NATION-BUILDING EXPOSES TWO NATIONAL SECURITY HOLES IN THE WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT

BY

COMMANDER CHARLES E. BOWERS
United States Navy
Civil Engineer Corps

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2009

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050
The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.
The recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest the United States is much more adept at winning wars than it is at winning the peace. This problem is a double edged sword, because the same capabilities required to establish the conditions for a sustainable peace post-conflict are also typically required for pre-conflict engagements intended to prevent conflict. The urgency of this dilemma is compounded by the fact that while our world has and continues to grow more interconnected since the end of the Cold War, the frequency of United States stability operations has increased to roughly one new nation-building commitment every other year. Moreover, since the events of 9/11 demonstrated that instability anywhere can be a real threat to American vital interests, it follows that “ensuring the existence of stability everywhere … becomes a national-security imperative.” This paper suggests that a lack of soft power resources and poor integration of soft power and hard power are the two principal problems plaguing the United States' foreign engagement. Having identified the principal problems it outlines viable solutions for these issues.
NATION-BUILDING EXPOSES TWO NATIONAL SECURITY HOLES IN THE WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT

by

Commander Charles E. Bowers
United States Navy
Civil Engineer Corps

Colonel Richard Megahan
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Commander Charles E. Bowers

TITLE: Nation-Building Exposes Two National Security Holes in the Whole of Government

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 23 March 2009     WORD COUNT: 7445     PAGES: 42

KEY TERMS: Reform, Organization, Alignment, Integration, Goldwater-Nichols, Reconstruction and Stabilization

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest the United States is much more adept at winning wars than it is at winning the peace. This problem is a double edged sword, because the same capabilities required to establish the conditions for a sustainable peace post-conflict are also typically required for pre-conflict engagements intended to prevent conflict. The urgency of this dilemma is compounded by the fact that while our world has and continues to grow more interconnected since the end of the Cold War, the frequency of United States stability operations has increased to roughly one new nation-building commitment every other year. Moreover, since the events of 9/11 demonstrated that instability anywhere can be a real threat to American vital interests, it follows that “ensuring the existence of stability everywhere … becomes a national-security imperative.” This paper suggests that a lack of soft power resources and poor integration of soft power and hard power are the two principal problems plaguing the United States’ foreign engagement. Having identified the principal problems it outlines viable solutions for these issues.
In the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, one of the most important lessons relearned is that military success is not sufficient. These so-called soft capabilities along with military power are indispensable to any lasting success, indeed, to victory itself as Clausewitz understood it, which is achieving a political objective.

—Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense

The recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest the United States is much more adept at winning wars than it is at winning the peace. This problem is a double-edged sword, because the same capabilities required to establish the conditions for a sustainable peace post-conflict are also typically required for pre-conflict engagements intended to prevent conflict. The urgency of this dilemma is compounded by the fact that while our world has and continues to grow more interconnected since the end of the Cold War, the frequency of United States stability operations has increased to roughly one new nation-building commitment every other year. Moreover, since the events of 9/11 demonstrated that instability anywhere can be a real threat to American vital interests, it follows that “ensuring the existence of stability everywhere ... becomes a national-security imperative.” This paper suggests that a lack of soft power resources and poor integration of soft power and hard power are the two principal problems plaguing the United States’ foreign engagement. Having identified the principal problems it outlines viable solutions for these issues.

While the different names like Stability Operations used by the Department of Defense, Reconstruction and Stabilization used by the Department of State and nation-building generally used by academia reflect different nuances in focus and approach,
nation-building is by and large defined by the debut speech of its greatest success, the Marshall Plan, delivered at Harvard University in 1947. “Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.” The success of the Marshall Plan and the reconstruction of Japan make them the benchmark by which most all nation-building efforts are measured and the marketing tool used to harvest the massive support required of a nation-building effort.

Likely rooted in an isolationist disposition that dates at least to George Washington’s counsel in his presidential farewell address, “against the insidious wiles of foreign influence,” American’s commitment to nation-building has vacillated almost from its 1947 debut. “In America, we look at the world from two powerfully opposed angles of vision. We are either ‘engaged’ or ‘isolationist.’” The engaged side, like Wilson, Marshal, and Truman, believes we can use our military, diplomatic, and economic capabilities to make world conditions better and shape the environment to prevent conflicts. The isolationists see foreign affairs beyond our control.

Despite this debate and its lineage to the very birth of the country, the trends in today’s world are clear. The frequency of engagements is increasing dramatically. During the Cold War “between 1945 and 1989, the United States launched a new military intervention about once per decade. With the end of the Cold War, the United States suddenly found itself leading a new multinational military intervention nearly every other year” Recent events like globalization and the tragic events of 9/11 imply that this increased frequency of engagements is most likely the norm for the foreseeable future. “Before 9/11 the United States felt it could safely ignore chaos in a
far-off place like Afghanistan; but the intersection of religious terrorism and weapons of mass destruction has meant that formerly peripheral areas are now of central concern.” Collectively “failing and post-conflict states pose one of the greatest national and international security challenges of our day, threatening vulnerable populations, their neighbors, our allies, and ourselves.”

In fact despite appearances Iraq was the seventh not the first nation-building mission the United States had assumed in little more than a decade.

In 1991, the United States liberated Kuwait. In 1992, U.S. troops went into Somalia, in 1994 into Haiti, in 1995 into Bosnia, in 1999 into Kosovo, and in 2001 into Afghanistan. Six of these seven societies were Muslim. Thus, by the time U.S. troops entered Iraq, no country in the world had more modern experience in nation-building than the United States. No Western military had more extensive recent practice operating within Muslim societies.

