THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT INTERAGENCY PROCESS AND THE FAILURE OF INSTITUTION BUILDING IN IRAQ

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The United States Government (USG) has been at war in Iraq for over five years. In that time, while there have been many tactical successes, the USG has been unable to fully succeed strategically because of an inability to help the Government of Iraq (GoI) become a fully functioning and sovereign government that is able to provide for the needs of its people. This study uses the war in Iraq as an illustrative case study to examine the weaknesses in USG capability to help build partner capacity and to conduct reconstruction and stabilization. The research leveraged numerous books, articles, reports, and very extensive interviews with senior leaders involved in both the war in Iraq and the broader USG mission of capacity building. The project makes a series of recommendations to support the development of a USG doctrine for stability operations, and provides a series of options for structure and command and control for further study and research.

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ABSTRACT

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KEY TERMS: Stability operations, reconstruction and stabilization, partner capacity building, interagency, Government of Iraq (GoI), United States Government (USG), Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and the State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).

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The United States Government (USG) has been at war in Iraq for over five years. In that time, while there have been many tactical successes, the USG has been unable to fully succeed strategically because of an inability to help the Government of Iraq (GoI) become a fully functioning and sovereign government that is able to provide for the needs of its people. This study uses the war in Iraq as an illustrative case study to examine the weaknesses in USG capability to help build partner capacity and to conduct reconstruction and stabilization. The research leveraged numerous books, articles, reports, and very extensive interviews with senior leaders involved in both the war in Iraq and the broader USG mission of capacity building. The project makes a series of recommendations to support the development of a USG doctrine for stability operations, and provides a series of options for structure and command and control for further study and research.
Germany 1943-1945:

In April of 1943 LTG Frederick Morgan was given the mission to start operational planning for the invasion and occupation of Germany. “While the terms of Morgan's mission suggested the need for military government, one of his early conclusions was that no such capability existed.” Morgan became an early advocate for the development of operational plans and structure for the occupation. He demanded that superiors take the problem seriously and that personnel with the required skill sets to administer and reconstruct a country be identified and assigned. “As of August 1943, he pointed out; he had nothing from which even to improvise a civil affairs organization.” Morgan’s advocacy led to the establishment of a table of organization consisting of four planning branches: civilian relief, military government, economics, and personnel and training. A fifth branch-area, research, was intended to take on operational as well as planning functions. “The section's directive gave it responsibility for planning military government in all enemy and enemy-occupied areas in the European theater, authority to recommend general and specific policies for military government, and control of civilian supplies and civil affairs personnel.”

Morgan’s team was challenged with many of the same problems and disagreements between the State Department and the War (Defense) Department that would later arise in Iraq. He operated with a lack of clear understanding of what the occupation would entail. Morgan and his team however, had two luxuries that were missing for future planners and administrators in Iraq: sufficient time to plan, and more than sufficient personnel and resources to draw the skilled

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staff necessary to man the civil affairs billets of an occupation and to provide a baseline of security.

**Iraq 2006:**

Late in the fall of 2006 the Chief of the Medical Support Training and Transition Team for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense came to the commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Coalition Team-Iraq (MNSTC-I), LTG Martin Dempsey, to make the case for an increase in the investment by the United States Government (USG) in the development of a self-sufficient medical support infrastructure for the Iraqi Military. The request was for millions of dollars in equipment to set up medical facilities.

The Iraqi Military was supposed to rely on the hospitals administered by the Ministry of Health (MOH) for serious and long-term medical support. The tactical care of security forces was to be provided by Iraqi Field Hospitals. As it became increasingly clear that the MOH had become a sectarian stronghold of the followers of Moqtada al-Sadr, the need to get the field hospitals up and running became a critical requirement. LTG Dempsey instructed the Medical Support Team and members of the HQ Staff to examine warehouses that had been set aside for support to these field hospitals to ensure that they had the capacity to support the influx of equipment and act as forward depots for the medical effort. When the team went out to the locations to examine the warehouses they were amazed to find pallets and pallets full of medical equipment from floor to ceiling that had had been in the warehouses for some indeterminate amount of time. The team suspected it might have been ordered during the Coalition Provisional Authority era but no one knew for sure. Almost all of the equipment that the team had asked the
Commander to request funds for was already right there on the ground.\(^2\) This incident is illustrative of an institutional failure of the USG Iraq reconstruction effort even as we gained tactical and operational success on the battlefield.

This paper will seek to examine the failures of institutional capacity building in Iraq as illustrative of a broader weakness in the capabilities of the United States Government (USG) to conduct post-combat stability operations and to work to strengthen foreign partners as part of the war on terrorism.

I. Gaming the Problem

The shear scope of the problem of capacity building is highlighted by the USG’s inability to effectively transition from combat operations to stability and reconstruction or to develop an effective partner capacity building operational approach. In the War on Terror the problems of ungoverned areas and areas of weak governance make it especially challenging for the United States to develop an effective policy. In many cases allies seek assistance to address the weaknesses in their governance capacity and in many others we make addressing these problems a pre-condition for aid. There are also the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These missions collectively have already stripped away the minimal capacity of the United States to address these problems.

In many cases we work collectively with allies and the United Nations to attempt to deal with these problems such as the U.S., and the international community’s, efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti. These cases however while successful in many areas have been impacted by the strain of two major post combat operations on the ability to deploy an already very limited civilian capacity for nation building.

\(^2\) Colonel Cosentino as the Chief of J5 Plans and Strategy was part of the team that examined these warehouses. The equipment origin was in dispute but was clearly of Western origin and from after the time of the March 2003 invasion.
II. Assumptions

Threat Environment:

The enemy is a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals, – and their state and non-state supporters –, which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends. This enemy finds the ability to act with impunity within physical and virtual safe havens by exploiting: modern technology, the broader Muslim population, the civil liberties resident within the societies they attack, and extremist religious ideology.\(^3\) The speed and simplicity of global communications, financial transfers, and inter-continental movement of people allow the terrorists of this disaggregated network to have global reach and access. Terrorists find physical safe haven by blending into large Muslim communities in metropolitan areas where they can conduct tactical planning, coordination, intelligence gathering, and execution of operations without being noticed.\(^4\) These terrorist actors also seek to create links with criminal organizations, weapons dealers and rogue states that seek advantage by working closely with extremist organizations. This complex threat environment in which USG personnel we will have to operate requires the sustained and integrated employment of all elements of national power and international support for many years in order to prevail.

The US is in this for the “long” war and must maintain a staying power and sufficient strategic depth to deal with the multitude of challenges. Despite current widespread disappointment with failures in Iraq, it is important for the USG to not be held hostage by the “never again” mentality. Since the Cold War, the US has engaged in some form of R&S operations every two years on average. The requirement to conduct nation-building type tasks is a characteristic of almost all operations that require the use of ground forces. Nation building is

\(^3\) Colonel Cosentino with Dr. Will McCants and Dr. Jarret Brachman, The United States Military Academy Countering Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, 6 Sept 2007.

\(^4\) Ibid.
part US engagement in the world, and Afghanistan and Iraq are not new in and of themselves. The major combat operations are actually the unique feature of these operations while the nation building and the training of security forces is most like the majority of US missions over the last 20 years.

**Unique Role of US:**

The US provides a unique role as maintainer of the international system but it has been challenged by the rise of extremism, rogue states, and rising peers. While global action to address terrorism and the problems of weak governance is desired and essential, US commitment as the primary global security and economic power is necessary.

During the Cold War, US orientation was towards the immediate threat of Soviet power. The US developed a policy of internal and external balancing against the Soviet Union. The US built up capabilities necessary to counter the threat and developed alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to counter the influence of the Soviet Union on a broader political level. This led to the evolution of the policy, articulated in the late 1940s by George Kennan, of containment. The entire US national security system was organized around Kennan’s policy of containment of the Soviet threat and structured based on the National Security Act of 1947.

Today we face a different threat environment, which mandates a new strategic orientation for our national security apparatus. Failing states and states in recovery from conflict are realities of the future. The USG is the economic and political leader of the world and has a combination of resources and global reach to be the necessary catalyst of change. Some sort of stability operation follows historically almost all military operations, with the exception of

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limited air or missile strikes. These stability operations require a strengthening of the capacity to establish security, and begin to rebuild indigenous capacity for governance.

**Security Risk of Ungoverned Spaces**

Establishing Security both from kinetic threats and from threats to human security means that security is defined not only as absence of violence. The international system is most immediately threatened by ungoverned spaces and failing states. The lessons learned of the dangers from not addressing failing states and poor or bad governance are most clearly illustrated by the case of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Failed states and ungoverned spaces pose security threats at the international, national, and human levels.

The effects of “Conflict neighborhoods” – failing states with weak borders-can often been seen across entire regions such as the Horn of Africa. These regions can become safe havens for terrorist groups and transit areas of weapons and drug trafficking and human smuggling networks. Ungoverned areas without capable institutions can also become breeding grounds for diseases, environmental degradation, and resource wars.

