Cuba: Issues for Congress

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Summary

Cuba remains a hard-line Communist state, with a poor record on human rights. Fidel Castro has ruled since he led the Cuban Revolution, ousting the corrupt government of Fulgencio Batista from power in 1959. With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experienced severe economic deterioration from 1989-1993. There has been some improvement since 1994 as Cuba has implemented limited reforms.

Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions. The Clinton and Bush Administrations have essentially continued this policy. The principal tool of policy remains comprehensive sanctions, which were made stronger with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) in 1992 and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act in 1996, often referred to as the Helms/Burton legislation. Another component of U.S. policy consists of support measures for the Cuban people, including private humanitarian donations and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. In May 2001, President Bush stated that his Administration would oppose any efforts to weaken sanctions against Cuba, and in July 2001, he asked the Treasury Department to enhance and expand its embargo enforcement capabilities.

There appears to be broad agreement among those concerned with Cuba on the overall objective of U.S. policy toward Cuba — to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island. But there have been several schools of thought on how to achieve that objective. Some advocate a policy of keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuing current U.S. efforts to support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referred to as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are hurting the Cuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. Still others call for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo. Policy debate in the past several years has focused on whether to maintain U.S. restrictions on food and medical exports as well as on travel to Cuba.

Legislative initiatives introduced in the 107th Congress reflect these divergent views on the direction of U.S. policy toward Cuba and also cover a range of issues including human rights, food and medical exports, travel restrictions, drug interdiction cooperation, and broadcasting to Cuba. On July 25, 2001, in action on the Treasury Department Appropriations for FY2002 (H.R. 2590), the House approved an amendment that would prohibit the Treasury Department from using funds to enforce restrictions on travel to Cuba. Ultimately, the Cuba travel provision was not included in the conference report to the bill. The Senate version of the “Farm Bill,” S. 1731 (Harkin), would strike language from U.S. law that prohibits private financing of agricultural sales to Cuba.
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Cuba: Issues for Congress

This report examines the economic and political situation in Cuba, including the human rights situation, and U.S. policy toward Cuba. The report also analyzes a number of issues facing Congress in U.S. policy toward Cuba, including: the overall direction of U.S. policy; challenges to U.S. policy in the World Trade Organization; restrictions on commercial food and medical exports; restrictions on travel; bilateral drug trafficking cooperation; Cuba and terrorism; funding for U.S.-government sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba; the Russian signals intelligence facility in Cuba; migration issues; and compensation to the families of those Americans killed in 1996 when Cuba shot down two U.S. civilian planes. The report cites legislation that was passed in the 106th Congress, and also tracks legislative action on these various issues in U.S. policy toward Cuba in the 107th Congress.

Most Recent Developments

In mid-January 2002, the U.S. military began transferring captured Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters from Afghanistan to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. As of late January, 158 detainees were being held at Guantanamo. Although the Cuban government objects to the U.S. presence at Guantanamo, it has not opposed the new mission of housing detainees from Afghanistan. (See “Cuba and Terrorism” below.)

On December 10, 2001, the Senate began consideration of S. 1731 (Harkin), the 2002 “Farm Bill”, which includes a provision striking restrictions in U.S. law (Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, P.L. 106-387, Title IX) on private financing of agricultural sales to Cuba. On December 18, the Senate tabled an amendment that would have conditioned the provision on a presidential certification that Cuba was not a state sponsor of international terrorism. The Bush Administration strongly opposes the provision (See “Food and Medical Exports” below).

In the aftermath of Hurricane Michelle that struck in early November 2001, Cuba negotiated with several U.S. agricultural companies for a reported $30-40 million in products such as wheat, corn, soybeans, rice, and chicken. The first shipments of goods arrived in mid-December 2001, and others are expected to be completed by February 2002 (see “Food and Medical Exports” below).
Economic Conditions

With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experienced severe economic deterioration from 1989-1993, although there has been some improvement since 1994. Estimates of economic decline in the 1989-93 period range from 35-50%. The economy reportedly grew 0.7% in 1994, 2.5% in 1995, and 7.8% in 1996. While the Cuban government originally was predicting a growth rate of 4-5% for 1997, growth for the year was just 2.5%, largely because of disappointing sugar production. For 1998, the government’s goal was for a growth rate of 2.5-3.5%, but another poor sugar harvest, a severe drought in eastern Cuba, and the effects of Hurricane Georges resulted in an estimated growth rate of just 1.2%. In 1999, the economy grew 6.2%, and in 2000, it grew 5.6%.

Economic growth forecasts for 2001 and 2002 were 3.8% and 5% respectively, but those forecasts most likely will be reduced in the aftermath of the effects of Hurricane Michelle and the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States.\(^1\) The terrorist attacks severely affected Cuba’s tourist industry, with reports of some hotels closing and restaurants empty. Hurricane Michelle damaged some 45,000 homes and severely hurt the sugar and citrus sectors.\(^2\)

Socialist Cuba has prided itself on the nation’s accomplishments in health and education. For example, according to the World Bank, the literacy rate is 94% and life expectancy is 76 years, compared to 79% and 68 years average for other middle-income developing countries. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reports that Cuba’s infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) was just 7.9 in 1996, the lowest rate in Latin America and among the world’s top 20 countries for this indicator. Nevertheless, the country’s economic decline has reduced living standards considerably and resulted in shortages in medicines and medical supplies.

When Cuba’s economic slide began in 1989, the government showed little willingness to adopt any significant market-oriented economic reforms, but in 1993, faced with unprecedented economic decline, Cuba began to change policy direction. Since 1993, Cubans have been allowed to own and use U.S. dollars and to shop at dollar-only shops previously limited to tourists and diplomats. Self-employment was authorized in more than 100 occupations in 1993, most in the service sector, and by 1996 that figure had grown to more than 150 occupations. Other Cuban economic reforms included breaking up large state farms into smaller, more autonomous, agricultural cooperatives (Basic Units of Cooperative Production, UBPCs) in 1993; opening agricultural markets in September 1994 where farmers could sell part of their produce on the open market; opening artisan markets in October 1994 for the sale of handicrafts; allowing private food catering, including home restaurants (paladares) in June 1995 (in effect legalizing activities that were already taking place); approving a new foreign investment law in September 1995 that allows fully owned investments

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\(^2\) Marie Sanz, “Hurricane Michelle Delivers Fresh Blow to Ailing Cuban Economy,” *Agence France Presse*, November 9, 2001.
by foreigners in all sectors of the economy with the exception of defense, health, and education; and authorizing the establishment of free trade zones with tariff reductions typical of such zones in June 1996. In May 1997, the government enacted legislation to reform the banking system and established a new Central Bank (BCC) to operate as an autonomous and independent entity.

Despite these measures, the quality of life for many Cubans remains difficult, characterized by low wages, high prices for many basic goods, shortages of medicines, and power outages. Moreover, some analysts fear that the government has begun to backtrack on its reform efforts. Regulations and new taxes have made it extremely difficult for many of the nation’s self-employed (at one point estimated at more than 200,000, but now estimated at 160,000 or lower, out of a total labor force of some 4.5 million). Some home restaurants have been forced to close because of the regulations. Some foreign investors in Cuba have also begun to complain that the government has backed out of deals or forced them out of business.  

Political Conditions

Although Cuba has undertaken some limited economic reforms, politically the country remains a hard-line Communist state. Fidel Castro, who turned 75 on August 13, 2001, has ruled since the 1959 Cuban Revolution, which ousted the corrupt government of Fulgencio Batista from power. Castro soon laid the foundations for an authoritarian regime by consolidating power and forcing moderates out of the government. In April 1961, Castro admitted that the Cuban Revolution was socialist, and in December 1961, he proclaimed himself to be a Marxist-Leninist. From 1959 until 1976, Castro ruled by decree.

A constitution was enacted in 1976 setting forth the Communist Party as the leading force in the state and in society (with power centered in a Politburo headed by Fidel Castro). The constitution also outlined national, provincial, and local governmental structures. Executive power is vested in a Council of Ministers, headed by Fidel Castro as President. Legislative authority is vested in a National Assembly of People’s Power, currently with 601 members, that meets twice annually for brief periods. While Assembly members were directly elected for the first time in February 1993, only a single slate of candidates was offered. Elections for the National Assembly were held for a second time in January 1998. Voters again were not offered a choice of candidates. From October 8-10, 1997, the Cuban Communist Party held its 5th Congress (the prior one was held in 1991) in which the party reaffirmed its commitment to a single party state and reelected Fidel and Raul Castro as the party’s first and second secretaries.

Pope John Paul II visited Cuba from January 21-25, 1998, and conducted a series of open-air masses across the country that were televised in Cuba. Numerous Catholic groups from the United States traveled to Cuba for the Pope’s visit as did thousands of journalists from around the world. While much of his visit was spent on pastoral issues, such as encouraging Cubans to come back to the Church, the Pope

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3“Crackdowns, Restrictions, Sour Investors in Cuba,” Miami Herald, June 10, 1999, p. 1A.
also made more political statements. He criticized the U.S. embargo as “unjust and ethically unacceptable,” but also criticized the Cuban government for denying freedom to the Cuban people. He asked the government to release “prisoners of conscience,” and Vatican officials gave Cuba a list of more than 200 prisoners. On February 12, 1998, the Vatican announced that Cuba had freed dozens of detainees, noting that this step represented a prospect of hope for the future.

There was much speculation about what effect the Pope’s trip to Cuba might have on the political situation. The trip did not spark unrest from those opposed to the regime, nor did the government take any actions to loosen the tight political control of the state and party. Over the longer-term, however, the Pope’s visit could result in elevating the profile of the Catholic Church in such a way that it emerges as an important actor in Cuba’s civil society. An enhanced profile could improve its chances to influence the policies and actions of the government.

**Human Rights**

Cuba has a poor record on human rights, with the government sharply restricting basic rights, including freedom of expression, association, assembly, movement, and other basic rights. It has cracked down on dissent, arrested human rights activists and independent journalists, and staged demonstrations against critics. Although some anticipated a relaxation of the government’s oppressive tactics in the aftermath of the Pope’s January 1998 visit, government attacks against human rights activists and other dissidents have continued since that time.