The Nature of Contemporary War

If trends so clearly predicted future nation-building operations and with this amount of experience, then how can such resounding military victories in Iraq and Afghanistan be allowed to slip into a deadly insurgency? A misread of American power provides a partial answer. With no peer competitor the United States military is well suited to institute regime change and provide post-conflict security. Yet particularly when regime change is martially imposed this unmatched advantage can work against the United States in post-conflict operations. “It seems that the more swift and bloodless the military victory, the more difficult postconflict stabilization can be.” When contrasted with the total war of WWII, the fall of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’thist regime in Iraq and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan were relatively swift and bloodless.
However, the total war waged with Germany and Japan concluded with a convincing defeat that removed any further will to resist, and greatly facilitated the rebuilding effort.

A corollary misunderstanding that derives from the absence of total war is the different nature of today’s small conflict than that of total war of WWII. Given the United State’s preeminence in traditional forms of warfare, it will not likely confront a peer competitor\textsuperscript{16} or engage in total war that totally defeats an adversary. Without total war and total defeat today’s battlefield is in the hearts and minds as much or more than the traditional landscape of military maneuvers. Absent total war and total defeat, battles over ideas and ideology matter as much or more than military might. “In the short term, we shall have to wear down the enemy’s forces; in the longer term, we shall have to wear down the appeal of his ideas.”\textsuperscript{17}

The absence of total war however, does not imply that conflict is now easier to manage. To the contrary in several respects its nebulous nature makes strategy formulation much more difficult. Arguably target selection in a war of hearts and minds is more difficult than for kinetic operations. Policy objectives are usually broad generalities like establishing self-sustaining representative governments, which are “unimpeachable as ideals but of little use in determining the specific objective we are likely to pursue.”\textsuperscript{18} In any warfare, but particularly in this realm military victory cannot be mistaken for achieving the political end.\textsuperscript{19}

Some postulate that beyond an increase in the number of small wars from the past, 9/11 marked the end of an era\textsuperscript{20} and the emergence of an entirely new form of hybrid war with “no distinction between what is or is not the battlefield. All traditional domains, (ground, seas, air, and outer space) as well as politics, economics, culture,
and moral factors are to be considered battlefields." As technology brings us closer together, the lines between the previously distinct domains of politics, economics, the military, culture, diplomacy, and religion blur. "Unfamiliar to policy makers and military planners, this new era has its own mode of conflict that makes conventional thinkers uncomfortable. This hybrid form of war, "as Mao suggested long ago, has several constituent components, and overwhelming military power by itself is insufficient to serve our strategic interests."23

Regardless if today's environment is a new era with a new form of war, or if it merely represents a surge in smaller conflicts of the past "the sine qua non of victory in modern war is the unconditional support of a population,"24 and requires something more than pure military might. Some form of nation-building is required to replace that which has been deposed by military action to provide for "a better peace—even if only from your own point of view."25 If military action is to achieve its objectives it cannot leave behind a breeding ground for the globally destabilizing forces like terrorism that it was intended to address. "In today's confrontations, warfighting and peacekeeping cannot be separated. They melt into one another, and the conduct of each determines the success of the other."26 In the future nations must combine all the resources at their disposal including information, financial trade and others.27

Two Holes in the Whole of Government

This perspective on the contemporary world highlights two major national security problems. The first is a lack of other than military capacity for foreign affairs — commonly called soft power — and the second is a lack of integration between all the elements of national power.28 Again from Marshal's debut of nation-building its purpose
is to “permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions

ca can exist.”\textsuperscript{29}

\textit{Soft Power Went AWOL}. Stability requires pluralism and reintegration. To

prevent or retard an insurgency requires good governance born from skillful and

thorough support of social and civil systems. With a rigid hierarchical organization,

militaries in general are not pluralistic by nature and with their focus on power

projection; civil and social systems are not a core military competency. Nation-building

requires …

specialists in the country/foreign policy, transitional security/policing, rule

of law, governance, economic stabilization, administration and logistics,

communications, education, health strategic communications, migration

and internally displaced persons infrastructure, urban planning, finance

and banding, diplomatic security, and legal issues,\textsuperscript{30}

… which typically reside as support functions in small numbers inside the

Department of Defense.\textsuperscript{31} Being outside the military's core competency and beyond the

military's limited organic capacity to do these functions the military is vested in the

theory that nation-building resides in someone else’s domain.

There is no question that the military has a role in nation-building efforts, but the

label of “stability operations” used by the military, provides insight to the limits of that

role. Consistent with its core competency of power projection, the military provides the

breathing space needed for stable self governance to mature. Particularly for post-

conflict nations, “the higher the proportion of stabilizing troops, the lower the number of

casualties suffered and inflicted.”\textsuperscript{32} In fact an inverse correlation between force levels

and risk can be seen where, “most adequately manned postconflict operations suffered

no casualties.”\textsuperscript{33}
The military sets the conditions to win but, when militaries are asked to go beyond providing security and mentor troubled nations through reintegration to good governance they are often caught between the two missions. It is no accident that civilian police force training procedures are different than military training and it is unrealistic to expect the military to train a foreign police force in the nuances of civil law and order, much less any of the other functions above that are required by civil society. This mismatch can be both the cause of and a constraint for dealing with an insurgency. The danger is that in the struggle over hearts and minds of the people, the threat to security forces drives them “to take short cuts and coerce rather than to persuade.”

A military’s use of force to provide security can create a sense of political crisis that erodes the legitimacy of the overall effort. Furthermore, there are compelling reasons for the military to stick to its core competency. While it is debatable if nation-building and conventional war fighting skills are mutually exclusive it is rather intuitive that developing skills in one will lead to neglect of the other. The military cannot be allowed to become so fixated on nation-building that it’s conventional war fighting skills diminish.

