

# **Resourcing the Army National Guard for its Domestic and Federal Missions**

**A Monograph  
by**

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## **Abstract**

Resourcing the Army National Guard for its Domestic and Federal Missions by MAJ Orlando Ortega, Army National Guard, 48 pages.

The National Guard is an integral part of the military's operational force deployed around the world, and a first responder in case of a catastrophic disaster in the United States. The use of the Army National Guard has been evolving over the last decade, but for many of those years it has lacked modern equipment to conduct its federal and domestic missions. The September 11, 2001 attacks initiated the transformation of the Army National Guard for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Over 255,000 National Guardsmen have deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan as part of the Operational Force in support of the Regular Army. The multiple deployments for each contingency have depleted and worn out the Army National Guard, especially its equipment. The shortage of equipment throughout the Army National Guard has impacted its abilities to respond to domestic missions. While the Army National Guard augments the Regular Army, non-deployed units continue to execute their domestic missions in Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, and Civil Support. The response to Hurricane Katrina sparked renewed debate over the National Guard's domestic and federal missions and its equipment shortages. Hurricane Katrina made it evident the past several years that the Army National Guard's response to domestic missions has been hampered by the lack of proper equipment and the condition of equipment it has on hand.

This paper explores the complexity of defining the National Guard's domestic and federal missions. Furthermore, it provides the background of equipment shortages found throughout the National Guard. The research reveals how the Army Force Generation model provides predictability for guardsmen about their potential deployment schedule; however, the model does not take into account the Army National Guard's domestic mission. The way forward for the Army National Guard to improve its execution of federal and domestic mission is the integration of dual-use equipment. This addition of dual-use equipment sets would increase the readiness posture of the Army National Guard. Finally, this paper provides recommendations on the future readiness of the Army National Guard to execute its dual missions.

The National Guard's dual missions need to be refined clearly to articulate roles and responsibilities because there are several interpretations as what an Operational Force should be and how it should be resourced. In addition, the difficulty for the Army National Guard to delineate between Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, and support to Civil Authorities missions is complicated. Therefore, resourcing the Army National Guard to execute these missions will strengthen our nation's defenses at home and abroad.

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## Introduction

*The dual status National Guard, with both a state and federal mission, lacks the necessary equipment and other resources necessary to fulfill the assigned tasks. A critical issue that may be lost in the discussion is the lack of resources for the Guard, and the Reserve, and diminution of readiness as they return to their states and local communities from Iraq and Afghanistan.*

Melvin Laird, former Secretary of Defense, May 2007<sup>1</sup>

Over the past 370 years, the organized militia evolved into the modern United States Army National Guard (ARNG) and it has performed a vital role in the nation's defense. At home and abroad, the ARNG now provides ready and capable forces that perform full-spectrum operations in support of America's civil and military leadership.<sup>2</sup> Since 1636, citizen-soldiers have existed to protect life, property, and preserve the peace and order of the American people.<sup>3</sup> The ARNG has played an important role in situations when the country mobilized and expanded the Army in a very short time, including World War I, World War II, and the Korean War.

When President Woodrow Wilson signed the National Defense Act of 1916, he made the National Guard a permanent reserve force to the Regular Army. The National Guard could then be ordered into active federal service by the President whenever Congress declared a national emergency.<sup>4</sup> While the National Defense Act of 1916 made official the term "National Guard," it also potentially left states without their principal means of responding to natural disasters, suppressing riots, and assisting local law enforcement when the National Guard was performing

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<sup>1</sup> Sean E. Duggan, and Lawrence J. Korb. *Caught Off Guard: The Link Between Our National Security and Our National Guard*. Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2007.

<sup>2</sup> Association of the United State Army, "The Rebalance of the Army National Guard," *AUSA.ORG*, January 31, 2008. [www.ausa.org](http://www.ausa.org) (accessed December 18, 2008).

<sup>3</sup> Michael D. Doubler. *I am the Guard: A Histroy of the Army National Guard, 1636-2000*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), xviii.

<sup>4</sup> Army National Guard, "Constitutional Charter of the Guard," National Guard, <http://www.arng.army.mil/constitution.aspx> (accessed January 10, 2009).

its federal missions.<sup>5</sup> At the time, Congress did not envision the National Guard being called upon as frequently as it is today as part of Total Force, to achieve the National Military Strategy.

In the aftermath of the Vietnam War the Total Force policy was created to use the Regular Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve to fight the nation's future wars. The policy was proposed by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in 1972. General Creighton Abrams, the Chief of Staff of the Army at the time, used this policy to structure the military in such a way as to prevent the President from going to war without calling up the reserve components. Politically, calling up the Reserve components would require the support of the American people.<sup>6</sup>

Under President George W. Bush's administration, the United States mobilized the largest ARNG force for overseas deployment since World War II.<sup>7</sup> Since September 2001, over 255,000 National Guardsmen have deployed in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. More than 84,000 guardsmen have experienced multiple deployments.<sup>8</sup> Because of the increased regularity of deployments in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), peace keeping operations, and the resulting lack of equipment throughout the National Guard, the readiness of the ARNG has been compromised. The heavy reliance on the National Guard to provide fully manned and equipped units to conduct multiple missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan has created a shortage of equipment throughout the ARNG. This has also degraded the ARNG's ability to execute its federal mission and domestic Civil Support mission.

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<sup>5</sup> Barry M. Stentiford. *The American Home Guard: The State Militia in the 20th Century*. (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 22.

<sup>6</sup> Barry M. Stentiford. *The American Home Guard: The State Militia in the 20th Century*. (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 214-215.

<sup>7</sup> David M. Walker, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, *Reserve Force: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reexamined*, October 20, 2005, GAO-06-170T, 1.

<sup>8</sup> Congressional Research Service, *National Guard Personnel and Deployments: Fact Sheet*. Report to Congress, Washington, D.C., January, 2008.

In 2006, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, conducted a review of the military and concluded that an overall decline in military readiness existed. This created significant risk to the U.S. military's ability to respond to emerging catastrophic challenges.<sup>9</sup> The Center of American Progress (CAP) defines readiness as a complex measure of the ability of individual units to execute combat missions.<sup>10</sup> CAP measures readiness by evaluating personnel, training, and the availability of equipment needed to accomplish assigned missions.<sup>11</sup> Both Regular Army and ARNG use the Unit Status Report (USR) to assess unit readiness. The report assesses quantitatively the number of personnel and equipment physically present in a unit to its wartime authorization. Qualitatively, the report assesses the actual condition of the equipment on hand and the training of the unit as prescribed prior to deployment.<sup>12</sup> The National Guard Bureau receives the USR from each of the 53 state and territories (Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Guam) and the District of Columbia National Guard State Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ-State) to establish a complete assessment of ARNG unit readiness. Each JFHQ-State provides command and control of all National Guard forces in the state or territory for the governor. It can also act as a joint service headquarters for national-level response efforts during contingency operations.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Lolita Baldor, "Gen. Peter Pace: Military Capability Eroding," *The Washington Post*, February 27, 2007. The term *Military* includes: Active component, National Guard, and Reserves.

<sup>10</sup> Lawrence J. Korb, Peter Rundlet, Max Bergmann, Sean Duggan, and Peter Juul, *Beyond the call of duty*. nonpartisan research, Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, August 2007. [[http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/08/readiness\\_report.html](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/08/readiness_report.html)] (accessed February 20, 2009).

<sup>11</sup> Mackenzie M. Eaglen, "Equipping the Army National Guard for the 21st Century." Backgrounder # 1983. The Heritage Foundation. November 13, 2006.

[<http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1983.cfm>], (accessed December 18, 2008).

<sup>12</sup> C-1: Fully combat ready; C-2: Substantially combat-ready, that is, the unit only has minor combat deficiencies; C-3: Marginally combat-ready, that is, the unit has major deficiencies but can still perform its assigned missions; C-4: Not combat ready because the unit has so many deficiencies that it cannot perform its wartime functions; and C-5: Not combat-ready because the unit is undergoing a planned period of overhaul or maintenance. U.S. Department of Army, *Army Regulation 220-1: Unit Status Reporting* (Washington D.C.: December 2006): 23.

<sup>13</sup> National Guard's Role in Homeland Defense. [<http://www.ngb.army.mil/features/HomelandDefense/jfhq/factsheet.html>] (accessed April 5, 2009).

Many state governors are concerned that the USR shows that the ARNG does not have the capabilities or unit readiness required to respond to catastrophic or disruptive events within their states. The problem of leaving states vulnerable at a time of crisis dates back to 1917, after the signing of the National Defense Act of 1916 and continues today. In 2007, California's Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger stated that "[n]ational Guard units have been unable to deal with natural disasters...the equipment shortages degraded the guard's response to large scale fires on the west coast."<sup>14</sup> In the same vein, Kansas Governor Kathleen Sebelius complained that the National Guard's response to a devastating tornado in 2007 was inadequate due to lack of equipment.<sup>15</sup>

The concern over equipment shortages throughout the Regular Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve has prompted many investigations. In 2007, the Pentagon reported that Army National Guard units had only approximately half of their required equipment in the United States, with the remainder left behind in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>16</sup> Critical equipment shortages include satellite communications equipment, radios, trucks, helicopters, and night vision goggles; which were left behind in Iraq and Afghanistan for subsequent unit rotations.<sup>17</sup> The shortage of equipment due to current federal missions deprives non-deployed ARNG units of the ability to train properly and to conduct their Civil Support missions. Yet it is difficult to establish this with absolute certainty because of the absence of defined requirements and preparedness standards for Civil Support missions. Units returning from overseas operations also have difficulty maintaining their skills learned in combat because they have no equipment to train with. The strain due to leaving behind critical equipment in theater, aging equipment, and the wear and tear on the

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<sup>14</sup> Peter Spiegel, "Panels finds Guard is down," *Los Angeles Times*, February 1, 2008.

<sup>15</sup> Amanda Terkel, "Sebelius: Iraq War is Slowing National Guard's Tornado Response," Think Progress, <http://thinkprogress.org/2007/05/07/sebelius-tornado/> (accessed January 5, 2009).

<sup>16</sup> Peter Spiegel, "Guard equipment levels lowest since 9/11," *Los Angeles Times*, May 10, 2007.

<sup>17</sup> David M. Walker, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, *Reserve Force: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reexamined*, October 20, 2005, GAO-06-170T, 3, 5.

equipment from multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan has degraded the ARNG's abilities to respond to catastrophic events at home.<sup>18</sup>

There are many factors that contribute to the readiness posture of the ARNG. They include training guardsmen for both domestic and federal missions, equipping the force, recruiting, and replacing aging and worn out equipment sets in the inventory. While all these factors are important, this paper is focused on the equipment shortages found throughout the ARNG due to the multiple unit rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the impact of the shortages on the ARNG ability to execute its domestic and federal missions.

