WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS IS NOT FOR AMATEURS:

PREPARING TO NEGOTIATE

by

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Preface

My introduction to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) came in late 2005 when the Operations Officer in my NATO unit was selected for PRT command. At the time, I had never heard of PRTs and knew nothing of the training or the mission. During his PRT command, I communicated with him regularly and came to appreciate the extreme complexity/difficulty of this mission. At ACSC, I was offered the opportunity to focus my research on negotiations. When reading Tressler’s report on negotiations in Iraq, I decided to direct my research toward PRT training, trying to determine how well the lessons were being incorporated. We owe it to every Soldier, Sailor, Airman and Marine to critically assess our training, to ensure we are doing our best to prepare for tomorrow’s complex battlefield environment. I would like to acknowledge the assistance of my research advisor, Dr. Stefan Eisen, Jr. His instruction, support and assistance were critical to the completion of this project. Additionally, I would like to acknowledge Major Dominic Kosumoto for his insight into the Civil Affairs career field. I would be remiss if I did not thank Dr. Fred Stone, on the ACSC staff, for his “quiet” financial support of my trip to Ft. Bragg. This funding enabled my research and made this report possible. Likewise, I would like to thank Captain Greg Lawlor and Mr. Mark Philbrook. Both took time out of their busy schedules to provide me with lesson materials and insight into the training they coordinate/conduct with the PRTs in their countries. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Pamela for her patience and support during the last few months, while I worked on this project.
Abstract

U.S. military forces have repeatedly been expected to perform in peacekeeping, nation-building and other non-kinetic roles throughout history. However, in recent years, the U.S. military has been awakened to its lack of preparedness for full spectrum operations. Two factors, the publication of DoD Directive 3000.05 and recent studies of negotiation in Iraq may help pave the way for improved training in negotiation, one of these non-kinetic skill areas. Reviewing these recent reports led the author to assess the negotiation training currently provided to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). Likewise, to provide additional perspective, the author examined how the Canadians prepare their PRTs to negotiate effectively. This report examines current negotiation training provided to U.S. and Canadian PRTs and evaluates the current training. After reviewing both training programs, some areas for improvement were noted. The training provided to U.S. PRTs is improving every year, but should include more academics, more practice negotiating, and training for all team members. To their credit, U.S. PRT trainers have developed a very realistic “capstone” exercise at the end of training which well prepares the teams to deploy. On the other hand, the Canadians have a very solid negotiation training program which includes much training and practice for all team members, but one that would be improved with practice in a challenging role-play scenario, reflecting a realistic Afghan cultural environment.
Part 1

Historical Background

And when people are entering upon a war they do things the wrong way around. Action comes first and it is only when they have already suffered that they begin to think.

—Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War

U.S. military forces are primarily trained and equipped to engage an enemy in violence, and through force, to prevail. There is no question that this is, and should be, the primary role of American combat forces. However, these same forces have repeatedly been expected to perform in peacekeeping, nation-building and other non-kinetic roles. Historically, U.S. military forces have not been trained and equipped adequately to perform well in this capacity. The amount of training that soldiers receive in cultural understanding and irregular warfare in the military schools pipeline has set them up for failure.\(^1\) General Richard Cody, the U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff, told Congress in testimony on March 15, 2007, “we have the best counterinsurgency army in the world, but they’re not trained for full-spectrum operations.”\(^2\) Some would argue that the skills required for these non-kinetic tasks are too complex and therefore, it is not realistic to expect that one person has the capacity to be effective in both venues. In his book, *The

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\(^1\) Jeff Hudson and Stephen Warman, “Transforming the American Soldier: Educating the Warrior Diplomat,” (working paper, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 2.
Thomas Barnett goes so far as to propose that the U.S. military be split into a combat (Leviathan) force and a nation-building (Sys Admin) force. In his proposal, the Marines would assume this new role of Sys Admin and would focus their efforts to equip and train exclusively for a peacekeeping and nation-building role. Thus far, there has not been much movement within the Department of Defense (DoD) to transition in this direction (especially by the Marines), but the argument has not gone completely unnoticed. The remainder of this paper will assess two military negotiation training programs, in light of two recent reports on military negotiation, and will provide suggestions for an improved training construct to better prepare American forces to negotiate in the Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) environment.

**Trends Toward Change**

In recent years, the U.S. military has been awakened to its lack of preparedness for full spectrum operations. As defined in Army Field Manual 3-0, full spectrum operations include offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations which range from combat to humanitarian assistance. Over the last decade, the U.S. Army has transitioned to a lighter and tailorable force structure called the Brigade Combat Team (BCT). Over the last two decades, doctrine has also begun to emerge. In the 1990s the Army created Field Manual 3-07, covering *Security Assistance and Stability Operations*, and over the last few years the Marines have dusted off their *Small Wars Manual* (written in the 1920s and revised in 1940) and are reexamining their training for low-intensity conflict. The creation and employment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams

(PRT), which are commanded and manned by members of all services, also points to the fact that the DoD has recognized the need for change. Likewise, waging war using a Special Operations-led force in Afghanistan also points toward these transformational changes in thinking. In August 2007, the U.S. Air Force became the last service component to publish doctrine on counterinsurgency. At the same time, the U.S. Navy has stood up its own Maritime Civil Affairs units to be employed in the Horn of Africa.

