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**THESIS**

**SOUTHWEST HISPANIC COMMUNITY—THE ABSENCE  
OF HOMELAND SECURITY THREATS**

by

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December 2012

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**SOUTHWEST HISPANIC COMMUNITY—THE ABSENCE OF HOMELAND  
SECURITY THREATS**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Threats of terrorism and insurgency along the Southwest border are typically supported by anecdotal evidence rather than objective assessments of such threats, which limit the ability to appropriately address issues related to homeland security, such as immigration enforcement and border security. This thesis provides an objective assessment of the potential for terrorist and insurgent threats to emanate from within the Southwest Hispanic Community by reviewing the status of and pressures upon the community using Social Identity Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory. Data indicates that Hispanics in the Southwest typically experience greater disparities in sociocultural, economic, and political conditions due to regional ethnic concentration. External and internal pressures, represented by immigration policy and mandates for language usage, also have greater impact upon the community. Social Identity Theory provides a means for understanding “why” social movement form, while Resource Mobilization Theory provides insight into “how” movements are created. The potential for radicalization is also examined to determine if violent movements can develop from otherwise nonviolent movements or communities. Despite disparities and significant pressure, the conclusion is that there are no current homeland security threats of terrorism or insurgency and the adoption of omnicultural policies can further reduce what limited potential may exist.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>I.</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
	A. <b>PROBLEM STATEMENT—BACKGROUND.....</b>	<b>1</b>
	B. <b>RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....</b>	<b>4</b>
	C. <b>HYPOTHESES.....</b>	<b>4</b>
	D. <b>SIGNIFIGANCE OF RESEARCH.....</b>	<b>4</b>
	E. <b>RESEARCH METHOD.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>II.</b>	<b>LITERATURE REVIEW.....</b>	<b>7</b>
	A. <b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>7</b>
	B. <b>INTERGROUP RELATION THEORY.....</b>	<b>7</b>
	1. <b>Resource Mobilization Theory.....</b>	<b>8</b>
	2. <b>Social Identity Theory.....</b>	<b>10</b>
	C. <b>HISPANIC COMMUNITY IDENTITY AND STATUS.....</b>	<b>13</b>
	D. <b>NATIONAL PRESSURES AFFECTING HISPANIC COMMUNITY ..</b>	<b>15</b>
	1. <b>Immigration Enforcement and Prosecutorial Discretion.....</b>	<b>17</b>
	2. <b>Language Usage.....</b>	<b>21</b>
	E. <b>HOMELAND SECURITY.....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>III.</b>	<b>INTERGROUP RELATION THEORY.....</b>	<b>25</b>
	A. <b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>25</b>
	B. <b>RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY.....</b>	<b>25</b>
	C. <b>SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY.....</b>	<b>27</b>
	D. <b>RADICALIZATION.....</b>	<b>29</b>
	E. <b>ANALYSIS.....</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>IV.</b>	<b>HISPANIC COMMUNITY.....</b>	<b>33</b>
	A. <b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>33</b>
	B. <b>SOCIOCULTURAL STATUS.....</b>	<b>34</b>
	1. <b>Current Population.....</b>	<b>34</b>
	2. <b>Population Growth.....</b>	<b>38</b>
	3. <b>Gender Distribution.....</b>	<b>39</b>
	4. <b>Age Distribution.....</b>	<b>41</b>
	5. <b>Language Usage.....</b>	<b>42</b>
	6. <b>Education.....</b>	<b>44</b>
	7. <b>Household.....</b>	<b>46</b>
	8. <b>Citizenship.....</b>	<b>48</b>
	9. <b>Mexican Nationalism.....</b>	<b>49</b>
	C. <b>ECONOMIC STATUS.....</b>	<b>52</b>
	1. <b>Household Income and Disparity.....</b>	<b>53</b>
	2. <b>Poverty.....</b>	<b>55</b>
	3. <b>Employment and Occupation.....</b>	<b>55</b>
	4. <b>Other Economic Indicators.....</b>	<b>57</b>
	D. <b>POLITICIAL INFLUENCE.....</b>	<b>59</b>

E.	ANALYSIS .....	62
V.	NATIONAL AND GLOBAL PRESSURES .....	65
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	65
B.	IMMIGRATION POLICY .....	65
1.	Enforcement Priorities .....	67
2.	Prosecutorial Discretion .....	68
3.	Deferred Action.....	69
C.	LANGUAGE USAGE.....	69
1.	English Only Movement .....	70
2.	Linguistic Isolation—Non-Spanish Speaking Hispanics .....	72
D.	ANALYSIS .....	74
1.	Immigration Enforcement and Resource Mobilization Theory ....	75
2.	Immigration Enforcement and Social Identity Theory .....	76
3.	Language Usage and Resource Mobilization Theory .....	77
4.	Language Usage and Social Identity Theory.....	77
5.	Hispanic Identity as a Resource.....	78
VI.	POTENTIAL FOR HOMELAND SECURITY THREATS.....	81
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	81
B.	SOUTHWEST HISPANIC COMMUNITY—FIRST FLOOR.....	81
C.	IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT—FIRST FLOOR .....	82
D.	LANGUAGE USAGE—SECOND FLOOR.....	83
E.	CONCLUSION .....	85
F.	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	89
	LIST OF REFERENCES .....	91
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....	97

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Hispanic/Non-Hispanic Population - National and Regional .....	34
Figure 2.	Ethnic Concentration – National and Regional .....	35
Figure 3.	Ethnic Concentration - Southwest States .....	36
Figure 4.	Ethnic Distribution - Hispanic Population Centers.....	36
Figure 5.	Ethnic Concentration - Hispanic Population Country of Origin.....	37
Figure 6.	Gender Distribution - National and Regional .....	40
Figure 7.	Age Distribution - Age 18 and Older.....	41
Figure 8.	Age Distribution - Community Median Age .....	42
Figure 9.	Spanish/English Speaking Ability (adapted from Pew Hispanic Center).....	44
Figure 10.	Education Attainment - National Comparison.....	45
Figure 11.	Education Attainment - Southwest Comparison.....	46
Figure 12.	Household Distribution - Percent “Family” Households.....	47
Figure 13.	Household Distribution - Average Family Size.....	47
Figure 14.	Citizenship - Hispanic Community Comparison .....	49
Figure 15.	Income Distribution - Median Household Income .....	53
Figure 16.	Income Distribution - Median Household Income Disparity .....	54
Figure 17.	Income Distribution - Poverty Rates.....	55
Figure 18.	Income Distribution - Employment Rate.....	56
Figure 19.	Income Distribution - Southwest Occupation Comparison .....	57
Figure 20.	Income Distribution - No Health Insurance.....	58
Figure 21.	Income Distribution - Home Ownership.....	58
Figure 22.	Income Distribution - Home Value.....	59

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

ACS	American Community Survey
CBP	United States Customs and Border Protection
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
ICE	United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
INA	Immigration and Nationality Act
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
MEChA	Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlan
NCLR	National Council of La Raza
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
SPLC	Southern Poverty Law Center
USCIS	United States Citizenship and Immigration Service
U.S.	United States

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# I. INTRODUCTION

## A. PROBLEM STATEMENT—BACKGROUND

Homeland Security threats of terrorism and insurgency along the Southwest border are often discussed within the framework of immigration enforcement and reform, border security improvements, and the need to combat transnational drug trafficking. Dr. Jack Riley testified before the Committee on Homeland Security that the “border threat is not just a southern phenomenon”<sup>1</sup> while attempting to draw attention to the northern border as a conduit for terrorists. The implication being that the use of the southern border as a conduit for terrorists is a given. Representative Lamar Smith recently wrote that the “9/11 terrorist attacks demonstrated a need to secure our borders and enforce our immigration laws.”<sup>2</sup> Additionally a growing body of research and discussion indicates that the Mexican government and general population are experiencing serious security threats from the drug cartels and raise the possibility of an increased potential for spillover crimes within the United States (U.S.).<sup>3</sup> Such security threats could include insurgency or terrorism; however, links between terrorism and insurgency within the Southwest U.S. may be anecdotal rather than systematic.

Anecdotal concerns of insurgency or terrorism are reflected in reports of “controversial” Imams being smuggled across the border,<sup>4</sup> and the rise of Hispanic nationalist movements<sup>5</sup> within the U.S., which increases the fear of security threats

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<sup>1</sup> Jack K. Riley, *Border Security and the Terrorist Threat* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2006), 3.

<sup>2</sup> Lamar Smith. 2011. “Immigration Enforcement and Border Security are the First Line of Defense Against Terrorists.” *Fox News*, September 12, accessed April 17, 2012, <http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/09/12/next-10-years-immigration-enforcement-and-border-security-are-first-line/>.

<sup>3</sup> Kristin Finklea, William Krouse, and Mark Rosenblum, *Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011).

<sup>4</sup> Richard Marosi, 2011, “Controversial Muslim Cleric is Arrested While Sneaking Into the U.S.” *Los Angeles Times*, January 27, accessed April 19, 2012, <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/27/local/la-me-border-cleric-20110127>.

<sup>5</sup> Miguel Perez, 2012, “Latinos Plan ‘Occupy Aztlan’ Movement.” *Examiner*, accessed March 11, 2012, <http://www.examiner.com/civil-rights-in-phoenix/latinos-plan-occupy-aztl-n-movement>.

emanating from that region and may drive policy. This thesis will attempt to add to the limited research that considers whether or not terrorist or insurgent threats have the potential to originate from the Southwest, independent of those criminal threats posed by drug cartels or others.

Central to the research question, to determine the potential for homeland security threats from within the Southwest Hispanic Community, will be the definition of terrorism and insurgency. Bruce Hoffman defines terrorism “as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.”<sup>6</sup> Similarly, Hoffman defines insurgency as containing irregular military tactics that characterize guerrilla operations and typically involve coordinated informational and psychological warfare efforts designed to mobilize popular support against a national government, imperialist power, or foreign occupying force.<sup>7</sup>

Fortunately, a wide array of tools and techniques, including intergroup relation theories, have been developed to study and counter terrorism, insurgency, radicalization, and violent extremism. Intergroup relation theories are commonly applied to examine the potential or explain the occurrence of terrorism and/or insurgency resulting from sociocultural, economic, or political pressures applied upon a specific population subset. Examples include “Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective”<sup>8</sup> and “The Explanatory Value of Social Movement Theory.”<sup>9</sup> With regards to terrorist or insurgent threats, those theories are most notably applied to Islamic communities or countries, reflecting a potential gap in the body of knowledge regarding the application of intergroup relation theories to other distinct groups, particularly those in the United States. Rather than rely on burgeoning anecdotal evidence, this thesis will attempt to systematically research, using intergroup relation theories, whether or not homeland security threats have the potential to emanate from within the Southwest Hispanic Community.

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<sup>6</sup> Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 40.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 35.

<sup>8</sup> Seth J. Schwartz, Curtis S. Dunkel, and Alan S. Waterman, “Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 32:6 (2009): 537–559.

<sup>9</sup> Jennifer Chandler, “The Explanatory Value of Social Movement Theory.” *Strategic Insights*, Volume IV, Issue 5 (May 2005).

The boundaries defining the research question includes the community of interest, pressures exerted upon that community, intergroup relation theories relevant to that community, and homeland security threats to be considered.

The community of interest will be bounded along geographical and ethnic lines that identify a significant, growing, and influential subset of the Southwest population. While internally diverse, it is believed that the Hispanic community in the Southwest maintains a sociocultural, economic, and political status and identity which is distinct from the remainder of the population.

Geographically, the research will only include those states forming the “Southwest” as broadly defined and typically includes California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and Oklahoma. Ethnically, the research will be limited to the “Hispanic or Latino” community as defined and used by the U.S. Census Bureau, following the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) standards.<sup>10</sup> For the purposes of this research, the terms “Hispanic” and “Latino” will be interchangeable and include persons of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, the community of interest considered will be the Hispanic Community in the Southwest; with the non-Hispanic Community in the Southwest forming the complementary portion of the population.

The next set of limits are the sociocultural, economic, and political pressures exerted upon the community of interest, specifically those pressures with the potential to elicit an unusually extreme but localized response and/or less extreme but widespread negative reaction. Such internal and external pressures may be represented by immigration enforcement and “English Only” policies.

Having established the distinct identity of the Southwest Hispanic Community and the pressures exerted upon that community, the theories of Social Identity and

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<sup>10</sup> Office of Management and Budget, “Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity.” Accessed February 7, 2012, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg\\_1997standards](http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg_1997standards).

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

Resource Mobilization will be applied to determine the potential for homeland security threats of insurgency or terrorism to emanate from that community is revealed.

## **B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

What potential homeland security threats, from within the Hispanic Community in the Southwest, are revealed through application of intergroup relation theories?

## **C. HYPOTHESES**

Inherent in the research is the assumption that there is both correlation and causation between the potential for a homeland security threat from within the Southwest Hispanic Community and internal or external pressures applied upon that community. There is also an assumption that relevant intergroup relation theories, such as Social Identity Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory, provide a means to reveal that correlation and causation. The expected finding is that application of Social Identity Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory to the Southwest Hispanic Community will reveal the absence of or potential for the occurrence of homeland security threats from within that community.

## **D. SIGNIFIGANCE OF RESEARCH**

The research will provide valuable analysis regarding the particular community researched but will also expand the body of knowledge regarding the ability to more broadly apply the analytical frameworks provided by Social Identity Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory. As for the Southwest Hispanic Community, should the application of those specific intergroup relation theories indicate potential homeland security threats, it will have revealed pressures that may be appropriately addressed in order to alleviate those threats. It would also be a significant finding to determine an absence of a potential threat, due to the application of the specific pressures explored.

## **E. RESEARCH METHOD**

Research related to this thesis will be performed using Social Identity Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory to examine sociocultural, economic, and political pressures placed upon the Southwest Hispanic Community in order to determine if potential terrorist or insurgent threats unique to that community are revealed. A mixed method research methodology using components of “ethnography,” along with other qualitative analysis methods, will be utilized. Ethnography includes both quantitative and qualitative methods to determine the sociocultural contexts in which people live their lives, as well as the meaning systems that motivate them. Qualitative and quantitative data will be collected and analyzed to determine which variables are the most prominent in identifying the Hispanic Community and which variables prove to be more sensitive with the potential to elicit strong reactions for that community. In addition to qualitative literature describing the communities sociocultural, economic, and political status and identity, secondary quantitative data will be collected from open sources that are available at government, nonprofit, and private organizations. Examples of those sources include the U.S. Census Bureau, the Pew Hispanic Center and various polling agencies.

Data regarding the identify of and external pressures upon the Southwest Hispanic Community will then be viewed through the lens of Social Identity Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory to derive qualitative indicators of the potential for, or absence of, terrorist or insurgent threats. Should the analysis indicate an existing or emerging threat, then the intergroup relation theory will have identified pressures that should be addressed positively and proactively to ease effects upon the Southwest Hispanic Community.