The US in order to seek to maintain stability across key regions should provide assistance to governments as part of a broader engagement strategy. Protectionism and isolationism as a grand strategy is no longer viable, if it ever was, given the current threat environment. The importance of capacity building, specifically strong, democratic governments is apparent in the case of post combat operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Less obvious, but just as important, is how these types of missions could serve as a tool for conflict prevention and

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6 See Appendix A
strengthening partner nations to participate in and contribute to the maintenance of the international system. To date, US response to weak and failed states has been ad hoc.\textsuperscript{7}

**Nature of the International System:**

The international system is state based. States function as the primary units of action in international affairs, building blocks of alliances and working through international organizations, agreements, and treaties. Responsible and sovereign state partners should be building blocks of global stability and are the key USG focus of effort to support stability in international relations. It is in the security and economic interest of the US to encourage capable and accountable states. The way this is accomplished best is through a focus on the public sector. This policy emphasizes the need for a capable national government to represent its people *internationally* and also to respond to the needs of its people *domestically*. This policy focus allows for an independent and natural development of civil space in line with the cultural norms of the partner nation but within the context of the norms of the international state system.

**Central Governments:**

The Foundation of responsible and sovereign state partners is capable and accountable *national governments*. These strong central governments are a necessary *prerequisite* for decentralization or devolution of power in a manner that supports national unity. The government has several characteristics:

- Legitimacy and authority
- Financial resources
- Monopoly on use of force
- Capacity to deliver services or regulate delivery of services

It can be argued that the Iraqi national government is essentially failing on all four accounts at least up to the 2007-2008 “surge” in coalition military and diplomatic efforts.

III. Background of the situation in Iraq:

An Illustrative Example: the USG in Iraq has undertaken what former Ambassador Jim Dobbins has called a mission of “heroic amateurism.”\(^8\) The USG, as currently resourced and organized, cannot build national Iraqi institutions (political, military, social, security) AND invest in local community building.\(^9\) In order to understand the points of failure in Iraq in the USG mission to build Iraqi capacity it is important to understand the context of the mission and the evolution that it has undergone over the last five years. In itself this story is illustrative and in some ways was partly predetermined by the lack of USG capacity and political will for nation building.

Overview:

As the war in Iraq enters the sixth year of conflict in Iraq, we are still faced with the two major consequences of the USG invasion of Iraq in 2003: the collapse of the state and the subsequent upending of the country's political structure. The latter produced a primarily Sunni Arab insurgency which was recognized and addressed early on by General Abizaid and that, while devastating in terms of human suffering, has never seriously threatened to overthrow the state.

However, the former, Iraqi state collapse has proven to be the greater problem. The vacuum it created has, in combination with al-Qaeda in Iraq’s (AQI) deliberate attempt to incite

\(^8\) Interview, Ambassador James Dobbins, 13 February 2008.
civil war, produced a sectarian conflict that threatened Coalition and Iraqi efforts to bring stability to the country. The USG’s and the Coalition Nation’s slowness in recognizing the deepening communal power struggle in Iraq brought the war close to failure.

2003-2005: Focus on the Sunni Arab insurgency:

From 2003 through 2005 violence was primarily the results of the overthrow of Saddam and the Sunni reaction to that overthrow. The occupation of the country produced an insurgency that in many ways was an attempt to restore the Sunni elites and their tribal allies to positions of privilege. These insurgents however frame the revolt in nationalist terms and as a fight against the occupying force. The insurgency resisted the Coalition forces, and sought to destabilize the emergent political process. The insurgents played on fears of a vengeful Shi’a government. Insurgent violence was directed at both the Coalition and, the new Government of Iraq. Increasingly this targeting involved members of Shi’a and –ethnic groups.

As the Coalition responded tactically to the insurgency and executed what was essentially a search and destroy strategy, the insurgency changed its tactics and targeting techniques. The originally Sunni Arab nationalist “resistance” came to portray the conflict increasingly in sectarian terms and in the terms of defense of the Sunni minority. This set the conditions for common cause with various Islamist terrorist groups. The remnants of the former Ba’athist regime allied at least tactically with Al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorists who sought to spur a sectarian conflict. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was the chief proponents of a strategy of provocation intended to separate the Iraqi people along sectarian line. Their goal was to fuel a cycle of sectarian violence. Sunni Takfiri jihadists and extremists would work together with the broader Sunni insurgency, and were seen as helping in the protection of the Iraqi Sunni people.

In cooperation the broader Sunni Arab insurgency and the Islamist groups were the main cause of Coalition casualties in Iraq, especially during the first three years of the war from March
2003-early 2006. As a result, during this timeframe the Coalition dedicated most of its effort against the efforts of these Sunni insurgents. This focus led to one of the widest doctrinal reviews within the U.S. Military since the post-Vietnam era and the rediscovery and implementation of a new counterinsurgency doctrine. The USG efforts became centered on countering the Sunni insurgent threat, and working to build an indigenous counterinsurgency capability in the new Iraqi Security Forces.\(^{10}\)

**The greater problem, Iraqi state failure:**

In early 2006 as a result of situation had changed due to the destruction of the Samara Mosque, by unknown assailants. This led to a cycle of sectarian violence. In many ways the Coalition and its fight against Al Qaeda obscured what was evolving into a low level civil fight between Sunni and Shi’a at the neighborhood level. Violence was largely a byproduct of the collapse of Iraqi institutions after the collapse of the regime. Saddam’s regime and the Iraqi state in genera, was so weekend by the sanctions regime, that after the invasion, civil society receded in 2003 as a cycle of looting broke out across the country. The collapse of the state and the insufficient coalition force on the ground caused a concomitant breakdown in law and order. Militias and gangs starting enforcing vigilante order and in the case of criminal gangs terrorized the population. “Throughout Iraq, armed militias and tribal groups replaced an Iraqi state that could provide neither security nor services for its people. The Iraqi people, who had already been deeply traumatized and polarized by the Ba’athist regime, desperately sought security by reinventing the base identities of tribe, sect, or ethnic group.”\(^{11}\) As society became divided along

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\(^{10}\) Colonel Cosentino observations in 2006 in Iraq: the Multi-National Security and Transition Command-Iraq made the training and funding of Iraqi counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency capability one of its top priorities. A review of the Congressionally mandated quarterly (9010) reports, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” from 2005-2006 will provide a good understanding of the details of this effort.

\(^{11}\) Colonel Cosentino discussions with Colonel H.R. McMaster in Baghdad, March 2007.
The communal power struggle:

The struggle amongst the successor groups and remaining power centers in Iraq increased month by month unabated and was further fueled by dashed expectations from both the new GoI and also by the inability of the Coalition to either stem violence or get services up and running in the country. The political elites who were in the government did not have the broad support of their communities and often reflected both inter-sectarian and intra-sectarian rivalries. Almost all groups to some degree were resistant to accommodation Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurd because continued polarization of Iraqi society along ethnic or sectarian lines since these divisions help solidify their respective constituencies. All of these actors viewed power politics as a zero-sum game. Without the USG in force militarily, diplomatically, and through other elements of national power taking a leading role in reconciliation and capacity building then each group felt that their were no possible absolute gains for Iraqi society and that their positions would always be relative to the other Iraqi actors. Therefore they sought to grab and consolidate power wherever possible and to weaken the other actors. There was little willingness by national leaders to reach political compromise and share power. Iraq’s turbulent history has set the conditions for this struggle because every past regime change has resulted in a violent, winner-take-all contest for the reins of power. The war in Iraq is in many ways a struggle for survival.
and the right to define Iraq’s future national identity. This struggle undermines the unified Iraqi state and discourages national reconciliation.

**Rushing to failure:**

In 2006, our objectives bring democracy to Iraq and our effort to build its security forces came in conflict with the new Iraqi realities of identity politics, terror, and state and non-state foreign subversion. Focused on strengthening a newly elected government and defeating the terrorists and insurgents we were in many cases setting the conditions where we were helping to arm the various sectarian elements in a nascent civil war. In the minds of the Sunni opposition groups we were arming one side in what was becoming a bloody communal power struggle. “Focused on the Sunni insurgency, we pursued a strategy of handing over responsibility for Iraq’s security as quickly as possible to the Shi’a-dominated government we had helped to create.”

We were, however, rushing to failure: Iraq’s new Shi’a-led government was incapable of reliably providing its people the most basic services, incapable of leading the counterinsurgency effort, and seemingly unwilling to take serious steps toward national reconciliation.