In order to understand the situation facing the ARNG, one must understand the role it plays in the nation's defense. The Constitution specifies that state based militias will also serve as part of the nation's main defense force.<sup>19</sup> The Militia Act of 1903 and the National Defense Act of 1916 reformed and reorganized the state militias into the National Guard. As a result of the National Defense Act of 1916, governors lost their National Guard capabilities to federal missions during wartime. As part of the Strategic Reserve to defend our country's interests, the National Guard was totally mobilized for WWI, and WWII, and partially mobilized for the Korean War, Berlin Crisis, Vietnam War, and Desert Storm.<sup>20</sup>

Since the end of the Cold War, the federal mission of the National Guard has shifted to an Operational Force from a Strategic Reserve. As the Operational Force, the ARNG conducted multiple deployments to Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In 2006, LTG Steven H. Blum, Chief of National Guard Bureau, testified before Congress and reaffirmed that the National Guard's first mission is Homeland Defense. LTG Blum stated, "Governors count on the National

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<sup>18</sup> *Restoring Military Equipment after Iraq*. National Security Program Proposal #6, Thirdway, (accessed January 5, 2009).

<sup>19</sup> "To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress" U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, clause 16.

Guard to be the first military responder and call on Guard assets at their disposal within the first hours of an event.”<sup>21</sup> According to Jack Spencer, a Policy Analyst of Defense and Homeland Security, “the National Guard is well suited to serve as the lead military agency for Homeland Security...because they are the first federal agents to assist local first responders...or may well be the first responders.”<sup>22</sup> The role the National Guard plays in the defense of our nation is complicated since it has a dual mission. The modern guardsmen have a state mission under the control of the Governor, when they are not federalized or conducting a federal mission under the control of the President. Once designated as a federal Operational Force, the federal mission legally has priority over state missions.

In 2008, Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 1200.17 officially announced the changed role of the National Guard from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Force. Strategic reserve is the “[u]ncommitted force of a country or coalition of countries that are intended to support national security interests and objectives, as required.”<sup>23</sup> The term *Operational Force* is fairly new and is not universally defined. Therefore, the term has evolved to mean different things to different people. The DoD proposed definition for Operational Force is “[t]he total Reserve Component structure that operates across the continuum of military missions performing both strategic and operational roles in peacetime, wartime, contingency, domestic emergencies, and Homeland Defense operations.”<sup>24</sup> Without a firm definition, the National Guard will continue to

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<sup>20</sup> National Guard Bureau. “About the National Guard,” <http://www.ngb.army.mil/About/default.aspx> (accessed April 26, 2009)

<sup>21</sup> Steven H. Blum, Homeland defense and Military support to civil authority: Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on emerging threats. National Guard Bureau, (Washington, D.C.: 2006).

<sup>22</sup> Jack Spencer, "The National Guard and Homeland Security," Executive Memorandum # 826. The Heritage Foundation. July 29, 2002. [<http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/EM826.cfm>] (accessed March 18, 2008.)

<sup>23</sup> Wolfram F. Hanrieder and Larry V. Buel, *Word and Arms: A Dictionary of Security and Defense Terms*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 121.

<sup>24</sup> As such, the Services organize resource, equip, train and utilize their Guard and Reserve Component to support mission requirement to the same standards as their active components. Each Service’s force generation plan prepares both units and individuals to participate in missions, across the full spectrum of military operations, in a cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, service members, their families and civilian employers. Joseph E.

have difficulty in assessing its capability to resource, equip, or fulfill both federal and state missions.

The role of the National Guard is complex, because it has two distinct missions. As the Operational Force, the National Guard needs to be adequately equipped and prepared to deal with the continuum of military missions both domestic and overseas. The wide range of domestic disaster missions and the full spectrum operations as part of the Operational Force with the Regular Army creates the challenge to properly equip and train the ARNG. By understanding the role and responsibility that the National Guard plays in national defense, the proper equipment can be identified and purchased for it to execute its assigned missions.

Section one of this paper demonstrates the complexity of defining the National Guard's domestic and federal missions. Section two provides the background of equipment shortages found throughout the National Guard. Equipment shortages have been a chronic problem of reserve forces for decades. Additional factors contributing to decreased readiness posture of guard equipment includes increased wear and tear due to numerous contingencies deployments around the world, and the age of ARNG's equipment in general. Section three examines how the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model provides predictability for guardsmen about their potential deployment schedule; however, the model does not take into account the Army National Guard's domestic mission. Section four discusses a way forward by demonstrating the need to adopt critical dual-use equipment to meet the challenges of the future for both federal and domestic missions. Section five examines the readiness posture of the ARNG to conduct domestic

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Whitlock, "What is an Operation Reserve?" Joint Matters, *Ameriforce*, (2007)  
[http://www.ameriforce.net/PDF/rng\\_rng\\_dec07\\_006-008.pdf](http://www.ameriforce.net/PDF/rng_rng_dec07_006-008.pdf) (accessed on December 18, 2008) The DoD Directive 1200.17 defines Operational Force as operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational roles, RCs participate in a full range of missions according to their Services' force generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families, and employers. In their strategic roles, RC units and individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy. As such, the RCs provide strategic depth and are available to transition to operational roles as needed.

missions. Finally, this paper provides recommendations on the future readiness of the ARNG to execute its dual missions.

## **The Struggle to Define Domestic Missions**

Under the control of the state Governors, the ARNG's state missions involve the protection of life and property, and the preservation of peace, order, and public safety.<sup>25</sup> Tasks in support of these various missions include emergency relief support during natural disasters, search and rescue operations, support to civil authorities, and counterdrug operations. The ARNG's federal mission under the control of the President is to provide ready forces capable of full spectrum operations during war or national emergencies.<sup>26</sup> Two statutes governing the activation of the National Guard are Title 32 and Title 10 of the U.S. Code. In Title 32 status, guardsmen serve their respective states and are not in Federal Service.<sup>27</sup> In the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 16, enables Congress:

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.<sup>28</sup>

The Constitution affirms that the respective Governors maintain command and control of their National Guard forces not in Federal Service; and includes conducting domestic law-enforcement operations, without any restriction pertaining to the Posse Comitatus Act. The Constitution does not state any provision prohibiting the use of the Regular Army or federalized militia to be used to enforce the laws.<sup>29</sup> The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which is codified in 18 U.S. Code and was designed to limit the President's use of military forces in peacetime, states that:

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<sup>25</sup> *National Guard Fact Sheet*. National Guard Bureau, Arlington: National Guard Bureau, 2006.

<sup>26</sup> *National Guard Fact Sheet*. National Guard Bureau, Arlington: National Guard Bureau, 2006.

<sup>27</sup> Townie 76, Title 10, Title 32, Posse Comitatus and National Guard of the United States, [[http://op-for.com/2009/02/title\\_10\\_title\\_32\\_posse\\_comita.html](http://op-for.com/2009/02/title_10_title_32_posse_comita.html)] (accessed February 26, 2009).

<sup>28</sup> U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, clause 16.

<sup>29</sup> Matt Matthews, *The Posse Comitatus Act and the United States Army: A Historical Perspective*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CSI Press Publication, 2006. 6.

It shall not be lawful to employ any part of the Army of the United States... for the purpose of executing the laws, except on such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution or by any act of Congress.<sup>30</sup>

An example of the ARNG conducting law enforcement came in the 1992 Los Angeles Riots, after an all-white jury acquitted white police officers for beating black motorist Rodney King. As a response to this verdict, some Los Angeles citizens rioted. The riots resulted in the death of thirty-one people, one thousand injured, and over a thousand fires set throughout the city. California Governor Pete Wilson called for the mobilization of two thousand guardsmen from MG Robert C. Thrasher, California's Adjutant General, to conduct riot control.<sup>31</sup> Guardsmen or Regular Army under the authority of Title 10 status are not permitted to conduct law enforcement activities in accordance with Posse Comitatus Act.<sup>32</sup> Section 502(f) of Title 32 allows the National Guard to be called up for service while remaining under the control of the Governor. This permits guardsmen to conduct law enforcement activities, such as the 1992 Los Angeles Riots. In addition, the Secretary of Defense collaborate with Governors on the decision to use federalize (Title 10 status) guardsmen in response to a national emergency or maintain them in a Title 32 status.<sup>33</sup>

Title 10 U.S. Code is focused primarily on the use of active duty military forces to deal with war and enforce the nation's foreign policy. Guardsmen mobilized under Title 10 serve under the command of the National Command Authority (the President), not the Governor of

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<sup>30</sup> *The Constitutional Charter of the National Guard: The Posse Comitatus Act 1787* [<http://www.arng.army.mil/constitution.aspx>] (accessed March 7, 2009).

<sup>31</sup> Matt Matthews, *The Posse Comitatus Act and the United States Army: A Historical Perspective*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CSI Press Publication, 2006. 47.

<sup>32</sup> The 1878 *Posse Comitatus Act* prohibits the direct use of federal military troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where authorized by the Constitution or acts of Congress. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, *Homeland Defense: DoD needs to assess the structure of U.S. Force for Domestic Military Mission*, Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003, GAO-03-670, 5,16.

<sup>33</sup> In federal status guardsmen are serving the Federal government as either United States Army or United State Air Force. National Governors Association, Policy Position: HHS-03. Army and Air National Guard,

their respective states. Once federalized guardsmen are able to execute their federal mission of supplementing the Regular Army. In order for Governors to execute the nation's Homeland Defense and Homeland Security responsibilities within their states they use State Active Duty (SAD) or Title 32 status.<sup>34</sup> The National Guard Bureau stated that since World War II, 99.9% of domestic missions are accomplished below the federal level and only 10 times since 1945 has a domestic response included a federalized National Guard.<sup>35</sup>

In the wake of the attacks on September 11, 2001, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense was created. The role and responsibility of this office is to coordinate and provide oversight in terrorism preparedness and prevention. To achieve its mission over forty federal agencies fall under the umbrella of Homeland Defense. Its mission in accordance with the October 8, 2001, Executive Order, the Homeland Defense states:

The mission of the Office shall be to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks. The Office shall perform the functions necessary to carry out this mission.<sup>36</sup>

The Department of Defense sees Homeland Defense as its primary mission, with its Active Duty, Reserve Forces, and National Guard units; it has the largest and most diversified personnel assets in the Federal Government. In particular, the Department of Defense remains the greatest federal repository of resources for responding to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incident.<sup>37</sup>

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[<http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.8358ec82f5b198d18a278110501010a0/?vgnextoid=24ca9e2f1b091010VgnVCM1000001a01010aRCRD>] (accessed February 26, 2009).