In spite of these shifts in thinking and organization, there is still an organizational culture that must be overcome. Many in the U.S. military still believe that skills like negotiation/mediation, cultural understanding and general diplomacy are unnecessary for U.S. military forces. For instance, a U.S. Army Brigade Commander in Iraq made the comment that his men were there to “kill the enemy, not win their hearts and minds.”\(^4\) If soft skills are needed, some believe that the Department of State (DoS) or non-governmental humanitarian assistance organizations should take the lead. Without question, in these post-conflict and nation-building operations, the ultimate goals are political, not military. Because of this, some continue to argue that the best force would be headed by the DoS. These same voices also quickly concede that because of the military’s ability to effectively plan, rapidly deploy and to provide security, they will always be an integral part of these operations.\(^5\)

To be sure, no one is calling for a total abandonment of combat skills training. On the contrary, to effectively employ the methods and skills discussed and examined in this paper, military forces must start from a position of credible power. In his book, *Counterinsurgency*

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Warfare: Theory and Practice, David Galula notes that forces “cannot safely enter into negotiations except from a position of strength.” However, with a relatively small investment of time, the DoD can better prepare military forces for these varied and complex full spectrum situations through focused training.

The DoD has long neglected its need for a more comprehensive approach to soft skills training for American military forces. Even though these forces are repeatedly thrust into peacekeeping and stability operations (Horn of Africa, Haiti, Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan), the military establishment has long viewed soft skills as something American forces will acquire when needed. However, two recent reports from the U.S. Army suggests this is not the case. Interestingly, since 1798 the United States has been involved in 235 deployments of U.S. forces overseas, not including peace operations. Of those ventures, five were declared wars and eight can be considered undeclared wars, while the remainder of conflicts (222) were small wars, insurgencies, and counterinsurgencies. Yet, given the amount (and frequency) of small wars, the U.S. military educational and training systems remain configured to deal with the conventional.

Instruments of Change

Two factors, the publication of DoD Directive 3000.05 and two recent studies of negotiation in Iraq, may help pave the way for improved training in the critical negotiation/mediation skill-

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7 James Jay Carafano, Post-Conflict Operations from Europe to Iraq, Heritage Lectures no. 844, published by The Heritage Foundation, 13 July 2004, 5-6.
DoD Directive 3000.05 was published in late 2005, and provided guidance on military support for SSTR operations. Specifically, it designated SSTR operations as a core mission of the U.S. military, comparable in priority to combat operations. Then, in August 2007, the U.S. Army published two reports based on interviews with soldiers and Marines in Iraq. Although they are not scientific studies, these timely after-action interviews and the subsequent analysis help provide a unique perspective as a form of field research. Their assessments provide a framework to analyze current training programs. The first, written by David Tressler at the Strategic Studies Institute, concluded that successfully adapting to the nature of the contemporary operating environment requires changes that include increased training in negotiation for combat forces deploying into SSTR operations. Additionally, he proposed minimum requirements for pre-deployment training to develop important negotiation skills and techniques. The second report, written by Orly Ben-Yoav Nobel, Brian Wortinger and Sean Hannah, all from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, concluded similarly that the negotiation training for forces deploying into SSTR has been inadequate. They also propose specific training requirements, emphasizing the importance of an integrated approach which merges tactical and negotiation training.

Another study by the National Research Council evaluated human behavior in military contexts and concluded that because military negotiations are typically conducted in a cross-cultural environment, that cultural awareness is another critical element for effective negotiation training. Although this is not a new idea, and it has been written about in the context of business

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9 David M. Tressler, *Negotiation in the New Strategic Environment: Lessons Learned from Iraq*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, August 2007), v.
negotiations,\textsuperscript{10} this report specifically focused on negotiation in the military operations environment. Additionally, in the West Point research, the findings concerning Iraqi negotiation techniques pointed to several tactics that were perceived to be guided primarily by distributive motives. The analysis provided in the paper suggested that these tactics were consistent with non-Western negotiation behaviors and reflected culturally based negotiation behavior rather than selfish individual motives.\textsuperscript{11} If this is the case, specific training on these tactics could greatly improve the negotiations performance of the military forces deployed into the post-conflict Iraq. Furthermore, the current war on terrorism has been a wake-up call for the DoD that cultural ignorance can have grave consequences or can make a positive difference at all levels.\textsuperscript{12} Perhaps the most compelling evidence of a changing attitude can be seen in the comments of a senior U.S. military officer, shortly after returning from a long tour in Iraq. He noted that after working in Iraq for over one year, his opinion was that among U.S. military members, critically important negotiation skills are lacking. He went as far as to suggest this training should be incorporated into all levels of professional military education.\textsuperscript{13} With signs of a change in attitude toward negotiation training, who should be the priority to receive this type of training?