**Government Capacity and weak institutions:**

Through the first several years of its existence the GoI has proven incapable of dealing effectively with the sectarian problem. It is only in the last year that the government, which is weak and divided, has attempted to come to grips with its inability to provide the basic security and services that are demanded for it to be able to establish legitimacy. GOI institutional development has been frustrated by behavior that is sectarian in nature (e.g., the manipulation of

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12 Biddle, Steven Ph.D., during a panel at the American Enterprise Institute, 7 January 2008.
[http://www.aei.org/events/filter_.eventID.1722/transcript.asp](http://www.aei.org/events/filter_.eventID.1722/transcript.asp)
the medical system through the MoH by the Sadarists) an inefficient system of government, and inept and insufficient civil servants lack of experience. Corruption and an insufficient coalition capacity building approaches contributed to a failure of institutional responsibility by the GoI. Government ineffectiveness exacerbates the sectarian problem as militias fill security and services vacuums, divert government resources, and force communities to fall back on tribal or religious leaders for support.\(^\text{14}\)

Iraq’s political culture with is colored by the legacy Saddam, who sought to divide the functions of government and prevent subordinate leaders from building effective working relationships. A general lack of trust between leaders and groups, and a tradition of coercion through violence has had a significant impact on the behavior of leaders and parties. “Iraq’s constitution created a weak central government and weak executive powers; precisely the opposite of what is needed to build institutions and resolve the country’s divisive issues.”\(^\text{15}\)

The Iraqi government is not a formal system, but rather a collection of offices linked by informal relationships among political parties in competition with one another. The government has a formal decision-making process that works in fits and starts, but it also has an informal process of which the Coalition has little knowledge. Decisions such as promotions and removals of key personnel are made through informal, opaque mechanisms. Sectarian behavior by organizations and individuals in the Government of Iraq (GoI) and security forces put the Coalition in the position of supporting one side in an intensifying communal struggle. GoI actions are inconsistent with, and often undermine coalition objectives, while weak and ineffective institutions lack legitimacy among minority populations. The Coalition can exert influence, but has either lacked sufficient leverage or has chosen not to impose its will on parties to the conflict. Meanwhile, Iraqi communities are positioning themselves for future conflict

\(^\text{14}\) Ibid, McMaster, CNAS panel 13 May 2008.
\(^\text{15}\) Ibid, McMaster, CNAS panel 13 May 2008.
rather than endeavoring to achieve stability through political accommodation; some believe they can wait out the Coalition.\textsuperscript{16}

Iraqi central government authority remains very limited outside Green Zone. The Council of Representatives can pass laws, but implementation and enforcement remains minimal and arbitrary. The relationship between the center and provinces remains uncertain and undeveloped, with inadequate contact between the central and provincial/district authorities and confusion about respective roles and responsibilities. Funding from the central government to provinces/districts remains erratic and colored by sectarian considerations and bureaucratic incompetence. Lastly, the security situation and related procedures hobble the ability of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to foster local governance.\textsuperscript{17}

The State has weak institutions. These institutions were degraded through years of Ba’ath Party control and international sanctions. De-Ba’athification removed most of the experienced managers, and the current instability has caused many within the middle class to flee the country. Ineffective government processes and systems contribute to extensive corruption. Political reconciliation and the passage of some reform of the de-ba’thification laws presents an opportunity to try and bring these technocrats back into government. The real question is how many even remain in the country.

Iraq’s political coalition to date impedes government service delivery, reconstruction and reconciliation. In the Iraqi system, Prime Minister Maliki acts essentially as a coordinator among the different parties in government. Individual ministers answer to their party bosses, rather than to the prime minister, or to the electorate. This ministerial autonomy causes governmental

\textsuperscript{16} Colonel Cosentino’s discussions with Dr. Stephen Biddle of the Army War College staff during March-April of 2007 in Baghdad.

\textsuperscript{17} Discussions with LTG(Ret.) Rick Olson while acting as Director of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq from Feb-May of 2007 and again in his new role as Deputy Director of the Special Inspector General for Iraq in Feb of 2008.
incoherence, and enables corruption and sectarianism to flourish. Under party control ministries have been stripped of assets or have been used to deploy resources in favor of one community or another.

The last year and a half has seen broad gains in the development of accommodation processes and cooperation on an emergent moderate constituency across the political parties. These moderate leaders however, are under the threat of constant attack and the capacity of the GoI to actually deliver goods and services lags firmly behind both the improving security situation and the increasing political dialogue. This lag of effective capacity has the potential to spur violence again because of a recurring cycle of dashed expectations.

**USG capacity building weakness:**

Into this mix the USG attempted to build capacity across the 34 ministries of the GOI. With the exception of the Ministries of Defense and Interior, which have a much greater effort but also with somewhat inconsistent results, there was little improvement in the ability of the GOI to provide goods and services, rule of law, and security from 2004-2006.

Iraq exposed post-conflict Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S) deficiencies of USG in several important areas. The failure to focus on public-sector institution building at the strategic level and failure to generate staff with skills to address post-conflict governance issues has led to the inability to speed the transition of security and administration of the nation of Iraq over to the GOI. As LTG (Ret). Rick Olson observed: “…primary reason we’re failing in Iraq is that no one has been assigned the mission to build the national government.”\(^{18}\)

The failure to coordinate military and civilian efforts became manifest as problems frequently arose in transition from military to civilian leadership. This clearly happened in Iraq in transition from military control to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Civilian

\(^{18}\) Ibid, LTG (Ret.) Rick Olson.
agencies frequently took on tasks that they couldn’t deliver on due to funding and personnel shortages, lack of SOPs in post-conflict environments etc. The result in Iraq was that the military frequently had to fill in\(^\text{19}\). In most cases this was sub-optimal because these military personnel were not trained in bureaucratic administration and even if experienced in particular areas of staff functions they were not prepared to train and transition Iraqis to take over these functions. The civilian departments of the USG were unable to generate large, competent, skilled staffs to project presence abroad not only in Iraq but it became clear that they are unable to do this mission across a set of broader global contingencies.

Unlike LTG Morgan, who was able to plan and build his occupation team from 1943-1945 in Germany, the rush to war in 2003 without concomitant planning and resourcing led to a critical lack of skilled staff? Morgan had two years to plan and was able to tap into almost 12 million men under arms. This allowed the occupation authority to adequately match requirements with skilled personnel and then to train them up for the specifics of a German occupation. One observation that is often missed about that World War II effort was its ability to tap into many government civil servants, from local to national level, who had just come from a decade of the biggest governance and capacity building effort America had ever experienced, the New Deal response to the Great Depression.

In an in depth United States Institute of Peace study of the early occupation planning (and of the manning of that effort) the team of Caan/Cole/Hughes and Serwer conclude that had the post-conflict presence been better planned and resourced, many problems could have been avoided. The implication is that failures at the strategic and planning levels caused many problems on the ground. This in turn calls for a serious need to reevaluate structure and planning processes of the USG. The “format of the transitional administration” was not the problem, it

\(^{19}\) Interview, Dr. Jeb Nadaner, 8 October 2007.
was the lack of governance specialists, lack of staff in general, and lack of security that inhibited the correct functioning of the “mechanisms of governance”\textsuperscript{20} This work goes onto conclude that “the political outcome in a post-conflict environment is directly correlated to security”\textsuperscript{21}. By extension, it matters not so much whom is in charge as long as that entity is able to secure the environment, this is a good argument for DoD leadership in the short-term. In a 2008 RAND study they conclude that “The failure was in institutional capability rather than in individual effort: The United States simply does not have, organized and in place, the bureaucratic machinery and expertise necessary to field large, competent civilian staffs for SSTR operations quickly.”\textsuperscript{22}

Failure of Security\textsuperscript{23} has then been at the root of many of the problems in Iraq and unlike the mission in Germany in 1945 it was largely a self-inflicted wound for the Coalition Forces. The increase in forces in 2007 and the subsequent growth of Iraqi forces that were able to enter the fight with a relative level of effectiveness at about the same time is setting the conditions for successful governance building efforts at least at the local and regional levels as undertaken by PRTs.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, 355.
\textsuperscript{23} According to one employee of the CPA: “Security issues and counter-measures continue to hamper the implementation of even the simplest tasks. Transportation, communication, electricity, fuel, and funding have proven to be daily obstacles that block progress at every stop.” (Davis, Craig,. “Reinserting Labor into the Iraqi Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs,” Monthly Labor Review, U.S. Department of Labor, June 2005.)
Security is widely regarded as the first priority in post-conflict environments, one question that arises is whether the military is in best position to restore security if given proper authorities? Several observations that come to mind are that:

- The monopoly on the use of force in the immediate aftermath of a conflict is crucial to long-term success.  
- The only USG agency capable of providing this is DoD.  
- In light of DoD Directive 3000.05 the Department leadership has shown that it possesses the institutional will to assume responsibility for this mission.  
- This mission should be relatively short in nature and there should be a companion non-military effort to get local and national police capabilities into operations as soon as possible.

Without security, the situation on the ground in Iraq, as mentioned earlier, quickly entered a negative feedback cycle. Massive looting in April 2003 set back the national reconstruction effort. The military was not prepared nor properly resourced to take on policing duties. A report on the state of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA) headquarters provides evidence and an example of the CPA’s security challenge: “Ministry buildings gutted; equipment hauled off; wiring stripped from the walls for copper; records burned; vehicles stolen; light fixtures and air conditioners removed; glass broken; and books and documents strewn about?”

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25 Serwer et al, 2007, 335: “Iraq demonstrated that without a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, no form of interim governance can ensure full effectiveness and sustainability.”  
In a Dec 2007 Report to Congress it was cited that “limited staff assistance visits to many of the ministries” were a major factor affecting progress in ministerial capacity development.\textsuperscript{28} It has been largely acknowledged now that stabilization presence under permissive conditions and with very modest stability and reconstruction goals, such as the aftermath of a natural disaster, requires 5 troops per 1000 people, and for long-lasting change in a semi-permissive or non-permissive environment the requirement would be 20 troops per 1000 people.\textsuperscript{29} This does not even take into account the prosecution of a true counter insurgency mission. This causes us to ask what the ratio in Iraq was at the fall of Saddam in 2003. The best case of 140,000 troops on the ground by the summer of 2003, allows for roughly 5.6 troops per thousand. This is a clear indication of a failed optimistic assumption about the level of violence following the fall of Saddam’s regime. It has only been the combination of a surge in U.S forces in 2007 and a concurrent growth of Iraqi Security Forces that has allowed for a footprint of security that is on par with historical requirements for such missions.