Estimates of the number of political prisoners in Cuba vary considerably since the Cuban government does not allow human rights organizations to monitor prisons. According to the State Department’s human rights report covering 2000, human rights groups inside Cuba estimate the number of political prisoners at between 300 and 400. According to the report, “the authorities have imprisoned persons on charges such as disseminating enemy propaganda, illicit association, contempt for the authorities (usually for criticizing Fidel Castro), clandestine printing, or the broad charge of rebellion, which is often brought against advocates of peaceful democratic change.”

In May 2000, Cuba released three prominent dissidents from prison. On May 23, Cuba released Rene Gomez Manzano, while Marta Beatriz Roque was set free on May 15 and Felix Bonne on May 12. All three were leaders of the “Dissident Working Group” and had been imprisoned since July 1997. All three have vowed to continue their peaceful opposition to the Cuban government. One remaining leader of the group, Vladimiro Roca, remains in prison. The four leaders were convicted by a Cuban court on March 15, 1999, on charges of “sedition” under the Cuban penal code after a one-day trial on March 1. Sentences ranged from 3 ½ years for Roque to 4 years for Bonne and Gomez Manzano and 5 years for Roca. Just before the dissidents’ trial, scores of human rights advocates, independent journalists, and other activists were detained so that they could not cover or protest the trial. The four dissidents had released a document in June 1997 entitled, “The Homeland Belongs to Us All” [http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y97/jul97/homdoc.htm] that strongly criticized a draft report of the 5th Congress of the Cuban Communist Party that was
going to be held that October. The dissidents also urged Cubans not to vote in legislative elections and encouraged foreign investors not to invest in Cuba.

**UNCHR Resolutions.** From 1991 until 1997, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) called on the Cuban government to cooperate with a Special Representative (later upgraded to Special Rapporteur) designated by the Secretary General to investigate the human rights situation in Cuba. But Cuba refused to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur, and the UNCHR annually approved resolutions condemning Cuba’s human rights record. In 1998, however, the UNCHR rejected — by a vote of 16 to 19, with 18 abstentions — the annual resolution sponsored by the United States that would have condemned Cuba’s rights record and would have extended the work of the Special Rapporteur for another year. U.S. officials and human rights activists expressed deep disappointment with the vote. Observers maintained that the vote did not signify any improvement in human rights in Cuba, but rather was an expression of disagreement with the United States over its policy toward Cuba.

For three years now, the UNCHR has again approved resolutions criticizing Cuba for its human rights record, although without appointing a Special Rapporteur. In 1999, the UNCHR resolution was approved by a vote of 21-20, with 12 abstentions. In 2000, the resolution, sponsored by the Czech Republic and Poland, was approved by a vote of 21-18, with 14 abstentions. On April 18, 2001, the resolution, sponsored by the Czech Republic and co-sponsored by 16 other nations, including the United States, was approved by a vote of 22-20, with 10 abstentions. A U.S. Congressional delegation traveled to Geneva to encourage adoption of the resolution. Mexico abstained but, in a shift under the new Fox administration, publicly stated its concern about human rights in Cuba.

**Outlook**

Observers are divided over the future of the Castro government. While some believe that the demise of the government is imminent, there is considerable disagreement over when or how this may occur. Varying scenarios range from a coup or popular uprising, possibly with support from or acceptance by the Cuban military, to the voluntary resignation and self-exile of Castro. Some point to Castro’s age and predict that the regime will collapse without Fidel at the helm. Other observers maintain that reports of the impending collapse of the Cuban government have been exaggerated and that Castro may remain in power for years. They point to Cuba’s strong security apparatus and the extraordinary system of controls that prevents dissidents from gaining popular support. Moreover, observers maintain that Cuba’s elite has no interest in Castro’s overthrow, and that Castro still enjoys some support, in part because of the social benefits of the Cuban revolution, but also because Cubans see no alternative to Castro. Even if Castro is overthrown or resigns, the important question remaining is the possibility or viability of a stable democratic Cuba after Castro. Analysts point out that the Castro government has successfully impeded the development of independent civil society, with no private sector, no independent labor movement, and no unified political opposition. For this reason, they contend that building a democratic Cuba will be a formidable task, one that could meet stiff resistance from many Cubans.
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro began to build a repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward close relations with the Soviet Union. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-Cuban relationship is illustrated by such events and actions as: U.S. covert operations to overthrow the Castro government culminating in the ill-fated April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis in which the United States confronted the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba; Cuban support for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments in Africa and the Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans to the United States in the so-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than 30,000 Cubans who were interdicted and housed at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo and Panama; and the February 1996 shootdown by Cuban fighter jets of two U.S. civilian planes, resulting in the death of four U.S. crew members.4

Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions. The principal tool of U.S. policy remains comprehensive sanctions, which were made stronger with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 and with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114), often referred to as the Helms/Burton legislation. The CDA prohibits U.S. subsidiaries from engaging in trade with Cuba and prohibits entry into the United States for any vessel to load or unload freight if it has engaged in trade with Cuba within the last 180 days. The Helms/Burton legislation — enacted in the aftermath of Cuba’s shooting down of two U.S. civilian planes in February 1996 — combines a variety of measures to increase pressure on Cuba and provides for a plan to assist Cuba once it begins the transition to democracy. Among the law’s sanctions is a provision in Title III that holds any person or government that traffics in U.S. property confiscated by the Cuban government liable for monetary damages in U.S. federal court. Acting under provisions of the law, President Clinton suspended the implementation of Title III at 6-month intervals.

Another component of U.S. policy consists of support measures for the Cuban people, a so-called second track of U.S. policy. This includes U.S. private humanitarian donations, U.S. government support for democracy-building efforts for Cuba, and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba, Radio and TV Marti.

In the aftermath of the Pope’s January 1998 visit to Cuba, the Clinton Administration made several changes to U.S. policy intended to augment U.S. support for the Cuban people. In March 1998, President Clinton announced: 1) the resumption of licensing for direct humanitarian charter flights to Cuba (which had been curtailed after the February 1996 shootdown of two U.S. civilian planes); 2) the resumption of cash remittances up to $300 per quarter for the support of close relatives in Cuba (which had been curtailed in August 1994 in response to the migration crisis with

4For more on the background of U.S.-Cuban relations from CRS see CRS Report RL30386, Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events Since 1959.
Cuba; 3) the development of licensing procedures to streamline and expedite licenses for the commercial sale of medicines and medical supplies and equipment to Cuba; and 4) a decision to work on a bipartisan basis with Congress on the transfer of food to the Cuban people. The President stated that his actions would “build further on the impact of the Pope’s visit to Cuba,” “support the role of the Church and other elements of civil society in Cuba,” and “help prepare the Cuban people for a democratic transition.”

In January 1999, President Clinton announced five additional measures to support the Cuban people: 1) a broadening cash remittances to Cuba, so that all U.S. residents (not just those with close relatives in Cuba) are allowed to send $300 per quarter to any Cuban family and licensing larger remittances by U.S. citizens and nongovernmental organizations to entities independent of the Cuban government; 2) an expansion of direct passenger charter flights to Cuba from additional U.S. cities other than the current flights from Miami, and to cities other than Havana (direct flights later in the year began from Los Angeles and New York); 3) the re-establishment of direct mail service to Cuba, which was suspended in 1962 (this measure has not yet been negotiated with the Cuban government); 4) authorization for the commercial sale of food to independent entities in Cuba such as religious groups and private restaurants and the sale of agricultural inputs to independent entities such as private farmers and farmer cooperatives producing food for sale in private markets and 5) an expansion of people-to-people contact through two-way exchanges among academics, athletes, and scientists.

President Bush made his first clear statement on his Administration’s policy toward Cuba on May 18, 2001. He stated that his Administration “will oppose any attempt to weaken sanctions against Cuba’s government ... until this regime frees its political prisoners, holds democratic, free elections, and allows for free speech.” He also said that he would “actively support those working to bring about democratic change in Cuba” and would therefore support legislation such as the Cuban Solidarity and the Cuban Internal Opposition Assistance Acts. He also advocated expanded access to the Internet for average Cubans and “strengthen[ing] the voices” of Radio and TV Marti.”

While President Bush has announced stronger measures to enforce the embargo, he also has continued in the same vein as the Clinton Administration by suspending implementation of Title III of the Helms-Burton legislation. On July 13, 2001, President Bush asked the Treasury Department to enhance and expand the enforcement capabilities of the Office of Foreign Assets Control. The President noted the importance of upholding and enforcing the law in order to prevent “unlicensed and excessive travel,” enforce limits on remittances, and ensure that humanitarian and cultural exchanges actually reach pro-democracy activists in Cuba. Just three days later, on July 16, 2001, President Bush decided to continue to suspend for a 6-month period the Title III provisions of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (P.L. 104-114) that allows U.S. nationals to sue for money damages in U.S. federal court those persons who traffic in property confiscated in Cuba. He cited efforts by

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European countries and other U.S. allies to push for democratic change in Cuba. President Bush again suspended implementation of Title III on January 16, 2002, for a 6-month period.

**Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations**

**Overall Direction of U.S. Policy**

Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objective of U.S. policy toward Cuba — to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island — there have been several schools of thought about how to achieve that objective. Some advocate a policy of keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuing current U.S. efforts to support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referred to as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are hurting the Cuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. Still others call for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo.

In general, those advocating a loosening of the sanctions-based policy toward Cuba make several policy arguments. They assert that if the United States moderated its policy toward Cuba — through increased travel, trade and diplomatic dialogue, that the seeds of reform would be planted in Cuba, which would stimulate and strengthen forces for peaceful change on the island. They stress the importance to the United States of avoiding violent change in Cuba, with the prospect of a mass exodus to the United States and the potential of involving the United States in a civil war scenario. They argue that since Castro’s demise does not appear imminent, the United States should espouse a more realistic approach in trying to induce change in Cuba. Supporters of changing policy also point to broad international support for lifting the U.S. embargo, to the missed opportunities to U.S. businesses because of the embargo, and to the increased suffering of the Cuban people because of the embargo. Proponents of change also argue that the United States should adhere to some consistency in its policies with the world’s few remaining Communist governments, and also maintain that moderating policy will help advance human rights in Cuba.