Because the military is an imperfect fit for nation-building, it is widely accepted that at the conclusion of major combat operations the responsibility for using political, diplomatic, and economic tools necessary to achieve political goals passes to civilian agencies and the international community and the military should transition to a support role of providing security. However, the reality is that with by far the greatest number of personnel on the ground at a conflict’s conclusion it is difficult for the military to avoid retaining many of these responsibilities. It is particularly difficult when the capacity
does not exist elsewhere. Much of the United States capacity required to develop the social and civil systems of a nascent government only resides in departments or agencies intended to serve the domestic population, like the expertise in the Department of Treasury, which would support reconstruction of a monetary system. Most organizations other than the Department of Defense and the Department of State do not have an expeditionary capacity to address foreign issues, and a long draw down of civilian agencies with an explicit nation-building mission, like the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), have left them with insufficient “resources to implement proactive security engagement activities worldwide.” Despite recent and projected future expansion in civilian agencies associated with nation-building, including the Department of State, USAID and the Central Intelligence Agency, their combined total number of personnel is dwarfed by the 90,000 personnel the Army and the Marine Corps are projected to add in the next several years.

As Sun Tzu suggested, when a powerful nation deprives itself of a balanced toolkit of statecraft it condemns itself to using its military instrument unnecessarily and to excess. Whether caused by or the result of the United States’ diplomatic atrophy, the result is that the Department of Defense has filled the void. Through the 1990’s as Goldwater-Nichols matured the Clinton administration tasked regional combatant commanders to use multilateral approaches and shape their regions in ways that went beyond the traditional military role. Largely a modern day Proconsul, the Department of Defense’s regional combatant commanders have became the chief conduit of American foreign policy and are perceived by states and other actors to hold a position...
of preeminence, as the most influential United States government regional representative.  

“The result, as experienced in Iraq, is that the United States has relied on its military to carry out diplomatic, foreign assistance, stabilization, reconstruction, and governance activities for which the military instrument is ill-suited and ill-trained.”

A Rift in the Whole of Government. “The thought that diplomats should be in charge of activities during peace and generals and admirals in charge of military operations is commonly accepted; who is in charge when operations require a delicate balance of civil and military activities is unclear and much disputed.”

Nation-building falls in the white space between war and peace and as such is orphaned by the Departments of State and Defense as well as the host of other agencies and departments involved in the conduct of foreign relations. Beyond mere perception, this distinction is codified in U.S. law. Title 22 of U.S. Code gives the Chief of Mission responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country (except for … employees under the command of a United States area military commander).

Excluding the military from Chief of Mission purview is part of a broad and rigid Title 10 reservation of authority exclusively for the president to direct the military. Under title 10 of U.S. Code “A function, power, or duty vested in the Department of Defense, or an officer, official, or agency thereof, by law may not be substantially transferred, reassigned, consolidated, or abolished.”

The National Security Act of 1947 construct was designed to and with minor revisions has become efficient at developing and disseminating policy. Its shortfall arises when decisions are required on how presidential policy should be implemented.
Two agents acting in good faith can have vastly divergent views over what actions are necessary to implement policy directives and by law only the President has the authority to align different execution strategies. Under the 1947 construct, the National Security Council provides direction through policy, but it cannot resolve divergent interpretations of the policy. Once policy is pushed to execution it enters stove pipes where it is sub-optimized. Each department and agency does their best but no one maintains visibility of the whole.

The magnitude of this problem is often discounted by nebulous statements that suggest that the interagency is the forum to resolve differing perspectives. The problem with this notion is that the interagency is a concept not an entity. “The ‘interagency’ is not a person, place, or thing. It is not part of the Government; it has no leader, nor does it have a workforce.” Assuming that opposing views are not so disparate to preclude consensus, differences can be resolved through interagency coordination, but problems can’t be forwarded to the interagency for adjudication.

This lack of execution unity is devastating to nation-building.

Successful nation building requires unity of effort across multiple agencies and often multiple governments. Structures for making and implementing decisions thus need to provide for a combination of common effort and unified direction. The entire national-security establishment needs to be engaged.

Aligning of diverse agencies and departments into a unified effort is a multidimensional challenge. It requires vertical alignment to facilitate the rapid deployment of strategy from the top “down to the ground where it can do some good.” “When vertical alignment is reached employees understand organization-wide goals and their role in achieving them.” It also requires a horizontal component that puts process in place that support mission. This requires 1) clearly stated policy objectives
that viscerally support the desired end and 2) end to end processes that span departmental boundaries. “Horizontal alignment infuses the [mission] into everything the organization does.”

Currently the United States government is not aligned to provide a unified nation-building effort. Foreign policy programs are spread across no less than thirty departments and agencies with no coordination of funding, policy, authorities, or areas of responsibility except at the presidential level.

Expedient Patches on the Two Holes in the Whole of Government

As outlined nation-building is an increasingly repetitive requirement that needs to be more replicable, in its execution and employment of a whole of government approach. While the growing militarization of foreign policy and the lack of integrated effort have been exposed by numerous international incidents over the several decades, the past seven years in Iraq and Afghanistan has served as a catalyst for some action.

Nation-Building in the Department of State. There are several efforts that have been initiated primarily in the Department of State domain. Reflecting a consensus between the Executive Branch, Congress and independent experts that the United States needs a more robust capability outside the military to enhance the nation's institutional capacity to respond to crises involving failing, failed, and post-conflict states and complex emergencies, Congress authorized the reprogramming of funds to create the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in July 2004. Acknowledging the need for a balanced approach to American foreign policy the S/CRS core mission is to grow “civilian capacity to prevent or prepare
for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies, … so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.”