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## **II. LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

Four main categories are implied by the primary research question and will be considered in this literature review. Those four main categories are:

- Intergroup Relation Theories
- Southwest Hispanic Community Status
- Southwest Hispanic Community Pressures
- Homeland Security Threats

Research and analysis to answer the primary question required a broad based review of each topic to identify relevant factors within each of the four categories, followed by a more focused review of those relevant factors. Analysis to determine whether terrorist or insurgent threats exist focused on Resource Mobilization Theory and Social Identity Theory, as those theories combine to examine both “how” and “why” social movement can be formed and maintained. The large body of quantitative and qualitative data available for the Southwest Hispanic Community was reviewed to determine what factors, if any, indicated relative disparity between or increased pressures upon the community of interest and the non-Hispanic community. That data was also examined in order to ascertain whether any factors or pressures were focused geographically in the Southwest. Finally, homeland security threats were scrutinized in order to reveal occurrences of radicalization, insurgency or even terrorism.

### **B. INTERGROUP RELATION THEORY**

The body of knowledge related to intergroup relation theories may be categorized on the basis of four main themes of rationality, material resources, identity, and perceived justice, which attempt to address specific questions based on the particular theory. Theories based in rationality attempt to address questions as to whether humans are rational creatures who know what they do and why. Material resource theories examine

whether conflict arises from competition for material resources. Identity theory questions whether the desire for a positive and distinct identity is universal, and if categorization leads to intergroup bias, competition, and conflict. Finally, perceived justice theories explores why people are inclined to see the world as just, even when objective criteria suggest a high level of injustice.<sup>12</sup> The primary theories utilized in this paper will be Resource Mobilization Theory and Social Identity Theory, which are complementary theories as the former attempts to examine “how” movements organize, while the later explores “why” movements organize. Resource Mobilization Theory, one of the material resources theories, was selected due to its emphasis on resource requirements and de-emphasis of specific grievances in order to determine impacts across a number of potential pressures. Social Identity Theory, one of the identity theories, was selected due to the emphasis on cultural and social categorizations that can be perceived as distinct traits within the Hispanic community.

## **1. Resource Mobilization Theory**

Resource Mobilization Theory is one of the major materialist theories relevant to the primary question as it probes the capability for movement organization. Pichardo provides an excellent summary regarding the development of Resource Mobilization Theory and the major theoretical variations of that theory.<sup>13</sup> That analysis is repeated to varying degrees among other literature that describes the basic theory, its variations, and limitations.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Fathali Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations* (Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 2008), 18–19.

<sup>13</sup> Nelson Pichardo, “Resource Mobilization: An Analysis of Conflicting Theoretical Variations.” *The Sociological Quarterly*, Volume 29, Number 1 (1988): 97–110.

<sup>14</sup> J. Craig Jenkins, “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements.” *Annual Review of Sociology*, Volume 9 (1983): 527–553; Kathleen J. Fitzgerald and Diane M. Rodgers, “Radical Social Movement Organizations: A Theoretical Model.” *The Sociological Quarterly*, Volume 41, Number 4 (Autumn, 2000): 573–592; Steven M. Buechler, “Beyond Resource Mobilization? Emerging Trends in Social Movement Theory.” *The Sociological Quarterly*, Volume 34, Number 2 (May, 1993): 217–235; Frances F. Piven and Richard A. Cloward, “Collective Protest: A Critique of Resource Mobilization Theory.” *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, Volume 4, Number 4 (Summer, 1991): 435–458; Susan Olzak, “Contemporary Ethnic Mobilization.” *Annual Review of Sociology*, Volume 9 (1983): 355–374; Harold R. Kerbo and Richard A. Shaffer, “Lower Class Insurgency and the Political Process: The Response of the U.S. Unemployed, 1890–1940.” *Social Problems*, Volume 39, Number 2 (May, 1992): 139–154.

Two primary models within Resource Mobilization Theory are the “entrepreneurial” or “professional organizer” model advocated by McCarthy and Zald and “political process” model advocated by McAdam and Tilley. The differences between the two models revolve around the role or involvement of “elite” groups in the formation and maintenance of social movements; however, both models are founded in the basic principles of Resource Mobilization Theory.

Resource Mobilization Theory examines the rational, purposive aspects of social movement behavior.<sup>15</sup> A basic concept of this theory, which evolved during social movement research in the 1970s, is that the capacity to act collectively upon grievances is more crucial to movement formation and maintenance than the particular grievances, interests, and aspirations of the movement. The capacity to act collectively is based upon internal environmental factors, such as leadership, level of available resources, group size, and degree of internal organization. External environmental factors include the level of societal repression, extent of external sympathizers and number and strength of polity groups.<sup>16</sup>

The shift of emphasis from the grievances of participants to the problems and obstacles faced by the movement organizer raised questions as to how impoverished communities were able to overcome a lack of resources to create organizational structures for social movements.<sup>17</sup> Attempts to answer those questions resulted in development of the “professional organizer” and “political process” models. The “professional organizer” model allows for the involvement of external “elite” groups and agents who provide a majority of the leadership and resources required by social movement organizations.<sup>18</sup> The “political process” emphasizes the internal capacity of a minority community to generate and maintain social movement organizations while elites provide support

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<sup>15</sup> Harvey Waterman, “Reasons and Reason: Collective Political Activity in Comparative and Historical Perspective.” *World Politics*, Volume 32 (1981): 554–589.

<sup>16</sup> Pichardo, “Resource Mobilization,” 99.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. *The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalism and Resource Mobilization* (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Corporation, 1973).

services to that social movement for their own self-interests.<sup>19</sup> A critical consideration on the formation and maintenance of a social movement then becomes whether a particular social movement is supported by a natural base from within the community. If it is supported by a natural base, the involvement of elites will most likely be in a supportive capacity rather than as a requirement. If not supported by a natural base, the involvement of elites will be a requirement and will impact the movement based on the motivation of the elites, which may be out of sincere concern in the “professional organizer” model or in order to contain, control, or profit from the social movement in the “political process” model.

There are ten issues which have emerged that have challenged the empirical generalizations of, aspects of collective action ignored by, or core assumptions of Resource Mobilization Theory. These include the downplaying of specific grievances, marginalization of ideology, bias towards formal organizations, the level and method of collective action analysis, deviations of individuals from personalities inherent to rational choice theory, and a lack of consideration of collective identity or movement diversity.<sup>20</sup> Another criticism is that Resource Mobilization Theory inappropriately normalizes collective behavior, by emphasizing the similarity between conventional behavior and protest behavior, and is unable to explain non-normative collective actions, such as disorder and rebellion.<sup>21</sup>

## 2. Social Identity Theory

The second theory that will be applied to the Southwest Hispanic Community and pressures upon that community is Social Identity Theory.<sup>22</sup> The advent of Social Identity Theory is widely attributed to Henri Tajfel and his work in the late 1970s. According to Social Identity theory, the three internal criteria for “group identification” are a cognitive

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<sup>19</sup> Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982); J. Craig Jenkins, *The Politics of Insurgency: The Farm Workers' Movement in the 1960s* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1985).

<sup>20</sup> Buechler, “Beyond Resource Mobilization?,” 221–231.

<sup>21</sup> Piven and Cloward, “Collective Protest.”

<sup>22</sup> Henri Tajfel, “Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations.” *Annual Review of Psychology*, Volume 33 (1982): 1–39.

awareness of membership, an evaluation of the value of membership, and an emotional investment in the awareness and evaluation.<sup>23</sup> Social identity is defined as that part of the individuals' self-concept that derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership.<sup>24</sup>

There are five basic tenets generally recognized as the foundations of Social Identity Theory that provide substantial and specific premises while leaving room for cultural variations:

- Identity Motivation – Individuals are motivated to achieve a positive and distinct identity. The minimal group paradigm provides strong evidence that just about any criterion for social categorization can be used by group members to construct a positive and distinct identity for themselves.<sup>25</sup>
- Centrality of Social Identity – The need for a positive and distinct identity will lead individuals to want to belong to groups that enable their members to fulfill their identity needs.<sup>26</sup> If a group fails to add positive values to the individual's sense of who he/she is, there is no reason to join or remain a member/supporter.<sup>27</sup>
- Assessing Social Identity Through Social Comparisons – We come to understand our own situations by comparing ourselves with others. The nature of the social comparisons we make are influenced by both our perceptions of our group memberships and the particular group goals we adopt.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Henri Tajfel, "Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations." *Annual Review of Psychology*, Volume 33 (1982): 1–39.

<sup>24</sup> Henri Tajfel, *Human Groups and Social Categories* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 255.

<sup>25</sup> Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations*, 94.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 99.

<sup>27</sup> Anders Strindberg, "Social Identity Theory and the Study of Terrorism," Working Paper, 2011.

<sup>28</sup> Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations*, 96.

- Availability of Cognitive Alternatives – The thoughts and actions of groups dissatisfied with their social identity are based on whether the present situation is perceived as stable and legitimate.<sup>29</sup>
- Strategies for Improving Social Identity – minority group members who perceive their social identity to be inadequate will employ various strategies to improve their situation. These include normative individualistic options to non-normative collective options. Individualistic strategies include making intra-group comparisons, trying to move up individually to a higher status group, or redefining in-group characteristics as positive. Such strategies do not alter the inter-group balance of power. Collective strategies do alter the inter-group balanced of power. Strategies include directly challenging the majority group to change inter-group power relations.<sup>30</sup>

Within Social Identity Theory, the social group is seen to function as a provider of positive social identity for its members through comparing itself, and distinguishing itself, from other comparison groups along salient dimensions, which have clear value differential.<sup>31</sup> In effect, there can be no intergroup behavior without categorization into groups and research on intergroup behavior has shown that when these categorizations occur intra-group differences are minimized while inter-group differences are exaggerated. Additionally, the minimal group paradigm influences categorization, as people can be and are classified into distinct groups based on arbitrary and trivial criteria.<sup>32</sup>

Social Identity Theory aids our understanding of intergroup conflict as the process of categorization into groups and evaluations of those groups is “a challenge for members of stigmatized, negatively valued groups, who may attempt to dissociate themselves, to

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<sup>29</sup> Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations*, 97.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 98.

<sup>31</sup> Barry Commins and John Lockwood, “The Effects of Status Differences, Favored Treatment, and Equity on Intergroup Comparisons,” *European Journal of Social Psychology*, Volume 9 (1979): 281–282.

<sup>32</sup> Judith Howard, “Social Psychology of Identities,” *Annual Review of Sociology*, Volume 26 (2000): 369.

evaluate the distinguishing dimensions of in-groups as less negative, to rate their in-group as more favorable on other dimensions, or to compete directly with the out-group to produce changes in the status of the groups.”<sup>33</sup> Put more succinctly, when the identities and associated political interests of one group clash with those of another group, the result can be political conflict, including insurgency and terrorist violence.<sup>34</sup>

A significant body of professional work that extends the concepts of Social Identity Theory first presented by Tajfel and Turner has been authored or coauthored by Michael Hogg in the mid-1990s and through early 2000.<sup>35</sup> Some of that work has sought to elaborate on the concepts of how self-categorization results in group behavior, which provides additional insight into the application of social identity theory, such as motivation for uncertainty reduction and prototype-based depersonalization.

### **C. HISPANIC COMMUNITY IDENTITY AND STATUS**

There is a wealth of information related to the sociocultural, economic, and political status and identity of Southwest Hispanic Community. The U.S. Census Bureau compiles many statistical measures as do other nongovernmental organizations like the Pew Hispanic Center. The statistical data is collected, analyzed, and disseminated using a wide array of variables and descriptors, with two of the more common being “race” and “ethnicity.” Race can be defined as an arbitrary classification of modern humans based on any, or a combination of, various physical characteristics, such as skin color, facial form,

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<sup>33</sup> Judith Howard, “Social Psychology of Identities,” *Annual Review of Sociology*, Volume 26 (2000): 369.

<sup>34</sup> Strindberg, “Social Identity Theory and the Study of Terrorism.”

<sup>35</sup> Michael A. Hogg, *The Social Psychology of Group Cohesiveness: From Attraction to Social Identity* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992); Michael A. Hogg, Deborah J. Terry, and Katherine M. White, “A Tale of Two Theories: A Critical Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory,” *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Volume 58, Number 4 (December, 1995): 255–269; Barbara-Ann Mullin and Michael A. Hogg, “Dimensions of Subjective Uncertainty in Social Identification and Minimal Intergroup Discrimination,” *British Journal of Social Psychology*, Volume 37 (1998): 345–365; Michael A. Hogg and Sarah C. Hains, “Friendship and Group Identification: A New Look at the Role of Cohesiveness in Groupthink,” *European Journal of Social Psychology*, Volume 28 (1998): 323–341; Michael A. Hogg and Cecilia L. Ridgeway, “Social Identity: Sociological and Social Psychological Perspectives,” *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Volume 66, Number 2 (June 2003): 97–100. Michael A. Hogg, Dominic Abrams, Sabine Otten, and Steve Hinkle, “The Social Identity Perspective: Intergroup Relations, Self-Conception, and Small Groups,” *Small Group Research*, Volume 35, Number 3 (June, 2004): 246–276.

or eye shape, and now frequently based on such genetic markers as blood groups.<sup>36</sup> Ethnicity refers to an identity with or membership in a particular racial, national, or cultural group and observance of that group's customs, beliefs, and language.<sup>37</sup> Culture, as it pertains to ethnicity, can be misunderstood or misused, so for the purposes of this thesis, will be defined as the sum of attitudes, customs, and beliefs that distinguishes one group of people from another. Culture is transmitted, through language, material objects, ritual, institutions and art, from one generation to the next.<sup>38</sup> Reduced to their most basic elements, it can be said that race is based on physical differences while ethnicity is based on sociocultural differences. The definition and usage of terms, as described above, are important as they pertain to the appropriateness of the available data. Racial differences, while an important aspect of social identity, will not be examined within this paper, which instead considers the impact of ethnic differences.

When the U.S. Congress passed Public Law 94–311 in 1976 requiring that federal government agencies categorize and collect data on Hispanics, it was the first and only time in the nation's history that an ethnic group had been singled out in this manner.<sup>39</sup> Government agencies also collect data on whites, blacks and Asian-Americans, but unlike Hispanics, they are all categorized by the U.S. Census Bureau as racial groups. Hispanics and Latinos are categorized as an ethnic group—meaning they share a common language, culture and heritage, but not a common race.

In October of 1997, the Office of Management and Budget accepted recommendations from the “Interagency Committee for the Review of the Racial and Ethnic Standards” that revised standards for classification of federal data on race and ethnicity. The revised standards included five minimum categories for data on race: American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Black or African American, Native Hawaiian

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<sup>36</sup> *Dictionary.com Unabridged*, s.v. “race,” accessed October 7, 2012, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/race>.

<sup>37</sup> *The American Heritage® New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, Third Edition*, s.v. “ethnicity,” accessed October 7, 2012, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ethnicity>.

<sup>38</sup> *The American Heritage® New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, Third Edition*. s.v. “culture” accessed October 7, 2012, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/culture>.