On the other side, opponents of changing U.S. policy maintain that the current two-track policy of isolating Cuba, but reaching out to the Cuban people through measures of support, is the best means for realizing political change in Cuba. They point out that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 sets forth a road map for what steps Cuban needs to take in order for the United States to normalize relations, including lifting the embargo. They argue that softening U.S. policy at this time without concrete Cuban reforms would boost the Castro regime politically and economically, enabling the survival of the Communist regime. Opponents of softening U.S. policy argue that the United States should stay the course in its commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba; that sustained sanctions can work; and that the sanctions against Cuba have only come to full impact with the loss of large subsidies from the former Soviet bloc. Opponents of loosening U.S. sanctions further argue that Cuba’s failed economic policies, not the U.S. embargo, are the causes of the economy’s rapid decline.
Numerous measures were introduced in the 106th Congress that reflected the range of views on U.S. policy toward Cuba. Legislative initiatives proposed both easing and increasing sanctions against Cuba. In the end, legislation passed reflected both approaches: it allowed the export of food and medicine to Cuba, but prohibited any U.S. financing, both public and private, of such exports. Another law facilitated enforcement of anti-terrorism judgments in U.S. courts to allow for the payment of a judgment against Cuba to be paid from Cuba’s frozen assets in the United States to the families of three U.S. citizens killed when Cuba shot down two U.S. planes in 1996.

Legislative initiatives introduced in the 107th Congress continue to reflect divergent views on the direction of U.S. policy toward Cuba (whether sanctions should be eased or intensified) and also cover a range of issues including human rights, immigration, drug interdiction cooperation, and broadcasting to Cuba. (For a full listing, see “Legislative Initiatives in the 107th Congress” below.)

Several bills in the 107th Congress would strengthen sanctions on Cuba. H.R. 160 (Ros-Lehtinen), would prohibit rescheduling or forgiving any outstanding bilateral debt owed to the United States by Russia until the President certifies that Russia has ceased all its operations, removed all personnel from, and permanently closed the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba (see section below on “Russian Intelligence Facility in Cuba,” which discusses Russia’s October 2001 decision to close the facility). H.R. 2292 (Rothman), would amend the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 to require, as a condition for the determination that a democratically elected government in Cuba exists, that the government extradite to the United States convicted felon Joanne Chesimard and all other U.S. fugitives from justice. S. 137 (Gramm), a bill authorizing the negotiation of free trade agreements with the countries of the Americas, would not apply to Cuba unless the President certifies that freedom has been restored in Cuba and that the claims of U.S. citizens for compensation for expropriated property have been appropriately addressed. In addition, some Members opposed to easing sanctions have proposed legislation, H.R. 1271 (Diaz-Balart) and S. 894 (Helms), providing increased support to the democratic opposition within Cuba.

On the other side of the policy debate, numerous measures have been introduced to ease U.S. sanctions policy toward Cuba. During July 25, 2001 floor action on H.R. 2590, the FY2002 Treasury Department appropriations bill, the House debated two amendments that would ease U.S. sanctions on Cuba, approving one (H. Amdt. 241) that would prohibit spending for administering Treasury Department regulations restricting travel to Cuba and rejecting the second (H.Amdt. 242) that would prohibit Treasury Department funds from administering the overall U.S. embargo on Cuba. Ultimately, the Cuba travel provision was not included in the conference report to the bill (see “Travel Restrictions” below.)

Numerous legislative initiatives focus on easing restrictions on food and medical exports to Cuba. The Senate version of the 2002 “Farm Bill,” S. 1731 (Harkin), would strike language from the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that prohibits private financing of agricultural sales to Cuba (for details, see “Food and Medical Exports” below). An attempt in the Senate to condition a lifting of financing restrictions on a presidential certification that
Cuba was not a state sponsor of international terrorism was defeated on December 18, 2001. (For further information, see “Food and Medical Exports” below and CRS Issue Brief IB10061, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Status and Implementation.)

In addition to H.R. 2590, several broad initiatives would lift all sanctions on trade, financial transactions, and travel to Cuba: H.R. 174 (Serrano), identical bills S. 400 (Baucus) and H.R. 798 (Rangel), and H.R. 2662 (Paul), a bill that would also prohibit any federal funds to provide assistance to Cuba.

**Helms/Burton Legislation**

**Major Provisions.** The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (P.L. 104-114) was enacted into law on March 12, 1996. **Title I, Section 102(h)**, codifies all existing Cuban embargo Executive Orders and regulations. No presidential waiver is provided for any of these codified embargo provisions. This provision is significant because of the long-lasting effect on U.S. policy options toward Cuba. In effect, the Clinton Administration and subsequent administrations will be circumscribed in any changes in U.S. policy toward Cuba.

**Title III** allows U.S. nationals to sue for money damages in U.S. federal court those persons that traffic in property confiscated in Cuba. It extends the right to sue to Cuban Americans who became U.S. citizens after their properties were confiscated. The President has authority to delay implementation for 6 months at a time if he determines that such a delay would be in the national interest and would expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba.

**Title IV** of the law denies admission to the United States to aliens involved in the confiscation of U.S. property in Cuba or in the trafficking of confiscated U.S. property in Cuba. This includes corporate officers, principals, or shareholders with a controlling interest of an entity involved in the confiscation of U.S. property or trafficking of U.S. property. It also includes the spouse, minor child, or agent of aliens who would be excludable under the provision. This provision is mandatory, and only waiveable on a case-by-case basis for travel to the United States for humanitarian medical reasons or for individuals to defend themselves in legal actions regarding confiscated property.

**Implementation of Title III and IV.** With regard to Title III, beginning in July 1996 then-President Clinton suspended — for 6-month periods, as provided for under the act — the right of individuals to file suit against those persons benefitting from confiscated U.S. property in Cuba. At the time of the first suspension on July 16, 1996, the President announced that he would allow Title III to go into effect, and as a result liability for trafficking under the title became effective on November 1, 1996. According to the Clinton Administration, this put foreign companies in Cuba on notice that they face prospects of future lawsuits and significant liability in the United States. At the second suspension on January 3, 1997, President Clinton stated that he would continue to suspend the right to file law suits “as long as America’s friends and allies continued their stepped-up efforts to promote a transition to
democracy in Cuba.” He continued, at 6-month intervals, to suspend the rights to file Title III lawsuits.

President Bush has continued to suspend implementation of Title III. On July 16, 2001, President Bush made the decision to continue to suspend the implementation and cited efforts by European countries and other U.S. allies to push for democratic change in Cuba. On January 16, 2002, President Bush once again suspended implementation of Title III for a six-month period.

With regard to Title IV of the legislation, to date the State Department has banned from the United States a number of executives and their families from three companies because of their investment in confiscated U.S. property in Cuba: Grupos Domos, a Mexican telecommunications company; Sherritt International, a Canadian mining company; and BM Group, an Israeli-owned citrus company. In 1997, Grupos Domos disinvested from U.S.-claimed property in Cuba, and as a result its executives are again eligible to enter the United States. Action against executives of STET, an Italian telecommunications company was averted by a July 1997 agreement in which the company agreed to pay the U.S.-based ITT Corporation $25 million for the use of ITT-claimed property in Cuba for ten years. In the 105th Congress, the FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 105-277, H.R. 4328) included a provision that requires the Administration to report on the implementation of Title IV of the Helms/Burton legislation.

**Foreign Reaction and the EU’s WTO Challenge.** Many U.S. allies — including Canada, Japan, Mexico, and European Union (EU) nations — strongly criticized the enactment of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. They maintain that the law’s provisions allowing foreign persons to be sued in U.S. court constitute an extraterritorial application of U.S. law that is contrary to international principles. U.S. officials maintain that the United States, which reserves the right to protect its security interests, is well within its obligations under NAFTA and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Until mid-April 1997, the EU had been pursuing its case at the WTO, in which it was challenging the Helms/Burton legislation as an extraterritorial application of U.S. law. The beginning of a settlement on the issue occurred on April 11, 1997, when an EU-U.S. understanding was reached. In the understanding, both sides agreed to continue efforts to promote democracy in Cuba and to work together to develop an agreement on agreed disciplines and principles for the strengthening of investment protection relating to the confiscation of property by Cuba and other governments. As part of the understanding, the EU agreed that it would suspend its WTO dispute settlement case. Subsequently in mid-April 1998, the EU agreed to let its WTO challenge expire.

Talks between the United States and the EU on investment disciplines proved difficult, with the EU wanting to cover only future investments and the United States wanting to cover past expropriations, especially in Cuba. Nevertheless, after months of negotiations, the EU and the United States reached a second understanding on May 18, 1998. The understanding set forth EU disciplines regarding investment in expropriated properties worldwide, in exchange for the Clinton Administration’s success at obtaining a waiver from Congress for the legislation’s Title IV visa
restrictions. Future investment in expropriated property would be barred. For past illegal expropriations, government support or assistance for transactions related to those expropriated properties would be denied. A Registry of Claims would also be established to warn investors and government agencies providing investment support that a property has a record of claims. These investment disciplines were to be applied at the same time that President Clinton’s new Title IV waiver authority was exercised.

Reaction was mixed among Members of Congress to the EU-U.S. accord, but opposition to the agreement by several senior Members has forestalled any amendment of Title IV in Congress. In a letter to then-Secretary of State Albright, Representative Gilman and Senator Helms criticized the understanding for not covering companies already invested in expropriated property. Among other criticisms, they argued that the understanding only proposes a weak sanction (denying government support) that may not deter companies that are willing to invest in Cuba. On the other side, however, some Members support the EU-U.S. understanding. They maintain that the understanding is important because it increases protection for the property of Americans worldwide and discourages investment in illegally confiscated property in Cuba.

The Bush Administration initially indicated that the Administration was looking into the possibilities of legislation to enact a presidential waiver for the provision, but during the June 2001 U.S.-EU summit, President Bush noted the difficulty of persuading Congress to amend the law. The Clinton Administration had lauded the 1998 EU-U.S. understanding on investment disciplines and attempted at the time, but without success, to win congressional support for a waiver of Title IV so that the investment disciplines could be implemented.