To organize reconstruction and stabilization framework, the Bush administration issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) – *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization* in December 2005, which superseded Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 56 of 20 May 1997, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*. By assigning the Secretary of State responsibility for reconstruction and stabilization that includes interagency strategy and budget coordination it reinstated civilian leadership that in a break with tradition had been delegated to the military by NSPD-24. It also officially established a functional National Security Council Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations. The short fall of NSPD-44 is “that an agency responsible for one of the instruments of power should not be responsible for integrating the efforts of all the others.” Additionally, it does not substantively change the authorities of the Department of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency require to issue meaningful direction.

Pursuant its charter S/CRS created the National Security Council Interagency Management System to fill the mandates of NSPD 44. It is designed to ensure unity of effort through a whole-of-government strategic planning and implementation planning for reconstruction and stabilization operations. However it is a reactive “response mechanism” intended only for highly complex crises and operations that are national security priorities, but not political and humanitarian crises. Activated only for complex reconstruction and stabilization crises the Interagency Management System does not
have a standing organization that enables processes and relationships to mature through exercise. Seemingly built by compromise it is “designed to support and augment, not replace, existing structures in Washington, at the GCC [Geographic Combatant Commander], and in the field.”\textsuperscript{69} It does contain directive authority necessary to align all United States agencies and departments with disparate functions and missions except for the Department of Defense\textsuperscript{70} which must be aligned through direction of the special Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) labeled the Country Reconstruction & Stabilization Group. Typically the biggest player in a reconstruction and stabilization operations, the Department of Defense is a big exception that questions the Interagency Management System’s capacity to ensure unity of effort across the whole-of-government. Acknowledging the need for tight civilian and military alignment the Interagency Management System (IMS) prescribes that the Country Reconstruction & Stabilization Group designate lead roles between civilian and military components at the country level and outlines when those roles should reverse,\textsuperscript{71} but dilutes the lead element authority for all agencies and departments with the caveat that it in “no way alters any officer’s right and duty to remain in communication with his/her parent agency … and to appeal to more senior parent agency representatives when necessary.”\textsuperscript{72} “If true integration only occurs at the national level, execution at the regional or local levels could be fraught with problems, as the agencies representing the instruments of power are organized differently and there is no directive authority for implementation at the regional level.”\textsuperscript{73}

To build civilian capacity S/CRS created the Civilian Response Corps (CRC), which was funded $75 million in initial funding for the Active and Standby components in
the 2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act.\textsuperscript{74} Given the broad range of expertise to restore stability and the rule of law, quickly stimulate economic recovery and sustainable growth in fragile states, the Civilian Response Corps is an interagency partnership of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice and Treasury.

Specifically developed for nation-building the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and its Civilian Response Corps may represent the future of nation-building inside American foreign policy, but with current funding and given the short time to mature its mission it does not currently offer a viable means to pursue nation-building. The vision for the CRC likely needs to expand beyond an expeditionary jack of all trades nation-building force in Department of State to developing expeditionary capacity in the other departments and agencies that have practitioner level expertise in the complex social and cultural task associated with nation-building.

Collectively S/CRS, NSPD-44, IMS and CRC take a step in the right direction, but fall short of the desired effect.\textsuperscript{75} They do not contain the authorities to align resourcing in a unified manner or provide operation direction.

\textit{Nation-Building in the Department of Defense.} A second initiative aimed at improving integration and augmenting the lack of United States capacity for nation-building is the incorporation of personnel from other departments and agencies into the newest geographic combatant command, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM).

“AFRICOM is pioneering a new way for a Unified Command to fulfill its role in
supporting the security interests of our nation. From inception, AFRICOM was intended to be a different kind of command designed to address the changing security challenges confronting the United States in the 21st Century.” More than mere advisors, AFRICOM is integrating interagency personnel into its structure as fully fledged staff members to better support “initiatives led by civilian Departments and Agencies, such as the Department of State and the USAID.

This is a natural step for combatant commands, with the standing charge issued in the 1990’s to shape the environment or their area of responsibility, but not having the social, political and economic competency in their organization to do so. The blank slate of a new command was probably the missing catalyst for incorporating interagency personnel into the geographic combatant command structure that will likely be a prototype for the other established geographic commands.

Although the intent of USAFRICOM is encouraging, several — including African nations — are concerned about its unintended consequences. The more the military incorporates personnel for other agencies to work issue from other national power domains into its structure it will increasingly be perceived as the United States foreign affairs conduit. This defines the militarization of foreign policy. It is paradoxical given the intent is to increase soft power, but sending a messenger wearing the uniform of a big stick militarizes foreign policy. Furthermore because AFRICOM’s interagency staff has no directive authority over their parent organization, the AFRICOM construct does not substantively increase integration. Additionally, as previously noted it is an intuitive concern that the military’s focus on soft skills will lead to atrophy of traditional war fighting skills. In AFRICOM’s own words “we remain concerned that, if interagency
capabilities are not better resourced, non-traditional tasks will, out of necessity, default to military elements.\textsuperscript{81}

Substantively Repairing the Holes in the Whole of Government

While the nation-building initiatives in the Department of State and the Department of Defense move nation-building in the right direction the noted short falls suggest opportunity for continued improvement. The following reviews unaddressed areas and recommends means to fill the void.

