REDEFINING THE US APPROACH TO RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

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### Title and Subtitle
Redefining the US Approach to Reconstruction and Stability Operations

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### ABSTRACT
This paper examines the United States Government’s (USG) current National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD 44) policy that drives reconstruction and stability (R&S) operations, and whether the USG has postured its legislative procedures and governmental agencies to support this policy. The current operational environment dictates how the USG will structure capability and expand capacity to successfully meet the strategic challenges. The United States’ history is full of great examples of conducting R&S operations; however, the looming 21st Century challenges will demand a “Whole-of-Government” approach to R&S operations. By focusing the USG national level approach to these operations, a better legislative approach will emerge. A new NSPD that is supported by statutory reforms that do not restrict the civilian and military capacity is paramount. The Departments of State (DOS) and Defense are the most important agencies in implementing this national directive. It is incumbent that clear delineated lines and authorities are granted to both agencies to facilitate a coherent national policy. The U.S. Army and DOS will need to reform some of its structure, policy, doctrine and training to better support the nation in R&S operations.
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This paper examines the United States Government’s (USG) current National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD 44) policy that drives reconstruction and stability (R&S) operations, and whether the USG has postured its legislative procedures and governmental agencies to support this policy. The current operational environment dictates how the USG will structure capability and expand capacity to successfully meet the strategic challenges. The United States’ history is full of great examples of conducting R&S operations; however, the looming 21st Century challenges will demand a “Whole-of Government” approach to R&S operations. By focusing the USG national level approach to these operations, a better legislative approach will emerge. A new NSPD that is supported by statutory reforms that do not restrict the civilian and military capacity is paramount. The Departments of State (DOS) and Defense are the most important agencies in implementing this national directive. It is incumbent that clear delineated lines and authorities are granted to both agencies to facilitate a coherent national policy. The U.S. Army and DOS will need to reform some of its structure, policy, doctrine and training to better support the nation in R&S operations.
The United States Government lacks an encompassing Reconstruction and Stability (R&S) Policy that grants the requisite authorities, establishes structure and provides resources for success in a world marked by persistent conflict. The current policy, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD 44), has been heralded as the best attempt to create a national policy to rectify an inherent weakness in US national policy to plan and execute R&S Operations; however, it still possesses flawed fundamentals. It further exposed US inability to establish unity of effort when conducting these operations. Reconstruction and Stability Operations are not new in US history. R&S has been present almost from the beginning of the Republic. The Army’s R&S history goes back to the foundations of the United States Military Academy that founded its common commissioning program on training officers in stabilizing frontiers and engineering construction for long term settlements. Even US operations in the late 19th century in the Philippines proved to be largely built around R&S Operations.

A habitual problem in all R&S Operations is a clearly defined agency in charge of the mission. The crux of this argument is whether Department of State (DOS) is better suited for R&S operations or the Department of Defense (DOD). World War II provided a conundrum to whom was better suited to conduct post world war R&S Operations. The argument continues in today’s environment marked by persistent conflict. Each agency has made valid arguments why they are better suited. Recently, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates stated “Yet even with a better-funded State Department and
U.S. Agency for International Development, future military commanders will not be able to rid themselves of the tasks of maintaining security and stability.” The problem is the U.S. Government does not have a policy that explicitly addresses the authorities, structure and resourcing process required to support this aspect of US national interest.

Clear authorities are essential to plan and execute R&S Operations. Because R&S operations are almost always multi-agency, Congress will have to establish or approve the authorizations and the process for securing resources. Structuring an agency or force that can plan, coordinate and execute any given R&S problem set should be part of a coherent policy. Thoughtful consideration and flexibility should also be incorporated as it is nearly impossible to foretell all possible eventualities. Global conflict trends point to a world where security is paramount and the inability of other agencies to assist in the initial phase of stability operations will become the norm as seen in Iraq. The global environment greatly impacts the US armed forces’ structure. This paper will redefine the approach to R&S Operations; address the fundamental policy shortfalls in our government; provide historical and future conflict examples for these operations; and address what agency and authorities are logical leads for R&S Operations.