Concurrent with the failure to plan for security was the failure in Policy. The failure to properly set the conditions for war to peace transition was a failure to plan effectively for and to coordinate all USG tools towards the building Iraqi national and federal state power.\textsuperscript{30} Despite current emphasis on private sector and civil society growth, a robust and capable national government is critical for long-term stability and catalyzing/regulating healthy private sector and civil society. These efforts should provide a cyclical and symbiotic approach to capacity building. The policy for R&S needs to focus on the importance of national government, which

\textsuperscript{28} Report to Congress, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December, 2007: “Factors affecting progress in developing Iraq ministerial capacity and performance are a lack of reliable data for assessments and limited staff assistance visits to many of the ministries.”

\textsuperscript{29} Defense Science Board,” Transition to and from Hostilities,” 2004 Summer Study, viii.

\textsuperscript{30} Dreschsler, Donald R., “Reconstructing the Interagency Process After Iraq,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, February 2005: “The State Department, CENTCOM, and OSD all worked on postwar plans in multiple locations, but little planning was fully coordinated.”
devolves authority to local and municipal levels but maintains the capacity to deliver key and central functions (e.g., state security, financial system, critical infrastructure, international trade and diplomatic agreements, etc.). However, as shown in the case of Iraq, even if key decision-makers established better policy, the USG is simply not designed and oriented for long-term success in R&S operations.

This USG inability to execute Ministerial Capacity Development (MCD) has retarded the transition to Iraqi control and has often caused a lack of exploitation of tactical military and reconstruction successes at the local and regional levels. An ideal positive feedback cycle would restore governance capability at one level, which then catalyzes reconstruction at subsequent levels:

Secure environment in the public sector → leads to development in the ministries → leads to growth of capacity in the provinces → leads to local development and political empowerment and the strengthening of loyalty back to the central government.

In Iraq, the opposite occurred: Lack of security → staff in Iraq immobile → unable to visit ministries → MCD problems incapacities not only by lack of skilled trained staff, but also by the inability to operate in an insecure environment led to a default to local, tribal, sectarian, and provincial identities.

In post-conflict environments, standing up a viable, efficient national government is crucial because it:

- Sets the tone for a transition from hostilities to peacetime
- Public sector participation and regulation of essential services delivery is a necessary catalyst for transition from war to peace
MCE is the USG term for central government institution building\textsuperscript{31}. The strategic objectives of these efforts are to help build or strengthen national governments realized through an effective system of ministries. In Iraq, as pointed out in Special Inspector General for Iraq (SIGIR) reporting, continued failure of Iraqi ministries to fully execute their budgets is a key factor in a weak public sector\textsuperscript{32}. Budget execution is one of the outputs that General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker identified as a key measure of the GOI’s ability to provide basic services to the provinces and the people of Iraq.\textsuperscript{33} The goals off these MCD programs was and still are\textsuperscript{34} to use public sector capacity as the foundation of political will impetus for national reconciliation. Services delivery would gradually allow the Iraqi National Government to tie the periphery to the center. Effective and efficient governments are a symbolic break with the past and an end to a cycle of problems with violent responses. A strong and effective national government would signal a new era with rule of law, social contact between people and government, and between government and the international community.

As discussed earlier, one of single largest failures is inability by Iraqi ministries to execute budget and a second major failure has been the sectarian infiltration of ministries.\textsuperscript{35} A General Accounting Office (GAO) report stated: “U.S. ministry capacity building efforts face

\textsuperscript{31} The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines MCD as: “[The] efforts and programs to advise and help Iraqi government employees develop the skills to plan programs, execute their budgets, and effectively deliver government services such as electricity, water, and security.”

\textsuperscript{32} SIGIR-06-045, Status of Ministerial Capacity Development in Iraq, . 2007, 7. : “The Iraqi government’s inability to spend its own budget resources (estimated at more than $13 billion as of December 2006) [is] a significant problem that, if not corrected, may lead to the failure of the government.”

\textsuperscript{33} Colonel Cosentino participated in numerous planning sessions and brief backs to the command team where this metric was carefully examined and fully discussed during Feb-May of 2007, after the arrival of the new commander and ambassador.

\textsuperscript{34} SIGIR identifies the following objective for Iraqi ministerial capacity: The overall objective is “an Iraqi government based on the principles of national unity capable of effective administration, diminishing corruption, improving the provision of services, and securing its infrastructure; with an accountable civil society invested in establishing a stable democratic, and economically viable Iraq.” (SIGIR-06-045, 2007)

\textsuperscript{35} Interview, Scott Feil, 27 November 2007.
four key challenges that pose a risk to their success and long-term sustainability. First, Iraqi ministries lack personnel with key skills, such as budgeting and procurement. Second, sectarian influence over ministry leadership and staff complicates efforts to build a professional and non-aligned civil service. Third, pervasive corruption in the Iraqi ministries impedes the effectiveness of U.S. efforts. Fourth, poor security limits U.S. advisors’ access to their Iraqi counterparts, preventing the ministry staff from attending planned training sessions and contributing to the exodus of skilled professionals from the country.”

**Trial and Error in Iraq:**

The CPA was the height of an ad hoc solution but one that was essentially executed on the cheap and without a tie back to an operational plan with achievable and measurable objectives. During the era of its control, starting in the late spring and early summer of 2003, there was no Iraqi government and sovereignty had not been formally transferred. ORHA had less than 24 people on its governance team. The demands across a wider array of governance requirements became quickly apparent and those requirements revealed the imperative for a skilled, competent, large staff, able to deploy in the short term. Nothing like such a force of civilians existed at the ready and the CPA couldn’t get it in place.

An example of the challenge to the CPA, and the inability of the State Department to supply the personnel, was revealed in the effort to provide an advisory team for the Ministry of Interior. This advisory team effort was authorized under the CPA a staff of up to 281 advisors, but the CPA was only able to fill 4 slots (when DoD, with all its resources, later took over this effort the Manning under the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq only approached

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the original identified requirement in mid-2007). The short-term nature of assignments was the only way to get volunteers to work within the CPA, but this undermined institutional memory or consistency in work. It also affected ability of Americans to earn trust and build working relationships with Iraqis. The ambiguity concerning CPA’s authority contributed and exacerbated command and control. Some feel that this effort, as in post-war Germany, should have been under one specific department to increase transparency, accountability, and reporting structure. Instead, CPA’s accountability structure was extremely nebulous, compounded interagency complications. Local elections were cancelled early on and Iraqis looked to the CPA to provide basic services and they failed to deliver, which contributed to further disappointment.

With the CPA in a stranglehold of the lack of capacity and lack of prior operational planning, Coalition leaders couldn’t effectuate service delivery and stand up governance structures. Given USG limitations, the failure of the CPA to deliver goods and services, and understanding the inability of the new GOI to step in to take the lead, the CPA leadership resisted turning sovereignty over to Iraqis too early because it could result in major violence and zero-sum politics. In many ways this is what happened later in 2006 after the first two election cycles.

In response to the lack of capacity and resources to build governance capacity in the areas within its own purview, the CPA became dependent on United States Central Command

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39 Serwer et al, 2007, 320. “According to a Congressional Research Service Report released in April 2004, ‘available information about the [CPA] found in materials produced by the Administration alternatively; (1) deny that it is federal agency, (2) state that it is a U.S. government entity; (3) suggest that it was enacted under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483; (4) refer to it, and ORHA, as ‘civilian groups…reporting to the Secretary [of Defense]’; and (5) state that it was created by the United States and the United Kingdom.”

40 Ibid, 323. “The difficulty the CPA experienced in providing basic services was so extreme that U.S. military commanders began to refer to it as “Can’t Provide Anything.” The inability to provide basic services, coupled with the inability to provide basic law and order, only further increased resentment and frustration in the local population.”
CPA never controlled its own resources on the ground and was never an autonomously acting agency. It couldn’t launch reconstruction activities without coordinating with CENTCOM, and CENTCOM frequently had other priorities. The inability to address violence and security contributed to advisors not embedding in ministries. The CPA focused on national governance at the expense of local governance initiatives, because of the security threat but it never had the assets in place to get those ministries up and running.

While many advisors in certain ministries, such as the Ministry of Health, might have possessed specific job sets necessary for sector-specific institution-building, these technocrats were not prepared to address issues within the context of post-conflict environments, and missed opportunities to prevent state capture by sectarian interests. As observed by analyst Scott Feil, MoH grew real capability but it was quickly captured by the Sadrists and became a focus of sectarian violence. SIGIR in its report on human resources management also observed the issue of capture of central ministries by sectarian interests. The ministries were so weak that the donor community frequently circumvented them. This failure of synergy between Iraqi

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42 Serwer, et al, 328-329: “With regard to developing indigenous governance, the focus fell on building national institutions, especially the ministries, court system, and police. The focus on national governance stemmed from the many security threats the CPA faced, as well as a lack of qualified international personnel. This focus, however, slighted the development of local governance. There was a lack of funding provided to local councils, as well as a lack of expertise provided to assist in their development.”
43 Interview, Scott Feil.
44 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006: “One success story in terms of detailee and civilian staffing, however, was the Ministry of Health. Shortly after CPA began operations, the highly experienced former head of the Michigan Department of Community Health was appointed as advisor to the Iraq Ministry of Health. Working closely with CPA recruiting at the Pentagon, he took personal responsibility for putting together a 25-person team before going to Iraq. The team comprised U.S. government detailees, military personnel, IRDC personnel, and civilians. Upon arrival in Baghdad, this group began working with the Iraqi Ministry of Health, which had 120,000 employees, 240 hospitals, and 1/200 clinics. The original Iraqi budget of $16 million grew to $1 billion a year later when the Ministry of Health became the first ministry to be transferred to full Iraqi control. A key lesson learned from this situation was the value of organizing a coherent and cohesive team before deployment.”
ministries and the donor community further frustrated capacity development, accountability, or the strengthening of the social contract between the GoI and the Iraqi people.\textsuperscript{45}

This is an illustration of the moral hazard issue in post-conflict developing host nations. The humanitarian imperative encourages the donor community to engage directly with local population, cutting out the government. The long-term effects of such decisions, however, erode the capacity and will of host governments to take on responsibility. There is a risk of host nation government dependency on the intervening forces, which manifests a lack of trust in the host government by the population at large. These adverse effects generate serious policy concerns for the international community and intervening nations.