According to a recent statement by the U.S. Secretary of State, the contributions of the 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams currently in Afghanistan (12 supplied by the U.S. and 14

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{11} Orly Ben-Yoav Nobel, Brian Wortinger, and Sean Hannah, \textit{Winning the War and the Relationships: Preparing Military Officers for Negotiations with Non-Combatants}, West Point, NY, United States Military Academy, August 2007, 27.
\end{thebibliography}
supplied by NATO) are critical to the nation-building effort being undertaken in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{14} However, reviewing the DoD guidance and these recent reports leads to an important question. What negotiation training is currently provided to these PRTs? Likewise, to provide additional perspective, how do the Canadians, as primarily a peacekeeping force, prepare their forces to negotiate effectively? Canadian Forces, as part of NATO, are now operating PRTs in Afghanistan along side the U.S. teams. This paper will review the training provided to these two groups by reviewing the curriculum, methodology, instructor experience and amount of time dedicated to teach negotiation skills. It will assess the courses based on the findings and recommendations provided in the two recent field reports, as well as commonly accepted negotiation training practices.

**Strategic Studies Institute Report**

David Tressler’s interviews of soldiers and Marines returning from Iraq demonstrated that the deployed U.S. forces were required to conduct thousands of negotiations while pursuing operational objectives, often with strategic impact.\textsuperscript{15} Additionally, he examined the U.S. Army’s pre-deployment training and determined that the negotiation training given to forces deploying into post-conflict Iraq is incomplete. Though training on non-kinetic skills like negotiation have been incorporated into pre-deployment training, the amount of training in the skills of negotiation are far from proportional to the amount of time soldiers will spend negotiating while

\textsuperscript{13} Briefing given by a Major General from the U.S. Air Force at Maxwell AFB, AL, 10 April 08, (non-attribution policy in effect at briefing).
\textsuperscript{14} Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, (address to students and faculty at Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL on 14 April 08).
\textsuperscript{15} Tressler, *Negotiation in the New Strategic Environment: Lessons Learned from Iraq*, vii.
deployed. He provides training recommendations at the end of his study. Ultimately the interviews lead Tressler to three primary conclusions about the nature of negotiations conducted by soldiers and Marines in Iraq. The three areas are primarily concerned with negotiation context, cultural influence and power.

His first conclusion exposed the unique and demanding context of the negotiations conducted in the SSTR environment. To summarize, he found the soldiers and Marines were not adequately analyzing and understanding the negotiation elements and were therefore not adequately preparing or strategizing on how to achieve the most desirable outcome. A lack of understanding about basic principles of negotiation like power, interests, relationships and how to deal with common negotiation techniques like avoidance, contributed to negotiation failures. He also notes the difficulty caused when local culture is not understood and considered in negotiations. Based on this, it is no surprise that Tressler’s second conclusion relates to cultural awareness. He finds that in an SSTR environment, culture does not impact every negotiation. Sometimes power or personality can override the cultural differences. However, in most cases, cultural awareness is very important and can significantly impact the outcome of a negotiation. Finally, he concludes that the soldiers and Marines did not understand how power impacts negotiations. He determined that this lack of understanding about power and assertion techniques left negotiators unprepared to recognize power plays and how to assess and use their power effectively. He further concludes that negotiation training could give soldiers and Marines a better understanding of their own power, minimizing the likelihood of power overestimates or power abuse.

Based on his findings, Tressler offers a proposed training program designed with the demands of SSTR operations in mind. His recommended plan would focus on preparation, situational awareness and rehearsal to prepare for the complex environment associated with SSTR operations. His plan would also instruct students how to strategize for the negotiation and how to negotiate, giving them simulated experience. He recommends that course instructors have formal instruction in negotiation. The length of Tressler’s recommended course would be a minimum of three days. It includes reading assignments, lectures, and supervised negotiation preparation. The program’s primary emphasis, however, is simulated negotiation with evaluation and critique by instructors. His idea is supported by another study of Dutch PRTs which concluded that inclusion of role-play exercises is beneficial to allow its personnel to become accustomed with the local situation and stakeholders. Despite being simulated, the exercises have proven to be very beneficial during deployments.17

Tressler’s plan prepares students for negotiation through an academic training plan presented throughout the three days. Ideally, lectures would cover several areas to include the fundamentals of negotiation practice and theory; potential outcomes of negotiations; small group preparation and supervision; cognitive bias; understanding, managing, and adapting to cultural differences in negotiation; lessons on interest-based negotiations and the practical benefits of focusing in negotiations on interests and using cooperative tactics instead of relying on power and competitive tactics; and finally, lectures with emphasis on proven negotiation techniques such as listening, asking questions, redirecting discussions away from power based or adversarial