Current NSPD 44

On December 7, 2005 President George W. Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD 44) to promote security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation of reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) assistance to foreign states and regions that are at risk of becoming failed states or in transition from conflict or civil strife. The Directive was intended to improve the
United States Government (USG) capabilities to assist governments in governing their territories and prevent territories from becoming safe havens for extremists, terrorists or those that pose a threat to the US and its allies.\(^6\) Even though NSPD-44 gave responsibility for coordination of stabilization and reconstruction activities to the Secretary of State, the policy lacks the critical statutory and programming authorities. Congress has significantly reduced all submitted budgets to support NSPD-44. For Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 the administration supplemental requested $17.2 million for start-up cost and rapid response cadre.\(^7\) The final version contained only 7.7 million for start-up cost and no money for cadre and FY 2006 witnessed similar cuts.\(^8\)

Specifically, an effective R&S policy must have legal authorities to assign missions and to direct actions to insure they are seamlessly planned and executed. Being the lead coordinator does make the DOS the lead agency, but that is insufficient. Without stronger language in the policy, it is a piece of paper that lacks the power to enforce or direct implementation and the authority to establish coordinated capacity to conduct operations. The policy must contain language directing continuous resourcing and programming in order to effectively conduct long term planning solutions. Furthermore, a lasting policy is needed that withstands changes in administrations and establishes the United States’ R&S position in the name of national interest. NSPD-44 has some parallels to PDD-56 in the fact that they both lacked action and lasting implementation.

The Post Cold War era exposed seams in the United States Government’s ability to conduct stability operations. First, the danger of world events demanded more flexible action. This is inherent with the executive branch, but is at odds with the constitutional powers of Congress to appropriate, authorize and have oversight of
foreign policy and spending. Second, it exposed the dangers in security worldwide stemming from the inability of a single US government agency to plan, direct and execute stability operations. These flaws have caused senior government officials to question the US institutions and culture. Secretary Gates opined “that new institutions are needed for the 21st Century, new organizations with a 21st Century mind-set.”

**Intelligence Trends for Future Conflict**

Both the National Intelligence Estimate and the Joint Operation Environment (JOE) have identified failing or failed states as places the US will intervene and conduct stability operations. The JOE has defined conflict categories into trends. The four major trends that could result in future military operations are: Human Geography, Governance and Legitimacy, Globalization of Economics and Resources, and Science, Technology, and Engineering.

The key trend that will impact R&S operations and induce the US into conflict areas will be demographics. The areas that effect demographics are: population migration, location, age, education and resources. The United States Census Bureau predicts the world population to be 6.9 Billion by 2010. Two critical aspects of this population growth are: 90% will be in developing countries and most governments will not be able to meet their population needs. Another area that will impact US interest is the fact that 49% of world’s population lives in urban areas and this will increase to more than 60% by 2030. A combining factor of a youth bulge, 15 to 29 year olds, will dominate developing and poor countries thus adding to a young urbanized population. Further exasperating this situation is the fact that the education level of this populace will not meet the demands of the 21st Century. Currently, there are more than one
billion people in the world that are illiterate or do not attend school. This segment of the world will not be able to meet the demands of a global economy and greatly strain governments to provide services for this urban population. The US will most likely conduct operations in these urbanized environments that are located in poor or developing countries that will necessitate reconstruction and stability operations. Unfortunately, most of these areas are in the national interest of the US by the mere facts of their locations are in essential resource rich areas, along key sea and land lines of communication or involve important alliances.

**Stability Planning**

One key component of national purpose is the ability to conduct Stability Operations. U.S. Joint Doctrine states stability operations are missions, tasks, and activities that seek to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief. It further states stability operations support USG plans for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations and will likely be conducted in coordination with and in support of HN authorities, OGAs, IGOs, and/or NGOs, and the private sector. The Army’s Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, is along the same lines as the joint definition except that it highlights these “activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other national elements of power”. From US national security documents to the Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07 Stability Operations, the common theme is that the US will be involved in Stability Operations. This reality, however, has not been sufficient to produce the legislative authority to develop and implement a broad strategic national plan. Legislative authorities by nature give broad
power to plan, program and execute long term plans. Long term strategic thinking is conducted by both the Departments of Defense and State. DOD is better suited for planning and executing Stability Operations where hostile conditions like terrorism, absent governance, WMD proliferation and security issues exist. For the present, DOD remains the primary force in ongoing stability operations partly because of continuing security concerns and its unique capacity to plan and execute operations. DOD has the “luxury” as well as the default requirement of conducting operations in many places that most government agencies cannot. All defense matters reside in a single agency, therefore, DOD tends to have cleaner lines of reporting and very active oversight by one congressional committee. There is no oversight committee for reconstruction and stabilization which disperses all relevant R&S issues in several different congressional committees. In fact, the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Congressional Committees that oversee DOS have not reauthorized the Foreign Assistance Act in more than two decades.