**Section 211 Trademark Provision**

Another EU challenge of U.S. law regarding Cuba in the WTO involves a dispute between the French spirits company, *Pernod Ricard*, and the Bermuda-based *Bacardi Ltd*. *Pernod Ricard* entered into a joint venture with the Cuban government to produce and export Havana Club rum, but *Bacardi* maintains that it holds the right to the Havana Club name. A provision in the FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure (Section 211 of Division A, title II, P.L. 105-277, signed into law October 21, 1998) prevents the United States from accepting payment for trademark licenses that were used in connection with a business or assets in Cuba that were confiscated unless the original owner of the trademark has consented. The provision prohibits U.S. courts from recognizing such trademarks without the consent of the original owner. Although *Pernod Ricard* cannot market Havana Club in the United States because of the trade embargo, it wants to protect its future distribution rights when the embargo is lifted.

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After Bacardi began selling rum in the United States under the Havana Club label, Pernod Ricard’s joint venture unsuccessfully challenged Bacardi in U.S. federal court. In February 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York upheld a lower court’s ruling that the joint venture had no legal right to use the Havana Club name in the United States. After formal U.S.-EU consultations on the issue were held in 1999 without resolution, the EU initiated a WTO dispute settlement panel on the issue in June 2000, maintaining that the U.S. law violates the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).

An August 6, 2001 ruling by the WTO panel was described as mixed, with both sides claiming a partial victory. The panel ruled that international rules on intellectual property rights did not cover trademarks but also ruled that a portion of the law (Section 211(a)(2)) prohibiting U.S. courts from recognizing such Cuban trademarks is in violation of the TRIPS because it denies access to U.S. courts by trademark holders. In early October 2001, the EU formally notified the WTO that it was appealing the ruling.

The WTO appeals panel issued its ruling on January 2, 2002, and again the ruling has been described as mixed. According to the United States Trade Representative, the appellate panel upheld the “U.S. position that WTO intellectual property rights rules leave WTO members free to protect trademarks by establishing their own trademark ownership criteria” and overturned the earlier ruling that Section 211 was in violation of TRIPs because it denied access to U.S. courts by trademark holders. However, the appellate panel also found that Section 211 violated WTO provisions on national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment, which could require the United States to amend Section 211 so that it does not violate WTO rules. The WTO appeals panel is expected to adopt its ruling formally on February 1, 2002, after which the United States will have 30 days to reply on the implementation of the ruling.

USTR has stated that it will consult closely with congressional committees and interested Members in considering its response.

Food and Medical Exports

Under U.S. sanctions, commercial medical and food exports to Cuba are allowed but with numerous restrictions and licensing requirements. The 106th Congress passed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for one-year export licenses for shipping food and medicine to Cuba, although no U.S. government assistance, foreign assistance, export assistance, credits, or credit guarantees are available to finance such exports. The law, furthermore, denies exporters access to U.S. private commercial financing or credit; all transactions must be conducted in cash in advance or with financing from third countries. The law reiterates the existing ban on importing goods from Cuba but authorizes travel to Cuba, under a specific license, to conduct business related to the

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newly allowed food and medicine sales. Regulations implementing the new provisions were published in the *Federal Register* on July 12, 2001.

Some in the business community argued that the changes in policy did not amount to much because they still do not allow financing for the sales. Nevertheless, U.S. agribusiness companies continued to explore the Cuban market for potential future sales. The Cuban government told a group of U.S. farmers who traveled there in November 2000, after passage of the new law, that although it was interested in U.S. agricultural exports, it refused to buy any under the financing restrictions imposed by that new law.

In the aftermath of Hurricane Michelle that struck in early November 2001, Cuba changed its policy of not buying agricultural products from the United States because of its disapproval of U.S. financing restrictions. While the U.S. government offered humanitarian assistance to Cuba in the aftermath of the hurricane, Cuba declined, saying that instead it wanted to purchase food supplies from the United States. As a result, Cuba negotiated with several U.S. agricultural companies for a reported $30-40 million in products such as wheat, corn, soybeans, rice, and chicken. Cuba dropped its demand to use Cuban ships to pick up the supplies. The first shipments of goods arrived in mid-December 2001 and others are expected to be completed by February 2002. This marked the first time that Cuba purchased food supplies directly from the United States since the approval of such sales in legislation in the 106th Congress.

Opponents of further easing restrictions on food and medical exports to Cuba maintain that U.S. policy does not deny such sales to Cuba, as evidenced by the recent sales in the aftermath of Hurricane Michelle. Moreover, according to the State Department, since the Cuban Democracy Act was enacted in 1992, the United States has licensed more than $4.3 billion in private humanitarian donations. Opponents of easing U.S. sanctions further argue that easing pressure on the Cuban government would in effect be lending support and extending the duration of the Castro regime. They maintain that the United States should remain steadfast in its opposition to any easing of pressure on Cuba that could prolong the Castro regime and its repressive policies.

Supporters of easing restrictions on food and medical exports to Cuba argue that the restrictions harm the health and nutrition of the Cuban population. They argue that although the U.S. government may have licensed more than $4.3 billion in humanitarian donations to Cuba since 1992, in fact much smaller amounts have actually been sent to Cuba. Some supporters of easing sanctions believe the embargo plays into Castro’s hands by allowing him to use U.S. policy as a scapegoat for his failed economic policies and as a rationale for political repression. U.S. agribusiness companies that support the removal of trade restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba believe that U.S. farmers are missing out on a market of some $700 million so close to the United States.
Legislative Initiatives in the 106th Congress. One of the most significant actions in the first session of the 106th Congress occurred during Senate consideration of the FY2000 Agriculture Appropriations bill, S. 1233, in August 1999. A modified amendment by Senator Ashcroft was approved requiring congressional approval before the imposition of any unilateral agricultural or medical sanction against a foreign country. Under the modified amendment, however, agricultural and medical exports to state sponsors of international terrorism — which include Cuba — would be allowed pursuant to one year licenses issued by the U.S. government, and without any federal financing or export assistance. The provision was ultimately dropped during the conference process, leading several Senators to express strong disapproval of the manner in which the issue was decided.

In the second session of the 106th Congress, there were initiatives using three legislative vehicles – the foreign aid authorization bill (S. 2382), the FY2001 Treasury Department appropriations bill (H.R. 4871), and the FY2001 agriculture appropriations bill (H.R. 4461) – to lift restrictions on food and medical exports to Cuba. Only the initiative introduced in the agriculture appropriations bill became law, and then in a very different form than it had been passed in both Houses.

The FY2001 foreign aid authorization bill, the Technical Assistance, Trade Promotion, and Anti-Corruption Act, would have lifted restrictions on food and medicine exports and allowed licensed exports of these goods to countries classified as state sponsors of international terrorism, which includes Cuba. Agricultural and medical exports to these countries would have been allowed pursuant to one-year licenses issued by the U.S. government. The bill remained in committee at the end of the 106th Congress.

During House consideration of the FY2001 Treasury Department appropriations bill, the House approved (301-116) a Moran (KS) amendment that would prohibit any funds in the bill from being used to implement any U.S. sanction on private commercial sales of agricultural commodities or medicine or medical supplies to Cuba. Although passage of the amendment marked a significant departure from the longstanding sanctions-oriented policy toward Cuba, its language was eliminated from a subsequent version of the FY2001 Treasury Department appropriations bill.

Both the House and Senate versions of the FY2001 agriculture appropriations bill (H.R. 4461 and S. 2536) as reported out of their respective committees included a provision similar to that in the foreign aid authorization bill that effectively would have allowed U.S. food and medical exports to Cuba. Continued opposition by the House GOP leadership and some Members to the sanctions-loosening effort led to a compromise agreement hammered out among the House GOP leadership, the House sponsors of the provision, and Members who opposed the initiative.

Under the compromise, U.S. food and medical exports to Cuba would be allowed pursuant to one-year licenses, but no U.S. government or U.S. private financing could be provided for the transactions. Critics charged that the restrictions...
were so great that sales would be practically impossible. In the final version of the FY2001 Agriculture appropriations bill signed into law on October 28, 2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX), the sale of agricultural and medical products to Cuba is allowed, but any U.S. financing – public or private – is prohibited.

**Legislative Initiatives in the 107th Congress.** Numerous initiatives focus in whole or in part on easing restrictions on food and medical exports to Cuba. Several focus on lifting private financing restrictions for agricultural sales set forth in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX, Section 910).

The Senate version of the 2002 “Farm Bill,” S. 1731 (Harkin), introduced November 27, 2001, would lift such financing restrictions. The Bush Administration strongly opposes lifting the financing restrictions because of “Cuba’s denial of basic civil rights to its citizens as well as its egregious rejection of the global coalition’s efforts against terrorism.”\(^\text{11}\) The Senate report to the bill (S.Rept. 107-117) notes that lifting the private financing restrictions would permit U.S. exporters to gain access to a potential market of about $400 million annually but would not commit U.S. government funds.

During consideration of S. 1731 on December 18, 2001, the Senate tabled (61-33) an amendment offered by Sen. Bob Smith, S.Amdt. 2596, that would have conditioned the lifting of restrictions on private financing of agricultural sales to Cuba on a presidential certification that Cuba is not a state sponsor of international terrorism. A secondary amendment offered by Sen. Torricelli, S.Amdt. 2597, fell when S.Amdt. 2596 was tabled. The Torricelli amendment would have conditioned the lifting of private financing restrictions on a presidential certification that all convicted felons who are living as fugitives in Cuba have been returned to the United States for incarceration.

In addition to the Farm Bill, S. 171 (Dorgan), introduced January 24, 2001, S. 239 (Hagel), introduced February 1, 2001, and H.R. 173 (Serrano), introduced January 3, 2001, would also lift the restrictions on private financing of agricultural sales to Cuba.

S. 1017 (Dodd) and H.R. 2138 (Serrano), the Bridges to the Cuban People Act of 2001, introduced June 12, 2001, would, among other provisions, ease restrictions on food and medical exports to Cuba and allow for the importation of certain Cuban medicines. Identical bills S. 402 (Baucus) and H.R. 797 (Rangel), the Cuban Humanitarian Trade Act of 2001, introduced February 27 and 28, 2001, respectively, would make an exception to the embargo for the export of agricultural commodities, medicines, medical supplies, medical instruments, and medical equipment.