<sup>34</sup> Guardsmen under State Active Duty (SAD) status are under the command and control of the Governor. The cost of calling-up the guardsmen is paid out of state revenue and not the federal government.

<sup>35</sup> Greenhill, Jim. "Exercise Tests Guard as First Military Responder." *Newspaper of the National Guard: The On Guard*, June 2007, 8.

<sup>36</sup> George W. Bush. *Executive Order-Office of Homeland Defense: Creating the Office of Homeland Defense-President George W. Bush*. October 8, 2001. <http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/bills/bleohomeland.htm> (accessed April 26, 2009).

<sup>37</sup> Steve Bowman. *Homeland Security: The Department of Defense Role*. Report for Congress, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2003. The Government Accounting Office defines Homeland Defense as the protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and

The National Guard has been conducting Homeland Defense for decades under the command of the Governors in State Active Duty, and Title 32 status. In 2001, Gov. Mark Schweiker of Pennsylvania deployed forces to assist Pennsylvania State Police to protect five nuclear facilities within the state for an extended period.<sup>38</sup> These activities included vulnerability assessments; planning, training, and exercising with civilian emergency responders; and securing strategic facilities as part of protecting the homeland.<sup>39</sup> In 2006, National Guard joined U.S. Border Patrol agencies to launch Operation Jump Start. At its peak, Operation Jump Start had approximately 6,000 guardsmen along the southwest border from Texas to California providing engineering assets, surveying teams, communication platforms, and early detection to combat illegal immigration. Another example of the National Guard conducting Homeland Defense missions is Operation Noble Eagle; an immediate response to 9/11. Governors across the nation called up the National Guard under Title 32 of the U.S. Code, which means guardsmen were under state control to provide additional security at airports. At the peak of this mission approximately 9,000 Guardsmen support Transport Security Agency (TSA) at check points in over 400 airports nationwide.<sup>40</sup>

Following September 11, as part of President George W. Bush's national strategy, Congress created the Department of Homeland Security. The emergence of this department brought about a different perspective of the battlefield. The United States homeland was attacked making it no longer secure from hostile threats abroad. Colonel Steven J. Tomisek, USMC, stated:

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critical infrastructure from external threats. The DoD is responsible to plan, and coordinate with civil authorities on the federal, state and local level in order to execute its Homeland Defense mission.

<sup>38</sup> Department of Military and Veterans Affairs, Gov. Schweiker asks President Bush to elevate National Guard protecting PA's Nuclear facilities to Federal Status. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. November 9, 2001, [<http://www.milvet.state.pa.us/PAO/pr/pres-req.htm>] (accessed March 7, 2009).

<sup>39</sup> Office of Homeland Security. "National Strategy for Homeland Security." Washington, D.C.: July 2002, 44.

The U.S. homeland was regarded as a rear area, not a frontline and the job of securing it was primarily a task for civilian law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, and local levels...the 'domestic battle space'—a highly complex environment...strategic, operational, and tactical level task all must be integrated<sup>41</sup>

Therefore, the role and mission of Homeland Security now reflects a changed battle space for the military. Homeland Security's mission involves securing the U.S., prevention and deterrence against terrorist attacks, and protecting against, and responding to, threats and hazards to the nation.<sup>42</sup> In addition, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), created in 2002, provides unity of command for domestic military operations.<sup>43</sup> The NORTHCOM mission involves Civil Support for domestic emergencies, and designated law enforcement and other activities. However, NORTHCOM's involvement with the National Guard Bureau and each Adjutant General of the 53 state and territories (Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Guam) and the commanding general of the District of Columbia National Guard involves taking steps to establish a thorough process for coordinating, cooperating, and interacting with Governors, and other state officials. This partnership will allow NORTHCOM and the National Guard to achieve their respective missions in securing the homeland.

The DoD protects the homeland through two distinct, but interrelated missions: Homeland Defense and Civil Support. Homeland Defense and Homeland Security, and Civil Support seem to be similar missions, but they are separate operations. They all have areas where roles and responsibilities overlap, and it is possible to be the lead agency or supporting agency

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<sup>40</sup> Bob Haskell, "National Guard ending Airport Security Mission," *Army News Service*. May 20, 2002, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/05/mil-020520-usa01.htm> (accessed April 26, 2009)

<sup>41</sup> Steven J. Tomisek, "Homeland Security: The New Role for Defense," *Strategic Forum*. No. 189. February 2002, [<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF189/sf189.htm>] (accessed February 26, 2009) COL Steven was a Senior Fellow at Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2002.

<sup>42</sup> Homeland Security, "One Team, One Mission, Securing our Homeland," U.S. Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal years 2008-2013, Washington, D.C., 3.

<sup>43</sup> Steve Bowman, and James Crowhurst, "Homeland Security: Evolving Roles and Missions for United States Northern Command," Order Code RS21322. Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2006.

concurrently in a situation.<sup>44</sup> The DoD assistance to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities is known as Civil Support.<sup>45</sup> Joint Publication 3-28 defines the Civil Support operational framework as the DoD organizational construct to support the Homeland Security mission through its warfighting and Civil Support missions. This framework has six characteristic that are prepare (train), detect, deter, prevent, respond, and recover.<sup>46</sup> DoD further breaks down Military Assistance to Civil Authorities into three types of assistance: Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA), and Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances.<sup>47</sup> First, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) generally consists of responding to natural or man-made disasters, and special events which have evoked Presidential or state emergency declaration. Second, Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA) consists of support provided to a Lead Federal Agency (e.g., U.S. Border Patrol or DEA) for activities such as counterterrorism and counterdrug operations. Third, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances occurs when the President employs the armed forces to suppress insurrections or riots, or to assist the states in maintaining law and order.<sup>48</sup>

The U.S. Congress authorized the National Guard to perform interdiction and anti-drug activities in 1989 under MSCLEA. Since then the National Guard has worked with law enforcement agencies along the southwest borders in the fight against illicit drug trafficking. Operation Jump Start was an example of MSCLEA assistance. In May of 2006, President George W. Bush ordered the National Guard to provide Civil Support to U.S. Border Patrol in securing

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<sup>44</sup> Joint Publication 3-28, *Civil Support*, Washington, DC: CJCS, 14 September 2007, vii.

<sup>45</sup> Joint Publication 3-28, *Civil Support*, Washington, DC: CJCS, 14 September 2007, vii.

<sup>46</sup> Prepare is defined as the continuous process to identify threats, determine vulnerabilities, and identify required resources. Detect is defined as discover or find out. Deter is defined as to discourage or prevent from acting. Prevent is defined as kept from happening or existing. Defend is to protect. Respond and Recover is the ability to react rapidly to a situation and maintain order. Joint Publication 3-28, *Civil Support*, Washington, D.C.: CJCS 14 September 2007, I-4.

<sup>47</sup> Joint Publication 3-26, *Homeland Security*, Washington, DC: CJCS 2 August 2005, IV-4.

<sup>48</sup> Steve Bowman, Lawrence Kapp, and Amy Belasco. *Hurricane Katrina: DoD Disaster Response*. Congressional Research Service, Order Code RL 33095, September 19, 2005.

the southwest border for Homeland Security. Governors and states adjutant generals from every state and territory signed a memorandum of agreement with four southwest Border States in order to send guardsmen to support the mission. The guardsmen serving in the respective four states were under the command of the Governors of that state. For example: if guardsmen deployed from Illinois to Texas then they were under the command of the Texas Governor and adjutant general for Operation Jump Start. The lead federal agency was the U.S. Border Patrol. As of November 30, 2007, National Guard members have assisted in apprehension of more than 169,000 aliens and seized more than 269,000 pounds of marijuana, 4,900 pounds of cocaine, and 7,900 vehicles in Operation Jump Start. The guardsmen have built more than 37 miles of fence, 18 miles of road, and 70 miles of vehicle barriers along the border. In addition, the counterdrug program provides support to local, state, and federal law enforcement to the 54 states and territories.

The example of Operation Jump Start is a good way to summarize the six characteristic (prepare [train], detect, deter, prevent, respond, and recover) of Civil Support. First, the ARNG prepared/trained guardsmen prior to deploying them along the southwest borders. This comprehensive plan allowed guardsmen to improve their operational capabilities and to maintain proficiency in both units and individual skills. Second, using the ARNG resources and capabilities allowed the U.S. Border Patrol to detect and monitor the transit of illegal drugs along the border. Third, the presence of approximately 6,000 Guardsmen alongside U.S. Border Patrol can be correlated to the deterrence of illegal immigrations activities in certain area along the southwest border. Fourth, in the context of prevention, the ARNG employed measures both passive and active to weaken or prevent a threat from entering the United States.<sup>49</sup> Passive actions include engineer projects to create barriers, obstacles, or hardened sites (check points) for the U.S. Border Patrol. Active measures included short and long range military sensors, such as

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) for reconnaissance and the Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) system to detect movement along the southwest border. Fifth, U.S. Border Patrol is able to respond rapidly and effectively to any threats that may emerge because of the additional ARNG troops in support of protecting the nation's borders. Lastly, the sixth characteristic, the deployment of ARNG force to the southwest border allowed sufficient time for the U.S. Border Patrol to recover, and to recruit, and train additional forces to combat any threat in the near future.

The absence of concrete boundary for Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, and Civil Support mission allows for overlapping roles and responsibility. Figure I-1 JP3-28 depicts the complex relationship between Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, and Civil Support. The overlap of the three organizations supports the national strategy by providing the federal government with military and non-military options to address a specific threat.<sup>50</sup> In an interview, LTG Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, stated:

The Guard's Homeland Defense missions include supporting Coast Guard patrols of sea and coastal areas, detecting and defending against air and missile attacks, protecting private infrastructure and responding to attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. In the event of an incident or crisis, DoD's and the nation's reliance would be very heavy on the National Guard.<sup>51</sup>

LTG Blum's statement demonstrates the complex challenge the National Guard has in executing domestic missions when Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, and Civil Support operations occur simultaneously, and roles and responsibilities overlap. Hurricane Katrina national response illustrates the overlapping of roles and responsibilities of these three agencies as shown in Figure I-1.

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<sup>49</sup> The U.S. Border Patrol defines threat as MS13 gang members, drug trafficker, human trafficker; terrorist and illegal immigrants.