Eventually, the USG should form a National Committee for Reconstruction and Stability. An example would be renaming a national committee for Reconstruction and Stability for National interest and Strategic planning (RSNS). This committee would be a permanent organization that includes representatives from all stakeholder agencies, legislative and executive branches. Streamlining the process where executive branch desires are linked to authorizations and agencies that must plan and implement operations will provide a national planning strategy that is holistic. These members must be able to pass legislative authorization for programs, funding and appropriation for government agencies and programs. Other relevant committee members must also
have a seat in this committee so there is no perception problem that they have ceded power. A good example of this type of cooperation was the bipartisan Armed Control Observers Group created in 1985 for Arms Reduction and Control Negotiations. This committee would hold regular consolations to plan, provide oversight and more when a crisis demanded attention or consolations. 21

The DOS is not as apt at planning because its newly developed capacity to do so has not improved enough to provide a credible alternative. 22 Also, DOS has other restrictions placed upon it by custom, and in some cases law, or policy. Some of these are the American Service-Member Act of 2002 (ASPA) that effectively cut off specific types of military assistance to countries that signed on to the International Criminal Court and the Nethercutt Amendment that placed prohibitions on economic support to foreign countries. 23 Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice equated the impacts of these restrictions to shooting ourselves in the foot. 24 The number of sanctions on foreign governments makes it difficult for DOS to plan long term stability operations in foreign countries. 25

Furthermore, the structure and inherent culture of DOS, plus its relationship with Congress, does not lend itself to an efficient organization for dealing with Stability Operations despite the clear need to do so in support of our national interest. The congressional committees that support DOS have approached issues on reconstruction and stability very tentatively. A majority of the current legislation is focused more on human rights, regional aid programs and the method of delivery of aid. 26 The larger defense budget has given defense committees more prominent power. The defense budgets are highly guarded from deficit cuts with its powerful constituency for defense
issues compared to the foreign operations account that are easily cut. 27 Congressional committee members on foreign affairs do not have the coherent view on R&S operations and funding. Even the executive branches of the Office of Management and Budgeting (OMB) see the DOS budget as an easy target for budget cuts.

The inability of the USG to plan and execute stability operations and use soft power has caused concern with the current Secretary of Defense, he stated, “I remain concerned that we have yet to create any permanent capability or institution to rapidly create and deploy these kind of skills in the future, we need to develop a permanent sizeable cadre of immediately deployable experts with disparate skills.” 28 NSPD 44 does not affect the authorities of the Secretary of Defense, Director of CIA, Director of National Intelligence or President’s Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance. 29 The policy did form new organizations and mission sets within DOS with relatively little funding.

**DOS Stabilization and Reconstruction Force**

NSPD 44 formed the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the executive branch of the State Department to coordinate stabilization and reconstruction operations. 30 Some of the highlighted language directed S/CRS to: “Develop strategies for reconstruction and stabilization activities; provide US decision makers with detailed R&S operations; ensure US policy coordination among US Departments and Agencies; coordinate interagency processes to identify states at risk of instability; lead interagency initiatives to prevent or mitigate conflict; develop detailed contingency plans for integrated US reconstruction and stabilization; lead US development of a strong civilian response capability; coordinate R&S budgets among
Departments and Agencies.” From this list of major components, S/CRS developed five major sectors that form the basis for interagency planning and integration of instruments of power. They are: Security; Justice and Reconciliation; Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure; Governance, Civil Administration and Civil Society/Participation; Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being. This list highlights some broad assumptions that the Department of State has the capability to coordinate, plan, lead and implement R&S operations.

S/CRS Response Organizations

In response to NSPD 44 to develop a civilian response capability, S/CRS created three primary organizations: Active Response Corps (ARC), Standby Response Corps (SRC) and Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). The ARC is a 250 person organization with representatives from State, USAID, Commerce, Justice, and other government agencies. This ready force is prepared to deploy within 72 hours of notification to train for, staff reconstruction, stabilization and conflict prevention efforts, and focus on critical initial interagency functions such as assessment, planning, management, administration, logistics, and resource mobilization. This Corps has the ability to deploy for a year and is prepared to conduct immediate R&S Operations. As of March 2008, the ARC “employs only 11 people and is supported by a small allocation of the State Department budget.”