The staffing within the CPA relied on civilian temporary travel orders, these people frequently did not have specified tour lengths and the situation on the ground was constantly in flux. Personnel were held to a “moral commitment” to stay for an agreed-upon period but the at-will contracting procedures enabled early departures and premature deployment terminations.\textsuperscript{46} As this problem is analyzed for lessons learned one real problem is lost institutional memory following transition from the CPA to the U.S. Embassy Mission Team. CPA advisors left because of uncertain funding and international support for MCD.\textsuperscript{47} Few, if any, real measurable statistics were kept and most information comes from anecdotal sources. Continuous personnel turnover due to inconsistent deployments in the CPA also aggravated institutional memory loss. This lack of clear records to conduct a thorough history or after action review is indicative of both the lack of planning and the ad hoc nature of personnel allocation.

\textsuperscript{46} Interview, Scott Feil.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
Iraq Illustrative of the need for a capable central government:

There is a tendency in post-conflict settings to view decentralization and devolution of power as appropriate and an ideal end state. However, especially in non-homogeneous societies, an international USG capacity building strategy with a focus on local government is important, but not a satisfactory end solution. Given association between strong central governments and authoritarian leadership, an aversion to central government capacity building is rational. However, decentralization as a policy for governance can backfire and increase competition for power, enable elite entrenchment in municipal institutions, and postpone addressing serious high-level problems such as bilateral and multilateral relations, national budgets/macroeconomic policy, international/regional membership in organizations, treaty and alliance-making.

Central governments should be organized to realize aspirations of citizens, link between international norms and domestic human security. Only central, not local, governments can have overall monopoly on use of force and control borders – that is the basic security characteristic of the state. In addition, is the requirements related to goods and services delivery.\(^{48}\) The current focus on PRTs is a viable solution for local-level reconciliation and economic regeneration, but the USG and allies must be able to complement it with capacity-building efforts at the ministerial level.

Central Government Reconstruction:

The ability to reconstruct central governments is a long-term objective and requires long-term staying power. This is extremely difficult in the context of USG structure. There is a mismatch between USG structure and needs on the ground. Budgetary planning and congressional oversight encourages emphasis on short-term results rather than long-term impact. In addition, an effective capacity building strategy is coming up against cultural and intellectual

\(^{48}\) Interview, Ambassador John Herbst, 11 October 2007.
imperatives that do not match the operational assets available to operate on the scale necessary to be effective.

The accepted norm that governments should be civilian run and led follows that civilians should lead post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The irony is that civilians working abroad generally LEAVE areas of instability; they do NOT augment their presence.⁴⁹ Early on in a stability operation it is an imperative that the effort must build confidence that a new government and national military/police can respond to needs of all citizens by avoiding the perception of policy based on sectarian or ethnic identities.⁵⁰ In Iraq this has not been the case for the first five years of the operation and it has only been in the sixth year, and into the spring of 2008, that the Iraqi central government has started showing signs of both competency and non-sectarianism.

Addressing the lack of civilian capacity to conduct nation building in a hostile environment has been a challenge. DoD and DoS have a mutual aversion to the military’s role in governance capacity building. Illustrative is the resistance in Iraq to MacArthur-style structure, which combines military and diplomatic occupation efforts under control of single individual or agency. The department most often tasked inside DoD to help cover these mission, the United States Army is especially resistant to what it sees as unfunded requirements and a diversion from its warfighting role. The standard response across the Army is to repeat the refrain that the State Department and the rest of the civilian departments of the United States Government (USG) need to step up their role in the War on Terror. This may be true but it ignores the short and mid-term realities of both budget constraints and personnel limitations.

The other departments of the USG are limited in their budgetary flexibility but they are also restrained by bureaucratic culture. Most of these departments either do not have an expeditionary culture or in the case of the State Department they may well deploy but not in

⁴⁹ Kelly et al., . 2007, Summary.
either the numbers necessary or with the approach that is needed for true capacity building.\textsuperscript{51} The State Department relies on its Foreign Service Officers to report and to shape policy; not to mentor and build partner country capacity. The one agency associated with the State Department that actually has the mission of development and governance capacity building, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is today 12% of its Cold War size.\textsuperscript{52} There has been resistance by DoS to service in Iraq, evidenced by State’s inability to fill civil positions on PRTs. In addition, the standard operating procedures (SOPs) for DoS personnel have been restrictive to the point of inhibiting those who are willing to accept personal risk in order to operate among the host nation population.

Compounding this problem of interagency combined operations is the lack of a government wide doctrine for stability operations. The military has R&S doctrine that is naturally narrower in focus then a full USG doctrine should be. DoS does not currently have an operational doctrine for these types of operations. For the military these missions are a challenge because they run counter to institutional culture. Military strategy and operational approach resists extended, open-ended deployments, ambiguous political and military objectives, and the possibility of no decisive victory (nation building). This is why military doctrine always emphasizes the triage nature of stability operations and as early a transition to civilian control and execution as possible.

\textsuperscript{51} CRS Report, RL32862.
\textsuperscript{52} Bankus, Brent and Kievit, James, . “Reopen a joint school of military government and administration?” Small Wars & Insurgencies, . Vol. 19, No. 1, March 2008, 137-143:. “When military governance and reconstruction responsibility is abdicated, or transitioned too quickly to civilians, the effects are likely to be disastrous for several reasons. First, despite any knowledge advantage they might possess, US civilian government agencies such as the Department of State do not have either the staff or resources in sufficient quantity to conduct either broad or prolonged large-scale governance operations. Second, for any successful governance and reconstruction operation, in both short and long term the ability to provide and sustain area security is a must.”.
The State Dept has shown an aversion to service for extended periods of time in non-permissive environments. The DoS organ of capacity building, USAID, has also evolved since the Cold War into primarily a vehicle for economic development. These operational facts then lead to concerns that internal to USG policy and operating approach there might be irreconcilable differences between the lead departments. However, the military is increasingly aware of importance of stability operations in planning, but has yet to actualize this in planning and procedures. There is some room for optimism of a change in focus by the DoD. The Army has changed its structure to a brigade based force and has written and employed a new 21st Century counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. The most recent change is the creation of the new Army field manual FM-3 (Operations) that elevates stability operations to a level on par with offensive and defensive operations.

In the review of USG actions in Iraq the Special Inspector General for Iraq (SIGIR) identified a series of key failures that led to an inability of the USG to achieve early success in ending the war and building Iraqi Capacity. These failures were:

- Failure to develop a capacity assessment baseline;

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53 A May 2007 GAO study found that “Three factors cause…limited and in consistent interagency participation in DOD’s planning process: (1) DOD has not provided specific guidance to commanders on how to integrate planning with non-DOD organizations, (2) DOD practices inhibit sharing of planning information, and (3) DOD and non-DOD organizations lack an understanding of each other’s planning processes and capabilities, and have different planning cultures and capacities. As a result, the overall foundation for unity of effort – common understanding of the purpose and concept of the operations, coordinated policies and plans, and trust and confidence in key participants – in military operations that involve stabilization and reconstruction activities is not being established.” (GAO Highlights. “Military Operations: Actions needed to improve DOD’s stability operations approach and enhance interagency planning.”)

54 The Army Campaign Plan and Posture Statement do a good job of laying out the move to modularity by the Army, and FM 3-0. Operations 27 February 2008, FM 3-24. Counterinsurgency 15 December 2006, and AR 10-87. Army Command, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units. 4 September 2007, all provide a good picture of new Army structure and doctrine.
• Failure to develop information-sharing mechanisms across ministries and between involved USG agencies;
• Failure to develop detailed plan, in collaboration with the GoI; and,
• Failure to assign clear responsibility for overall USG MCD to one official or organization.\textsuperscript{55}

These failures led to redundant and competing efforts, waste and misallocation of resources and personnel.

\textbf{New Leadership and 2007 Strategy, Surge and New Way Forward}

In early 2007 the President made the decision to “Surge” an additional 30,000 plus troops into Iraq to augment the ability of the new command team of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker to execute a counter-insurgency strategy. This surge, along with the defection of the large mass of Sunni insurgents from alliance with Al Qaeda, offered a window of opportunity to refocus USG and GoI efforts. In the spring of 2007, the MNF-I Commander and Ambassador determined that Ministerial Advisory Teams (MATs) were not achieving sustainable progress. The President has made ‘government capacity development’ a high priority as part of the new strategy.\textsuperscript{56} In these efforts the Iraq command team refocused their capacity building efforts down to key ministries and sought to provide the Iraqi central government with a baseline operating capability.