<sup>39</sup> Ruben Rumbaut, *Hispanics and the Future of America*, ed. Marta Tienda and Faith Mitchell (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2006), 36–65.

or Other Pacific Islander, and White. The standards also included two categories for data on ethnicity as either “Hispanic or Latino” or “Not Hispanic or Latino.”<sup>40</sup>

The revised standards recognized regional differences in the usage of the terms “Hispanic” and “Latino,” which contributed to OMB’s decision to recognize both identities in their terminology to improve response rates. OMB’s usage of the term “Hispanic or Latino” refers to a “person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race.”<sup>41</sup>

Quantitative data and qualitative analysis from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Pew Hispanic Center were particularly useful sources of information relevant to the primary research question. Information related to sociocultural, economic, and political wellbeing at the state, regional and national level was readily available but had to be reorganized and recalculated to capture factors and influences specific to the Southwest region. The primary need for the reorganization was based on the fact that the U.S. Census Bureau does not analyze data for the Southwest region. Data for six of the states included in a broad definition of the Southwest are included in the West region and the remaining two states are included in the South region. The regional organization is an important consideration as cumulative effects of including California, Texas, Arizona, and Mexico within a single region indicate a magnification of disparity in a number of community indicators.

#### **D. NATIONAL PRESSURES AFFECTING HISPANIC COMMUNITY**

Civil rights advocacy and public policy groups and research organizations provide a seemingly inexhaustible source of information regarding pressures exerted internally or externally upon particular communities and the potential impacts of those pressures. Particularly relevant to this thesis is information and analysis from National Council of La Raza (NCLR), self-described as the largest national Hispanic civil rights and advocacy organization in the United States, which conducts applied research, policy

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<sup>40</sup> Office of Management and Budget, “Revisions to the Standards.”

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

analysis, and advocacy to provide a Latino perspective for key areas of assets/investments, civil rights/immigration, education, employment and economic status, and health. Another excellent source of information is the Pew Hispanic Center, which identifies itself as a nonpartisan research organization that seeks to improve understanding of the U.S. Hispanic population and to chronicle Latinos' growing impact on the nation.<sup>42</sup> Other organizations that collect, analyze, and publish relevant and often contentious or contradictory information are the Center for Immigration Studies, Federation for American Immigration Reform, and the Cato Institute; however, some of these organizations collect data more relevant to the non-Hispanic community, and therefore, was of limited value to the primary research question being considered.

With regards to literature describing pressures specific to the Southwest Hispanic Community, a first impression is made by the rhetoric used by various organizations on either side of an issue. Frequently uncivil and often derogatory or defamatory in nature, the rhetoric tends to paint the "other" organizations as overly leftist, rightist, or racist in an apparent attempt to discredit either the positions or information presented by that organization. An excellent example is the English Only organization ProEnglish, which was founded, among other organizations, by John Tanton.<sup>43</sup> ProEnglish has not been designated as a hate group by Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC); however, other organizations founded by John Tanton have.<sup>44</sup> The designation of other organizations founded by John Tanton as hate groups, which are often cited in articles aimed at ProEnglish specifically.<sup>45</sup> It should also be noted that designation as a "hate group" by

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<sup>42</sup> "About the Center," Pew Hispanic Center, accessed July 11, 2012, <http://www.pewhispanic.org/about-the-center/>.

<sup>43</sup> "The Board of Directors," ProEnglish, accessed July 15, 2012, <http://www.proenglish.org/about-us/the-board.html>.

<sup>44</sup> "John Tanton's Network," Southern Poverty Law Center, accessed July 15, 2012, <http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2002/summer/the-puppeteer/john-tantons-network>.

<sup>45</sup> "Controversy Ahead of House Hearing on GOP's 'English Only' Bill," TPM Muckraker, accessed August 9, 2012, [http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2012/08/steve\\_king\\_english\\_only\\_proenglish.php](http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2012/08/steve_king_english_only_proenglish.php).

SPLC is in itself controversial, as conservative organizations point to a perceived preference for designating rightist groups as a hate group.<sup>46</sup>

With these considerations in mind, literature that attempts to remain clear of such rhetoric, accusations, or preferences is more difficult to find but much more valuable. The Pew Hispanic Center again proved to be a valuable source of information, which was more objective in nature relative to other available sources. A number of polls by the Pew Hispanic Center, which are supported by other polls, indicate that Hispanics are more concerned with the availability of healthcare, economic uncertainty and unemployment, immigration enforcement, and educational opportunities.<sup>47</sup> Concern for most of those issues is shared with the non-Hispanic community in general, but the issues of immigration enforcement and language usage, which underlies a number of general concerns, have a unique and specific impact on the Hispanic community.

### **1. Immigration Enforcement and Prosecutorial Discretion**

Through a merger of the investigative and interior enforcement elements of the U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was created in 2003 as the principle investigative agency of the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (ICE 2011). ICE's central responsibility is to enforce the nation's civil immigration laws in coordination with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).<sup>48</sup> Although it represents an ability to remove the largest amount of aliens since

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<sup>46</sup> "Is the Family Research Council Really a Hate Group?" The Daily Beast, accessed on August 17, 2012, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/08/16/is-the-family-research-council-really-a-hate-group.html>.

<sup>47</sup> Mark H. Lopez, Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, and Seth Motel, *As Deportations Rise to Record Levels, Most Latinos Oppose Obama's Policy* (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, 2011), 26; "Hispanic Voters Put Other Issues Before Immigration," Gallup, accessed on July 9, 2012, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/155327/hispanic-voters-put-issues-immigration.aspx>.

<sup>48</sup> Memorandum by John Morton, "Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens," Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 17 June 2011, 2.

1892,<sup>49</sup> ICE only has resources to remove approximately 400,000 aliens each year,<sup>50</sup> which is much less than the 10.8 million unauthorized immigrants DHS estimates to be living in the U.S. as of January 2010.<sup>51</sup> Limited availability of resources led to the issuance of directives by ICE<sup>52</sup> (to exercise prosecutorial discretion and prioritize alien removal based on list of factors to consider when exercising prosecutorial discretion. By adhering to established priorities and exercising prosecutorial discretion, ICE leadership attempts to focus limited resources on individuals posing a risk to national security or public safety.

Threats to national security are posed by aliens engaged in or suspected of terrorism or espionage, or who otherwise pose a danger to national security. Those aliens posing a risk to public safety are defined as those convicted of crimes, with Level I and Level 2 offenders receiving principal attention. Level I offenders are those aliens convicted of “aggravated felonies” or two or more “felonies” each punishable by more than one year of confinement. Level 2 offenders are those aliens convicted of any felony or three or more “misdemeanors” each punishable by less than one year of confinement. These priorities are also applicable to the Secure Communities program to identify and remove criminal aliens. Second priority is given to aliens who have recently violated immigration controls at the border, ports of entry, or through the knowing abuse of the visa and visa waiver programs. Third priority is the removal of aliens who are subject to a final order of removal and abscond, fail to depart, or intentionally obstruct immigration controls.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2010* (Washington, D.C: Office of Immigration Statistics, 2011), 94.

<sup>50</sup> Memorandum by John Morton, “Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens,” Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2 March 2011, 1.

<sup>51</sup> Michael Hoffer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker, *Estimate of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2010* (Washington, DC: Office of Immigration Statistics, 2011), 1.

<sup>52</sup> Morton, “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion,” Morton, “Civil Immigration Enforcement.”

<sup>53</sup> Morton, “Civil Immigration Enforcement,” 2.

The 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) limited the authority of immigration judges to provide relief from removal, which increased attention on the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) exercise of prosecutorial discretion.<sup>54</sup> While prosecutorial discretion itself is not a new concept, the use of prosecutorial discretion in immigration enforcement was institutionalized within the INS in 1999 and 2000. The recent direction issued by Director John Morton of ICE, to exercise prosecutorial discretion in order to prioritize the use of limited immigration enforcement resources has renewed attention of this practice.

Bo Cooper, General Counsel for INS, found that "Prosecutorial discretion is a decision by an individual or law enforcement agency charged with enforcing a law to enforce—or not to enforce—the law against someone."<sup>55</sup> One example of prosecutorial discretion is a decision, absent statutory, national security, public safety threat, or other requirements, to forgo making an administrative arrest or custody determination for aliens who are nursing mothers.<sup>56</sup> It is important that, as stated, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is not limited to prosecutors but includes immigration investigators and agents that are charged with enforcing immigration law. The concept of prosecutorial discretion is intended to prevent "over criminalization" due to existing statutes society does not wish to enforce, account for limitations in enforcement resources making it impossible to prosecute all offenses, and address equities of individual cases that rigid application of broad statutes cannot do.<sup>57</sup>

Prosecutorial discretion is limited to the decision to enforce, or not enforce, a particular law and cannot be an "affirmative act of approval, or grant of a benefit, under a statute or other applicable law that sets guidelines for determining when the approval

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<sup>54</sup> Memorandum by Doris Meissner, "Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion," Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 17 November 2000, 1.

<sup>55</sup> Memorandum by Bo Cooper, "INS Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion," Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 4 October 1999, 2.

<sup>56</sup> Memorandum by Julie L. Meyers, "Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion," Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 7 November 2007, 1.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

should be given.”<sup>58</sup> For example, the inspection and admission of aliens, at a port-of-entry, involves elements of both enforcement and benefit adjudication. In that case, admitting an otherwise inadmissible alien with an authorized status and length of stay is an affirmative action is not a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion.<sup>59</sup> In some cases, the distinction between an enforcement decision and an affirmative act of approval is often blurred,<sup>60</sup> as the decision to not enforce a law can lead to the granting of benefits. An example would be a decision not to place an alien currently in the United States into removal proceedings, which results in an ongoing violation of the law, and in some cases lead to an adjustment of status and granting of benefits.<sup>61</sup> The result is that otherwise removable aliens remain in an ambiguous and uncertain status.

The Supreme Court has ruled that there is a presumption that decisions to exercise, or not exercise, prosecutorial discretion are not reviewable by the courts under the Administrative Procedures Act.<sup>62</sup> In practice this ruling has two effects. The first is that prosecutorial discretion does not require equal enforcement, or non-enforcement, in the case of two individuals with similar circumstances. In those cases, the person who was selected for prosecution cannot have their case reviewed, or force prosecution on an individual not selected for prosecution, on the basis of being improperly singled out for prosecution.<sup>63</sup> The second effect is that absent a clear exception, the decision to exercise prosecutorial discretion to not enforce a particular law cannot be questioned by those without standing to enforce that law. It is possible another individual, with prosecutorial authority, can decide to prosecute but someone without prosecutorial authority cannot question the decision through the judicial system to force prosecution. The limited exceptions include situations where equal protection under the constitution has not been

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<sup>58</sup> Memorandum by Julie L. Meyers, “Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion,” Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 7 November 2007, 4.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

provided,<sup>64</sup> and where statutes, or the law enforcement agency itself, have provided clear guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers.<sup>65</sup>

## 2. Language Usage

Language as a keystone for social identity is exemplified by Berger and Luckmann's contention that human "knowledge" is developed, transmitted and maintained in social situations, and that the sociology of knowledge must seek to understand the process by which knowledge comes to be socially established as "reality."<sup>66</sup>

They point to three foundations of knowledge in everyday life as reality, social interaction, and language.<sup>67</sup> The first foundation of reality may seem difficult in the abstract but is more easily understood when we consider that the reality we face is the foundation of our knowledge, as we must recognize and adapt to that reality on a daily basis. That knowledge of reality would be different for each person in the absolute absence of social interaction, and the availability of a common language should social interaction even be possible. It then becomes clearer that knowledge within society is based on the extent of social interaction and the ability to share reality through a commonly understood language. This concept of reality, social interaction, and language gains importance when one considers the different realities of everyday life, extent of social interaction, and existence of a common language between the Southwest Hispanic Community and the remainder of the Southwest Community.

Berger and Luckmann further stated that language is the most important sign system of human society, as it essential for the understanding of the reality of everyday life. It is used in face-to-face discussion but is not confined to those situations as it is used to "speak" across distances through audio or written communications. Language is also

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<sup>64</sup> Memorandum by Julie L. Meyers, "Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion," Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 7 November 2007, 6.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 5 and 8.

<sup>66</sup> Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 1966), 3.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 19–46.

able to “speak” across the ages enabling us to communicate (albeit one way) with future generations as past generations can communicate with us via similar methods. It also enables us to “speak” across experiences enabling us to be part of events that we may not ever partake in.<sup>68</sup> Consider written accounts of explorers who have stepped on the moon or reached either the North or South pole, which are experiences that take on meaning and form a part of our socially constructed knowledge as a result of language.

These concepts gain importance when applied to the Southwest Hispanic Community, as they help to understand the impact language usage has on that community. Two interesting language usage pressures revealed by the literature are the English Only movement as an external pressure and the negative identity formed by non-Spanish speaking Hispanics, which is an internal pressure.

#### **E. HOMELAND SECURITY**

A review of the literature on homeland security reveals there are many meanings and connotations for related terms, which often vary and even conflict between and among various public and private entities. To alleviate complications as a result of these variances and conflicts, “homeland security” will be derived from the 2010 National Security Strategy<sup>69</sup> and broadly defined as the adaptation of traditional and historic functions of government and society, such as civil defense, emergency response, law enforcement, customs, border patrol, and immigration to confront new threats and evolving hazards by identifying and interdicting hostile actors within our borders, maintaining effective control of physical borders, and disrupting or dismantling transnational terrorist and criminal organizations. This definition allows for a broad and objective review of hazards and threats that have the potential to emerge within our borders to include.

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<sup>68</sup> Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 1966), 3.

<sup>69</sup> Office of the White House, *National Security Strategy: May 2010* (Washington, DC: Office of the White House, 2010), 14.

Within the homeland security enterprise, particular attention is paid to the issues of radicalization, insurgency, and terrorism although usage and definitions also vary widely in homeland security literature. Thus, a “line in the sand” with regards to terminology usage will be drawn for the purposes of this particular research.

Applying the term specific to Islamic radicalization, Marc Sageman defines radicalization as “the process of transformation from ordinary individual into a terrorist willing to kill and sacrifice life. Radicalization has four prongs: A sense of moral outrage for events locally and globally, this outrage is then interpreted in a specific way—namely Islam. This ideology appeals to certain people because it resonates with their personal experience of discrimination and makes them feel they are part of the larger war. A few of these individuals are then mobilized through networks both face-to-face and online to become a terrorist.”<sup>70</sup>

Bruce Hoffman, particularly his definitions of “insurgency” and “terrorism,” is widely cited within homeland security literature. He defines insurgency as containing irregular military tactics that characterize guerrilla operations and typically involve coordinated informational and psychological warfare efforts designed to mobilize popular support against a national government, imperialist power, or foreign occupying force.<sup>71</sup> He also defines terrorism “as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence—or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.”<sup>72</sup>

It is within these specific definitions and usage that the terms homeland security, radicalization, insurgency, and terrorism will be used to examine the primary research question.

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<sup>70</sup> Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 135.

<sup>71</sup> Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 35.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 40.