17 Myriame Bollen and Bas Rietjens, “Considering Dedication and Integration During Reconstruction Processes,” (paper prepared for presentation at the Biennial International Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago, IL, 26-28 October 2007), 7.
communications, and dealing with threats. In addition to lecture, each day involves at least one (usually two) negotiation simulation exercises with review and evaluation. Tressler rightly emphasizes that the application of academic lessons through simulated negotiation with critical instructor review is the most important part of the recommended training program. 18 To be effective negotiators, students must not only study academic lessons about the subject, but also the texture of real negotiation. The student must not only develop plans, strategies and techniques in theory, but also internalize these through the practice of negotiation. 19

**West Point Report**

The West Point report also studied negotiations in Iraq, through interviews with soldiers, and developed several conclusions for consideration. Specifically, the report “develops a conceptual framework capturing the unique characteristics of negotiations between military personnel and local civilians that can guide the design of negotiation training programs for officers preparing to deploy.”20 The report recommends an instructional program to train the fundamentals of negotiation with an emphasis on the unique aspects (high risk and cross-cultural nature) of the SSTR environment.

The term “fundamental” refers to teaching distributive and integrative negotiation behaviors. 21 As negotiators, military personnel need to recognize and understand the consequences of win-lose or adversarial tactics. Additionally, “they need to learn to recognize

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19 Deepak Malhotra, “Approaching Negotiation as Art: Some Striking Results of Students Negotiating in the Real World” (working paper, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, January, 2002), 3.
win-lose bargaining tactics employed by their opponents.\textsuperscript{22} In addition to the distributive framework, the training program would have to teach the benefits of integrative negotiation techniques to develop, “mutually satisfying agreements, generating commitment to agreement implementation, and in fostering long term collaboration and stability in the relationship,”\textsuperscript{23} as well as a familiarity with interest based negotiation techniques as described in the foundational text of interest based negotiation,\textsuperscript{24} to ultimately foster and enhance long-term relationships with members of the local population. Moreover, their ideal curriculum should address other factors which can impact negotiation and outcomes, including power, communication techniques, influence of cognition and emotion on perception, ethical considerations, and cross-cultural differences affecting negotiation behavior. The report goes on to identify three major categories of issues that are likely to become the subject of SSTR negotiations. They are issues related to neighborhood and institutional improvement projects, security matters, and civil affairs concerns.\textsuperscript{25} Notably, all of which are the primary focus of PRTs. Finally, the authors of the report call attention to the value of developing an integrated approach that merges tactical and negotiation training, and combining skills to advance the mission of the SSTR operations.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 24-28.
\textsuperscript{25} Nobel, et al., \textit{Winning the War and the Relationships: Preparing Military Officers for Negotiations with Non-Combatants}, 27.
Part 2

Training: Ideal and Actual

It’s no use saying, “We are doing our best.” You have got to succeed in doing what is necessary.

—Sir Winston Churchill

Ideal Training

Successful negotiation is a skill that can be developed through effective training. In an effort to prescribe an “ideal” negotiations training model for PRTs, it only makes sense to use the findings from the two reports to help develop this construct. However, this ideal model will not exclude elements of instruction which are not present in both reports. Furthermore, it will include some suggestions which are not in either report, but are commonly viewed as integral to effective negotiation training, like ethics and effective use of an interpreter. Finally, it will be as short as possible, while providing necessary minimum instruction. Time considerations in the pre-deployment training pipeline are always a factor, as there is usually more to train than time will allow. The next few paragraphs will attempt to synthesize the findings and conclusions of the two reports into a recommended baseline for curriculum, methodology, instructor experience and amount of time dedicated to teach negotiation skills. The first area to address is preparatory

academics. This training will lay the foundation for practical application, and ultimately successful negotiation in theater.

The two reports are not significantly different in their recommendations of topics for academic instruction. Both recommend instruction in the fundamentals of negotiation, such as interest based theories, communication techniques, familiarity with how to address commonly used tactics like avoidance, and understanding the use of power in negotiations. Specifically, Tressler recommends an emphasis on proven techniques such as listening, asking questions and redirecting away from power based or positional communications. Likewise, both reports value training in how to plan and strategize in preparation for negotiation. Cultural awareness is also a key aspect of recommended training in both reports and therefore should also be included in the academic instruction. In addition to basic cultural awareness, the focus of the training should be on the specific population and culture within which the PRT will work. Ideally, this training will identify specific cultural considerations which could impact negotiations. Furthermore, even though not specifically addressed in either report, some basic instruction on how to effectively work with an interpreter should also be included in this instruction unless the team is training for a location where the majority of the population speaks the same language as the PRT members. Because of the converging complexities of negotiation and cross-cultural communication, working effectively with an interpreter is something which is a learned skill. Finally, the academics should address ethical considerations. Though not specifically mentioned