The SRC is a 2,000 person strong organization with the same representation of the ARC. The key difference is the SRC trains for two to three weeks a year, is the second element to deploy, and deploys within 45 to 60 days of a crisis for up to 180 days.
The CRC is the third organization, consisting of 2,000 personnel. One big difference is these personnel are outside the federal government and are called to active duty to serve in the federal government much like the DOD’s ready reserve when called to active duty. They are civilian experts that incur a four year service obligation that provide much needed skills from specific civilian sectors that would better enable the USG during R&S operations. After mobilization, they are trained and then within 30-60 days they are deployed up to a year.

Broad assumptions have been made about the culture changes of DOS and other government agencies’ Officers will be required to facilitate NSPD 44s success. Ambassador John E. Herbst believes that the DOS culture will take a decade to change.  

But a decade may be a little too late. No one will argue the need for unity of effort across all government agencies to support US interest, however, as of April 2007, 70 of 74 staff positions were from the DOS and the other four were from DOD.  

There were no representatives from Treasury, Justice, Education, Transportation and Agriculture. The goal for the 250 person ARC roughly 90 positions would be from USAID, 70 from State, 60 from Justice, and the other 30 split between Treasury, Commerce, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services and Agriculture. Without these critical high-level inter-agency representatives, S/CRS is merely an embryonic office that lacks the ability to fulfill its broad mission. The S/CRS combined strength of all three branches is only 365.  

A hindrance is the inability to obtain necessary funding for unfilled positions. Support for S/CRS is weak throughout the legislative branch for these three reasons: “contingency funds exist elsewhere in the Foreign Operations budget; dissatisfaction
with the S/CRS plan on how it will use these funds; and the failure of the State Department to reallocate any of its own funds.  

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**Stability and Reconstruction Money**

The executive branch produces the National Security Strategy, and then must entrust multiple congressional committees with the wisdom to see to it that the required capabilities are given adequate financial underpinning. Authorization for undertakings of this type is often bifurcated between the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees in the House of Representatives. It is incumbent on the Executive Branch to clarify priorities and ensure funding for programs that have national implications. The lack of funding for the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was addressed by Ambassador Herbst when he briefed the U.S Army War College Class of ‘09 in December 2008 “we are hopeful that we will receive the funding that has been requested.”  

40 This does not bode well when considering NSPD 44 was signed in 2005. The fact is that the State Department has not prioritized this organization within its own budget. Furthermore, within the confines of DOS, C/SRS relationship with “powerful regional bureaus, country desk offices and the new Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance, and USAID have not been clearly delineated, which puts it at great bureaucratic disadvantage.”  

41 The annual appropriations cycle and the ability to reprogram funds also have a negative impact on funding stability programs. Foreign assistance authorizers of annual appropriations have ceded entirely to appropriators thus causing appropriators to impact programs.  

42 A crucial piece is for DOD, DOS and the legislative branch to work closer in funding priority R&S programs dictated in multiple strategic documents which support national interests.
In Section 1206 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act is the authority to train and equip foreign military forces. The program assists foreign militaries to “conduct counterterrorist operations; or participate in or support military and stability operations in which the United States Armed Forces are a participant.” A critical budget work around is the use of these funds for Stability Operations. The benefit of Section 1206 is that it can be initiated by either DOD or DOS for training and equipping projects but must be approved by both. Both State and Defense approval of these funds force both departments to work together. Currently, spending levels are capped at $300 million. DOD and DOS submitted a spending request to $750 million, but were denied it in the FY 08 authorizations. Even though this funding is a major step forward in that it forces two departments to work together, it does not address the long term approach that is needed to plan for long term R&S Operations. Congressional resistance has been reluctant to expand section 1206 for numerous reasons. The section is seen as DOD having a say in DOS’ budget, missions and a sign of DOS internal weakness.