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### **III. INTERGROUP RELATION THEORY**

#### **A. INTRODUCTION**

For this particular research, Resource Mobilization Theory and Social Identity Theory provide the filter through which the status of and pressure upon the Southwest Hispanic Community will be examined. It is recognized that there are a number of theories that may be applied to a community of interest, such as Relative Deprivation Theory or Terror Management Theory, however Resource Mobilization Theory and Social Identity Theory were selected to allow for an examination of how and why social movements may emerge with a potential for conflict between Hispanics and non-Hispanics. It is believed that the materialist and identity themes inherent in each theory would prove to be complementary themes that are both relevant and appropriate to the research. Additionally, the concept of identity as a resource should be considered as a link between the two theories. The following sections are intended to increase familiarization with the two theories as they relate specifically to the Southwest Hispanic Community. A more comprehensive and focused understanding of those theories allows the sociocultural, economic, and political status of and certain pressures upon the community to be examined within the necessary context.

#### **B. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY**

Resource Mobilization Theory equates social movement behavior with political behavior.<sup>73</sup> The general model posits the existence of a polity structure composed of groups that have regular, routine, and low-cost access to societal resources. Excluded groups are denied this ready access and strive for inclusion to the polity to gain such privileges. Hence, the model depicts a dynamic and interactive struggle between the out-polity groups who seek inclusion and the in-polity groups who resist such incursions.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Sandor Halebsky, *Mass Society and Political Conflict: Towards a Reconstruction of Theory* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 116–130.

<sup>74</sup> Pichardo, “Resource Mobilization,” 98–99.

Two dominant models are the “professional organizer” and “political process” models, which are largely determined by resource availability, motivation, and the political environment. In the “professional organizer” model, McCarthy and Zald point to the involvement of whites (foundations, churches, corporations, and government) in the formation of civil rights organizations for the provision of money, manpower, skills, and leadership.<sup>75</sup> In the “political process” model, McAdam pointed towards certain socioeconomic processes that allowed the black community to organize to a limited extent which was independent of the intervention of external agents.<sup>76</sup> Relative to the Southwest Hispanic Community, a major consideration appears to be whether community resources (leadership, organizing, technical, and financial) would allow an oppressed group to develop and sustain an internally generated organization, or if external resources would be required and/or be made available.

Within the political process model, the motivation for “elite” or outside involvement is presented as a method to control, contain, or profit from the social movement. The professional organizer model suggested by McCarthy and Zald presents elites as willing, even aggressive, sponsors of social insurgency who are motivated out of a sincere sense of social conscience. The political process model takes a more pessimistic view of elite participation, as all social movements pose a threat to existing institutional arrangements in society.<sup>77</sup> Therefore, it is unlikely that members would act sincerely to promote insurgent challenges to existing social arrangements that arise out of the movements. Instead, elite involvement would occur only as a response to the threat posed by the generation of a mass-based social movement.<sup>78</sup> It should be noted that rather than being mutually exclusive, the professional organizer and political process models could conceivably be contained within a particular social movement and may complement or be detrimental to the main effort.

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<sup>75</sup> Pichardo, “Resource Mobilization,” 100.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>78</sup> McAdam, *Political Process*, 26.

Political environment is of central importance to the political process model as the alignment of political groups and the susceptibility of the social structure to the efforts of social movements is a crucial element. Political environment is not as crucial in the professional organizer model as the important variable is simply the infusion of resources to support social movements. The assumptions in the professional organizer model are that elites will be aligned with and will support the social movement out of sincere desire.

To put it simply, if there is a natural social base with significant resources, the professional organizer model will likely dominate and movement autonomy will be assured as elites support the movement out of sincere concern. If there is no natural social base for the movement or inadequate resources, the political process model will likely dominate and the potential for movements to be appropriated is increased as elite provide support out of self interest. For this reason, the status of the Southwest Hispanic Community, particularly those factors indicative of economic and political resource availability, is an important consideration. Under Resource Mobilization Theory, the availability of resources will not only determine whether a social movement can be formed and maintained, but whether that movement will be preempted or allowed to proceed as intended by those aggrieved.

### **C. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY**

Social Identity Theory can be looked at as a means with which to understand and examine intergroup actions as they compete for resources. In that regards, it is a valuable tool with which to examine intergroup behaviors between the Southwest Hispanic Community and the non-Hispanic community, as Social Identity Theory can be used to predict the types and degrees of intergroup bias, such as those between those communities. The same processes that govern intergroup competition and conflict can also be seen between Spanish speaking Hispanics and non-Spanish speaking Hispanics and is readily explained by the minimal group paradigm that allows for categorization on the basis of the most trivial characteristics.

Group Identification is one of the foundational concepts of Social Identity Theory and is based on the existence of the following three components:<sup>79</sup>

- Cognitive – A sense of awareness of membership.
- Evaluative – Awareness is related to some value connotation.
- Emotional - Investment in the awareness and evaluation.

Group identification or categorization will occur when there is an awareness of membership in which an individual attributes value to that membership and is invested in that awareness and evaluation. Judith Howard discussed a relevant finding regarding an individual's preference for adopting racial and ethnic identities.<sup>80</sup> Howard noted that Hispanics who are African-American or Asian will not typically identify with their Hispanic group while some White people will readily adopt a Hispanic identity. This finding points to categorizations based on different valuations that have been applied to racial-ethnic distinctions. In general, it also indicates a positive connotation for cultural distinction, although the exception seems to be non-Spanish speaking Hispanics who attribute a negative connotation to the group identity, as will be shown in future sections.

Tajfel concluded that an individual's sense of worth is significantly influenced by group membership(s) and by the process of making comparisons with relevant out-groups.<sup>81</sup> Thus, an individual readily takes action to improve the positive identity of their group at the expense of out-groups. Various studies have been conducted that have revealed group identification has led to bias and favoritism towards the in-group. One such study led Tajfel to conclude that intergroup conflict was inevitable when group goals were mutually exclusive.<sup>82</sup> This result indicated that in conditions where groups are directly competing for resources, individuals reflected a bias towards their group and embraced strategies that showed favoritism towards their group. Tajfel further found that the very act of allocating people to groups, even on fairly trivial grounds, was an essential

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<sup>79</sup> Tajfel, "Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations."

<sup>80</sup> Howard, "Social Psychology of Identities."

<sup>81</sup> Tajfel, *Human Groups and Social Categories*.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

ingredient leading to intergroup discriminations.<sup>83</sup> As applied to the primary research question, we can understand how Hispanics and non-Hispanics can be categorized into their respective groups on the basis of sociocultural, economic, or even political traits regardless of how minor.

#### **D. RADICALIZATION**

The “staircase to terrorism,” summarized here, provides a useful method for visualizing the radicalization process that an individual may experience as a result of a negative social identity. This particular method can be applied consistently across all cultures in that everyone begins on the ground floor, although there are cross-cultural differences captured by the amount of time to travel from one floor to another, the importance of each floor, and salience of psychological processes characteristic of each floor. As an individual climbs the staircase, fewer choices are available with the final outcome being the destruction of the individual, others, or both.<sup>84</sup>

All people from all cultures start on the ground floor. The important consideration for understanding the “ground floor” is how people subjectively interpret their personal and collective identities and situations, in lieu of objective or actual interpretations. Even though many may have developed one or more negative social identities, the existence of a more dominant positive social identities will induce the vast majority to remain on the ground floor. Those individuals with a dominant negative social identities and feel the need to improve their living conditions, find greater justice, or establish a more positive individual identity may exit the ground floor by climbing the stairs.<sup>85</sup>

Some individuals may experience increasingly intense feelings of shame and anger, as they perceive they have no voice in decisions that impact their lives or are denied the ability to improve their situation.<sup>86</sup> Those feelings of shame, similar to those

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<sup>83</sup> Tajfel, *Human Groups and Social Categories*.

<sup>84</sup> Fathali Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists' Point of View* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 31–44.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 45–58.

<sup>86</sup> Fathali Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists' Point of View* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 59–70.

expressed previously in this paper, and an inability to take advantage of opportunities to exit the staircase on the first floor, may cause an even smaller number of individuals to climb the “staircase to terrorism” to the second floor.

Displacement of aggression on an out-group is an important aspect of the environment on the second floor as feelings of frustration, dissatisfaction, and anger increase. By displacing negative feelings onto an out-group, the leaders of the in-group are able to build group cohesion, silence dissenters, increase support for their leadership, and group member sentiments allow for more aggressive postures towards out-groups.<sup>87</sup>

On the third floor, radicalization continues with categorization of the out-group as different, unclean, and corrupt while adopting beliefs that would justify further actions through affiliation, increasing secrecy, isolation, and fear.<sup>88</sup> The inadequate identity and severe sense of dissatisfaction that lead individuals to climb to the third floor is transformed into a morality that justifies an “us” versus “them” morality.

An individual enters the secret world of terrorist organizations on the fourth floor with an evolved identity with a morality that justifies killing others to find fulfillment and meaning. Specialized training is provided at this level before proceeding to the fifth floor where a terrorist act is executed.<sup>89</sup>

## **E. ANALYSIS**

Resource Mobilization Theory is concerned with the resources that are available to allow a social movement to form and be maintained. As a result, application of theory relies less on particular grievances, as it generally assumes grievances of one form or another to exist, and more on resources internal to an aggrieved group and whether or not external resources will be necessary. When resources from external sources are required, there is the potential for the movement to be contained, controlled, or used for provide by external organizations. Resource availability for the Southwest Hispanic Community,

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<sup>87</sup> Fathali Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists' Point of View* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 71–81.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 83–96.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, 97–126.

relative to the non-Hispanic community, is therefore found to be an important determinant for social movement organization and success.

Social Identity Theory is more concerned with the reasons a social movement is formed and maintained rather than resource availability. Due to individual and collective categorizations, relative comparisons between those identities and the need to maintain positive social identities, an individual or group with a negative identity may employ strategies to develop a positive identity. Such strategies may be relatively benign, such as an individual learning another language, or in extreme circumstances result in conflict through radicalization to insurgency or terrorism. Therefore, a specific community may be examined to reveal whether a negative identity may exist as a result of that community's status or pressures exerted upon and from within that community. However, it must be noted that the existent of a negative identity will not necessarily lead to extremist behavior.

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## IV. HISPANIC COMMUNITY

### A. INTRODUCTION

As sociocultural, economic, and political factors impact both categorization and creation of a positive and distinct social identity, it is necessary to understand the current status of the Southwest Hispanic community relative to the non-Hispanic community. Additionally, the social and economic factors are important considerations with regards to Resource Mobilization Theory, as they pertain to the capacity for mobilization and how that mobilization may occur. The following sections present factors that appear relevant to the primary research question. Unless noted otherwise, data in these sections has been obtained or derived from the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) collected by the U.S. Census Bureau.<sup>90</sup>

The Hispanic population in the eight Southwestern states account for a majority share of the total U.S. Hispanic population and is comprised of native born citizens, foreign born citizens, and foreign born noncitizens. One of three residents in the Southwest is Hispanic of which a vast majority is of Mexican origin with the remainder being mostly of Central and South American origin. Population projections have historically indicated that the Hispanic community, already the largest minority, continues to grow at a fast rate. However, recent trends have revealed that net immigration between the U.S. and Mexico may have stalled, although the higher fertility rate of Hispanics will likely continue to increase their share of the total population.

While the Hispanic population has and continues to grow sociocultural, economic, and political comparisons between Hispanics and non-Hispanics, this indicates continuing and significant gaps between the two communities. Median household income is significantly less for Hispanics with the impacts being magnified by a higher

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<sup>90</sup> Data was obtained from U.S. Census Bureau “American Factfinder,” which can be accessed at <http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml>. Dataset “2010 ACS 1-year estimates” from table “S0201 - Selected Population Profile in the United States” for Hispanics and non-Hispanics were obtained for the United States and the eight Southwestern States. Data for complementary region made up of non-Southwestern states were calculated from this data.

household size. Language usage, education attainment, home ownership, and poverty rates also indicate that Hispanics lag significantly behind non-Hispanics in other social and economic indicators. Finally, the Hispanic community appears to be politically underrepresented within Congress due to the relative lack of Hispanic members.

**B. SOCIOCULTURAL STATUS**

**1. Current Population**

The 2010 ACS data shows the total U.S. population is estimated at 309 Million, of which 85 Million live in the eight Southwestern states (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Hispanic/Non-Hispanic Population - National and Regional

Hispanics make up 16.4% of the total U.S. population; however, the proportion of Hispanics as part of the Southwest region population more than doubles to 33.9% (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Ethnic Concentration – National and Regional

Of the eight Southwest states the three states with higher regional concentrations of Hispanics are New Mexico (46.4%), Texas (37.7%), and California (37.7%) (Figure 3). The five states with lower regional concentrations of Hispanics are Arizona (29.8%), Nevada (26.6%), Colorado (20.8%), Utah (13.0%), and Oklahoma (8.8%) (Figure 3). It is also notable that the only two Southwestern states with concentrations of Hispanics that are lower than the national proportion of 16.4% are Oklahoma and Utah.




Figure 3. Ethnic Concentration - Southwest States

Significantly, the data shows that slightly more than half of the nearly 50.1 million Hispanics living in the U.S. reside in the three Southwestern states of California (27.8%), Texas (18.8%), and Arizona (3.8%) (Figure 4).




Figure 4. Ethnic Distribution - Hispanic Population Centers

Data from the Pew Hispanic Center and 2010 Census also indicate a regional concentration of Hispanics based on country of origin. Among the 10 largest Hispanic origin groups, all have their largest populations in just three states: California (Mexicans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans), Florida (Cubans, Colombians, Hondurans and Peruvians) or New York (Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Ecuadorians).<sup>91</sup> Nationally, Hispanics of Mexican origin make up 63.0% of all Hispanics. In the Southwest, the proportion of Hispanics of Mexican origin increases to 81.5% with the majority of the remaining 18.5% coming from Central and South America (Figure 5). The largest single Hispanic origin group population in a state is the Mexican population in California at 11.8 million people. Texas is home to another 8.4 million Mexicans. Together, these two states contain 61% of the total Mexican population in the U.S.<sup>92</sup>




Figure 5. Ethnic Concentration - Hispanic Population Country of Origin

The preceding review of available data reveals that proportions of Hispanic and non-Hispanic populations differ significantly from national averages within the Southwest region. The data indicates a regional concentration in the Southwest of

<sup>91</sup> Seth Motel and Eileen Patten, *The 10 Largest Hispanic Origin Groups: Characteristics, Rankings, Top Counties* (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, 2012), 13.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

Hispanics in general and Hispanics of Mexican origin specifically. This data supports a conclusion that the Southwest Hispanic community is both separate and distinct from the non-Hispanic Community in the Southwest and Hispanic/non-Hispanic Communities outside of the Southwest. That conclusion is based upon the larger concentration of Hispanics in the Southwest, and the fact that a large proportion of those Hispanics are of Mexican origin.

