur people either. The strategy won’t work in the case of Falun Gong, whose practitioners simply want to live in peace and freedom.

In the United States, we fight for the right of our citizens to practice their belief. China seems too often to fight against those practices of its people. China must end all repression of Falun Gong practitioners, guarantee their freedom of belief, expression, and assembly, and release all political prisoners.

Threats to freedom only strengthen people’s resolve, people like Bruce Chung. It makes them fight harder for what is right. The sooner China realizes this, the better off their people, and this world, will be.
So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SMITH. Thank you very much for your excellent statement.

I would like to now welcome to the witness table our first panel, beginning with Bruce Chung, who is a technology company manager in Taiwan and Falun Gong practitioner. He was arrested in June of this year after he visited relatives in China. He was detained and interrogated for “endangering state security and health” for 54 days, even though he was not indicted on any charges. His cause was taken up by family, Amnesty International, and many civil organizations in Taiwan.

We will then hear from Mr. Zhiming Hu, who was serving as an Air Force officer in Beijing and began practicing Falun Gong. After the Chinese Communist Party began the persecution of Falun Gong in 1999, Mr. Hu joined many peaceful appeals calling for religious freedom.

Bypassing China’s controls on the Internet, he downloaded information on the persecution from the Internet. For these activities he was imprisoned twice, for a number of years. He was accepted by the United States as a refugee in August of this year.

We will then hear from Sarah Cook—we welcome her back—a Senior Research Analyst for Freedom on the Net in East Asia at Freedom House. She is a member of the China Media Bulletin and Weekly News Digest. Before she joined Freedom House, she co-edited the English translation of “A China More Just,” a memoir by prominent rights attorney Gao Zhisheng.

Then we will finally hear in this first panel from, again, Dr. Jianchao Xu, who is currently Assistant Professor of Medicine at Mt. Sinai School of Medicine in New York. He received his M.D. from Shenyang Medical School in China and his Ph.D. from Yale University, where he also completed his post-doctorate research and was trained as a kidney specialist.

We will also thank Helen Gao, who is our interpreter for today.

STATEMENT OF BRUCE CHUNG, A TECHNOLOGY MANAGER IN HSINCHU, TAIWAN; FALUN GONG PRACTITIONER ARRESTED IN CHINA

Mr. CHUNG. I want to thank Chairman Smith and Cochairman Brown for holding this important hearing and inviting me to testify today. My name is Chung Ting-Pang, manager of Intek Technology Company, Ltd., in Taiwan.

Like hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese citizens, I practice Falun Gong. I traveled to Ganzhou City in China’s Jiangxi Province to visit some family members on June 15 this year. During the several days of visit I didn’t do any Falun Gong activities or contact any Falun Gong practitioners in Mainland China.

On June 18, I was on my way back to Taiwan as planned. When I was just about to board the flight from Ganzhou to Shenzhen, I was forcefully taken away by state security agents. I was then detained for 54 days under the vague accusation of sabotaging national security and the public safety until my release on August 11.

I protested with a hunger strike. It wasn’t until the second day of my unlawful detention that I was allowed to see my family and make one supervised call to my home in Taiwan. It wasn’t until the
next month that I was able to see my attorney, Guo Lianhui, but they only let us meet once and not in private.

Without the presence of my attorney, I was subjected to marathon interrogation sessions that drove me to deep fatigue. The main content of the interrogations was all about my activities in Taiwan, of which they seemed to know a great deal, suggesting that I had been monitored in Taiwan for some time.

The points the interrogation concentrated on were as follows:
(1) An incident in 2003 in which I mailed TV hijacking equipment to Falun Gong practitioners in Mainland China;
(2) I had once asked a Mainland China Falun Gong practitioner to provide me with government documents regarding the persecution of Falun Gong;
(3) I tried to broadcast truth films regarding persecution of Falun Gong via satellite signals in Taiwan;
(4) they wanted to know all the methods that Taiwan Falun Gong practitioners use to expose the prosecution of Falun Gong in Mainland China; and
(5) they tried to force me to provide all names, phone numbers, email addresses, and participating projects of Falun Gong practitioners in Taiwan.

Throughout the interrogations, they threatened me that if I did not cooperate they would bring in the harsher team to handle me, that they would change my civil detention to a criminal detention, and that they would send me to judicial authorities to be sentenced to prison.

What is most unacceptable to me was that the state security agents forced me to sign a “Confession Statement” and asked me to admit that I committed a crime to endanger national security, public safety, and sabotage public property.

Three weeks before I went back to Taiwan, they began to threaten me to admit my “guilt” and “remorse.” I was forced to write and rewrite many times the statement and I was videotaped again and again. I was threatened not to be too outspoken after I got to Taiwan.

Undeterred, I called for a press conference on the third day after I landed in Taiwan, openly stating that:
(1) What I wrote in that so-called “Confession Statement” and all the interrogation records were not done with my free will. All the details I provided were made up by me to deal with their threats;
(2) I will continue to spread the truth to the Chinese public until the day the persecution ends; and
(3) as an individual living in free and democratic Taiwan, it is an appropriate and just action for me to help the Chinese public, who have been deceived and persecuted by the Chinese Communist Party.

Not until I returned to Taiwan did I realize that the people of Taiwan had put in tremendous efforts to rescue me. About 200,000 people in Taiwan signed a letter campaign that urged President Ma Ying-jeou to gain my release. Over 30 NGOs came together to organize activities and on three occasions accompanied my family during their petitions at the Office of the President.

Additionally, I wish to make two points clear. First, the Chinese Communists do not only prosecute Falun Gong practitioners in
China. According to the Taiwan Falun Gong Association, I am the 17th Taiwanese Falun Gong practitioner subjected to persecution from the Chinese Communist Party. Second, the Chinese Communist Party has hired spies overseas to illegally collect Falun Gong practitioners' personal information and information on their activities.

Finally, I would like to thank Members of the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament for their efforts to secure my release. Thank you.

Chairman SMITH. Mr. Chung, thank you so very much. Like Chairman Brown, we are very grateful that you made the trip here to convey this very powerful testimony to us. So, thank you so very much.

Mr. CHUNG. Thank you. Thank you.

Chairman SMITH. Professor Hu?

STATEMENT OF ZHIMING HU, TWICE-IMPRISONED FALUN GONG PRACTITIONER; FORMER PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY [PLA] AIR FORCE OFFICER

Mr. Hu. First, I wish to express a heart-felt thank you to Chairman Smith and Cochairman Brown for holding this important hearing.

I came to the United States as a refugee in August of this year. I witnessed the popularity of Falun Gong before 1999. I saw the horrors of the persecution between 1999 and 2010. I also have seen how the peaceful and valiant grassroots efforts of so many in China are turning back tyranny.

I'll start at the beginning.

My brother told me about Falun Gong in 1997. I loved it right away. My nasal problem that bothered me all of my life was gone after practicing Falun Gong for two weeks. The teaching also made me full of joy and peace. Falun Gong gave me a renewed outlook on life and on human society.

In 1997, I was an officer in the Air Force. I lived and worked on a base in Beijing. We had an exercise practice site at the Air Force Command University. I went almost every morning along with 40 or 50 other Air Force officers or professors. We helped each other to be more ethical in our behavior, more responsible in our work, and more noble in our actions. I cherish these memories immensely.

But on July 20, 1999, former Communist leader Jiang Zemin started a violent campaign to eradicate Falun Gong. The situation around the entire country was extremely tense. At first, we were confused. But then I began to use a proxy server to read reports on Minghui.org, the main Falun Gong Web site. I read how many practitioners were being tortured and killed. I had to act.

By early 2000, many of us had a proactive attitude. We wanted to help, so I decided to leave the Air Force compound so I had more time and freedom.

Within a week, however, the Air Force found me. They detained me for more than two months. But they couldn't transform me. Instead they forced me to retire from military and took me back to my hometown in Liaoning Province, in May 2000.
I returned to Beijing to continue the work of peacefully exposing the persecution. We made a plan to travel the country, and train practitioners to get around the Internet blockade and share information on the Minghui Web site. We were successful in seven major cities. But in Shanghai, in October 2000, police raided my hotel room and arrested me. They put me in a detention center and prison for four years. I could easily have died from mistreatment there.

I was released in October 2004. But in 2005, a plainclothes policeman saw me give a copy of the Nine Commentaries DVD to someone on the street in Beijing. They put me through a show trial and sent me to four more years of prison. For more than three of these years I was very close to dying. Hunger strikes, force-feedings, and injections of poisonous chemicals made me an immobile and skeletal whisper of a man. During this time they often conducted blood testing and comprehensive physical exams. But they never gave me treatment that helped me get better. When I later learned of organ harvesting, I can't help but wonder if I might have been a candidate. When I was released in 2009, doctors told my family that I would probably die. If I didn't, I would be disabled.

At home, I resumed my Falun Gong practice and was able to walk in two months. Soon I could take long walks outside. My experience of recovery is similar to how Falun Gong is still being practiced in China. The prisons failed to transform me and the Communist Party has failed to wipe out Falun Gong.

In 2000, I saw no signs of Falun Gong practitioner activity in my hometown. But when I left China in 2010, I saw many Falun Gong posters hung in public for a long time. More and more people see through the once-widespread lies and are refusing to be accomplices in this persecution.

Because of hearings like this, awareness is spreading and pressure on the Communist regime is mounting. I believe this persecution will end soon. Please do all that you can to help the persecution end more quickly.

Thank you for your time.

Chairman Smith. Thank you very much for your testimony.

Ms. Cook?

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hu appears in the appendix.]

STATEMENT OF SARAH COOK, SENIOR RESEARCH ANALYST, FREEDOM ON THE NET AND EAST ASIA, FREEDOM HOUSE

Ms. Cook. Good morning, Chairman Smith and Cochairman Brown, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very much for convening this hearing.

I've been asked to address the origins of the campaign that led to the arrest of these two men on my right. Today, as we have just heard, Chinese citizens who practice Falun Gong live under constant threat of abduction and torture. The name of the practice, and various homonyms, are among the most censored terms on the Chinese Internet.

Any mention by Chinese diplomats is inevitably couched in demonizing labels. But this was not always the case. Throughout the early and mid-1990s, Falun Gong, its practitioners, and its founder,
Mr. Li Hongzhi, were often the subject of awards, positive media coverage, and government support.

In an occurrence almost unimaginable today, Mr. Li gave a series of lectures at the Chinese Embassy in Paris in 1995. Chinese from every strata of society—doctors, farmers, workers, soldiers, some Communist Party members—began taking up the practice.

Students of Falun Gong would gather in groups to perform its meditative exercises, but many saw the discipline as a personal, rather than collective, endeavor to enhance their health, mental well-being, and spiritual wisdom.

There were no signs of a political agenda, or even the kind of criticism of the Communist Party that appeared in Falun Gong literature after the persecution began. By 1999, according to government sources, Western media reports, and Falun Gong witnesses, tens of millions of people were practicing.

So what went wrong? The answer lies in a combination of ideological fears, institutional factors, and an individual leader's fateful decision. As you all know, Falun Gong is a spiritual practice. Its key features are qigong exercises and teachings reminiscent of Buddhist and Daoist traditions that have been part of Chinese culture for thousands of years.

But for decades the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] has displayed a low tolerance for groups or individuals who place any authority above their allegiance to the Party. For Tibetans, this is the Dalai Lama. For Falun Gong practitioners, it is spiritual teachings centered on the values of truthfulness, compassion, and tolerance.

Falun Gong's emphasis on these particular three values as part of its theistic world view appears to have especially attracted the Party's ire. The concepts seem to conflict with Marxism and other ideas that have been a source of legitimacy for the Party's authoritarian rule, like materialism, political struggle, and xenophobic nationalism.

In fact, Xinhua, the state-run news agency, hinted at this in one of its articles in 1999 after the ban: “In fact, the so-called truth, kindness, and tolerance principle preached by Li Hongzhi has nothing in common with the Socialist ethical and cultural progress we are striving to achieve.”

The Communist Party also feels threatened by independent civil society entities. In 1996, the state-run Qigong Association instructed the establishment of Party branches among Falun Gong followers and wished to profit from the practice, so Li Hongzhi parted ways with it. Falun Gong’s spiritual independence was then coupled with a loosely-knit organizational network.

From 1996 to 1999, many in the government and the Party held favorable views of Falun Gong and publicly cited its benefits for health, and even social stability. But as Falun Gong’s popularity and independence from Party control grew, several top cadres began viewing it as a threat. This translated into repression that showed its first signs in 1996, not 1999.

The publication of Falun Gong books by state printing presses was banned shortly after these were listed as best-sellers. Sporadic articles smearing Falun Gong appeared in state-run news outlets. Security agents began monitoring practitioners and occasionally dispersing meditation sessions.
It was in this context that in April 1999 the escalated harassment culminated in several dozen practitioners being beaten and arrested in Tianjin. Those calling for their release were told that the orders had come from Beijing.

On April 25, over 10,000 adherents gathered quietly outside the National Petitions Office in Beijing, adjacent to the Zhongnanhai Government Compound. They asked for an end to abuses and recognition of their practice.

Some observers have pointed to this incident as taking Party leaders by surprise, and triggering the suppression that followed. But such an interpretation is flawed when one considers that it was escalating harassment led by central officials, including then security czar Luo Gan, that sparked the appeal in the first place.

Rather, the event was pivotal because of how individual leaders responded to it. Premier Zhu Rongji adopted an appeasing stance and met with several of the petitioners’ representative. The practitioners in Tianjin were released and those in Beijing went home. But Party Secretary Jiang Zemin overruled Zhu. He called Falun Gong a serious challenge to the regime’s authority, in fact one of the most serious challenges since the founding of the People’s Republic.

In a circular dated June 7, he issued his fateful order to “disintegrate” Falun Gong. Indeed, several experts have attributed the campaign in part to Jiang’s personal jealousy. He reportedly disliked the sincere enthusiasm Falun Gong inspired, while his own standing in the eyes of the Chinese public was weak.

But whatever the specific event of the late 1990s, the repression of Falun Gong in China cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Rather, it is one episode within the Communist Party’s long history of arbitrarily suppressing independent thought and launching political campaigns against perceived enemies.

The Party’s tactics have become more subtle and sophisticated over time, but the underlying dynamics remain the same. The decision of what is approved or forbidden is made arbitrarily by Party leaders and the institutions, like an independent judiciary, that might curb their excesses are kept within the Party’s realm of influence. We see this with daily censorship directives, and it is the same when it comes to spiritual movements like Falun Gong.

Once Jiang made his decision, there was little to stop what came next. In July 1999, a full-scale campaign reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution was launched. The full weight of the CCP’s repressive apparatus was turned on Falun Gong.

The Communist Party and Chinese officials typically assert that Falun Gong needed to be banned because it was “an evil cult” that was having a nefarious influence on society. But these claims have not held up to scrutiny when investigated in China, nor when one considers Falun Gong’s spread in other parts of the world, including democratic Taiwan.

In fact, it was only several months after Jiang had already initiated the campaign that the Party apparatus zeroed in on this very effective term for its propaganda purposes, a manipulated English translation of the Chinese term “xiejiao.” Zhao Ming, a former Falun Gong prisoner of conscience, summed up the dynamics as fol-
“The Party’s machinery of persecution was there, Jiang pushed the button.”

Thank you very much. In my written testimony you will find comments on some of the long-term consequences this campaign has had, both for Falun Gong and for the rule of law in China. Thank you very much.

Chairman Smith. Ms. Cook, thank you very much.

Now, Dr. Xu?

[The prepared statement of Ms. Cook appears in the appendix.]

STATEMENT OF JIANCHAO XU, M.D., ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF MEDICINE, MT. SINAI SCHOOL OF MEDICINE; MEDICAL DIRECTOR, DOCTORS AGAINST FORCED ORGAN HARVESTING

Dr. Xu. Good morning. Honorable Chairman Christopher Smith and Cochairman Mr. Brown, Members of Congress, and distinguished panelists, my name is Jianchao Xu. As a kidney specialist, I am also a tenured staff physician at James J. Peters Veterans Administration Hospital in New York. I am also Assistant Professor of Medicine at Mt. Sinai School of Medicine.

In addition, I serve as Medical Director for the nonprofit organization, Doctors Against Forced Organ Harvesting, DAFOH, which is comprised of medical professionals from around the world who investigate the practice of illegal organ transplantation. We are particularly concerned about the reports of organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners in China who, we believe, have been victimized on a very large scale.

The medical community has known about unethical organ transplantation in China since the 1990s. At a congressional hearing in 2001, it forced their hand and direct evidence of unethical organ transplant practices in China surfaced.

Dr. Wang Guoqi, a Chinese medical doctor, testified to the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Human Rights. Dr. Wang testified that prisoners receive blood tests in prison to determine their compatibility with interested donors. On execution day, the prisoners who are to become organ donors are the first to die. That was over a decade ago. Since then, things have gotten worse, much worse.

There are vastly more transplants in China today than the identifiable source of organs. The government of China has openly admitted to using the organs of executed prisoners. But even if we were to assume that every single execution results in organ transplant, there is still not enough to account for the vast discrepancy between organ donations and the transplant operations.

Falun Gong practitioners are the most likely source of many of the organs used in transplant procedures in China over the past decade. There was an enormous increase in transplants after 1999, with no reported changes in the organ donation process.

The one thing that did occur in 1999 was the beginning of the persecution of Falun Gong, which now stands as the alleged explanation for the 41,500 official transplants from 2000 to 2005 and would explain the donors. Even if we use the Chinese Deputy Minister Wang Jiefu’s own data, there were approximately 30,500 unexplained source organs from 1997 to 2007.
Mr. Ethan Gutmann, an adjunct Fellow of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies painstakingly interviewed the victims who were imprisoned in China, as detailed in his chapter in the book, “State Organs.” His estimate is that 65,000 Falun Gong practitioners have been killed for their organs. We have every reason to believe that organ harvesting is ongoing in China to this day.

According to a report from NTD–TV [New Tang Dynasty TV], a patient this year traveled from Taiwan to Mainland China, to Tianjin First Central Hospital and received concurrent liver and kidney transplantations. It only took one month to find a matching liver and kidney, while he had waited for years in Taiwan. Organ harvesting is an ongoing problem and it remains widespread. Fortunately, the movement to stop this gruesome practice is gaining momentum.

The Taiwan Government is now requiring citizens to provide details of the transplant from the surgeons and donors if they go abroad to have an organ transplant, and subsequently seek health insurance coverage for their post-operative treatments.

Starting in May 2011, instructions from the American Journal of Transplantation state that the publication will not accept manuscripts whose data is derived from transplants involving organs obtained from executed prisoners.

In the January 2012 issue of the Journal of Clinical Investigation, an editorial stated that the practice of transplanting organs from executed prisoners in China appears to be widespread. They have vigorously condemned this practice and effective immediately will not consider manuscripts on human organ transplantation for publication, and so on and so forth.

As you can see, there has been progress, but more needs to be done. Membership in an international professional society by Chinese transplant professionals must be conditioned by acceptance that no organs will be used from executed prisoners.

Insurance companies must ensure that no executed prisoners are the source of organs used in their studies. I urge the U.S. Government and anyone with any knowledge of organ harvesting to publicly release all evidence they have with regard to China’s use of prisoners as a source for organ donation.

Those are the steps we can take. Some of them are underway. Let us strive further and even faster. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the CECC for holding this hearing, and especially to the honorable chairman, Christopher Smith. You have been a true champion in advocating for Falun Gong and human rights.

I particularly applaud your recent effort, the Dear Colleague letter, expressing concerns about China’s forced organ harvesting from prisoners of conscience, particularly from Falun Gong detainees, and asking the Department of State to share any information they have received about unethical organ harvesting in China, including anything that Wang Lijun, a Chinese police chief who met with the consulate officials in China might have divulged to U.S. consulate officials.

One is believed to have been intimately involved in organ harvesting and has received an award for innovation in organ harvesting by the government. Also, as a police chief who directly
oversaw the persecution of Falun Gong in his jurisdiction, which included the hospital. Thus, this information may hold the key to unlock the mystery of organ harvesting in China. Revealing this information may put an end to this horrific crime against humanity. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Xu appears in the appendix.]

Chairman SMITH. Dr. Xu, thank you very much for your testimony.

Without objection, all of your full statements will be made a part of the record because they are very detailed and very chilling in the information they convey to this Commission.

Dr. Xu, if I could just ask you first, I would note parenthetically when I held a hearing back in the mid-1990s on organ harvesting, Harry Wu, the great survivor of the laogai, actually helped smuggle out a man who was a guard who gave expert testimony and eventually got asylum, because he obviously could not go back, about executed prisoners. He showed how they would execute the prisoners, take their organs, the pain and the suffering often accompanying that because anesthesia was not given to the prisoners.

Hearing your testimony talk about how much worse this has gotten and the numbers that you have in your testimony is absolutely numbing. You point out, for example, that Ethan Gutmann has estimated that 65,000 Falun Gong practitioners have been killed for their organs.

I remember reading a book some years ago about the Japanese Unit 731, which did horrific experimentation on especially Chinese but also on others—he was the Josef Mengele, of the Nazis, but in this case for the Japanese, a horrifying war crime and crimes against humanity. Yet, this is being replicated today.

As you pointed out, Dr. Wang was so upset—tormented is the word you used—after he followed orders to remove the skin of a still-living prisoner in October 1995. The incident prompted him to alert the international community to the inhumane practice of organ harvesting in China. As you and others have pointed out, it has only gone from bad to worse.

So I thank you, and I thank all of you for bringing one abuse after another that is imposed upon the Falun Gong to the attention of this Commission, but this practice and the widespread nature of it begs correction. Actually, we need to do far more than we have done to combat it.

So my question to you is: Are we doing enough, the United States, the President, the Congress? How is the United Nations doing on this? I mean, they have the Human Rights Council that is supposed to be taking up these issues. It seems to me that very often if it's not Israel that's in the crosshairs, very little is done human rights-wise by the Human Rights Council. So if you could speak to that as well.

You also point out, Dr. Xu, about the monitoring at a national level. When someone goes and gets an organ transplant, there needs to be a filing as to who was the provider of that organ, and under what circumstances. Because when they do come back, as we all know, they're going to need anti-rejection drugs like CellCept and other things that are very expensive, but they work.
But for all of that after-care, if the organ has been procured in a totally inhumane way, we need to know it and people need to be held accountable. So if you could speak to what we could do legislatively as well, and others who would like to join in on that question.

Dr. Xu. Thank you, Chairman Smith. The persecution [inaudible] just to give you an example [inaudible] Dr. [inaudible] effort to expose [inaudible] and the Israeli Government has implemented legislation on this that they will not cover patients for their medical care if they got the organ from tourism overseas.

In our country, I think what we can do is institute similar legislative changes to expose the truth of what is going on in China, to expose what organ trafficking involves, to expose the live organ harvesting especially going on in China. If our citizens know that if you go to China to receive an organ that another person has to die, I think our citizens would stop going there, and so other citizens around the world would do the same.

We can also, at the economic level, implement legislative changes, such as, we can have a witness protection program so that doctors, who I believe are the most powerful witness to stand in front of you to testify against the crimes against humanity—if we don't offer such protection, I think it's very difficult to have a doctor to come forth and who is involved in this crime to testify.

Other things, like we could—at the government level, as I mentioned, we can have—for example, as you mentioned, when patients get organ transplantation overseas often the operation is a butchered operation and less than our standards.

When they come back home—like Dr. Gabriel Danovitch, my dear colleague who is an expert in transplantation—when he sees patients who have high complications and whose mortality and morbidity are much higher than our standards, and they spend much money and impose a bigger economic burden to our country to take care of these patients post-operatively. I think that is how I can answer your question.

Chairman Smith. Could you tell us what kind of profit is derived per organ? Who gets it? What are the countries where the recipients are coming from? Is it the United States, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan? Is there any kind of breakdown? Do we have any detailed information concerning who they are?

Dr. Xu. I cannot give you the exact number or precise number offhand.

Chairman Smith. Sure.

Dr. Xu. But what I can tell you, like, Taiwan has recipients on the order of the hundreds and thousands. Saudi Arabia, the richest countries, richest states, they can afford this kind of tourism. They are a large portion of the recipients. Certainly the United States, but because anecdotally my colleagues have seen patients returning home getting an organ from China who received post-operative care.

In terms of the price for each organ, I think it's on the order of $60,000, for example, for a kidney. For a heart, it's over $100,000. For a liver, it's on the order of $80,000 to over $100,000. The precise number is advertised in China's hospitals' Web sites. This
Chairman SMITH. Now, in a parallel way, I never visited it, but I did look at it on the Web when it was in this area—The Bodies Exhibition. What struck me was how unbelievably healthy the people look—there was some East German doctor that perfected this method of preserving those people.

There have been suggestions that they are Falun Gong and that they are incredibly healthy, they're prisoners, and then they are killed for these exhibitions. It's not the same as organ harvesting obviously, but it's the same macabre genre. Do you know anything about that?

Dr. Xu. I focused my study on organ harvesting, but I also was told of such body preservation of young people that were killed and they are Falun Gong practitioners. I understand, because when Falun Gong practitioners are detained, some of them are afraid of their family, friends, and relatives being persecuted if they disclose their name, so some of them don't even tell the police their name. So those people are subject to being a very vulnerable group of prisoners. I would not be surprised—in fact, there is some evidence to suggest—that those bodies come from Falun Gong practitioners.

Chairman SMITH. Cochairman Brown?

Senator BROWN. Well, thank you, Chairman Smith.

Dr. Xu, one more question on that and then I want to ask Mr. Chung some questions and others. You had mentioned membership in international organizations and pharmaceutical companies. What do you suggest we do, how can we help, and how can those two groups, membership in international physician organizations, in allowing Chinese or not allowing Chinese physicians into those organizations, and the role of pharmaceutical companies.

There are a number of U.S. companies that do a lot of production of pharmaceuticals in China. I know that’s not related to this, but there is certainly a connection between our countries and the pharmaceutical industry that way.

Do you have thoughts on how we can, perhaps in terms of hope to answer some of the issues that Chairman Smith brought up, how to stop this practice by working with international organizations and international physician organizations and with the drug companies?

Dr. Xu. We are not opposing the pharmaceutical companies from setting up their shops to manufacture their goods to serve the patients. However, I think if they do a clinical trial to develop new drugs and if they use the organs which are from executed prisoners, living prisoners, Falun Gong practitioners, the international community should condemn and should oppose such a practice. If they manufacture a drug, let's say you order whatever anti-rejection medicine for FDA-approved use, I think that is standard practice and we have no objection to that.

In terms of what the international community, medical community, can do to end this horrific crime, one thing we propose is to have the membership to ask the training centers, the hospitals, to stop taking trainees from China who will not sign the affidavit that they will not participate in organ transplantation involving executed prisoners.
I think that’s a step we can take. Until the international community is satisfied that Chinese law on organ transplant is effectively implemented, like foreign funding agencies, medical organizations, or individual health professionals should not participate in any government—China—meetings on organ transplant research.

Foreign companies that currently provide goods and services for China’s organ transplant program should stop if they know their services and goods are involved in organ transplantation which is coming from executed prisoners.

Foreign governments should not issue visas to doctors, to trainees, to medical professionals who are involved in the organ or body tissue transplantations involving executed prisoners. I think that’s a step we can take.

Senator BROWN. Do you have evidence that U.S. or Western companies are doing clinical trials in China using either living prisoners doing clinical trials or using organs from executed prisoners?

Dr. Xu. In fact, there was at least one company I know of, however, I cannot recall the name of the company. If I do, I should probably give it to you in a private manner. Because of our effort to expose the truth at different meetings, international meetings such as World Transplant meetings, that company has stopped and withdrew their status using the compound of chemicals to test the efficacy of their organ donations—organ transplants. In addition to this company, whether there are more companies involved, I do not have an answer to that. I don’t know.

Senator BROWN. Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Chung, thank you, again, for being here. This commission has done a series of hearings that Chris Smith has convened on all kinds of human rights abuses. Talk to us if you would about if you believe the campaign by your family, by organizations in Taiwan and outside of Taiwan, and just international human rights organizations, if those efforts, you think, moderated the treatment you received, that the treatment was less harsh as a result of those efforts, were they or not, and do you think those efforts play a role in being freed as you were, after far too long in confinement?

Mr. Chung. Sure. I believe that I safely came back to Taiwan because of those people supporting me, many Taiwanese people in public supporting me. Everybody knows my case. That is the main reason that I can safely go back to Taiwan.

Senator BROWN. The other side of that is that Chinese authorities—I mean, nobody likes being preached to or told what to do by people, by outsiders. Nobody does. We don’t like it when other countries criticize our behavior, and the Chinese Government doesn’t like it when we do that, understandably to a point.

Is there some chance that authorities dig in when we are critical of their practices and we speak out, when this commission or individual elected officials or human rights advocates like Ms. Cook speak out for you against the kinds of practices aimed at you, that it causes the Chinese officials to dig in more and resist and make the treatment worse in some cases?

Dr. Xu. I think they do everything to hide their ugly things. They are afraid that what they’ve done, those ugly things, will be exposed. So we have to let everybody know what they have done, those ugly things.
Senator Brown. Okay.
What lessons from your experience should you tell this country, should you tell people in this country that pay attention to Chinese-American relations and Taiwan-American relations, and Taiwan-Chinese relations? So what lessons would you take from your experience?

Dr. Xu. The most important thing is to let everybody know what they have done. They hide everything. They control the media, they control Internet access for their citizens. They hide everything. They control any media they can. So the most important thing is, the things they hide, to expose. That’s what I think is the most important thing that we can do to stop the persecuting or anything.

Senator Brown. Do you think your family members in China face persecution for your speaking out today or face persecution for your speaking out on human rights for the last several weeks?

Dr. Xu. Yes, including my family in Taiwan. We are potentially in some kind of unsafe condition. But in my case, I think everybody is watching so I think basically we are safe just because everybody is watching.

Senator Brown. Okay.

Mr. Hu, you were one of many—I thought Ms. Cook’s history was very good, the sort of documentation of how Falun Gong was—I’m not sure you used the word “celebrated,” but close enough, in the 1980s and into the 1990s, and then what happened in the mid-late 1990s.

So many military personnel were practitioners of Falun Gong, apparently. Mr. Hu, did most of the personnel in the Chinese military who were practicing Falun Gong, did they cease to be practitioners? Did they stop practicing? And those that did and those that didn’t, what happened to them?

Mr. Hu. First, if I can correct one of the time issues. Falun Gong started in 1992 in Mainland China.


Mr. Hu. As far as I know, starting in 1992, a lot of military personnel, just like a lot of civilian people, started to practice Falun Gong. In 1999, the Communist Party started to persecute Falun Gong and we learned about the 7–20 [July 20th] incident. From that date on, we were prohibited from connecting with each other.

So we could only connect with each other in private. I could only connect with less than 10 military officials who formerly practiced in the same practice site with me. When I left China, I could only make contact with two of them, they were still practicing.

When you ask the question, what happens to these people, for those who continue to practice like myself? We would be dismissed from the military. For those who do not want to give up but still want to remain in the military, they will receive forced transformation.

Actually, in fact, China, under the rule of the Communist Party, within that realm, all the military officials, government officials, and the public are banned from practicing Falun Gong. That’s my answer. Thank you.

Chairman Smith. Thank you very much, Chairman Brown.

Just a few final questions. Mr. Hu, what was your rank in the military? You talked in your testimony about how the soldiers re-
pected you because you were an officer, but you were subjected to
dless hours of brainwashing. What does that brainwashing look
like? Do they try to say that it is a psychological disorder to be
Falun Gong?

I read the People's Daily frequently and I am amazed that the
propaganda is so intense almost on a daily basis, at least in the
American version of the People's Daily, and I'm wondering what
that brainwashing looked like.

Second, earlier in the year I was visited by a number of high
school students, the equivalent of high school from China. None of
them spoke English. They were here on some visitor's program. We
had about a two-hour meeting and I asked them very specific ques-
tions about Falun Gong.

The prejudice and the bias against the Falun Gong, a direct re-
sult of the propaganda and what's being taught in the schools, was
mind-boggling. I challenged every one of their views and they had
no answers, other than that Falun Gong is wrong and horrible, and
went on and on.

I am wondering, since there are so many college students, and
some high schoolers, here in the United States, what effort is the
Falun Gong undertaking to educate them as they sit on U.S. cam-
puses and European campuses about the big lie that they have
been fed by Beijing with regard to the Falun Gong? Hate radio
works. Hate TV works. We saw that in Rwanda, where it led to
genocide. So if you could speak to that.

Charles Lee, in his testimony, talks about how China is facing
an unprecedented moral crisis and is going overboard in trying to
destroy Christians, Buddhists, Uyghurs, and Falun Gong. Is it be-
because of the moral crisis? Is the dictatorship that fragile?

Finally, are Falun Gong in any way singled out for even worse
persecution under the one-child policy as a means of eliminating
Falun Gong children? I mean, Rebiya Kadeer testified some time
ago that forced abortion is being used as a means of genocide, that
systematically the Uyghurs are being eliminated at birth or imme-
diately prior through these programs and it's part of a planned
elimination of the Uyghur people. That's not all to Mr. Hu, but if
you could about the brainwashing.

Mr. Hu. The degree of the brainwashing that is experienced in
the military compared to prison was different. In my testimony I
mentioned that when I was detained in the military compound the
soldiers were respectful to me because I was still an officer within
the military.