DOD Directive 3000.05 Stability Security Transition Reconstruction (SSTR)

During Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, USG agency support to execute SSTR was often limited and consequently that mission fell exclusively on the military thus forcing it to assume most of the key R&S sectors of security, justice, economic, governance and humanitarian assistance. These operations are not only indicative of the form of future conflicts but were also tasks the military assumed in WW II. Recognizing the inevitable, DOD promulgated Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
Operations, before the release of NSPD 44. Just as in WWII, the Directive states the “U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish order when civilians cannot do so.” This directive identifies stabilization and reconstruction operations as a core U.S. military mission that has a priority comparable to “combat operations and must be explicitly addressed and integrated across all defense activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, material, leadership, personnel, facilities and planning.” In order to accomplish this, DOD is focused on improving the three domains of internal, interagency and international. DOD is taking several concrete steps including; establishing a joint definition, accepting a new Army FM, and moving to change DOD culture.

Joint Doctrine

The joint definition of stability operations clearly lays out the interagency need and a very land centric need for the Army to be the core of Stability Operations. The Army must undertake actions in coordination with other relevant USG agencies in order to secure support. The United States Government views Stability Operations as an integral element of the USG’s capability to achieve the full breadth of national missions that support U.S. policy. To solidify these missions, some adjustments in Title X need to dictate specified reconstruction and stability service responsibilities. This would clearly define stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations (SSTRO) responsibilities by service.

Army Doctrine

The Army has published FM 3-07 Stability Operations that lays out a doctrine and conceptual foundation that DOD can choose to apply to planning and executing
R&S Operations. There have also been great strides made in training at all levels of the military education system. Students at all levels understand the importance of R&S Operations in winning wars and supporting national security policy. Where DOD has fallen short is the detailed intellectual planning and level of effort required for stability operations in all war plans. Historically, staffs have typically dedicate more time, resources and talented officers for the kinetic phase of war planning than securing the peace. This lack of incorporation into war planning was evident in the early stages of Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. NSPD-44 specifically states:

“Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate….and will develop a general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels where appropriate.”

DOD must better understand how to incorporate requirements and accompanying resources early in planning, how to manage the implementation of those plans across several agencies, and measure their effectiveness in order to meet the requirements of the NSPD and to establish a basis for securing funds for future operations. The Army must accept that it will lead this charter for DOD because of the land centric focus of stability operations. The Army has done its part by cross-walking the Army Stability Tasks with DOS Stability Sectors as seen in the figure below.
The Army has done a great job in documenting and partnering with other agencies to codify stability operations as part of its lexicon, but the real challenge will lie with the DOD culture.

DOD Culture

DOD understands that to enhance the military’s ability to conduct stability operations it will “require a transformation in organizational culture focused on new habits of thought and action….not on new technologies and weapon systems.” Since the Army is the focal point of Stability Operations there are dynamic cultural changes that must occur in order for DOD to be successful in R&S Operations. The biggest obstacle is to overcome DOD’s long held principal that their primacies of combat operations are more important than R&S Operations. DOD’s current SSTR Directive recognizes Stability Operations but also states that the tasks are best performed by civilians rather than military forces. Implementation of Stability Operations has been
slow. Directive 3000.05 challenges “a long-held principal of US military doctrine, and if fully implemented could cause potentially radical challenges in military organization, training and doctrine.” Key to this implementation is the transformation of the Army’s culture.

The Army’s main culture shifts are required in officer training. Organizational structure will likewise have to be reexamined although the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB) concept may actually suffice because of its inherent flexible organizational structure. The MEB must have the requisite recognition in military circles as being an important command and be granted the priorities it deserves for securing the peace in all operations. The Army is on the right path, but needs to further develop its officer corps through assignments with other USG agencies that are involved in R&S Operations. “Education on stability operations should ensure that leaders at all levels understand the objectives, principals, and characteristics of stability operations, and can plan and conduct these operations.” By having a designated Army Skill Identifier (ASI) for those who have completed education and assignment requirements, the Army will do more than incorporate lessons in their education system but track and give credit to those who serve in interagency assignments. Officer level education and training will change cultural biases towards other agencies. A third challenge, however, is in developing training opportunities with other agencies. This will require the cooperative development of training plans and scenarios, and most important, a fenced funding stream for those non-DOD agencies. This will lead to exercises, training and concept developments that have an interagency perspective.
The Army must prepare to also lend its expertise in planning to other agencies. A recent GAO report characterizes the new planning process for R&S operations by DOS “as cumbersome and too time consuming for the results it has produced.” Most courses offered by DOS are short one day introduction courses. Having DOS planners attend the Army’s Strategic Planners Course at Carlisle Barracks or similar academically challenging course that awards an Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) is required to produce qualified non-DOD planners. This training would improve DOS planning and foster cooperative contingency planning between the two key departments. These DOS planners would become an integral part of operations planning at flag-level staffs. They would then become invaluable members to lead the culture change that Ambassador Herbst said DOS so desperately needs. The DOS has made great strides in planning documentation in the last two years by establishing a planning framework. DOS recognizes the requirement to have a whole government approach to planning. DOS accepts the purpose of R&S planning “is undertaken in support of achieving transformation in the specified country or region undergoing or projected to undergo violent conflict or civil strife.”