27 Gary R. Weaver, American University Intercultural Relations Lecture DVD #SER-08-003, Air University Television, 15 February 2008.
in the Tressler paper, it is widely accepted as a key part of negotiations training.\textsuperscript{29} As noted by the senior commander in Iraq, “Setting the right tone ethically is another hugely important task. If leaders fail to get this right…Nothing can be more destructive.”\textsuperscript{30}

As noted above, these academic lessons should be practiced with instructor evaluation. More specifically, the fundamentals should be practiced in a controlled academic environment prior to using them in more complex, scenario-based, role-play environment.\textsuperscript{31} It is in these role-play environments where fundamentals learned and practiced in a more controlled classroom environment can be strengthened and integrated in a realistic and dynamic environment, and where negotiation skills must be combined with other tactical skills.

To instruct and assess the critical elements of negotiation training, the recommended course would have two phases (not including general cultural awareness training for the region). Phase one could cover the necessary introductory material in only two days, with approximately 12 hours in academic lecture and six hours utilizing lessons in practical exercises. Each day’s lessons would be reinforced through practical exercise involving preparing for, and conducting negotiations. Rehearsal is the most important part of the training.\textsuperscript{32} The course would involve some work outside of the academic environment, with nightly reading assignments given to prepare students for the next day’s academics. Phase two would occur at the end of all pre-deployment training in a culminating exercise where all parts of training are evaluated in realistic, complex, role-play scenarios. This phase should attempt, as much as possible, to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Malhotra, “Approaching Negotiation as Art: Some Striking Results of Students Negotiating in the Real World,” 3.
\end{itemize}
replicate the environment into which the team is deploying and include as many members of the deploying team as possible.\textsuperscript{33} Beyond course design and methodology, class size and instructor qualifications are also critical parts of an effective training program.

Logic would indicate that class size should be considered, and as some evidence suggests, smaller class sizes will likely yield better results.\textsuperscript{34} Trying to teach academic lessons to large groups is not necessarily a problem, but there is limited access to the instructor and it is much more difficult for the instructor to engage students, keeping them involved in the learning process, and assessing reception of the course material. Additionally, in rehearsal exercises, large groups will limit individual participation. There is no recipe for determining an ideal class size, but it is something which should be considered in course design. On the subject of instructor experience, as a minimum, instructors should have formal training in negotiation and have experience negotiating in an SSTR environment. Ideally, the instructors would also have formal training on instruction and evaluation techniques.

**Current U.S. PRT Negotiation Training**

Given the present level of U.S. involvement in SSTR operations, PRT training has evolved considerably over the last few years. In fact, each subsequent class has attempted to incorporate lessons from experienced PRT members and commanders.\textsuperscript{35} This is certainly a positive trend, and should be continued. However, the current training they provide on negotiation has some


deficiencies. The good news is that these deficiencies are easily correctable. The bad news is that the already over-stressed pre-deployment training time-line leaves little room for the additional academic instruction and practical exercises which should be added. Moreover, the addition of more instruction time might also require more instructors to handle the significant volume of PRTs currently going through training.36

Currently the U.S. PRT members receive a very good cultural awareness training and overview of the region into which they will deploy. Typically this overview is about 2-3 days in length and is taught by very knowledgeable instructors from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other graduate-level educational institutions.37 This instruction also includes a lesson on working with interpreters. However, the negotiation academics consist of only one 2.5 hour lecture with no reinforcement through practical exercises until several weeks later, during exercise week at the end of training. The academic lecture is provided by a very qualified instructor from the NPS and is a superb overview on the basics of effective negotiation. The lesson covers some key aspects of communication in negotiation, the basic principles of interest-based negotiation (including the concepts of BATNA and principled negotiation), and the importance of going into the negotiation with a plan.38 Based on its length, however, none of these subjects is covered in any depth. As stated above, without the reinforcement of these ideas through practical exercises,

36 Mark Philbrook, (U.S. PRT Training Coordinator, 189th Infantry Brigade), interview by the author, 14 February 2008.
37 PRT training agenda for LDESP, 16-23 January 2008, and schedule for South/Central Asia Orientation Course 8SC_001, 10-13 December 2007, Fort Bragg, NC, documents obtained by the author from LDESP course instructor Ed McCarthy and SCAOC course director Major Charles Westbrook.
it is unlikely this basic knowledge can effectively be employed later in the final training exercise (or while deployed).