Compared to the other Falun Gong practitioners, I did enjoy a
certain level of respect. Whereas, the other practitioners would be
scolded and tortured every day. I didn't experience that when I was
still in the military.

What the soldiers did to me is that they would prohibit me from
learning what was going on in the outside world; the window, for
example, was blocked by a cotton quilt. I was monitored 24 hours
a day and they needed to have two shifts of people monitoring me.
So I would have four people watching me at any given time.

Even while I was asleep, they would be standing right by me.
Each morning after I woke up, they would play a video at very
high volumes. This video defamed Falun Gong. For most of the
time, they would find people from other agencies to attempt to brainwash me. They would tell me bad things about Falun Gong. You asked what rank I held when I was with the military. I was mainly conducting administrative work in an office. My rank was equal to a major level.

I would say the level of brainwashing in prison was much more severe. I was imprisoned in Tilanqiao Prison in Shanghai. One Falun Gong practitioner was locked with two criminal prisoners in a three-square-meter cell. The two criminal prisoners chosen to stay with us were usually the more vicious criminals and they were ordered to “transform” us. If their transformation was not successful, they would not be let out earlier. But if they could transform us, their sentence would be reduced.

This is a method that the authorities have been using for a long time. Many Falun Gong practitioners, if they were put into detention centers or prisons, like myself, would face a long time of scolding and torture. I was forced to do labor. I was subjected to brainwashing sessions where I was forced to sit inches from a video monitor with deafening speakers blaring hateful messages. Under such circumstances, I spent two years at Tilanqiao prison in Shanghai.

During the last two months of my time in prison, because I was not transformed, the level of persecution actually increased. Each day they would forbid me from sleeping. As soon as I fell asleep, they woke me up in a very violent way.

In this situation I had no way but to make a hunger strike. After two days of hunger strike, I was almost in a coma. In that situation they sent me to a hospital, but I did not receive any medical treatment. They stretched out my limbs and bound me to a bed.

At the same time, they injected a kind of substance that gave me a severe headache. They also force-fed me. I spent the entire month bound to the bed. I had to relieve myself in bed, too.

It was a situation that human beings really cannot stand. But, I did survive that period.

Let me go back to the brainwashing activities of the military. At first, they said bad things about Falun Gong. They fabricated some stories and examples, trying to persuade me to give up my belief. When I argued back with them, they had nothing to say. When they had nothing to say, they started to show me a report that the government did at that time.

From that report, I saw two sets of statistical data. The first data, I don’t remember the precise time over which it was collected, told at that time there were over 80 million Falun Gong practitioners in China. A second survey was conducted after this first one because by that time the government had already began to think there were too many people practicing. The survey team thought too high a number would cause a negative impact, so then they came out with a new number, which was 60 million practitioners. They asked me, “How could the government be happy with so many people not being atheist? How could they allow this many people to practice Falun Gong?” This is what I experienced in military detention.
From these personal experiences, I learned that the persecution the Chinese Communist Party used against Falun Gong practitioners was based on lies and violence.

In the beginning, they used lies to deceive the Chinese public and the people in the international community. As a result, the general public would be deceived by all these lies when they were not really aware of the truth of Falun Gong.

But they could not deceive people like us who knew the truth of Falun Gong. To people like us, they would use violence to try to transform us. That is why, when I was in the military, I refused the transformation. They dismissed me and then later put me into prison. However, to those in the public who were not aware of the truth of Falun Gong, the lies did take effect.

That is why, when you might have talked to the Chinese students who were visiting this country, they would give you some negative comments about Falun Gong. That is the result of this lies-based education. For people like us who are practitioners now in the United States, we have tried our best to tell the people in China and in the world the truth of Falun Gong.

So I sincerely hope that the U.S. Government, the U.S. Congress, could provide us with more support and address the serious persecution of human rights. Thank you.

Senator BROWN. One last question. Ms. Cook, his comments about the college students coming here and their beliefs about Falun Gong. Do you find in your extensive kind of travels and studies and observations with human rights, do you find in China that neighbors and colleagues at work, or relatives of persecuted Falun Gong practitioners sometimes rise up, speak out, show support? What do you see in Chinese society sort of around the practitioners’ social networks when they are persecuted?

Ms. COOK. I haven’t had such conversations in China with people, but speaking with people who have come out it’s interesting because it seems that there has been a change over time. Initially, quite a few people, especially after the incident of the supposed self-immolation in 2001 and some of the other propaganda, a lot of practitioners talked about how their own family members would be afraid of them. Their brother was worried that they were going to do something to them or to their children.

To the credit of individuals like Mr. Hu, they have spoken to their family members about the lies told about Falun Gong, but increasingly a lot of Falun Gong literature also touches on the lies and the propaganda of the Communist Party more broadly. And they have managed to convince those they speak with. Many talk of their family members’ attitudes changing.

What you see happening is things like family members going to hire lawyers, so you have the human rights lawyers then going to defend Falun Gong practitioners, despite the risks, in part because the family members of those Falun Gong practitioners who may not be practitioners themselves have gone to seek out the lawyers to get their help.

Increasingly, you’re seeing these cases of petitions, that family members have started, to rally villagers who will then actually sign petitions calling for the release of a Falun Gong practitioner.
But in other ways I think a lot of the change happens more quietly. So in conversations even with people from some Chinese Government think tanks, in private, they'll admit that the campaign against Falun Gong was a mistake. It's just that they can't say that publicly because of their own position and that they may be put at risk.

So when you speak to people publicly, there are a lot of people who still have very negative views of Falun Gong. But you also see people who are aware, even on the inside of the system, who have started to change their views.

I just wanted to make one more comment also with regard to the organ harvesting issue. There is a two-prong approach that can be taken. One aspect is to respond to what is very clearly happening and the question of where these organs are coming from, because clearly China does not have a voluntary organ donation system. Whether they're coming from executed prisoners, or increasingly the evidence that they may be coming from Falun Gong or also from Uyghurs, there's the element of what we can do with regard to transplant tourism.

But Ethan Gutmann's research also showed that some of these organs, originally in the Uyghur case, were going to high-ranking Chinese officials. So you also have a market for these things within China. The other prong would be to seriously investigate and create some kind of mechanism, I would think, to really look into these questions about whether it's pharmaceutical companies, whether it's medical exchange programs and mechanisms of accountability, not just with regard to the transplant tourism but also with regard to the whole industry itself. Because one could see a situation where, besides the tourism, people within China, including possibly Party officials, may be the recipients of these organs.

So I just wanted to mention, in terms of looking into that investigative side, to follow up on some of the research that individuals like Ethan Gutmann or others have done. As you saw, there are still a lot of questions about how this is actually playing out and how it may be spreading to other groups.

We have seen generally with the campaign against Falun Gong, that tactics and entities like the 6–10 Office have started to be used to target other individuals, whether they're spiritual groups or ethnic minorities. There are a lot of Uyghurs who have disappeared as well, so there's a real question of what the actual current scope is of these organ transplant abuses. Thank you.

Chairman Smith. Thank you very much to all of you for your very detailed testimony. It certainly helps our Commission do a better job, and hopefully our government. Thank you so much.

I would like to now welcome our second panel. But as you go, Dr. Xu, you mentioned Dr. Wang. I think it's worth noting very briefly from his testimony back in 2001, and I would just quote the pertinent part. He says,

Before the execution I administered a shot of heparin to prevent blood clotting to the prisoner. A nearby policeman told him it was a tranquilizer to prevent unnecessary suffering during the execution. The criminal responded by giving thanks to the government.

At the site, the execution commander gave the order to go and the prisoner was shot to the ground. Either because the executioner was nervous and aimed
poorly, or intentionally misfired to keep the organs intact, the prisoner had not yet died but instead lay convulsing on the ground.

We were ordered to take him to the ambulance anyway, where the urologist extracted his kidneys quickly and precisely. When they finished, the prisoner was still breathing and his heart continued to beat. The execution commander asked if they might fire a second shot to finish him off, to which the county court staff replied, “Save that shot. With both kidneys out, there’s no way he can survive.”

That is brutality beyond comprehension.

Thank you for your testimony, and thank you to this panel.

I’d like to now ask our second panel if they would proceed, beginning with a medical doctor by training, Dr. Charles Lee pursued his medical studies at Harvard Medical School in the mid-1990s. In 1999 when the Chinese Communist Party began persecuting Falun Gong, Charles decided to go to China to help.

He was arrested unlawfully and sentenced to three years in prison. He returned to the United States in 2006. I would say parenthetically that no one has done more and been more tenacious in defending Falun Gong than Charles Lee, so thank you for being here today.

We will then hear from Professor James Tong, who is a Scholar of Comparative Politics, specializing in Chinese politics and political violence. He is currently director of the Center for East Asian Studies at the University of California at Los Angeles.

We will then hear from Caylan Ford, an independent scholar and human rights consultant currently residing in Ottawa. She holds honors in World History from the University of Calgary, and a master’s degree in International Security and Chinese Politics from George Washington University.

She has authored numerous publications, including academic papers and op-eds in publications like the Washington Post and the Christian Science Monitor. Most recently, she co-authored a manuscript on the current status of Falun Gong in China, which is now under review with a leading China journal.

Then we will hear from Mr. Xia, Senior Director of Policy and Research at the Human Rights Law Foundation. He’s an expert on Chinese politics, the structure and functioning of the Chinese propaganda and judicial systems, and a range of extralegal Communist Party entities involved in human rights abuses in China.

Over the past decade, he has overseen research and investigations contributing to numerous analytical reports. He has presented his research and analysis at the European Parliament, the United Nations Human Rights Commission, and academic institutions in the United States and Southeast Asia. He has a rich and multifaceted Chinese cultural background, including work with military personnel, a university lecturer, and medical research here in the United States.

Dr. Lee?

STATEMENT OF CHARLES LEE, M.D., SPOKESPERSON FOR GLOBAL CENTER FOR QUITTING THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Dr. Lee. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith and Cochairman Brown, and all the distinguished members and staff members of the CECC for giving me this opportunity to testify today.
Falun Gong actually had members from 70 to 100 million people, practicing at the end of 1998, according to government sources. Since the persecution started, the severity is tremendous. According to the 2006 U.N. Special Rapporteur Report, two-thirds of the torture cases in China were against Falun Gong practitioners. The torture methods include sexual assaults, beatings, shocks with electric batons, and violent force-feedings with feces and salt solutions. The cruelty of this persecution is unprecedented. We have heard of these organ harvesting issues for a long time. What is more, Chairman Smith mentioned about the Body Exhibit. We have this investigative report from the World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong, which confirms that those body exhibits, most of them were of Falun Gong practitioners. So I can give this report to you later.

Chairman SMITH. Actually, I would like to make that, or at least a major part of that, part of our record.

Dr. LEE. Okay. That is good. I will give that to you.

What we have heard, the Nazi’s, after the gas chamber was used on those Jews, they used their hair as pillow stuffing and their skins for lampshades and gloves, and their bones were ground for fertilizer. What the Communist Party has been doing to the Falun Gong practitioners is very much comparable, sometimes even more horrific. They harvest organs when people are alive and then use the body’s remains for the body exhibits—to maximize their profit.

For the deaths of Falun Gong practitioners, there are three levels of evaluations. The first one, is that we have 3,627 reports of deaths which have been well documented and confirmed by Falun Gong practitioners inside China, but there are still a lot of people missing.

The organ harvesting—deaths—estimates by David Kilgour and Matas—50,000 people, and 65,000 by Ethan Gutmann. But the actual number could be much, much bigger than this because the CCP has always been manipulating the numbers. When they feel like the numbers are not good for them, they can just scale it down.

Another thing is that China is a big country. They have about a 300 million transient population in China. These include the migrant city workers from the countryside, and tens of millions of appellants who constantly appeal to the government for their injustices, and also millions of unyielding Falun Gong practitioners who have lost their jobs, school, and families and they left their hometown to escape the persecution. In the past decade, many of them have disappeared or vaporized and nobody can trace them down.

Also, in March 2006 there was a retired military doctor that revealed that there were 36 concentration camps for Falun Gong practitioners in China. The biggest one he claimed was in Jilin Province called 672–S Camp, which held 120,000 Falun Gong practitioners. On the other side, there are tens of millions of Falun Gong practitioners who have recovered from their illnesses, including terminal diseases, and benefited from improved health.

The persecution on Falun Gong in the past 13 years has forced many of them into giving up the practice and, as a consequence, facing deteriorating health and eventually dying. My mother actually is one of them. So the death caused by the persecution should have reached several millions if all types of death are included.
What is outlined here is only part of the clues on this heinous crime to humanity. It is extremely important for governments and people, both in the West and the East to know and find out the scale and the severity of largely undisclosed persecution.

Much more efforts are needed to stop this crime against humanity and to fully investigate and lay down the framework for the long-overdue justice to be served. I would say that the persecution of Falun Gong is comparable to the Nazi’s holocaust and genocide. It’s a very big issue and we really need much more efforts.

On the other side, Falun Gong practitioners have been peacefully resisting in the persecution. In the last 13 years, even though they have had so many people tortured to death, there is no single case in which Falun Gong practitioners used violence against the perpetrators.

Practitioners have been trying their best to reveal the truth in China and overseas. Also practitioners outside of China have developed media outlets as well as firewall circumvention software to help people in China.

I am one of those people. I went to China to bring true information to the Chinese people and I was detained and later arrested in 2003. When I was unlawfully imprisoned, they also tried everything possible to brainwash me and intimidate me in addition to the physical torture and the forced slave labor. The brainwash sessions lasted for all three years.

They forced me to watch TV programs defaming Falun Gong and praising the Communist Party. Very often they have cut off all of my information sources for weeks on end, not even letting me talk with anybody. After those periods of isolation they would subject me to intensive brainwashing sessions in the hope that my resistance would be reduced.

If I weren’t an American citizen whose case was internationally known, the treatment I experienced would have been much worse. I am thankful very much for this strong support from friends around the world, especially the U.S. Congress, that allowed me to come back to this country with my body intact and my will unbroken.

Another thing I want to emphasize is the awakening of the Chinese people during this decade. While I was imprisoned I wondered to myself how it was that people could so readily abuse and torture their own compatriots, and I wondered to myself how they allowed themselves to be deceived and how they came to be so full of hatred.

At the end of 2004, the book titled, “Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party,” published by Epochtimes, has given answers to these questions and truly led to a historic awakening of the Chinese people. In the past 60-plus years, the Party distorted the Chinese people’s sense of right and wrong and taught them to really view each other as enemies and to struggle against each other. The Party’s ideology is so pervasive that people are even unaware of their inability to think independently.

What is more, from a young age, Chinese people are taught that the Party and the country are the same concept, so whenever someone criticizes the Party they fear that it is an attack on the Nation of China and on themselves as Chinese.
What has happened in the last eight years is that more and more people are quitting the Communist Party membership and other organizations affiliated with the Communist Party. There are many people who have stood out, like attorney Gao Zhisheng. He quit the Communist Party in 2005 and announced that it was his happiest day because he denounced the Communist Party and he was no longer part of the Communist Party.

These people are making the choice to live according to their own conscience. That is really an awakening of the conscience and not according to the will of the Party, and they are refusing to participate in further violations against human rights. The process of denouncing the Party known in Chinese as “Tuidang” is thus a deeply spiritual, personal, and moral process and a method of reconnecting with traditional Chinese values of human-heartedness and compassion.

To date, there are 129 million people in China renouncing and quitting the Party, taking this important step. More and more people’s consciences are free from the CCP’s control. The broad social and political environment is changing. The CCP is losing the battle for the hearts and minds of the Chinese people. This is a process that will ultimately lead to the CCP’s disintegration.

Today, Chinese people are becoming unafraid of suppression and crackdowns by the CCP regime, and more and more people are taking a public stand to support Falun Gong and oppose the persecution.

I would like to conclude my testimony by thanking the leadership of Congressman Smith and Congressman Andrews, along with the other 106 Members of Congress from 32 States for their bipartisan “Dear Colleague” letter to Secretary Clinton explaining the serious concerns over China’s forced organ harvesting from prisoners of conscience and asking the Department of State to release all information about organ harvesting in China, including what Wang Lijun might have shared with U.S. diplomats while seeking asylum at the U.S. consulate in Chengdu. To my knowledge, the Department of State has not yet responded to the “Dear Colleague” letter.

We believe that the United States is the world leader in protecting human rights and has a moral obligation to speak out and help bring an end to this horrific crime against humanity, and we also believe that by doing this the United States will protect itself from being further deceived and harmed by the CCP regime. I did submit a report on the Quitting CCP movement, so maybe you can take that for the record.

Thank you very much.

Chairman Smith. Dr. Lee, thank you very much for your testimony and for your leadership.

Professor Tong?

[The prepared statement and report of Dr. Lee appears in the appendix.]

STATEMENT OF JAMES TONG, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–LOS ANGELES

Mr. Tong. Chairman Smith, thanks for organizing this.
I have personally learned from this hearing from the other witnesses. I have done research on Falun Gong. Of course I've read many accounts of persecution of the Falun Gong, I have even read some of the publications by other witnesses, but they are not as moving as hearing them saying it firsthand, in person.

So, let me begin with what Mr. Hu earlier alluded to, which is that Falun Gong was founded in 1992. This means that this year is the 20th anniversary of the Falun Gong. At the anniversary, the Falun Gong, as well as its Grand Master Li Hongzhi, was inundated with many greetings from China. In all, there are 2,788 greeting cards from all over China from six different administrative regions in China, as well as 23 occupational groups, including teachers, military, law enforcement, and steelworkers, et cetera.

What this suggests is that: (1) there is an extensive network of Falun Gong survivors who outlived the 1999 crackdown; (2) there has been regular and frequent communication with the global Falun Gong community; and (3) China’s regime is either less willing or less able to persecute them.

There are some interesting developments. One, is that the Chief Procurator, the equivalent of the Attorney General in China, has to deliver an annual report to the national legislature in China. In this annual report, he has to list what the major law enforcement problems facing China were in the previous year. From 1999 through 2002, the Falun Gong was listed as a major law enforcement problem in China. But from 2004 onward, it has not been listed as such. That is on the national level.

China has 31 provinces. In each of these provinces, each of the provincial procurators also has to make an annual report to the provincial legislature. In 1999, 29 out of the 31 provincial procurators also listed Falun Gong as a major problem in their province; in 2000, 28 of the 31.

But through 2004 onward, then the number has become single digits. In the last three years, 2009, 2010, 2011, there is not a single province which lists the Falun Gong as a major law enforcement issue in its jurisdiction.

There are other developments as well. One of the earlier witnesses mentioned the 6–10 Office. The 6–10 Office was created on June 10, 1999, with the exclusive function to manage the Falun Gong problem. But starting in 2002, it changed its name to become the Leading Committee on Maintaining Social Stability, along with changes in its function. Its function is no longer exclusively on handling the Falun Gong. It has to deal with other law enforcement issues like peasants demonstrating against being evicted from their land, workers for being fired because their factories were closed, and also citizens protesting high prices.

Other developments also suggest that Falun Gong is no longer perceived as a serious political threat. If it was an important policy matter, then the Politburo would convene a meeting, the Central Committee would issue an important document, and the entire national media would be launched to get involved on the campaign. Xinhua, the official news agency, would have a special commentary. The People’s Daily would have an editorial, and then China’s Central Television would have a special program on the case.
These were all part of the crackdown campaign in 1999, but in the past decade none of these things have happened.

Similar changes also take place at the local level. Unlike what happened in 1999, there are no roadblocks to stop Falun Gong practitioners from going to Beijing or to provincial capitals. There has been no systematic checking of hotels or rental properties for registered Falun Gong members.

Now, this is not to suggest that Falun Gong has been decriminalized, nor does this suggest that this is the end of persecution in China. For sure, as Mr. Hu earlier suggested, if you are a member of the People’s Liberation Army or if you work for the government or you work for the Party, you would be expelled from the military, from the government, from the Party.

And if you unfold a banner of the Falun Gong in public, if you participate in collective meditation in a public park, if you print or distribute Falun Gong publications, you will also be arrested. And if you have been registered as a Falun Gong member, then you are under a surveillance network which is either in your residence or in your workplace. So, all those things would still be true.

It is not a case of persecution or no persecution. It is a case of different levels of persecution and different degrees of perceived threat. It is similar to the case in the United States, where there are five levels of perceived risks of terrorism. So the levels of risks are the severe, the high, the elevated, the guarded, and the low levels. Right now we’re in an elevated level of risks as far as the Department of Homeland Security is concerned.

So if you look at the Falun Gong problem in China, certainly the case was severe in 1999, and from 2000 to about 2003 it was high. But right now it is probably in the low and guarded level. On special occasions like, say, May 13, which is the foundation day of the Falun Gong, or July 20, which is the anniversary of the crackdown on the Falun Gong, then it would be elevated. Then on special events like the 2008 Olympics, then the perceived risk level would be high.

In my prepared statement I have dealt with other issues and I will refer interested parties to look at my prepared statement. Thank you.

Chairman Smith. Thank you, Professor Tong.

Ms. Ford?

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tong appears in the appendix.]

**STATEMENT OF CAYLAN FORD, INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTANT, OTTAWA, CANADA**

Ms. Ford. Thank you. I’d like to thank the Congressional-Executive Commission on China for convening this very important hearing today.

I’d like to begin my testimony with a story about one man whose experience I believe is representative of Falun Gong practitioners in China. This is the story of Qin Yueming. He’s a father and businessman from Yichun City in the northeastern province of Heilongjiang.

Qin learned about Falun Gong in the spring of 1997 while visiting a friend’s home. That evening he practiced Falun Gong’s one-
hour meditation for the first time, and borrowed a copy of its central text, Zhuan Falun.

Soon, Qin's family and friends noted that his temperament changed for the better. He was no longer irritable. He gave up drinking, stopped quarreling with his wife. Neighbors recall that he took it upon himself to repair the potholes on Lixin Street where he lived. Witnessing these changes, Qin's wife also began practicing Falun Gong, as did the couple's two daughters and several of their neighbors.

In October 1999, three months after the persecution of Falun Gong was launched, Qin traveled to a local petitioning office to appeal against the persecution. He was sent immediately to the Yichun City forced labor camp for two years. Not long after his release in April 2002, security agents broke into his home, took him and his wife and their 15-year-old daughter into custody.

In a Kafkaesque trial, Qin was sentenced to 10 years at the Jiamusi Prison. There he endured regular torture and humiliation as guards sought to coerce him into renouncing his spiritual faith. In the spring of 2010, the Communist Party's Central 6–10 Office initiated a new three-year campaign to intensify the ideological re-education of Falun Gong adherence across the country.

Party Web sites in every province of China carried details of the campaign, which set quotas for each region, specifying the percentage of adherents who were to be “transformed,”—a process, as you've already heard, of coercive and often violent indoctrination that ends when the victim renounces Falun Gong.

On February 1, 2011, the Jiamusi prison where Qin Yueming was held established a “Strict Transformation Ward” in compliance with the 6–10 Office directives. At least nine Falun Gong practitioners were transferred to the ward. Within two weeks, three of them were dead.

Qin was the first victim. Less than five days after the establishment of the Strict Transformation Ward, his wife received a phone call from the prison informing her that her husband had died, ostensibly of a heart attack. He was 47 years old.

When she arrived at the prison, she found his entire back covered in deep purple bruises, with dried blood around his nose and mouth. Other inmates and a sympathetic guard related that he'd been violently force-fed the night before. They believed a feeding tube may have punctured his lung.

The two other men who were killed were 48-year-old Yu Yungang—abducted in 2009 and sentenced to eight years in prison—and 55-year-old Liu Chungjing. They all died within days of each other.

But Qin's story did not end here. News of the deaths at Jiamusi quickly were related via an underground network of Falun Gong adherents and published on Web sites overseas. His oldest daughter issued a petition to authorities demanding redress and accountability for his death. Soon, the petition garnered over 15,000 signatures.

I should mention as well that Qin's wife and his youngest daughter were sentenced to a forced labor camp because they were seeking a death certificate, and seven other Falun Gong practitioners were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 11 to 14 years simply
for visiting Qin’s widow. Those sentences were handed down just two months ago.

Similar petitions to the one that I’ve alluded to have sprung up in Heilongjiang, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Liaoning, Henan, and other provinces, demanding justice for Falun Gong practitioners. They have been signed by thousands of ordinary citizens, including members of security forces.

The petitioners have not changed the will of Central Party authorities. Every year they launch renewed efforts to eliminate Falun Gong and undermine public sympathy for the practice. In 2007, as the Congressional-Executive Commission on China documented, security czar Zhou Yongkang, a Politburo Standing Committee member, ordered the nation’s security forces to wage a “Strike Hard” campaign against Falun Gong ahead of the 17th Party Congress and the Beijing Olympics. References to this crackdown were found in provincial jurisdictions of every province in China.

In the first six months of 2008, there were at least 8,000 Falun Gong adherents who were abducted by security agents, typically from their homes. In 2009, the Central CCP leadership initiated the 6521 project aimed at intensifying surveillance and suppression of Tibetans, democracy activists, and Falun Gong practitioners. The campaign was rumored to have been led by Xi Jinping.

Zhou Yongkang led his own top-level CCP committee which exhorted security agencies to “closely watch out for and strike hard against Falun Gong.” Top officials have consistently launched such campaigns, the recent three-year transformation campaign being one iteration.

Now, interestingly, as Dr. Tong mentioned, anti-Falun Gong propaganda has been largely absent at the national level since around the time of the 16th Party Congress in 2002. The campaign’s continued prominence in national media was attracting unwanted international attention to the suppression and the new generation of leaders may have decided that a better PR strategy was to allow the issue to fade away.

But while the high-profile national propaganda campaign petered out, propaganda activities against Falun Gong at the local level have continued unabated. Earlier this year, for example, the Central 6–10 Office launched a comprehensive campaign to clean up Falun Gong information or literature.

The initiative mobilized neighborhood committees to tear down Falun Gong messages that were plastered on billboards, light posts, and telephone poles. In Weifang City, authorities were required to conduct twice-daily patrols looking for Falun Gong pamphlets. In Qingdao, they demanded 24-hour vigilance against Falun Gong’s posters.

The notices also required neighborhood committees to hold study sessions to unify their thinking on the anti-Falun Gong work. They mobilized local Party functionaries to screen anti-Falun Gong forms and go door-to-door, collecting promises from families that they would not support Falun Gong.

A Party document uncovered in several geographically disparate locales earlier this year exhorts authorities to create a climate in
which Falun Gong are “like rats running across the street that everyone shouts out to smash. Don’t leave them any space.”

A Party document from the Laodian township in Yunnan Province dated May 15, 2010, notes that the Falun Gong adherents in custody, however, are “becoming more and more difficult to transform.” The practitioners were returning to the practice with greater frequency and new people were taking up the practice. It further notes that Falun Gong is “fighting with us to win the masses and the struggle to win people’s hearts is still very intense.”

Party documents published this year repeatedly admonished cadres to “overcome their paralysis of thought” and truly understand that the anti-Falun Gong struggle has always been a “long-term, important political task to grasp unremittingly.”

The continued suppression campaign launched against Falun Gong evinced two things. First, to senior leaders of the Communist Party, the eradication effort remains of great importance and continues to command tremendous human and material resources.

Recently released prisoners from China continue to report that in many detention facilities, Falun Gong practitioners comprise the majority population. In the Beijing Women’s Labor Camp, for instance, they are between two-thirds and 80 percent of the imprisoned population. They are singled out for abuse, and of course there are ongoing allegations that the organs of Falun Gong prisoners of conscience are sold for transplant.

Yet, the official Communist Party literature coming out in recent years also reveals that the 13-year-old campaign to defeat Falun Gong has failed, that local cadres are increasingly unwilling to pursue the campaign, despite orders from their superiors, that more and more people are returning to or taking up the practice, and that despite all of its efforts, the Party is losing the battle for the hearts and minds of the Chinese people.

Thank you.

Chairman SMITH. Ms. Ford, thank you very much for your testimony and for your insights.

Mr. Xia?

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ford appears in the appendix.]

STATEMENT OF YIYANG XIA, SENIOR DIRECTOR OF POLICY AND RESEARCH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW FOUNDATION

Mr. XIA. Thank you, Chairman Smith and Cochairman Brown, for holding this hearing. Thank you to the CECC.

I would like to address how this persecution operates without a legal basis. We have established the argument that the Chinese Government never legally banned Falun Gong. This is based on Chinese lawyers who defended Falun Gong practitioners, based on the Chinese Constitution and the Chinese laws.

Since the Falun Gong practitioners didn’t break any law, the regime couldn’t apply the rule of law to deal with the Falun Gong issue. It initiated a political campaign instead. Political campaigns cannot co-exist with the rule of law, so the regime used special tactics to create a very sophisticated system, including setting up a new chain of command outside the legal system, this is the 6–10 Office; using an existing Party system, such as the Political and Legal Affairs Committee [PLAC]; using internal Party documents
to override the laws and the Constitution. It used this method to persecute Falun Gong. So the regime created a system to systematically break the law, to persecute Falun Gong. I have included details in my written statement. This is the result: When the regime systematically breaks its own laws, then nobody is safe. That is the current situation in China.

I will also talk about why Wang Lijun is so important. Wang Lijun fled to the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu, setting off one of the biggest political scandals in China in recent years. But most people don't realize that Wang Lijun's human rights abuses went way back, way before he took the position in Chongqing.

So I would like to mention, Wang Lijun set up and directed a research facility in Jinzhou, Liaoning Province to study and refine the harvesting of organs from prisoners. In 2006, Wang Lijun received the Guanghua Innovation Special Contribution Award for his research on organ transplantation from donors who had been subjected to drug injection.

Why is this so important? Because Wang Lijun's case was well documented and published by the Chinese media before he fell, so the evidence is already there. We know the following facts from the Chinese media and official reports.

First, Wang admitted that he did the organ removal operations.

Second, from the published information, his experiments at least included developing a brand-new protective fluid to preserve the organs that enabled the recipient's body to receive the organ.

Third, during the award ceremony for his organ research, Wang explained that the so-called on-site research is the result of several thousand intensive on-site cases. According to available data, the executions in Jinzhou from 2003 to 2006 would not exceed 100. So the numbers don't match.

Wang Lijun doesn’t have medical training. Without any medical background, he collaborated with top universities, both inside and outside China. He was just a middle-level city police chief. The only reason for the cooperation is that he could offer something the others couldn't: Taking organs from live human beings.

Last, execution is not under a police chief's jurisdiction, and so he is not supposed to execute prisoners.

Then, who are those thousands of prisoners who are under the police chief's jurisdiction? This is where Falun Gong comes in. In November 2009, a World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong investigator interviewed a former member of the Armed Police.

The armed policeman witnessed a female Falun Gong practitioner's organs being removed when she was alive. At the end of the interview, the officer mentioned that he had taken orders from Wang Lijun, who had said to eradicate them all, referring to Falun Gong practitioners.

Taking the entire interview into account, the investigators concluded that although the organ harvesting incident the police officer witnessed had occurred in Shenyang, the victims were likely from Tieling, where Wang was the police chief, and that her detention and prior torture had occurred there.

Finally, I would like to say something about the new leadership. There are several reasons to believe that the policy of persecution
of Falun Gong will not have a big change in the near future under the new leadership. The new leadership will face a big challenge on Falun Gong issues. The Hong Kong Trend magazine published an article in October listing three major challenges that the new leadership would face. One of them was how to handle the anti-Falun Gong campaign.

But why can't the policy of persecuting Falun Gong change? One reason is that the CCP lacks self-correction mechanisms, and the CCP has never fully redressed a political campaign targeted at ordinary Chinese people, never. The Cultural Revolution is the only exception. But the Cultural Revolution was targeted at the Chinese Communist Party itself and at high-ranking Party officials.

Some newly selected members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo are also involved in the persecution. Before and after the 18th Party Congress, the persecution of Falun Gong has become more severe, along with harassment of other religious groups. Finally, the social, political, and economic crisis the CCP is facing will get worse, thus the human rights abuses will get worse.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Xia appears in the appendix.]

Chairman SMITH. Mr. Xia, thank you very much for your testimony.

Let me begin. Professor Tong, your information which you've conveyed to the Commission, I think, is very interesting, particularly Table 2 where you talk about how, on the national level, the enforcement problem from the various counties shows that it probably peaked in 2001, maybe 2003, but then it began to abate.

Now, my question is, so no one draws the wrong conclusion that somehow there's been an easing, is it that—and the others might want to speak to this as well, and Ms. Ford, you spoke about that, and so did Mr. Xia—there seems to be a morphing of how they do it and a change of direction rather than a lack of persecution or an abatement of the maltreatment of Falun Gong practitioners. Is that true or is it a mixed bag?

I mean, I've heard that local cadres are unwilling, and yet the labor camps are overflowing with Falun Gong practitioners, but at the local level it continues unabated in terms of how it is implemented. What is the accurate picture in terms of the level of persecution? Has it changed or has it abated? Are the numbers growing of Falun Gong practitioners?

In light of this gross disinformation campaign, this hate campaign that's being leveled by the government at all levels, are people moving away from the Falun Gong?

Mr. Tong. I would rely on the other, more knowledgeable Falun Gong practitioners to comment and say whether the number of Falun Gong practitioners inside China has been growing or is about the same. Compared with, say, 1999 when we had more or less reliable numbers, the lowest range is 2.3 million and the highest number, as Mr. Hu mentioned, is 80 million. The 2.3 million—I believe, is every one of these 2.3 million number has a name, has an address, so these are actual people with faces.