\textbf{Assessing the Interagency Process}

One key area to look at during an assessment of the interagency process is the different institutional and bureaucratic cultures that exist between military and civilian departments and

\textsuperscript{55} SIGIR-06-045, 2007.
even between the various civilian departments. Several important observations become apparent. In the area of planning it appears that civilian departments do not do “systematic planning”. The military and civilian departments also have different methods for problem solving. For example, State prefers flexibility over SOPs and DOD likes to plan for every contingency. Across the various departments there are also predispositions in common that work counter to stability operations and reconstruction. There does not appear to be a single bureaucratic mindset to do institution building. Most executive-level departments focused on policy-making rather than action-oriented approaches (Defense Science Board).

When examining this challenge future research must study in depth the workings and culture at the inter-organizational level. Specifically, future study must explore how organizations view themselves, their organizational processes, outside stakeholders, and what the organization views as it’s foreign vs. domestic responsibilities. In addition, future research will have to case study intra-organizational approaches and pre-dispositions. What is the institutional view amongst the various departments on the distribution of responsibility for contingency operations, proper chains of command, and emergency response vs. long-term assistance/planning?

In development work, fear of confusing civil and military roles, “battle space” has caused friction and concerns of “militarizing” development. This is not only between civilian and

57 A May 2007 GAO Report (07-549) interviewed several DOD officials who “described what they believe is a significant difference in the planning and cultures of DOD and non-DOD organizations. They stated that the DOD has a robust planning culture that includes extensive training programs, significant resources, dedicated personnel, and career positions. Conversely…agencies outside of DOD do not appear to have a similar planning culture and do not appear to embrace the detailed planning approach taken by DOD. In addition, these officials repeatedly stated that their efforts to include non-DOD organizations in planning and exercise efforts has been stymied by the limited number of personnel those agencies have available to participate.”.


59 Ibid. . . .
military departments but also between the USG and the international development community. The inherent focus on national interests of emerging USG policy does not sit particularly well with the primarily non-governmental development community. This leads to the observation that a broad and open dialogue is probably warranted on the topic of “battle space” vs. “humanitarian space”. Current operations no longer support separation of these two spaces. They are merging in spite of the fact that neither military nor civilian practitioners desire such a merger. The military traditionally is not involved in, and not interested in an expanding role in, development activities. Military organizational culture inculcates a fear of mission creep.

These cultural constraints lead to an agent approach vs. “whole of government” approach. This is further complicated by a generational attitude that was pre-disposed towards an American fear or at least dislike of ‘big government’. The dislike was formed however because Americans have had the luxury of living under a relatively effective big government for almost seventy years. This then has tended to focus intellectual approaches to fine tuning and limiting government when in stability operations it is the lack of any effective governance that is the problem. Americans and the USG as a collective of operational departments will have to overcome this aversion if it is to be successful in meeting their strategic objectives of responsible and sovereign international partners.

There are multiplicities of civilian organizations and various aspects of post-war governance dispersed across the USG and this dispersion without a supporting operational construct, unified doctrine, and clear command and control, creates problems in unified leadership with disparate programs undermining each other or duplicating each other and competition over mandate and jurisdiction.60

60 Schadlow, . . 2003, 91. “During World War II, competition between the Army and civilian planning efforts emerged less because of the Army’s desire to lead governance operations and
Structure

One question that supersedes all other is whether there is capacity to do institution building? While greatly diminished from the Cold War era it is clear that there is still significant capacity in the USG for institution building but most of it resides in DoD. The capacity across the USG is further more disaggregated and uncoordinated. No structure exists in the USG, or regulatory template, for recruiting personnel to staff a “temporary surge” in national building skills sets. No contingency organization exists with the authority to task, organize, and lead an R&S mission. Across the USG civilian agencies do not have reserves. DoS has primarily overseas policy responsibility, miniscule domestic constituency and limited budget, and it is traditionally a reporting agency. DoD on the other hand has a huge domestic constituency, a robust budget, and significant numbers of personnel, but has traditionally been used to direct implementation and execution of warfighting mission objectives. Its new doctrine however opens up a deep well of capacity by making stability operations on a par with offensive and defensive operations. In the case of USAID you have a subordinate organization of state that has evolved into a management and oversight agency for contracting purposes with little experience of direct implementation of policy in the field. This is changing however due to the needs of supporting PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This lack of capacity and interagency strategy results in “low technical and procedural interoperability.” The Stafford Act stood up FEMA for domestic emergency management but no similar legislation for overseas R&S operations has been implemented to empower central planning and execution.

more because of the Army’s determination to rise above the confusion of civilian planning and preserve unity of command.”

Goldwater-Nichols, pushed through after a 40-year debate and following a series of disappointing military operations, forced interoperability and joint planning and resourcing by the military services. The challenges of institution building in Iraq and Afghanistan lead to questions of whether it is time to have legislation that forces interagency interoperability and manning. If such legislation was enacted it begs the question of what would be the organizational hierarchy and criteria for mission completion? Further what would be the plan and allocation of financial resources for contingency operations and institution building? It is increasing clear from our operations in Iraq that the absence or availability of resources to implement a program distorts ability and drives a reverse engineering of both operational approach and strategic objectives.

In the American political system funding becomes a driving part of the problem solving culture. The agencies such as DoS who operate on small budgets do not become innovative but tentative. This constantly finds such departments seeking to minimize objectives and scaling back aggressive planning to address national challenges, “…those that receive larger and larger resource allocation often develop the kind of organizational culture that can apply those resources.”62

One of the primary hurdles in addressing the funding shortfalls, and the strategic hesitancy that is associated for R&S operations, is the House Appropriations sub-committee structures. These sub-committees are very hesitant to either cross funding streams between executive departments or to radically increase the funding over traditional norms in particular functional areas. In many cases these representatives just don’t believe the departments can effectively spend money outside of their areas of expertise and they are somewhat concerned

with appropriating money outside of their own knowledge areas. These concerns on the part of appropriators tend to dissuade the authorizers from pushing for bolder strategies and investment plans.

Another challenge for the USG is the dearth of resident skills and experience in its permanent workforce. When trying to assess USG capabilities one is forced to ask does knowledge and understanding of R&S necessary to do institution building exist resident in the USG? One option is to attempt to tap into the capabilities of the military reserve forces. Reserves offer a great deal of expertise in non-military skills but can “crowd out” comparable civilian capability in R&S operations. Today there are no standing procedures for surveying nascent capabilities and calling up capable personnel in civilian agencies. There is no strategy for “assessing, deploying, and applying” skills for partner capacity building. This lack of civilian capacity leads to an increasing reliance on military units to conduct nation-building missions. This tendency is reinforced by security issues as civilian agencies to not ordinarily have SOPs for operation in non-permissive environments. The lack of resources has retarded both interest in capacity building and the true scoping of the tasks, skills, chain of command, authorities, and strategy for R&S operations.

In the area of deployability the question is not only willingness or numbers of personnel but also the ability to actually self deploy support for institution building into the contested governance space. In the best of circumstances this would be a very international and dispersed effort utilizing the United Nations, Non-Governmental organizations, allies, and civilian USG assets. When time, hostilities, or complex terrain are involved then DoD is the only organization...

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63 SIGIR-06-045, . 2007, 1: “The continued threat of violence by anti-Iraqi forces against Coalition members and Iraqi officials viewed as cooperating with the Coalition limits the ability of capacity-development experts to interact with their Iraqi counterparts. While meetings are possible within the International Zone, the risk of violence affects the delivery of capacity-development support to ministries and institutions, such as the Iraqi Ministries of Finance, Interior, and Electricity.”
that has self-protecting lift and communications capabilities. An example of this kind of challenge was the huge set of problems the Department of Justice (DOJ) had in actually getting to Iraq. In studies of post-conflict governance, civilian organizations historically have not been able to conduct missions abroad for sustained periods of time, nor do they have the staff for long-term contingency operations.\footnote{Bankus and Kievit, . . . . 2008, 137-143: . “When military governance and reconstruction responsibility is abdicated, or transitioned too quickly to civilians, the effects are likely to be disastrous for several reasons. First, despite any knowledge advantage they might possess, US civilian government agencies such as the Department of State do not have either the staff or resources in sufficient quantity to conduct either broad or prolonged large-scale governance operations. Second, for any successful governance and reconstruction operation, in both short and long term the ability to provide and sustain area security is a must.”}