One other item of note is the presence of a nine-person Civil Affairs (CA) team on each U.S. PRT. This is noteworthy because some of the CA specialists may have received additional instruction (a four day course) in negotiation as part of their advanced training (unrelated to their assignment as a PRT member). However, those who have are graduates of a five day course (50% academics and 50% practical exercises) where they have been trained on negotiation in a cross-cultural environment. Course attendees learn how to negotiate using an interpreter in complex scenarios. Additionally, they receive instruction on negotiation theory, communication, strategy development and other aspects of negotiation in the SSTR environment. Most CA specialists assigned to PRTs today, however, are either In Lieu Of (ILO) or U.S. Army Reserve soldiers and have not completed this training. All active duty Army CA specialists receive this additional negotiation training.

The final week of the U.S. PRT training is referred to as ARTEP (Army Training and Evaluation Program) and it is designed as a capstone exercise where the team, almost exactly as it will deploy, is involved in a large, multi-day scenario. The event utilizes role-players, mock villages, and complex scenarios to evaluate team readiness for deployment. Events are planned throughout the six-day event to evaluate the team in many areas, to include proficiency at negotiation. Events are pass/fail and must be repeated if not completed to the satisfaction of the

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38 Briefing from PRT LDESP training, 16-23 January 2008, titled “Negotiations: Systems and Process,” presented by and obtained by the author from COL (R) Ed McCarthy, Adjunct Professor, PKSOI; Senior Fellow, Naval Postgraduate School.
40 Major Dominic Kosumoto (U.S. Army Civil Affairs Officer) to the author, e-mail, 17 February 2008.
evaluators. Evaluators come from a variety of backgrounds, to include CA and USAID. Each evaluator has first-hand SSTR operational experience. At the end of each event, the evaluators gather the team to ask questions and to provide feedback on overall performance. As an example, one ARTEP event directs members of a PRT to travel to a village where they are to meet with the family of a child killed by a stray bomb. The purpose of the meeting is to negotiate a payment to the family to compensate for the loss. However, when the team arrives they find that the meeting will also involve several men from the village, a member of parliament and a local religious leader. The villagers have an agenda which includes discussions about agricultural improvements in the village and more difficult questions about the presence of the U.S. in their country. The PRT commander and other team members attending the meeting must quickly re-evaluate and react to these unexpected events, while still negotiating for the payment to the father. All role-players speak Farsi, and dress and act as Afghani citizens. The negotiation requires approximately two hours and is conducted with the use of an interpreter.

Current Canadian PRT Negotiation Training

The Canadian Forces (CF) are primarily a defensive force which has embraced peacekeeping as a primary mission.41 The CF have played a key role in numerous peacekeeping operations over the last decade, to include Haiti, Cyprus, and the Balkans.42 Because of the Canadian government’s decision to embrace the peacekeeping mission, it would seem logical

that the CF would prepare military members specifically to perform in this capacity, unlike the U.S. which has historically seen non-kinetic skills as something to be developed only when needed. This truth was echoed by senior U.S. military leaders at a conference in November 2007. The panel noted that the main skills found lacking in U.S. forces, upon arrival in theater, were non-kinetic.  

In contrast, a review of the training provided to members of CF PRTs reveals differences from the Americans in the philosophy used to determine who should be trained, as well as what and how lessons should be taught.

The CF military base in Kingston, Ontario is home to the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC), where a great deal of pre-deployment training is conducted. At the PSTC, PRT members whose jobs would require them to venture outside their compound and interact with the local population receive a five day course on negotiation. Members whose job does not require leaving the compound and interacting with locals receive a shortened one-day course. Not surprisingly, both courses provide academic instruction (with graded exams) and negotiation scenarios (only one scenario is provided in the short course) in which student performance is evaluated by course instructors. Students in the course are not necessarily part of the same PRT. Students come from all parts of the CF and even outside Canada. U.S. CA specialists attend the course periodically. The fact that the training is not conducted as a PRT could be a disadvantage when compared to U.S. training. The course also presents lessons on improving communication skills and specific Afghani cultural lessons to assist the student negotiators to prepare for their upcoming deployment to Afghanistan. What is more surprising, however, is the thinking and resources used to shape the lessons which are presented to the CF students.

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43 Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference report, “General/Flag Officer Panel Gives
The CF course has historically focused on instructing (primarily) interest-based negotiation. However, recently the course has shifted some to incorporate police interview tactics, crisis response techniques and effective meeting conduct (from formal meetings to impromptu roadside meetings). The training is a joint effort between the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the CF. Instructors in the course include RCMP negotiators who bring their crisis response perspective to the classroom. Also of note, the CF are shifting away from using the term “negotiation” in their training. They are now using the terms “multi-cultural skills” or “cross-cultural skills” to cover negotiation training. This change has been made because of a belief that there is a negative perception or misunderstanding about negotiation, especially in a military environment. Additionally, the target audience for CF negotiation training demonstrates a different perspective from the U.S. about who should be trained to negotiate.