But after 1999, because the Falun Gong has gone underground, the number will be difficult to know, whether it has been growing or not. It will also be difficult to know at the local level whether
the persecution has been intensifying or abating or not. China has 3,000 counties and over 700 cities, so it’s difficult to know what happens at the local level.

Plus, in the case of the Falun Gong and religious communities, China subscribes to the policy of local management. So there’s really no uniform national policy and that makes the picture all the more confusing.

Chairman Smith. But is there a national strategy that’s being implemented at a local level in a way that is more efficacious for the outcome? I mean, I think, Mr. Xia, you’ve spoken about the extralegal chain of command.

Mr. Xia. I would like to answer this question.

Chairman Smith. Yes, please.

Mr. Xia. I would like to answer this question. First, this is a political campaign of the Party. The 6–10 Office belongs to the Party, not the state, so it’s not required to report to the People’s Congress. It’s an option, but it’s not required. This is first.

Second, the 6–10 Office continues to exist independently from the Maintaining Stability Office. People mix them together because, first, the Maintaining Stability Office was established on the experience of persecution of Falun Gong. So at the beginning, the office members were overlapping, especially when the director of both offices are the same person, Liu Jing. When Liu Jing retired, the offices separated again. You can see it’s a totally different office.

Now, the leader of the 6–10 Office, Central 6–10 Office, is Li Dongsheng and the leader of the Maintaining Stability Office is the Vice Minister of Public Security. So it’s a totally different person. So we cannot mix them together. But they have the same strategies because the Maintaining Stability Office learned experience from the 6–10 Office.

This is a nationwide political campaign. Since there has never been any National People’s Congress that authorized the persecution, we cannot say the persecution never happened. It’s never been state action. It’s a Party action, but it used the state organ as the instrument. That’s my observation.

Chairman Smith. Dr. Lee?

Dr. Lee. I want to just mention that before the persecution started in 1999, the Communist Party’s Sports Commission did an investigation on Falun Gong practitioners. They estimated there were 70 to 100 million people practicing Falun Gong at that time and the National Congress head—his name is Qiao Shi—he also was involved in the investigation. His conclusion was that Falun Gong has nothing bad, but all goodness to the society. Many other officials in the high-level CCP, they all supported Falun Gong.

The number was mentioned and published in the publications before the persecution. When the persecution started, the Communist regime changed the number to 2.3 million. The reason was that they were going to scale down the numbers of Falun Gong practitioners because if they say there are so many people, like 100 million people practicing, then the target is too big and it’s a very bad image. So those are the tactics of the CCP when they do these political movements. They always twist around the numbers.

Another thing. Professor Tong mentioned that after 2002, there was almost no Falun Gong in the media in China. This is also the
strategy, because in the first two years of the persecution it caused a lot of international attention. People saw clearly that there were human rights violations. Everybody was questioning, what’s going on in China? So they decided to go underground, but the persecution never stopped, never reduced or abated.

My personal case is exactly the kind of case they want to cover up in the persecution of Falun Gong. When they arrested me they tried to brainwash me, trying to transform me to give up Falun Gong. After they failed, they changed the tactics. They said we’re not going to talk about Falun Gong anymore because your case is not a religious persecution, your case is a criminal case. So that’s what happened.

They did not allow me to talk about anything concerning Falun Gong at the court and they did not allow me to show the evidences, what were the reasons for which we wanted to reveal the truth. So that is exactly what the Communist Party wanted people to believe in, that Falun Gong is no longer a major problem in China and they do not publicize the persecution, but underground the persecution never abated.

On the other side, because of the resistance by the petitioners, a lot of people, including those policemen, they found their conscience—many of them even helped Falun Gong practitioners in the police station and those kind of places. So that’s like both sides of the story. So I just want to mention this is a tactic of the regime. Thank you.

Ms. Ford. I would be happy to address the question that you had asked about members. Obviously it’s a very opaque climate and it’s very difficult to get a sound assessment. In 2009, there was a human rights lawyer in Beijing who told the Telegraph that he believed there were tens of millions of Falun Gong practitioners, and perhaps more significantly that the practice was growing. This is consistent—we find references to this both within Falun Gong literature and within Party literature. They refer to newly discovered or new practitioners quite frequently, actually with increased frequency.

There was a study done by Falun Gong’s primary overseas Web site in 2009 that produced an estimate of about 40 million people who continued practicing. Not only practicing but who had some level of contact with the wider community. This calculation was based on the number of underground Falun Gong material sites in China.

These material sites are a Samizdat-like network that practitioners have established, where they upload and download information about Falun Gong to and from the international Web site. There are 200,000 of these material sites, and they estimated that each one was connected to dozens or hundreds of Falun Gong practitioners.

There is also some evidence that comes from local-level documents. You will find a particular township or district sometimes referring to the fact that they’ve got 1,600 Falun Gong practitioners that they’re monitoring, for instance. It’s very difficult to piece together a coherent picture, but I think it’s safe to say that the number is, I would say, still probably in the millions.
As far as your question about the willingness of authorities at local levels to implement the persecution, my answer to James Tong’s question is—is this a matter of the Party’s willingness or their ability to fully sort of disintegrate Falun Gong—and I would say that at the Central level the Party is completely willing to pursue the campaign to its end.

They refer to this in official documents from the 6–10 Office at the Central level, they describe this as a matter of “life and death for the Party,” as a “test of the Party’s ability to govern,” in these very hyperbolic terms.

But as Dr. Lee was mentioning, at the local level—this isn’t to say that there aren’t a good number of very sadistic police officers and so on, but at the local level we find increasingly that even members of the security forces are sympathizing with Falun Gong.

You hear stories about 6–10 Officers who visit Falun Gong practitioners, that tell them, “I’m going to have to arrest you in a couple of days because my superiors are watching, but don’t worry, we’ll let you out really fast and we’ll try to protect you.” So this is some of the dynamic.

Of course, it varies from locale to locale, but increasingly we are finding that at the grassroots level, as evidenced as well by these petitioners, that people are increasingly sick of this and that even the cadres who are charged with performing this transformation work, authorities were having a more and more difficult time convincing them of the necessity of the persecution of Falun Gong.

Chairman Smith. Let me ask you, in his testimony Dr. Xu had a final concluding set of paragraphs: What can we do? He had a number of admonitions to the medical community, to society, and to the U.S. Government. One, is the petition that they’ve launched, Dr. Kaplan, Dr. Centurion, and Dr. Xu. They’ve gained over 10,000 signatures within two weeks, asking that President Obama speak out against this horrific practice. I’m wondering what your thoughts are on that approach.

Second, he also asks that Congress adopt legislative changes to prohibit patients from going abroad to receive illegal organ transplants, and then suggests a registry that would include the source of the organ donation. Your thoughts on that?

Finally, in 2000, I authored a law that empowered the U.S. Government to deny visas to anyone who is involved with forced abortion or forced sterilization. Sadly, both the previous administration and the current administration has so inadequately enforced it, that only some 27 people have been denied entry into the United States, despite the fact that forced abortion is absolutely commonplace throughout China. So it has been very ineffectively implemented.

The other side, or a contrary-positive, in 2004 I authored the Belarus Democracy Act, which also has a visa ban in it, and some 200 top people associated with the Lukashenko regime, the last dictatorship in Europe, are denied entry into the United States. The Europeans have a similar annex that lists people and their families who are denied entry into Europe and it has had a huge positive, and I think over time will have a very positive, impact.

I heard from some Belarusian leaders last week at a forum with Freedom House that there are judges who do not want to handle
human rights cases because they don’t want to be put on that list and be denied access to the United States. I just got news a moment ago that Jacob Ostreicher, a man that I’ve been working to get out of prison at the Palmasola Prison in Bolivia, and I actually visited him in June and was down there just last week, he just got bail.

But I introduced a bill called Jacob’s Law that would say that anyone who is engaged in human rights abuse against an American will be denied a visa to the United States, as well as their families, so they can’t send their kids here to college, and hopefully this will have a chilling effect on barbaric practices by these individuals.

There’s a bill that’s pending now, and I’ve introduced it, called H.R. 2121—and I’d appreciate your thoughts on it—that would say that anyone who engages in human rights abuse is inadmissible to the United States. We have already had one hearing at the Judiciary Committee on H.R. 2121. Chai Ling, the great Tiananmen Square activist who now heads up All Girls Allowed, was one of those who testified, as did I.

It seems to me that a very focused sanction of this kind that says to individuals who engage in barbaric practices, well, at the very least you’re not allowed to come to the United States—hopefully the Europeans and other countries will follow suit—will have potentially a chilling effect over time, but will also hold to account those who commit these. It comports, I think, with what Dr. Xu basically is talking about, holding the individuals to account who commit these crimes.

Your thoughts on a visa denial policy, and the other questions that I asked earlier?

Mr. XIA. I think that the State Department already has questions on the online application form, do you ever, I don’t remember exactly, ever involved in forced organ removal operation. They already have one. But I think it should be well-publicized to let everybody know.

Another thing I would like to think about on that “Dear Colleague” letter that Representative Smith initiated and the petition. I think the U.S. Government should respond to those letters and petitions. As I mentioned, Wang Lijun’s case is important because this is the first and only case we know that is published by the Chinese authorities and all the evidence pointed to that one person.

Before, it was all collected evidence: How many? All numbers. But now this is individual. So, this is very important. That’s why the government should get involved, because the individuals, the non-government organizations have limited resources, so the governments should get involved in the investigation. That’s what I think.

Another thing, really short, is there should be some kind of protection for whoever testifies against themselves. Because if the doctor who operates did the organ harvesting and then he testified, then he is against himself. He lost a chance to practice either in China or in the United States. He’s against himself because his actions violated the ethical code. So there should be some kind of protection to protect those who can step out to testify, because who-
Chairman SMITH. Like Dr. Wang.

Dr. LEE. I have some suggestions. First, the State Department should speak out. We heard that in 2009 the Secretary of State said that human rights should not interfere with the trading, which is totally wrong because human rights are for every human being. If we do not respect human rights, if we do not protect human rights, we cannot be called a human being.

So the U.S. Government should have this right stance. There should be no exceptions. If there is any human rights violation, the U.S. Government should speak out; let alone these severe, heinous crimes happening in China, as the scale that I just talked about. It’s comparable to the Nazi’s holocaust or genocide.

For visa denials, the second step, we can do that in the legislative branch. Also, what we can do is like the Bo Xilai case. We know that their family has $6 to $8 billion U.S. dollars outside of China. We can trace this money down, maybe freeze these accounts. Also, for these confirmed human rights perpetrators—against humanity—they should be arrested if they come to the United States or other countries. There should be this kind of law and it should be explored in this direction later on. But the U.S. Government should speak out clearly to the CCP regime that no such thing could happen in this world, we cannot see it happening and do the trading normally. Thank you.

Ms. FORD. With respect to H.R. 2121, I think it has the potential to be very powerful. Falun Gong sources have already compiled massive lists with the names, often the addresses, phone numbers, educational backgrounds of those who are particularly egregious in their use of torture and coercion in the persecution. So these lists already exist and are often fairly well corroborated.

To give an example of why this kind of thing is powerful, just at the micro-level within China, one of the things that Falun Gong practitioners have done very effectively to mitigate the worst excesses of persecution is precisely to adopt a kind of name-and-shame tactic against the perpetrators.

So if there’s one police officer or prison guard who’s particularly vile, they’ll post information about them, about their crimes and their use of torture, they’ll give it to the man’s wife, to his kids, they’ll put it on telephone poles, and that person will largely stop doing that. They will also publish it overseas with their phone numbers and the person will be inundated with phone calls explaining to them why they shouldn’t be complicit in crimes against humanity.

So even though that’s just at the local level, the risk of people losing their reputation, their standing in the community because of these things, I think is very potent. At the larger level, many Chinese officials at the mid-levels and higher have assets abroad or have children that they’ve sent abroad or intend to and hold foreign passports, so I think it could be a very strong deterrent.

On the question that was raised in the previous panel as well about the impact of public pressure in individual cases, I think the Chinese Government has sometimes been deliberately inconsistent in how they respond to such pressure, precisely so that Western
policymakers can’t figure out the most effective way to engage with them on human rights. So in some cases attention on a particular case can exacerbate the abuses.

But what I have found, and I think the Falun Gong victims on these panels would agree, is that on a whole the pressure is beneficial. Take the case of Bu Dongwei, an Amnesty International prisoner of conscience, who was detained twice at the same labor camp in Beijing.

The first time there was no international attention attached to his case and he was tortured very severely. The second time he noticed that other prisoners were still being tortured severely, but he was not. What he didn’t know is that Amnesty had listed him as a prisoner of conscience, his wife was lobbying for him at the State Department, and that contributed directly to an improvement in his condition.

Mr. Tong. Diplomacy is always a two-way street. American citizens are paying a very high visa fee to go to China. It’s because the U.S. Government is requiring Chinese citizens coming to the United States to pay a high U.S. visa fee.

So if we say the State Department wants to deny visas to certain categories of Chinese citizens, it is quite likely that China will also reciprocate and deny visas to certain categories of American citizens, so it needs to be thought through. That’s my only comment.

Chairman Smith. Let me just say, the State Department celebrated the one millionth visa granted to an American citizen just a few months ago, but this Chairman—me—I have been denied a visa, as have members of our staff, to travel to China because we’ve raised the case of Chen Guangcheng and wanted to visit him. So it is a one-way street.

When you’re talking about abusers, any collateral damage that might be done if it has any mitigating effect on the abuse is well worth it, in my opinion, which is why I think we need to promulgate lists. Again, I heard it as recently as two weeks ago from Belarusian leaders that certain judges—and I want to get more information on this to see how widespread it is—simply will not take up human rights cases because they don’t want to be on the list.

I think if we are serious about it and promulgate these lists and hold our own government to account and say we don’t want them coming here—when I was in La Paz, I raised with government officials of Evo Morales that Jacob’s Law, which is a parallel to everything we’re talking about here—we’re saying if you want to send your kids, and you’re an abuser, to University of Miami or some other school, forget about it because we’re serious about abuse.

All these other positives that you might glean from coming to the United States, like going on a shopping spree, enjoying the benefits of Disney World, or sending your kids to Yale or Harvard, or wherever you want to send them, from our point of view is part of the price of trying to help victims, because this Commission and everything we do on the Human Rights Committee and what we should be first and foremost all about, in my opinion, is victims, to try to mitigate and lessen the number of victims.

It seems a no-brainer that holding abusers to account, they should be before a court of law, on their way to the Hague, or if it’s an international issue for crimes against humanity, rather than
whether or not there might be some corresponding retaliation by the Chinese.

Bring it on. I would say to the Chinese Government, we need to be very serious about abuse. We have not been, and as a government, it goes through successive administrations that have been very weak and vacillating when it comes to human rights of the Chinese people. That has to change.

On May 26, 1994, Bill Clinton de-linked most-favored-nation status from our trade policy. We have seen a deterioration—it was already bad, obviously—every since. I think while we may never get that back again, we do have other tools in the toolbox and we need to use them. If any of you have any final comments, any statement you’d like to make before we conclude the hearing, please. Dr. Lee? You don’t have to if you don’t want to.

Dr. Lee. Yes. I just want to thank you and all the other members on the CECC for their hard work. It’s extremely important for us to face the human rights violations in China because China is such a big country. As I said, even the transient population in China is 300 million. It’s like the entire United States population is moving around, moving from city to city looking for jobs, that kind of thing.

The impact is huge so we have to really look into these things and do whatever is possible. As I also said, people in China are awakening, so we do see hope and we do know that we need to do a lot more things. We hope we can do this together with the U.S. Government. Thank you very much.

Chairman Smith. Professor?

Mr. Tong. I just want to commend Mr. Smith’s principled position on human rights.

Chairman Smith. Thank you.

Ms. Ford. I’ll just echo that. Thank you again for convening this hearing.

Mr. Xia. Thank you for holding this hearing. Another thing is the petition outside. I think whoever attends this meeting and hasn’t signed, please do so when the hearing is finished. Thank you.

Chairman Smith. Thank you very much.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m. the hearing was concluded.]
I want to thank Chairman Smith and Co-chairman Brown for holding this important hearing and inviting me to testify today.

My name is Chung Tung-pang, manager of INTEK TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. in Taiwan. I have been practicing Falun Gong since 2001. Like hundreds of thousands of Falun Gong practitioners in Taiwan, I follow this spiritual path because Falun Gong has not only brought me good health but also provided me with meaningful spiritual guidance.

I traveled to Ganzhou City, Jiangxi Province to visit my family members on June 15, 2012. My father's ex-wife and my two elder half-brothers live there. During the several days of visit, I didn't do any Falun Gong activities or contact any Falun Gong practitioners in Mainland China. On June 18, I was on my way back to Taiwan as planned. When I was just about to board the flight from Ganzhou to Shenzhen, I was forcefully taken away by the State Security agents. I was then detained for 54 days under the vague accusation of sabotaging national security and public security until my release on August 11.

My family members in both Mainland China and Taiwan didn't know about my secret arrest. First, I protested with a hunger strike. I demanded that these plain-clothed State Security agents should inform my family members. At the same time, I should have an attorney. However, my legal rights were ignored. No attorney came to my defense. In the afternoon of the second day of my detention, I was allowed to see my family members in Ganzhou City. Then, while under police surveillance, I was allowed to make a call home. They instructed me to inform my wife that I would be able to go home two days later, but that turned out to be a lie.

Without the presence of my attorney, I was subject to marathon interrogation sessions that drove me to deep fatigue. They verified my answers over and over again. On July 11, I finally saw Attorney Guo Lianhui, who my family in Ganzhou retained for me. However, I couldn’t communicate with my attorney in private. He only saw me once. He was turned down by the State Security when he requested to see me for the second time. During my detention, I was deprived of my basic human rights. I had no protection at all. My pain was beyond words.

The place I was detained included a bedroom, an interrogation room, and a dinner table. Two or more people were watching me at all times. I had to keep the bathroom door half open—I had no privacy at all.

The main content of the interrogations was as follows:

1. An incident in 2003 in which I mailed TV hijacking equipment to Falun Gong practitioners in Mainland China.
2. I had once asked a Mainland China Falun Gong practitioner to provide documents regarding how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tried to systematically eliminate and persecute Falun Gong. At the time, this Mainland China practitioner was an officer himself. Afterwards however, he was arrested later and forced to sign the so-called “guarantee letter” not to practice Falun Gong.
3. I tried to broadcast truth films regarding persecution of Falun Gong via satellite signals in Taiwan.
4. The wanted to know all the methods that Taiwan Falun Gong practitioners use to expose the persecution of Falun Gong in Mainland China.
5. They tried to force me to provide all names, phone numbers, email address and participating projects of Falun Gong practitioners in Taiwan.

Without the presence of my attorney, State Security agents interrogated me for a long time and threatened me if I did not cooperate with them. These threats included:

1. That they would bring in a harsher team to handle me.
2. That they would change my civil detention to a criminal detention. Once this change was made, I would then be detained with other prisoners and interrogated behind bars.
3. That they would send me to judicial authorities and threaten that I would have to serve at least three years of jail term.

What is most unacceptable to me was the State Security Bureau in Ganzhou City forced me to sign a “Confession Statement”, and asked me to admit that I committed a crime to endanger (Chinese) national security, public safety, and sabotage
They said my help to intercept TV signals resulted in losses for the nation and society. Among all these nonsense accusations, they never asked why I would think of using satellite interception technology to help the Chinese public understand the truth of the persecution of Falun Gong (in the first place); Chinese people are entitled to freedom of belief under the Chinese Constitution, and they should be not be persecuted for what they believe.

The day before they allowed me to go back to Taiwan, they told me that as early as one week before I arrived in mainland China, they had already prepared to put me under "house arrest" and waited for me. This showed that when I was preparing for the trip to mainland, they’d known my itinerary and were ready to take action against me.

Three weeks or so before I went back to Taiwan, they began to threaten me to admit my "guilt" and "remorse." I was forced to write and re-write many times the statement. The night before they let me go back to Taiwan, Jiangxi Television (the government TV station in Jiangxi Province) was arranged to be where I was held in Nanchang City (the capital city of Jiangxi Province) to video-tape my "remorse," and I was threatened "not to be too outspoken" after I got to Taiwan. If I spoke out, they threatened to release this "remorse" video.

Undeterred, I called for a press conference on the third day after I landed in Taiwan, openly stating that:

1. What I wrote in that so-called "confession statement" and all the interrogation records, were not done with my free will. All the details I provided (during the interrogation) were made up by me to deal with their threats.
2. I will continue to spread the truth to the Chinese public until the day the persecution ends.
3. As an individual living in free and democratic Taiwan, it is an appropriate and just action for me to help the Chinese public, who have been deceived and persecuted by the Chinese community party.

Not until I returned to Taiwan did I realize that Falun Gong practitioners in Taiwan, non-government organizations, and the people of Taiwan had put in tremendous efforts to rescue me: about 200,000 people in Taiwan signed a letter campaign that urged President Ma Ying-jeou to strive to gain my release; over 30 non-government organizations came together to organize activities and on three occasions accompanied my family during their petitions at the Office of the President. As far as I know, the main reason that I was able to come back to Taiwan as a free man was the support from the people in Taiwan, while the Administration was relatively passive. Up to now, the Taiwan government has not formally responded to the requests of myself, my family, and other organizations regarding the protection of Taiwanese personal safety in Mainland China.

Additionally I wish to make two points clear.

First, the Chinese Communist does not only persecute Falun Gong practitioners in China; they have also extended the persecution overseas toward Taiwan. According to the Taiwan Falun Dafa Association, I am the 17th Taiwanese Falun Gong practitioner subject to persecution from the Chinese Communist Party.

Second, the Chinese Communist Party has hired spies overseas to illegally collect Falun Gong practitioners' personal information and information of their activities. The regime has illegally abducted foreign Falun Gong practitioners that travel to China. The international society should condemn these behaviors.

In Taiwan, I am a respected and highly educated intellectual with a decent job and no criminal record. I am the same as the hundreds of thousands of people in Taiwan who practice Falun Gong and adhere to the principle of Truthfulness-Compassion-Tolerance. I enjoy the freedom of expression and freedom of belief guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of China. I also join the great efforts of tens of millions of fellow Falun Gong practitioners in spreading the facts of the persecution and calling for the international community to stop this prolonged persecution.

Finally, I would like to thank members of U.S. Congress and European Parliament for their efforts to secure my release. At the same time, I am also worried about many Falun Gong practitioners in prisons, labor camps, and detention centers in China who are facing torture and even facing the risks of being killed for their organs. The United States is the world's leader in human rights. I hope that the U.S. Congress and President Obama publicly ask the Chinese Communist Party to stop the persecution of Falun Gong. I sincerely hope that when the regime's crimes against humanity are finally put to an end, all the Chinese people around of the world will be able to thank the righteous efforts from the United States.

Thank you.
I wish to express a heart-felt thank you to Chairman Smith and Co-chairman Brown for holding this important hearing. I am truly honored to be your guest and hope that my experiences below will be helpful to you.

I have organized my written testimony into four sections.

(1) Personal experiences of finding and practicing Falun Gong, both before and after the persecution.

(2) Resistance to the persecution.

(3) Details of three instances of detention over 8 years and two months.

(4) Observations on how practitioners’ resistance to the persecution has rendered it unsuccessful and how it cannot be sustained for much longer.

(1) PERSONAL EXPERIENCES OF FINDING AND PRACTICING FALUN GONG

I was born in northeast China, Liaoning Province, in the middle of the Cultural Revolution, in 1972. Because my father had been labeled a Rightist, the first fourteen years of my life were spent living on different farms with my parents and three older brothers, where we received “re-education” through manual labor. I vividly remember as part of the re-education posters depicting Confucius as a ferocious monster and liar when he was criticized by the CCP in its political activity. I also remember being terribly cold. Our clothes were always tattered and I believe that because of this, I had a runny nose, congested sinuses and horse breathing for my entire life.

My views on Confucius and the cultural legacy he represents, as well as my nasal condition dramatically changed when I first started practicing Falun Gong in November, 1997. At that time I had already earned a B.S. in Radar and a M.S. in Informational Technology from the Air Force Engineering University in Xi’an City. I was living and working at the Institute of Military Training Equipment under the Air Force Headquarters in Beijing. Although I was an Officer in the military and enjoyed a good lifestyle, I felt empty. Chinese people as a whole knew little of our cultural heritage, which had been systematically destroyed by the CCP through its many political activities. Still, very few people, if any, believed in Communist ideology, either. I believed there was more to life than material pursuit.

My older brother, who was living in San Francisco, mailed the main book of Falun Gong, Zhuan Falun, to me. I immediately discovered that this practice represented a precious opportunity for any individual to raise their spirit, as well as the best opportunity for society to stabilize and return to a level where ethical behavior was cherished. In these early weeks of practice, the most memorable experiences were the inexplicable healing of my life-long respiratory and sinus condition as well as dramatic improvement in my outlook of the world. The military bureaucracy is extremely politicized and corrupt, with bribery and embezzlement being the norm. By adjusting my behavior to Falun Gong’s guiding principles of Truthfulness, Compassion and Tolerance, by taking personal interest more lightly and by striving to be unaffected by others wronging me, I felt lightness in my spirit and in my step. Work and relationships went more smoothly and I found a happiness I had never experienced.

I benefited greatly at this time from the veteran Falun Gong practitioners at the practice site within the Air Force Command University, which was across the street from my campus. 40 to 50 Air Force officers or professors regularly attended the morning exercises.

At this time, 1998–1999, Falun Gong practice sites were everywhere. Just about every morning, when I left my campus for errands around Beijing, I would see scores, even hundreds of people practicing the Falun Gong exercises in parks or grassy boulevards.

(2) MY RESISTANCE TO THE PERSECUTION

Starting in April of 1999, the situation changed dramatically. After the “4–25 Incident,” in which as many as 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners appealed to the central government to, among other things, release Falun Gong practitioners detained in Tianjin city and stop publishing articles defaming Falun Gong, most workplaces and housing units around Beijing put pressure on people to stop practicing Falun Gong. Nearly all of the 40–50 Air Force officers and professors in my practice group continued, however.

By June, the situation was more tense. China had sought to have Mr. Li Hongzhi extradited from the United States. Mr. Li published a short article in response but
many practitioners were not able to read it as the regular channels among practitioners had been disrupted. Perhaps members of the Falun Dafa Buddha Research Society had already been detained. Perhaps in some areas the Internet was already blocked. I did not know the exact reason but I printed this and several other subsequent articles by Mr. Li from the Minghui.org, a website founded by US-based practitioners. I distributed copies to the military officers.

By mid-June, the Minghui website was blocked and I had to circumvent the blockade using techniques that most computer users would be unable to use. At this time we also lost our practice site as a regulation had been passed prohibiting military personnel from practicing Falun Gong. We tried to practice outside the Air Force compound but were usually forced to disperse by public security.

On July 13, Mr. Li published another short article. I was again able to print and make copies of it but by this time there were few people left to give it to. They no longer came out to the practice sites and I lost contact with them from that point on.

On July 20, when the practice was officially banned, the whole country seemed to be on edge. I later learned that not only all military personnel, but even all workplaces and housing units across the country ordered all people to watch CCTV news programming that explained the ban on Falun Gong. Even people who had never heard of Falun Gong were ordered to watch it. The widespread reaction was initially one of shock and curiosity.

Already relatively sheltered because I was living on a military compound, in the next two or three months I had very little contact with other practitioners. I left Beijing for several weeks in August and September for a military exercise and when I returned the situation was the same. I decided to bypass the Internet blockade again to find out news from the Minghui website. I learned that thousands of practitioners from around the country had been pouring into Beijing to appeal the government ban. I also learned that there had already been cases of abuse, including practitioners being tortured to death.

I learned that the burden on Beijing practitioners was immense because hotels would not give rooms to appealing practitioners from out of town, and, moreover, there were updates on the increasing gravity of the situation that the out-of-towners needed to hear. I realized that my skills on the computer were quite valuable at this time and took it upon myself to share these with other practitioners.

By the beginning of 2000, the situation among practitioners had changed dramatically. It had gone from one of shock, disbelief and confusion to one of urgency and clarity. The persecution was getting more and more serious, with deaths and accounts of abuse mounting. We needed to be proactive.

Then-UN Ambassador Kofi Annan was scheduled to visit Beijing in March, 2000. I agreed to assist in a plan to collect signatures from practitioners around the country for a petition that would ask him to intervene. As my days were generally quite busy on the military compound I knew I needed more time to accomplish this task and in early March decided to leave, with no notice.

The political affairs committee of my workplace found out and acted right away. They had always known I was a practitioner but were loath to report me or even put a lot of pressure on me. As the military and political organs are different entities, they chose to bide their time with the many officers in their ranks who practiced Falun Gong. They did not want the responsibility of transforming practitioners, (who posed no threat to their organization, and usually, as in my case, were model employees,) and yet, at the same time, did not want the political blemish of having a Falun Gong practitioner. When I left, however, they needed to report my status as a Falun Gong practitioner and, now, one who was missing.

They looked at the records of my apartment landline and within one weeks time were able to find me in the act of exchanging signatures for the Kofi Annan petition. They took me back to my workplace where the Air Force Deputy Commander criticized my boss over my situation.

They held me for more than two months at an Air Force base outside of Beijing. I stayed in a bunker and was watched 24 hours a day by 4 soldiers at any given time. The soldiers respected me because I was an officer but they were ordered to show me endless hours of brainwashing programs. I rationally explained why all of the programs were false and how they had not convinced me to stop practicing.

Seeing that they couldn’t convince me to quit practicing along these lines, officers attempted to appeal to me on ideological grounds, stating, “As a Master’s degree holder you are a member of the Communist Party? As a military officer you should be especially clear ideologically. How could a military officer not be an atheist?” I asked for a piece of paper and wrote, “Then I quit the Communist Party.”

They then showed me a report that the Central Government had written on Falun Gong prior to banning it. It estimated the number of practitioners around the coun-
try to be 80 million which was later lowered to 60 million for the reason that limited
the effect. The officers then argued, "But you are still a military officer. Think about
it. If so many people are practicing, including military officers, and they are not
ideologically clear, how can our military continue to function properly?" I wrote,
"then I won't be an officer anymore."

Having failed to transform me, 4 armed officials escorted me back to by home-
town, Dandong, Liaoning Province, in May. In Dandong, they registered my civilian
status with local authorities as a matter of medical discharge. They did not mention
Falun Gong as doing so would have placed the burden of transformation on the local
authorities, who would then have insisted that the Air Force be in charge of trans-
forming me. This fact is illustrative of the means of the Communist Party system
to carry out the persecution of Falun Gong. Because the Communist Party decreed
Falun Gong to be illegal, it put pressure on the military and all levels of govern-
ment to carry out the decree. No level of government wanted the burden of trans-
forming Falun Gong practitioners as it was expensive and exhaustive, but if they
did not they could lose favor with higher authorities who would, in turn, lose favor
with the Central Government. It was often easier to look the other way.

I stayed with my family for ten days in Liaoning Province but then returned to
Beijing. As my records as a Falun Gong practitioner were only within the Air Force,
I felt relatively free as a civilian. I met with several Beijing practitioners who were
skilled in computers as I was. We decided that we needed to share our expertise
with others around the country so as to create a network of people that could pass
information to each other. More importantly, Minghui and other media would
spread the blocked information to the international society, exposing the evil activ-
ity of the CCP. The free flow of information, we realized, was most feared by the
Communist Party because it was the most important element to withstanding and
exposing the persecution.

Travelling around China was difficult and complicated. Out of safety concerns my
one companion and I could not contact many practitioners. We started with people
we knew to be genuine practitioners, and then asked them to organize small meet-
ings with 5 to 15 others who might possesses the necessary technical expertise. Be-
tween May and October of 2000, we established viable lines of communication be-
tween Minghui and trained practitioners in at least seven cities from all different
regions.

Through our efforts, timely news of practitioner detentions, abuse and deaths
were reported on the Internet. In time the postings became detailed, including the
names, addresses and phone numbers of the perpetrators. It was found, the years
that followed, that as more and more information exposing the persecution was pub-
lished, the pressure on local practitioners became less. Minghui also proved to be
invaluable as a resource for practitioners to learn from each other about matters
related to personal cultivation and matters of faith and courage.

(3) INCARCERATION

Our successes came to a halt on October 4, in the early dawn hours, when a group
of ten police officers knocked on my Shanghai hotel door. I yelled loudly so as to
alert two other practitioners in nearby rooms. They managed to escape the hotel but
the officers detained me and found evidence of the Minghui website on my laptop.

I went through a show trial and was charged with "using a cult to destabilize soci-
ety." They held me at a detention center for 26 months instead of placing me in
prison because they wanted to find more evidence against me, an ex-military official
with expertise in information technology. They wanted to frame me as a spy work-
ing with an overseas brother and possibly the American government. They wanted
to build a story around me that would give credence to some of the propaganda that
claimed Falun Gong was an established organization with a lot of funding from hos-
tile overseas forces with political motives.

They were unable to collect any other evidence that would help those claims and
sent me to the Shanghai Tilan Qiao Prison for 22 more months. Conditions were
considerably worse in the prison. Whereas before I was beaten for refusing to wear
the detention center uniform, I was still permitted to practice Falun Gong exercises
and read Falun Gong books. In the prison there was no chance for Falun Gong exer-
cises. They tried their utmost to "transform" me.