**Recommendations:**

**Short-Term:**

The USG should expand detailing of DOD officers to other USG agencies in order to leverage the department that has the most USG capacity but keeping functional control of specific tasks underneath departments that have the resident, if limited, expertise. This recognizes pragmatically, that when it comes to resources, the military will have advantages in the short-term in rapid deployability, better funding, and the ability to operate in insecure environments.\footnote{CRS . report RL32862observes that military leadership lead reconstruction and stabilization operations in the past “not only because of its extensive resources but also because no other US government agency could match the military’s superior planning and organizational capabilities. In addition, because of its manpower, the military carried out most of the US humanitarian and nation-building contribution [in the 1990s].”} By detailing officers you enhance the civilian departments in the area of their strength, functional and regional expertise. This would allow the detailed officer to gain technical expertise and represent interests of their host agencies and departments when serving as liaisons back to the DoD. It also counters the “inside beltway” dialogue about who should be in charge by making it a team effort.
Another factor is that critical examination of capacity for R&S reveals that it is more viable, in addressing the possible near-term challenges the USG may face, to scale up of DoD’s governance and institution building expertise than it is to work through congressional authorities for better funding, contingency funds and personnel in other agencies. Jeb Nadaner, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy observed that the USG could “apply an empirical test to jurisdictional claims”. Civilian agencies consistently fall short of promises in resources, funding, and personnel. While these operations should be civilian-led and implemented, in the short run gaps are too large and they simply lack the programmatic capability to project significant capabilities abroad.\(^{66}\) Iraq bears out the truism that troops on the ground in Iraq are thrown into capacity building with little appropriate training but they want to learn how to do it.\(^{67}\) In addition, a better use of DoD planners detailed out to interagency partners could improve planning support for future operations.\(^{68}\)

Just as doctrine inside the Army has shifted, operational plans need to shift to show a greater understanding of the needs of partner capacity building. A 2004 DSB report also recommended empowering an executive agent at the high level: deputy assistant secretary of defense for stab ops. This recommendation was instituted by DoD and this office is now tasked with being both the DoD agent to the interagency and also the arbiter and DoD interlocutor of the various doctrinal re-write efforts that are in the works, both within DoD and without. The DSB report asserts that responsibilities for stab ops are dispersed throughout the staff in the Joint Staff and OSD and that strategy needs to be integrated under this new DASD (Stab Ops).

\(^{66}\) Interview, Dr. Jeb Nadaner, 9 October 2007.
\(^{67}\) Ibid.
\(^{68}\) Defense Science Board, 2004: “Stabilization and reconstruction operations should be given more weight in planning and programming the future force, and appropriate objectives and metrics should be established. S&R operations are not adequately accounted for in DOD’s current force planning framework, which is driven by objectives of rapid response, swift defeat, and decisive wins…Objectives need to be complemented by a set of…metrics appropriate to S&R operations, where the time will likely be measured in years.”
These changes in DoD are starting to synchronize authority at the strategic level with the emerging ad hoc solution sets at ground level. This synchronization should allow the institutionalization of lessons learned, emerging skill requirements, operational approaches, and organizational structures that come from operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the broader War on Terror.

The real risk here is that there will be recognition by decision-makers that this is a temporary response to a resource and capacity vacuum in civilian agencies, but that the will to follow through with systemic change and investment will dissipate. One concern is that augmenting DoD’s institution building capabilities should not establish a precedent for all future R&S missions as this could aggravate long-standing departmental imbalances instead of providing a short-term capabilities bridge. In fact, the Pentagon is a major proponent of ramping up civilian post-conflict capabilities.

In order though to meet the challenges of the “Long War”, military involvement in R&S is crucial. Time sensitive capabilities by DoD to secure, protect, plan and implement logistics, and establish communication and intelligence capabilities on the ground is unparalleled in any civilian agency and would take a long time to build.

Military involvement and leadership in rebuilding post-war governments is not new. In fact, the military lead reconstruction efforts several times in the past, including:

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69 Ibid, 45.
71 Defense Science Board, 2004: “The U.S. military services have evolved the most refined management schema and discipline in the federal government. Operational planning is an area where the military has particularly well-developed processes and deep experience….While there are excellent executives throughout the government, by far the greatest and deepest “bench strength” of personnel skilled and experienced in executive management is in the military services. While the military has deep experience in operational planning and execution, other parts of the U.S. government seldom demonstrate comparable discipline, and plans are often poorly prepared.”
• Germany and Japan after WWII
• Mexican War, 1840s
• Domestic reconstruction after Civil War
• Dominican Republic, 1965
• Grenada, 1986
• Panama, 1989
• Vietnam, CORDS program (Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development Support), created within the US Military Assistance Command 72

Detailing officers to support stability operations missions would have to be part of a broader re-make of Army Officer career paths and personnel management designed to keep many more mid-career officers on active duty to meet both Army operational requirements and these R&S requirements related to the mission of partner capacity building. While the full description of reform in Army officer management is beyond the scope of this paper, one option for revised officer career paths includes a fast track option for mid-career officers to transition to other agencies of the USG. One method to accomplish this opportunity would be by tracking those officers from early in their careers who might be interested in service careers in other departments of the USG. These officers would most likely work with their personnel managers to develop their skills and experiences starting with their graduate school choices. An illustrative example of this type of flexibility would be an officer aspiring to a career with Treasury would most likely accept additional active duty service obligation (ADSO) for a graduate degree in finance, accounting, or in business management. Finance officers are the most likely candidates but this route would not be closed off to those who select or are forced to branch in the combat

72 Schadlow, . . 2003, 87-89.
arms or other support branches. This officer, after graduate-level education, would then compete for a utilization tour working with Treasury as a liaison. An example of this would be support to task forces focused on countering the financing of terrorist groups or with deployed teams helping partner nations improve their financial systems. This option, with its path to service in other agencies of the USG, could be combined through skillful personnel management with a transition to reserve or National Guard status. This might actually be a way to start testing modified career options by targeting the current crop of officers approaching the end of their ADSO and those mid-career officers who may be contemplating ending their military service. Such test efforts would be a good way to examine the overall challenge of capacity building in a non-permissive environment.

One of the primary challenges for civilian agencies that might receive such detailed personnel, or mid-career transfers, is in fact the difficulty of finding personnel willing to accept the physical risk of operating in a combat zone. Flexibility in Army personnel career options could enable the USG to deploy a cadre of personnel that can defend themselves. This capability may have to become a long-term attribute of civilian personnel who deploy. The other short-term requirement is to get a handle on the tasks and missions of stability operations to codify them in a “stab ops doctrine”. The most innovative work in this area is being done by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)(Beth Cole and Daniel Serwer) in partnership with the Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) at the Army War College (Colonel John Agoglia and Dr. William Flavin). This doctrinal work should be the basis of a scenario gaming series that is conducted in the 2009-2010 time frame with the objective to validate tasks, responsibilities, scope, requirements, roles and missions, and command and control for stability operations and partner capacity building. This effort will help the understanding of the possible
theaters of operation and identify local players for integration for planning.  

This gaming series should be funded as a specific line item in the 2009 Defense Authorization Bill or in the next appropriate War Supplemental measure, and a facilitator, such as USIP who has established relationships with interagency actors, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations, should be designated as the lead for such analytical work.

**Long Term:**

In the longer-term, several options are being examined in policy circles. The January 2007 SIGIR report concludes that, “The majority of U.S. government capacity-development activities conducted to date have been internally driven and responsive to individual agency direction rather than part of an overarching U.S. government capacity-building plan or program. Further complicating the U.S. effort is the lack of a single entity with the mandate to implement a unified comprehensive U.S. ministerial capacity-development program in Iraq, having full authority not only to direct proactive solutions, but also to measure desired end-state results.” There is an apparent need for a “whole-of-government” approach that will, to some degree, require the key decision makers across the USG to get over its aversion to ‘big government.’

It is also necessary to build incentives at the individual, group, and organizational levels within the interagency to forge relationships and rely on cooperation. Looking out twenty years it is hard to accurately assess where the USG needs to be in terms of capabilities, especially in the absence of a systematic review of doctrine, requirements, roles and mission, and command

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73 Campbell . and Hartnett,. . . 2005.

74 SIGIR-06-045,. 18.

75 Defense Science Board, 2004: “Coherent U.S. government-wide direction is needed to deal with ‘ripe and important’ countries/region.”

76 Campbell. and Hartnett. . . , 2005.
and control as mentioned in the previous section. However, the capability for rapid response to emerging problems and unified strategic vision of end game would appear to be something that should be evolved as part of a continuing operational feedback loop, and quantitative and academic evaluation. Such an interagency and academia effort could form the basis of better capabilities for the USG to deal with crisis management and long-term planning for future threats.

Goldwater-Nichols for the interagency is not the correct analogy. Differences between civilian agencies’ missions and SOPs are much greater than differences between military services. As the USG goes forward in a review effort it will need to assess start-up costs of each option listed below (and others that may come from starting this process), and pick one that is economically supportable as well as operational viable. Some general observations to frame such an analytical effort include:

- If governments should be civilian-lead, then civilians should be helping other civilians, not the military
- Based on the experience of PRTs, local leaders don’t want to deal with the military regarding civilian issues (from USIP PRT panel)
- USAID: “the best scenario [for addressing coordination of ministerial capacity development] would be for a single organization to receive all funding for the capacity development with the head of that organization named as the one U.S. government official responsible for U.S. capacity development efforts”

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78 Ibid. . .
79 Ibid. . .
80 SIGIR-06-045. , vi.
SIGIR: “A number of U.S. government organizations have implemented capacity-development initiatives within Iraq’s executive institutions and key ministries, but most on-going activities are internally driven and responsive to agency direction rather than part of an overarching plan for a unified comprehensive U.S. capacity-development effort. Thus, we could not determine the relevance and impact of these individual activities. This problem occurs because no one office or person is clearly in charge of the overall U.S. capacity-development effort. Without clear lines of authority and responsibility and a plan that details U.S. goals, objectives, and responsibilities, it will be difficult for the myriad of organizations involved to coordinate and prioritize activities.”