Finally, several broad bills would lift all sanctions on trade, financial transactions, and travel to Cuba: H.R. 174 (Serrano), the Cuban Reconciliation Act, introduced

In other legislative action in the 106th Congress, the Senate considered the issue of travel to Cuba in June 30, 1999 floor action on the FY2000 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, S. 1234. An amendment was introduced by Senator Christopher Dodd that would have terminated regulations or prohibitions on travel to Cuba and on transactions related to such travel in most instances. The Senate defeated the amendment by tabling it in a 55-43 vote on June 30, 1999. On November 10, 1999, Senator Dodd introduced identical language as S. 1919, the Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2000, but no action was taken on the bill.

The House took up the issue of travel to Cuba when it considered H.R. 4871, the Treasury Department appropriations bill, on July 20, 2000. A Sanford amendment was approved (232-186) to prohibit funds in the bill from being used to administer or enforce the Cuban Assets Control Regulations with respect to any travel or travel-related transaction. Subsequently, the language of the amendment was dropped from a new version of the FY2001 Treasury Department appropriations bill, H.R. 4985, introduced on July 26. H.R. 4985 was appended to the conference report on the Legislative Branch appropriations bill – H.R. 4516, H.Rept. 106-796 – in an attempt to bypass Senate debate on its version of the Treasury appropriations bill, S. 2900. The Senate initially rejected this conference report on September 20, 2000, by a vote of 28-69, but later agreed to the report, 58-37, on October 12. The House had agreed to the conference report earlier, on September 14, 2000, by a vote of 212-209.

**Legislative Actions and Initiatives in the 107th Congress.** During July 25, 2001, floor action on H.R. 2590, the House approved an amendment that would prohibit spending for administering Treasury Department regulations restricting travel to Cuba. H.Amdt. 241, offered by Representative Flake (which amended H.Amdt. 240 offered by Representative Smith) would prohibit funding to administer the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) with respect to any travel or travel-related transaction. The CACR are administered by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. The Flake amendment was approved by a vote of 240 to 186, compared to a vote of 232-186 for a similar amendment in last year’s Treasury Department appropriations bill.

The Senate version of H.R. 2590, as approved September 19, 2001, did not include any provision regarding U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba. In floor debate, Senator Dorgan noted that he had intended to offer an amendment on the issue, but that he decided not to because he did not want to slow passage of the bill. He also indicated his support for the House provision when it came up in conference, but ultimately Congress did not include the provision in the conference report to the bill (H.Rept. 107-253).

Several other initiatives introduced would ease U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba. As noted above, several broad bills would lift all sanctions on trade, financial

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13The Dodd amendment allowed for travel restrictions to be imposed if the United States is at war with Cuba, if armed hostilities are in progress, or when threats to physical safety or public health exist. Under current law, the Secretary of State has the same authority to restrict travel (22 USC 211a).
transactions, and travel to Cuba: H.R. 174 (Serrano), the Cuban Reconciliation Act, introduced January 3, 2001, and identical bills S. 400 (Baucus) and H.R. 798 (Rangel), the Free Trade with Cuba Act, introduced February 27 and 28, 2001, respectively. S. 1017 (Dodd) and H.R. 2138 (Serrano), the Bridges to the Cuban People Act of 2001, introduced June 12, 2001, would, among other provisions, ease restrictions on travel by U.S. nationals or lawful permanent resident aliens to Cuba. Identical bills S. 402 (Baucus) and H.R. 797 (Rangel), the Cuban Humanitarian Trade Act of 2001, introduced February 27 and 28, 2001, respectively, would, among other provisions, repeal the travel restrictions imposed in the 106th Congress by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX, Section 910). S. 171 (Dorgan), introduced January 24, 2001, would repeal travel and export finance restrictions in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX, Section 910). S. 239 (Hagel), the Cuba Food and Medicine Access Act of 2001, introduced February 1, 2001, would, among other provisions, repeal the travel restrictions in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX, Section 910).

Drug Interdiction Cooperation

Because of Cuba’s geographic location, its waters and airspace are used by drug traffickers to transport cocaine and marijuana for ultimate destination to the United States. Cuban officials have expressed concerns over the use of their waters and airspace for drug transit as well as increased domestic drug use by way of the growing tourist sector. Cuba has made a number of law enforcement efforts to deal with the drug problem, including legislation to stiffen penalties for traffickers and cooperation with a number of countries on anti-drug efforts. The United States cooperates with Cuba on anti-drug efforts on a case-by-case basis, and there are undergoing efforts to make bilateral cooperation more systematic.

In 1999, U.S. and Cuban officials met in Havana to discuss ways of improving anti-drug cooperation. According to the State Department, Cuba accepted an upgrading of the current telex link between the Cuban Border Guard and the U.S. Coast Guard as well as the stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard officer at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. Barry McCaffrey, then-Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, stated that Cuba had demonstrated a willingness to help the United States in anti-narcotics efforts but has been ineffective because of a lack of resources. Some Members have called for closer U.S.-Cuban cooperation on anti-drug measures, while some, strongly opposing such efforts, have called on Cuba to be added to the State Department’s list of major-drug producing or transit countries. They believe that the Cuban government is involved in the drug trade, although the State Department asserts that the United States has no credible evidence of recent high-level official drug-related corruption in Cuba. H.R. 3427, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2000 and FY2001, enacted into law by reference in P.L. 106-113 on November 29, 1999, required a report within 120 days on the extent of international drug trafficking through Cuba since 1990.

In November 1999, the former Clinton Administration decided not to add Cuba to the annual list of major drug transit countries. According to the Department of State, “Cuba was not placed on the list of major drug transit countries because there is no clear evidence that cocaine or heroin are transiting Cuba on the way to the
United States in quantities that significantly affect the United States” (Daily Press Briefing, November 10, 1999). Some Members of Congress strongly objected to Cuba not being included on the list. A hearing on the issue was held November 17, 1999, before the House Government Reform Committee’s Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources.

In the 107th Congress, the Senate version of the FY2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, H.R. 2506, had a provision (Section 580) that would have made available $1.5 million for preliminary work for the Department of State and other agencies “to establish cooperation with appropriate agencies of the Cuba government on counter-narcotics matters.” The money was conditioned on a presidential certification that 1) Cuba has in place appropriate procedures to protect against loss of innocent life in the air and on the ground in connection with drug interdiction and that 2) there is no evidence of the involvement of the government of Cuba in drug trafficking. The House version of the bill, however, did not include the Cuba drug cooperation, and the conference report was filed without the Senate provision.

Nevertheless, the conference report to H.R. 2506 (H.Rept. 107-345) called for a report by the Secretary of State within 6 months on 1) the extent, if any of the direct involvement of the government of Cuba in illegal drug trafficking; 2) the likelihood that U.S. international narcotics assistance to the government of Cuba would decrease the flow of drugs transiting through Cuba, and 3) the degree to which the government of Cuba is exchanging with U.S. agencies drug-related law enforcement information. The conference report also encouraged the Administration to transmit to Congress, not later than 9 months, any legislation necessary to decrease the flow of drugs to or from Cuba.

In addition to the foreign operations measure, a bill has been introduced (H.R. 1124) to authorize the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy to negotiate with Cuban government officials for increased cooperation between the two countries on drug interdiction efforts.

Cuba and Terrorism

Cuba was added to the State Department’s list of states sponsoring international terrorism in 1982 for its complicity with the M-19 insurgent group in Colombia. Communist Cuba has had a history of supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa, but in 1992 Fidel Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past. Cuba’s change in policy was in large part because of the breakup of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the loss of billions in annual subsidies to Cuba, and led to substantial Cuban economic decline. Cuba remains on the State Department’s terrorism list today because it provides safehaven to several Basque ETA terrorists from Spain as well as U.S. fugitives from justice, according to the State Department’s April 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism report. Moreover, the report asserts that Cuba maintains ties to other state sponsors of terrorism and to two Colombian insurgent groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), both of which maintain a permanent presence in Cuba. Cuba has been the site of peace talks between the Colombian government and the ELN.
Reportedly, there are a number of U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba, including Joanne Chesimard, who was convicted for the killing of a New Jersey state trooper in 1973. In the 107th Congress, legislation has been introduced, H.R. 2292, to amend the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114) to require, as a condition for the determination that a democratically elected government in Cuba exists, that the government extradite to the United States convicted felon Joanne Chesimard and all other U.S. fugitives from justice.

During July 25, 2001 consideration of H.R. 2590, the FY2002 Treasury Department appropriations bill, Representative Smith offered an amendment, H. Amdt. 240, that would have prohibited funds in the bill from being used to enforce restrictions on travel to Cuba once the President certified to Congress that the Cuban government has released all political prisoners and has returned to the United States all persons residing in Cuba who are wanted in the United States for crimes of air piracy, narcotics trafficking, or murder. Before it was approved, however, the amendment was amended by H.Amdt. 241 offered by Representative Flake, which eliminated the presidential certification regarding political prisoners and U.S. fugitives in Cuba. During December 18, 2001 consideration of the Farm Bill, S. 1731, the Senate defeated an amendment, S.Amdt. 2596, that would have conditioned a lifting of restrictions on private financing of agricultural sales to Cuba on a presidential certification that Cuba was not a state sponsor of international terrorism.

Although Cuba offered support to the United States in the aftermath of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, Fidel Castro also stated that the attacks were in part a consequence of the United States having applied “terrorist methods” for years. 14 Cuba’s subsequent statements became increasingly hostile, according to press reports, which quote Cuba’s mission to the United Nations as describing the U.S. response to the U.S. attacks as “fascist and terrorist” and that the United States was using the attack as an excuse to establish “unrestricted tyranny over all people on Earth.” 15 Castro himself reportedly said that the U.S. government was run by “extremists” and “hawks” whose response to the attack could result in an “infinite killing of innocent people.” 16

The Cuban government, however, had a much more muted reaction to the U.S. decision to send captured Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters from Afghanistan to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Guantanamo has been U.S. base since 1903, and under a 1934 treaty that remains in force, the U.S. presence can only be terminated by mutual agreement or by abandonment by the United States. In 1994-1995, the base was used to house thousands of Cubans and Haitians fleeing their homeland. As of late January 2002, there were 158 detainees from Afghanistan being held at Guantanamo, and the facility is preparing to house up to 2,000 detainees. Although the Cuban government objects to the U.S. presence at Guantanamo as a

16 Ibid.
national security threat and opposes the presence as illegal, it has not opposed the new mission of housing detainees from Afghanistan. Defense Minister Raul Castro noted that, in the unlikely event that a prisoner would escape into Cuban territory, Cuba would capture the prisoner and return him to the base.17

Cuba itself has been the target of various terrorist incidents over the years. In 1976, a Cuban plane was bombed, killing 73 people. In 1997 almost a dozen bombings targeted the tourist sector in Havana and in the Varadero beach area in which an Italian businessman was killed and several others injured. Two Salvadorans were convicted and sentenced to death for the bombings in March 1999, and three Guatemalans were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 10-15 years in January 2002. Cuban officials maintain that Cuban exiles funded the bombings.