An orphan between war and peace, many of the United States nation-building limitations are symptoms of a larger systematic problem of a government structure with rigid divisions between departments and agencies. It is not total coincidence that the hallmark of Nation-Building, the Marshal Plan was unveiled the same year as the National Security Act of 1947, which by and large established the national security structure that is still in place today. Born of the same era they share similar pedigree and intent. Both Marshal’s vision of nation-building and the National Security Act of 1947 expected and were designed to address issues one after the other, but not simultaneously\textsuperscript{82}. The National Security Act of 1947 provides “strong functional capabilities but poorly integrates them.”\textsuperscript{83} However, “the security environment of the early 21st century differs significantly from the one the United States national security system was created to manage.”\textsuperscript{84}

A consensus is building that we must “adopt new approaches to national security system design focused on national missions and outcomes, emphasizing integrated effort, collaboration, and agility”\textsuperscript{85} that can seamlessly span military and nonmilitary programs.\textsuperscript{86} “Thus our programs would no longer be disparate and fragmented, we’d be
looking at them in a holistic way. In other words, we would be doing for government what the Goldwater-Nichols Act did for the military. We’d be making government joint.\textsuperscript{67} Several contend that the need for reform is urgent.\textsuperscript{68} The overlap between nation-building capabilities and domestic disaster response adds justification to the argument that broad national security reform is required to address the ails of nation-building. Many of the challenges from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan and several in between mirror the federal government’s difficulty in mustering an integrated response to Hurricane Katrina.\textsuperscript{69}

However, if such a broad approach to fixing nation-building is taken it must be mindful of the maximum attributed to Mark Twain, H.L. Mancken and Peter Drucker “For every complex problem there is a solution that is simple, neat --- and wrong.”\textsuperscript{90} We must remember that the United States government is a complex system refined over years of trial and error. Even small changes in one area could have far reaching unintended consequences.

Although the following proposals reengineer the core coordination and integration mechanisms of the 1947 architecture the “the basic structure of the national security system is not going to change, nor should it.”\textsuperscript{91} Excessive reform in the name of unity of effort risks homogenizing the various United States government departments and agencies “in a way that makes each less effective.”\textsuperscript{92} Additionally as the 1947 National Security Act mostly structures coordination within the executive branch, restructuring does not impinge on any constitutional requirement for separation of power between the executive, judicial and legislative branches of government. In contrast to typical reform proposals that focus on organization and chain of command, the following
recommendations predominantly address process and resource alignment. Unity of effort is achievable without unity of command, but unity of effort cannot be achieved unless the various departments and agencies are aligned by common process and purpose down to the field level.

*Clarifying Policy and Strategy.* The first fundamental recommendation is to improve strategic direction through a more systematic means of developing and publishing policy and strategy. Currently policy and strategy are often nebulous concepts and must be inferred from speeches, isolated executive orders and a host of unintegrated strategy documents. Current legislated mandates for the plethora of strategic guidance documents contains internal conflicts in the reporting frequency, synchronization of various report submissions, overlapping mandates, intended audience and a particularly with respect to fiscal constraints a lack of prioritization between the objectives the strategies prescribe. The current system describes but does not prioritize national security goals and challenges, and it does not direct how the different instruments of national power are to be applied to achieve those goals. A construct is needed to unify “the several mission-specific strategic reviews currently required by statute, such as the quadrennial defense, homeland security, and intelligence reviews.” Proposals range from expropriating Department of Defenses’ Quadrennial Defense Review process to create a Quadrennial National Security review that is more robust and rigorous than the current National Security Strategy, to creating a strategic guidance in a document “— National Security Planning Guidance — that would convey the President’s intent and direction to departments and agencies.”
However, all of these objectives are already mandated in current legislation. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 requires that the National Security Strategy be submitted annually to Congress and not less than 150 days after the President takes office in both classified and unclassified format. It is required to address 1) interests, goals and objectives, 2) capabilities of the United States, 3) short term and long term uses of national power to promote interests, 4) the adequacy of United States capabilities and 5) other necessary information to inform Congress on national security strategy.  

Just submitting the report as required should largely meet the need. “In practice, since the Goldwater-Nichols Act, administrations have submitted national security strategies fairly regularly although not always precisely on schedule.” The solution to this error may simply be to grow “the small portion of the White House staff that advises the president on strategic direction and national security system management.”

Aligning Resource Investments. The second critical reform required is to improve resource management. Assuming sound and cogent policy and strategy, the single best way to align the actions of numerous departments and agencies with policy objectives is the effective allocation of resources. Programs and policies, good or bad die on the vine without funding. Conversely, if available money will be spent on programs and systems whether they support policy objectives or counter it. Tying resourcing to policy development ensures that ends are supported by ways and means. Some argue that looming budget pressures represent the straw that will break the camel’s back and that the current national security resource and budget
management system’s inefficiencies must be addressed to prevent national security failures.\textsuperscript{103}

With over thirty departments and agencies involved in national security, resource allocations must be both sized to the task and aligned to prevent inefficient redundancy and expenditures at cross purpose. This can only be done through a holistic review of the various department and agency budgets in a manner similar to Department of Defense’s, Planning Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) which integrates the budgets of the component services. Only through this type of macro perspective can the balance between hard and soft power be adequately assessed. One recommendation is that the National Security Council and the Office of Management and budget be tasked to jointly review mission areas “for national security priorities that require interagency implementation,”\textsuperscript{104} “in order to ensure that budgets reflect national security priorities.”\textsuperscript{105}

\textit{Human Resource Management}. The third critical reform is improving national security personnel management. Given that people are the greatest resource any organization possesses, it is obvious that management of this resource deserves special attention. The current system is dominated by department and agency cultures that inhibit unified effort.\textsuperscript{106} This makes process alignment virtually impossible with the disparate personnel systems of over thirty departments and agencies.\textsuperscript{107} The lack of a common personnel clearance system demonstrates the inefficiencies of the current system. It not only requires needless administration to redo a security clearance for personnel assigned to interagency duty, but differences in clearance procedures creates artificial firewalls that stifes sharing of valuable information. As with fiscal
resources a macro perspective is needed that can look at government holistically rather than only through its component parts. The United States needs “a unified national security human capital system supports a common culture for national security.”