Some possible, but not exclusive, options for long-term organizational reform for partnership capacity building include:

- **Option #1**: Super-State. S/CRS through State Department, the diplomatic arm of USG takes on the primary leadership responsibilities
  - Commit to S/CRS and the idea that the State Dept. should be in control long term (Defense Science Board reached same conclusion in 2004 summer study)
  - Sec State needs to actively take on NSPD-44
    - S/CRS as it exists now can only field small teams as part of multi-national missions

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81 SIGIR-06-045, 8.
82 Defense Science Board, 2004: “[The] Department of State needs to develop, maintain, and execute a portfolio of plans and capabilities for the civilian roles in reconstruction operations.”
• Give S/CRS ability to coordinate with field offices and embassies\textsuperscript{84}

• Make head of S/CRS an ambassador-at-large\textsuperscript{85}

• Whole of government approach, rely on military for lift\textsuperscript{86}

• Expand personnel capacity - 250\textsuperscript{87} (one triage option although exact personnel requirements could not be analyzed without the scenario exercising of the new doctrine)

• Expand budgets, resources, authorities
  a. S/CRS currently has authority to coordinate but not direct R&S operations
  b. In 2006/7 S/CRS and JFCOM held series of experiments and exercises to work out processes. Continue these efforts but tie them to a formal interagency gaming process. USIP could serve as the facilitator of such a series of games because of its unique relationship with the various USG departments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations.
  c. Precedents: JITF – counter drug efforts; National Wildfire Coordination Group \(
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\) authorities and directives for both initiatives from senior leadership, commitment by all

\textsuperscript{83} Kelly, et al, . . 2007, 62.
\textsuperscript{84} Defense Science Board, 2004, 61: “State’s new office for stabilization and reconstruction should provide a locus for individuals who have the time and expertise to engage in such planning, and a link to the policy makers who will ultimately have to implement the plans.”
\textsuperscript{85} CRS Report RL32862.
\textsuperscript{86} Defense Science Board, 2004, 65.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid, 65.
stakeholders, resources for training and personnel made available
d. S/CRS has yet to be given authority for an R&S mission, the longer the USG waits to try them out, the more likely it is that they will never assume the role and other agencies will reject their leadership\textsuperscript{88}

- **Option #2**: Super-USAID
  
  - Elevate USAID to cabinet-level office
  
  - PRT experience does not translate to development experience outside of Iraq and Afghanistan
  
  - Perhaps we need a new breed of development professional? – prepared to do development in conflict environments?\textsuperscript{89}
  
  - USAID should lead MCD, most other agencies should be rightly domestically focused because it is, not in their jurisdictions to stand up ministries abroad USAID should remain under State. Capability would have to be enhanced because right now the agency does not have the capacity to surge.\textsuperscript{90}

- **Option #3**: Build planning/implementation capacity within NSC
  
  - Defense Science Board, Summer 2004, studying interagency and transition to and from hostilities, recommends this approach\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{88} Interview, Nora Bensahel, 14 April 2008.
\textsuperscript{89} Interview, Elisabeth Kvitashvili, 11 December 2007.
\textsuperscript{90} Interview, Ambassador Jim Dobbins, 13 February 2008.
\textsuperscript{91} Defense Science Board, 2004: “A new coordination and integration mechanism is needed. We envision the creation of Contingency Planning and Integration Task Forces – full-time, sustained activities, established by the President or the National Security Council, for countries where the risk of U.S. intervention is high. The task forces would direct a robust planning process and
- PDD 56 placed responsibility with the NSC during Clinton administration

- Importance of organizational essence and mission, specific aspects of government need to be nurtured/mentored within base organizations and led from the higher executive level.\(^{92}\)

- Keep the expertise in its incubators? Do not dilute it by moving it out of parent USG organizations Avoid the “single-agency” model because of the only slim possibility that it could adequately account for full spectrum of skills necessary in a post-conflict environment\(^{93}\)

- **Option #4** – Build a United States Trade Representative (USTR)-like organization\(^{94}\)
  
  - Stuart Bowen the Special Inspector General for Iraq is a big supporter of this option.
  
  - Funding arrangements would have to be determined by type of solution or the by the operational mandate.

These options would need to be gamed in a scenario play by applying the new stability operations doctrine for the USG that is being developed by USIP and PKSOI.

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\(^{92}\) Interview, Terry Bartlett, 30 January 2008.

\(^{93}\) Kelly et al., 2007, 59.

\(^{94}\) This option was suggested during an interview with General Bill Olsen, SIGIR, February ??, 2008.
Long-long term:

The USG needs to invest in a new cadre of civil servants who are truly National Security officers. This should be tied to military officer management reform and should include a National Security Professional Development Plan supported by a National Interagency Training and Readiness Center. As Jeb Nadaner observed, “civilians don’t understand what it means to ‘come’ to the fight.” The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) cannot handle numbers of people who will need training, which raises the potential need to stand up a new federally funded school for interagency professional advancement. In addition, no career path in government service rewards swings in assignments. Service in extraordinary circumstances and service under other departments should be an executive development requirement, and like the Joint Service mandates of Goldwater-Nichols, these could and should be the type of standard experiences of all senior USG officials both civilian and military. Military and civil servant promotion should be at least partially based on interagency bona fides, as these are important for understanding different systems, SOPs, communication hierarchies etc., and also building local relationships to rely on in contingency situations. These options are going to require a fluid personnel management system that allows movement across government in order to scale up national and interagency skills.

Almost as important is the reorientation of interagency and USG culture. Individual agencies must cease to optimize their own capabilities at expense of whole government capability. The USG lacks a self-image as an interagency team functioning together a various

96 In a 2004 study the Defense Science Board recommend “a national center for contingency support. A federally funded research and development center with country and functional expertise that would support the contingency planning and integration task forces and the joint interagency task forces. The center would augment skills and expertise of the government task forces, provide a broad range of in-depth capability, support the planning process, and provide the necessary continuity.”

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levels. USG departments view each other as competitors and no organizational or personal incentives exist to participate in R&S operations? These cultural roadblocks must be addressed through dialogue and education. While changing culture and educating leaders the USG must also educate Congressional members and staff because Congress will have to be the primary agent of change to address USG gaps. Defense Science Board recommends new kinds of flexible contracts for State and USAID to activate on short notice. This is the type of change that will require the full cooperation of Congress to provide for flexibility and a weakening of the firewalls between money and functions.

Conclusion:

The new administration that enters office in January 2009 must resist the tendency that bad experiences encourage “never again” mentality (e.g., Vietnam, Korea, Somalia, etc.). It is important that the new leadership acknowledge the reality of failing and failed states and the requirement of the USG to participate in post-conflict operations. Taking on these challenges will initially offer more questions that answers:

- What are the capabilities necessary for R&S operations?
- What specifically is the USG missing in terms of processes, procedures, organization, and resources?
- Is the funding and contingency personal in the right agencies?
- What is the appropriate doctrine, and what are the correct security SOPs for non-military in R&S environments?
- Do we have the capabilities but lack mission control structure?

• How do we balance the gap between traditional roles and current needs?

These are hard and complex questions but they must be addressed head on by the leaders of the USG because history shows that we will in fact have to address these challenges again, and most likely in the very near future.
APPENDIX A: UNGOVERNED AREAS

Ungoverned Areas: (These definitions came from working discussion in 2005-6 between Colonel Cosentino and other personnel in the Office of Secretary of Defense-Policy Planning. They are not accepted joint or Army doctrinal terms but serve as a good working set of definitions)

Physical ungoverned areas (of territory) and non-physical exploitable areas (of activity): Areas where states exert limited influence, thereby producing conditions that allow transnational terrorist or criminal networks to operate with anonymity or impunity

Conditions of limited state influence may result from:

Inadequate governance capacity: The inability of the state to exercise effective authority stemming from gaps in:

- National security capabilities
- Capabilities related to justice and law
- Administrative capabilities and economic resources
- Characteristics of political institutions and civil society

Inadequate political will: The lack of government resolve to expend resources and political capital needed to exercise effective authority

Legal and normative constraints: Limits on governing authority created by laws and principles

Ungoverned and exploitable areas have physical and non-physical dimensions:

Ungoverned territories: Rugged, remote, maritime, or littoral areas not effectively governed by a sovereign state (e.g., Afghanistan/Pakistan border, Saudi/Yemen border)
**Competing governance:** A sovereign state’s inability or unwillingness to exercise authority over part or whole of a country, e.g.,

Situations in which *incapacity* or, in extreme cases, *government collapse* has allowed actors that potentially threaten domestic or international order to fill the governance void by controlling territory or providing basic governance functions (e.g., Somalia, Philippines)

Conditions where a government has made the political decision to relinquish authority over territory or the provision of essential functions (e.g., education, health) to actors that potentially threaten domestic or international order (e.g., Egypt, Palestinian Authority, Lebanon)

**Exploitation of legal principles:** Areas in which legal norms and processes can be exploited by actors that potentially threaten domestic or international order (e.g., speech and assembly rights, immigration and asylum laws).

**Opaque areas of activity:** Areas created by the inability of a government to monitor or control certain illicit or facilitating transactions when they are conducted in a certain way (e.g., within cyber or financial systems)
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