## **2. Population Growth**

Past and future trends typically support a view of rapid continued growth of the Hispanic community, which is now the largest minority group in the U.S. The Hispanic population grew by about 15.5 million people from 2000 to 2010—a 44% increase. In 2000, there were 35.2 million Hispanics living in the U.S. Today, there are 50.7 million Hispanics.<sup>93</sup>

Estimates of future growth of the Hispanic population project a rapid increase between 1995 and 2025, accounting for 44% of the growth in the U.S. population (32 million Hispanics out of a total of 72 million persons added to the U.S. population). The Hispanic population is the second fastest-growing population, after Asians, in every region over the 30-year period.<sup>94</sup> Further, the Hispanic population in the U.S. is projected to reach 132.8 million in July 2050 and comprise 30% of the nation's population.<sup>95</sup>

The U.S. Census Bureau considers Net International Immigration in their population projections, which capture estimates of net migration that includes all foreign-born immigrants and emigrants, regardless of legal status.<sup>96</sup> Thus, unauthorized migrants are implicitly included in Census Bureau estimates of net international migration.

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<sup>93</sup> Seth Motel and Eileen Patten, *The 10 Largest Hispanic Origin Groups: Characteristics, Rankings, Top Counties* (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, 2012), 15.

<sup>94</sup> Paul R. Campbell, *Population Projections for States by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2025*, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Division, PPL-47, accessed August 27, 2012, <http://www.census.gov/population/projections/files/stateproj/ppl47.pdf>.

<sup>95</sup> U.S. Census Bureau, *Hispanic Heritage Month 2012: Sept 15 – Oct 15* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, 2012).

<sup>96</sup> "International Migration," U.S. Census Bureau, accessed August 28, 2012, <http://www.census.gov/population/intmigration/about/faq.html>.

However, it should be noted that the Pew Hispanic Center published a report in April 2012 that indicates the net immigration between the U.S. and Mexico has come to a “standstill” with 1,390,000 migrating from the U.S. to Mexico and 1,370,000 migrating from Mexico to the U.S. between June 2005 and June 2010.<sup>97</sup>

There are likely a number of factors that have led to the standstill. The Pew Hispanic Center report posits that a weakened U.S. job and housing construction market, heightened border enforcement, a rise in deportations, growing dangers with illegal border crossings, long-term decline in Mexico’s birth rates, and broader economic conditions in Mexico have contributed to the standstill.<sup>98</sup>

### **3. Gender Distribution**

The process of radicalization discussed previously can include the separation and segregation of males from females due to societal customs or norms. The formation of male-only groups, whether based on gender distribution or societal customs, can create conformity and obedience within those groups and has the potential to lead to riskier moral values and behavior that may be supportive of terrorism (Moghaddam 2006, 96). For this reason, the gender distribution was analyzed to determine disparities that might be indicative of this dynamic occurring within the Southwest Hispanic Community.

At the national and regional level, the Hispanic community has more males than females, while the distribution is reversed in the non-Hispanic community where females outnumber males. The Hispanic population is predominantly male (50.7%) with Hispanic males making up 51% of the non-Southwest and 50.5% of the Southwest populations. In comparison, the non-Hispanic community is predominantly female (51.1%) with non-Hispanic females making up 51.2% of the non-Southwest and 50.6% of the Southwest populations (Figure 6).

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<sup>97</sup> Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzales-Barrera, *Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero – and Perhaps Less* (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center 2012).

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.




Figure 6. Gender Distribution - National and Regional

The gender disparity is largest between non-Hispanic males and non-Hispanic females in the non-Southwest where there are almost 5 million more females than males. While the gender disparity is reversed in the Hispanic community outside the Southwest, a smaller community size means there are approximately 450,000 more Hispanic males than Hispanic females. In the Southwest, there are 260,000 more Hispanic males and 730,000 more non-Hispanic females.

The data summarized above does not support a general conclusion that the disparities in gender distribution require the separation or segregation into male-only groups, as can be seen in other cultures. The numerical dominance of males in the Hispanic community might be an important factor in the formation of the Hispanic cultural identity, especially in the Southwest where there is increased competition for female companions; however, the increase in societal acceptance of inter-ethnic relationships will likely forestall radicalization due to numerical inequities based on gender. In a society, as in the U.S., where monogamous relationships (dating, as well as

marriage) are a generally accepted norm, the ability for Hispanic males to find mates among non-Hispanic females will prevent the formation of Hispanic male-only groups.

#### 4. Age Distribution

The age distribution of a particular community will impact both identity and resource availability. For example, the availability of political resources will be affected by the eligibility of community members to vote. The age distribution can also be a factor in determining the impact that certain pressures will have upon a community, such as when a group will be eligible to draw Medicare or Social Security benefits. A community with a greater proportion of members already drawing upon such benefits may be more inclined to preserve the ability to draw upon those resources, while a community with a lesser proportion eligible to do so may look reduce benefits in the short term in favor of preserving such benefits for the future.

The percentage of Hispanics in the Southwest aged 18 years or older at 65.3% is significantly less than the percentage for non-Hispanics at 77.8% (Figure 7). This disparity is consistent with those found in the non-Southwest. Additionally, the disparity exists for those aged 62 or older (7.3% Hispanic to 18.1% non-Hispanic) and those aged 65 or older (5.5% Hispanic to 14.5% non-Hispanic), which are the ages where early Social Security benefits and Medicare benefits can be accessed respectively.




Figure 7. Age Distribution - Age 18 and Older

Nationally, the median age among Hispanics has risen from 25 in 2000 to 27 in 2010,<sup>99</sup> which corresponds closely with the median age of Hispanics in the Southwest. However, the median age of Hispanics in the Southwest at 26.9 is significantly lower than the median age for non-Hispanics in the Southwest, which is 39.7 (Figure 8).




Figure 8. Age Distribution - Community Median Age

The relatively younger age, in terms of both age distribution and median age, of Hispanics to non-Hispanics in the Southwest is important as a consideration for any issues with an age related component, such as marriage, education attainment, voting eligibility, or senior benefits. It can be expected that pressures or policies will elicit different reactions based the particular age distribution of the community and their desire to maintain access to resources either in the short or long term.

## 5. Language Usage

Usage of Spanish and English by Hispanics and non-Hispanics has broad sociocultural impacts due to its foundational basis in the social construction of reality and more specifically upon the formation of social identities and categorizations based on

<sup>99</sup> Motel and Patten, *The 10 Largest Hispanic Groups*, 15.

those identities. Language usage also has economic and political implications; however, the discussion will focus more on the sociocultural impacts given the primary research question being considered.

More than six-in-ten (61%) Hispanic adults in the U.S. say they can carry on a conversation in English “very well” or “pretty well.” Among the foreign born or first-generation Hispanics, 38% say they can carry on a conversation in English. Ninety-two percent of Hispanics in the second generation say they are proficient at speaking English. The number increases to 96% for third-generation Hispanics<sup>100</sup> (Figure 9). At the second and higher generations, the number of Hispanics who are English proficient is higher than those in the total U.S. population who are English proficient, which is 91%.<sup>101</sup>

Another important finding regarding language usage was that the number of Hispanic adults who state they are proficient in Spanish decreases significantly for the third and higher generations. The percentage of all Hispanics who say they can speak Spanish “very well” or “pretty well” is 82%. Ninety-one percent and 82% of the first and second generation respectively state they are proficient in speaking Spanish. The number of Hispanics that can speak Spanish proficiently drops dramatically to 47% for third and higher generations.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Paul Taylor, Mark Hugo Lopez, Jessica Hamar Martinez, and Gabriel Velasco, *When Labels Don't Fit: Hispanics and Their Views of Identity* (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, 2012), 24.

<sup>101</sup> Motel and Patten, *The 10 Largest Hispanic Groups*, 9.

<sup>102</sup> Taylor, *When Labels Don't Fit*, 25.




Figure 9. Spanish/English Speaking Ability (adapted from Pew Hispanic Center)

“First generation” refers to foreign-born people. “Second generation” refers to people born in the United States, with at least one first-generation parent. “Third and higher generations” refer to people born in the United States, with both parents born in the United States.<sup>103</sup> The rapid decrease in Spanish usage between second and third generation Hispanics, at a time when multiculturalism and diversity are being celebrated and valued, has the potential to create a negative positive identity for a large portion of the Hispanic community.

## 6. Education

Nationally, the attainment of educational degrees for Hispanics has improved over the past 10 years, although it lags the achievements of non-Hispanics (Figure 10). Among all Hispanics ages 25 and older, the share with less than a high school diploma is down 10 percentage points, from 48% in 2000 to 38% in 2010.”<sup>104</sup> Additionally, both shares of Hispanics with a high school diploma and with a college degree have risen over the past decade. Between 2000 and 2010, the share with only a high school diploma increased

<sup>103</sup> Taylor, *When Labels Don't Fit*, 7.

<sup>104</sup> Motel and Patten, *The 10 Largest Hispanic Groups*, 16.

four percentage points—from 22% to 26%. Similarly, the share with at least a bachelor’s degree increased three percentage points during the same period—from 10% to 13%.<sup>105</sup>




Figure 10. Education Attainment - National Comparison

Despite such success, the proportion of Hispanics in the Southwest that achieve a high school or higher degree is alarmingly lower at 59.6% than the proportion of non-Hispanics at 91.3%. Again, we see an instance where a disparity, education attainment in this case, between Hispanics and non-Hispanics is greater in the Southwest than the disparity seen outside the Southwest (Figure 11).

<sup>105</sup> Motel and Patten, *The 10 Largest Hispanic Groups*, 16.




Figure 11. Education Attainment - Southwest Comparison

Such a high disparity in educational attainment, regardless of reasons for the disparity, will have important and lasting sociocultural and economic impacts upon the Southwest Hispanic Community. Education attainment can be considered an important factor in the creation of a positive identity when comparisons are made against other groups. Additionally, when occupations and income are tied to education attainment, it will affect the availability of resources for the formation of social movements.

## 7. Household

The U.S. Census Bureau defines, and tabulates, a “family” household as a family that consists of a householder and one or more other people living in the same household who are related to the householder by birth, marriage, or adoption. Conversely, a “nonfamily” household consists of a householder living alone or with nonrelatives only. Same-sex couple households with no relatives of the householder present are tabulated in nonfamily households.<sup>106</sup>

The ACS data reveals that Hispanics have a greater proportion of family households to nonfamily households when compared against non-Hispanics both

<sup>106</sup> U.S. Census Bureau, *American Community Survey and Puerto Rico Community Survey: 2010 Subject Definitions* (Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau 2010), 75–76.

nationally and regionally. However, the proportion of family to nonfamily households is slightly greater for Hispanics in the Southwest than those in the non-Southwest (Figure 12). That same dynamic is observed with regards to average family size (Figure 13).




Figure 12. Household Distribution - Percent “Family” Households




Figure 13. Household Distribution - Average Family Size

The greater number of family households, and the larger average family size of those households, indicates that the Southwest Hispanic Community favors family units over nonfamily units, and therefore, the maintenance of stronger familial bonds. This

conclusion is supported by data that shows that Hispanics have a divorce rate that is significantly less than non-Hispanic households. However, that data is contrasted by the lower percentage of Hispanics who have never been married than non-Hispanics. These dynamics may be explained in part by the lower income, inducing Hispanics to live at home longer, and the younger age of Hispanics families.

## **8. Citizenship**

Citizenship is one of the limited cases where disparities between Hispanics and non-Hispanics is not more pronounced in the Southwest but instead closely follows national trends. National and Southwest percentages of Hispanics that are U.S. citizens is 74% and 75%, respectively. The percentages of non-Hispanics that are U.S. citizens are 93% and 95%, respectively.<sup>107</sup> The increased concentration of Hispanics within the Southwest, more specifically those of Mexican origin, typically correlates with increased disparity between Hispanics and non-Hispanics, as seen with previously presented indicators of sociocultural status. However, that correlation does not exist where citizenship is concerned.

While the disparity between Hispanics and non-Hispanics is still pronounced, a different dynamic appears to be at play as the disparity at the national and regional level is essentially identical (Figure 14).

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<sup>107</sup> Motel and Patten, *The 10 Largest Hispanic Groups*, 10.




Figure 14. Citizenship - Hispanic Community Comparison

One potential reason for the difference is that increased immigration enforcement, or the perception of increased enforcement, in the region have counteracted conditions leading to increased regional disparity. Increased immigration enforcement would by definition target the removal of aliens leading to a higher proportion of U.S. citizens. Additionally, the perception of increased enforcement in the region might entice removable aliens to look for and take up residence outside the region, which would also result in an increased proportion of U.S. citizens within the region.

## 9. Mexican Nationalism

Although generally recognized as not being representative of Hispanic cultural beliefs, there are Mexican Nationalist groups within the U.S. that have some impact, however minor, in shaping Hispanic cultural identity. These groups appear to be relatively small, but the size and scope of these nationalist groups, however they can or should not be dismissed, as their founding documents contain language that is relevant to the central research questions.

Many of the Mexican nationalist movements reference the Reconquista, or the mythical Aztec homeland called Aztlán, with some using that term to refer to land in the

Southwest that belonged to Mexico at one point and is currently part of the U.S.<sup>108</sup> A number of these movements include charters or founding documents, which include language that can be characterized as divisive and may be labeled as advocating more disruptive or violent behavior. An example of such a document is “El Plan Espiritual de Aztlan,”<sup>109</sup> which is still referenced by Mexican Nationalist movements like the National Brown Berets<sup>110</sup> and MEChA<sup>111</sup>. Another nationalist movement of particular note, which uses that document, is the Nation of Aztlan that has been designated by the Anti-Defamation League as an anti-Semitic organization<sup>112</sup> and as evidenced by their online publication *Voz de Aztlan*<sup>113</sup>. The level of support for these organizations from within the Hispanic community is unclear, although the student organization MEChA appears to be more widespread with 400 chapters loosely organized through regional and national organizations.<sup>114</sup>

MEChA’s constitution, first ratified in 1995 and as amended in 2003 in Section 24, states that recognized chapters have the responsibility to “orient all members by discussing and reading historical documents related to the social movement, such as El Plan de Santa Barbara, El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán, and the MEChA Position Papers of Philosophy, Constitutions, Relationship to Outside Organizations, and Goals &

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<sup>108</sup> “Aztlan,” National Brown Berets, accessed October 10, 2012, <http://www.nationalbrownberets.com/Aztlan.html>; “The Philosophy of MEChA,” MEChA, accessed October 10, 2012, <http://www.nationalmecha.org/philosophy.html#philosophy>; “Professor Predicts ‘Hispanic Homeland’,” accessed October 10, 2012, <http://www.aztlan.net/homeland.htm>.

<sup>109</sup> “Aztlan Historical Documents,” *La Voz de Aztlan*, accessed October 10, 2012, [http://www.aztlan.net/aztlan\\_historical\\_documents.htm](http://www.aztlan.net/aztlan_historical_documents.htm).

<sup>110</sup> “Historical Documents,” National Brown Berets, accessed October 10, 2012, [http://www.nationalbrownberets.com/Historical\\_PLAN.html](http://www.nationalbrownberets.com/Historical_PLAN.html).

<sup>111</sup> “Documentos,” MEChA, accessed October 10, 2012, <http://www.nationalmecha.org/documentos.html>.

<sup>112</sup> “Backgrounder: Nation of Aztlan,” Anti-Defamation League, accessed October 10, 2012, [http://www.adl.org/learn/aztlan/anti\\_SZ.asp](http://www.adl.org/learn/aztlan/anti_SZ.asp).