<sup>50</sup> Thomas Goss. "Who's in Charge? New Challenges in Homeland Defense and Homeland Security." *Homeland Security Affairs* Volume II, Issue 1 (2006): Article 2.

<sup>51</sup> Douglas Hanson, *The National Guard and Homeland Security*, American Thinker. July 10, 2005. [[http://www.americanthinker.com/2005/07/the\\_national\\_guard\\_and\\_homelan.html](http://www.americanthinker.com/2005/07/the_national_guard_and_homelan.html)] (accessed December 21, 2008).




Figure I-1. Notional Relationship between Homeland Defense, Civil Support and Homeland Security Missions<sup>52</sup>

While the military response to Hurricane Katrina came from DoD NORTHCOM, the National Guard, national, state and local responders, this study will only examine the response of the National Guard to Hurricane Katrina and not NORTHCOM's. The role of the National Guard is critical in the event of natural or man-made disasters to provide logistical support, maintain civil order, and assist in coordinating search and rescue efforts. This was evident during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. In 2005, the National Guard had sufficient guardsmen to respond to Hurricane Katrina. At the peak of the effort, 48 states, 2 U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia responded by sending over 50,000 National Guard personnel to assist with the disaster relief operation.<sup>53</sup> The majority of these guardsmen were originally called to duty in a state active

<sup>52</sup> The illustration depicts a notional relationship between HD, CS, and HS with examples of the types of operations that can take place for each mission. The HD, CS, and HS missions are separate but have areas where roles and responsibilities may overlap and/or lead and supporting roles may transition between organizations. Joint Publication 3-28. *Civil Support*, Washington, D.C.: Department of Army 2007.

<sup>53</sup> David M. Walker, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, *Reserve Force: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reexamined*, October 20, 2005, GAO-06-170T.

duty status by their respective Governors. Shortly after Katrina made landfall, LTG Blum requested the authority to transfer all National Guard personnel participating in Katrina related disaster relief operation from State Active Duty (SAD) to Title 32. On September 7, Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England approved the transfer from SAD to Title 32. The significance of this request was to equalize pay and benefits for all National Guard soldiers leaving their respective states.<sup>54</sup> The National Guard deployed soldiers in Title 10 status to assist in the relief effort as well. The Title 10 guardsmen came from the National Guard Bureau to support Louisiana's command center. Due to the size of the disaster Joint Task Force Katrina (JTF-Katrina) was established with LTG Russel Honroé, the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), as task force commander.<sup>55</sup> He served as the focal point for DoD resources assisting government agencies operating in the incident area. However, he did not have operational control over the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or National Guard personnel operating in SAD or Title 32 status.

Governors have speculated that the deployments overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan affected the ability for the National Guard and active duty forces to respond to the citizens of Louisiana and Mississippi.<sup>56</sup> This contention has been repeatedly denied by both the DoD and National Guard leadership.<sup>57</sup> Fueling the speculation is the shortage of equipment throughout the National Guard. For example:

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<sup>54</sup> Steve Bowman, Lawrence Kapp, and Amy Belasco. *Hurricane Katrina: DoD Disaster Response*. Report for Congress, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, Order Code RL 33095, September 19, 2005. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2005.

<sup>55</sup> A Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) is designated and deployed to the area of the incident.

<sup>56</sup> Steve Bowman, Lawrence Kapp, and Amy Belasco. *Hurricane Katrina: DoD Disaster Response*. Report for Congress, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, Order Code RL 33095, September 19, 2005. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2005.2.

<sup>57</sup> Steve Bowman, Lawrence Kapp, and Amy Belasco. *Hurricane Katrina: DoD Disaster Response*. Report for Congress, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, Order Code RL 33095, September 19, 2005. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2005. 17.

According to the Congressional Research Service the National Guard units responding to Katrina did not have adequate numbers of tactical radios or High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) adapted for high water operations because this equipment was in Iraq.<sup>58</sup>

Hurricane Katrina exposed the inability of the National Guard to respond to a major disaster in the United States. There were many factors that contributed to the inadequate response by the National Guard to the victims of Hurricane Katrina, but the equipment problem throughout the National Guard in terms of aging equipment, poor maintenance, and shortages are the focus of those work.

## **Providing Context to Equipping the Force**

After more than eight years of continued fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the ARNG remains critically deficient in equipment, which has degraded its capabilities to respond to a catastrophic domestic disaster. The multiple deployments for each contingency has depleted and worn out ARNG equipment causing shortages. Due to a lack of equipment within the military supply system to fully outfit every unit when mobilized, units rely on a system of cross leveling or cross decking to fill shortage and meet mission readiness. In essence, equipment is transferred from non-deploying to deploying units. This took place at the onset of the war and still occurs to some degree today. This leaves the non-deploying units, which are already short on equipment, unable to respond to domestic disasters or prepare for upcoming deployment.<sup>59</sup> For example, in 2007, MG Harry Wyatt III, Adjutant General of Oklahoma, stated his troops were unable to train properly because of a lack of equipment. General Wyatt said the guard needs body armor, M4 rifles, and night vision goggles, as well as armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWVs) and other heavy equipment to properly train for deployment to Iraq in spring 2008.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> "Military Lacked Critical Gear in responding to Katrina," Newhouse.com, September 13, 2005; "Behind Poor Katrina Response, A long Chain of Weak Links," *Wall Street Journal*, September 6, 2005, 1.

<sup>59</sup> Brian Bresnahan, "Big Government Philopshy Erodes Freedom." *High Plain Patriot*. February 13, 2007. [<http://www.highplainspatriot.blogspot.com/>] (accessed December 21,2008).

<sup>60</sup> NewsOn6, "National Guard Lacks equipment," NewsOn6.com, March 26, 2007, [<http://kotv.com/news/local/story/?id=123531>] (accessed March 24, 2009).

As stated earlier, the shortage of high water modified vehicles and transportation vehicles were also evident in the ARNG response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the tornado season in Kansas in 2007.

At the time of Hurricane Katrina over 8,200 personnel and the brigade sets of equipment from the 155<sup>th</sup> Armored Brigade of Mississippi and the 256<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade of Louisiana were deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and were not available to perform their domestic missions.<sup>61</sup> At the time of the hurricane, Louisiana and Mississippi lacked Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with neighboring states and the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) process was affected by national political agendas which further prevented the ARNG from deploying guardsmen with the proper equipment to the affected region.<sup>62</sup> According to National Guard officials, much of the Guard's most modern equipment, such as high water vehicles, wreckers, and water trailers, were deployed to Iraq while less capable equipment remained in the United States.<sup>63</sup> State units under the control of the Governor reported that a lack of vehicles on-hand and lack of available replacement parts to repair vehicles compromised their ability to transport personnel to the Gulf area.<sup>64</sup> Other reports described ARNG units that could

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<sup>61</sup> David M. Walker, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, *Reserve Force: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment Needs to be Reexamined*, October 20, 2005, GAO-06-170T, 15.

<sup>62</sup> Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) is an agreement between states to share resources in time of crises and the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), is a congressionally ratified organization that provides form and structure to interstate mutual aid. The Democrats' and the mainstream media's focus on the Bush Administration's failures to respond adequately to Katrina...the critics do not present the Bush Administration's in a positive light. Greg Lewis. "Katrina's Negative Effect on Dems' Campaign Strategy." Greglewis.org. September 5, 2006. [<http://www.greglewis.org/2006/090506.htm>] (accessed April 26, 2009).

<sup>63</sup> David M. Walker, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, *Reserve Force: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment need to be Reexamined*, October 20, 2005, GAO-06-170T, 15.

<sup>64</sup> Brian Bresnahan, "National Guard Equipment Shortage." *High Plain Patriot*. February 13, 2007. [<http://highplainpatriot.blogspot.com/search?q=Hurricane+Katrina/>] (accessed December 21, 2008).

not communicate among themselves or with other units because of shortfalls in communication equipment.<sup>65</sup>

Two years after Hurricane Katrina, a devastating tornado roared through Greensburg, Kansas, obliterating the town and leaving in its wake ten fatalities and more than 100 injuries. Once again, shortage of the proper equipment for the Kansas ARNG compromised its response to the affected region. The Governor's office estimated that 16% of the Guard's equipment, valued at \$117 million, did not return to Kansas from Iraq.<sup>66</sup> In an interview with the Associated Press, Kansas Governor Kathleen Sebelius, stated:

The state's response will likely be hampered because much of the equipment usually positioned around the state to respond to emergencies — including tents and semi-trailers — is in Iraq. Not having the National Guard equipment...to bring in immediately is really going to handicap this effort to rebuild.<sup>67</sup>

According to MG Tod Bunting, the state's Adjutant General, the Kansas National Guard was operating with 40% of authorized equipment on hand, down from 60% in 2001.<sup>68</sup> Prior to the war, the state had 660 HMMWVs and 30 large trucks to maneuver difficult terrain and transport heavy equipment. When the tornado struck, the state had fewer than 350 HMMWVs and 15 trucks due to OIF, OEF, and maintenance to include 850 soldiers deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan.<sup>69</sup> BG (Retired) Stephen Koper, former Chief of Staff, Ohio Air National Guard, stated, "Kansas is not

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<sup>65</sup> Brian Bresnahan, "National Guard Equipment Shortage." *High Plain Patriot*. February 13, 2007. [<http://highplainpatriot.blogspot.com/search?q=Hurricane+Katrina/>] (accessed December 21, 2008).

<sup>66</sup> Dion Lefler, "National Guard Deals with less equipment." May 8, 2007. *The Wichita Eagle*. [<http://www.kansas.com/233/story/64524.html>] (accessed February 28, 2009).

<sup>67</sup> Emily Bazar, "Tornado obliterates Kansas Town." May 5, 2007. *USATODAY*. (accessed November 15, 2008).

<sup>68</sup> Susan Saulny, and Jim Rutenberg, "Kansas Governor faults National Guard response to tornado," *International Herald Tribune*, May 9, 2007 [<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/us/09guard.html>] (accessed February 28, 2009).