Another key element to changing culture must be to improve information sharing among the agencies. This is critical when preventing and preparing for the next trouble spot in the world. Intelligence officers and regional specialist are critical in providing the leadership with critical assessments of fragile states. Combatant Commander’s should not accept an assessment that does not include interagency assessments from the start. Again, shared schooling and exchanges would greatly benefit both DOD and DOS. Supportive personnel management of Army officers and interagency personnel is
essential. An important aspect is the promotions and awards that are given to those who serve in these organizations. This lever proved to be critical in establishing requirements for joint qualification for becoming a general officer. Many leaders inside and outside DOD are calling for a Goldwater Nichols II to force another such change. 

Despite its extensive historical involvement and even recent deployments, the Army does not want to create stability units in its force structure. Stability Operations require many ground forces and the question of whether or not the Army will culturally embrace Stability Operation missions or reject them as was done after Vietnam has not yet been settled. Part of the debate is what will be required and at what cost to the capabilities of the fighting force? FM 3-07 did not address the requirements for specialized stability or support units. The Army has stated “operational experience supports the Army’s view that a combined-arms modular force, fully trained to conduct full-spectrum operations, is more effective in current environment and more flexible.” The Army’s focus of recent modularity is overly weighted on conventional warfare, but the continuing development of flexibly organized MEBs may be a solution. Despite countless calls to create units that are better prepared for Stability Operations, the Army has “decided against fielding brigades oriented in irregular warfare missions such as stability operations, counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense.” The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept have called on the Army to do more in preparation for these missions. Secretary of Defense Gates stated that the “most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern themselves. Standing up and mentoring of indigenous army and
police -- once the province of Special Forces -- is now a vital mission for the military as a whole." 60 This culture change, however, will not be easy for an Army that’s strategic plan of Grow the Army (GTA) is tactically focused on building modular combat brigades for today’s fights in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Historical Perspective

The United States has been successful in post-conflict Stabilization Operations as far back as the 1898. During WW II there was great debate over which department should be in charge of Stability Operations. The debate centered on whether or not Soldiers should be governors. The Army defined any occupation as divided into two phases. Phase I was a period of military necessity to establish and maintain military government; and Phase II an enduring period when military necessity will no longer exist and civilian authority assumes the mission from the Army. 61 General Eisenhower established that “civil supply and civil affairs in Tunisia upon its recovery will be, for the initial period, a direct and sole military responsibility.” 62 He was adamant that it was a military function to supply the necessary materials and personnel until the circumstances allowed the Theater Commander to delegate these authorities to non-military agencies. Post War World II Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S) became a model for all other conflicts to follow. Japan and Germany had functioning governmental institutions and were developed countries prior to the war. Thus, are not useful examples in regards to future Stability Operations in which the US will most likely participate. In essence, post conflict stabilization operations are easier tasks in developed nations than in countries which lack functioning governmental institutions upon which to build.
Actually Stability Operations have been a part of every operation the US has been involved in worldwide. Stability Operations were usually much more protracted, generally 7 to 10 years, than were combat operations. “Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been involved in or contributed significant resources to more than 17 reconstruction and stabilization operations.” 63 Sustained victory has been achieved only through sustained Stability Operations. Haiti provides a good example. In 1995, after less than two years of R&S, the U.S. Government called Haiti a success and turned the mission over to the United Nations. A couple years later, President Aristide was forced from office and the “overall impression was that Haiti would never develop into a democratic or functioning government.” 64 Recent operations in Iraq and the threat in the operational environment have highlighted the need for enhanced unity of effort especially in failed or failing states.

![Failed or Failing States](image)

Figure 2:
“Stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq is the sixth major stability operation effort the U.S. has undertaken in the past 12 years, and the fifth in an Islamic nation.” The failed or failing states have defined characteristics, implications and issues that the United States will face today and continue to face in the next twenty years as seen in Figure 2 above.