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>114</sup> “Chapters/MEChistAs,” MEChA La Universidad de Arizona, accessed October 10, 2012, <http://clubs.asua.arizona.edu/~mecha/pages/MechaChapterLinks.html#AltaCalifasNorte>; “What is MEChA,” *El Sexto Sol de MEChA*, accessed October 10, 2012, <http://www.utpa.edu/orgs/mecha/tutor.html>.

Objectives.”<sup>115</sup> A review of El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán reveals the following statements:

In the spirit of a new people that is conscious not only of its proud historical heritage but also of the brutal “gringo” invasion of our territories...

Aztlán belongs to those who plant the seeds, water the fields, and gather the crops and not to the foreign Europeans.

Economic control of our lives and our communities can only come about by driving the exploiter out of our communities, our pueblos, and our lands...

Our struggle then must be for the control of our barrios, campos, pueblos, lands, our economy, our culture, and our political life.

For the very young there will no longer be acts of juvenile delinquency, but revolutionary acts.

Self-Defense against the occupying forces of the oppressors at every school, every available man, woman, and child.

It is recognized that documents, such as El Plan de Santa Barbara and El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán were written during the 60s and 70s when the civil rights movements were at their peak and such documents and rhetoric were not unusual. It is problematic that MEChA continues to reference that document in their current constitution, despite the divisive language, while certain groups that do not support immigration are very vocal about MEChA's use of those documents.<sup>116</sup> Due to the absence of any significant violent actions by the group, it should be recognized that MEChA does provide certain social benefits to its members, such as a positive collective social identity and can act as a natural base for mobilization of resources to include political, economic, or even identity resources.

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<sup>115</sup> “MEChA National Constitution,” MEChA, accessed October 10, 2012, <http://www.nationalmecha.org/documents/nationalConstitution.pdf>.

<sup>116</sup> “The Scourge of MEChA,” American Patrol, accessed October 10, 2012, <http://www.americanpatrol.com/REFERENCE/MEChAindex.html>.

Despite the divisive language in the foundational documents, it should be highlighted that these organization are not secretive, actively seek and include female participation, and have no record of violent protest or activity. Such indications are counter to those that can be used to gauge the potential for radicalization leading to violent actions. Perhaps more importantly than the questionable rhetoric used by such nationalist groups is the fact that widespread popular support for most Mexican Nationalist movements does not appear to exist. National Council of La Raza specifically objects to claims that the organization supports the concept of Reconquista.<sup>117</sup> For example, Nativo Lopez, previously the president of the Mexican American Political Association in Los Angeles, when asked about the concept of Reconquista by a reporter, responded “I can’t believe you’re bothering me with questions about this. You’re not serious. I can’t believe you’re bothering with such a minuscule, fringe element that has no resonance with this populace.”<sup>118</sup>

### **C. ECONOMIC STATUS**

As with sociocultural indicators, the 2010 ACS contains a wide range of economic information that can be used to compare the Hispanic community against the non-Hispanic community at the national, regional, and state levels. As with sociocultural factors, the economic disparities in the Southwest are typically greater than disparities observed outside the Southwest, although there are limited exceptions, such as when home ownership is examined. Similar to sociocultural status, economic status can provide insight to whether the Southwest Hispanic Community might establish a positive or negative identity based on how the group perceives their status or how the non-Hispanic community perceives them. Additionally, the economic status can provide a very valuable gauge of resources available within the natural base to allow for a social movement to form and be maintained with or without elite involvement.

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<sup>117</sup> “Reconquista and Segregation,” National Council of La Raza, accessed October 11, 2012, [http://www.nclr.org/index.php/about\\_us/faqs/the\\_truth\\_about\\_nclr/reconquista\\_and\\_segregation](http://www.nclr.org/index.php/about_us/faqs/the_truth_about_nclr/reconquista_and_segregation).

<sup>118</sup> “Mexican Aliens Seek to Retake ‘Stolen’ Land,” The Washington Times, accessed October 11, 2012, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/apr/16/20060416-122222-1672r/>.

## 1. Household Income and Disparity

“In 2010, the median household income for Hispanics in the U.S. was \$40,000, less than the U.S. median of \$49,800.”<sup>119</sup> Those findings are similar to those derived using 2010 ACS data which revealed the median household income is \$40,165 for Hispanics and \$51,315 for non-Hispanics, for a relative income disparity between the two ethnic groups of \$11,150. As with population makeup, a greater disparity is observed when data for the Southwest region is focused upon. The median household income for Hispanics in the Southwest is \$40,834, which is \$16,834 less than the Southwest median for non-Hispanics at \$57,668 (Figure 15).




Figure 15. Income Distribution - Median Household Income

As discussed in a previous section, the average family size for a Hispanic household in the Southwest is 4.1, while it is only 3.1 for a non-Hispanic household (Figure 13). As a result, the impact of a higher average family size for a Hispanic household serves to amplify the impact of a lower median household income.

<sup>119</sup> Motel and Patten, *The 10 Largest Hispanic Groups*, 11.

The largest disparity between Hispanic and non-Hispanic median household income was in Colorado (\$20,392) with the least disparity observed in Oklahoma (\$7,828) (Figure 16). The highest and lowest median household incomes were found in California and Oklahoma, respectively.




Figure 16. Income Distribution - Median Household Income Disparity

The income disparities contribute to the fact that the poverty rate among Hispanics is greater than among non-Hispanics. As a result, more Latino children are living in poverty—6.1 million in 2010—than children of any other racial or ethnic group. This marks the first time in U.S. history that the single largest group of poor children is not white. This negative milestone for Hispanics is a product of their growing numbers, high birth rates, and declining economic fortunes.<sup>120</sup>

<sup>120</sup> Mark Hugo Lopez and Gabriel Velasco, *Childhood Poverty Among Hispanics Sets Record, Leads Nation* (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, 2011), 4.

## 2. Poverty

In order to determine a person’s poverty status, the U.S. Census Bureau compares the person’s total family income in the last 12 months with the poverty threshold appropriate for that person’s family size and composition. If the total income of that person’s family is less than the threshold appropriate for that family, then the person is considered “below the poverty level,” together with every member of his or her family. If a person is not living with anyone related by birth, marriage, or adoption, then the person’s own income is compared with his or her poverty threshold.<sup>121</sup> In this instance, poverty rates for Hispanic families are consistent at the national and regional level with only slight variations. However, the poverty rates for non-Hispanics in the Southwest are lower than in the non-Southwest. As a result, the already large disparity in poverty rates between Hispanics and non-Hispanics is slightly greater in the Southwest (Figure 17).




Figure 17. Income Distribution - Poverty Rates

## 3. Employment and Occupation

The employment rate and occupations worked are additional useful indicators of the economic status of the community that work in concert with sociocultural factors to

<sup>121</sup> U.S. Census Bureau, *American Community Survey*, 102.

establish the community’s social identity. It had been expected that employment rates would be dramatically lower for Hispanics than for non-Hispanics; however, data revealed that the employment rate was slightly higher for Hispanics. For Hispanics in the Southwest, the employment rate is 58.1% compared against 56.6% for non-Hispanics with the difference being slightly larger in the non-Southwest (Figure 18).

Interestingly, the unemployment rate for Hispanics was found to be slightly higher than non-Hispanics with an approximately 2% disparity revealed both nationally and regionally. The different findings for employment and unemployment can be partially explained by the slightly higher percentage of Hispanics (36.2%) to non-Hispanics (32.2%) who are in the labor force.




Figure 18. Income Distribution - Employment Rate

With employment and unemployment data showing relatively minor and counteracting disparities between Hispanics and non-Hispanics, the impact of occupation should be considered an important factor in the establishment of income disparity. Occupation data reveals that non-Hispanics are more likely to be employed in management positions, which would have a higher salary (Figure 19).




Figure 19. Income Distribution - Southwest Occupation Comparison

In comparison, Hispanics are more likely to be employed in service occupations that would have a lower salary. Additionally, a significantly higher proportion of Hispanics are employed in construction and production occupations.

In addition to the potential for creating income disparity, these traditional occupational roles are typically based within hierarchical structures, which would aid in the formation of a less positive identity for Hispanics who are employed in nonmanagement and nonsales occupations.

#### **4. Other Economic Indicators**

Other economic indicators, such as health insurance, home ownership, and the value of homes also highlight the relative disparity between Hispanic and non-Hispanic communities, although findings differ as to whether the effect is more pronounced in the Southwest. Data regarding health insurance coverage shows that 31.6% of Hispanics in the Southwest lack health insurance coverage, which compares negatively against 13.8% of non-Hispanics. The observed disparity in health coverage was found to be consistent both regionally and nationally (Figure 20).




Figure 20. Income Distribution - No Health Insurance

Home ownership for Hispanics in the Southwest is at 50.5%, which is less than non-Hispanics at 64.2%. However, the disparity is less than that seen outside the Southwest where Hispanics ownership is at 42.8% as compared to 68.7% for non-Hispanics (Figure 21).




Figure 21. Income Distribution - Home Ownership

The median home value for Hispanics in the Southwest is \$172,396, which is much less than the median home value for non-Hispanics at \$259,362. This disparity is significantly greater than the disparity observed outside the Southwest (Figure 22).




Figure 22. Income Distribution - Home Value

The particular dynamic, of higher unemployment/unemployment rates coupled with the lower household income observed within the Southwest Hispanic Community point to the ability for and success in mobilizing Hispanics as an economic bloc. The higher unemployment rate and the lower wages paid by occupations more likely to employ Hispanics indicates the availability of a labor force that can be readily mobilized by elites. Elites involvement in forming policies, such as immigration reform or migrant work visas, to ensure access to Hispanics as a labor force is supported by the “political process” model of Resource Mobilization Theory. The higher employment rate can be seen as an indicator of the success in mobilizing Hispanics as an economic bloc providing a lower cost labor force.

#### **D. POLITICAL INFLUENCE**

Two useful indicators of Hispanic political influence are the existence of Hispanics in the federal government, as result of previous elections, and the potential of Hispanics to influence political outcomes. Past elections have seen some relative success of Hispanics being elected to federal governments; however, that success does not appear to represent the Hispanic population in the Southwest. The degree to which the Hispanic

community has or exercises political influence are based in part on voter eligibility and turnout, perceived importance of electoral issues, or support for a particular platform or candidate.

Membership of the 112th Congress includes 31 Hispanic members, with 29 serving in the House of Representatives and two in the Senate.<sup>122</sup> The Hispanic membership represents 5.7% of congressional membership, 6.6% of the House, and 2.0% of the Senate. Further, Southwestern states are apportioned a total of 121 seats in the House of Representatives<sup>123</sup>, however, only fifteen or 12.4% of those seats are filled by Hispanic members, which represent the four Southwestern states of Arizona (2), California (6), New Mexico (1), and Texas (6).<sup>124</sup> Finally, the two presently serving Hispanic Senators represent New Jersey and Florida, with none currently serving Hispanic Senators hailing from the Southwest.<sup>125</sup> Considering that Hispanics make up 16.3% of the U.S. population and 33.8% of the Southwest population, by all indicators, it would appear that Hispanics are underrepresented within the federal government with a larger disparity within the Southwest.

Due to their ongoing population growth, Hispanics comprise a greater share of the nation's eligible voters than they did just a few years ago—11.0% this year, up from 9.5% in 2008 and 8.2% in 2004. However, the turnout rate of eligible Latino voters has historically lagged that of whites and blacks by substantial margins. In 2008, for example, 50% of eligible Latino voters cast ballots, compared with 65% of blacks and 66% of

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<sup>122</sup> Jennifer Manning, *Membership of the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress: A Profile* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011). This profile was altered by recent elections held on November 6, 2012, most notably the election of Senator-elect Ted Cruz from Texas who will join the 113<sup>th</sup> Congress. Even with this forthcoming addition to the Senate, Hispanics remain underrepresented within the federal government.

<sup>123</sup> "Apportionment Population and Number of Representatives, by State: 2010 Census," U.S. Census Bureau, accessed October 12, 2012, <http://www.census.gov/population/apportionment/files/Apportionment%20Population%202010.pdf>.

<sup>124</sup> "List of Hispanic and Latino Americans in the United States Congress," Wikipedia, accessed October 12, 2012, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_Hispanic\\_and\\_Latino\\_Americans\\_in\\_the\\_United\\_States\\_Congress](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Hispanic_and_Latino_Americans_in_the_United_States_Congress).

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*

whites.<sup>126</sup> These numbers reflect lost opportunities for Hispanics to influence past political outcomes while at the same time indicating a greater potential for influencing future political outcomes should participation of eligible voters increase. As 55% of Hispanics are not eligible to vote because they are under age 18, or are an adult that does not hold U.S. citizenship,<sup>127</sup> the ability to affect political outcomes will increase as the Hispanic community ages and U.S. citizenship increases.

The influence of Hispanics on the 2012 presidential and future elections will be reflected in the distribution of Hispanics among “battleground” states. While a majority of U.S. Hispanics live in the three Southwestern states of California, Texas, and Arizona none of the states are considered “battleground” states.<sup>128</sup> Colorado and Nevada are two Southwestern states where Hispanics will wield greater influence as those states are considered “battleground” states where large portions of the population is Hispanic; 20.7% and 26.5%, respectively. Another political factor would be whether voter issues perceived to be important to Hispanic voters would drive or increase turnout in general or for a specific candidate. As indicated earlier, the top issues for Hispanics include healthcare, unemployment, education, immigration, and economic growth, so any ballot measures or candidates who focus positively on those issues could expect greater voter turnout and support from Hispanics.

Due to their status as the largest minority group, Hispanics have the potential to influence and shape political issues and discussions. However, the disparity between Hispanic legislators and the population may indicate a lack of political resources within the natural base of the Southwest Hispanic Community. The degree to which the Hispanic community is under-represented indicates their political resources are limited to affecting the political process primarily through elections and ballot measures or through the formation of social movements. In this way, politicians who support and in turn gain

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<sup>126</sup> Mark Hugo Lopez, Seth Motel, and Eileen Patten, *A Record 24 Million Latinos Are Eligible to Vote, But Turnout Rate Has Lagged That of Whites, Blacks* (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, 2012), 5.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>128</sup> “2012 Swing States,” Politico, updated November 10, 2012, <http://www.politico.com/2012-election/swing-state/>.

the support of Hispanics can be seen as an example of political support by the elites for Hispanic movements, either through sincere support or need to control, contain, or profit from that community.

## **E. ANALYSIS**

Although the preceding discussion treats the sociocultural, economic, and political factors as distinct elements, they are integrated within society resulting in complex interactions that allow a distinct and unique identity to be formed within groups sharing those conditions. For example, interaction between factors can be observed where language usage impacts education attainment, which then effects occupation, employment, income, and home ownership. Such considerations are not limited to the Southwest Hispanic Community but are relevant to any community or group being examined.