<sup>69</sup> Susan Saulny, and Jim Rutenberg, "Kansas Governor faults National Guard response to tornado," *International Herald Tribune*, May 9, 2007 [<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/us/09guard.html>] (accessed February 28, 2009).

an isolated situation. Every state is significantly below level for equipment across the National Guard.”<sup>70</sup>

The National Guard Bureau refutes Governor Sebelius claim that her ARNG would be hampered because of lack of proper equipment. According to the National Guard Bureau, the Kansas Army National Guard was ready to respond to the citizens of Greensburg, Kansas. The 278<sup>th</sup> Sustainment Brigade established a Joint Task Force near the site: the Army National Guard deployed an additional 366 Guardsmen; and the Air National Guard provided 200 Airmen. The National Guard established shelters, distributed food and water, and supported first responders with search and rescue, power generation, logistical support, debris removal, and law enforcement assistance.<sup>71</sup> In addition, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) deployed several command centers in Greensburg with hours of the incident. The agency had approximately 15,000 gallons of water, and 21,000 ready-to-eat meals, enough to feed 10,000 people.<sup>72</sup> The lack of equipment or personnel in the state did not hinder the response effort of the Kansas ARNG, FEMA, the National Guard Bureau or neighboring states as stated by Governor Sebelius. If the state had to respond to more than one tornado throughout the state then recovery efforts might have been hampered.

A temporary fix to the Guard’s equipment shortages is to coordinate requests for additional support through MOA and EMAC between states. This process existed but was not being fully exercised by states. This national partnership agreement paves the way for states to share resources during state-or-federally declared emergencies. According to Air Force Lt. Col. Ellen Krenke, a Pentagon spokeswoman:

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<sup>70</sup> Christine Lagorio, “Wartime Hamper National Guard.” May 7, 2007. *CBSNews*. [<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/05/07/eveningnews/main2772124.shtml>] (accessed February 20, 2009).

<sup>71</sup> National Guard Bureau, *National Guard Posture Statement 2009*. National Guard, Arlington: National Guard Bureau, 2008, 10.

The states are poised to help one another when their own resources are overwhelmed...and saving lives and protecting property is what the American people expect the National Guard to do, and that's exactly what we are seeing take place in the wake of the Kansas tornado disaster.<sup>73</sup>

In January 2009, the EMAC agreement between the states was tested by a devastating winter storm that rendered more than a half million Kentucky citizens without electric power, and paralyzed most of western Kentucky. Governor Steve Beshear called the largest state activation of Kentucky National Guard forces in the history of commonwealth. At the peak of the operation, the Kentucky National Guard had 4,600 guardsmen providing relief to human suffering and ensuring the safety and well-being of state residents. They clear roads, assisted emergency responders, checked every resident's home and other rescue efforts. The state has on hand 59% of its critical dual use equipment to conduct rescue efforts. They received equipment and personnel from the Florida, Indiana, Ohio, West Virginia, Arkansas, and Wisconsin National Guard to assist in the recovery.<sup>74</sup>

From 2001-2009, multiple deployment to Iraq, Afghanistan, and numerous domestic missions have left ARNG equipment depleted and worn-out. The shortage of equipment and the lack of a comprehensive plan to replace the equipment inventory led to a decrease in the ARNG's readiness to fulfill domestic missions. The National Guard responded to numerous domestic missions from 2001-2009 however, due to lack of equipment in each state, Governors were forced to rely on neighboring states for assistance to conduct Civil Support operations. A review of the following domestic incident Operation Katrina Relief in 2005, the Kansas Tornado in 2007,

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<sup>72</sup> Susan Saulny, and Jim Rutenberg, "Kansas Governor faults National Guard response to tornado," *International Herald Tribune*, May 9, 2007 [http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/us/09guard.html] (accessed February 28, 2009).

<sup>73</sup> Donna Miles. "American Deployment Model Brings Reservists Readiness, Predictability." *American Forces Press Service*. June 23, 2006. [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=15966](accessed October 10,2008).

<sup>74</sup> Philip Miller, Governor Beshear orders unprecedented total call up of Kentucky National Guard, Kentucky National Guard Public Affairs Office. January 31, 2009. [http://dma.ky.gov/publicaffairs/pressreleases/Unprecedented+activation+of+Kentucky+National+Guard.htm] (accessed February 3, 2009).

and the Kentucky ice storm in 2009 provides evidence to support the decrease of readiness in the ARNG. In conclusion, the equipment shortages throughout the ARNG did not occur overnight.

Since the Cold War, the Army has accepted risk by not providing the National Guard more modern equipment or maintaining 100% equipment on-hand. For example, the ARNG has 20 equipment systems over 30 years old in the inventory, second worst among all reserve components (Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve).<sup>75</sup> The ARNG had fifteen enhanced brigades which were well equipped for the mission of mobilizing and deploying for combat within 90 days. The logic behind the Army's decision on equipment for the ARNG was that ARNG units were not expected to deploy early and therefore would receive required equipment through the mobilization process prior to deploying into combat. Lieutenant General James Lovelace, the former Army Operations Officer, testified to the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, that:

During this period of time that extended through the 1990s, Reserve Component equipping and mobilization policies were framed based on assumptions that in times of crisis, there would be sufficient warning and time to mobilize, fill the ranks and then get the country on a war footing to fill any material shortages. This strategy assumed that the Active Component would be large enough to sustain the fight with forward deployed forces, first deployers, and pre-positioned stocks, until the strategic reserve was committed to the theater of war.<sup>76</sup>

Two assumptions of LTG Lovelace's statement stand out. First, throughout the 80s and 90s it was assumed there would be adequate time to man, equip, and train the reserve components. Second, the active force was large enough to sustain the fight until the strategic reserve was committed. In the 2001 U.S. response to the terror attack, the active force was not large enough to engage in a two front war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, the time allotted to man, equip, and train the

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<sup>75</sup> Council of Foreign Relations. *Transforming the National Guard and Reserve into a 21st-Century operational forces* (commission on National Guard and Reserve, final report ), Council of Foreign Relations. January 31,2008, [[http://www.cfr.org/publication/15401/transforming\\_the\\_national\\_guard\\_and\\_reserves\\_into\\_a\\_21stcentury\\_operational\\_force\\_commission\\_on\\_national\\_guard\\_and\\_reserves\\_final\\_report.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/15401/transforming_the_national_guard_and_reserves_into_a_21stcentury_operational_force_commission_on_national_guard_and_reserves_final_report.html)] (accessed September 1, 2008), 215.

reserve components for combat was shortened. The ARNG soldiers deployed with both modern equipment and with their outdated equipment, which was used normally for domestic missions.

The essential ARNG equipment needed by state Governors to respond to crisis within their states deployed during the initial ARNG troop rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan. Afterward, the Department of Defense decided to leave National Guard equipment behind in theater for follow-on units rather than bring it back to cross level. This decision caused a ripple effect throughout the ARNG and a shortage of equipment in the system stateside. The National Guard estimates that since 2003, it has left more than 64,000 equipment items (HMMWVs, medium trucks, small arms, night vision goggles, and tactical radios) valued at over \$1.2 billion, overseas to support continuing operations.<sup>77</sup> According to the Army National Guard, 14 military police companies left an excess of 600 HMMWVs and other trucks in Iraq. This compromised their ability to train and maintain the proficiency they acquired while deployed.<sup>78</sup> The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will continue to challenge the Army and ARNG in term of equipment shortages hindering response to Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) deployments as well as domestic mission requirement.

## **ARFORGEN Process Impact on State Missions**

In 2006, the Army adopted the ARFORGEN model to ensure unit readiness for deployment overseas.<sup>79</sup> This model established a synchronized cycle of readiness and training for

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<sup>76</sup> LTG James J. Lovelace JR. “Statement by Lieutenant General James J. Lovelace, JR. Deputy Chief of Staff, G3 United States Army Before the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves” (Statement, Commission on the National Guard and Reserve, April 12, 2007),3.

<sup>77</sup> David M. Walker, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, *Reserve Force: Army National Guard’s Role, Organization, and Equipment need to be Reexamined*, October 20, 2005, GAO-06-170T, 13.

<sup>78</sup> David M. Walker, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, *Reserve Force: Army National Guard’s Role, Organization, and Equipment need to be Reexamined*, October 20, 2005, GAO-06-170T.14.

<sup>79</sup> Further information on ARFORGEN model can be found in FMI 3-35, *Army Deployment and Redeployment*, chapter 1 and 2007 *Army Posture Statement*, addendum B and 2007 *Army Modernization Plan*, pp. 4 to 5.

all active and reserve units. It calls for units in the Army Guard to spend five years at home and one year on Active Duty. In theory, the ARFORGEN model divides forces into three pools: those ready, those available, and those requiring reset train. The forces in the available pool are certified and equipped to deploy anywhere in world to conduct full spectrum missions. In the ready pool, units conduct higher-level collective training and receive equipment in preparation for impending deployment missions. The units returning from a major operation deployment theater make up the reset and retrain pool. According to LTG Clyde A. Vaughn, Director of the Army National Guard,

The ARNG has fully embraced the creation of the Army Force Generation model in Figure I-2. The model provides predictability to the potential time frame at which ARNG units might be called to active Federal Service. The ARNG has arrayed all of its units into the model to account for when they can reasonably expect to be in the ready, available or reset/train pools.<sup>80</sup>

The ARFORGEN process enhances the Army's ability to provide combatant commanders with ready forces capable of performing full-spectrum operations while increasing predictability and uncertainty for soldiers.<sup>81</sup> However, it fails to provide Governors with proper equipped forces capable of performing crisis response missions and Civil Support operations as part of Homeland Defense.

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<sup>80</sup> Clyde A. Vaughn, "Army National Guard: An Integral Part of Army Strong," *Business Network*, (October, 2007), [[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_qa3723/is\\_200710/ai\\_n21099856/pg\\_3](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3723/is_200710/ai_n21099856/pg_3)] (accessed February 22, 2009).

<sup>81</sup> *The Army Strategy*. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2008.8.




Figure I-2 Army Force Generation Model<sup>82</sup>

The ARFORGEN model does not take into account domestic Civil Support operations. The process has National Guard units on a five year train-up with a one year rotational deployment. The unit is filled with personnel, equipment, and trained in a span of five years to meet one deployment mission. It seems the ARFORGEN model was design from the perspective of the DoD on how to use the National Guard as an Operational Reserve; without the consideration of the Governor’s perspective and how they use the ARNG. The National Guard has to prepare for two missions; including its federal mission and its state mission. A Governor needs the National Guard to be equipped by the federal government, trained, and ready to meet the calls when a disaster occurs in their states or anywhere in the United States at all times. In addition, the ARFORGEN process does not account for the Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) of guardsmen while they are not deployed, nor the equipment required for their domestic missions. The ARNG

<sup>82</sup> The ARFORGEN model rotates units through three force pools: First, unit enter the RESET force pool (usually after returning from a deployment) where they reconstitute and train to required levels. Second, units enter the Train/Ready force pool where they conduct mission preparation and continue

has approximately 10,000 guardsmen daily conducting Civil Support operations.<sup>83</sup> These include detecting and defending against air and missile attacks; protecting private infrastructure and responding to attacks involving weapons of mass destruction; and responding to hurricanes, tornados, fires, and winter storms. Therefore, the ARFORGEN process is well suited for the National Guard's federal operational mission, but it does not prepare the National Guard to properly respond to man-made or natural disasters within the United State.