There were approximately 150 prisoners in my division and about 50 were Falun
Gong practitioners. Very vicious criminals with sentences normally over 15 years
beat us regularly. Their sentences could be reduced if they kept practitioners from
practicing or even successfully transform us. The guards did not beat us themselves
but further incited the criminals by placing one practitioner and two criminals in
a three-square meter cell. As a practitioner I could withstand being in such a small space, but a violent criminal became even more violent under such circumstances.

In addition there were times when I was forced to watch brainwashing programs at deafening volumes, with the TV screen only one meter from my face, for 16 or more hours a day. They deprived me of sleep as well.

Under these conditions I was approaching rock bottom, so I started a hunger strike that would last from August to October of 2004. They bound my limbs and torso to a hospital bed so that I could not move at all. They inserted a feeding tube in through my nose to my stomach. I was in this position for over a month, during the hottest time of the year, unable to move, itchy from sweat as well as weeks of defecation matter buildup. They also injected me with an unknown substance that would give me headaches that I felt put me on the brink of insanity. During this time they also drew large quantities of blood and routinely examined my body.

I survived my prison term and was released in October, 2004, having served a total of four years in the detention center and then prison. I lived in my hometown in Liaoning for six months but decided to not burden my parents and family members, who were not wealthy, any longer. I moved to Beijing to seek employment and resume work with practitioners there to counteract the persecution.

Several plain-clothed policeman saw me distributing a DVD of the 9–Commentaries to someone on the street in early September, giving rise to a chase and eventually capture. Another show trial ensued and I was again sentenced to four years in prison on Sept 23, 2005. I entered Beijing Haidian District Detention Center that was even more vicious that my experiences in Shanghai. Knowing the difficulties involved with a hunger strike, it took me some time to summon the will to sustain one. But by May 13, 2006, I was once again protesting my detention with a hunger strike. Guards shackled me to a hospital bed for six months straight and, similar to my experience in Shanghai, force-fed me through a tube in my nose, and injected me with drugs that numb the nerves. They took my blood samples and performed comprehensive physical examinations from time to time but never did they administer medical treatment for my ailments. I didn’t know anything about organ harvesting at that time. Now looking back, I am scared, as they could be checking my candidacy for organ harvesting.

In six months time I was transferred to the Jinzhou Prison Hospital in Liaoning Province. They no longer needed to shackle me as by this time I was but a skeleton on the brink of death and totally immobile. The force feeding continued, as did the painful injections and oddly placed medical exams. During the next three years, until my term expired, my weight fluctuated. For months at a time I would grow bloated and fat, seemingly due to a different force-feeding diet. Then I would become skeletal once again when they denied me food.

I narrowly survived more than three years of such treatment, languishing on either a hospital bed or a wheel chair, until my term ended in September 2009. Hospital doctors advised my family that I would likely die and that, even if I didn’t, I would be permanently disabled for the rest of my life.

(4) THE PERSECUTION HAS FAILED

The Communist Party’s persecution has failed to wipe out Falun Gong from China and it can not be sustained for much longer. I make this assertion based on observations of the greater situation as well as personal experience.

For the ten years I lived in China under the persecution, I spent eight years and two months in custody, and over half of this time languishing alone. After my three releases from custody I lived for a time with my parents in Liaoning Province. In 2000 I saw no signs of Falun Gong practitioner activity in Liaoning Province. In 2004 I saw no signs of Falun Gong practitioner activity in Liaoning Province. In 2000 I saw no signs of Falun Gong practitioner activity in Liaoning Province. In 2004 I saw no signs of Falun Gong practitioner activity in Liaoning Province. In 2009 I saw copious posters, signs, flyers and informational DVDs. Moreover, the posters hung in public places had been there for a long time, with ink faded from the sun and paper crisp from dried rain. I believe that, like my hometown in Liaoning, even the CCP continues to order people to persecute Falun Gong, more and more people know the truth of the persecution. That is, more and more people see through the once-widespread lies that substantiated the decision to ban the practice.

I make the above assertion because I have also seen the efforts by people like myself, proficient in computer technology and proxy circumnavigation software, breed success in making Minghui an accurate, timely and truthful tool to expose the persecution.
Finally, I make the above assertion based on my personal experience. When the doctors released me, an immobile skeleton in a wheelchair, to my parents and brothers in October 2009, they said I would likely die. For this reason the 610 Office and other public security personnel didn’t bother my house. But I resumed my cultivation in Falun Dafa, studying the teachings, reflecting on matters of my spirit, and practicing the Falun Gong exercises. In two months time I could walk around my house. In three months time I could perform strengthening exercises outdoors. I stand here before you today, three years later, almost completely healed with no visible trace of the depraved state the persecution left me in. This is a testament to the power and wonder of this spiritual practice. It also perhaps helps you understand how I could withstand 8 years of hell and persevere in my faith.

For a person of faith, his conscience, more than the physical body, is his life. This persecution has managed to take away physical bodies but it has not managed to shake the conscience of the people. I believe we are now seeing the people of China wake up to the facts of this persecution, to the facts of the Communist Party’s wickedness, and to a day when our conscience is free.

I thank you and the great nation you represent immensely for your efforts to bring justice to China.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SARAH COOK
DECEMBER 18, 2012

Good morning Chairman Smith, Co-Chairman Brown, members of the commission, ladies and gentleman in the audience. Thank you for convening this hearing and for inviting me to participate. I have been asked to address the origins of the Communist Party's campaign against Falun Gong and in my brief time, I will do my best to cover this complex topic.

Today, Chinese citizens who practice Falun Gong live under constant threat of abduction and torture. The name of the practice, its founder Mr. Li Hongzhi, and a wide assortment of homonyms are among the most censored terms on the Chinese Internet. Any mention in state-run media or by Chinese diplomats is inevitably couched in demonizing labels.

But this was not always the case. Throughout the early and mid-1990s, Falun Gong, its practitioners, and its founder were often the subjects of awards, positive media coverage, and government support. From 1992 to 1994, Mr. Li toured the country giving lectures and seminars to introduce the practice under the auspices of the state-run qigong association. State media reports from that period laud the benefits of Falun Gong practice and show Falun Gong practitioners receiving "healthy citizen awards." In an occurrence almost unimaginable today, Mr. Li gave a lecture at the Chinese embassy in Paris in 1995, at the government's invitation.

As word spread, Chinese from every strata of society—doctors, farmers, workers, soldiers, some of them Communist Party members—began taking up the practice. Sites of daily exercise groups in Beijing, for instance, included professors from the prestigious Tsinghua University or employees of state media like Xinhua or China Central Television. Though students of Falun Gong would gather in groups to practice its meditative exercises, many saw the discipline as a personal rather than collective endeavor to enhance their health, mental well being, and spiritual wisdom. There were no signs of a political agenda or even criticism of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as one sees in Falun Gong literature after the persecution began. By 1999, according to government sources, Western media reports, and Falun Gong witnesses, tens of millions of people were practicing.

SO WHAT WENT WRONG?

The answer lies in a combination of ideological fears, institutional factors, and an individual leader's fateful decision.

Falun Gong is a spiritual practice whose key features are qigong exercises and teachings reminiscent of Buddhist and Taoist traditions that have been an essential dimension of Chinese culture for thousands of years. It inevitably encourages ways of thinking outside the boundaries of Party doctrines. Yet for decades, the Party has systematically sought to suppress independent thought, be it in the form of religious...
faith or political expression. It displays a low tolerance for groups or individuals who place any authority, spiritual or otherwise, above their allegiance to the Party. For persecuted Tibetans, this authority is the Dalai Lama; for persecuted human rights lawyers, it is the law; for persecuted Falun Gong adherents, it is the dedication to spiritual teachings centered on the values of truthfulness, compassion, and tolerance.

Falun Gong’s emphasis on these three values as part of its theistic worldview appears to have especially attracted the Party’s ire. The concepts seemed to conflict with Marxism and other ideas that have been a source of legitimacy for the CCP’s authoritarian rule—like materialism, political struggle, and nationalism. The spread of Falun Gong began to be seen as a fundamental challenge to the Party’s authority. Xinhua hinted at this in one of its articles in 1999 after the ban: “In fact, the so-called ‘truth, kindness and tolerance’ principle preached by Li Hongzhi has nothing in common with the socialist ethical and cultural progress we are striving to achieve.”

Perhaps even more than free thinking, the Communist Party feels threatened by independent civil society entities and collective organization. As the popularity of qigong practices, and among them Falun Gong, grew in the mid-1990s, the Party attempted to insert itself into their activities and bring them under its control. In 1996 it sponsored a state-run qigong association with which Falun Gong was linked in-structed the establishment of Party branches among its followers and wished to profit from Falun Gong, Li Hongzhi parted ways with the association. He intended for Falun Gong to be a personal practice without formal membership and shared free of charge. As it continued to spread in society, Falun Gong’s spiritual independence was coupled with a loosely knit network of meditation practice sites and “assistance centers” sprinkled throughout the country.

From 1996 to 1999, many in the government and the party held favorable views of Falun Gong and publicly cited its benefits for health and even social stability. But as Falun Gong’s popularity and independence from Party control grew, several top cadres began viewing it as a threat. This translated into repression that showed first signs in 1996. The publication of Falun Gong books by state printing presses was banned shortly after their being listed as bestsellers. Attempts to register under various government organizations were denied. Sporadic articles began appearing in state-run news outlets smearing Falun Gong. Security agents began monitoring practitioners and occasionally dispersing outdoor meditation sessions.

In April 1999, the escalating harassment culminated in several dozen practitioners being beaten and arrested in Tianjin. Those calling for their release were told that the orders had come from Beijing. On April 25, over 10,000 adherents gathered quietly outside the national petitions office in Beijing, adjacent to the Zhongnanhai government compound, asking for an end to abuses and recognition of their right to practice.

Some observers have pointed to this incident as taking Party leaders by surprise and triggering the suppression that followed. Such an interpretation is flawed, however, when one considers that it was escalating harassment led by central officials—including then-security tsar Luo Gan—that sparked the appeal in the first place.

Rather, the event was pivotal because of how individual Party leaders responded to it. Premier Zhu Rongji took an appeasing stance toward Falun Gong. He was prepared to resolve the grievances. He met with several of the petitioners' rep-
resentatives. The practitioners in Tianjin were released and those in Beijing went home.

But then-Party Secretary Jiang Zemin overruled Zhu's conciliatory approach, calling Falun Gong a serious challenge to the regime's authority, "something unprecedented in the country since its founding 50 years ago." In a circular dated June 7, Jiang issued his fateful order to "disintegrate" Falun Gong. Indeed, several experts have attributed the campaign to Jiang's personal jealousy deriving from the sincere enthusiasm Falun Gong inspired at a time when he perceived his own standing in the eyes of the Chinese public as weak.

Whatever the specific events of the late 1990s, however, the repression of Falun Gong in China cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Rather, it is one episode within the Communist Party's long history of arbitrarily suppressing the basic rights of Chinese citizens, including via political campaigns launched against perceived "enemies." The party's tactics have become more subtle and sophisticated in recent decades. But the underlying principle and institutional dynamic remains the same: the decision of what is approved or forbidden is made arbitrarily by Party leaders and the institutions—like an independent judiciary—that might curb their excesses are kept within the Party's realm of influence. This is the case with the daily censorship directives issued by the propaganda department and applies equally to spiritual movements.

Thus, once Jiang made the decision and asserted his will over other members of the Politburo Standing Committee, there was little to stop what came next. Over the following months, Jiang and leaders like Luo began making preparations for a campaign to wipe out Falun Gong. Lacking legal authority and fearing the popularity of Falun Gong even among members of the security forces, Jiang created a special Party leadership group and related extralegal, plainclothes security force to lead the fight. Established on June 10, 1999, it came to be known as the 6–10 Office.

In July 1999, a full-scale campaign reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution was launched. The full weight of the CCP's repressive apparatus was turned on Falun Gong. Demonizing propaganda flooded the airwaves. Thousands of people were rounded up. Millions were forced to sign pledges to stop practicing.

Zhao Ming, a former Falun Gong prisoner of conscience and the subject of international rescue campaigns, explained the dynamics as: "the Party's machinery of persecution was there—Jiang pushed the button." One more point deserves clarification. The CCP and Chinese officials typically assert that Falun Gong needed to banned because it is an "evil cult" that was having a nefarious influence on society. The claims have not held up to scrutiny when investigated in China, nor when one considers Falun Gong's spread in other parts of the world, including democratic Taiwan. As importantly, in the context of the current discussion, it was only several months after Jiang initiated the campaign that a resolution was passed punishing involvement with "heretical organizations" and that the Party's propaganda apparatus zeroed in on a slightly manipulated English translation of the Chinese term xiejiao to claim that Falun Gong was an "evil cult." Unfortunately, today, media reports about Falun Gong often erroneously state that "Falun Gong was banned as an 'evil cult,'" with little further explanation. In fact, the label came later and as noted above, the reasons behind it had little to do with anything "evil" about Falun Gong. By using this incomplete reference, media inadvertently repeat the Party line and may plant the thought in readers' minds that a repressive campaign that has turned millions of lives upside down might be justified.

---

A DECISION WITH LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES

When Jiang ordered that Falun Gong be targeted, he had not anticipated that its practitioners would not relent easily. Though some renounced the practice under pressure, many remained determined and endured “torture” even in the face of official “transformation” or “reeducation through labor” programs. Many resumed their practice upon release or withstood torture and continued to resist. Over time, the authorities escalated their tactics, enhancing the sophistication of their propaganda, and encouraging the use of violence. Freedom House’s publications—alongside those of Amnesty International, the United Nations Rapporteurs, and the CECC itself—have recorded the ongoing rights abuses suffered by those who practice Falun Gong in China. These include large-scale detentions, widespread surveillance, extreme torture, deaths in custody, and the sentencing of practitioners to long prison terms following unfair trials or to “reeducation through labor” camps by bureaucratic fiat. The abuses continue 13 years and two leadership changes after Jiang’s initial decision, pointing to an entrenchment of the repression.

The result is that the Party now finds itself trapped. If it backs down, it would have to admit to a mistake that ruined millions of lives and tore apart families. If it stays the course, then with each day that passes, another Falun Gong practitioner is abducted, another judge imprisons an innocent person, another police officer learns he can torture with impunity. The effect on the rule of law and the Party’s legitimacy is corrosive.

Meanwhile, so long as the campaign continues, it not only affects Falun Gong practitioners and their families. The tactics and strategies developed to suppress one group in China can be quickly and easily applied to others. From vague legal provisions, to “black jails,” to certain torture and “transformation” methods, human rights lawyers and others have remarked on how elements first used against Falun Gong practitioners have since been applied to other victim groups, including the lawyers themselves.

Similarly, the entities created to target Falun Gong can be expanded or used as models. The 610 Office’s operations have long stretched beyond its core task of wiping out Falun Gong. Since 2003, their targets have also included 28 other small spiritual groups and qigong organizations. The Economist reported in June that a few members of blind activist Chen Guangcheng’s entourage of secret police were from the 610 Office. Meanwhile, the agency may be serving as a model for the Party’s broader “stability maintenance” initiatives.

The intractable nature of the CCP’s campaign against Falun Gong presents unique challenges for advocates, policymakers, and victims. Tools available when dealing with other large-scale human rights violations in China are not feasible. The openness and occasional compromise that Chinese officials display when dealing with workers’ rights, discrimination against Hepatitis B patients, or even the one-child policy, are non-existent when it comes to Falun Gong. But in their interactions with regimes such as the CCP’s, democratic governments must not let the authoritarians dictate the agenda. It is precisely because victims of the Falun Gong campaign have so few avenues of recourse within the system that international solidarity, exposure of abuses, and pressure on their behalf are even more vital. For these reasons, since 1999, Freedom House has consistently tracked the campaign in its publications, called for the release of illegally detained practitioners, and participated in annual rallies calling for an end to abuses against them.

In this context, we would offer the following recommendations to members of Congress and the Obama administration:

1. Meet with former Falun Gong prisoners of conscience or the family of imprisoned practitioners residing in the United States: It is difficult and dangerous for U.S. officials to meet such individuals inside China. But as is evident from some of the witnesses testifying here today, there is a sporadic stream of Falun Gong practitioners coming from China with first-hand information on what is happening inside and outside of detention facilities. U.S. diplomats preparing for their departure to China or officials participating in

---

20 Hao’s testimony before the European Parliament.
22 Cook and Lemish.
human rights discussions with their Chinese counterparts should periodically meet with such individuals.

2. **Continue to lobby for the release of individual prisoners of conscience:** Former prisoners of conscience whom I have interviewed and who were the subject of international appeal campaigns—including Falun Gong practitioners—have repeatedly testified to the noticeably less harsh treatment they received compared to their fellow, more internationally anonymous, detainees.

3. **Support initiatives to independently research the dynamics of the campaign:** Central to the ability to advocate on behalf of individuals and to gauge the full scale of abuses targeting groups like Falun Gong is the capacity to verify individual cases of religious prisoners and thoroughly investigate deaths in custody, including allegations of forced organ removals. Despite the sensitivity of the issue and difficulty in obtaining information about Falun Gong prisoners, there are avenues for doing so. Increased support, including funding, for groups taking the initiative to conduct such research could translate into real protection for members of this persecuted minority.

4. **Take proactive measures to ensure that American companies, citizens, and institutions are not deliberately or inadvertently enabling or condoning abuses:** Over the past year, reports have emerged of incidents that point to the pitfalls of engaging in close economic, educational, and medical relationships with China at a time when the CCP is carrying out a campaign like the one against Falun Gong. These have ranged from a U.S. company allegedly supplying surveillance capabilities to Chinese security agencies, to discriminatory policies regarding teachers assigned to Confucius Institutes, to concerns that medical journals are accepting papers with data drawn from abusive organ transplant policies. Measures could be taken to improve accountability in these sectors that involve U.S. citizens and institutions.

5. **Remain vigilant in the face of Chinese official pressure to self-censor outside of China:** Although this is not the focus of today’s discussion, pressure to self-censor beyond China’s borders is a daily reality for government officials, journalists, and event organizers when it comes to Falun Gong—similar to Tibetans, Uighurs, and other victim groups whose persecution the regime is sensitive about. It is critical that those of us outside China resist such pressures and remain vigilant in protecting the right to free expression for all, including those whose voices are systematically silenced within China.

* * *
Numerous official websites from the past six months—in Beijing, Qingdao, Shandong, and Jiangsu among others—mention the 610 Office, an entity engaged in efforts to “carry out comprehensive investigations,” strengthen “transformation,” and prevent unwanted incidents (Pingyin.gov.cn, September 5; Jrm.gov.cn, August 15; Laoshan.gov.cn, April 2011). A June 2011 article in a reputable Chinese magazine briefly referenced the 610 Office as a key component of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) “stability-preservation work” (Caijing, June 6). What is the 610 Office? How and why did it come to exist? Why is it carrying out measures ostensibly under the purview of the Ministry of Public Security?

The answers to these questions point to the establishment of a CCP-based, rather than a state-based, security organization, as well as a revival of the use of security agencies to enforce ideological compliance. Moreover, the 610 Office signifies a systemic arrangement by CCP leaders to avoid the reach of legal reforms when dealing with a perceived existential threat to their power. The willingness and ability of CCP leaders to take such actions has implications not only for how we understand the trajectory of rule of law development in China, but also for how we might anticipate the regime responding to present and future threats to its security.

The 610 Office’s beginnings lie partly in the CCP’s tradition of “leading groups.” Since 1958, the CCP has used leading small groups (lingdiao xiaozu) to coordinate and guide action on various issue areas. They are typically secretive, arbitrarily created and dissolved, and headed by members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee. In 2008, Alice Miller counted eight such “primary” leading groups in operation, their responsibilities ranging from foreign affairs to economics, with subsidiary entities running down the Party’s system and State Council offices to execute policy (“The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups,” China Leadership Monitor, September 2, 2008).

There is however another key leading group strikingly out of character with the broad focus of each of the other leading groups: “The Leading Small Group for Preventing and Handling the Problem of Heretical Organizations” (zhongyang fanfang he chuli xiejiao wenti lingdiao xiaozu). Originally called “The Leading Small Group for Handling the Falun Gong Issue” (falun gong wenti lingdiao xiaozu), the name change suggests its activity has expanded since 1999 (Lstdww.gov.cn, August 10, 2011; Gxboai.gov.cn, April 2010). Though Falun Gong remains the primary focus, its targets now include house church Christians, Buddhists and other religious or spiritual groups, and it has been renamed accordingly.

The 610 Office was formed concurrently as this leading group’s implementing body and is named after the date of its creation: June 10, 1999. “Six-ten” functions outside the state system without any official standing. At its core, the 610 Office is a plainclothes CCP-based extra-ministerial security force focused on suppressing the Falun Gong spiritual group. The leading group sets the policy direction, which the 610 Office executes.

After featuring briefly in news articles in 2000, the 610 Office has since garnered only occasional international attention, leading to a common misconception that it is defunct. Recent evidence—including eyewitness accounts, official online documents, United Nations reports, and Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) analysis—however, all points to an agency that remains active nationwide at all levels of Chinese governance. It was particularly involved in crackdowns surrounding the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai (Hnepb.edu.cn, November 6, 2008; Xzqsp.gov.cn, June 23, 2010). Today, based on extrapolating from district-level numbers on local government websites, we estimate it retains at least 15,000 officers.

The 610 Office is Born

This office’s story begins on June 7, 1999, when then-Party Secretary General Jiang Zemin called a special Politburo meeting. Jiang was determined to resolve what he perceived as a serious challenge
to the regime's authority, "something unprecedented in the country since its founding 50 years ago" that "did not occur even during the Cultural Revolution"—a group of meditators who practice Falun Gong [1].

According to government sources, Western media reports, and Falun Gong witnesses, tens of millions of Chinese—from peasants to young professionals to military officers—were practicing the discipline at the time. With so many individuals dedicated to spiritual self-fulfillment independent of Party control or ideology, several top cadres began viewing Falun Gong as a threat (Associated Press, April 26, 1999; New York Times, April 27, 1999).

This translated into repression that showed first signs in 1996, and escalated to beatings and arrests in Tianjin in April 1999. On April 25, over 10,000 adherents of the meditative religious movement gathered outside the national petitions office in Beijing, adjacent to the Zhongnanhai government compound, asking for an end to abuses. According to the memoirs collection, Zhu Rongji in 1999, Premier Zhu took an appealing stance toward Falun Gong and was prepared to resolve the grievances before Jiang intervened [2].

In a June 7 directive, Jiang ordered the creation of a special leading group within the Party's Central Committee to "swiftly handle and solve the Falun Gong problem." He ordered that the team, placed under the responsibility of Politburo Standing Committee member Li Lanqing, "should immediately organize forces" and "get fully prepared for the work of disintegrating [Falun Gong]" [3].

A few days later, the CCP also established an office to handle day-to-day operations. This office was internally named 610, or "liu yao ling" for its June 10 creation. No legislation was passed establishing it. No provisions formally outlined its mandate. This extra-legal flexibility has proved critical in recent years, as its responsibilities have expanded.

Given that the CCP already had control over a range of security agencies and military forces, forming yet another entity seems unnecessary. Several factors may have contributed to Jiang's decision:

• Numbering in the tens of millions, Falun Gong practitioners included many individuals within the military and security establishment. This contributed to a sense that Falun Gong had quietly infiltrated the CCP and state apparatus. Jiang may have felt the need to create a trusted network of security agents to counter Falun Gong's influence.

• Given the task's scale, Jiang needed an entity that would act quickly and forcefully with no holds barred. He may not have envisioned that twelve years later millions would still be practicing with new believers joining and the 610 Office seemingly permanent.

• The creation of a new leading group quickly sent a signal down CCP ranks that countering Falun Gong was a new priority.

• Given that the entire anti-Falun Gong campaign functioned outside Chinese law, Jiang needed a security force that could operate outside the existing legal system and its potential restrictions [4].

Over the following months, 610 Office branches were created throughout China and a chain of command emerged, closely linked to the Political-Legal Committee (PLC) structure. Hao Pengjun, a former 610 Office official selected from the Tianjin Public Security Bureau, stated that the office's orders come directly from the Party's top echelons, then trickle down to cities and neighborhoods [5]. Much of this structure overlaps with the CCP's Political-Legal Committee (PLC). For example, after Li Lanqing retired in 2003, Jiang's confidant and politburo member Luo Gan took over the leading group overseeing the 610 Office, while also heading the PLC. In 2007, Zhou Yongkang replaced him as head of both the leading group and the PLC.

Hao's description of a nationwide network of 610 Office branches closely linked to the PLC apparatus is corroborated by a range of official sources. An online search reveals scores of recent references, pointing to the existence of active branches even in small cities and districts of Jiangxi, Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Shandong. A website of the Leiyang Municipal Party Committee in Hunan Province states its local 610 branch "reports to and is under the supervision of the municipal Party Committee's Political-Legal Committee," and is located in the Party Committee's office building (Leiyang.gov.cn, December 12, 2008).
Functions of the 610 Office

The 610 Office has two main functions: coordinating personnel at state institutions to assist in fulfilling the office’s mandate and directly conducting operations against Falun Gong and other forbidden spiritual groups. The first coordination role can involve pressuring staff from state bodies to act according to the 610 Office’s wishes, even when these run counter to their legal authority. Several lawyers who have defended Falun Gong practitioners report 610 Office personnel subverting the ability of judges and prison wardens to carry out their duties as outlined by Chinese law. Attorney Jiang Tianyong says compromised judges decide Falun Gong cases without recourse to Chinese legal standards but, instead, based on extrajudicial intervention from the 610 Office (Radio Free Asia, April 13, 2010). Meanwhile, Gao Zhisheng, Guo Quotong, and Wang Yafu have reported 610 Office interference in their efforts to meet with clients held in labor camps, prisons and detention centers (“Lawyer Barred from Representing Client by “6-10” Agents,” Human Rights in China, September 10, 2010).

Second, the 610 Office also has an immediate role in executing the leading group’s policies. In the process, the 610 Office appears largely exempt from even the basics of China’s judicial and legal reforms, often employing methods that are technically illegal under Chinese law. Various credible sources describe 610 Office agents directly participating in extrajudicial killings, torture, sexual assault, and illegal confiscation of property. For example, the 2009 report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings cited 610 Office involvement in pre-Olympic cases of Falun Gong deaths in custody [6]. Other Chinese dissidents and activists have detailed extra-legal detentions and torture on a scale and severity that appear to go beyond commonly-cited abuses in the law enforcement system. [7].

Reviving Thought Reform

610 Office activities also differ from those carried out under other leading groups in that its mandate does not relate to policy areas, like foreign affairs or economic reform. Rather, it targets Chinese citizens for thought reform.

Millions of Falun Gong practitioners place their moral teachings, revolving around Truthfulness-Compassion-Tolerance, as their spiritual compass. CCP leaders arbitrarily deemed these beliefs “heretical” in 1999 and “transformation” quickly became a key aim of 610 Office operations. Like “patriotic education” tactics used in Tibet, the purpose of this ideological reprogramming is to break the will of subjects by coercing them—reportedly including physical and psychiatric torture, sleep deprivation and manipulation of family members—to renounce Falun Gong, profess loyalty to the CCP, and ultimately participate in the forced conversion of others (Washington Post, August 5, 2001) [8].

Today, this objective remains fundamental to 610 operations, a testament to the Party’s difficulty crushing a decentralized groups of dedicated believers. In March, an analysis of local 610 Office-related references on official websites indicated that the Central 610 Office launched a renewed campaign to “transform” Falun Gong practitioners nationwide scheduled to last from 2010 to 2012 (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, March 22).

The 610 Office’s transformation work—like other aspects of the campaign against Falun Gong, such as the extensive use of labor camps and nationwide propaganda—is a throwback to Maoist-era practices. In the 1980s, reformers pushed for entities like the Ministry of Public Security to get out of the business of “resolving ideological questions” (People’s Daily, April 5, 1979). The rise of the 610 Office however suggests a retrogression of the security apparatus to address thought crimes.

Conclusion

The 610 Office’s operations long ago expanded beyond its core task of wiping out Falun Gong. Testifying before the European Parliament, Hao Fengjun said that in April 2003 Party leaders ordered the 610 Office to dispose of 28 other “heretical organizations” and “harmful gigong organizations” [9]. The broadened functions remain in effect today as local government websites detail 610 Office investigations of other spiritual groups (See, for example, Hiong.gov.cn, May 2009).
The expanded mandate points to the entrenchment of the 610 Office in the CCP apparatus. What began as a temporary leading small group and task force has become a permanent fixture. It also highlights how 610 Office’s existence undermines rule of law—whatever official state policy towards religion might be, this entity operates at the direction of a small group of CCP leaders with no official standing.

Such conclusions take on even greater significance at a time when the 610 Office may be serving as a model for new CCP initiatives. Since 2008, official reports, speeches and circulars have referenced a novel set of CCP “leading groups” maintaining stability. Reportedly, branches of the Office of Maintaining Stability “are being set up in every district and major street” in rich coastal cities. They are charged with “ferreting out anti-CCP elements” (Wall Street Journal, December 9, 2009).

Multiple official sources indicate that these new entities and the 610 Office are working closely together. In at least one district in Guangdong’s Foshan City, for example, the 610 Office and the “leading group office for maintaining stability” were listed side-by-side in an online description of the local PLC’s internal functioning and staff (Chongchuan.gov.cn, June 7, 2010). In some localities, staff and even the leadership of the two entities seem to overlap. A March 2010 notice from Zhejiang’s Pingyang County government states that the same person was appointed to direct both 610 Office and the local stability maintenance office.

The rise of the 610 Office and stability maintenance offices suggests a sense among CCP leaders that existing internal security services, like the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of State Security, are not satisfactorily effective. That these officials are increasingly relying on more arbitrary, extra-legal, and personalized security forces to protect their hold on power does not only bode badly for China’s human rights record. It also threatens the stability of internal CCP politics. Should 610 Office work become politicized—just as counterespionage was corrupted prior to Reform and Opening—amid the jockeying for power ahead of and beyond the upcoming 18th Party Congress.

Notes:

5. Hao Fengjun, signed statement on file with the authors, November 8, 2005.
8. Interviews conducted by Ethan Gutmann and Leeshai Leminsh in London (August 2007) and Bangkok (July 2008).

[The authors thank Yi Yang Xiu, Senior Director of Research and Policy at the Human Rights Law Foundation, for his research assistance.]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JIANCHAO XU, M.D.

DECEMBER 18, 2012

Honorable Chairman Christopher Smith, members of Congress, and distinguished panelists. Thank you for your invitation to this hearing today. It is my honor and privilege to testify here before you in Congress.

My name is Jianchao Xu. As a kidney specialist, I am an attending Staff Physician at the James J. Peters Veteran Administration Hospital in New York. I am also an Adjunct Assistant Professor in Medicine at Mount Sinai School of Medicine. In addition, I serve as the Medical Director for the non-profit organization Doctors Against Forced Organ Harvesting (DAFOH), which is comprised of medical profes-
sionals from around the world who investigate the practice of illegal or unethical harvesting or transplantation of organs.

The most powerful witness we could have here today would be a victim whose organ was illegally harvested. But as we all know, such victims will never have such a chance after their vital organs are removed from their bodies. Their chairs here will remain empty. After the victims, the next best witness would be a doctor who has removed organs from living prisoners of conscience and is now willing to step forward to tell the world about his or her first-hand knowledge of this crime against humanity. In lieu of their presence, I stand before you to submit my own findings and knowledge on the matter.

Organ transplants are life-saving procedures, and organ donation—which we often call “the gift of life”—make this possible. Unfortunately, demand for organs greatly exceeds supply in every country. And as people live longer, as medical science and technology continues to advance, the demand will only grow with more patients steadily becoming eligible for organ transplant and more qualified doctors and transplant centers becoming available.

A shortage of organ supply opens a door for illegal organ trafficking, organ tourism, and forced organ harvesting. The medical community has known about unethical organ transplant in China since the 1990s. At a Congressional hearing in 2001, first-hand and direct evidence of unethical organ transplant practices in China surfaced. Dr. Wang Guoqi, a Chinese Medical Doctor, testified to the House of Representatives subcommittee on human rights, stating “My work required me to remove the skin and corneas from the corpses of over one hundred executed prisoners, and on a couple of occasions, victims of intentionally botched executions … It is with deep regret and remorse that I stand here today testifying against the practices of organ and tissue sales from death row prisoners.”

Dr. Wang described coordinated procedures that he said government officials and Chinese doctors developed to extract organs from inmates immediately after their executions so that they could be transplanted, in some cases before the prisoners’ hearts stopped beating. Dr. Wang became tormented by the practice after he followed orders to remove the skin of a still-living prisoner in October 1995. The incident prompted him to alert the international community to the inhuman practice of organ harvesting in China.

According to Wang’s testimony, prisoners received blood tests in prison to determine their compatibility with interested donors. On execution day, he said, the prisoners who were to become organ donors were the first to die—thus, the prisoners’ own blood and tissue types dictated how they were executed.

As a nephrologist, I take care of patients whose lives depend on hemodialysis treatment three times a week. Each dialysis treatment typically lasts 3.5 hours. So, including the travel time, these people are basically devoting three days every week to hemodialysis treatment. Think of the burden on their lives, and now think about the fact that if they receive a kidney transplant, their lives immediately improve in every way. However, due to the limited source of kidney donations, only a fraction of my patients can ever receive a transplant, and for those that do, the usual waiting time is more than three years. When I first learned that patients in China can receive kidney and other organ transplants within just days or weeks, I was appalled because I know exactly what process it takes to receive a kidney transplant.