Cuban Spies in the United States

Over the past several years, the FBI has arrested and convicted several Cuban intelligence agents in the United States. In June 2001, five members of the so-called “Wasp Network” were convicted on espionage charges by a U.S. Federal Court in Miami. Sentences handed down in December 2001 ranged from 15 years to life sentences. The group tried to penetrate U.S. military bases and exile groups. The Cuban government has vowed to work for the return of the five spies who have been dubbed “Heroes of the Republic” by Cuba’s National Assembly. In addition to the five, a married couple was sentenced in January 2002 to lesser prison terms of 7 years and 3½ years for their participation in the spy network.

In addition, two U.S. government officials have been implicated in spying for Cuba. In February 2000, an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) official from Miami, Mariano Faget, was arrested and ultimately convicted in May 2000 for passing classified information to a friend with ties to Cuba. He was sentenced to 5 years in prison in June 2001. The case led to the State Department’s expulsion of a Cuban diplomat working in Washington. On September 21, 2001, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst Ana Montes was arrested on charges of spying for the Cuban government. Montes reportedly supplied Cuba with classified information about U.S. military exercises and other sensitive operations.18

Radio and TV Marti

U.S.-government sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba (Radio and TV Marti), begun in 1985 and 1990 respectively, have at times been the focus of controversies, including adherence to broadcast standards. Over the years there have been various attempts to cut funding for the programs, especially for TV Marti, which has not had an audience because of Cuban jamming efforts. TV Marti offers its daily broadcasts between the hours of 3:30 a.m. - 8:00 a.m., while Radio Marti broadcasts

24 hours a day. (For background on Cuba broadcasting through 1994, see CRS Report 94-636 F, Radio and Television Broadcasting to Cuba: Background and Issues Through 1994.)

Until October 1999, U.S.-government funded international broadcasting programs had been a primary function of the United States Information Agency (USIA). When USIA was abolished and its functions were merged into the Department of State at the beginning of FY2000, the Broadcasting Board of Governors became an independent agency that included such entities as the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), which manages Radio and TV Marti.

**FY2001 Funding.** For FY2001, the Clinton Administration requested $23.456 million for broadcasting to Cuba for both Radio and TV Marti. Of that amount, $650,000 was for the purchase of a 100-kilowatt solid state transmitter to improve the operation, reliability, and efficiency of Radio Marti broadcasts to Cuba.

H.R. 5548, a bill making appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State; the Judiciary; and related agencies, was incorporated into the H.R. 4942 conference report (H.Rept. 106-1005). Signed into law December 21, 2000 (P.L. 106-553), it provided $22.095 million for radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. A subsequent recission brought the estimated amount down to $22.046 million.

**FY2002 Funding.** The FY2002 State Department and Related Agencies Appropriations measure (P.L. 107-77, H.R. 2500) fully funds the Administration’s request and provides $24.872 million for broadcasting to Cuba for FY2002, $2.826 million more than the amount provided in FY2001. Both the House and Senate versions of H.R. 2500 had fully funded the request. During Senate consideration of the bill on September 10, Senator Dorgan filed an amendment, S.Amdt. 1542, that would have eliminated funding for TV Marti, but in light of the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington, Senator Dorgan withdrew the amendment on September 13, 2001.

H.R. 1646, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2002 and FY2003, approved by the House May 16, 2001, would authorize $25 million for broadcasting to Cuba for each fiscal year. In addition, the bill authorizes $750,000 for the enhancements of transmission facilities in Belize and the cost of transmissions from that country. According to the report to the bill (H.Rept. 107-57), such enhancements to the Belize facility “will help increase the capacity of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting to evade the jamming by the Cuban regime.” The bill would also eliminate staff positions, including the staff director, from the Advisory Board for Cuba Broadcasting, which had often been the source of political controversy. Although the Senate version of the authorization measure, S. 1401, does not authorize a specific amount for Cuba broadcasting, the report to bill (S.Rept. 107-60) notes that the Office of Cuba Broadcasting is authorized at the Administration’s requested level for FY2002. The Senate is expected to complete action on S. 1401 in the second session of the 107th Congress.
Russian Intelligence Facility in Cuba

Some Members of the 107th Congress again raised concerns about the Russian signals intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba. The facility at Lourdes was built in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. It allows Russia to monitor U.S. communications, including military communications that Russians contend ensure compliance with arms control agreements.

The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (P.L. 104-114) contains a provision that would reduce U.S. assistance for Russia by an amount equal to the sum of assistance and credits provided in support of intelligence facilities in Cuba. However, the legislation also provides that such a restriction does not apply to most categories of assistance. Moreover, the legislation also provides a presidential waiver if such assistance is important to U.S. national security and if Russia has assured the United States that it is not sharing intelligence collected at the Lourdes facility with officials or agents of the Cuban government.

H.R. 160 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced January 3, 2001, would prohibit the rescheduling or forgiveness of any outstanding bilateral debt owed by the Russian government to the United States until the President certifies to the Congress that the Russian government has ceased all its operations and permanently closed the Lourdes intelligence facility. In the 106th Congress, a similar bill (H.R. 4118) was approved by the House (275-146), but stalled in the Senate, where the Senate version (S. 2748) remained in committee at the end of the 106th Congress.

Those supporting the bill argue that the listening post, which reportedly has been upgraded in recent years, permits the collection of U.S. military, diplomatic, and commercial data and allows the invasion of Americans’ privacy. They argue the compensation paid by Russia to Cuba, estimated at some $200 million annually, helps prop up the Castro government financially. Those opposed to the bill argue that facilities such as that at Lourdes help both Russia and the United States to have confidence that international arms controls agreements are being respected. They maintain that the bill attempts to undermine U.S. leadership on engagement with Russia and could threaten U.S. leadership in Paris Club negotiations for debt rescheduling and forgiveness. The Clinton Administration had opposed the legislation, maintaining that it could call into question U.S. signals intelligence facilities that perform activities similar to the facility at Lourdes. (Also see CRS Report RL30617, Russia’s Paris Club Debt and U.S. Interests)

On October 17, 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that the Russian military would close the Lourdes facility. The announcement was met with approval from President Bush who said that both Russia and the United States “are taking down relics of the Cold War and building a new, cooperative and transparent relationship for the 21st century.” On the other hand, Cuba strongly criticized Russia’s move, saying that it had not agreed to the Russian pullout. As indicated above, Cuba reportedly receives about $200 million annually for the facility. The

dismantlement of the facility, scheduled to begin January 15, 2002, reportedly has been delayed because funding had not been allocated to pay for the Russian military transport.20

Migration21

In 1994 and 1995, Cuba and the United States reached two migration accords designed to stem the mass exodus of Cubans attempting to reach the United States by boat. On the minds of U.S. policymakers was the 1980 Mariel boatlift in which 125,000 Cubans fled to the United States. In response to Castro’s threat to unleash another Mariel, U.S. officials reiterated U.S. resolve not to allow another exodus. Amidst escalating numbers of fleeing Cubans, on August 19, 1994, President Clinton abruptly changed U.S. migration policy, under which Cubans attempting to flee their homeland were allowed into the United States, and announced that the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy would take Cubans rescued at sea to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Despite the change in policy, Cubans continued fleeing in large numbers.

As a result, in early September 1994, Cuba and the United States began talks that culminated in a September 9, 1994 bilateral agreement to stem the flow of Cubans fleeing to the United States by boat. In the agreement, the United States and Cuba agreed to facilitate safe, legal, and orderly Cuban migration to the United States, consistent with a 1984 migration agreement. The United States agreed to ensure that total legal Cuban migration to the United States would be a minimum of 20,000 each year, not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. In a change of policy, the United States agreed to discontinue the practice of granting parole to all Cuban migrants who reach the United States, while Cuba agreed to take measures to prevent unsafe departures from Cuba.

In May 1995, the United States reached another accord with Cuba under which the United States would parole the more than 30,000 Cubans housed at Guantanamo into the United States, but would intercept future Cuban migrants attempting to enter the United States by sea and would return them to Cuba. The two countries would cooperate jointly in the effort. Both countries also pledged to ensure that no action would be taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a consequence of their attempt to immigrate illegally. On January 31, 1996, the Department of Defense announced that the last of some 32,000 Cubans intercepted at sea and housed at Guantanamo had left the U.S. Naval Base, most having been paroled into the United States. Periodic U.S.-Cuban talks have been held on the implementation of the migration accords.

Since the 1995 migration accord, the U.S. Coast Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to their country, while those deemed at risk for persecution have been transferred to Guantanamo and then found asylum

20 “Russia Delays Closure of Cuba Spy Station,” Agence France Presse, January 8, 2002.
21 For background on U.S. migration policy toward Cuba, see CRS Report RS20468, Cuban Migration Policy and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
in a third country. Those Cubans who reach shore are allowed to apply for permanent resident status in one year.

Tensions in South Florida heightened after a June 29, 1999 incident — televised live by local news helicopters — in which the U.S. Coast Guard used a water cannon and pepper spray to prevent six Cubans from reaching Surfside beach in Florida. The incident prompted outrage from the Cuban American community in Florida and several Members of Congress. President Clinton characterized the incident as “outrageous,” and stated that the treatment was not authorized (Associated Press, July 1, 1999). Another incident occurred on July 9, 1999, when a boat being interdicted by the Coast Guard capsized and resulted in the drowning of a Cuban woman. The State Department expressed regret over the incident and noted that the Department of Justice and the Immigration and Naturalization Service would investigate whether this was a case of alien smuggling.