### **Critical Dual-Use Equipment**

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Kansas Governor Kathleen Sebelius are advocates for the National Guard receiving the appropriate funding to replenish its equipment shortages.<sup>84</sup> Secretary Gates stated that 70-80 percent of the Army National Guard would be fully modernized with equipment by 2013.<sup>85</sup> The proposal to modernize the National Guard begins in 2009 at a cost of \$32 billion spread over the next four years. The \$32 billion was appropriate by Congress for fiscal year 2009 to purchase critical dual-use equipment which can be used in domestic and wartime missions. The priority list is known as the "Essential 10" capabilities out of the 342 identified by the National Guard Bureau. The "Essential 10" capabilities are: 1) a Joint Force Headquarters for command and control, 2) a Civil Support Team for chemical, biological, and radiological detection, 3) engineers assets, 4) communications, 5) ground transportation, 6) aviation, 7) medical capability, 8) security forces, 9) logistics and 10) maintenance capability.<sup>86</sup> According to LTG Blum, the \$32 billion still leaves a gap in requirements in the areas of

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training. If necessary, these units can be committed to meet operational requirements. Third, units enter the Available force pool, where they will execute directed missions or provide contingency capability.

<sup>83</sup> Personal experience working at the Joint Operation Center at National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia.

<sup>84</sup> Ray Suarez, "Kansas Governor Outlines Tornado Recovery Efforts," *OnlineNewsHours*, May 8, 2007, [[http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/weather/jan-june07/kansas\\_05-08.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/weather/jan-june07/kansas_05-08.html)] (accessed 30, 2009).

<sup>85</sup> There is a discrepancy of 10% . Roxana Tiron. "Gates says funding for Guard at Record Levels." *The Hill*. September 22, 2008. <http://www.thehill.com> (accessed October 15, 2008).

<sup>86</sup> *Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness*. Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations,

HMMWVs, trucks, and other transport gear that does not match the level of risk for the National Guard in domestic or wartime missions.<sup>87</sup> LTG Blum's statement refers to the level of risk the nation is willing to accept if the National Guard is not properly equipped to respond to another domestic incident. Currently the ARNG, at the state level, is capable of responding to tornados, small to medium hurricanes, and even forest fires fairly well. The risk is high for ARNG at the state level to respond to another class four or five hurricane or even a small terrorist attack within the United States. These types of domestic missions would require the support of whole National Guard Bureau. The ARNG on the national level assumes high risk to respond to a catastrophic incident as a dirty bomb in the capital region or another conflict overseas because the shortages of equipment, lack of domestic training, and multiple rotation to Iraq and Afghanistan. If this budget is not corrected to meet the demands place on the ARNG, then equipment shortages will continue to impact ARNG readiness into the future for both federal and domestic missions.

Currently, the National Guard has a shortage of critical dual-use (CDU) equipment for its domestic and wartime missions.<sup>88</sup> The equipment that is available is typically older, more difficult and expensive to maintain, and neither easily deployable nor useful in all types of domestic missions. Out of the 54 states and territories only seven states are above 65% of critical dual-use equipment they are authorized to have on hand based on missions requirements.<sup>89</sup> The remainder

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House of Representatives, Government Accounting Office, U.S. Government, Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting Office, GAO 07-60. 2007. 22.

<sup>87</sup> Kristin Roberts, "U.S. National Guard Chief says funds lagging risks," *Reuters*. May 13, 2007. [<http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN1324433720070513?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0>] (accessed March 3, 2009).

<sup>88</sup> Equipment available for the ARNG wartime and domestic mission is considered dual-use equipment. In 2005, the National Guard has identified a total of 342 types of dual-use equipment. The list of equipment the Army National Guard identified includes types of trucks, generators, radios, medical gear, and engineering equipment. *Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness*. Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations, House of Representatives, Government Accounting Office, U.S. Government, Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting Office, GAO 07-60. 2007.25.

<sup>89</sup> *Transforming the National Guard and Reserve into a 21st-Century Operational Force* (Commission on National Guard and Reserve, Final Report). Final Report, Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2008.

of the ARNG critical dual-use equipment levels was approximately 56% on-hand.<sup>90</sup> As of October 2007, Alaska and Guam maintain the highest CDU with 70% and 83% of equipment on hand.<sup>91</sup> The emphasis on dual-use equipment is critical to National Guard modernization because it allows troops to train and deploy with the same gear for both domestic and overseas missions. The Department of Defense and the National Guard Bureau understand the significant importance and cost benefits of procuring critical dual-use equipment in a time of financial crisis. The purchase of dual-use equipment is part of the transformation process to modernize the ARNG for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The Army National Guard does not have an equipment modernization program of its own that is specifically designed to meet its unique needs and capabilities. LTG Lovelace testified, “Although the Army does not procure equipment specifically for Homeland Defense and support to Civil Authorities missions, it does recognize that the highest priority for National Guard units is critical ‘dual use’ equipment and works to field this equipment first.”<sup>92</sup>

The lack of equipment is negatively affecting readiness. In the National Guard’s 2007 Posture Statement, LTG Blum noted that, “morale suffers when Soldiers cannot train for their

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[[http://www.cfr.org/publication/15401/transforming\\_the\\_national\\_guard\\_and\\_reserves\\_into\\_a\\_21stcentury\\_operational\\_force\\_commission\\_on\\_national\\_guard\\_and\\_reserves\\_final\\_report.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/15401/transforming_the_national_guard_and_reserves_into_a_21stcentury_operational_force_commission_on_national_guard_and_reserves_final_report.html)] (accessed September 1, 2008), 215.

<sup>90</sup> Transforming the National Guard and Reserve into a 21st-Century Operational Force (Commission on National Guard and Reserve, Final Report). Final Report, Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2008.

[[http://www.cfr.org/publication/15401/transforming\\_the\\_national\\_guard\\_and\\_reserves\\_into\\_a\\_21stcentury\\_operational\\_force\\_commission\\_on\\_national\\_guard\\_and\\_reserves\\_final\\_report.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/15401/transforming_the_national_guard_and_reserves_into_a_21stcentury_operational_force_commission_on_national_guard_and_reserves_final_report.html)] (accessed September 1, 2008), 223.

<sup>91</sup> Transforming the National Guard and Reserve into a 21st-Century Operational Force (Commission on National Guard and Reserve, Final Report). Final Report, Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2008.

[[http://www.cfr.org/publication/15401/transforming\\_the\\_national\\_guard\\_and\\_reserves\\_into\\_a\\_21stcentury\\_operational\\_force\\_commission\\_on\\_national\\_guard\\_and\\_reserves\\_final\\_report.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/15401/transforming_the_national_guard_and_reserves_into_a_21stcentury_operational_force_commission_on_national_guard_and_reserves_final_report.html)] (accessed September 1, 2008), 223.

<sup>92</sup> LTG Lovelace, “Prepared Statement,” April 12, 2007, 4.

wartime or domestic missions for lack of equipment.”<sup>93</sup> According to the Government Accounting Office, “the National Guard will continue to face critical equipment shortages that reduce its readiness for future missions and it will be challenged to train and prepare for future missions.”<sup>94</sup> Mission requirements demand an adequate supply of equipment, a proper mix of capabilities, and the most recent technologies for the National Guard.<sup>95</sup>

The “Essential 10” capabilities identified by the National Guard Bureau out of the approximate 342 critical dual-use equipment capabilities will ensure that the ARNG and Governors are well equipped to handle future domestic and federal operations. These ten capabilities were put to the test in an annual exercise named “Vigilant Guard” where the National Guard, federal, state and local agencies all participated in 2006.<sup>96</sup> The exercise scenario simulated 10-kiloton nuclear device detonation in the greater Indianapolis, Indiana, area and all levels of government exercised their crisis reaction plan. As part of the first response, the National Guard deployed over 2,000 Soldiers to the area from various states through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact process. The “Essential 10” capabilities can be deployed into this scenario as follows: The state of Indiana Joint Force Headquarters served as a focal point for the National Guard response, to include providing reception, staging, onward movement, and integration areas for arriving forces. A chemical, biological, and radiological detection team would assess the area, and advise the commander of any hazards. Engineer units would assist local and state agencies in debris removal, and search and rescue. Communication platforms would deploy to the area to establish and maintain interoperable communications. Ground transportation assets would

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<sup>93</sup> Mackenzie M. Eaglen, "Equipping the Army National Guard for the 21st Century." Backgrounder # 1983. The Heritage Foundation. November 13, 2006. [<http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1983.cfm>] (accessed December 18, 2008) 4.

<sup>94</sup> David M. Walker, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, *Reserve Force: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reexamined*, October 20, 2005, GAO-06-170T.

<sup>95</sup> Mackenzie M. Eaglen, "Equipping the Army National Guard for the 21st Century." Backgrounder # 1983. The Heritage Foundation. November 13, 2006. [<http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1983.cfm>] (accessed December 18, 2008).

transport civilians from the contaminated area to a clear zone, and transport logistical supplies to sustain the operation. Aviation assets can be used for Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) and to support first responders. Medical units could establish a mass casualty area and support civilian medical systems. Throughout the whole area, military security force can assist civil law enforcement agencies in maintaining law and order. Maintenance capabilities would be deployed to the area to ensure equipment is sustained for the operation. The 10 capabilities, under the direction of the JFHQ-State provide a comprehensive response to this type of simulated catastrophe.

According to Army officials, items procured for ARNG under the Guard modernization program will be standard warfighting equipment and may be deployed with the unit, and not always be available for domestic missions. Under the ARFORGEN model, units deploying will have access to three types of equipment sets over time as they mobilize for deployment once every six years, they include: a baseline set that would vary by unit type and assigned missions; a training set that would include more of the equipment units would need to be ready for deployment; and a deployment set that would include all equipment needed for deployment, including theater-specific equipment from the Army.<sup>97</sup> The purchase of the equipment set, to meet the “Essential 10” capabilities requirements will decrease the amount of equipment the Army needs to provide deploying ARNG units. It will also provide non-deploying units with the proper equipment to respond to domestic crises at home.

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<sup>96</sup> For further information on “Vigilant Guard” go to the National Guard website [<http://www.ngb.army.mil/features/vigilantguard/default.aspx>].