While Hispanics make up a large, and still growing, share of the population in the Southwest, the sociocultural, economic, and political factors show that Hispanics lag behind non-Hispanics in many important indicators, such as income, poverty, home ownership, education, and language usage. On that basis, it would appear that categorization under Social Identity Theory would be accomplished in accordance with the minimal group paradigm resulting in the creation of a separate and distinct identity, although that identity would likely be less positive when compared against the non-Hispanic community. The willingness and ability for the Hispanic community to compete with non-Hispanics for resources is therefore an important consideration, which under the most extreme of circumstances could lead to direct conflict. As shown in the preceding sections, the disparities between Hispanics and non-Hispanics in the Southwest are typically more pronounced, and therefore, the potential for competition and conflict under Social Identity Theory are greater in that region.

The lower availability of internal resources would also indicate a reduced natural base that could be mobilized to form and maintain social movements. For this reason, it appears that the “political process” model would be the more appropriate model to examine the capacity and mechanisms for Hispanics to mobilize as a social movement.

The ability of elites to contain, control, or profit from movements under the political process model is therefore an important consideration. For example, the Southwest Hispanic Community is underrepresented within Congress, which indicates a lack of natural political resources, however, Hispanics are increasingly able to draw upon political resources through the “political process” model of Resource Mobilization Theory although at the risk of such a politically oriented social movement being contained, controlled, or profited upon.

A final consideration for Resource Mobilization Theory is the potential to impact voter turnout to support Hispanic or non-Hispanic candidates or issues. Although particular grievances are less important under Resource Mobilization Theory, understanding what a community’s grievances are is critical for being able to mobilize the community in support of or against candidates or issues. For example, issues related to increased immigration enforcement, or English Only requirements, will have a far greater ability to mobilize the Hispanic community than they would in trying to mobilize other segments of the population.

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## **V. NATIONAL AND GLOBAL PRESSURES**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

As with any other community, the Southwest Hispanic Community is under pressure from issues played out in the local, county, state, regional, national, and global communities that they belong to. Those issues have varying impacts on individual or collective identity and the sociocultural, economic, and/or political standing of the Southwest Hispanic Community. As mentioned previously, the top concerns for Hispanics, as identified in various polls, include the availability of healthcare, economic uncertainty and unemployment, immigration enforcement, and educational opportunities. While there are a wide variety of issues underlying those primary concerns, those internal or external pressures that have the potential to elicit an unusually negative response from the general community, or a particularly violent response within a specific segment of the community, are of particular interest. Research for this thesis indicated two potential issues that result in typically strong local or regional responses by the Hispanic community and are therefore appropriate for further consideration. Those two issues are immigration policy and language usage.

### **B. IMMIGRATION POLICY**

Immigration policies and their enforcement have wide implications for the Southwest Hispanic Community, which can be better understood when viewed through intergroup relation theories, such as Social Identity Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory. Social Identity Theory allows the cognitive, evaluative, and emotional components driving intergroup relations to be considered when formulating policy options that have the potential to impact specific groups in an overly negative way. Resource Mobilization Theory provides an opportunity to examine how a social movement may form or be maintained based on the resources within a particular community or when supported by external sources. Immigration policies and their enforcement can be viewed as a means for certain groups to establish a negative identity

for the Southwest Hispanic Community and can be seen as a method of mobilizing Hispanics as a political or economic bloc using the identity resources of the community.

In 2010, 97% of aliens removed from the U.S. were Hispanic, with 73% being Mexican immigrants.<sup>129</sup> That data highlights the relative importance of immigration policy to the Southwest Hispanic community, as Hispanics of Mexican origin have previously been shown to be concentrated in the Southwest. Underscoring that finding is data that shows 24% of all Hispanics know someone who has been deported or detained in the past year. Among Hispanics who are registered to vote, 33% state that immigration is extremely important to them, with that value relatively unchanged since 2010.<sup>130</sup>

Under the current administration, the number of removals has in fact increased with priorities focusing on those posing a danger to national security or risk to public safety. The share of convicted criminal deportations among all deportations has increased from 29% in 2008 to 44% in 2010.<sup>131</sup> Such policies with general societal benefits would reasonably be expected to garner popular support; however, 59% of all Hispanics disapprove of the way deportations of unauthorized immigrants are occurring.<sup>132</sup> It is interesting to note that disapproval differs depending on nativity of Hispanics as 70% of foreign born Hispanics disapprove of deportations while only 46% of native born Hispanics disapprove.<sup>133</sup> Intergroup relation theory helps to explain these apparent contradictions due to the negative impact upon the Southwest Hispanic Community identity when the vast majority of deportations involve Hispanics in general or Hispanics of Mexican origin specifically.

Two proposed policy options that represent complementary, but not mutually exclusive alternatives, are the provision of a path to citizenship for immigrants and improving border security while increasing immigration enforcement. There is general agreement between Hispanics and the public at large that both policy options should be

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<sup>129</sup> Lopez, Gonzalez-Barrera, and Motel, *As Deportations Rise to Record Levels*, 12.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

considered a priority (46% to 43%, respectively) when they are not thought of as exclusive policies. However, when the policy options were believed to be mutually exclusive, the general agreement disappeared with 24% the public supporting a path to citizenship while a slightly larger proportion of 29% favored improved border security and immigration enforcement. Those results contrast with the opinions of Hispanics where 42% favored a path to immigration and only 10% favored improved border security and immigration enforcement.<sup>134</sup> The following discussion is related to recent executive policies that impact priorities for immigration enforcement, exercise of prosecutorial discretion for immigration, and allowances for deferred action for immigrants meeting certain conditions. These policies have a relatively major impact upon the Southwest Hispanic Community and should be understood in greater detail to allow that impact to be fully considered. It should be noted at the outset that these executive policies do not provide a path for citizenship but instead leave otherwise removable aliens in an ambiguous and uncertain status.

## **1. Enforcement Priorities**

Immigration and Customs Enforcement's central responsibility is to enforce the nation's civil immigration laws in coordination with CBP and USCIS. The removal of aliens who pose a danger to national security or a risk to public safety are provided ICE's highest immigration enforcement priority. This includes aliens engaged in or suspected of terrorism or espionage, or who otherwise pose a danger to national security.

Those aliens posing a risk to public safety are further defined as those aliens convicted of crimes, with Level I and Level 2 offenders receiving principal attention. Level I offenders are those aliens convicted of "aggravated felonies" or two or more "felonies" each punishable by more than one year of confinement. Level 2 offenders are those aliens convicted of any felony or three or more "misdemeanors" each punishable by less than one year of confinement. These priorities are also applicable to the Secure Communities program to identify and remove criminal aliens. Second priority is given to aliens who have recently violated immigration controls at the border, ports of entry, or

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<sup>134</sup> Lopez, Gonzalez-Barrera, and Motel, *As Deportations Rise to Record Levels*, 7.

through the knowing abuse of the visa and visa waiver programs. Third priority is the removal of aliens who are subject to a final order of removal and abscond, fail to depart, or intentionally obstruct immigration controls.

Of the 387,242 foreign nationals removed from the United States in 2010, 168,532 were aliens known to have criminal convictions.<sup>135</sup> ICE estimates the total number of fugitive criminals at 500,000,<sup>136</sup> which indicates that approximately 33% of the fugitive criminals were removed in 2010. The combination of limited resources and the establishment of priorities, due to those limited resources, resulted in the removal of approximately 215,000 noncriminal aliens in 2010. This indicates that, out of an estimated 10.8 million aliens residing in the United States, approximately 2% of the noncriminals were removed in 2010. Despite the relatively small number of criminal and noncriminal immigrants removed, the impact upon the Hispanic community has been significant.

## **2. Prosecutorial Discretion**

Direction issued in 2011 and 2012, from Director John Morton of ICE, was intended to clarify the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in order to prioritize the use of limited immigration enforcement resources.<sup>137</sup> Prosecutorial discretion is limited to the decision to enforce, or not enforce, a particular law and cannot be an “affirmative act of approval, or grant of a benefit, under a statute or other applicable law that sets guidelines for determining when the approval should be given.”<sup>138</sup> Prosecutorial discretion does not require equal enforcement, or nonenforcement, in the case of two individuals with similar circumstances. In those cases, the person who was selected for prosecution cannot have their case reviewed, or force prosecution on an individual not selected for prosecution, on

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<sup>135</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2010* (Washington, D.C: Office of Immigration Statistics, 2011).

<sup>136</sup> Laura Probuski, “ICE Cracks Down on the ‘Worst of the Worst’ Criminal Illegal Aliens,” Fox News, accessed August 27, 2011, <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/28/ice-cracks-down-on-worst-worst-criminal-illegal-immigrants/>.

<sup>137</sup> Morton, “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion,” Morton, “Civil Immigration Enforcement.”

<sup>138</sup> Meyers, “Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion,” 4.

the basis of being improperly singled out for prosecution.<sup>139</sup> The second effect is that absent a clear exception, the decision to exercise prosecutorial discretion to not enforce a particular law cannot be questioned by those without standing to enforce that law. It is possible another individual, with prosecutorial authority, can decide to prosecute, but someone without prosecutorial authority cannot question the decision through the judicial system to force prosecution.

### **3. Deferred Action**

In June 2012, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano announced<sup>140</sup> a program known as the “Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals,” which has the potential to allow up to 1.7 million of the 4.4 million unauthorized immigrants ages 30 and under to qualify for a program that would shield them from deportation and enable them to apply for temporary but renewable work permits. Eighty-five percent of those eligible for the program are Hispanic, which is higher than the Hispanic share (77%) among the nation’s total estimate of unauthorized immigrants.<sup>141</sup> The impact and response of deferred action remains to be seen, as it is a newer program that has not been fully implemented.

### **C. LANGUAGE USAGE**

Language relates to Social Identity Theory due to its critical importance in the social construction of reality and impact on social identity formation/categorization. Social Identity Theory includes concepts of bias and favoritism towards one’s own group to maximize group resources. In cases where Hispanics and non-Hispanic are competing for resources, the social significance of language provides a distinct characteristic that can be used for categorization. Such categorization need to be associated with a particular social identity that provides a greater or lesser degree of positive valuation. Similar to

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<sup>139</sup> Meyers, “Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion,” 7.

<sup>140</sup> Memorandum by Janet Napolitano, “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children,” Department of Homeland Security, 15 June 2012.

<sup>141</sup> Jeffrey S. Passel and Mark Hugo Lopez, *Up to 1.7 Million Unauthorized Immigrant Youth May Benefit from New Deportation Rules* (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, 2012).

immigration enforcement, language usage may also be used to mobilize the Southwest Hispanic Community or the non-Hispanic population through the “political process” model of Resource Mobilization Theory.

The issue of language touches directly upon the sociocultural, economic, and political standing of the Southwest Hispanic Community, which makes it a particularly relevant issue to examine. Language should be considered a Complex Adaptive System, as it consists of multiple agents who interact with one another and the speakers’ behavior is based on past interactions, and current and past interactions shaping future behavior.<sup>142</sup> Language plays a fundamental role in human society and culture, providing the central means by which cultural knowledge is transmitted, elaborated, and reformed over time.<sup>143</sup> Language usage within the Hispanic community is subjected to external pressures, represented here by the English Only movement, and internal pressures, as evidenced by reactions of non-Spanish speaking Hispanic. These pressures will be the subject of the discussion to follow.

### **1. English Only Movement**

External pressures upon the community are represented by “English Only” movements, which seek to designate English as the official language and mandate the use of English by government agencies. ProEnglish is one organization involved in the English Only movement and describes itself as the “nation’s leading advocate of official English.”<sup>144</sup> ProEnglish guiding principles includes statements indicating “the right to use other languages must be respected,” while their agenda includes the adoption of laws declaring English the official language of the United State and individual states and ending foreign language immersion programs in public schools.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> Clay Beckner et al., “Language Is a Complex Adaptive System: Position Paper,” *Language Learning*, Volume 59, Supplement 1 (December, 2009): 1–26.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid.

<sup>144</sup> “Mission,” ProEnglish, accessed October 15, 2012, <http://www.proenglish.org/about-us/mission.html>.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid.

On a national level, there has been no legislation passed that designates English as the official language, although a number of resolutions in various forms have been introduced in Congress with the intent of designating English as a national and/or state language. Senator Samuel Ichiye Hayakawa (R – CA) introduced a joint resolution on 27 April 1981 to amend the U.S. Constitution to proclaim English as the official language and prohibit the federal or state government to require the use of any other language. The resolution was referred to committee without having ever being voted upon. There were 10 cosponsors to the resolution of which only one was affiliated with the Democratic Party.<sup>146</sup> More sweeping legislation making English the official national language, introduced by Rep Bill Emerson (R – MO) as House Resolution 123, passed the House by a vote on 1 August 1996. It was received in the Senate and referred to committee where no further significant action was taken.<sup>147</sup>

At the state level, within the Southwest, various laws have been enacted in five of the eight states which recognize English as the official language and mandate the use of English by state governments to a greater or lesser degree. In contrast, Nevada, New Mexico, and Texas have not adopted any laws recognizing English as the official language or mandate the use of English by state governments.<sup>148</sup>

The armed forces provide a suitable example of an omnicultural approach to the multilingual nature of their personnel. Army command policy is that “English is the operational language of the Army. Soldiers must maintain sufficient proficiency in English to perform their military duties. Their operational communications must be understood by everyone who has an official need to know their content, and, therefore, must normally be in English. However, commanders may not require Soldiers to use English unless such use is clearly necessary and proper for the performance of military

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<sup>146</sup> “Bill Summary & Status - 97th Congress (1981 - 1982) - S.J.RES.72,” Library of Congress, accessed October 13, 2012, <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d097:44:/temp/~bdZDt>.

<sup>147</sup> “Bill Summary & Status - 104th Congress (1995 - 1996) - H.R.123,” Library of Congress, accessed October 13, 2012, <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:H.R.123>.

<sup>148</sup> “Official English Map,” ProEnglish, accessed October 13, 2012, [http://www.proenglish.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=58&Itemid=91&lang=en](http://www.proenglish.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=58&Itemid=91&lang=en).

functions. Accordingly, commanders may not require the use of English for personal communications that are unrelated to military functions.”<sup>149</sup>

The Navy has a similar policy whereby “Commanders may issue an order that only English be spoken in a work place when they have a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the rule (e.g., to ensure everyone on the bridge understands the orders to the helm). It must be clear that the purpose of such an order is to foster uniformity of action and operations within a work place. A rule requiring employees to speak only English at all times in the workplace is a burdensome term and condition of employment; therefore, personnel engaged in personal conversation off-duty should be allowed to communicate in the language of their choice. Commanders should also be cognizant that some on-duty operations may require the use of other languages and should ensure that English-only rules are not broader than they need to be (e.g., Bridge-to-Bridge radio and interactions with a ground crew).”<sup>150</sup>

Both the Army and Navy policies essentially implement a “do nothing” approach by limiting the circumstances within which a “do something” approach would be considered acceptable. This reflects an omnicultural policy that highlights similarities and effectively celebrates differences, most notably the Navy rule, which highlights on-duty operations that may require the use of other languages.