The Road Ahead

The USG has executed Reconstruction and Stability Operations in the past. What has significantly changed is the fact that the large tank-on-tank, state-versus-state battles are diminishing and in its place we face strategic challenges that will draw the USG into longer more prolonged problems that require considerable amounts of forces and resources to provide security in failed or failing states. A vital factor affecting success in future conflicts are that uniformed and civilian assets of the USG will be employed for Reconstruction and Stability Operations that produce a different kind of “victory.” Some recommendations for achieving the necessary synergy among those elements of government are: acknowledge the complexities of the world environment that impact the USG; establish a policy that directs concrete measurable participation from all agencies; align policies and directives with U.S. Strategy; then insure that those policies are backed by requisite programming and planning authorities.

The US has been forced to invest billions in the countries of Afghanistan and Iraq due to the security threats they pose to US national security. Any initial R&S Operations will be done by the U.S. Army until security is at a level where other agencies can deploy and engage effectively. Thus, the Army needs to have the capability to conduct initial R&S tasks. The Department of State needs to restructure
leadership and planner training, and personnel recruiting. All of these will require major shifts in culture for DOD and DOS.

Essential elements in a new policy must address the authorities to plan, lead and spend. In order for an organization to plan, it needs to take a long term approach to current and future problems. Furthermore, the agency in charge of R&S must have words stronger than “coordinate” in their charter to demand others to participate in and adopt strategic concepts. Any policy must designate a lead organization charged with the overall planning of R&S Operations. The organization must have access to and active participation by all agencies and stakeholders in R&S Operations. All agencies must respond to direction from this organization to include providing resources, people and restructure according to the threat and mission. A new R&S policy must possess the flexibility to react to potential conflicts when and where directed by the President. Last year, acting under section 1207 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, DOD has transferred $100 million to DOS for projects for stability needs. Although a step in the right direction, the authorization does not program financial capital for strategic responsiveness. DOD spends more than transferred last year in a day in Iraq.

Conclusion

The world has changed more than the United States Government has been willing to restructure its policy to align all agencies and branches of government. The US hesitancy to construct a clear policy that delineates responsibilities and grants authorities to an agency or even a combined NSC and congressional committee for Reconstruction and Stability Operations will continue to plague the effectiveness and
potential of the USG. In order to attain U.S. political objectives, a comprehensive policy that forces DOD and DOS into fundamental changes that reflect the realities of future threats is needed immediately for successful Reconstruction and Stability Operations. Secretary of Defense Gates recently stated “to truly achieve victory as Clausewitz defined it—to attain a political objective – the United States needs a military whose ability to kick down the door is unmatched by its ability to clean up the mess and even rebuild the house afterward.” 70 Because there is no other agency capable of performing R&S Operations from end to end, the US Government should positively assign DOD lead authority to plan and execute R&S operations. These missions must be tied to Combatant Commanders overall Theater Engagement Plan and coordinated with the DOS. This does not exonerate DOS from its responsibility of integrating their expertise in the R&S planning and implementation process, but ensures they are prepared to deploy as enablers to DOD forces. All R&S planning and missions must have representatives from stakeholder agencies. DOD must possess the authorities consummate with the responsibilities to ensure success in Reconstruction and Stability Operations

Endnotes


2 U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Definitions, Joint Publication 1-02, (Washington D.C.: U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 14, 2008), Unity of Effort defined as Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization – the product of successful action.

3 The United States Military Academy, “A Brief History of West Point ,” http://www.usma.edu/history.asp (accessed January 4 2009)


6 Ibid.


8 Ibid, 69.


16 Ibid.


22 Ibid.


28 Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, “Landon Lecture at Kansas State University,”


30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.


40 Herbst, “Civilian Stabilization Initiative: Building a USG Civilian Response Capability to Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,”


42 Flickner, “Removing Impediments to an Effective Partnership,” 228.


46 Ibid, 2.


52 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Stabilization and Reconstruction, Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve


55 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Operating Environment, Trends and Challenges for the Future Joint Force Through 2030, Fragile state is defined as a state that is closed to becoming a failed state as defined by the United States Joint Forces Command.


60 Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, “Landon Lecture at Kansas State University,”


63 U.S. Department of Army, Stability Operations, Appendix B-1.


65 James Dobbins, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003), 220.


67 Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Future War/Future Battlespace: The Strategic Role of American Landpower (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2003), ix.