<sup>97</sup> *Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness*. Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations, House of Representatives, Government Accounting Office, U.S. Government, Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting Office, GAO 07-60. 2007. 31.

## Evaluating Readiness

In 2006, the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, General Peter Pace, stated that overall military readiness has declined and that the U.S. military is unable to respond to emerging challenges.<sup>98</sup> The Center of American Progress defines readiness as a complex measure of the ability of individual units to execute their missions.<sup>99</sup> Readiness is typically measured by evaluating personnel, training, and the availability of equipment needed to accomplish its assigned mission.<sup>100</sup> National Guard readiness cannot be gauged by comparing it to the active component, since the active component does not have to execute or be prepared for daily domestic response missions. Therefore, maintaining and measuring high readiness for both missions are vital, because unit readiness indicate to citizen of the nation that the National Guard is prepared and ready to respond when a crisis occurs. MG (retired) Arnold L. Punaro, chairman of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, stated that Guard readiness has continued to decline since March 2007. The panel on the National Guard and Reserve found 88% of the ARNG units were “not ready.”<sup>101</sup> MG (retired) Punaro reinforces General Pace assessment in 2006 that ARNG readiness continues to decline jeopardizing its ability to respond to nuclear, biological, and chemical (N.B.C.) strikes on U.S. soil.

There has been evidence from 1989 to 2009 to prove the existence of a decline in readiness in the National Guard. The size of the National Guard force has declined since the end of the Cold War. According to Director Richard Davis, national security analysis, in 1989 the

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<sup>98</sup> Lolita Baldor, “Gen. Peter Pace: Military Capability Eroding,” *The Washington Post*, February 27, 2007. The term *Military* includes: Active component, National Guard, and Reserves.

<sup>99</sup> Lawrence J. Korb, Peter Rundlet, Max Bergmann, Sean Duggan, and Peter Juul, *Beyond the call of duty*. Nonpartisan research, Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, August 2007. [[http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/08/readiness\\_report.html](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/08/readiness_report.html)] (accessed February 20, 2009).

<sup>100</sup> Mackenzie M. Eaglen, “Equipping the Army National Guard for the 21st Century.” Backgrounder # 1983. The Heritage Foundation. November 13, 2006. [<http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1983.cfm>] (accessed December 18, 2008).

<sup>101</sup> Ann Scott Tyson. “Appalling Gap Found in Homeland Defense Readiness.” *Washington Post*, February 1, 2008. A04 [<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/31/AR2008013101833.html>] (accessed February 25, 2009).

Guard had approximately 457,000 personnel. By the end of the fiscal year 1996, the Guard had 373,000 personnel. The ARNG continued to downsize in 1999 to 367,000. Today, the ARNG has approximately 355,000 personnel to conduct both federal and state missions.<sup>102</sup> Due to decline, the ARNG has lost over 103,000 personnel in the last two decades while the federal and state missions have increased. Since 9/11, personnel have been cross-leveled to ensure deploying units are at least 90-100% strength as they deploy. This process has compromised the capability of non-deploying units to respond to crises within their respective states and further exacerbating the declining readiness posture of the ARNG. An example of how the decline of personnel has had an impact on readiness is getting a unit ready for deployment. If 10,000 troops are to deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan, it will actually take 30,000 troops to prepare them for combat. 10,000 guardsmen are mobilizing to deploy, while another 10,000 are trainers at the mobilization station, and 10,000 are participating in the demobilization process.<sup>103</sup> This triples personnel requirements in the constant mobilization deployment cycle of ARFORGEN.

Clearly, the increase in OPTEMPO in the last eight years has had a detrimental effect on overall combat readiness. According to General Henry H. Shelton, in his testimony to Senate Appropriations Committee in 2000, “our experience in the Balkans underscores the reality that multiple, persistent commitments place a significant strain on our people and can erode warfighting readiness.”<sup>104</sup> That was true for the Balkans in 2000 as it is true for Iraq and Afghanistan in 2009. Both people and equipment wear out faster under extreme conditions.

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<sup>102</sup> Government Accounting Agency. “Army National Guard: Validate Requirements for Combat Forces and Size Those Forces Accordingly” (GAO/NSIAD-96-63). [<http://www.fas.org/man/gao/ns96063.htm>] (accessed March 5, 2008).

<sup>103</sup> Jack Spencer. *The Facts About Military Readiness*. Backgrounder # 1394. The Heritage Foundation. September 15, 2000. [<http://www.heritage.org/research/missiledefense/bg1394.cfm>] (accessed March 4, 2009).

<sup>104</sup> Jack Spencer. *The Facts About Military Readiness*. Backgrounder # 1394. The Heritage Foundation. September 15, 2000. [<http://www.heritage.org/research/missiledefense/bg1394.cfm>] (accessed March 4, 2009).

Training is another key component of readiness, and frequent deployments have caused guardsmen to postpone training and to reduce training schedules for units. If units are participating in the ARFORGEN model and training for deployment then it is done at the expense of training for state missions. The ARNG has a unique challenge to ensure guardsmen are trained on MOS skills, individual skills, and collective skills. Unlike Soldiers in the active component, guardsmen have full time civilian employment that competes for their time. The lack of proper training and civilian job commitments both impact ARNG readiness to respond to crisis. Commanders cannot train their soldiers if they do not have time. They also cannot train properly without the right equipment.

The National Guard's aging equipment and shortages have impacted readiness in training as well. According to General John Coburn, Commander of U.S. Army Material Command, "[o]ne of the most serious issues the Army faces is aging equipment. This issue is so serious that if not properly addressed and corrected it will inevitably result in degradation of the Army's ability to maintain its readiness."<sup>105</sup> He made this statement in 2000, and in 2003, as the National Guard was heavily mobilized to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan, it was evident at mobilization stations as well. Aging equipment, coupled with the decision to leave behind ARNG equipment in theater, has negatively impacted training, readiness measures, and the ability to respond to domestic support missions.

Overall, unit readiness is broken down into ranges from C-1 to C-5 in the four categories of personnel, equipment on hand, equipment readiness, and training. The USR assesses quantitatively the number of personnel and equipment physically present at a unit to the authorized provision for deployment. Qualitatively it assesses the actual condition of the

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<sup>105</sup> Jack Spencer. *The Facts About Military Readiness*. Backgrounder # 1394. The Heritage Foundation. September 15, 2000. [<http://www.heritage.org/research/missiledefense/bg1394.cfm>] (accessed March 4, 2009).

equipment on hand and the training of the unit as prescribed prior to deployment.<sup>106</sup> In this regard, one must understand how equipment is tracked and reported through the chain of command. The Army National Guard uses the standards in Army Regulation 220-1 to track equipment readiness. The USR, allows commanders at higher levels to assess the readiness of a unit, to include equipment status. This report assesses the equipment readiness of a unit by what is on hand, measured against the unit's wartime requirements and the condition or serviceability of the available equipment, --- whether it is fully mission capable, partially mission capable, or inoperable and awaiting maintenance.<sup>107</sup> The unit commander is responsible for the accuracy of the information and data provided in the report. The USR requires objective and subjective measurements of the status of resources and training in the unit and conveys the unit commander's concern and personal assessments of the unit's overall mission readiness to the chain of command. The USR system indicates the degree to which a unit has achieved prescribed levels of fill for personnel and equipment, the operational readiness status of available equipment, and training proficiency status of the unit.

The current reporting procedure for readiness is designed for the active component and the ARNG's federal mission. DoD's legacy readiness reporting system and its annual National Guard equipping report to Congress address warfighting readiness but do not address the Guard's domestic missions.<sup>108</sup> For example, if an Armor unit does not have all of its tanks and equipment for its wartime missions, it may receive a C-4 or C-5 rating which is low. This rating does not

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<sup>106</sup> C-1: Fully combat ready; C-2: Substantially combat-ready, that is, the unit only has minor combat deficiencies; C-3: Marginally combat-ready, that is, the unit has major deficiencies but can still perform its assigned missions; C-4: Not combat ready because the unit has so many deficiencies that it cannot perform its wartime functions; and C-5: Not combat-ready because the unit is undergoing a planned period of overhaul or maintenance. U.S. Department of Army, *Army Regulation 220-1: Unit Status Reporting* (Washington D.C.: December 2006): 23.

<sup>107</sup> Michael Waterhouse and JoAnne O'Bryant. "National Guard Personnel and Deployments: Fact Sheet." Order Code RS22451. Congressional Research Service. (January 17, 2008), 214.

<sup>108</sup> Christopher Shays, *Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness*. Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on National Security

equate to the unit's ability to respond to a domestic mission, such as a riot or search and rescue after an ice storm. According to the Government Accounting Office,

The National Guard's equipment requirements for domestic missions are not fully identified and DoD cannot acquire information that compares equipment on hand to those requirements, the department cannot provide Congress with detailed information on the National Guard's equipment status for its domestic missions, and senior decision makers of the military and civilian lack information to both assess whether the National Guard is appropriately equipped to respond to a large-scale domestic event and to target resources to assist the National Guard in mitigating any shortfalls.<sup>109</sup>

In 2002, the Army moved from the legacy readiness reporting system to the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). The new system is to meet the need of the U.S. Joint Forces Command by identifying units that have or can quickly develop, the capabilities requested by theater commanders.<sup>110</sup> Once again, the readiness reporting system is focused on the Regular Army and fails to take into account the National Guard's domestic mission. The National Guard readiness cannot be measured accurately until the requirements to conduct domestic missions are identify by the DoD.

## Conclusion

The United States Army National Guard (ARNG) continues to perform a vital role in the nation's defense. At home and abroad, the ARNG now provide ready and capable forces that perform full-spectrum operations in support of America's civil and military leadership.<sup>111</sup> It continues to play an important role in situations when the country needs an expanded Operational Force in a very short time, exemplified by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since September 11,

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and International Relations, House of Representatives, Government Accounting Office, U.S. Government, Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting Office, GAO 07-60. 2.

<sup>109</sup> Christopher Shays, *Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness*. Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations, House of Representatives, Government Accounting Office, U.S. Government, Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting Office, GAO 07-60, 22.

<sup>110</sup> Laura J. Junor, "The Defense Readiness Reporting System: A New Tool for Force Management," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue thirty nine. (accessed April 27, 2009).

<sup>111</sup> Association of the United State Army, "The Rebalance of the Army National Guard," *AUSA.ORG*, January 31, 2008. [www.USA.ORG](http://www.USA.ORG) (accessed December 18, 2008).

2001, the National Guard has mobilized over 255,000 guardsmen, to include 84,000 guardsmen for multiple deployments.<sup>112</sup> However, this increase in deployments for the National Guard has negatively impacted the readiness of the National Guard.