As a potential kidney organ recipient, the patient must contact a transplant center and ask for a transplant evaluation. A team of doctors can then provide an evaluation and determine if the patient is definitely eligible for a kidney transplant. After all of that, if the patient is lucky enough to be deemed a suitable candidate for transplantation, the patient will be put on the waiting list, where they wait—as I said—for an average of more than three years. The key to a successful transplant operation is to have the closest possible blood and tissue match. That is one of the reasons why the waiting time is so long—simply finding the right match takes years.

Yet many Chinese hospitals have openly advertised that the waiting time for kidneys and even livers does not exceed one month; sometimes it’s just a matter of a few days. Thus the question we face is: why can a patient in China find a match so quickly? One possibility is that the patient just gets a kidney that does not closely match patient’s blood and tissue type, but if that were the case, the rejection rate of transplant patients in China would be alarmingly high. Since we do not see a trend of increased organ rejection in China, the mismatched transplant theory is not likely. The second possibility is that there is large number of living organ donors representing all possible blood and tissue types; when a patient walks into the hospital, the doctors only need to determine the patient’s blood and tissue types, then they simply match the patient with one of the cataloged organ donors who will be killed on demand.
If that process sounds too terrifying to believe or too coldly efficient to think possible, I'd like to present to you findings reaped from multiple investigations, systematic analysis of official medical reports in China, as well as prisoners' personal experiences. Together, I think you'll find that they prove the practice of illegal organ harvesting in China, especially from Falun Gong practitioners, is an expansive and ongoing operation supported and endorsed by the central Party leadership.

Just looking at the numbers, it is obvious that something is wrong. There are vastly more transplants in China every year than there are identifiable sources of organs. For cultural reasons, Chinese people are reluctant to donate their organs after death. At least 98% of the organs for transplants come from someone other than family donors. In the case of kidneys, for example, only 227 out of 40,393 transplants (less than 0.6%)—done between 1971 and 2001 in China came from family donors. There is no organized, effective system of organ donation yet formed in China. The government of China has openly admitted to using the organs of executed prisoners. According to Amnesty International’s reports, the average number of officially reported prisoners between 1995 and 1999 was 1680 per year. The average between 2000 and 2005 was 1616 per year. The average number for the periods before and after Falun Gong persecution began is the same. Even if we are to assume that every single execution results in an organ transplant, there is still not enough to account for the increase in transplants that came about after 1999, when the persecution of Falun Gong began.

According to public reports, prior to 1999, there had been a total of approximately 30,000 transplants in China’s history, with 18,500 of those cases in the six-year period during 1994 to 1999. Dr. Bingyi Shi, vice-chair of the China Medical Organ Transplant Association, stated that there were about 90,000 transplants as of 2005, which means that there were 60,000 transplants in the six-year period of 2000 to 2005.

Where do the increased organ donors come from? The identified sources of organ transplants, consenting family donors and the brain dead, have always been a small fraction of the donor pool. For example, in 2005, living-related kidney transplant consists of 0.5% of total transplants national wide. There is no indication of a significant increase in either of these categories in recent years. It is reasonable to assume that the identified sources of organ transplants which produced 18,500 organ transplants in the six-year period 1994 to 1999 produced the same number of organs for transplants in the next six year period 2000 to 2005 because there has been no recorded change in the donation system or the overall willingness of the population to participate. Without a significant change in the donation process, the source of 41,500 transplants from 2000 to 2005 is unexplained. Where do the organs come from for these extra transplants? The allegation of organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners provides an answer.

Because of China’s lack of transparency, the precise statistics are impossible to obtain. However, independent lines of investigation using different methodologies from each other have reached the same conclusion: Organs are being harvested from living prisoners.

Even if we use the China Deputy Minister, Wang Jiefu’s own data there are approximately 30,500 unexplained sources of organs from 1997–2007. Another method of calculating the mysterious source of organs is from Mr. Ethan Gutmann, an adjunct Fellow of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He painstakingly interviewed victims who were imprisoned in China’s prison and labor camps. As detailed in his chapter in the book “State Organs”, his estimate is that 65,000 Falun Gong practitioners have been killed for their organs.

Gutmann found that Falun Gong practitioners detained in prisons and labor camps were often singled out to receive medical exams aimed at assessing the health of their vital organs, and that afterwards, some would disappear.

It is also important to note that even though most of the statistics we are working from only go up to the middle or end of the last decade, we have every reason to believe that organ harvesting is ongoing in China. According to a report from NTDTV, a patient this year traveled from Taiwan to Mainland China’s Tianjin First Central Hospital and received concurrent liver and kidney transplantations. It only took one month to find a matching liver and kidney, whereas he had been waiting for years in Taiwan. During his hospitalization, he was told that some transplant tourists had received matching donor organs within one week of initial evaluation there. The patient stated that, “There were other foreign patients [at the Tianjin First Central Hospital], but I didn’t ask where they were from. I know there is a special guarded international patient ward on the hospital’s 10th floor. I guess the patients inside have special backgrounds.”

As a medical doctor, I struggle to understand why this is happening at this order of magnitude. I could not comprehend that fellow doctors, members of a noble pro-
profession, people granted special status in our society, could use their knowledge and skills to kill another human being.

WHAT HAS BEEN DONE SO FAR

The practice of harvesting organs from executed and living prisoners in China has seen distinct opposition from the medical community and other professions. Aside from medical organizations and associations like Doctors Against Forced Organ Harvesting (DAFOH), The Transplant Society (TTS) and World Medical Association (WMA), many individual doctors have started to oppose the unethical organ harvesting practices in China. Our collective effort to expose the illegal organ harvesting in China has generated results.

The work of DAFOH is an exemplary resource for those from both medical and non-medical backgrounds to learn more about the unethical procedures in China. Since its inception a few years ago, DAFOH enlisted a host of well-respected doctors around the world to speak out against illegal organ harvesting in China. Our collective efforts also contributed to several publications in medical journals, including a letter in the prestigious Journal of American Medical Association in 2011 (JAMA).4 DAFOH’s mission is to raise awareness and to call for an end to the unethical organ harvesting practices. DAFOH has co-hosted or organized forums and participated in panel discussions, including a panel discussion in the U.S. Capitol. There are many colleagues who share the same wish as us. Upon requesting a statement from TTS in early 2012, President-Elect Dr. Francis Delmonico replied: “TTS is opposed to the use of organs from executed prisoners, and through the efforts of the Declaration of Istanbul Custodian Group, TTS opposes the presentation of reports from China at international congresses and the publication of papers from China in the medical literature that involves the use of organs from executed prisoners.”

In November 2011, Chinese medical professionals published an article in the respected British medical journal Lancet, entitled “A pilot programme of organ donation after cardiac death in China.”5 The article can be characterized as an acknowledgement of China’s unethical transplant. Of note, the lead author is Dr. Jiefu Huang, China’s deputy minister of Health, making the article almost an official public policy statement rather than a scientific research.

In Europe, a DAFOH petition drive to call upon UNHRC to lead an international investigation in China has generated 160,000+ signatures. Among the signers were more than 200 parliamentarians in Europe, including EU parliament’s Vice President.

Bob Doris, member of the Scottish parliament released a statement against organ harvesting on November 5.

Michael Prue, member of Ontario’s Legislation Assembly, has also spoken up against the forced organ harvesting.6 The President of the Taiwanese Medical association has publicly condemned unethical organ harvesting in a November 2012 statement.

Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan made the following resolution on November 22, 2012: The 2011 annual human rights report of the U.S. State Department released on May 24, 2012 for the first time mentioned organ harvesting of Falun Gong practitioners and Uighurs. According to the statistics of Taiwan’s Department of Health from 2000 to 2011, up to 1,754 Taiwan citizens received organ transplants overseas with 86% of those being conducted in China. And from 2005 to 2011, the National Health Insurance payments for postoperative anti-rejection drugs rose to $7,734,540,000 NTD. But because the Department of Health has no law to require organ transplant recipients abroad who return home and receive anti-rejection drugs by the health insurance subsidies to register the transplant hospitals and physicians, it may allow the recipients of organs of unknown origin to become accomplices of organ harvesting while still enjoying the benefits of health insurance and anti-rejection drugs. This is a significant oversight. Therefore, within three months, the Department of Health shall require major medical institutions and physicians to register the transplant country and hospital information (including surgeons) of those who have received organ transplants in a foreign country while they apply for postoperative health insurance payments after returning home. It is reasonable for foreign organ transplant information to be transparent to gain health insurance benefits. While this is a very welcoming change, we hope the Taiwan government can further tighten their restriction on organ tourism.

In addition to political leaders and other organizations, we have also seen individual citizens from different countries starting grassroots movements against organ harvesting.
DAFOH petition in US: within 4 weeks, 30,000+ signatures collected  
DAFOH petition in Europe: 160,000+ signatures collected  
DAFOH petition in Australia: 30,000 signatures collected  

Additionally, an independent signature drive among Taiwanese doctors generated 2,000+ signatures to call for further investigations.

Within the international medical community there have also been strong steps. At the July 2010 biennial World Transplant Congress meeting of TTS in Vancouver over 30 abstracts were submitted from China and considered for acceptance; the data for the research came from several hundred transplants where the donor source was deemed likely to be executed prisoners. This occurred despite the fact that a standard ethics filter mechanism was in place, and the TTS ethics policy regarding organs from executed prisoners had been published and was well known. Fortunately the failure of the ethics filter to prevent acceptance of these abstracts was recognized, and authors were specifically required to state, in the text of their abstracts, as a condition of acceptance, that no data from studies using executed donor organs were included. As a result, most abstracts were withdrawn.

Recent actions taken by the editorial board of the American Journal of Transplantation are very encouraging. Starting in May 2011, changes have been made to the instructions to authors submitting manuscripts to these journals. The instructions now include the following statement: "The American Journal of Transplantation (AJT) will not accept manuscripts whose data derives from transplants involving organs obtained from executed prisoners . . ."

Similarly, a firm stance was undertaken by one of the most respected clinical journals in the world: the Journal of Clinical Investigation. In its January issue of 2012, an editorial statement was made as follows: "The practice of transplanting organs from executed prisoners in China appears to be widespread. We vigorously condemn this practice and, effective immediately, will not consider manuscripts on human organ transplantation for publication unless appropriate non-coerced consent of the donor is provided and substantiated."

The statement continues, "This disparity in the supply of organs is a particular problem in China, where rapid expansion of the capacity to perform transplants has not been accompanied by the development of a system for recovering organs from those who die in hospitals while on life support, as is international practice. There is almost no systematic recovery of voluntarily donated cadaver organs. No regional or national system exists for soliciting consent to donate organs in advance from those who die or their relatives after death. Unfortunately, the evidence is clear that some physicians in China, in an effort to perform more transplants, are engaged in a practice that violates basic standards of medical ethics and human rights, namely the use of organs from executed prisoners."

"Using organs from executed prisoners violates basic human rights. It violates core ethical precepts of transplant medicine and medical ethics. Worse still, some of those who are killed may be prisoners whose 'crimes' involve no more than holding certain political or spiritual beliefs."

"... the international biomedical community, including especially journal editors and editorial boards, must not be complicit with the practice of killing on demand to obtain organs from executed prisoners. We are not naive. We recognize that a boycott by this journal and its peers is unlikely, by itself, to bring an end to this practice. But we do hope that our actions will bring attention to this outrage and, in doing so, encourage China to develop policy options for obtaining organs consistent with international standards, conventions, and ethics."

We have seen progress, but more need to be done.

**WHAT CAN WE DO?**

**To the medical community:**

As medical doctors, we will continue to inform and advise the professional transplant community to implement policies to dissuade organ harvesting. This includes advocating for international and national professional medical societies and journals to not accept abstracts, publications, or presentations from Chinese transplant centers unless the authors clearly indicate that the data presented is in accordance with the most recent Chinese government regulations regarding transplant tourism and that executed prisoners were not the source of organs.

Membership of international professional societies by Chinese transplant professionals must be conditioned by acceptance of ethics policies that specifically express the unacceptable of executed prisoners as a source of organs. Memberships of Chinese doctors should be suspended if they fail to comply with the ethical standards of medical associations.
Training of Chinese transplant professionals by the international community must be conditioned on commitments that trainees will not engage, directly or indirectly, in the use of organs from executed prisoners. Pharmaceutical companies must ensure that no executed prisoners are the source of organs used in their studies and that Chinese government regulations regarding transplant tourism are adhered to rigorously.

To society and our government:

I urge the United States government and anyone with any knowledge of organ harvesting to publicly release all evidence they have with regard to China’s use of prisoners as a source of organ donation. I believe that a well-informed citizen will stop going to China for transplants if they know clearly that someone will be killed for his or her organ transplant. Likely this is the most effective and least expensive way to decrease demand for organs in China.

Together with my other two colleagues, Dr. Arthur Caplan, director of medical ethics with New York University’s Langone Medical Center and Dr. Centurion, a practicing physician in California, we have launched a petition on the White House website urging President Obama to speak out and help stop this gruesome practice on December 2, 2012. Within 2 weeks, we have collected over 10,000 signatures. People can visit www.organpetition.org to learn more.

I ask Congress to adopt legislative changes, to prohibit patients going abroad to receive illegal organ transplants, or at the very least, congress could require the patients to register their operations with the Department of Public Health. Their respective transplant information must include the name of the transplant center, the attending physician, and most importantly, the source of organ donation.

I urge Congress to adopt legislative changes to limit health care insurance coverage for those who receive organs from unknown sources. It has been well documented that the medical outcomes of such transplants are much poorer with unusually high mortality and morbidity rates, and the economic burden is being shifted to the United States for the post-operative care for these patients.

All countries should strengthen their laws against the crime of trafficking in organs. The laws should require doctors to report to the authorities of their country any evidence suggesting that a patient has obtained an organ from a trafficked person abroad, defined to include persons in detention abroad.

Until the Chinese law on organ transplants is effectively implemented, foreign governments should not issue visas to doctors from China seeking to travel abroad for the purpose of training in organ or bodily tissue transplantation. Any doctor in China known to be involved in trafficking in the organs of prisoners should be barred entry by all foreign countries.

Until the international community is satisfied that the new Chinese law on organ transplants is effectively implemented, foreign funding agencies, medical organizations, and individual health professionals should not participate in any Government of China-sponsored organ transplant research or meetings. Foreign companies that currently provide goods and services to China’s organ transplant programs should cease and desist immediately until the government of China can demonstrate that their law on organ transplants is effective.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the CECC and especially the honorable Chairman Smith; you have been a true champion in advocating for Falun Gong and Human rights, and particularly the work you have done to expose organ harvesting, such as by spearheading the bipartisan dear colleague letter expressing concern about China’s forced organ harvesting from prisoners of conscience, particularly from Falun Gong detainees, and asking the Department of State to share any information they have received about unethical organ harvesting in China, including any information that Wang Lijun, a Chinese police chief who met with consular officials in China, might have divulged to U.S. consular officials. Wang is believed to have been intimately involved in organ harvesting; he has received an award for “innovation” in organ harvesting, and also, as a police chief, he directly oversaw the persecution of Falun Gong with his jurisdiction, which included hospitals. Thus, Mr. Wang information may hold the key to unlock the mystery of organ harvesting in China. Revealing this information may put an end to the horrific crime against humanity.

REFERENCES


PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES LEE, M.D.

DECEMBER 18, 2012

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the distinguished members from the U.S. House and Senate, as well as executive branches of the government, for giving me the opportunity to testify today.

1. FALUN GONG AND THE BENEFITS OF THE PRACTICE

Falun Gong, also known as Falun Dafa, is an ancient meditation system that consists of five meditative exercises and the principles of “Truthfulness Compassion Forbearance,” which all practitioners are supposed to assimilate themselves to.

The practice has an ancient lineage, yet it was only made public on a large scale in 1992. After that, it spread in China like wild fire. It is free and easy to practice; there is no formal membership and no places of worship. Those of us who practice Falun Gong find that it brings significant health benefits, reduced stress, and that its moral principles bring harmony to interpersonal relationships, our workplaces, and wider communities. At the end of 1998, Chinese government sources estimated that 70 to 100 million people were practicing it in China.

2. THE PERSECUTION ON FALUN GONG BY THE CCP

In the 1990s, the government of China enthusiastically promoted Falun Gong on the basis that it improved public health and helped reduce healthcare costs. Yet the rapid growth of the practice, coupled with the fact that it had a spiritual philosophy rooted in traditional Chinese beliefs, caused some Communist Party leaders to view Falun Gong as a threat to their monopoly on moral authority. Moreover, Falun Gong’s values of “Truthfulness Compassion Forbearance” stood in sharp contrast to the corruption and violence of the Communist Party.

In July 1999, the Communist Party started the campaign to eradicate Falun Gong and promote the supremacy of Party’s leadership and loyalty to the party.

The Party has always tried to control every facet of life in China. It has done this partly through force and coercion, and creating an environment of fear where nobody dares to speak out. Secondly, it has systematically indoctrinated the whole country, destroyed traditional religions and value systems, and exercised complete control over all the media and information outlets. These are the same techniques it uses to persecute Falun Gong.

This persecution is one of the greatest tragedies happening in the world today. Hundreds of thousands of Falun Gong practitioners have been detained extralegally in this persecution. In many labor camps and detention centers, former prisoners report that Falun Gong practitioners are the majority of detainees.

Central party authorities have sanctioned the use of systematic torture against Falun Gong practitioners. In the labor camps, authorities are told to use any measures necessary to force Falun Gong practitioners to recant their beliefs, and are told that they will not be punished if Falun Gong practitioners die in custody. Authorities at all levels of government are given economic incentives and penalties that are tied to their success in cracking down on Falun Gong. Former prisoners, many of whom are not themselves Falun Gong practitioners, regularly report that Falun Gong detainees are singled out for mistreatment in prisons and labor camps; in a 2006 UN Special Rapporteur report, two-thirds of reported torture cases in China were against Falun Gong practitioners. The torture methods include sexual assault, beatings, shocks with electric batons, violent force-feedings with feces and salt solutions.

3. THE CRUELITIES OF THE PERSECUTION AND THE DEATH TOLL

So far, 3,627 reports of deaths have been documented and confirmed by Falun Gong practitioners. However, the true death toll should be much higher. An untold
number of Falun Gong practitioners have disappeared amidst persecution in the last 13 years.

More gruesome still, China's massive organ transplant industry has been supplied by organs taken from Falun Gong prisoners of conscience. Canadian investigators David Matas and David Kilgour have estimated that between 2000 and 2005, more than 40,000 Falun Gong practitioners may have been killed and their organs sold to supply China's organ transplant industry. Researcher Ethan Gutmann says that about 65,000 were likely killed for their organs between 2000 and 2008. The actual number of deaths can be many times more, because the CCP has always been manipulating numbers to mislead people or simply tell the blatant lies in order to cover up the atrocity. And much of the data collected by the researchers were from the official figures. There have been also many underground organ transplantation operations as well.

There is also evidence that Falun Gong practitioners' bodies have been sold to plastination companies, which put them on display in body exhibits.1 Human beings have been turned into commodities and been used to maximize profits. These atrocities recall the Nazis' medical experiments and their use of human hair as pillow stuffing, and skin as lampshades. As Chairman Smith wrote, the possibility of mass organ harvesting from Falun Gong "pushes us into a horrific beyond, a beyond that challenges our language, making 'barbaric' too calm a word, too leached of horror."

The volume of Falun Gong practitioners was so high that the party actually built new labor camps just to contain them. In March 2006, a retired military doctor revealed that there were 36 such large concentration camps in the country. He claimed that one camp, 672–S in Jilin Province, held more than 120,000 Falun Gong practitioners.

It is estimated that there are 300 million transient population in China. These include the migrating city workers from the countryside, tens of millions of appellants who constantly appeal to the governments for their injustices, and millions of unyielding Falun Gong practitioners who have lost their jobs, schools, and families, and left their hometown to escape the persecution. In the past decade, many of them disappeared/vaporized, and nobody can trace them down. (We have many practitioners in the U.S. with their practicing family members cannot be located or found.)

Tens of millions of Falun Gong practitioners had recovered from their illnesses (including terminal diseases) and benefitted from an improved health. The persecution on Falun Gong in the past 13 years has forced many of them giving up the practices, and in consequence, facing with deteriorated health and eventually died. My mother was one of them.

The total deaths caused by the persecution should have reached several millions, if all types of death are included. What is outlined here is only part of the clues on this heinous crimes in human history. It is extremely important for governments and people, both in the West and the East, to know/find-out the scale and severity of the largely-undisclosed persecution. Much more efforts are needed to stop this crime against humanity and to fully investigate and lay down the framework for the long-overdue justice to be served.

4. PEACEFUL RESISTANCE BY FALUN GONG PRACTITIONERS

Even though we have faced such severe persecution, there is not a single case in which a Falun Gong practitioner used violence against the perpetrators. Instead, we have resisted persecution by peacefully informing Chinese people about the true situation, debunking the propaganda that the Chinese government has produced against us.

One way we have done this is through underground "material sites" all across China, where practitioners can use proxy services to bypass the censorship firewall, download and share reports of persecution, and create informational literature and DVDs telling the truth about Falun Gong and the persecution. Courageous practitioners then distribute this information at great personal risk. There are estimated to be about 200,000 such material sites in China today, and between 20 and 40 million practitioners.

Overseas practitioners have also developed various media outlets and circumvention software to bring information in and out of China uncensored.

5. MY OWN EXPERIENCE

In 2002 and 2003, I also sought to resist the persecution by breaking through the veil of censorship in China. I traveled to China with the goal of tapping into state
television broadcasts to show videos about the true situation of Falun Gong and the persecution. However, I was abducted in January 2003, and sentenced in a show trial to three years in Nanjing prison.

Even though I was an American citizen, the prison guards still did everything possible to brainwash and intimidate me. In addition to the physical torture and forced slave labor, the brainwashing sessions lasted for all three years. They forced me to watch TV programs defaming Falun Gong and praising the Communist Party. Very often, they cut off all my information sources for weeks on end, not even letting me talk with anybody. After these periods of isolation, they would subject me to intensive brainwashing sessions in the hopes that my resistance would be reduced. If I weren't an American citizen whose case was internationally known, the treatment I experienced would have been much worse.

I thank the strong support from friends around the world, especially the US Congress, that allowed me to come back to this country with my body intact and my will unbroken.

6. AWAKENING OF CHINESE PEOPLE

While I was imprisoned, I would wonder to myself how it was that people could so readily abuse and torture their own compatriots. I wondered to myself how they'd allowed themselves to be deceived, and how they came to be so full of hatred.

The book titled "Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party" published in November 2004 by the Epochtimes has given the answer and led to a truly historical awakening of Chinese People.

In the past 60 plus years, the party distorted the Chinese people's sense of right and wrong. It taught them to view each other as enemies, and to struggle against each other. The party's ideology is so pervasive that people are even unaware of their inability to think independently. What's more, from a young age, Chinese people are taught that the party and the country are the same concept, so whenever someone criticizes the party, they feel that it's an attack on the nation of China and on themselves as Chinese.

If there is to be freedom and lasting peace in China, it will only come after the Chinese people take a principled stand and reject the culture of violence and deceit promoted by the Communist Party. This is beginning to happen already. In the last several years, tens of millions of Chinese people have renounced their membership in the Communist Party, Youth League, and Communist Young Pioneers. They are making the choice to live according to their own conscience—not the will of the party—and are refusing to participate in further violations of human rights. The process of renouncing the party (known in Chinese as "Tuidang") is thus a deeply spiritual, personal, and moral process, and a matter of reconnecting with traditional Chinese values of human heartedness and compassion. To date, 129 million renunciation statements have been received from people taking this important step.

As more and more people's consciences are freed from the CCP's control, the broader social and political environment is changing. The CCP is losing the battle for the hearts and minds of the Chinese people, a process that will ultimately lead to the CCP's disintegration. Today, Chinese people are becoming unafraid of suppressions and crackdowns by the CCP regime, and more and more people are taking a public stand to support Falun Gong and oppose the persecution.

I would like to conclude my testimony by thanking the leadership of Congressman Smith and Congressman Andrews, along with 106 members of Congress from 33 states, for their bipartisan Dear Colleague letter to Secretary Clinton, expressing serious concern over China's forced organ harvesting from prisoners of conscience (particularly from Falun Gong detainees) and asking the Department of State to release all information about unethical organ harvesting in China, including what Wang Lijun might have shared with U.S. diplomats while seeking his asylum at U.S. Consulate General in Chengdu. To my knowledge, the Department of State has not yet responded to the Dear Colleague letter.

We believe that the United States as a world leader in protecting human rights has a moral obligation to speak out and help bring an end to this horrific crime against humanity. We also believe that by doing this, the US will protect itself from being further deceived and harmed by the CCP regime.

Thank you.

* * *
(Draft Report submitted as part of Testimony)

On the Tuidang Movement in China

by

Dr. Charles Lee, Spokesperson

Global Service Center for Quitting the Chinese Communist Party

http://quitecp.org/cms/

40-48 Main Street, No. 201, Flushing, NY 11354

at

CECC (Congressional-Executive Commission on China) Hearing

Falun Gong in China: Review and Update

Room 418, Russell Senate Office Building, US Capitol, Washington, DC

December 18, 2012;

Abstract

This report provides an overview and a comprehensive analysis of the Tuidang (Quit-the-Communist Party) movement in China: from its historical background, to the start and recent development of the movement. The reasons why Tuidang movement is important and beneficial to not only China, but the United States and the rest part of the world are discussed. The report also provides a chronological overview on the global efforts on decommunization. Through examining the historical development, the current situation in China and the world is put in a bigger and broader picture. The topics covered in this report include:

1. The Trigger of the Tuidang Movement: Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party
2. The Background of the Tuidang Movement: CCP's Destructions to China
3. The Start and Recent Development of the Tuidang Movement
4. The Spiritual Aspects of the Tuidang Movement
5. The Analysis of Historical Events Concerning the CCP and the Free World
6. The Analysis of Current World Affairs Concerning CCP's Unrestricted Warfare
7. The Significance of the Tuidang Movement to the Free World
1. The Trigger of the Tuidang Movement: Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party

In November 2004, The Epoch Times published a special editorial series titled “Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party.” It is an exposition of CCP’s history, its origin, its essence, its rise to power, and its crimes during its 60 years rule.

The Nine Commentaries analyzes and criticizes the CCP in a way that has never been done before. Through examples of how the CCP’s ideology of violence and struggle has led to millions of deaths and great suffering, its words have resonated with many readers, showing them that their suffering under the CCP is shared.

1.1 The Face of an Anti-Universe Specter

Perhaps the most significant piece of argument by the Nine Commentaries is the revelation that the CCP is the manifestation of an anti-universe specter in the human world, that the specter takes on the form of a political organization in order to attach itself to every cell of the society. By creating the omnipresent Party committees, the specter exercises mind control through dictatorship to satisfy its desire to destroy.

Atheism and evolution theory have been used by the CCP to sever the tie between human and their creator. Materialism and violent revolution have been used by the CCP to destroy the moral standards, which define human and formed a stable base for the Chinese society for 5,000 years.

1.2 The CCP is an Evil Cult

Another piercing statement made by the Nine Commentaries is “the CCP is not a political party in the ordinary sense, but a harmful and evil cult possessed by an evil specter.” Below is a comparison between the basic forms of a religion and the cultish traits of the CCP provided in the eighth commentary of the “Nine Commentaries on the Communist
The most obvious cultish trait of the CCP has to be its disrespect to life. The CCP used violence and killing to usurp the ruling power of China. Moreover, it has been carrying out violence and killing during peace times through various political campaigns. During the First World War, 10 million people died; 50 million people died in the Second World War; the CCP has killed 80 million people since 1949. This does not include the millions of Falun Gong practitioners killed during the brutal persecution since 1999.

The CCP’s live organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners, House Christians and other prisoners of conscience is the utmost evil on this planet only an evil cult can accomplish.

1.3 Abandon all Illusions about the CCP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Basic Forms of a Religion</th>
<th>The Corresponding Forms of the CCP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church or platform (pulpit)</td>
<td>All levels of the Party committee; the platform ranges from Party meetings to all media controlled by the CCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrines</td>
<td>Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong’s ideology, Deng Xiaoping’s theory, Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents, and the Party Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiation rites</td>
<td>Ceremony in which oaths are taken to be loyal to the CCP forever</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to one religion</td>
<td>A member may only believe in the Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priests</td>
<td>Party secretaries and staff in charge of Party affairs on all levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worshiping god</td>
<td>Slandering all gods, and then establishing itself as a “god,” though not using the name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death is called “ascending to heaven or descending to hell”</td>
<td>Death is called “going to see Marx”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scriptures</td>
<td>The theory and writings of the Communist Party leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preaching</td>
<td>All sorts of meetings; leaders’ speeches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chanting scriptures; study or cross-examination of scriptures</td>
<td>Political studies; routine group meetings or activities for the Party members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hymns (religious songs)</td>
<td>Songs to eulogize the Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations</td>
<td>Compulsory membership fees; mandatory allocation of governmental budget, which is money from people’s sweat and blood, for the Party’s use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disciplinary punishment</td>
<td>Party disciplines ranging from house arrest, investigation, expulsion from the Party, to deadly torture and even punishments of relatives and friends</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Nine Commentaries also argues that China will never be free and prosperous until the CCP is gone. Its goal is to “pass a final judgment on the CCP and call for those who are still deceived by the CCP to see its true nature, purge its poison from their spirits, extricate their minds from its evil control, free themselves from the shackles of terror, and abandon for good all illusions about the CCP.”

Despite of CCP’s frantic blockade, the Nine Commentaries continues to spread in China. Two weeks after its publication, The Epoch Times editors started to receive statements from Chinese readers wanting to renounce their ties with the CCP, hence the start of the quitting the CCP, or Tuidang, movement.

2. The Background of the Tuidang Movement: CCP’s Destructions to China

China has 5,000 years of history because the teachings from Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism build up a strong moral foundation for the society. Dynasties came and went. China remains a prosperous and enchanting land. However, when CCP usurped power in 1949, it brought endless disasters to the Chinese people and the land of China. The past 60 years of CCP rule is the darkest time in China’s history. After dozens of political campaigns aimed at “transforming human” and extravagant construction projects aimed at “altering nature”, and at the cost of 80 million innocent lives, the CCP has devastated China’s social, moral and ecological systems.

2.1 China is facing an Unprecedented Moral Crisis

To date, the CCP has cracked down on almost all traditional religions and dismantled the traditional value system. The unscrupulous way by which the CCP seizes wealth and deceives people has had a trickle down effect on the entire society, corrupting the entire society and leading its people towards villainy. The CCP, which rules by devious means, also essentially needs a corrupt society as an environment in which to survive. That is why the CCP tries everything it can to drag the people down to its level, attempting to turn the Chinese people into schemers to various degrees. This is how the CCP’s deceitful nature is eradicating the moral foundation that has long sustained the Chinese people.

2.2 China’s Ecological System is on the Brink ofCollapse

Indiscriminate cutting of trees, leveling of rivers and filling of lakes have resulted in drastic ecological deterioration in China. Today, China’s ecosystem is on the brink of collapse. The drying- up of the Hai River and the Yellow River and the pollution of the Huai River and the Yangtze River sever the life line on which the Chinese nation has
depended for its survival. With the disappearance of grasslands in Gansu, Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang, sandstorms have made their way into the central plains.

From the 1980s to the end of the 1990s, desertification in China increased from a little over 1000 to 2460 square kilometers (386 to 950 square miles). The per capita arable land also decreased from about two mu in 1980 to 1.43 mu in 2003. The widespread upsurge of land enclosure for development has led China to lose 100 million mu of arable land in just a few years time. However, only 43 percent of the confiscated land is actually used. Currently, the total amount of wastewater discharge is 43.95 billion tons, exceeding the environmental capacity by 82 percent. In the seven major river systems, 40.9 percent of the water is not suitable for drinking by humans or livestock. Seventy-five percent of the lakes are polluted so as to produce various degrees of eutrophication. The conflicts between man and nature in China have never been as intense as they are today. Neither China nor the world can withstand such unhealthy growth. Deluded by the superficial splendor of high-rises and mansions, people are unaware of the impending ecological crisis. Once the time comes for nature to exact its toll on human beings, however, it will bring disastrous consequences to the Chinese nation.

3. The Start and Recent Development of the Tuidang Movement

3.1 Empowering the People

The Nine Commentaries completely exposed CCP’s lies, deceptions, secret dealings, clandestine operations, alterations to the history and false glories. In the face of the powerful truth, the Chinese people wry about their country and their future obtained clarity and saw hope from the Nine Commentaries. Empowered by the truth, people quickly realized that the key to a better future is to completely cut off their ties to the CCP mentally and spiritually.

3.2 Calling Chinese People to “Erase the Mark”

The first statement to withdraw from the CCP was received by The Epoch Times in December 2004. On Jan. 1, 2005, 50 overseas Chinese scholars jointly renounced their memberships in the CCP and its affiliated organizations. On Jan. 12, 2005, The Epoch Times Solemn Declaration, addressed to all Chinese people, was published.

It reads:

"The end of the Communist Party is in sight. The evil party (cult) has committed heinous crimes to sentient beings, Gods and Buddhas throughout history. Gods are bound to expose and eradicate this demon."
When Gods arrange for somebody in the human world to purge the Communist Party, the so-called evil henchmen will certainly not be let off the hook. We hereby solemnly announce that whoever has joined the Communist Party or any organizations associated with the Communist Party (who have been branded with the mark of the beast), should quit immediately and erase the mark. When the cult begins to be eliminated, the records saved by The Epoch Times will provide evidence of those who left the Communist Party or the organizations associated with the Communist Party.