According to the CF Peace Support Operations Field Book, in peace support operations, situations will arise where the “diplomacy of negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration will be required at the lower levels of operations. The diplomat must then be the front line soldier, whatever the rank.” U.S. PRT negotiation training is focused toward the more senior PRT members. The CF has learned through experience that, in the SSTR environment, negotiation situations are not always planned. Every member of the CF PRT receives some negotiation training and gets the chance to practice the skills in a controlled environment.

In the five-day course, the academic lessons presented to CF students include an introduction to interest-based and positional negotiation, common behaviors experienced in crisis

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44 Captain Greg Lawlor, (Peace Support Training Centre, Kingston, Ontario), interview by the author, 7 January 2008.
situations and the impact on negotiation, meeting/negotiation preparation and conduct, effective communication techniques (including recognition of barriers to communication), stress management in a crisis, use of an interpreter, and effective elements of influence and persuasion (reciprocity, scarcity, consistency, etc.). These lessons are provided throughout the training and are intermixed with practical application exercises designed to reinforce the academic learning.

In the practical exercises students are given time to prepare for the negotiation event. Also, there is an after action review of student conduct in the exercise. If performance is below standards, the student will repeat the training. All exercises are supervised by instructors throughout the process. In the five-day course, the exercises become gradually more complex throughout the training. To enhance realism, the exercises utilize role-players and interpreters. The complete environment is not as complex or developed as the U.S. PRT’s ARTEP scenario (with artificial villages, gunfire and mortar blasts in the background, etc.). However, it is realistic and serves the intended purpose, to provide a controlled environment within which to reinforce classroom learning. The CF training culminates with a final graded negotiation event. In the longer course, students are given the weekend to prepare and strategize for this event. The exercise involves role-players and requires the students to utilize interpreters, but the environment is not region specific. Since not all course graduates are headed to Afghanistan, (some are part of peace support forces deploying to other regions) the course only requires that the training be in a language other than English or French. Although Afghani culture is discussed in academics, practice involving the aspects of negotiating in this unique culture is not a required element of the course.

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45 Peace Support Operations Field Book, PO 102.01, Part 3, page 1-3
Part 3

Conclusions

The higher level of grand strategy [is] that of conducting war with a far-sighted regard to the state of the peace that will follow.

—Sir Basil H. Liddel-Hart

In the foreword to the latest “PRT Playbook,” Colonel Steven Mains summarizes the roles of PRTs. He notes that they were established, “as a result of the need to develop the infrastructure necessary for the Afghan and Iraqi people to succeed in a post-conflict environment.” He goes on to explain that PRTs are a key part of the long-term strategy to transition the responsibility for security, governance, and economics to the indigenous people. In this role, there is at least anecdotal evidence that PRTs have made positive contributions to stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan. There is also evidence that these teams could be useful in more situations ranging from post-conflict to interventions in failing states. With so much at stake, the forces which comprise PRTs must be adequately prepared in many areas. One of the most important areas is negotiation. The current training provided to U.S. and Canadian PRTs is better than nothing, and in some areas is superb, but overall there are some areas for improvement.

46 Colonel Steven Mains, “PRT Playbook 07-34,” Center for Army Lessons Learned, September 2007, 1.
The suggested training outlined earlier in the paper required at least two days of academics and at least two practice negotiations in the early phase of training. The lessons learned in the classroom and controlled environment should then be employed at the end of training in a unit exercise. The ending exercise should be a complex, dynamic and realistic role-play environment. Course instructors should have formal training on negotiation and experience negotiating in an SSTR environment. As well, every member of the PRT should receive negotiation training. Based on this basic construct, can the U.S. and CF training courses be improved?

In looking at the U.S. training, a few areas stand out as noteworthy. The academics provided to U.S. PRTs on the subject of negotiation are far from adequate. Less than 3 hours of academics is enough to provide the basics of negotiation theory, but little more. The academics should be increased to cover commonly used tactics like avoidance, use of power, ethics, questioning techniques, redirecting away from power based or positional communications, preparing for negotiation, and specific cultural considerations which could impact negotiations. In addition to the minimal academic training, the U.S. PRTs do not get the chance to practice negotiation skills in a controlled environment to reinforce academic lessons. This was obvious when observing the PRTs in the complex role-play scenarios, struggling to negotiate for the first time. By Tressler’s standards, instructors were found to be sufficiently qualified and experienced.