The conclusions reached by General Pace, and General (retired) Punaro that military readiness, including the ARNG, has declined overall in the last several years, is evident in the numerous reports conducted by the Government Accounting Office. At present, the military and National Guard would have difficulty responding at 100% of personnel and equipment to a new catastrophic crisis like the attack on the Twin Towers in New York or another war. It is evident that the National Guard is having trouble responding or even preparing for traditional seasonal spikes in domestic natural disasters, such as hurricanes in the Gulf Coast, tornado season in the Mid-West, or fire season on the west coast of the United States. Examples like Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the Kansas tornado in 2007 have elevated concerns that the readiness of the National Guard to respond to domestic missions has been seriously compromised due to the shortage of proper equipment. Heavy reliance on the National Guard to provide fully manned and equipped units to conduct multiple missions in Iraq and Afghanistan has created this shortage of equipment for the ARNG. This has prevented the ARNG from being able to respond fully to multiple crises, in a timely manner, to the domestic missions of Civil Support and Homeland Defense.

State governors are rightfully concerned that they will not have the capabilities required to respond to catastrophic or disruptive events within their states. Since 2001, there is evidence throughout the 54 states and territories to affirm the Governors' concerns. According to National Guard officials, much of the Guard's most modern equipment, such as high-water equipped vehicles, wreckers, and water trailers were deployed to Iraq, while less capable equipment remained in the United States. Non-deployed units reported that a lack of vehicles on-hand and a lack of available replacement parts to repair vehicles compromised their ability to transport

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<sup>112</sup> Congressional Research Service, *National Guard Personnel and Deployments: Fact Sheet*.

personnel during Katrina relief in 2005. In 2007, California's Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger stated, "National Guard units have been unable to deal with natural disasters...the equipment shortages could hinder the guard's response to large scale fires on the west coast."<sup>113</sup> Among these critical equipment shortages are satellite communications equipment, radios, trucks, helicopters, and night vision goggles that remained behind in Iraq and Afghanistan for subsequent unit rotations.<sup>114</sup>

It is difficult to understand where Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, and Civil Support all start and end. There is no clear transition. The ARNG needs to be equipped, trained, and resourced to respond to all three, as well as its national wartime missions. Governors will continue to use the resources and capabilities of the ARNG to be the first responders in time of crisis. Identifying the correct resources and capabilities is challenging, because of the many possible missions the ARNG is expected to perform. In 2006, LTG Steven H. Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, reaffirmed the National Guard's first priority is Homeland Defense and this is what the American public expects. LTG Blum also stated, "Governors count on the National Guard to be the first military responder and call on Guard assets at their disposal within the first hours of an event."<sup>115</sup> The two missions identified by LTG Blum required a wide range of resources needed to train, equip, and execute both types of missions.

The National Guard's dual missions need to be refined to clearly articulate the roles and responsibilities for war, Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, and support to civil authorities. The National Guard is heavily relied on to conduct multi-missions required by the National Security Strategy but is not resourced, equipped or funded to meet all the demands. The increased

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Report to Congress, Washington, D.C., January, 2008.

<sup>113</sup> Peter Spiegel, "Panels finds Guard is down," *Los Angeles Times*, February 1, 2008.

<sup>114</sup> David M. Walker, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, *Reserve Force: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reexamined*, October 20, 2005, GAO-06-170T, 3, 5.

OPTEMPO to support the deployments overseas has impacted the readiness of the National Guard to fully respond to domestic crises. The future must balance the requirements of federal and state missions in order to fully optimize the capabilities of the National Guard.

While predicting future demands for the ARNG is impossible, it seems clear that the Regular Army will rely heavily on the ARNG, not just as an Operational Reserve, but as an employed Operational Force. In order to optimize the capabilities of the ARNG, an increase of forces is necessary to build additional brigades. This will allow Army and ARNG planners the flexibility to prepare, train, and deploy units using the ARFORGEN model. Additional units will also compensate for deployed units in responding to domestic crises. The intent of ARFORGEN is to provide predictability for soldiers and guardsmen, in terms of impending deployment but it does not align well with the dual National Guard missions. The ARFORGEN process does not account for the purpose, missions, or uniqueness of the National Guard in terms of Homeland requirements. If the model does not compensate for the Guard's dual missions, then guardsmen who have full time employment, their duty to the National Guard, and impending deployments, will not be able to balance the three on their own.

The increased OPTEMPO on the National Guard force came with the transformation from the Strategic Reserve to Operational Force. This transformation was required to bring the National Guard into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, but this change brought emergent challenges. The National Guard is not currently equipped, or the policies in place to protect the guardsmen civilian jobs from multiple deployments as an Operational Force. Functioning as an Operational Force, multiple deployments have impacted the capabilities and resources available for Governors to respond to crisis within their respective states. The DoD projects that in the next five years, the

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<sup>115</sup> Steven H. Blum, "Homeland defense and Military support to civil authority: Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, National Guard Bureau," (Washington, D.C., 2006).

National Guard will receive up to 75% of its authorized equipment. Until then, the National Guard has to deal with inevitable domestic crises with inadequate resources.

## **Recommendations**

Guardsmen in the 21<sup>st</sup> century will be expected to do more, as citizen soldiers, than those of the past; an expectation that will challenge national and state leaders to maintain the readiness of the Guard. The National Guard is more flexible, resilient, agile, and responsive to merging foreign and domestic threats than ever in its history. ARNG units are currently deployed on multiple federal missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In addition, the ARNG requirements for Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, and support to Civil Authorities have increased throughout the 53 states, territories (Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Guam), and the District of Columbia. As a result, over 250,000 guardsmen have vital experience from their federal and domestic missions. To further improve the readiness posture of the National Guard, it should stand-up a battalion in four Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions to respond to crises of Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, support to Civil Authorities.

The Office of Homeland Security forecast the likelihood of non-state actors acquiring weapon of mass destruction to attack the United States in the next five years as high. This scenario should drive the demand for future Homeland Defense missions. In October 2008, U.S. Army North assigned a Regular Army Brigade to respond to Homeland Defense missions. This course of action is problematic because the Regular Army does not have a working relationship with FEMA, state governors, or state adjutant generals. Use of Regular Army units in domestic crises also raises issues of response time to an incident, command and control, and legal ramifications. The Governor maintains states ARNG capabilities in order to deploy the ARNG within hours to respond to a natural disaster without the President authority or a declaration of a national emergency. This is another advantage over Regular Army forces, which can take up to 72 hours, and a declaration from the President, before they can respond. I propose the National

Guard assign a battalion in FEMA Region Ten (Seattle), one in Region Five (Chicago), one in Region Six (Texas), and the last one in Region Three (Philadelphia) to supplement states capability to respond to a natural disaster.

As part of the first responders, FEMA, the National Guard, state, and local government have a habitual relationship in responding to natural disasters within hours in the respective region. The locations of the battalion in the four regions reflect the types of natural disasters which occur. The battalion in Region Ten (Seattle) would respond to large fires and powerful magnitude earthquake in the region. The battalion in the Region Five (Chicago) would respond to major floods, devastating tornados in the Midwest region, and winter ice storms in the region. The battalion in Region Six (Texas) would respond to catastrophic hurricanes in the southeast states, devastating tornados, and major floods in the region. Lastly, the battalion in Region Three (Philadelphia) would respond to catastrophic hurricanes along the east coast, winter ice storms, and additional request for force in the capital region. If the United States suffered another Hurricane Katrina or if a dirty bomb detonated in key a location the four battalion could converge to the location and merge into an enhance brigade to support the governor, state, and local authorities.

The composition of the four battalions would vary depending on the types of natural disasters they are responsible for in the region. In accordance with the 10 Essential capabilities the units would have additional personnel in the command and control headquarters to report to JFHQ-State. The battalion would be under the command of the governor and state adjutant general of the FEMA region until requested to respond to a natural disaster. Then the battalion would be under operational control of the governor requesting assistance from the National Guard Bureau. Additional unit capabilities in the battalion would be aviation, medium to large ground transportation, medical, military police, and signal units. Special units assigned to the battalion would be civil support teams and a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRNE) team.

The employment of the battalion would be contingent to a request from a state governor dealing with a situation that exceeds his/her capabilities. The employment of a battalion would require a significant disaster where a governor does not have the capabilities within his/her state to respond. For example, if a Category 4 Hurricane Thomas hits Newport, Rhode Island (RI) causing destruction equivalent to Hurricane Katrina the following events may occur. Rhode Island JFHQ-State would assume the role of command and control center, the RI-ARNG would be activated to conduct recovery operation, EMAC and MOA would be executed, and the state adjutant general would request assistance through the National Guard Bureau. With the request for additional capabilities and forces the National Guard Bureau would task the battalion in FEMA Region Three (Philadelphia) to deploy to Rhode Island prior to the hurricane landing. Another scenario is to deploy all four battalion with a brigade headquarter to support Rhode Island Governor. The ability to deploy a battalion or four battalions that are resourced, trained, and that have vital capabilities to an affected region of the nation would allow senior leadership on the national, state, local level and the military time to assess the situation.

The ARNG has over 250,000 guardsmen with vital experience from their federal and domestic missions. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have restored pride among communities across the nations on the perspective of the National Guard. The next generations of Citizen-Soldiers are experienced combat veterans and they have closed the gap with the Regular Army as an Operational Force. At home, American's can rest assure the National Guard is ready and will be there when a catastrophic disaster hits in the United States. This was demonstrated when 50,000 Citizen-Soldiers and Airmen from 53 states, territories (Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Guam), and the District of Columbia saved more than 17,000 lives during Hurricane Katrina.<sup>116</sup> The National Guard Bureau needs to continue to enhance the emergency response capabilities

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<sup>116</sup> National Guard Bureau, "*Vigilant Guard*," National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia. <http://www.ngb.army.mil/features/vigilantguard/RI.aspx> (accessed May 1, 2009)

and coordination of all first responders as we become the next generation of Citizen-Soldiers in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

The National Guard is an integral part of the military's operational force deployed around the world, and a first responder in case of a catastrophic disaster in the United States. The use of the Army National Guard has been evolving over the last decade, but for many of those years it has lacked modern equipment to conduct its federal and domestic missions. The dependency on the National Guard from Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, and support to Civil Authorities missions is complicated and the demand continues to increase. The four Quick Reaction Brigade would be aligned with Homeland Security National Defense Strategy and provide another option for senior civilian and military leadership to respond to any threats. Therefore, resourcing the Army National Guard to execute these missions will strengthen our nation's defenses at home and abroad.

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