The heavenly network is extensive and clearly differentiates good and evil. For those who have been deceived by the most evil cult in history and branded with the mark of the beast, please grab this precious opportunity that may disappear at any time!""

On the same day, tuidang.epochtimes.com was established as a platform and a database to publish and record renunciation entries. Each entry tells a unique story identified by date, time (to the second), name, location, and the statement. Each entry is given a numerical ID, which also serves as a counter of the total number of people who have quit the CCP. This tallied number is updated in real time on the website. To ensure the security and reliability of the database, an independent server is maintained and special software is developed for data analysis.

3.3 Spreading Like Wild Fire

Despite of tight surveillance and strict blockade, the Nine Commentaries and the news about Tuidang spread like wild fire in mainland China. The major driving force of the Tuidang movement is the Falun Gong practitioners in mainland China. Although under brutal persecution, Falun Gong practitioners have been risking their lives to tell people, who have been brainwashed, why they should quit and how to quit the CCP.

The Tuidang website receives tens of thousands of withdrawals daily. By April 21, 2005, the number of those who quitted the CCP reached 1 million; May 31, 2005, the number reached 2 million; 3 million on July 15, 2005; 5 million on October 18, 2005; 10 million on April 25, 2006; 20 million on March 26, 2007; 30 million on December 25, 2007; 40 million in July 2008; 50 million on Feb. 1, 2009; 60 million by September 2009; 70 million by March 2010; 80 million by September 2010; 90 million by February 2011.
By Aug. 7, 2011, the number has reached 100 million. That is to say, in a period of 6 years 8 months 4 days, or a total of 2,437 days, 100 million Chinese people have renounced their membership of the CCP.

3.4 Analyzing 100 million denunciation statements

The 100 million renunciations translate to over 10GB of raw data that is secured in a standalone server. The special software parses each Chinese word and categorizes each denunciation by the organization.

The final outcome of the analysis shows that out of 100 million withdrawals, 37 percent were withdrawals from the CCP, 23 percent were withdrawals from the Youth League, 25 percent were withdrawals from the Young Pioneer League and 15 percent were uncategorized.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of people</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Withdrawals from the Party</th>
<th>Withdrawals from the Youth League</th>
<th>Withdrawals from the Young Pioneer League</th>
<th>Uncategorized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100,005,934</td>
<td>36,602,172</td>
<td>22,901,359</td>
<td>25,701,525</td>
<td>14,700,872</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of 100 Million Withdrawals
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that 99 percent of all renunciations came from Mainland China. Due to CCP’s Internet censorship, in order to get access to the Tuidang website, people have to use special software to break through the firewall. Some even risk being persecuted.

3.5 Weighing the Tuidang Movement

By December 2012, the Tuidang website shows almost 130 million withdrawals. The significance of this data is not to be neglected. That is, one out of every 15 Chinese people in mainland China has quit the CCP and its affiliated organizations. This is equivalent to persuading one third of the American population to take on a brand new outlook at something they have been taking for granted for years. Moreover, the CCP spent billions of dollars to build the Internet firewall, but it cannot block the withdrawal statements from reaching the overseas server. Thanks to the software developed by overseas Falun Gong practitioners.

3.6 Examples of Chinese People Quitting the CCP Using Real Names

For people who have not lived in an environment dominated by the communist party, it is difficult to understand how much courage is required to publicly denounce one’s membership in the communist party. In China, for students to find good jobs, for workers to be promoted, for businessmen to sustain their business, one must be a member of the CCP or the Communist Youth League or the Youth Pioneer. That is to say, to be able to make a normal living in China in the past 60 plus years, one must become part of the CCP system.

It’s human nature to pursue fame and fortune. In free societies, people can pursue fame and fortune regardless of their political views and memberships. In China, the CCP membership is a prerequisite to people’s pursuit of fame and fortune.

In China, a typical punishment issued to criminals by the court is: remove one’s membership in the CCP and all associated political rights. The person thus become an outcast of the society.

There is no easy way for one to proactively quit the CCP. Therefore, people are encouraged to use pseudo-names to quit the CCP in order to maintain a normal life in the society. However, there are numerous brave people who chose to quit the CCP publicly using their real names. Among them are prominent figures in their respective walks of life. They are undoubtedly an inspiration to the Chinese people.

Here are a few examples.

Chen Yonglin, former 1st Secretary of the Chinese Consulate in Sydney
June 13, 2005

“My conscience pushed me to leave the Chinese Communist regime and free myself from the evil control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Your support is valuable, and it gives me more strength and courage. I have been struggling for freedom for years. My action demonstrates the ruling CCP is unable to control the conscience of the people of China.

Those innocent souls caged in the CCP machine, should free themselves out of the spirit bondage and the Party chains. Now it is the time to smash and break the chains holding your body and soul, and embrace a life of freedom, as I did, walking out of shadows into a new life, no matter how difficult it is.”

Jia Jia, former General Secretary of Shanxi Provincial Association of Scientists and Technology Experts

Oct. 22, 2006

Mr. Jia defected to Taiwan and publically withdrew from the CCP. He also confirmed that different levels of officials, cadre members, soldiers and citizens were determined to separate from the CCP because they saw the nature of the CCP on account of its tyranny.

Gao Zhisheng, Prominent Human Rights Attorney
Dec. 13, 2005

“And I had lost my hope for the CCP completely. This CCP has employed the most barbarous and most immoral and illegal means to torture our mothers, our wives, our children, and our brothers and sisters. It has made this kind of torture part of the Party member's job and raised the political standing of torture. It continuously persecutes and torments the conscience, character, and kindness of us, the people! From now on, Gao Zhisheng, a Party "member" who hasn't paid the membership fee for a long time and has been absent from the "Party activities" for many years, declares that he quits the cruel, untrustworthy, inhumane, and evil party. This is the proudest day of my life.”

Zhang Kaichen, former Director of Communications for the Shenyang Propaganda Department and General Manager of Shenyang Daily

January 2010

Mr. Zhang, a CCP member for over 20 years, renounced the CCP, saying that the word "evil" points directly to the CCP's nature, and that being in the CCP goes against one's conscience and means abandoning morality.

Li Fengzhi, former officer of China's Ministry of State Security (MSS)

March 11, 2009,
Li Fengzhi, former officer of China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS)

March 11, 2009,
Mr. Li publicly announced his break from the CCP, making his case the first public resignation from the CCP’s espionage system.

Qiu Mingwei, former journalist for the Chinese regime’s propaganda newspaper

August 23, 2009
Mr. Qiu announced in a press conference that he quit the CCP and its affiliated organizations, making him the first working employee of an organization affiliated with the regime’s Central Propaganda Department to quit the CCP using his real name.

Lu Dong, former General Secretary of the Communist Youth League, faculty at the Department of Foreign Languages at Fudan University in Shanghai

Tuidang Certificates Issued

At the New York City rally to support 90 million withdrawals from the CCP, the Global Service Center for Quitting the CCP issued certificates to those who quit the CCP using their real names. The picture shows people holding their certificates. The certificate is recognized by many countries as a legal document for immigration purposes.
4. The Spiritual Aspects of the Tuidang Movement

4.1 How the CCP Brainwashed the Chinese People

Generations of Chinese people have been brainwashed and force-fed with CCP’s ideology to the extent that one was unaware of the incapability of independent thinking. One regards one’s thoughts to be his or her own, yet in fact they were how the CCP had conditioned them to think and to react to the surroundings.

For example, Chinese people, from a young age, were told that there was an overseas anti-China force seeking to overthrow the CCP and China. Whenever someone comments on the CCP, the brainwashed Chinese person would feel as if the anti-China force was in action and he or she would defend the CCP as if one’s own self was under attack.

4.2 How Quitting the CCP Brings Spiritual Freedom

The Nine Commentaries empowers people with the true nature of the CCP. It provides explanations for the irrationality of CCP’s actions. It melts away CCP’s brainwash. It evokes soul searching that leads to spiritual awakening. Once a person is free from CCP’s brainwash, one is no longer controlled by this evil specter, one is capable of independent and rational thinking. When more and more people’s spirits are freed, the broader social environment will change. The specter will lose its feeding ground and its manifestation in the human world, the CCP, will collapse.

Thus, the benefit of Tuidang on each individual is personal and deeply spiritual. By denouncing one’s membership in the CCP, one erases the specter’s print, removes oneself from the specter’s organization, and consequently escapes the collapse of the CCP. It is the spiritual awakening that Tuidang brings people.

4.3 The Tuidang Movement Prepares China for a Better Future

Many people wonder, if the CCP collapses, who will replace it and govern China. Some even worry that China might slide into another civil war. Not to mention that some businessmen and politicians hope that the CCP stay in power as long as possible so that they can continue to abuse the people and resources for their own profit.

The nation of China existed for already 5,000 years. Dynasties came and went, but China is still here. The CCP regime has been and most probably will be the darkest as well as the most evil one in the entire history of China. When the CCP exits the historical stage, China will welcome its revival. Besides, there are also examples in the Eastern European countries, where the communist regimes collapsed and the countries continued in a better way.
However, it must be emphasized that the Tuidang movement certainly prepares China for the future, because it frees Chinese people's spirit from the control of Communism. Those who are freed spiritually will become better people in terms of the morality and the capability of independent thinking. This is especially important when the government apparatus will mostly come from those who have had educations and experiences in governing. The lessons should be learned from the Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union, where some of those former communist officials got the power again and brought the countries back into authoritarian systems again.

4.4 The Relationship between the Tuidang Movement and CCP's Demise

Many people have mistakenly considered the Tuidang movement a political movement aimed at bringing down the CCP. However, there is no direct causality between the Tuidang movement and the demise of the CCP. The essence of the Tuidang movement lies in the spiritual awakening of each individual. The CCP's demise is caused by its own evil and anti-universe nature.

Meanwhile, it is crucial that people become clear about the nature of the CCP and renounce their association with the CCP before its collapse. This is to escape the fate of being eliminated together with the CCP.

At this turning point in history, the Tuidang movement is also paving the road towards a peaceful transition to a better future for China and the world. As the July 2012 Proclamation by Edward McMillan-Scott, Vice President of the European Parliament, puts, "The Tuidang movement has brought to the international community a renewed vision of a world without communism through a peaceful and spiritual movement."

5. The Analysis of Historical Events Concerning the CCP and the Free World

The United States is the beacon of the free world. China is a nation with 5,000 years of civilization under siege by the CCP. What we are concerned with in this report is not the relationship between the free world and China, but the relationship between the free world and the CCP. Therefore, distinguishing China and the CCP is very important.

5.1 The Terms "China" and "CCP" are not Mutually Replaceable

It has been one of CCP's tactics to confuse people by mixing up the conception of China and CCP. Under CCP's twisted logic, loving one's country translates to loving the CCP; criticizing the CCP translates to attacking the country. When a Chinese athlete wins a gold medal, he must thank the CCP for training him; when foreign nationals express interests in China's rich culture, the CCP would glorify itself by playing host.
How absurd is it if someone equates the Republican Party or the Democratic Party to the United States? Would people be persecuted as anti-United States for criticizing the policy of Republican or Democratic Party? But the CCP somehow has been enforcing this absurdity both inside and outside China. In September 2011, the CCP sent dance troops to Washington D.C.'s Lincoln Center to perform pro-communist ballet (which was created during the Cultural Revolution) yet holding the banner of promoting Chinese culture.

5.2 Lessons Learned from Failing to Understand the Evil Nature of the CCP

History has shown that the CCP has always been able to manipulate the understanding of other governments towards the CCP.

The United States has been regarding the CCP as a legitimate political entity and the CCP regime as a legitimate form of government, even as a partner with differences. The CCP, however, views the United States as an enemy despite of some commonalities. Looking back, we realized that the United States was given many chances to eliminate the CCP. We present 3 cases in the recent history when the United States had the option to stop or minimize CCP’s destruction but made the wrong choice and suffered dire consequences.

Case I: Coalition or Defeat

Background: The Chinese Civil War (1927 – 1949) between Soviet-backed CCP and American-backed KMT started shortly after CCP was formed and during the Japanese invasion of China. In 1946, the Soviets withdrew from China. The KMT was close to a complete victory over the CCP, who was struggling for its survival.

Options: A) Continue to support KMT and helped establish the Republic of China led by Chiang Kai-shek; B) Broker a cease-fire between KMT and CCP, so that the CCP could recoup and recover.

Choice - Coalition: The United States mistakenly treated the CCP as a legitimate political party, and chose option B. In June 1946 General George C. Marshall brokered a cease-fire between KMT and CCP in an attempt to build a coalition government. The attempt failed. During the 4 months cease-fire, the CCP was able to recoup and recover. In 1949, after President Truman refused further aid to KMT, the CCP usurped the ruling power of mainland China. The KMT retrieved to Taiwan.

Negative Consequences: The CCP regarded the United States as its biggest threat and waged two wars against the United States shortly after it gained power: the Korean War (1950-1953) and the Vietnam War (1965-1970). In both cases, the United States suffered bitter consequences.

Case II: Friend or Fowl
**Background:** The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) devastated China on all fronts. An estimated 8 million people were killed and 100 million people were persecuted. In 1970s, China was in dire economic and social conditions. The CCP could hardly cling to power.

**Options:** The Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union was going on. The United States could A) take the opportunity to isolate and further weaken the CCP, a communist stronghold south of the Soviet Union; or B) recruit the CCP as an ally in the Cold War against the USSR.

**Choice - Friend:** With no clear understanding of the CCP’s nature, the United States chose to ally with the CCP. Nixon’s 1971 visit to Beijing stunned the world. Diplomatic relationship was established between the United States and China. The CCP replaced Taiwan’s seat in the UN and became a member of the UN Security Council.

**Negative Consequences:** The United Nations was formed with the mission to facilitate cooperation in international law, international security, economic development, social progress, human rights, and achievement of world peace. Since the CCP became a member, the mission has been deterred. Many righteous initiatives brought up by the United States and allies have been deterred, abstained or vetoed by the CCP.

**Case III: Trade or Human Rights**

**Background:** In 1990’s, the collapse of Eastern European communist regimes and the Soviet Union has exerted tremendous pressure on the CCP’s ruling status. After the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the foreign investors’ interests in China dropped dramatically. Apart from international condemnation, the CCP was put under trade sanctions on the condition of improved human rights.

**Options:** A) Continue to demand improvements in the human rights situation in China and use more economic sanctions if the conditions were not improved. B) Downplay human rights in favor of trade benefits.

**Choice - Trade:** The United States mistakenly thought lifting trade sanctions would result in the CCP willing to improve its human rights record. Clinton extended the Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status to China in 2000. China was granted the Permanent Normal Trade Relations in 2001. Such developments propelled the communist China to become a member of the WTO.

**Negative Consequences:** Although the CCP entered the WTO, it does not play by the rules. The human rights conditions continue to worsen. By 2010, China has become the world’s leading provider of manufactured goods, together with currency manipulation, pushing down the price of products from other countries. The manufacturing sectors of many nations, including the United States, have been losing jobs.
6. The Analysis of Current World Affairs Concerning CCP's Unrestricted Warfare

It is the innate characteristics of the CCP to see the United States as its natural enemy. In order to maintain its rule, CCP must take away people's rights and freedom; The United States has been the beacon of human rights and freedom; Therefore, CCP's survival requires destruction of the United States. Any attempt to partner with the CCP will backfire because the CCP does not "play by the rules."

6.1 Unrestricted Warfare, the Book

The book "Unrestricted Warfare – China's Master Plan to Destroy America" was written by two People's Liberation Army senior colonels and published by PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House in February 1999. The English translation of the book uses the photo of World Trade Center under attack as its front cover.

Let's examine two alarming statements from the book: "The first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden;" and "The first battle will be the final battle."

The first statement explains CCP's unscrupulous behavior in the international community. There are various treaties, as well as international law and regulations, but none of these have any effect on the CCP.

The second statement implies that the unrestricted warfare has been happening outside the conventional battleground, in preparation for the conventional battle to break out. Once it breaks out, the CCP will deliver a fatal attack on the United States.

Some examples of CCP's unrestricted warfare are obvious, some are not. Here we list a few major ones.
6.2 Global Infiltration – CCP’s Ambition to Take Over the World

The CCP takes political actions through transnational or non-governmental organizations to manipulate a policy change in another country.

CCTV-9: CCP’s Mouthpiece with Global Presence

CCTV-9 was launched as a 24-hour English channel in 2000. From 2004, it began broadcasting in Spanish and French. The goal was to make CCTV-9 the equivalent to CNN, a global media presence with 24-hour news coverage. However, CCTV-9 is most definitely the mouthpiece for the CCP’s perspectives on international affairs and the Party-line perspectives on China’s own affairs. The station has no editorial independence. CCTV-9 journalists are under constant pressure to present a positive account of China. While CCTV-9 is allowed to broadcast in the United States, CNN is not allowed in China.

Confucius Institutes: an Important Part of CCP’s Overseas Propaganda Setup

Confucianism, along with Daoism and Buddhism, are the three pillars of traditional Chinese culture. Confucius was regarded as the founding father of the Chinese culture. Confucius opened a school to teach students more than 2,000 years ago and imparted to society the Confucian ideals represented by the five cardinal virtues of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and faithfulness. Dynasty after Dynasty, Confucius teachings have been passed down and Confucius was revered as the “Greatest Teacher.”

However, the CCP, in its frantic attempts to eradicate traditional Chinese culture, launched a fierce campaign against Confucius in 1971. The CCP’s banner magazine The Red Flag published an article describing Confucius as a “madman who wanted to turn history backward,” and a “deceptive and shrewd demagogue.” Throughout China, thousand-years-old Confucius temples were smashed and books were burned.

Yet, today’s CCP, with its ever growing fear of demise, brought Confucius to the center stage of its global infiltration. Li Changchun, CCP’s propaganda chief, regarded the overseas Confucius Institute as “an important part of CCP’s overseas propaganda setup.” On the other hand, private schools who taught students Confucius teachings in China were closed down by the CCP.

In Feb. 2010, during an unpublished CCP secret meeting, Hu Jintao had this to say about the Confucius Institute: “...we should not only focus on maintaining the existing ruling party status, but also pay attention to developing future generation cadres in order to expand Party’s reach to the entire world. Specifically, through building Confucius Institutes around the world, we will expand the Party’s influence. Through these Chinese schools, we can pick out those who are sympathetic with the Party and turn them into active supporters of the Party. We build Confucius Institutes, not because we all of a
sudden fell in love with Confucius. This is the way we develop: through Party school, administrative institutes, colleges and overseas Chinese schools, form a complete system. Our cadres are the most important “soft power.” In the future, when the era of CCP arrives, our Party’s influence will be all over the world. The comrades we identify now will be the main force for the future.”

The Confucius Institute is a new breed of CCP Party School. Its goal is to identify future CCP comrades in taking over the entire world!

The first Confucius Institute in the United States was established in the University of Maryland in 2006. As of April 2011, there were 322 institutes and 369 classrooms around the world.

6.3 Foreign Espionage

The United Front Work Department of the CCP, the International Department of the CCP Central Committee, the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Military Department of the People’s Liberation Army all have a large number of intelligence agents. These agents collect information on potentially useful figures, including Western governmental officials, businessmen, famous scholars and leaders of overseas Chinese communities and their relatives.

The regime’s intelligence apparatus is the largest, most amorphous, most active. From governmental agencies to any overseas Chinese, student or CEO alike, can be active intelligence assets. According to defected Chinese spies, the regime’s main target for espionage is the United States.

6.4 Cyber Warfare

The CCP hackers are capable of attacking and disabling networks of transportation, financial institutions, communications, etc.

George Tenet, former Director of National Intelligence once stated that in the late 1990s, the Chinese regime had already obtained information on the United States’ most advanced nuclear weapons.
According to the 2011 McAfee report, from 2006 to 2010, more than 70 governments, international institutions, defense contractors, corporations and think tanks were hacked, many by China-based hackers.

Larry Wortzel, commissioner and former chairman on the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, said that the Chinese regime had gathered a great deal of information on stealth technology, naval propulsion systems, electronic warfare systems, and nuclear weapons through espionage.

6.5 Production of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Although development of WMD is prohibited by international treaty, the CCP is notorious for not following the rules. Who can guarantee that the CCP is not developing WMD? Recent evidences show that the CCP has been conducting human experiments with Falun Gong practitioners and other prisoners of conscience.

The picture is the Chinese embassy building in Washington D.C., which opened in summer 2008. The three-year construction was done exclusively by imported workers using imported materials from China. It’s a structure that resembles a “fortress”. Speculators say this could be more than a building, but something that can stand biochemical weapons attack, etc. Or could it be a command center for the CCP to overthrow foreign governments?

6.6 Manipulating Other Countries through Underhanded Approaches

On its human rights violations, the CCP silenced other nations through underhanded diplomatic and economic dealings. This is the prime example of Edmund Burke’s line: “The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.”

7. The Significance of the Tuidang Movement to the Free World

We now come back to the topic of the significance of the Tuidang movement to the free world led by the United States. Tuidang matters greatly to the world especially to the United States because the United States is the beacon of human rights and freedom.
In order to maintain its rule, the CCP however, must take away people’s rights and freedom. It must handle the delicate relationship with the United States to the effect that under the mutually beneficial surface lies the secretive, volatile and fatal struggle where only one side will come out alive and the other will die. That is to say, CCP’s survival requires the destruction of the United States.

The CCP never regarded the United States as an ally. Especially after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, internationally, the CCP was under global condemnation. Domestically, the Chinese people had completely lost hope for CCP’s so-called reform. The CCP is again struggling to find a way to survive.

Focusing on the economic development was its way out. The strategy to tie Chinese currency to the U.S. dollars was CCP’s way to piggyback on the United States for as long as possible.

The 10 years from 1989 to 1999, the CCP’s main target of attack was the United States. Starting from 1999, with the emergence of Falun Gong, the CCP switched its main target of attack from the United States to Falun Gong. This is because, Falun Gong really understands the CCP.

Falun Gong is an open form of cultivation practice with no political motives. Falun Gong practitioners have no organizational binding. If the CCP does not start the persecution against Falun Gong, Falun Gong would never have stepped out to expose CCP’s deceptions, violence, evil nature and ulterior motives towards international community.

Simply because exposing the CCP’s crimes is the only way to stop the persecution, Falun Gong practitioners embarked on a very difficult journey of clarifying the truth to the world. The Tuidang movement is a valuable opportunity for the world’s people to join the effort of protecting freedom led by Falun Gong practitioners. In the meantime, as the main target of attack by the CCP, Falun Gong actually has taken on the role to protect the free world.

The United States, historically speaking, has always been the beacon of freedom for the world. In other words, Falun Gong’s truth clarification activities are helping the United States to remain the beacon of freedom and are fending off attacks from the CCP.

**Summary**

Today, at this special historical moment, the free world is given another chance to stand together and eliminate the last communist strong hold – the CCP - once and for all from planet earth. Only by thoroughly understand the evil nature of the CCP, can the international community completely get rid of any lingering hope for the CCP to become better. Only by not harboring any hope for the CCP, can the international community resist evil’s temptation and protect the universal values. Only by upholding the universal values, can the free world remain free. Only by cherishing the freedom of the heart and soul, can the world’s people realize that Tuidang movement is the only way towards the triumph of good people and a better future for all.
Supplemental Material

Chronology of the Global Decomunization

1. The spirit of the Baltic Sea. On August 23, 1989, two million people from the Baltic Sea region stood hand in hand to form a 600km long human chain through Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, in order to show the shocking world their resolve to stop the Communist dictatorship. In 1990, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia announced their independence and marked the end of the communist rule in the region.

2. In February 1989, Hungary reassessed the 1956 “Hungarian Anti-Soviet Revolt” to be a “popular uprising” and endorsed a multi-party system. In May 1989, Hungary communist party general secretary and party president János Kádár was ousted. In October, the legislation was adopted for multiparty parliamentary elections. A center-right coalition government, Hungarian Democratic Forum, won the first free parliamentary election in March 1990, marking the end of the communist rule in Hungary.

3. May 1989, Bulgaria communist government’s repression against the Muslims caused the massive exodus of some 300,000 Muslim Bulgarian citizens. Throughout the country, strikes and uprisings followed. In the same year, Todor Zhivkov, Bulgaria’s communist dictator for 35 years, was forced to resign. The absolute ruling party status of the communist party was removed from the Constitution, and free election was adopted. In the October 1991 election, the communist rule over Bulgaria came to an end. Shortly after the election, Zhivkov was put on trial.

4. August 31, 1980, a new national union “Solidarity”, which was not controlled by the communist party, was formed in Poland. In the Eastern European history, the “Solidarity” movement has been labeled the first step toward freedom from the communist dictatorship. The trigger of the “Solidarity” movement was the strike at the Gdansk Shipyard, where a female worker was fired because she complained about the rising meat price. The strike, led by Lech Walesa, later spread around the country and over 10 million people participated. Back in 1970, the Polish communist government used forces to crack down similar strikes and uprisings. By the end of 1989, with the rapid changes taking place in Eastern Europe, under the pressure of people’s freedom movement, the Polish communist government was forced to negotiate with Solidarity in the Polish Roundtable Negotiations. Walesa was elected president in the 1990 Polish legislative elections, which became one of the important events marking the fall of communism in Poland.
5. November 1989, First Secretary of East Berlin, Günter Schabowski announced in a radio speech to begin the destruction of the Berlin Wall. Tens of thousands of people immediately went to the Berlin Wall where the vastly outnumbered border guards were forced to open access points and allow them through. October 3, 1990 was the date of German Reunification, marking the end of communism in East Germany. The leaders of the communist party were charged with murder. In 1993, a 70 meter long wall was built as a memorial to this important era in history.

6. November 1989, in Czechoslovakia, a peaceful student demonstration in Prague sparked a series of popular demonstrations with 2.5 million peaceful protesters. They demanded to reassess the “Prague Spring 1968”. With the collapse of other communist governments and increasing street protests, the communist party of Czechoslovakia announced on November 28 that it would relinquish power and dismantle the single-party state. December 1989, the demonstrations continued to demand the removal of the ruling party status of the communist party from the Constitution, and to remove the Marxism-Leninism from the education system. In April 1990, the “Czechoslovak Socialist Republic” changed its name to “Czech and Slovak Federative Republic”, and adopted the legislative election. The communist leaders, including Gustav Husak and Mikos Jakes, were ousted and put on trial for their allowing the Soviet invasion.

7. December 1989, Romanian dictator Ceauşescu executed the defense minister Vasile Milea, who supported the idea of “people’s army for the people”. Ceauşescu characterized the “Timişoara event”, where police fired at the unarmed protesters, as a revolt. After the truth was brought to the public, people gathered in the Revolution Square, which led to the overthrow of the Ceauşescu government. December 25, Ceauşescu and wife were sentenced to death by a military court on charges ranging from illegal gathering of wealth to genocide, and were executed on the same day. The democratic Romania has since enjoyed economic growth. By 2006, the GDP was over 10,000 dollars.

8. March 1991, under the pressure of the democratic demand from the general public, Albanian Party of Labor was forced to abandon the one-party state and to adopt free election. March 1992, Albania’s second parliamentary election saw the fall of the Socialist Party of Albania (former Albania Communist and Labor Party), which marked the fall of communism in Albania. Prior to this, in the beginning of 1967, Albania Communist Party’s atheism dictatorship banned all religious activities, of which 70% was Muslim, 20% was Albanian Orthodox Christianity, 10% was Catholic. All monasteries and churches were forced to close. All religious ceremonies were forbidden. After the long time effort of the democratic forces, in November 1990, Albanians have gained back their freedom of religious believes.
9. In August 1991, the Soviet Conservative Coup, which involved a group of communist party members, tried belatedly to stop the tide towards democracy. It was rejected by the general public, military and the majority of awakened former communist party members. In a discussion forum, which consisted of 100,000 elite members of the society, over 90% of whom were against communism. In November 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree banning the communist party of Soviet Union throughout the Russian Republic. On December 8, 1991, the leaders of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian republics met in Belavezhskaya Pushcha and signed the Belavezha Accords declaring the dissolving of the Soviet Union and replacing it with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). On December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned as president of the USSR, declaring the office extinct and ceding all the powers still vested in it to the president of Russia: Yeltsin. This is recognized as the official dissolution of the Soviet Union.

10. In December 1991, a referendum and the first presidential elections took place in Ukraine, formally declaring Ukraine as an independent state.

11. In 1997, "The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression" was first published in France, under the title of "Le Livre noir du communisme : Crimes, terreur, repression". It was then published in the United States by the Harvard University Press. It is a book which describes a history of repressions, both political and civilian, by communist states, including genocides, extrajudicial executions, deportations and artificial famines.

12. June 2002, a 2.7 million year old megalith was discovered in Zhangbu Township, Pingtang County, Guizhou Province. Six protruding Chinese characters can be clearly seen. It reads: Chinese Communist Party Collapses.

13. May 2004, In order to ban communism, Latvia put an equal sign between crimes of Nazism and Communism in the form of law.


15. Dec. 3, 2004, the first renunciation statement by an overseas former Communist Party member was sent to The Epoch Times.
16. On Jan. 1, 2005, fifty overseas Chinese scholars and specialists declared to quit the CCP. This action started the massive wave of quitting the CCP by the Chinese people.

17. The founder of Falun Gong, Mr. Li Hongzhi, renounced his membership of Communist Youth League in February, 2005 in an article entitled “Turning the Wheel”. This article, along with another article entitled “Turning the Wheel Towards the Human World”, received strong followings among the Falun Gong practitioners in China and around the world. The daily number of those who quit the CCP has increased from a few hundred to hundreds of thousands.

18. On Feb. 22, 2005, the Global Service Center for Quitting the CCP was established. The Service Centers aim to provide multiple channels for the Chinese people to quit the CCP, establish regional Service Centers around the world, organize discussion forums on the Nine Commentaries and quitting the CCP, organize public gatherings and parades, and introduce the Nine Commentaries and the quitting the CCP movement to the leaders and citizens of other countries.

19. On April 21, 2005, the number of those quit the CCP reached 1 million. On April 23, over 200 organizations from over 20 countries gathered on Foley Square in New York city to celebrate the courageous act of these first one million Chinese people. Afterwards, 4000 participated in a parade in China Town, which attracted huge numbers of on-lookers. 200,000 special edition Epoch Times newspaper and 100,000 “Nine Commentaries” in English were distributed on the same day. In the meantime, over 30 countries around the world held similar gatherings.

20. May 31, 2005, the number of those quit the CCP reached 2 million.

21. In June 2005, the book titled “Mao: The Unknown Story” by writer Jung Chang and historian Jon Halliday was published. The book depicted Mao using a lot of never-been-published materials. In an interview with the Radio Free Asia, Chang said: “Mao is responsible for the deaths of 70 million Chinese people. Thirty-eight million of those died during the famines of the Great Leap Forward from 1958-61. On a moral level, there isn’t a single good thing to say about him. Mao is not the hero of the Chinese people, and his portrait should not be hanging in Tiananmen Square. The Chinese people should be told the truth about him.”

22. In July 2005, the Global Service Center for Quitting the CCP named July 1st the “Global Quitting the CCP Day”, and July the “Global Quitting the CCP Month”.

23. In the evening of July 3rd, 2005, 25 TV stations in mainland China, including the CCTV, were tapped into and the “Nine Commentaries” was broadcasted along
with the news about millions of people already quit the CCP. This event effectively spread the word of quitting the CCP in mainland China.

24. July 15, 2005, the number of those quit the CCP reached 3 million.

25. Aug. 18, 2005, the Nine Commentaries won the “Asian American Issues – Online” category of the AAJA National Awards at the 2005 Asian American Journalists Association (AAJA) convention held in August 2005. The "Commentaries" were subsequently translated into more than 30 other languages.

26. October 3, 2005, a symposium entitled “A World without the Communist Party” was held in the Parliament Mansion of the Czech Republic. Marek Benda, a member of the Czech Republic Party, presided over the seminar as host. Honored guests, seven experts and well-known figures made speeches at the seminar. Among those who have attended were: Steve Ispas on behalf of Epoch Times USA, Mr. Jan Rum, Chairman of the Czech Olympic Observation Association, Lord Francis Thurlow from the UK, Mr. Man-Yan, director of the German International Association of Human Rights, Mr. Peter Zvagulis, an award-winning reporter, Ms. Michaela Freiova, a reporter of the Christian Journal from Cretas and Mr. Petr Kutilek, the First Secretary of the Czech Olympic Organization of Observation.

27. October 18, 2005, the number of those quit the CCP reached 5 million. The topic of quitting the CCP has become a popular one in mainland China. Service centers for quitting the CCP have spread across China’s provinces and cities. The rallies organized by the overseas service centers and other organizations continued around the world in cities, such as Amsterdam, Sydney, Washington D.C., San Francisco, Huston, Austin, etc.

28. On November 26, 2005, the symposium entitled “2005 Path to Baltic Sea – the World without Communism” was held in the Latvia capital city of Riga. Mr. Peteris Simons hosted the symposium. The meeting passed the referendum to condemn the crimes committed by the communist dictators in the Baltic Sea region, aiming to help future generations remember the crimes of communism. The referendum called for countries that are still under the communism rule, especially China, to stop the persecution based on religious believes. This included the persecution on Christians, Falun Gong practitioners, Tibetan monks, and lawyers, writers, pro-democratic activists. The referendum also called for democratic countries to develop a system which prevents further development of communism.