At a minimum government needs a common framework that promotes interoperability between disparate department and agency cultures, much like the Joint Community created by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Although not new, “recent operational experiences at home and abroad — from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to the responses to Hurricane Katrina” emphasize the need for better interagency integration of effort. Going a bit further than establishing an interagency personnel certification system that merely allows an employee obtain an interagency accreditation is a proposal that national security agencies, working with the Office of Personnel Management and Congress, develop a national security career path that would give career professionals incentives to seek out interagency experience, education, and training.

Centralizing Strategy Development & Decentralizing Operations. The final critical reform is to decentralize issue management away from the President and the National Security council to permit them to focus on policy, strategy and strategic management. The evolution of the Interagency Management System and its component National Security Council Policy Coordination Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization demonstrates that the national security structure for planning is both mature and adaptable. However the same is not true for execution oversight. Currently, “only the president has the authority to integrate across … autonomous agencies, but the president has no effective way to delegate his authority.”
Consequently, issues that require a whole of government response gravitate to the White House, which leads to an unmanageable span of control for the President.\textsuperscript{115} Unity of effort necessitates the centralization of strategy formulation and the simultaneous decentralization of implementation.\textsuperscript{116}

Alignment is a multidimensional problem. As discussed better career field management will improve the horizontal connections in end to end processes that span departments and agencies in a manner that facilitates continual focus on the ultimate policy objective,\textsuperscript{117} but policy and strategy must also be effectively pushed vertically from the top to the implementation level. The National Security Council is good at developing and publishing policy but the message becomes distorted as it filters through the various departments and agencies tasked to implement it. Particularly for foreign affairs as policy implementation moves further away from Washington, regional perspectives become increasingly important and demand that implementation be tailored to accommodate local issues and customs vice being molded by agency missions.

While the first three proposed reforms are critical to aligning government to provide a unity of effort, doing so without decentralizing issue management “might mislead the president’s security advisors to believe they can personally manage the full array of pressing issues, and thereby exacerbate the system’s proclivity for crisis management rather than strategic direction.”\textsuperscript{118} Accordingly, the following outlines three options to decentralize issue management that range progressively from less decentralization and collaboration to more.

The first option to decentralize issue management is to merge the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council into a single President’s Security
Council\textsuperscript{119} that is headed by a super cabinet position “Director of National Security.”\textsuperscript{120} The least aggressive option, it is likely the easiest to implement. This option leverages the similarities of domestic and foreign issues like nation-building and federal emergency response. It also improves the President’s ability to focus on strategic issues by delegating all security issues to a Director of National Security. However, issue management is not moved far from the President. It also does not incorporate the regional perspectives that become increasingly important as policy implementation moves further away from Washington. More importantly the merging the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council into a single council only addresses one dimension of alignment. It does improve vertical alignment, by uniting the message from the top of the two organizations, but does not address the horizontal mission integration of departments and agencies at the regional or local level.

A second option for decentralizing issue management, again borrows from the success that the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 had at integrating the efforts of the component services. Following the Joint combatant command model this proposal would essentially recreate the combatant commands under civilian leadership, potentially with a four star deputy and have regional responsibility for all aspects of national power.\textsuperscript{121} The Interagency Regions would report directly to the president through the National Security Council\textsuperscript{122} or if the first option is adopted through the new Director of National Security with directive authority over everything below the National Security Council including Ambassadors, Country Teams and the military.\textsuperscript{123}
Much like the services are resource providers to the combatant commands, “[i]n this model, departments and agencies are capabilities providers”[^1] for the Interagency Regions. The senior department or agency representative would most likely serve as the department or functional head for functions of the department or agency they represent. In this construct the Combatant Commander would be a deputy to the Interagency Region Chief for military operations. Essentially creating a regional Chief of Mission with authority delegated by the President to direct military operations the construct only changes the authority to integrate the instruments of national power. Much like Goldwater Nichols changed the role of the Service Chiefs of Staff “It would not change Title 10 military administrative command responsibility, which would continue to run from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the senior ranking military officer in the new organization.”[^2]

This option improves the President’s strategic focus by delegating issues through a tiered structure of cascading responsibilities from the strategic to geographic region and to the country level. In doing so it also incorporates the regional perspectives that are critical to policy implementation. The decentralization addresses vertical alignment by unifying the manner that policy and strategic direction is customized to accommodate a particular region. A domestic region could be created that would leverage the similarities between nation-building and federal emergency response. The supporting departments and agencies would be responsible for administrative and process issues and much like the services do today under the joint construct of Goldwater-Nichols would be a forcing mechanism for horizontal alignment[^3] by handling the details of department or agency specific process issues. The other three primary
recommendations of a more systematic approach to strategy development, better strategic fiscal investment and more integrated human capital management provide the muscle to overcome parochial resistance of the supporting departments and agencies. Assuming the Interagency Regions have input to an integrated budget program, if not budget submitting authority, this construct would also force the balance between hard and soft power to a healthy equilibrium.\textsuperscript{127}