While observing two teams completing a role-play scenario, some problems were noted with their performance which could be traced back to the minimized level of academic practical

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training accomplished earlier. In the first case, the team was completing the scenario for the first time. The second observed team was completing the scenario for the second time due to a failing grade on the first attempt. In the evaluator’s meeting at the end of the scenario, both team commanders admitted that they had not really planned or developed a strategy for the negotiations prior to arrival. Likewise, both struggled to understand the importance of the meeting attendees (especially the religious leader) as a method to build relationships and gain credibility with the people in the region. One commander attempted repeatedly to direct the negotiation back to his interests, communicating to the group that their interests were unimportant. Finally, both commanders were hesitant to look for creative solutions. Both acted as if they were “in the hot seat” for the entire negotiation. They were visibly nervous and overly vague with their wording, making them appear disingenuous. It did not take long for the villagers to recognize this and to question the motives of the commander and his team. Each of these problems was the result of poor preparation and the resulting lack of confidence. It was obvious that these commanders were uncomfortable with their negotiation skills due to lack of practice. Though the CA team leader was present at one of the meetings, his ability to influence the negotiation was limited, as he was a junior officer and was not put in a position to lead the U.S. team during the negotiations. However, the PRT commanders’ lack of experience in negotiation was not the only noteworthy weakness in the teams’ training.

Through observation, it appears that in the U.S. PRT training environment, negotiation training and practice is primarily for officers. Even the two reports referenced in this paper develop their conclusions based exclusively on discussions with commissioned officers.
Likewise, Tressler’s conclusions and recommendations are directed towards better training, specifically for officers. However, there appears to be some evidence that negotiation skills are important, regardless of rank. This idea is perhaps best articulated in an article by Major Lynda Liddy of the Australian Army. Her article is about developing strategic corporals, and makes a compelling case for the development of proficiencies in foreign language, cultural awareness, media training, negotiation techniques and conflict-resolution skills among the junior ranks.48

Discussions with the PRT training coordinator also revealed that some upcoming improvements in the negotiations training provided to teams would be directed predominately towards senior PRT members.49 As mentioned above, one of the PRTs observed in the village scenario was repeating the event due to a failing grade on the first attempt. The primary reason given for the failing grade was the fact that a non-commissioned officer (rather than the commander) was sent to conduct the negotiation during the first iteration. Because it was not observed, it is not possible to identify a causal relationship between this failure and a specific lack of training for enlisted team members. In fact, in this case, it appears that all team members were trained similarly. However, the focus of the two U.S. Army reports, and the comments from the team training coordinator would indicate that the general viewpoint is that negotiation training and practice are less important for enlisted team members. It is arguable that in the unique environment of SSTR operations, enlisted team members, which are the majority on a PRT, would end up in a situation where negotiation skills would enhance the ability of the team to accomplish the mission.

49 Mark Philbrook, (U.S. PRT Training Coordinator, 189th Infantry Brigade), interview by the author, 5 March 2008.
Shifting to a review of the Canadians, their course is well developed and is effective to train students how to negotiate in the SSTR environment. Their instructors are well qualified and experienced. However, since some of the instructors were from the RCMP, they did not specifically have SSTR experience. In the areas of academics and practice negotiations, their course is a model. However, some aspects of their training could also be improved. The primary improvement would be the inclusion of a final team exercise for the PRT members. This event would be conducted just prior to deployment, and would give the PRT an opportunity to practice negotiation/mediation, along with other tactical skills in a complex role-play environment. This event would challenge the PRT while allowing the group to practice as a unit in a more complex environment like the ARTEP. There are concerns within the CF that, due to the peacekeeping mission, combat skills have diminished across the Canadian military.\textsuperscript{50} Since these skills have not been used by the majority of CF deploying in a peacekeeping role, before entering a potentially hostile environment like Afghanistan, combat and convoy protection skills must be assessed. These kinetic skills should be evaluated along with the non-kinetic in order to best prepare the forces to perform well in the SSTR environment. Additionally, the opportunity to work together as a unit will allow a level of basic familiarity with specific personalities and strengths which could be leveraged in negotiation scenarios. Finally, this event would improve familiarity with the specific cultural aspects of the Afghani people, which could impact negotiation and other aspects of the PRT’s mission. It is clear to see that the CF has learned through years of peacekeeping, that negotiation training is important. However, because the CF has been involved primarily in the peacekeeping role, their training should be adjusted for the

\textsuperscript{50} Dr. Alan Okros, (The Royal Military College of Canada), interview by the author, 12 Oct 2007.
PRT mission. Specifically, the CF should train its PRTs as a unit (including civilian team members) and should practice with the unique aspects of the Afghani culture which could impact negotiation.

Without question, the U.S. military has begun, out of necessity, to shift its focus toward improving non-kinetic skills like negotiation. The first PRT teams received little training in negotiation, but with each year, the course improves. It is reasonable to assume that as teams continue to deploy to Afghanistan and Iraq, and as the lessons learned by PRTs are brought back to the school, training will continue to improve. With an improved focus on academics, reinforced with practice negotiations, the U.S. PRT has the potential to be the best trained team of negotiators in Afghanistan. This will enable the PRTs to accomplish their mission as effectively and efficiently as possible. And in the end, these 21st Century warriors will help win the Global War on Terrorism and, more importantly, establish a lasting relationship with the Afghani people.
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