The Cuban government has taken forceful action against individuals engaging in alien smuggling. Prison sentences of up to three years may be imposed against those engaging in alien smuggling, and for incidents involving death or violence, a life sentence may be imposed. Around 80 U.S. residents are being held by the Cuban government for alien smuggling.

From late November 1999 through June 2000, national attention became focused on Cuban migration policy as a result of the Elian Gonzalez case, the five-year old boy found clinging to an inner tube off the coast of Fort Lauderdale. The boy’s mother drowned in the incident, while his father who resided in Cuba, called for his return. Although the boy’s relatives in Miami wanted him to stay in the United States, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ruled that the boy’s father had the sole legal authority to speak on his son’s behalf. After numerous legal appeals by the Miami relatives were exhausted, the boy returned to Cuba with his father in June 2000. In Cuba, Fidel Castro orchestrated numerous mass demonstrations and a media blitz on the issue until the boy’s return. The case generated an outpouring of emotion among the Cuban population as well as in south Florida.

**Compensation for February 1996 Shootdown**

On February 24, 1996, Cuban Mig-29 fighter jets shot down two Cessna 337s in the Florida Straits, which resulted in the death of four members of the Cuban American group Brothers to the Rescue. The group was known primarily for its humanitarian missions of spotting Cubans fleeing their island nation on rafts but had also become active in flying over Cuba and dropping leaflets.

In 1996, President Clinton authorized $300,000 to each of the families of the four victims, which was drawn from a pot of Cuban assets frozen in the United States. In addition, on December 17, 1997, a U.S. federal judge awarded $187.6 million ($49.9 million in compensatory damages and $137.7 million in punitive damages) to the families of three of the shootdown victims who sued under a provision in the

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22 For further background, see CRS Report RL31258, *Suits Against Terrorist States*, by David M. Ackerman.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132). (The fourth shootdown victim was not a U.S. citizen, and therefore not eligible to sue under the Act.) However, Cuba refused to recognize the court’s jurisdiction.

A provision in the FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 105-277, H.R. 4328) could have affected the payment of the December 1997 judgment from Cuba’s frozen assets in the United States. That provision stipulates that foreign states are not immune from U.S. judgments for violations of international law. However, the provision also includes a presidential waiver for national security interests, which the President exercised October 21, 1998. The Clinton Administration opposed the provision, maintaining that it would undermine the authority of the President to use assets of countries under economic sanctions as leverage when sanctions are used to modify the behavior of a foreign state. Supporters maintain that it would let those nations who sponsor terrorism know that if they are found guilty in U.S. court, their assets will be liquidated in order to serve justice.

Nevertheless, in light of further congressional action on the issue in October 2000, the Clinton Administration agreed to go forward with payments to relatives of three of the shootdown victims. The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-386, Sections 2002 and 2003) directed the Secretary of the Treasury to pay compensatory damages for certain claims against Cuba (and Iran). Subsequently, on January 19, 2001, the day before he left office, President Clinton signed an order unfreezing Cuban funds in the United States to pay almost $97 million to the relatives of the shootdown victims. The money came from a pot of $193.5 million in Cuban assets frozen in the United States, consisting of funds from long-distance telephone fees that AT&T paid for access to Cuba’s telephone system from the mid-1960s until 1994. While supporters of the relatives, the Cuban American community, and many in Congress supported the President’s action, other U.S. citizens with claims against Cuba maintain that the large judgment drained the pot of money that might have been available for other claims.23

### Legislation in the 106th Congress

#### Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2000

**P.L. 106-113 (H.R. 3194)**

Enacts by reference H.R. 3421, the Commerce, Justice and State appropriations bill for FY2000, and H.R. 3427, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2000 and FY2001, as introduced November 17, 1999. H.R. 3194 signed into law November 29, 1999. H.R. 3421 appropriates $22.095 million for Cuba broadcasting for FY2000. H.R. 3427 includes the following Cuba provisions: Section 108 (b) (3) authorizes $6,000 for each of FY2000 and FY2001 for the investigation and dissemination of information on violations of freedom of expression by Cuba; Section 121 authorizes $22.743 million for broadcasting to Cuba for each of FY2000 and FY2001; Section 206 requires a report from the Secretary of State not later than 120

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23 David Cazares, “Families of Fliers Get Award, $97 Million Compensation Draws Criticism,” *Sun Sentinel* (Fort Lauderdale), February 1, 2001, p. 1B.
days after enactment of the Act on the extent of international drug trafficking through Cuba since 1990.

**Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill for FY2001**

**P.L. 106-429 (H.R. 4811)**  
On October 28, the conference report (H.Rept. 106-997) struck H.R. 4811 and enacted by reference H.R. 5526. Section 507 prohibits direct funding of assistance or reparations to Cuba (and other countries). Section 523 prohibits indirect assistance or reparations to Cuba unless the President certifies that withholding such funds is contrary to U.S. national interests.

**Compensation for the February 1996 Shootdown**

**P.L. 106-386 (H.R. 3244)**  
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. Sections 2002 and 2003 direct the Secretary of the Treasury to pay compensatory damages for certain claims against Cuba (and Iran). As provided for in the bill, President Clinton waived such payments in the interest of national security when he signed the bill into law on October 28, 2000. (On January 19, 2001, he signed an executive order unfreezing the funds.)

**Modifications of Sanctions on Cuba**

**P.L. 106-387 (H.R. 4461)**  
Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, FY2001. Title IX of the bill, Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement, terminates unilateral sanctions on food and medical exports from economic sanctions imposed for foreign policy purposes. It allows one-year licenses for exports of these goods to countries classified as state sponsors of international terrorism, which includes Cuba, but without any U.S. financing (the President may waive the prohibition of U.S. assistance for commercial exports to Iran, Libya, North Korea, or Sudan for national security or humanitarian reasons but may not do so for Cuba). Prohibits travel to Cuba for tourism, restricts non-tourist travel to Cuba to that expressly authorized in current federal regulations. Signed into law October 28, 2000.

**Resolutions Regarding Cuba’s Human Rights Situation**

**H.Res. 99 (Ros-Lehtinen)**  
Introduced March 9, 1999. House approved March 23, 1999, by voice vote. Expresses the sense of the House regarding the human rights situation in Cuba, including a condemnation of Cuba’s repressive crackdown against the internal opposition and independent press; a call for the Administration to secure support for a UNCHR resolution condemning Cuba for its human rights abuses and for the reinstatement of a UNCHR Special Rapporteur on Cuba; and a call for the Administration to nominate a special envoy to advocate internationally for the establishment of the rule of law for the Cuban people.
S.Res. 57 (Graham)
Introduced March 4, 1999. Senate approved (98-0) March 25, 1999. Expresses the sense of the Senate that the United States should make all efforts to pass a UNCHR resolution criticizing Cuba’s human rights abuses and securing the appointment of a Special Rapporteur.

Funding For Radio and TV Marti

P.L. 106-553 (H.R. 4942)

Legislative Initiatives in the 107th Congress

Human Rights Issues

P.L. 107-115 (H.R. 2506)

H.Res. 91 (Smith, Christopher)
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the human rights situation in Cuba. Condemns the repressive and totalitarian actions of the Cuban government against the Cuban people. Expresses the sense of the House of Representatives that the President should (1) have an action-oriented policy of directly assisting the Cuban people and independent organizations to strengthen the forces of change and to improve human rights within Cuba; and (2) made all efforts necessary at the meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva in 2001 to obtain passage of a resolution condemning the government of Cuba for its human rights abuses and to secure the appointment of a Special Rapporteur for Cuba. Introduced March 19, 2001. Passed/agreed to in House on April 3, 2001. Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays: (2/3 required): 347 - 44, 22 present.
H.Con.Res. 123 (Andrews)
Calling for the immediate release of all political prisoners in Cuba, including Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, and for other purposes. Introduced and referred to Committee on International Relations May 3, 2001.

H.R. 1271 (Diaz-Balart)
To assist the internal opposition in Cuba, and to further help the Cuban people to regain their freedom. Introduced and referred to International Relations Committee March 28, 2001.

H.R. 1646 (Hyde)/S. 1401 (Biden)
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2002 and FY2003. H.R. 1646 Introduced April 27, 2001; Committee on International Relations reported the bill May 5, 2001 (H.Rept. 107-57). House passed (352-73) May 16, 2001. Section 101 would authorize $70,000 for each fiscal year for the establishment and operation of a mobile library at the United States Interests Section in Cuba primarily for use by dissidents and democracy activists. Section 107 would authorize $6,000 for each fiscal year for the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression in the Western Hemisphere of the Organization of American States for the investigation and dissemination of information on violations of freedom of expression by the government of Cuba. S. 1401 introduced September 4, 2001, and reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (S.Rept. 107-60). The Senate bill does not have similar human rights and democracy provisions on Cuba. (Also see legislative initiatives on “Broadcasting to Cuba” below for additional provisions in these bills.)

S.Res. 62 (Lieberman)
A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the human rights situation in Cuba. Introduced and referred to Foreign Relations Committee March 22, 2001.

S. 894 (Helms)
A bill to authorize increased support to the democratic opposition and other oppressed people of Cuba to help them regain their freedom and prepare themselves for a democratic future, and for other purposes. Referred to as the Cuban Solidarity, or Solidaridad, Act of 2001. Introduced and referred to Foreign Relations Committee May 16, 2001.

Modifying Sanctions Against Cuba

H.R. 160 (Ros-Lehtinen)
To prohibit the rescheduling or forgiveness of any outstanding bilateral debt owed to the United States by the government of the Russian Federation until the President certifies to the Congress that the Government of the Russian Federation has ceased all its operations at, removed all personnel from, and permanently closed the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba. Introduced and referred to International Relations Committee January 3, 2001.
**H.R. 173 (Serrano)**
To amend the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 to allow for the financing of agricultural sales to Cuba. Introduced and referred to Committees on Agriculture; Financial Services; and International Relations January 3, 2001; referred to House subcommittee March 2, 2001.