The final option for decentralizing issue management draws on the private-sector’s move to horizontal structures in the past several decades\textsuperscript{128} by organizing the national security structure directly by function or issue. Although this proposal exploits private sector innovations more fully, precedence in government ranges from President Eisenhower’s use of cross-functional teams with Project Solarium, to develop the Cold War strategy\textsuperscript{129} to Joint Interagency Task Force-South, which integrates law enforcement, intelligence, and military assets to combat narco-terrorist organizations.\textsuperscript{130}

Despite appearances to the contrary the National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees (PCC) do not have the mandate, resources or culture envisioned by this proposal.\textsuperscript{131} Most notably as discussed earlier the PCCs only addresses integration at the national level.\textsuperscript{132} While sound in concept, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan offer another poor example of functional teams envisioned by this proposal. With poorly a defined mission, poorly defined interagency relationships and insufficient resourcing they have not been able to effectively muster a whole of government capability.\textsuperscript{133}

Essentially a pick up team on an issue by issue basis, this option provides great flexibility and “allows the national security system to apply integrated expertise to end-
to-end issue management,“ as long as the issues that the teams are working do not overlap. With adequate empowerment the team’s composition defines horizontal integration and delegates issue management in an integrated fashion but allows for centralized strategic direction. The same interagency composition also provides good vertical alignment by insulating policy from department or agency interest, by allowing strategic direction to flow within the functional team structure from the president to the local level. Replicable in scale from the national to local echelon they can be formed to be responsive to regional perspectives that are critical to policy implementation. If the fiscal management reform recommendation is adopted programmatic resourcing on an issue basis rather than on departmental and agency equities would be requested by and executed by the functional teams thus would also drive a healthy equilibrium between hard and soft power.

The lack of bureaucratic structure in the functional teams would require sophisticated knowledge management processes that require cutting edge IT support. This may be a bridge too far for an organization as large and complex as the United States federal government. By far the biggest critique of this option is that it is “unwieldy and the easiest to unravel. With so much activity, it is hard for the system to coordinate all its parts.”

**Multiplying National Power Through Alignment**

Amid debate about a new era of small scale wars, irregular wars or even the rise of a new hybrid form of warfare one point clearly comes to the surface. At a current rate of nearly one military intervention every two years, global instability and nation-building are likely to be the norm for the foreseeable future. As the tragedy of 9/11
demonstrated, instability abroad poses one of the greatest security threats to the United States and its allies. However, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that more than military power alone is required to prevail in this era. The danger of continuing to patch the holes in national security is clear. The time to pursue substantive reform is present.

If only to provide the breathing space that allows the application of the other elements of national power, the military will remain a key player, but it cannot be the only player. No amount of transformation inside the military will compensate for the dearth of capacity in agencies like the Department of State. Further those soft power capabilities must be aligned in a unified whole of government with the military if the United States is to protect its security and that of its friends and allies. The United States must be able to project all means of nation power in a manner that produces the social and political stability crucial to its security.

Drawing on the lessons learned from National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), its subordinate institutions and from USAFRICOM, alignment of this magnitude requires reform at least as broad as that of the National Security Act of 1947 to align the thirty or more departments and agencies with foreign policy programs. This reform must clarify the policy generation process so that it produces clearly stated policy objectives that viscerally support the desired end. The reform must align resource investment in a manner that obtains synergy and leverage from competing investments with a long range view across the whole of government in a manner like the Planning, Programming Budgeting and Execution System does for the Department of Defense. This reform must better align human resources holistically rather than through its
component parts to tear down artificial firewalls, which stifle sharing of valuable information. Lastly this reform must centralize strategy development while decentralizing issue management away from the President. Collectively these reforms would do for the whole of government what the Goldwater-Nichols Act did for the military. It would make government joint. 

Endnotes


4 For the purpose of this paper soft power is the exercise of any element of national power in a manner that entices one state to accept another states stance on a given issue. By contrast hard power is the exercise of diplomatic, information, military or economic power in a manner that compels or forces capitulation on one state to another’s will. Colloquially soft power refers to carrots while hard power refers to sticks. Because 1) economic power can as easily be an instrument of hard power through the use of embargos or sanctions as it can be an instrument of soft power through development assistance funding and mutually beneficial trade agreements and 2) because informational power is largely the communiqué of power whether it is a hard or soft message, the terms hard and soft power tend to polarize on the diplomatic and military elements of national power. With the express mission of diplomacy and statecraft, soft power is typically considered the domain of the Department of State, while the use of military force makes the Department of Defense largely synonymous with hard power.


12 Fukuyama, “Nation-Building 101.”


15 James Dobbins et al., *America’s Role in Nation-Building From Germany To Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 2003), 162.


19 Ibid.


21 Ibid.


See also:


29 Marshall, “Harvard University Commencement Address [The Marshal Plan].”


See also:


31 The lack of practitioner level experience in the U.S. military for the skills required to competently perform nation-building tasks is supported by personal experience while serving as the Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Engineer in Mosul, Iraq from July 2006 to December 2006. As a licensed engineer in the state of Virginia, with a master’s degree in urban planning and fourteen years of facility maintenance, construction contracting and contingency construction experience as a US Navy, Civil Engineer Corp Officer I felt uniquely qualified to mentor Iraqi Public Works officials. In particular, my tour on the Chief of Naval Operations Ashore Readiness staff provided insight into the governance aspects of civil infrastructure
management through my work on budget preparation for submission by the executive branch to the legislative. However, my suitability was an anomaly. The Department of State lead PRT was nearly entirely manned by military with little to no experience in the disciplines they were charge with mentoring. As an example the economics branch of the PRT was lead by an enlisted nuclear submariner warrant officer with no background in economics or economic development. I felt the shallowness of nation-building talent on the PRT detracted from my ability to advise my Iraqi counterparts as they developed systems for public works sustainment, restoration and modernization. Although familiar with the fiscal separation between the US executive and legislative branches marked by the legislatives appropriation authority, I was unable to fully apply that knowledge to the parliamentary system under the Iraqi constitution.