29. On December 14, 2005, the Political Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly held a meeting in Paris. The resolution of “The need for
international condemnation of the crimes of communism" was passed. This is an important public condemnation of communism from a political organization.

30. In December 2005, "the foundation for investigating the crimes of communism" was established in Estonia. The foundation is to prove to people that as an ideology, communism is no different from Nazism.

31. On December 20, 2005, a political affairs committee in the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) passed a draft resolution strongly condemning communist totalitarian governments' crimes against human rights and expressing understanding and sympathy towards the victims, calling members of the European Union to reassess the history of communism, to publicly condemn the crimes of communism if they have not separated themselves from it.

32. On Jan. 27, 2006, PACE -- a leading political human rights watchdog that brings together parliamentarians from 46 countries across the continent -- adopted the resolution condemning abuses committed by communist regimes for the first time. A similar resolution condemning Nazism took place half a century ago. The resolution demanded the eastern European countries to modify the school textbook and to build memorials for the victims of communism.

33. On April 7, 2006, US Congressman Dana Rohrabacher spoke with reporters about the Chinese government harvesting organs from living Falun Gong practitioners in Chinese labor camps. He said, "This case can be investigated either inside or outside, and the truth should be made known to the American people and the people of the world. This is gruesome and clearly beyond the moral standards of almost every country that I know. It's time for the civilized world to say "no" to the monsters that are tearing apart people in China and enriching themselves from others' bodies."

34. On April 25, 2006, the number of those quit the CCP reached 10 million. Global Service Center for Quitting the CCP obtained analysis data from the Southern CA internet data analysis center, that 60%, about 7 million, were CCP members quitting the CCP.

35. In May 2006, many Lithuanian political leaders attended the "Truthfulness-Compassion-Forbearance International Art Exhibition" and gave speeches afterwards to condemn the CCP's persecution of the Falun Gong practitioners. Former president of Lithuania, member of the European Parliament, Vytautas Landsbergis said: "Communism is in its nature, an ideology against humankind. Its evilness destroys human nature and the basis for human life. It brings about tyranny and hundreds of thousands of innocent deaths. Human beings are kind, but communism is no soil for kindness."
36. Oct. 22, 2006, Mr. Jia Jia, former Secretary General of the Science and Technology Experts Association of Shanxi Province, left his tour group upon arriving in Taiwan and sought political asylum. Four days later, he was deported and arrived in Hong Kong. He brings with him news of widespread discontent among Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials and hopes for a democratic China. Jia emphasized, "If everyone quits the CCP in public, there will be no place for the CCP any longer. I want to be a model for people."

37. On Dec. 18, 2006, Romania president, Traian Băsescu delivered a speech to Parliament (broadcast live on TV) in which he condemned Romania’s pre-1989 communist regime. Băsescu stated that the totalitarian communist regime in Romania was a case of an illegitimate regime. The speech drew international attention and support from former Czech president, Vaclav Havel; former Bogariya prime minister Jelio Jelev; former Poland president and Nobel Peace Prize winner, Lech Walesa; former Romania president, Emil Constantinescu; former king of Romania, Mihai, Prince Radu and Princess Margareta.

38. On March 26, 2007, the number of those quit the CCP reached 20 million. Support rallies were held around the world.

39. On April 17, 2007, former Polish military leader and president Jaruzelski was charged with “communist crimes”, which could lead to ten years in prison.

40. On April 22, 2007, the forum titled “Communism endangering mankind” was held in the Ukraine capital city Kiev. Historians, sociologists, human rights representatives, and representatives from other political organizations attended the forum to discuss measures to eliminate the Communist Party of Ukraine, to abolish the communism ideology, and to put those responsible to charges. It was decided to reassess the crimes of communism in Ukraine and organize memorial activities and build a museum to commemorate the victims of communism in the 20th century.

41. On May 1, 2007, a large scale anti-communism campaign was held in in Prague, Czech Republic. The theme of the campaign was “anti-communism, anti-nazism, anti-totalitarianism”. Czech prime minister said in the gathering: “We can promise everyone that as long as we have the support of general public, we will establish a government without the communist party.” He also emphasized that “we are responsible for educating our children, so that they are aware of the crime and tyranny of communism, that they will ensure the tragedy caused by communism will never re-occur, and that democracy will be with us forever.”

42. On June 12, 2007, in Washington D.C., the Victims of Communism Memorial was dedicated by President Bush. In his speech, he equated communism to
terrorism. Bush stated that 20th century saw the most death in the history of mankind, that communism murdered one billion lives, tens of millions of whom were murdered in China. Bush pointed out that “it is important that we recall these lessons because the evil and hatred that inspired the death of tens of millions of people in the 20th century is still at work in the world.” “We dedicate this memorial because we have an obligation to future generations to record the crimes of the 20th century and ensure they’re never repeated.”

43. On July 25, 2007, Former President of Bulgaria and prominent anti-communism activist, Zhelyu Zhelev visited Taiwan. He said that communism is the most extreme form of totalitarianism, and that its damage to mankind is more than that of the Fascism. He called for the international community to condemn communism. Zhelev was born in Bulgaria and is a prominent leader promoting democracy in the eastern European countries. He enjoys the same fame as the president of Poland, Walesa and the president of Czech Republic, Havel.

44. Sept. 30, 2007, Global Service Center for Quitting the CCP opened its office in Flushing, NY.

45. On November 24, 2007, ten thousand people gathered in Saint Michael’s Square of Ukraine’s capital Kiev to commemorate victims of the Soviet-era forced famine. Ukraine's President Viktor Yushchenko attended, along with Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, and ministers representing the gamut of the country’s political parties. In his speech, Yushchenko urged ‘world condemnation of communist terror’. He said that evil can only be labeled evil and nothing else, that those who support the evil will be punished. During the great famine of Ukraine from 1931 to 1933, a total of ten million people starved to death, among which four million were children. Ukraine used to be called the “bread basket” of Europe, however, during the 1930’s the Soviet authorities forced peasants across the former USSR to give up their privately held land and join collective farms. The Ukraine farmers had their produce confiscated and their food supplies blocked, and thus caused the Great Famine. During the Soviet era, there were all together three famines. The famine during 1932 and 1933 was the worst.

46. On December 25, 2007, the number of those quit the CCP reached 30 million, among which are many CCP officials. The CCP thugs continued their violent attacks on the oversea service centers and its volunteers. The thugs also stole the Epoch Times newspaper.

47. On May 18, 2008, in the event to commemorate political victims held in the outskirts of Kiev, Ukraine President Yushchenko gave the speech of “see clearly the communism totalitarian, harbor no hope”. He urged those who still are hoping
for a better communism to see clearly its totalitarian nature, and in the meantime, demanded to put those, who do not admit the Soviet crimes against Ukraine, to justice. Yushchenko said, “no matter who you are, no matter how old you are, no matter what you do, what communism wants is absolute power over you. Under this totalitarian dictatorship, humans will forget about morality and their soul. They will become animal-like and inhuman.” Yushchenko named May 18th the day to commemorate political victims.

48. On May 29, 2008, the foundation for investigating communism crimes was established in Estonia. The foundation is to investigate and publicize the crimes of communism and communist countries and prove to people that as an ideology, communism is the same as Nazism. One of the founders, the Estonia prime minister said that another mission of the foundation is to support those who have broken away from communism and to help those who are still under the communism rule.

49. On June 14, 2008, Baltic Sea countries and Ukraine organized commemorations for the victims under Soviet and Stalin era, urging the international community to see the crimes by communism as the same as the crimes by Nazism. June 14th was named the “Memorial day for victims of communism genocide”. The President of Latvia said, “We must not forget this tragedy in Latvia history.”

50. On June 30, 2008, the last Polish communist party leader Wojciech Jaruzelski was charged in court.

51. July 2008, CIPFG submitted the signatures of those condemning the CCP’s persecution of Falun Gong to the headquarters of International Olympic Committee located in Luzern, Switzerland. The signature gathering took six months around the world gaining support from 131 countries, 1,215,793 people, and 1,700 VIPs. On June 24, Australian government unanimously passed a motion to press for an end to the persecution of Falun Gong in China. This is the first formal message from the Australian government and is viewed as the direct result of the global signature gathering activities.

52. July 2008, the number of those quitted the CCP reached 40 million. The “global month for quitting the CCP” was supported by people and organizations in mainland China.

53. On October 3, 2008, Germany celebrated the 18th anniversary of the fall of communism in Berlin. German Chancellor Angela Merkel said during an interview with the biggest newspaper “Bild” that the disintegration of the east German communism was a wonderful thing.
54. In Canada, a group representing some 240 Polish-Canadian groups, as well as
groups representing Canadians from 10 other ethnic backgrounds are advocating
for a monument to the victims of Communism to be erected in downtown Ottawa.
The other groups represented include Latvian, Cuban, Czech, Slovakian,
Argentine, Chinese, Iranian, Korean, Ukrainian, Estonian and Canadian. Polish
ambassador attended a gathering on December 14, 2008 and said, “Communism
is anti-humanity. We have experienced countless tragedies.” Ambassadors and
their delegates from 14 countries have written to the Canadian Prime Minister
calling for the creation of a memorial.

55. The United States President Obama, during his inauguration speech in early 2009,
once again equated communism to terrorism and made communism a target to
dismantle.

56. Feb. 1, 2009, the number of those quit the CCP reached 50 million.

57. Starting March 2009, many democratic countries, include the United States, have
regarded the “certificate for quitting the CCP” as a lawful document for
immigration purposes. The global wave of quitting the CCP and eliminating
communism has won popular support among overseas Chinese people.

58. February 17, 2009, in Cambodia capital city Phnom Penh, a war crimes tribunal
for the first time convened of a trial of a former Khmer Rouge leader. The UN-
backed war crime tribunal was established under the international law aiming at
prosecuting the Pol Pot regime of the crimes against humanity. In today’s world
where communism still exists in China, the formation of the tribunal is
monumental to the development of the international law. The charges to former
Khmer Rouge leaders are not only towards those communist individuals, but also
towards the Cambodian communist regime.

59. On March 18th, 2009, the public hearing “European Conscience and Crimes of
Totalitarian Communism: 20 Years After” was held in the European Parliament
headquarter in Brussels. Deputy prime minister for European affairs of the Czech
Republic Alexander Vondra, together with Ján Figel’, European Commissioner,
Alejo Vidal-Quadras, Vice-President of the European Parliament, and Jan
Zahradil, László Tökés and Jana Hybášková, Members of the European
Parliament, attended the hearing. Two times prime minister of Estonia, Mart Laar
said that the earlier China breaks away from CCP the better. People should know
that communism is evil no matter where it is. Former Czech Republic prime
minister Vaclav Havel said that the crimes of communism must be assessed and
made known to the next generation.
60. March 2009, Mr. Li Fengzhi, a former officer of China’s Bureau of State Security (BSS), announced his withdrawal from the CCP in Washington D.C. and held a press conference in Capitol Hill urging international leaders to pay closer attention to the human right situation in China. US Senator Dana Rohrabacher attended a rally supporting Mr. Li and the 50 million people who have already quit the CCP. This event was reported by many western mainstream media, such as CNN, AFP.

61. On April 2, 2009, European parliament passed the resolution on “European conscience and totalitarianism” in Brussels. The resolution condemns the totalitarianism and communism dictatorship, proclaiming 23 August a Remembrance Day for victims of all totalitarian communism. To recognize the human dignity and justice, commemorations will be held throughout the year to celebrate the fall of communism in eastern Europe and the fall of the Berlin Wall. One of the initiators of the resolution, EP senator, Tokes said that the entire Europe will unite to condemn the anti-humanity crimes committed by totalitarian communism.

62. On April 8, 2009, member of the National Assembly of France, Marc Le Fur, advocated to show the film “Katyn Massacre” in the national assembly hall. Katyn massacre was a mass murder of 25,000 thousand victims, including Polish military officers, policemen, intellectuals, and civilian prisoners of war by Soviet NKVD during World War II. The murder took place in the Katyn Forest in Russia, in an attempt to stop Poland from gaining freedom. Polish ambassador to France, Tomasz Orlowski, former French Minister of Culture and human right activist, Jack Lang, chairman of the France-Poland friendship committee, Jean-Louis Leonard, and several members of the France National Assembly attended the showing. All agreed that now is the time to expose the crimes of communism.

63. On April 13, 2009, New Zealand Service Center for Quitting the CCP organized a rally to support 55 million people quitting the CCP. The rally took place in Elizabeth Square in Auckland. New Zealand Prime Minister John Key asked his secretary Emma Holmes to send a letter to express his support.

64. On April 28, 2009, Afghanistan quietly celebrated the 17th anniversary of the fall of Soviet Communist Party. The parade was cancelled and the money intended for the parade was allocated to provinces of Badakhshan and Ningxia Ha province earthquake victims. President Hamid Karzai hosted a memorial gathering attended by former Mugabe Hedding leaders, military officers and diplomats.

65. May 17, 2009, in the event to commemorate political victims held in the outskirts of Kiev, Ukraine President Yushchenko said that the symbols of totalitarian
96

communism should be completely eliminated. He said those who do not admit the crimes of communism will be eliminated and that this kind of crimes will not be forgiven by history.

66. On July 7, 2009, Canadian government decided to build a memorial for the victims of communism near the war museum in Ottawa. The memorial foundation will be dedicated in November 2009, on the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the meantime, groups suggested adding display in the National History Museum to educate the future generations of the communist tyranny.


68. On July 20, 2009, many gathered in the Parliament Square in London in support of “disintegrate the CCP, end the persecution”. UK politicians from across the political spectrum called on the British government to take action to help end the persecution. EU Parliament member Batten said, “We cannot be on the same side of the enemy of mankind.” Liberal Democrat MP Tom Brake urged the British government to support the human rights of Falun Gong practitioners. Neville Farmer, PPC and Vice Chair Chinese Liberal Democrats called on the British government not to turn a blind eye to the practice in China of harvesting organs from a live bank of Falun Gong practitioners for profit. Farmer said, “I want to plead with the Chinese Government to put an end to one of the most disgusting abuses of human life since the second world war, the practice of organ harvesting for profit.” Their speeches represent the voice of British people out of their righteous minds.

69. On August 6, 2009, New York Senator Tony Avella held a press conference in front of the Flushing public library in Queens to formally reject Asian American Business Development Center’s invitation to China. He said, “Because in China, many citizens, including Falun Gong practitioners, are being persecuted for their religious believes. Last year’s attack on Falun Gong practitioners in Flushing was carried out by the CCP’s Chinese embassy. It is unacceptable that CCP is expanding its persecution on religious believes to overseas.” Avella urged other senators to not visit China.

70. August 2009, the number of those quit the CCP in a single month reached its highest ever: 1,689,500.

71. September 2009, the number of those quit the CCP broke 60 million.
72. Oct. 3, 2009, Global Service Center for Quitting the CCP opened its second office in Los Angeles, CA.

73. Nov. 10, 2009, during the 20th anniversary celebrations of the fall of the Berlin Wall, a long line of giant dominos were toppled along the original location of the wall. When it reached the last domino—the one adorned with Chinese characters symbolizing the CCP—did not fall. The question is not IF but WHEN the CCP will fall.

74. On Nov. 30, 2009, the President of Poland, Lech Kaczynski, approved an amendment to the criminal code which outlaws the production, possession, distribution or sale of items in print, recordings or other symbols of communism, such as sickles, hammers, red flags and red stars, etc. The amendment also bans the display of the Nazi symbols. Both the communist and Nazi symbols represent totalitarianism. The communist symbols cannot exist in the land of Poland anymore. In fact, laws and regulations like this have been established in some Baltic countries years ago. Lithuania passed a similar law one year ago and Latvia has already applied similar law in the 1990’s.

75. In November 2009, Ukraine President, Yushchenko, said that he was going to submit the bill to the parliament to ban communist symbols. On the eve of the Memorial Day for Starvation of Victims, the curator of Ukrainian Archives and National Foreign Intelligence Service, Viatte Petrovic, said if the communist party of Poland regards itself as the successor of the communist party of former Soviet Union, then Polish government should ban all activities of the communist party. The communist party of former Soviet Union massacred millions of people in Poland in 1930’s.

76. On November 19th, 2009, Spanish National Court ruled to sue former Chinese communist leader Jiang Zemin and four top Chinese communist officials Luo Gan, Bo Xilai, Jia Qinglin and Wu Guanzheng, on charges of genocide and torture. This ruling was based on the principle of universal jurisdiction, evidence and witness’ testimony, the report jointly issued by Amnesty, Human Rights Watch Society, and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Provided there is no objection in the four to six weeks period of Defense, international arrest warrants could be issued to the defendants. In case the defendants enter into any countries with which Spain has an extradition treaty, the defendants will be extradited to Spain to face the charge. Alliance of Global Public Trial of Jiang Zemin announced: the culprit head of persecution of Falun Gong has been sued to courts in 30 countries by 35 lawyers in over 55 cases. It is believed that more rightful adjudications will be given by more and more international courts.
77. On 17th December 2009, a landmark ruling was made by Dr. Octavio Aroz de Lamadrid, the judge of the Argentine Federal and Criminal Corrective Court No. 9. The ruling ordered the indictment and international arrests of former Chinese communist leader Jiang Zemin and his right hand man Luo Gan, on charges of genocide and torture against Falun Gong practitioners in China. Following Spain, Argentina is the second country to issue judicial action against the violation of human rights by Chinese Communist Party in China. If Jiang Zeming and Luo Gang enter into any countries with which Argentina has an extradition treaty, they might be arrested and brought to Argentine to face the charges.

78. On January 9, 2010, the number of those quit the CCP broke 66 million.

79. On 14th January 2010, Ukraine Court ruled that Former Leader of Soviet Union convicted genocide in the forced starvation in Ukraine in the 1930's. Kiev Court of Appeal stated in its ruling, Former Leaders of Soviet Union Communist Party, including Stalin, was responsible for death of 4 millions Ukraine people in the forced starvation in 1930s.

80. March 2010, the number of those quit the CCP broke 70 million.

81. March 16, 2010, H.Res. 605 (111th): Recognizing the continued persecution of Falun Gong practitioners in China on the 11th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party campaign to suppress the Falun Gong spiritual movement and calling for an immediate end to the campaign.

82. September 2010, the number of those quit the CCP broke 80 million.

83. Feb. 2011, the number of those quit the CCP broke 90 million.

84. July 13, 2011, S.Res. 232: A resolution recognizing the continued persecution of Falun Gong practitioners in China on the 12th anniversary of the campaign by the Chinese Communist Party to suppress the Falun Gong movement, recognizing the Tuidang movement whereby Chinese citizens renounce their ties to the Chinese Communist Party and its affiliates, and calling for an immediate end to the campaign to persecute Falun Gong practitioners.

85. August 2011, the number of those quit the CCP broke 100 million.


87. February 2012, the number of those quit the CCP reached over 110 million.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES W. TONG
DECEMBER 18, 2012

My testimony will focus on three issues. First, how serious is the Falun Gong as a law enforcement problem for the Chinese government in recent years? Second, what kind of activities does the Falun Gong community engage in inside China in the same period? Third, how does the Falun Gong community inside China communicate with each other and with the global Falun Gong community? I will begin, however, with the birthday celebration of the Falun Gong this year.

On May 13, 2012, the Falun Gong celebrated its 20th anniversary. Its head office was overwhelmed by well wishes and greetings. There were new proclamations of a Falun Gong Day in Baltimore, Charlotte, Denver and Milwaukee, a Falun Gong week from Detroit and a Falun Gong month from Edmonton. But what is inter-

esting were unique computer-generated greeting cards and hand-drawn paintings, many with classic Chinese poems, sent by 2,788 practitioners from all seven administrative regions in China, in addition to those of more than a dozen occupational groups from steel-workers to law-enforcement inside China. What is just as noteworthy is the absence of reports of acts of overt defiance. There was no report of protest rallies in Beijing, or of Falun Gong groups staging collective meditation exercises in provincial capitals, or of unfurling Falun Gong banners in public places. The celebration of the Falun Gong as a congregational festival and not an act of political defiance leads us to the three issues referred to earlier.

1. GRADUAL REDUCTION OF THE TEMPORAL-SPATIAL SCOPE OF FALUN GONG DEFIANCE

First, there has been a gradual but steady reduction of reported Falun Gong defiance in the past twelve years. The overall trend was a precipitous decline of such activities from 2000–2002, a sharp rebound in 2003, then a steady decline from 2004 thereafter. The trend can be observed from three official sources. Table-1 presents references to the Falun Gong in the annual report of the Chief Procurator, the equivalent of the U.S. Attorney-General. Every year, the top law-enforcement official of China delivered a report to the National People’s Congress. The report reviews the main law-enforcement tasks of the nation in the preceding year, addresses major law and order issues facing the country, and states the priority procuratorial tasks in the year ahead. As shown in Table-1, the Falun Gong was named as a notable law-enforcement problem from 1999 to 2003, but was dropped from the annual report from 2004 through 2011. At least at the national level, the Falun Gong appears to remain a public security risk in the first five years after the government ban in 1999, but declines in relative importance from 2004 on.

Table-1: Reference to Falun Gong as a Law-Enforcement Problem in the Annual Chief Procuracy Report to the National People’s Congress, 1999–2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tianjin</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebei</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanxi</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neimonggu</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Since the procurator report of a given year provides law-enforcement data of the preceding year, data in the table refers to the law-enforcement calendar year and not the year when the report is delivered.

At the next administrative level, provincial procuratory reports offer a similar view of the issue. Similar to its central government counterpart, the provincial procuracy report is also an annual ritual delivered to the provincial legislature, covering the same subject scope and written in the same format. As shown in Table-2, provincial trends largely mirror the national trend, where the Falun Gong was depicted as a major law-enforcement problem from 1999–2003, but faded out in significance thereafter.

Table-2: Reference to Falun Gong as Local Enforcement Problem in the Annual Procuracy Report to Provincial People’s Congress, 1999–2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tianjin</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebei</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanxi</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neimonggu</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Reference to Falun Gong as Local Enforcement Problem in the Annual Procuracy Report to Provincial People’s Congress, 1999–2011—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhejiang</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anhui</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujian</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangxi</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubei</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangdong</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangxi</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hainan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guizhou</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xizang</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qinghai</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ningxia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xinjiang</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chongqing</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no. of Provincial reports with ref. to FLG</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See source note on Table 1. Full Chinese texts of provincial procuracy reports for 2009–2011 are obtained from internet searches. “NA” denotes provinces where the latter has not yielded any such documents for given years using the subject keyword and searching for the websites of the provincial government, the provincial legislature and the provincial procuracy.

A similar pattern on the decline of the Falun Gong threat can also be seen in the number of articles on the Falun Gong published in the Renmin ribao, the major national newspaper in China and the official organ of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. These are articles that either refer to the Falun Gong in the title or name the Falun Gong in the text. Table 3 presents the monthly total of such articles from July, 1999 through December, 2011. It can be seen that except for 2000, the annual aggregates have been on a monotonic decline, registering 609, 325, 534, 198, 54, 17 from 1999 through 2004, and in the single digits thereafter. Monthly totals also show a similar pattern. In 1999, they range from 41 (October) to 196 (August), 10 to 63 in 2000, 6 to 66 in 2001, 1 to 28 in 2002, 2 to 9 in 2003, 1 to 4 in 2004, and 1 to 2 in 2005 through 2011. Data from both the annual central and provincial procuracy reports, as well as Renmin ribao articles then, point to a
sharp reduction of both sets of indexes since 2003, followed by a steady decline thereafter, with a hard-core remnant that had survived and continued to defy official suppression efforts through at least 2008. In combination, they show that the Falun Gong has been emasculated in China but not eradicated.

### Table-3: Articles on Falun Gong in RMRB, 1999–2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>325</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>325</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1767</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


II. NEW FORMS OF ORGANIZED UNDERGROUND FALUN GONG ACTIVITIES

If the Falun Gong has not been engaging in overt acts of defiance inside China in recent years, what has it been doing? There are two main forms of organized Falun Gong activities. Both meet in unstructured small groups or in larger assemblies.

**Small Study groups and Fa Conferences**

In the Fa Study Group, small cells of two or more engage in common spiritual cultivation, at fixed or irregular intervals, usually in a private residence like Christian house fellowships, about once or twice a week. There is no formal structure, and no fixed meeting schedule, format, size, and organization. Fa Conferences are larger gatherings of Falun Gong practitioners, generally meeting also in private homes, of around 10 people. At least some were convened on major Falun Gong anniversaries, such as April 25th when the Falun Gong staged their historic protest rally in Beijing’s Zhongnanhai, or on May 13, the foundation day of the congregation, or on July 20th, the date commemorated by many Falun Gong groups as the anniversary of the ban on the Falun Gong.

A detailed report shows one Fa conference had a make-shift altar set up with a Falun Gong plaque placed at its center, on top of a Falun Gong table-cloth, beneath two Buddhist or Li Hongzhi portraits. A candle stand was placed in the middle of the altar in front of the plaque, itself flanked by a plate of fruits or buns as tributary articles, surrounded by silk floral arrangements on each side of the altar. Practitioners sat on the floor with their legs crossed in a standard Falun Gong exercise posture.

The congregation was called to order at 8 a.m. The meeting consisted of four segments each punctuated by ten-minute meditation sessions on the hour where practitioners were called on to join the universal Falun Gong congregation to send forth righteous thoughts. In the first session, two short videos were played, the first on ‘Remembrance’, where photographs of Falun Gong practitioners who reportedly died...
in official custody were shown on the screen. This was followed by another short video on “The Flying Revolving Wheel” on developments in the Falun Gong. The second session was the main part of the conference where practitioners discussed the recent articles of Li Hongzhi, who instructed all practitioners to perform the three tasks of Studying the Falun Method, Sending forth Righteous Thoughts, and Clarifying the Truth. Before the discussion of the third task, a musical video entitled “Coming for You” was played. It was about 36 European Falun Gong practitioners who went to Beijing on November 20, 2001 and displayed a Falun Gong banner in the Tiananmen Square. Returning to Europe, they composed the title song and formed a “Coming for You European Choir” made up of over 80 singers from 13 European nations that performed in London, Paris, New York and Hong Kong, singing separately in Mandarin, Swede, French, Italian and in four voice parts. In the Fa Conference, both the musical CD, as well as the commemorative video elicited strong emotions from sobbing participants. As the last item of the conference, the host mentioned two specific projects to which participants were called on to contribute their efforts. The first was to collect documentary evidence for official persecution, including the Indictment, Sentencing, and Ruling Statements, Detention Notices, Summons to appear in labor reform institutions, as well as official receipts for fines and Falun Gong material confiscated by the authorities, which would be sent to Falun Gong media organizations overseas for documenting official repression. The second was to locate and assist the orphans of Falun Gong practitioners who perished in official custody. The conference adjourned at noon.

Propagation Activities to Clarify the Truth

The second set of organized activities was “Clarifying the Truth”, a direct instruction from Li Hongzhi to his adherents that all should do their part in letting the public know about the true Falun Gong doctrine and practice, and the plight practitioners suffer under the repressive regime, repeated in many of his written messages and public speeches. These are done both in passive and active ways, and both in their work units and residence as well as outside their place of employment and domicile.

Passive ways of Clarifying the Truth entail drop-and-run tactics of leaving Falun Gong materials at target sites—at the door of houses in rural villages, or in buses, shopping malls, restaurants, post offices, public phone booths, benches in public parks, bicycle shopping baskets, the door handle of autos, and outside shop windows. Some left leaflets on bus depot, underground walkways, trains, electric wire poles, telephone booths, and street walls. Additional drop-off points included postal boxes, milk delivery containers, newspaper holders outside doors, shelves in supermarkets, suit pockets on racks of clothing stores.

These non-invasive tactics contrast with the more interactive methods of other bolder practitioners who engaged their targets, including speaking to the elderly in nursing homes, talking to store cashiers, peasants waiting in fields for the harvester to arrive. Not all acts of clarifying the truth were, however, done by lone operators. Some travelled in groups on bicycles or in two cars, bringing food and water for their own consumption to distant mountain communities. Along the way, they put up Falun Gong posters on electric wire poles, trees, and hung Falun Gong banners, traveling over 100 li (50 km. or 31 miles) one-way, speaking to villagers as well as residents of forest lands and dropped off pamphlets to rural households, putting up posters in every house.

III. COMMUNICATING WITH THE GLOBAL FALUN GONG COMMUNITY

Thanks to the internet, the underground cellular Falun Gong community is connected with each other and with the universal Falun Gong congregation in the diaspora, which has organizations in 114 countries and regions in the world, including groups in 45 of the 50 states in the U.S. Falun Gong practitioners inside China can thus tap into the vast resources of its universal community. On one end of this cyber link is the elaborate Falun Gong telecommunications network composed of two news agencies, three television stations, two radio stations, a newspaper, and the worldwide web Minghui.org with global electronic footprint. On the other are the “Material Centers” established by the underground Falun Gong community inside China that reproduce Falun Gong global communications, create local content, and distribute these to other local Falun Gong practitioners.

The Falun Gong Cyber Community

Falun Gong practitioners in China can get their daily bread from the Minghui.org website, which publishes around 40 daily news items on developments relating to the Falun Gong in China. In addition to information on the Falun Gong survivors in China, what practitioners in China may find particularly useful are up-to-date
intelligence, like when some public security bureau was planning a systematic inspection of computers, that some taxicab operators in the city were government agents, or some cities were installing electronic surveillance systems in the residential compound or in street walls.

The Minghui.org website offers a whole spectrum of technical consulting on how to set up a Material Center, produce and distribute Falun Gong materials. In its section on Technical Reference, it lists informational entries on 11 topics including appropriate equipment and production processes for manufacturing CD's, DVD's, video-tapes, stick-on posters and banners; text and graphics editing; software debugging as well as computer and photocopier trouble-shooting. It suggests ways to position the household satellite dish at different times of the day in China to get the best reception for television programs broadcast by the Falun Gong New Dynasty Station in the U.S. It warns against the most recent mail interception techniques of public security agents embedded in Chinese post offices, suggests ways to prevent electronic locating and eaves dropping by the authorities, and to circulate Falun Gong slogans widely by writing those slogans on currency bills.

In a special section entitled how to evade network blocking, the Minghui.org website publishes 67 entries ranging from the best anti-virus and data management software available in China, techniques to save documents and data when surfing in internet cafes, the latest technology by law-enforcement to erect firewalls and how to bypass these obstructions. To minimize the pernicious effects of official hacking and worming, it suggests that practitioners in the mainland should set up three email addresses, one for correspondence and the other two for storage, where Falun Gong documents and graphic data would be saved as attachments. To bypass official surveillance efforts, it offers step-by-step instructions on how to apply for free overseas email addresses, attaching the actual English-language electronic application form, highlighting the key entries that are to be filled, translating the terms in Chinese, and providing samples of responses in English.

Material Centers

To rebuild the communications system within China, a network of Material Centers was established by Falun Gong survivors to link Falun Gong practitioners inside China with each other as well as with its international media hub in the U.S. The "Home Material Centers" are operated by members of a single family in their own residence. The standard equipments are a computer, printer, photocopier, and CD-burners. The operations of the Material Centers involved three basic tasks. First, the master copy from the international Minghui.org website are downloaded, from which relevant items to produce a local edition of newsletter and posters are selected. Second, multiple copies of the local printed or electronic file are then made by photocopiers or CD burners, stapled and/or packaged for dissemination. Third, these end products are then distributed to fill local orders from other Falun Gong groups, or to their target locations in urban housing blocks or rural villages.

One report from Northeast China describes a large material centers that was equipped with a state-of-the-art photocopier, a high-volume, multifunctional machine capable of printing 100 pages per minute. The output in a busy day was 4–5 boxes of print-outs, or 40,000–50,000 sheets. Orders for printed products were placed by other Falun Gong groups, or to their target locations in urban housing blocks or rural villages.

One report from Northeast China describes a large material centers that was equipped with a state-of-the-art photocopier, a high-volume, multifunctional machine capable of printing 100 pages per minute. The output in a busy day was 4–5 boxes of print-outs, or 40,000–50,000 sheets. Orders for printed products were placed by other Falun Gong groups, or to their target locations in urban housing blocks or rural villages.

CONCLUSION

On the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Falun Gong, one may well ponder why the authoritarian regime was able to emasculate but not eradicate what its top leader considered to be the most serious domestic political threat since the 1989 Democracy Movement. Has the regime that once crushed demonstrating students with tanks become mellow, second-guessing itself about the expected utility of nipping another domestic challenger? Is it a case of calculated inaction, where the price of the pyrrhic victory was considered too costly for China's newfound international status? Or is it rather that the Anti-Falun Gong Campaign had a limited objective in the first place, including only the liquidation of its national and provincial leadership, decimation of its organizational structure, purge of Falun Gong adherents who were inside the Communist Party, sanction for its collective actions that breached the law, but excluding grassroots practitioners who do breathing exercises and read Falun Gong mantra in the solitude of their homes, or even gather
for piety and not for protest? And since the regime has delegated law-enforcement authority relating to the Falun Gong to local governments, should explanations for regional variations in repressive efficacy be sought not at the central but at the local levels, which differ significantly in their willingness and ability to deal with the outlawed sect? Or is it the case that China does not fall exception to the general rule that few governments can exterminate well-entrenched and committed ideologues, determined insurgents and underground churches, especially one that has metathesized and nourished by daily and easy international contact with a well-established global community that enjoys international protection? Whatever the case, both the Falun Gong and the Chinese government have reasons to prefer the status-quo than the relentless campaign that suppressed the congregation in July, 1999. For Beijing, it gained social stability which it needs for economic development at home and a positive international image abroad. For the Falun Gong, it has survived the mortal wound inflicted by the Chinese government in a ruthless suppression, lived through its darkest night and rebuilt the movement for a better tomorrow.
I would like to thank the Congressional-Executive Commission on China for organizing this hearing and inviting me to testify today.