**H.R. 174 (Serrano)**
To lift the trade embargo on Cuba, and for other purposes. Introduced and referred to Committees on Agriculture; Financial Services; International Relations; Government Reform; Energy and Commerce; Judiciary; and Ways and Means January 3, 2001; referred to House subcommittee March 2, 2001.

**H.R. 796 (Rangel)/S. 401 (Baucus)**
To normalize trade relations with Cuba, and for other purposes. H.R. 796 introduced and referred to House Ways and Means Committee February 28, 2001. S.401 introduced and referred to Finance Committee February 27, 2001.

**H.R. 797 (Rangel)/S. 402 (Baucus)**
To make an exception to the United States embargo on trade with Cuba for the export of agricultural commodities, medicines, medical supplies, medical instruments, or medical equipment, and for other purposes. H.R. 797 introduced and referred to International Relations Committee and Ways and Means February 28, 2001; referred to House subcommittee March 7, 2001. S.402 introduced and referred to Finance Committee February 27, 2001.

**H.R. 798 (Rangel)/S. 400 (Baucus)**
To lift the trade embargo on Cuba, and for other purposes. H.R. 798 introduced and referred to Committees on Agriculture; Financial Services; Government Reform; Energy and Commerce; Judiciary; and Ways and Means February 28, 2001; referred to House subcommittee March 14, 2001. S. 400 introduced and referred to Finance Committee February 27, 2001.

**H.R. 2138 (Serrano)**
To provide the people of Cuba with access to food and medicine from the United States, to ease restrictions on travel to Cuba, to provide scholarships for certain Cuban nationals, and for other purposes. Referred to as the “Bridges to the Cuban People Act of 2001.” Introduced and referred to Committees on Agriculture, Financial Services, International Relations, Judiciary, and Ways and Means June 12, 2001.

**H.R. 2292 (Rothman)**
The No Safe Harbor in Cuba Act. To amend the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 to require, as a condition for the determination that a democratically elected government in Cuba exists, that the government extradite to the United States convicted felon Joanne Chesimard and all other U.S. fugitives from justice. Introduced June 21, 2001; referred to House Committee on International Relations.
**P.L. 107-67 (H.R. 2590/S. 1398)**
Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2002. Introduced and reported (H.Rept. 107-152) by the House Committee on Appropriations July 23, 2001. House approved (334-94), amended, July 25, 2001. As approved, Section 648 (Title VI) of the bill provides that none of the funds in the Act may be used to administer or enforce the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (31 CFR, part 515) with respect to any travel or travel-related transaction. This section was added by H.Amdt. 241 ( Flake) that the House approved by a vote of 240-186. Another amendment, H.Amdt. 242 (Rangel), that would have prohibited the use of Treasury Department funds to implement or enforce the economic embargo of Cuba, failed by a vote of 201-227. Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its version of the bill, S. 1398, on September 4, 2001 (S.Rept. 107-57). On September 19, 2001, the Senate approved its version of H.R. 2590, amended, which substituted the language of S. 1398. The Senate version did not have a provision regarding Cuba travel regulations. Conference report (H.Rept. 107-253) filed October 26, 2001, that did not include the Cuba travel provision. The House and Senate approved the conference on October 31, 2001, and November 1, 2001, respectively. Signed into law on November 12, 2001.

**H.R. 2662 (Paul)**
A bill to lift the trade embargo on Cuba and to prohibit any federal funds to provide assistance to Cuba. Introduced July 26, 2001; referred to the Committee on International Relations and in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, the Judiciary, Financial Services, Government Reform, and Agriculture.

**S. 137 (Gramm)**
A bill to authorize negotiation of free trade agreements with countries of the Americas, and for other purposes. Section 4 outlines restrictions prior to restoration of freedom in Cuba, standards for determining restored freedom in Cuba, and establishes priority for negotiating free trade with Cuba once the President determines that freedom has been restored in Cuba. Introduced and referred to Finance Committee January 22, 2001.

**S. 171 (Dorgan)**
A bill to repeal certain travel provisions with respect to Cuba and certain trade sanctions with respect to Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan, and for other purposes. Introduced and referred to Foreign Relations Committee January 24, 2001.

**S. 239 (Hagel)**
A bill to improve access to the Cuban market for American agricultural producers, and for other purposes. Introduced and referred to Foreign Relations Committee February 1, 2001.

**S. 1017 (Dodd)**
Referred to as the “Bridges to the Cuban People Act of 2001,” the bill would provide the people of Cuba with access to food and medicines from the United States, ease restrictions on travel to Cuba, provide scholarships for certain Cuban nationals, and for other purposes. Introduced and referred to Foreign Relations Committee June 12, 2001.
S. 1731 (Harkin)

2002 Farm Bill. Introduced November 27, 2001. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry reported the bill (S.Rept. 107-117) on December 7, 2001. Section 335 strikes restrictions on private financing of agricultural sales to Cuba that were set forth in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX). Senate consideration began December 10, 2001. During consideration on December 18, 2001, the Senate tabled (61-33) an amendment offered by Sen. Bob Smith, S.Amdt. 2596, that would have conditioned the lifting of restrictions on private financing of agricultural sales to Cuba on a presidential certification that Cuba is not a state sponsor of international terrorism. A secondary amendment offered by Sen. Torricelli, S.Amdt. 2597, fell when S.Amdt. 2596 was tabled. The Torricelli amendment would have conditioned the lifting of private financing restrictions on a presidential certification that all convicted felons who are living as fugitives in Cuba have been returned to the United States for incarceration.

Immigration Issues

H.R. 26 (Serrano)

To waive certain prohibitions with respect to nationals of Cuba coming to the United States to play organized professional baseball. Introduced and referred to International Relations and Judiciary Committees January 3, 2001; referred to subcommittee February 12, 2001.

H.R. 348 (Gutierrez)/H.R. 707 (Smith, Christopher)

To amend the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act to provide to certain nationals of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Haiti an opportunity to apply for adjustment of status under that Act, and for other purposes. Would provide for the limited reopening of certain orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal by certain Cuban or other nationals. H.R. 348 introduced and referred to Judiciary Committee January 31, 2001; referred to House subcommittee February 16, 2001. H.R. 707 introduced and referred to Judiciary Committee February 14, 2001; referred to House subcommittee March 2, 2001.

H.R. 823 (Condit)/S. 169 (Kyl)

To provide federal reimbursement for indirect costs relating to the incarceration of illegal criminal aliens and for emergency health services furnished to undocumented aliens. The sections on Cuba in both bills are identical, and would provide that reimbursement of States for incarcerating illegal aliens and certain Cuban nationals would be allocated to give special consideration for any State that: (1) shares a border with Mexico or Canada; or (2) in an area with a large number of undocumented aliens. H.R. 823 introduced and referred to Committees on Energy and Commerce; and Judiciary March 1, 2001; referred to House subcommittee March 20, 2001. S. 169 introduced and referred to Judiciary Committee January 24, 2001.
Drug Interdiction Cooperation

**P.L. 107-115 (H.R. 2506)**

Foreign Operations Appropriations, FY2002.Introduced and reported by the House Committee on Appropriations July 17, 2001 (H.Rept. 107-142). House passed (381-46) July 24, 2001. Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its version September 2, 2001 (S.Rept. 107-58). Senate passed (96-2) October 24, 2001. The Senate version would provide $1.5 million for the Department of State and other agencies to establish cooperation with Cuba on counter-narcotics matters. Conference report (H.Rept. 107-345) filed December 19, 2001, without the Senate provision on counter-narcotics cooperation with Cuba. However, the conference report called for a report by the Secretary of State within 6 months on 1) the extent, if any, of the direct involvement of the government of Cuba in illegal drug trafficking; 2) the likelihood that U.S. international narcotics assistance to the government of Cuba would decrease the flow of drugs transiting through Cuba, and 3) the degree to which the government of Cuba is exchanging with U.S. agencies drug-related law enforcement information. The conference report also encouraged the Administration to transmit to Congress, not later than 9 months, any legislation necessary to decrease the flow of drugs to or from Cuba. House agreed (357-66) to the conference December 19; Senate agreed (unanimous consent) December 20. Signed into law January 10, 2002. (Also see “Human Rights Issues” above for House report language on U.S. support for U.S. funding of democracy and human rights funding regarding Cuba.)

**H.R. 1124 (Rangel)**

To authorize the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy to enter into negotiations with representatives of the government of Cuba to provide for increased cooperation between Cuba and the United States on drug interdiction efforts. Introduced and referred to International Relations Committee March 20, 2001.

Broadcasting to Cuba

**P.L. 107-77, H.R. 2500**


**H.R. 1270 (DeFazio)**

To increase accountability for government spending and to reduce wasteful government spending. Would repeal (1) the Television Broadcasting to Cuba Acts; and (2) the United States International Broadcasting Act of 1994. Introduced and referred to Committees on Armed Services; Financial Services; International
Relations; Energy and Commerce; Resources; Science; Veterans' Affairs; Ways and Means; and Select Committee on Intelligence March 28, 2001; referred to subcommittees April 24, 2001.

H.R. 1646 (Hyde)/S. 1401 (Biden)
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2002 and FY2003. H.R. 1646 introduced April 27, 2001; Committee on International Relations reported the bill May 5, 2001 (H.Rept. 107-57). House passed (352-73) May 16, 2001. Section 121 would authorize $25 million for broadcasting to Cuba for each fiscal year. The section would also authorize $750,000 for enhancements to and costs of transmission from the facilities in Belize, which according to the bill’s report, would increase the capacity of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting to evade jamming by the Cuban government. Section 501 would eliminate staff positions for the Advisory Board for Cuba Broadcasting. (Also see legislative initiatives on “Human Rights Issues” above for additional House provisions related to Cuba in this bill.) S. 1401 introduced September 4, 2001, and reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (S.Rept. 107-60). Although the Senate version does not authorize a specific amount for Cuba broadcasting, the report to bill notes that the Office of Cuba Broadcasting is authorized at the Administration’s requested level for FY2002.

For Additional Reading


CRS Report RS20450, The Case of Elian Gonzalez: Legal Basics, by Larry M. Eig.

CRS Report RL30837, Cuba: An Economic Primer, by Ian F. Fergusson.


CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Legislative Initiatives In the 107th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.


CRS Report RS20468, Cuban Migration Policy and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.