Many of the mentoring efforts initiated by my military counterparts further demonstrated a misinterpretation of nature of nation-building. My personal experience with the physical infrastructure reconstruction demonstrated that the military in particular and Americans in general tended to project their American experience and misdiagnose the reconstruction problem as a higher order technical issue with little awareness of the foundational dimensions. Often they tended to pursue technical solutions to problems rooted in governance issues. For example training in sophisticated Geographic Information System database software was a commonly sought as a means to help Iraqi technocrats develop projects based on both technical and pluralistic societal priorities and submit them to the appropriate legislative body for funding. Typically the software was so far advance beyond the maturity of the local industry that it could not be integrated into the existing governmental system. Moreover the technical solution did not address the root problem which was a governance issue. Consequently like a well constructed house on a weak foundation, these and similar efforts did little to develop a transparent and sustained capability to govern, promote increased security and rule of law, foster political and economic development, and provide leadership and competence necessary to meet the basic needs of the population.

32 Dobbins, *America’s Role in Nation-Building From Germany To Iraq*, 165 & 166.

33 Ibid.

34 Townsend, “People’s War,” 191.

35 Bacevich, “The Petraeus Doctrine.”


37 Cabe, “Nation Building: Shedding Its Isolationist Stance.”

38 Buchanan, “Death of the Combatant Command?,” 93.


43 Ibid., 319.


Also see:


50 Personal experience while serving as the Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Engineer in Mosul, Iraq from July 2006 to December 2006, illustrates both lack of nation-building capacity organic to the military and the inefficiencies of that result from poor integration at the field level of interagency efforts. As a Naval Civil Engineer Corp officer I was assigned to duty with the US Army Corp of Engineers Gulf Region North (GRN), but was operationally used by GRN to fill the PRT Engineer job in the Department of State led PRT. Tasked with physical infrastructure reconstruction GRN had little understanding of the PRT’s mentoring mission. With little appreciation for Department of State’s need to teach a man to fish, GRN detracted from the my effectiveness and that of my peers in other provinces by regularly using us in support of its Department of Defense give a man a fish mission.

Personal experience while serving as the Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Engineer in Mosul, Iraq from July 2006 to December 2006, provides an example of suboptimization that results from poor integration at the field level of interagency efforts. The Department of State led PRT’s mission was to mentor institutions to achieve self reliant governance able to provide for the basic needs of the population. Similarly the operational military civil affairs (CA) battalions’ mission focused on the basic needs of the population, but with the purpose of engendering support or at least averting resistance to military operations. Aiming at likely the most basic need in the Middle East the CA battalions frequently constructed water well that served even the most remote locations. However, because the new water wells were constructed outside of the provincial government’s overview they seldom addressed technical and pluralistic societal priorities often detracted from public perceptions of the provincial government’s ability to provide for the basic needs of the population. This unintended consequence was compounded by the fact that the new water wells were not incorporated into the provinces’ sustainment plans and often fell into disrepair. Thus while the CA work served the operational military objectives and met the immediate needs of the population its work often had an adverse effect on the PRT’s success.

Dobbins, “Securing the Peace: Presidents and Nation Building,” 42.


Ibid., 26.

Ibid., 32-34.

Ibid., 109.

Project on National Security Reform, *PNSR Recommendations*, 484.

See also:


See also:


Buchanan, “Death of the Combatant Command?,” 92

See also:


63 *U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Home Page*.


66 Buchanan, “Death of the Combatant Command?,” 93.


69 Ibid., 3. Italic emphasis added by author.

70 Ibid., 15.

See also:

Buchanan, “Death of the Combatant Command?,” 93.


72 Ibid., 18.

73 Buchanan, “Death of the Combatant Command?,” 93.

74 *U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Home Page*.


77 Buchanan, “Death of the Combatant Command?,” 94.
78 United States Africa Command, “AFRICOM Posture Statement.”

79 Penn, “USAFRICOM: The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy?,” 75.

80 Buchanan, “Death of the Combatant Command?,” 94.

81 United States Africa Command, “AFRICOM Posture Statement.”

82 Project on National Security Reform, PNSR Recommendations, ii – iii.

83 Ibid., 221.

84 Ibid., iii.

85 Ibid., ix.


See also:

Project on National Security Reform, PNSR Recommendations, viii.

89 Project on National Security Reform, PNSR Recommendations, ii – iii.


91 U.S Department of State, A Call to Action: The Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, 397.


99 Ibid., 4.

100 Project on National Security Reform, *PNSR Recommendations*, 401.


103 Ibid., vi.


106 Ibid., 260.


Ibid., 181.

115 Ibid.

116 Ibid., x.


118 Project on National Security Reform, *PNSR Recommendations*, 419.

119 Ibid., ix.

120 Ibid., 419.

121 Buchanan, “Death of the Combatant Command?,” 94.

See also

Project on National Security Reform, *PNSR Recommendations*, 434. PNSR Recommendations exclude operational control over military

122 Buchanan, “Death of the Combatant Command?,” 94.

123 Ibid., 95.

See also:


125 Buchanan, “Death of the Combatant Command?,” 95.


130 Ibid., 446.

131 Ibid., 448.

132 Buchanan, “Death of the Combatant Command?,” 93.

134 Ibid., 449.

135 Ibid.

136 Ibid., 456.

137 Ibid., 451.

138 Ibid., 459.