As you will learn from the other witnesses today, hundreds of thousands of Falun Gong practitioners have been extrajudicially imprisoned in China over the last 13 years. Untold thousands have been killed. This is arguably the largest single population of prisoners of conscience in the world. But statistics alone cannot capture the gravity of this campaign, nor its impact on individuals, families, and communities. So I would like to begin my testimony with a story about one man whose experience is representative.

This is the story of Qin Yueming, a father and businessman from Yichun city in the northeastern province of Heilongjiang. Qin learned about Falun Gong in the spring of 1997, when he was 33 years old. One evening, while visiting a friend’s home, he practiced Falun Gong’s one-hour meditation for the first time and borrowed a copy of its central text, Zhuan Falun.

Soon, Qin’s family and friends noticed that his temperament changed for the better; he was no longer irritable, he gave up drinking and stopped quarrelling with his wife. Neighbors recalled that he took it upon himself to repair the potholes on Lixin street where he lived. Witnessing these changes, Qin’s wife also began practicing Falun Gong, as did the couple’s two daughters and several of their neighbors.

In October 1999, Qin traveled to a local petitioning office to appeal against the persecution of Falun Gong, then only in its third month. He was sent immediately to the Yichun city forced labor camp for two years. Not long after his release, in April 2002, security agents acting under the direction of the local 610 office forced their way into Qin’s house, taking him, his wife, and their 15-year-old daughter into custody. In a Kafkaesque trial in which the judge followed the instructions of Communist Party apparatchiks, Qin was sentenced to ten years at the Jiamusi prison.

At Jiamusi, he endured regular torture and humiliation as guards sought to coerce him into renouncing his spiritual faith. Former prisoners recounted that he was tied to a “tiger bench,” suspended with ropes, deprived of sleep, and stripped naked as guards poured freezing water over him.

By early 2011, Qin was finally approaching the end of his sentence. He was one year away from being released and, hopefully, reunited with his wife and now grown daughters.
But that day would never come. One year earlier, the party’s central 610 Office initiated a new, three-year campaign to intensify the ideological “reeducation” of Falun Gong adherents across the country. Communist party websites in every province of China carried details of the campaign, which set quotas for each region specifying the percentage of Falun Gong adherents who were to be “transformed”—a process of coercive and often violent indoctrination that ends when the victim renounces Falun Gong. The 610 office mandated that authorities every last Falun Gong practitioner in their locales to reeducation-through-transformation sessions (Falun Gong practitioners are estimated to still number in the millions in China). If the practitioners did not renounce, they could be sentenced to forced labor or prison terms.

Those already detained were also targets of the new campaign. On February 21, 2011, the Jiamusi prison where Qin Yueming was held formed a new “strict transformation ward.” According to numerous reports from sources inside China, they were instructed to achieve a transformation rate of 85%. At least nine Falun Gong practitioners were transferred to the ward. Within two weeks, three of them were dead.

Qin was the first victim. Less than five days after the establishment of the strict transformation ward, Qin’s wife received a call from the prison informing her that her husband had died, ostensibly of a heart attack. When she arrived at the prison, she found his entire back covered in deep purple bruises, with dried blood around his nose and mouth. When pressed for an explanation on how he sustained these injuries the prison guards declined to answer, but other inmates relayed that Qin had been violently force-fed the night before. They believed the feeding tube might have punctured his lung.

Days later another Falun Gong practitioner in the same ward was killed. 48-year-old Yu Yungang had been abduced in February 2009 and sentenced to eight years at the Jiamusi prison for practicing Falun Gong. He died on March 5, 2011. On March 8, the third man was killed for refusing to renounce Falun Gong: 55-year-old Liu Chongping.

News of the deaths at Jiamusi prison were quickly relayed via an underground network of Falun Gong adherents. With the help of censorship circumvention software, they published reports on websites overseas. The prison was placed under lock-down. Family members of the deceased came under intense surveillance. Qin’s wife and youngest daughter were detained and interrogated, and ultimately sent to the Qianjing forced labor camp. Just two months ago, in October, seven more Falun Gong practitioners were handed prison terms ranging from 11 to 14 years, simply because they’d been caught visiting Qin’s widow.

This story illustrates the continued importance accorded to the eradication of Falun Gong by the central leadership of the Communist Party, and testifies to the severity of the campaign.
Yet Qin’s story does not end here. The persecution of Qin Yueming and his family was too much for his friends and neighbors in Yichun city to bear. His oldest daughter initiated a petition to authorities demanding redress and accountability for his death. Soon, the petition garnered over 15,000 signatures.  

As a point of reference, when Liu Xiaobo won the Nobel Peace Prize for his contribution to Charter 08, the charter had about 10,000 signatures.

And this was not the only such petition in China. In Heilongjiang, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Liaoning, Henan province and elsewhere, similar petitions have appeared demanding justice for Falun Gong practitioners. They have been signed by thousands of ordinary citizens, including members of the security forces. The petition for Qin Yueming’s family included signatures from a guard in the prison where he was held.

The petitions do not appear to have succeeded in changing the will of central party authorities. Although many Party members believe that the suppression of Falun Gong was misguided and unnecessary, to change course now—after so much time has passed, so many human and material resources spent, and so many lives destroyed—would amount to a potentially fatal admission of Communist Party fallibility. So from the top down, the campaign grinds on.

Every year, central party authorities launch renewed efforts to eliminate Falun Gong, undermine public sympathy for the practice, and crack down on the proliferation of informational literature produced by Falun Gong practitioners.

In 2007, security czar Zhou Yongkang ordered the nation’s security forces to wage a strike hard campaign against Falun Gong ahead of the 17th party congress and Beijing Olympics. References to this crackdown appeared on websites of every provincial jurisdiction in China. In the first six months of 2008, at least 8,000 Falun Gong adherents were abducted by security agents. Many of them were sentenced to labor or prison camps; some, like the popular folk musician Yu Zhou, died within just days of detention.

In 2009, the central CCP leadership initiated the “6521” project aimed at intensifying surveillance and suppression of Tibetans, democracy activists, and Falun Gong practitioners. The campaign was rumored to have been led by Xi Jinping, now the leader of the CCP.

---

2. For more information on the pre-Olympic strike hard campaign, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2008.
parallel, PSC member Zhou Yongkang led his own top-level CCP committee for the
“Comprehensive Management of Social Order,” which exhorted security agencies to “closely
watch out for a strike hard” against Falun Gong. 4

Interestingly, anti-Falun Gong propaganda has been largely absent from national state-run
television programs and newspapers since around the time of the 16th party congress in 2002.
The campaign’s continued prominence in the national media was attracting unwanted
international attention to the suppression, and a new generation of leaders evidently decided
that a better PR strategy was to allow the issue to fade away. But while the high profile,
national propaganda campaign petered out, propaganda activities against Falun Gong at the
local level have continued unabated.

Early this year, the 610 office launched a comprehensive campaign to “clean up” Falun Gong
informational literature—that is, the flyers, booklets, and DVDs produced clandestinely by
Falun Gong practitioners, challenging the official propaganda against the practice, and
detailing the persecution suffered by adherents. 5 Evidence of this “clean up” campaign is
found on party websites from all corners of the country this year, from Guangdong to
Heilongjiang to Yunnan province. The initiative mobilized neighborhood committees to tear
down Falun Gong messages plastered on “billboards, light posts, telephone poles, [and]
telephone booths.” In Weifang city, authorities were required to conduct twice-daily patrols; in
Qingdao, they demanded 24-hour vigilance against Falun Gong’s posters. 6

The notices also required neighborhood committees to hold study sessions to “unify their
thinking” on the anti-Falun Gong work, and “step up publicity efforts” to win public opinion
in the campaign. This included mobilizing local party functionaries to screen anti-Falun
Gong films and go door-to-door collecting “family commitment cards”—promises from
families not to support Falun Gong. 7 Notices from party authorities also remind citizens that
they must not “listen, look, believe, or disseminate” information given to them by Falun
Gong practitioners. Additional guidance of this nature is provided on local party websites.
Sometimes, as is the case in Lazhui county in Guangxi province, citizens are also reminded
that they are responsible for ensuring that their relatives living abroad stay away from Falun
Gong. 8

Within schools, students are subjected to anti-Falun Gong training sessions, and are
sometimes made to watch videos of Falun Gong practitioners recanting their faith, no doubt
after being coerced and possibly tortured. Those wishing to gain admission to university
programs—especially at the graduate level—must first sign a pledge demonstrating that they

4 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2009.
5 See, for example, Wangu Town Communist Party Office, “Wangu Town to carry out special operations
work focused on cleaning up and collecting ‘Falun Gong’ reactionary propaganda,” 13 February 2012; Jinan
Municipal People’s Government, “Notice to be on guard against and attack ‘Falun Gong’ reactionary
propaganda activities,” February 2012.
6 Weifang city Beihai Road neighborhood office, “The neighborhood office will continue to expand activities
to clean up and investigate ‘Falun Gong’ reactionary propaganda,” February 14 2012.
7 Qingdao, Laoshan district neighborhood office, “Zhonghan street launches clean up and investigation of
Falun Gong propaganda activities,” 8 June 2012.
8 For example, see Jingtai County People’s Government, “Township report on the progress of anti-evil
religion work,” 22 March 2012.
9 Luzhui county government. 2012. “Eight methods for the public to respond to the infiltration of Falun Gong
evil religion reactionary propaganda,” 5 June 2012.
have the “correct attitude” on Falun Gong. In some large workplaces, employees must still gather regularly—sometimes weekly—to participate in study sessions to strengthen their resolve against Falun Gong.

The Communist Party documents published this year emphasize again that the struggle against Falun Gong is of a “long-term, acute, and complex nature,” and admonishes cadres to “overcome the paralysis of thought, and truly understand the struggle has always been an important long-term political task to grasp unremittingly.”

Monetary rewards and punishment are employed as incentives to comply with the party’s dictates. For instance, in March of this year, authorities in Jiaonan Shandong offered 5,000 - 10,000 Yuan for assistance in locating Falun Gong’s underground printing sites.\(^{11}\) In Tanghe County, the heads of village-level security are fined 50 Yuan for every three items of Falun Gong literature uncovered during door-to-door searches.\(^{12}\) A party document uncovered in several geographically disparate locales exhorts authorities to create a climate in which Falun Gong are treated “like rats running across the street that everyone shouts out to smash; don’t leave them any space.”\(^{13}\)

A party document from the Laodian township in Yunnan province dated May 15, 2010 notes that Falun Gong adherents in custody are becoming “more and more difficult to transform,” with practitioners returning to the practice with greater frequency. It further notes that Falun Gong “is fighting with us to win the masses, and the struggle to win people’s hearts is still very intense.”\(^{14}\) A similar document released by a national organization with ties to the 610 office in August 2010 reports that the work of “transforming” Falun Gong practitioners “has encountered a new series of problems. The work is increasingly difficult, the cycle is getting longer and longer, the recidivist rate is increasing.” Party cadres in charge of the work are becoming weary, notes the document, and some had apparently had their loyalties tested. It warned “the competition against Falun Gong is the principal means of competition for the hearts and minds of the masses.”\(^{15}\)

The continuous suppression campaigns launched against Falun Gong evince two things: first, to the senior leaders of the Communist Party, the eradication effort remains of utmost importance, and continues to command tremendous human and material resources. Recently released prisoners from China continue to report that in many detention facilities, Falun Gong practitioners comprise the majority population;\(^{16}\) they are still singled out for abuse and

---

\(^{10}\) Weifang city Beihai Road neighborhood office, “The neighborhood office will continue to expand activities to clean up and investigate "Falun Gong" reactionary propaganda,” 14 February 2012.


\(^{12}\) Tanghe County People’s Government, “Zhangzhai town carries out special operations to control and collect "Falun Gong" reactionary propaganda,” 20 February 2012.

\(^{13}\) A typical example was published in Laiyang City, “City management unit strengthens measures to clean up of Falun Gong propaganda materials and enact punishments,” 5 March 2012.


\(^{15}\) China Anti-Cult Association, “Properly Establish the Basic Thoughts for the Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Overall Battle,” 5 August 2010.

\(^{16}\) Bill Smith, “Activists Suffer as China Holds on to Labour Camps,” Deutsche-Presse Agentur, 13 January 2011.
mistract, and as some of the other witnesses here will describe, there are ongoing allegations that the organs of Falun Gong prisoners of conscience are sold for transplant.

But the official communist party literature also reveals, perhaps unwittingly, that the 13-year-old campaign to defeat Falun Gong has failed; that local cadres suffer lethargy and “paralysis of thought” in pursuing the campaign, that more and more people are returning to or taking up the practice of Falun Gong, and that, despite all its efforts, the Communist Party is losing the battle for the hearts and minds of the Chinese people.

The illegality of China’s Falun Gong crackdown and its relevance to the recent political turmoil

Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, December 18, 2012

Written Statement by Yi Yang Xia, Senior Director of Policy and Research at the Human Rights Law Foundation and Director of the Investigation Division for the World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong

I would like to express my appreciation to the members of CECC, particularly Chairman Smith and Co-Chairman Brown, for holding this hearing for FLG.

In recent years, the world has witnessed deteriorating human rights conditions and growing disregard for the rule of law in China, whether it is in cases involving activists, democracy advocates, or even high-ranking officials. But what are the underlying causes of the current situation? In essence, it began 13 years ago when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched its campaign to eliminate Falun Gong, a spiritual practice with followers numbering in the tens of millions.

In my remarks, I will explore three dimensions of the persecution:

1. How the party has systematically violated Chinese laws for the purposes of implementing the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners.
2. How Wang Lijun, a centerpiece of recent political turmoil in China, was involved in the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners and organ transplant abuses.
3. The challenge facing the new leadership when it comes to the ongoing campaign against Falun Gong.

How the persecution operates without a legal basis

The Chinese government never legally banned Falun Gong and there is, in fact, no law on the books prohibiting this religious practice. In 2007, six prominent Chinese lawyers defended Falun Gong practitioner Wang Bo and her family. The defense statement was later posted online under the title “The Supremacy of the Constitution, and Freedom of Religion.” Some observers have called it a historic document. Following extensive analysis, the attorneys concluded: “it is clear that the punitive actions carried out at present against Falun Gong believers have no constitutional legal basis, and they should be suspended forthwith.”

Given that the persecution of Falun Gong has no legal basis and represents more of a political campaign rather than the rule of law, how has the regime managed to implement it? In 1999, when the campaign was first launched, China was quite different from in Mao’s era. On the surface, at least, China had established a functioning legal system and many laws had been passed. The regime therefore used several tactics to bypass the law and carry out the large-scale and violent political campaign.

1) Creating a new chain of command outside the realm of the legal system. On June 7, 1999, 43

---

days before the persecution was launched, Jiang Zemin announced in a meeting of Politburo members that a new leadership team would be established under the CCP’s Central Committee to deal with the Falun Gong issue. Under this leadership team, an office was established to handle day-to-day duties and called, “the Office of the Leadership Team of the CCP Central Committee for Handling the Falun Gong Issue.” That office is more commonly known as “the 6-10 Office,” named for the date it was established: June 10, 1999. After that date, almost every Party branch, from the province to the county to the district level, established its own 6-10 Office. The power source of the 6-10 Office’s ability to operate extralegally and with impunity is not drawn from the State. Neither the National People’s Congress nor the State Council has authorized its actions. Rather, approval and support for its deeds comes from the Communist Party. Each 6-10 Office takes orders from the 6-10 Office one level above it, going up to the Central 6-10 Office. The local 6-10 Offices also take orders from the leadership team of the CCP Committee at its same organizational level. Today, thousands of 6-10 Office branches remain active throughout China.2

2) Using the existing Party system to interfere with the implementation of the law. In China, the judiciary is not independent but rather, faces significant interference from the Communist Party. The Political and legal Affairs Committee (PLAC, Chinese official translation is Political and Legislative Affairs Committee) is the CCP body most often used to influence law-related organs from behind the scenes. As stated by the Central PLAC: “The Central PLAC is a functional department for the CCP Central Committee to lead and administer political and law related work.”3 At the central level, the state organs under the committee’s influence include the Supreme Court, the Supreme Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, and the Ministry of Justice. The same set-up applies to all levels of governance in China, with the PLAC influencing the corresponding organs at each level. All 610 Offices are set up within the PLAC. This has made aspects of the 610 Office’s work related to detentions and imprisonment more convenient and easy to implement.

3) Twisting the laws, causing them to be used on Falun Gong by illegally interpreting the laws. Since a law could not be passed targeting one specific group, the Supreme Court and the Supreme Procuratorate have issued “interpretations” to close this gap. The “Interpretations from the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate Regarding the Application of the Law in Handling Cases Involving Heretic Organizations” Part 1 (dated October 8 and 9, 1999) and Part 2 (dated June 4, 2001) are examples of this phenomenon.4 However, these “interpretations” are invalid from a legal standpoint, contradict article 36 of the Constitution, and overstep the jurisdiction of the bodies that issued them. Article 42 of the Legislative Law of the PRC states that clarifications regarding the appropriate execution of a given law can only be made by the Standing

---


Committee of the National People's Congress. The Supreme Court and the Supreme Procuratorate thus had no jurisdiction to interpret the law as they did. In addition, neither of these Interpretations mentioned Falun Gong by name. Instead, both the Supreme Court and the Supreme Procuratorate issued separate administrative and extralegal notices to detail how to apply the NPC "Decision" and the two above-mentioned "Interpretations" to Falun Gong.  

4) Issue internal memos, documents, and circulars to direct the persecution. The persecution is mostly carried out by internal documents marked as "classified" or even "top secret." Such documents can be issued at any level, but from the various ones leaked online or via informants in the government it appears that almost all are modified copies of orders that originated from the CCP’s Central Committee or its 610 Office. For example, a letter from April 25th, a memo from May 8th, and a speech from June 7th in 1999, all by Jiang Zemin, were distributed by the Office of CCP Central Committee as formal CCP internal documents to direct the persecution even before the it had formally started. Relevant CCP members and bodies are typically instructed to study such speeches and carry out their aims. More recently, an internal document issued by the 610 Office of the CCP Central Committee in 2010 initiated a three-year campaign to reinvigorate the brainwashing and "transformation" of Falun Gong practitioners. Analysis by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China found that versions of the orders and plans for their implementation appeared on websites across China at various levels of the party apparatus. 

According to the Legislation Law of the PRC, higher-level laws carry more authority than lower-level laws. But, in order to persecute Falun Gong, the CCP has reversed this rule in practice. The internal CCP documents override laws and regulations, the "Notices" override the "Interpretations" of the Supreme Court and Procuratorate, the "Interpretations" override the "Decision" of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and the "Decision" overrides the Constitution.  

5) Article 300 of the Chinese Criminal Code is the most commonly used way to charge Falun Gong practitioners with a crime and sending them to prison for up to 18 years. Over the past 13 years, thousands of innocent practitioners have been subjected to such punishments. Article 300

---

1. pkulaw.cn (Peking University Law Net)  
2. www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?vid=26459&DBC=ch1; pkulaw.cn (Peking University Law Net)  
establishes “using heretical religious organizations to disrupt the implementation of law” as a crime, which, besides once again contradicts Article 36 of the Constitution, cannot be legitimately applied to Falun Gong for various reasons. As raised by Chinese lawyer Wang Yonghang in a 2008 open letter to the Supreme Procuratorate, it does not meet minimal international legal standards of clarity and specificity. In practice, the legal organs that have tried to charge Falun Gong practitioners at the behest of the 610 Office have never been able to legitimately demonstrate that the practitioners had committed an actual crime. It has never been established in court which law’s implementation is disrupted by Falun Gong adherents peacefully practicing their faith, doing their exercises, or disseminating information on human rights abuses.

6) Using the existing extrajudicial system of Reeducation-through-Labor, as well as mental hospitals and newly established brainwashing centers to jail and torture Falun Gong practitioners. Since the fake trial still needs to go through the legal process, it’s not convenient for the perpetrators, more extralegal measures have been widely used to avoid “trouble”. Reeducation-through-Labor (RTL) is an administrative punishment that was first introduced by the Ministry of Public Security in 1957 to persecute “counter-revolutionaries” and “Rightists”. The most recent update is that the State Council approved the Ministry of Public Security report on their status in 1982. Since both MPS and the State Council have no legislative power, this is not a legally sanctioned system. Any Chinese citizen can be sent to a labor camp for as long as three years without any legal process and can have this extended by an additional year for “bad behavior.” The RTL system quickly became the CCP’s most convenient tool for persecuting Falun Gong. The CCP found it to be a quick, efficient way for punishing adherents, torturing them, and locking them away until they renounced their faith. Although there had previously been scattered reports of mental hospitals being used to jail dissenters, this was not a common phenomenon until the campaign against Falun Gong began. But since 1999, mental hospitals have been widely used to detain practitioners not only because no legal process is needed but also because this tactic can further isolate and demonize Falun Gong practitioners in the eyes of the Chinese public. Brainwashing centers is another system established for persecuting Falun Gong. This network involves makeshift detention centers in schools, hotels, senior citizens homes, and so-called “legal education centers,” where adherents are taken and subjected to severe psychological pressure and physical abuse aimed at forcing them to renounce their faith and pledge allegiance to the CCP. People are typically held for several weeks, but can be detained for months or even years. Over the past thirteen years, such centers have been established at different administrative levels, from the provincial to the neighborhood level, from local 610 Offices to state-run enterprises.

7) The systematic, illegal use of torture. In their public statements, Chinese officials often state that torture is prohibited. China has also signed international treaties prohibiting torture and Chinese criminal law includes provisions for perpetrators to be punished. In practice, though, when the regime was faced with a group the size of Falun Gong and was trying to accomplish an impossible task—to force tens of millions of people to give up their beliefs—CCP leaders decided to resort to systematic torture. It is difficult to find the direct orders, especially written documents, of specific instructions to use torture on Falun Gong. However, there is widespread evidence that physical violence is used deliberately and systematically. In August 2001, Washington Post

---

9 epochtimes.com 王永乾：昔日權大錯，如今宣威濟世救。<wong yong hang: xi ri zhu da cuo, ru jin yi suquiring yi huo> Wang Yonghang: Big mistakes have been made, which should be corrected as soon as possible.” July 17, 2008. http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/7/7/20/n2198340.htm
reporters John Pomfret and Philip Pan authored an article titled: “Torture Is Breaking Falun Gong: China Systematically Eradicating Group.” This was the first time that a Western media outlet obtained and directly reported on a high-ranking official acknowledging that violent acts against Falun Gong practitioners is part of a well-designed strategy. Numerous testimonies and eyewitness accounts by Falun Gong practitioners, human rights lawyers, and former detainees imprisoned with practitioners confirm the widespread and routine use of brutal torture tactics on Falun Gong adherents. These include shocks with electric batons, torture devices like the “Tiger Bench,” severe beatings, injections with drugs, and long-term deprivation of food and sleep. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, Amnesty International, and other human rights bodies have also reported on the prevalent use of such torture methods against Falun Gong. Moreover, instances of perpetrators being punished for such acts as required by Chinese law are few and far between. More common is for individual officials and detention facilities known for obtaining high transformation rates through torture to be rewarded in various ways, including through promotions and monetary bonuses.

The whole set-up ensures that no legal protections apply to Falun Gong practitioners. The result has been that judges only take internal documents, secret memos or even phone calls from CCP officials as guidance for sentencing Falun Gong practitioners to prison. Even worse, many cases have been decided in internal meetings with CCP PLAC officials before a trial has even taken place and the judge had yet to see the defendant. In other cases, no legal proceedings are held at all for those sent to labor camps and other extralegal facilities.

How those who involved in this year’s political turmoil relate to the persecution of Falun Gong

The lawlessness and impunity create the conditions for extreme abuses. In February 2012, then-police chief of Chongqing Wang Lijun fled to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu, setting off one of the biggest political scandals in China in recent memory. Some aspects of Wang’s previous involvement in human rights abuses have been widely reported in the media, such as the notoriety he gained for his role in Chongqing’s “hitting the black” campaign against organized crime. But for those following organ transplant abuses or the persecution of Falun Gong in China, Wang’s role in human rights abuses dates back far before his arrival in Chongqing.

Specifically, Wang set up and directed a research facility in Jinzhou to study and refine the harvesting of organs from prisoners. The facility was called the “On-Site Psychological Research Center of Jinzhou Public Security Bureau.” It was established in late 2003 or early 2004 and was located within the Public Security Bureau building in Jinzhou. Among other research conducted at the facility, official documents and state media reports indicate that one of its areas of expertise was organ transplantation from prisoners killed via lethal injection. In 2006, Wang Lijun received the “Guanghua Innovation Special Contribution Award” for his “Research on Organ Transplantation from Donors Who Have Been Subjected to Drug Injection.”

A closer look at the activities of the center and Wang’s involvement point to several disconcerting elements:

1. **Wang had no medical training but was present at organ removal operations:** According to Wang’s official resume, he had no medical training. Rather, as is now well known, his career was in the security services. At the time of the center’s establishment, he was serving as CCP secretary of the Public Security Bureau in Jinzhou and the city’s deputy mayor. Yet, he became director of this center and was present at execution and organ removal operations. In an
interview with China Central Television in 2004, he was quoted as saying “For a veteran policeman, to see someone executed and within minutes to see the transformation in which this person’s life was extended in the bodies of several other people, it was soul-stirring.”

2. One of the research objectives was refining organ removal from executed prisoners: From official statements, it is evident that a focus of the center’s research was to refine the methods for executing prisoners via lethal injection and then removing their organs such that the patient does not reject the organ because it was contaminated from the injection. In a speech at the 2006 award ceremony for the Guanghua Innovation Special Contribution Award, Ren Jinyang, the secretary general of the foundation giving the award explicitly said that: “Professor Wang Lijun and the Research Center conducted basic research and clinic trials to study how to resolve the challenging issue, which is, the organ transplant recipients are generally not very receptive to organs injected with drugs.” He continued that Wang and his colleagues had developed a “brand new protective fluid” that enabled the recipient’s body to receive the organ. An article in the state-run Liaooshen Evening News from the previous year similarly noted this dimension of the center’s research.

3. Center received cooperation from Chinese and international medical and academic institutions: Despite the questionable ethical foundation of the center’s research, it apparently collaborated with a wide array of institutions, though in many cases these were on project unrelated to organ transplants. During the award ceremony, Wang Lijun claimed that the “secretary-general of China Guanghua Science and Technology Foundation Jinyang and his staff were right there at the transplant scene, the very spot of anatomicization, the very spot of organ transplantation into the organ recipient.” According to the website of China’s Ministry of Commerce, the center received technological support from over ten universities in China, including the China Criminal Police College, the Beijing Institute of Technology, and China Medical University. The website also noted collaboration and scholarly exchange programs with foreign universities, including ones in the United States.

4. Numerically impossible that those killed were only executed criminals: Perhaps the most disconcerting aspect of the center’s work is the question of who the organ “donors” were. During the award ceremony, Wang explained that “the so-called ‘on-site research’ is the result of several thousand intensive on-site cases.” This immediately raises the question – where did these thousands of organs come from? The center claimed that they were from prisoners facing execution who were lethally injected. The fact is, however, that such a large number of executions were not carried out in Jinhzhou during that period. No accurate data is available from Jinhzhou from that time, but it is possible to estimate the number of executions based on other information. The website China Against Death Penalty, run by prominent human rights lawyer

---

1. CCTV’s International Channel, Oct. 21, 2004: The Development and Future of Skull Body Source Authenticating
http://www.cctv.com/program/xwys/20041021/101709.shtml

2. Guanghua Dragon Design Foundation website, Sept. 19, 2006: Secretary-General Ren Jinyang’s Speech at the Award Ceremony for “Guanghua Innovation Special Contribution Award”

http://218.66.46.104/frame_a/ReadNews.aspx?webnum=100&rec_id=11185

4. China’s Ministry of Commerce website: The On-Site Psychology Research Center of Police Department of Jinhzhou
http://eas.mofcom.gov.cn/lybj/display.php?e_id=50894
Teng Biao, estimates that in Henan province, the annual total of executed prisoners is about 500 in most years and about 800 in the years that witnessed a “strike hard” anti-crime campaign.\textsuperscript{15} Liaoning’s population is less than half of Henan’s and during the years 2003 to 2008 when Wang was police chief in Jinzhou, there were no “strike hard” campaigns, so the annual total of criminal executions should be about 250 in Liaoning. Jinzhou is only one of 14 prefecture-level cities in Liaoning, so the number of executions should have been between 20 and 30 at most. In the three years between when Wang took up his position in May 2003 and when the award ceremony took place in 2006, the total number of executions should not have exceeded 100. This is far from thousands of cases.

Then who were these thousands of prisoners? This is where Falun Gong comes in. Because Falun Gong was especially popular in Northeast China before 1999, provinces like Liaoning have been the focus of intense persecution. Indeed, according to Falun Gong sources, it is one of the places where the largest number of Falun Gong practitioners are documented to have been tortured to death.\textsuperscript{16} In a recent article in the World Affairs Journal, Ethan Gutmann further states, “refugees from the Laogai System have consistently pointed to Liaoning Province, including locations such as Yida, Sujiajian, and in particular Dalian, as the epicenter of Falun Gong [organ] harvesting.”\textsuperscript{17} It was during this time that Wang was police chief in Tieling and then Jinzhou, and led implementation of the persecution of Falun Gong, beginning from as early as 2002.\textsuperscript{18} As such, there is strong reason to believe that a large proportion of those thousands of cases were Falun Gong prisoners of conscience.

But the most incriminating piece of evidence emerged in late 2009 during conversations that an investigator had with a former member of the armed police. Over the course of two interviews, the fellow relayed a chilling but credible and detailed account of how he had witnessed a living female Falun Gong practitioner be killed and her organs removed. At the end of the interview, the officer mentions that he had taken orders from Wang Lijun who had said to “eradicate them all,” referring to Falun Gong practitioners. Taking the entire interview into account, investigators concluded that although the organ harvesting incident the police officer relayed had occurred in Shenyang, the victim was likely from Tieling or Jinzhou where Wang was police chief and that her detention and prior torture had occurred there.\textsuperscript{19}

Taken together, these findings point to the egregiousness of the violations Wang Lijun was involved in and provide insight into the workings of the abusive organ transplant industry in China. The results of these investigations were published right after Wang Lijun sought protection at the US Consulate in Chengdu.\textsuperscript{20} One of the unique elements of Wang Lijun’s case is that this is the only instance of a Chinese official without medical background admitting to Chinese media that he had been involved in organ harvesting experiments.

\textsuperscript{16}  http://www.falundafa.org/article/56: http://www.falundafa.org/article/1124
\textsuperscript{17}  http://www.worldaffairjournal.org/article/alien-harvest-china%E2%80%99s%E2%80%99organ-donation%E2%80%99nightmare
The New Leadership

The CCP lacks self-correction mechanisms. Misguided policies create huge interest groups based on benefits accrued from the problematic policy or collective guilt for having engaged in criminal behavior. Any effort to change such a policy would face huge resistance. For example, Deng Xiaoping refused to vindicate the Anti-Rightists campaign in the early 1980s, partly because he was deeply involved in the persecution of Rightists and of course, didn’t wish to incriminate himself.

As a result, with the exception of the Cultural Revolution—when many victims were themselves top party leaders—none of the political campaigns targeted at ordinary Chinese people has been fully redressed, though some were partially vindicated alongside negation of the Cultural Revolution.

The persecution against Falun Gong, however, is the longest lasting and widest reaching such campaign, affecting even people outside China. Thus, the number of officials involved in the persecution is particularly significant. Some of the newly promoted Party officials, including members and the Politburo Standing Committee, are known to have been involved in the persecution of Falun Gong during the last 13 years. For example, Liu Yunshan, one of the seven new Standing Committee members, has been in charge of anti-Falun Gong propaganda since July 1999. Thus, although the new leadership might have been unlikely to initiate the persecution if faced with the decision in 1999, now that the campaign is underway, it is very unlikely they will put a stop to it. In China, it is much harder to end a wrong policy than to initiate one.

Nevertheless, they cannot avoid the Falun Gong issue. Hong Kong’s Trend Magazine published an article in October listing three main challenges the new leadership would face. One of them was how to handle the anti-Falun Gong campaign. The author stated that Hu's strategy was not to mention it openly but to also turn a blind eye to the ongoing efforts by other officials and security agencies—led by Zhou Yongkang in particular. With the PLAC portfolio demoted from the Standing Committee, the new leadership won’t have that excuse at their disposal and as the campaign continues, they will have to take full responsibility. During the period before and after the 18th Party’s Congress, the persecution of Falun Gong has become more severe along with harassment of other religious groups. Thus, judging from the current Party line and the policy towards religion, I am not optimistic that Xi and his colleagues will end the campaign and redress Falun Gong.

作者姓名:《习近平治下三大焦头——第五代面临宗教问题大考》，《民主与科学》2012年10期
http://www.chenmingmag.com/2012/10/22608.html