## **2. Linguistic Isolation—Non-Spanish Speaking Hispanics**

Non-Spanish speaking Hispanics, in workplaces dominated by Spanish speaking Hispanics, have expressed feelings of exclusion or shame as they can only speak English and are unable to interact with the majority of their co-workers. “Fake Latino” and “Tan White Boy” are two of the insults that Joshua Saldevar endured from Spanish speaking Hispanics growing up in New York as a Hispanic unable to speak Spanish.<sup>151</sup> Alberto

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<sup>149</sup> U.S. Army. “4-13 - Army Language Policy” *Army Command Policy, AR 600-20*, 2012.

<sup>150</sup> U.S. Navy, “9 - Foreign Language,” *Navy Equal Opportunity (EO) Policy, OPNAVINST 5354.1F*, 2007.

<sup>151</sup> “Yo No Hablo Espanol: BUT I AM STILL LATINO DAMN IT!!!!” Yahoo! Contributor Network, accessed September 27, 2012, <http://voices.yahoo.com/yo-no-hablo-espanol-but-am-still-latino-damn-it-73855.html>.

Padron, writing on BornBilingualUSA.com, penned an article titled “If Your Kids Don’t Speak Spanish, Are They Really Hispanic?” and expressed his disappointment for not ensuring his sons were bilingual.<sup>152</sup> And David Madrid stated that he felt “discriminated against by my peers because I did not speak Spanish.”<sup>153</sup>

Based on data from the Pew Hispanic Center presented earlier, these experiences are not likely isolated as the number of 16- to 25-year old Hispanics that can speak Spanish very well, or pretty well, decreases from a majority of the first generation to less than half of third and higher generations. The number of “third generation non-Spanish speaking Hispanics” can be reasonably estimated at 800,000 individuals based on a total estimated Hispanic population of 52 million<sup>154</sup>, that third generation Hispanics aged 18–24 make up approximately 3% of the total population<sup>155</sup>, and the aforementioned statistic that only 47% of third or higher generations can speak Spanish very well or pretty well.

The importance of language is that it allows access to a common stock of knowledge that allows for common participation and interactions with others in everyday life.<sup>156</sup> Further “participation in the social stock of knowledge thus permits the ‘location’ of individuals in society and the ‘handling’ of them in the appropriate manner.”<sup>157</sup> In short, language allows us to interact with others and understand the context within which that language is used and respond appropriately during those interactions.

Alberto Padron in his article about being bilingual stated that “language is social currency” and further stated that “in my experience, to the degree you can command the language of a given community is the degree by which that community accepts you. By

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<sup>152</sup> “If Your Kids Don’t Speak Spanish, Are They Really Hispanic?” Born Bicultural USA, accessed September 27, 2012, <http://bornbiculturalusa.com/2010/02/03/if-your-kids-dont-speak-spanish-are-they-really-hispanic/>.

<sup>153</sup> “English-Only Latinos Face ‘The Shame’ of Not Speaking Spanish,” New America Media, accessed September 14, 2012, [http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view\\_article.html?article\\_id=ddf412a88eafd78bf1db7261b9](http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=ddf412a88eafd78bf1db7261b9).

<sup>154</sup> U.S. Census Bureau, *Hispanic Heritage Month 2012: Sept 15 – Oct 15*.

<sup>155</sup> “Generational Differences - Three Generations of the Hispanic Population,” Cable Advertising Bureau, accessed September 25, 2012, <http://www.thecab.tv/main/bm-doc/hispanic-generational-differences.pdf>.

<sup>156</sup> Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction of Reality*, 41.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, 34–46.

command, I mean not only the general language, but rather all the nuances, voice inflections, rate of speech, slang and other idiosyncrasies that denote your level of cultural authenticity.”<sup>158</sup> His observations appear to be supported by data that shows a majority of Hispanics in the U.S. do not believe they share a common culture, instead recognizing “many different cultures.” In contrast, there is recognition of a “shared connection” through the use of Spanish language, as 82% of Hispanic adults speak Spanish and 95% of Hispanics state it is important for future generations to speak Spanish.<sup>159</sup>

The positive identity that has formed around the ability to speak Spanish therefore creates a negative identity among those Hispanics unable to speak Spanish. Additionally, it is possible that multicultural policies will result in the creation of enclaves of Hispanic communities in the Southwest that will be self-sufficient, due to their size, local concentration, and proximity to Mexico. Those self-sufficient enclaves may not naturally assimilate with the non-Hispanic communities around them, as there is limited need to do so socioculturally, economically, or politically. In essence, multicultural policies aimed at diversity may have an unintended impact of dividing rather than uniting the population into groups of Spanish speaking Hispanics, non-Spanish speaking Hispanics, and non-Hispanics. For this reason, and as will be discussed in later sections, an omnicultural approach would provide greater societal benefits.

#### **D. ANALYSIS**

The preceding discussion has focused on various policies that exert internal and external pressure upon Hispanics in general. Due to the concentration of Hispanics in the Southwest, which magnifies sociocultural, economic, and political disparities, it is reasonable to expect an amplified response as a result of certain pressures exerted upon the Southwest Hispanic. It is believed that the issues presented in this section are representative of pressures that have the potential to elicit an unusually negative response within the Southwest Hispanic Community, or a particularly violent response within a

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<sup>158</sup> Padron, “If Your Kids Don’t Speak Spanish, Are They Really Hispanic?”

<sup>159</sup> Taylor, *When Labels Don’t Fit*, 4.

localized segment of the community. With this in mind, it is useful to look at the issues of immigration enforcement and language usage through the specific intergroup relation theories of Resource Mobilization Theory and Social Identity Theory.

### **1. Immigration Enforcement and Resource Mobilization Theory**

The pressure of immigration enforcement is viewed in a different manner when Resource Mobilization Theory is applied as the specific grievance is given much less importance. The availability of resources from the natural base to support a social movement from within the Southwest Hispanic Community is in question given the economic status of the community as presented earlier. Therefore, the “political process” model of Resource Mobilization Theory will likely dominate with elites providing material support to contain, control, or profit from social movements from within the Southwest Hispanic Community. In such cases, the Hispanic community identity is essentially the resource desired, as elites choose to provide resources in support of specific policies, such as immigration reform or enforcement, which have the capability to elicit provide popular support from the community.

As current immigration policies are not codified in law and can be changed at any time by current or future administrations, the use of executive orders to establish immigration enforcement policy has provided an effective means of harnessing the identity resources of the Southwest Hispanic Community for political support. Even if unintended, the fate of otherwise removable aliens, left in an uncertain status due to executive polices in lieu of comprehensive immigration reform through legislative processes, have been tied politically to the fate of the current administration. Hispanics in the Southwest who experience the emotional trauma of deportations to a greater degree than Hispanics in the non-Southwest will be more inclined to support an administration that has taken positive steps to reduce deportations for those not posing a national security threat or risk to public safety.

## **2. Immigration Enforcement and Social Identity Theory**

Currently enacted immigration policies do not enjoy widespread support among Hispanics; however, there is agreement with the general public that immigration enforcement and border security along with creating a path to citizenship should be considered a priority. Recent policies regarding prioritization of resources on aliens who pose a national security threat or risk to public safety and increasing the use of prosecutorial discretion have not been as well received as would be expected given the emphasis on criminal aliens in lieu of noncriminals. Given that these policies were enacted in mid-2011 and 2012, it is highly possible that the impact of such policies have not yet been fully appreciated with such appreciation hampered by articles that emphasize removals have in fact increased. The application of Social Identity Theory provides some insight as to why these policies do not receive popular support within the Hispanic community.

The terminology used to reference aliens subject to immigration enforcement actions provide one example for how Social Identity Theory can increase our understanding of intergroup relations. The Immigration and Nationality Act refers to any person not a citizen or national of the United States as an “alien,” or in certain cases as an “immigrant.”<sup>160</sup> Aliens are considered “admitted” when they have been provided lawful entry to the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. An alien may be “inadmissible” when they present themselves for inspection and do not meet the criteria for admission or “deportable” when they have been admitted but are subject to removal for various grounds, such as criminal grounds. Those aliens found to be inadmissible or deportable are considered “removable.”

However, various “groups” use terminology that is inconsistent with the Immigration and Nationality Act, which can be understood using Social Identity Theory. Those groups looking to categorize removable aliens in a negative manner will include

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<sup>160</sup> “INA: Act 101 – Definitions,” U.S. Customs and Immigration Service, accessed October 29, 2012, <http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-29/0-0-0-101.html>.

terms with a pejorative connotation, such as “illegal.”<sup>161</sup> In contrast, those groups looking to avoid categorizing removable aliens in a negative manner will include more neutral terms such as “undocumented.”<sup>162</sup> As with the preceding example of terminology, particular policies advocated for or against can be viewed in a similar manner as having a positive or negative impact upon the Southwest Hispanic Community identity. Immigration policies that have a negative impact upon the identity of the Southwest Hispanic Community or decrease their group standing relative to the non-Hispanic community will typically result in competition or conflict between Hispanic and non-Hispanic groups where access to resources are involved.

### **3. Language Usage and Resource Mobilization Theory**

As with immigration enforcement, Resource Mobilization Theory provides an understanding of how Hispanic or non-Hispanic groups may be mobilized using the “political process” model with language usage as the central issue or grievance. The groups in support of English Only policies use language and the framing of efficient use of resources to mobilize a conservative base, which is non-Hispanic and generally unilingual. Those groups who are against English Only policies use sociocultural factors, such as the benefits of language diversity to mobilize a Hispanic base that has cultural roots tied directly to language and is generally bilingual to support their platforms or positions. In this fashion, Hispanics, who might support conservative candidates or platforms due to their focus on economic or family values, can instead be mobilized in support of more liberal candidates or platforms due to their support for multi-lingual policies.

### **4. Language Usage and Social Identity Theory**

Language policies, as both external and internal pressures, upon the Hispanic community were presented. Those policies that favor assimilation, as represented by the

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<sup>161</sup> “Report and Illegal Alien,” Help Protect America, accessed October 29, 2012, <http://www.reportanillegalalien.com/>.

<sup>162</sup> “Is It Time for the Media to Stop Using ‘Illegal?’” National Council of La Raza, accessed October 29, 2012, <http://nclrblog.wordpress.com/2012/10/19/is-it-time-for-the-media-to-stop-using-illegal/>.

English Only movement, have not achieved widespread support at the national level. However, support of similar legislation at the state and regional level has been observed in five of the eight Southwestern states. This regional support again indicates an increased disparity between Hispanics and non-Hispanics in the Southwest.

The most interesting, and concerning, revelation was the creation of a large group of non-Spanish speaking Hispanics as society in general begins to embrace multiculturalism in lieu of assimilation. Earlier immigrants to the U.S. were subject to racism based on their culture, including language, and sought to learn English in order to improve their living conditions and take advantage of opportunities.<sup>163</sup> Those early immigrants did not see the need to teach their children and the impact can be seen in the number of third generation Hispanics who cannot speak Spanish. However, as multiculturalism has expanded, subsequent generations have embraced the benefits and value of bilingualism. Non-Spanish speaking Hispanics on the other hand are not perceived as being part of that positive group identity, as the ability to speak Spanish provides an authentic social identity. The concern here is how to ensure non-Spanish speaking Hispanics may form that positive social identity.

## **5. Hispanic Identity as a Resource**

The mobilization of Hispanics as either a voting or economic bloc provides salient examples of how Hispanic identity can be viewed optimistically as an important and valued resource, especially to the Southwest Hispanic Community. Those resources can be mobilized through either the “professional organizer” or “political process” model of Resource Mobilization Theory where elites provide support due to a sincere desire to aid the community or to contain, control, or profit from the community. Mobilization would generally be more beneficial to the community when done via the “professional organizer” model but can also be accomplished in an effective manner using the “political process” model when the benefits to the community outweigh the costs of elite involvement.

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<sup>163</sup> “Hispanic Attitudes Towards Learning English,” Pew Hispanic Center, accessed October 29, 2012, <http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/20.pdf>.

As a significant voting bloc, Hispanics can effectively exercise their identity resource as political elites work to mobilize the community in support of their candidate or platform. Issues, such as public health care, immigration enforcement, education, jobs, minimum wage, voter ID cards (which are resisted by elites in the U.S. while receiving general support for use in Mexican elections), and income provide a few examples where Hispanic identity can be positively employed.

As an economic resource, Hispanics provide less costly labor in construction, agriculture, and manufacturing sectors. The data showing that employment rates for Hispanics is greater than non-Hispanics, along with a lower median income, points to past success in mobilizing Hispanics as an economic bloc. That unemployment rates for Hispanics are also greater than non-Hispanics indicates a potential for further mobilizing Hispanics as a valuable labor force. This conclusion is supported by ongoing calls from industry to reform the system for issuing workers visas for migrant and seasonal labor while ensuring border security does not restrict the ability of migrant workers to transit the border.

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## **VI. POTENTIAL FOR HOMELAND SECURITY THREATS**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

Rather than delve into trans-border criminal threats posed by Drug Trafficking Organizations or gang activity, which is not intended to minimize the significance or extent of those threats, the primary research question focused on the potential for homeland security threats posed by insurgency or terrorism. The previous sections covered the individual elements of intergroup relation theory, the status of the Southwest Hispanic Community, and some of the more important internal and external pressures upon that community. This section is intended to bring together the prior sections through the concept of radicalization as represented by the “staircase to terrorism.”

### **B. SOUTHWEST HISPANIC COMMUNITY—FIRST FLOOR**

A review of the sociocultural, economic, and political status of the Southwest Hispanic community indicate a strong disparity when compared against non-Hispanics; however, the sentiments expressed by that Hispanic community does not generally support a finding that radicalization has progressed any higher than the first floor. The only potential exception is non-Spanish speaking Hispanics, as discussed in a following section that may have progressed to the second floor.

While Hispanics may fewer resources with which to form and maintain such social movements, the costs to do so are relatively lower due to social media and believed to be beyond those available to the natural base. Additionally, there seems to be a ready supply of elite resources with which to form and maintain social movements. One indicator that supports a finding that the vast majority of Southwest Hispanics reside on the ground or first floor is the relatively minor support for social movements from within the Hispanic community that have existed despite the relative disparities and elite support. The lack of such support from the natural base and popular perceptions within the Hispanic community that opportunities remain greater in the U.S. contribute to this finding.

Although there are not a large number of Hispanic members within congress, there is general, but not widespread, support for Hispanic centered policies currently in place and being considered. General support of policies and the political process, along with the majority perceptions that opportunities are better in the U.S., are likely to reduce the motivation for social movement. However, this dynamic is fluid and may change as the costs and benefits of social movements are continuously weighed. The large concentration of Hispanics residing in the Southwest has led to the formation of a strong positive social identity, although less positive than that of non-Hispanics, that under the right conditions could be quickly mobilized by professional organizers if that identity is jeopardized.

Despite disparities between Hispanics and non-Hispanics, which are more pronounced in the Southwest, a majority of Hispanics feel they have been as successful or more successful as other ethnic groups. Additionally, a majority of Hispanics, to a greater extent than the general public, feel that they can get ahead through hard work and that people are generally trustworthy. Finally, more Hispanics believe that conditions in the U.S. for raising children, treatment of the poor, and societal mores are better than in their country of origin.<sup>164</sup> These positive indicators support a conclusion that Hispanics hold a belief that success in the U.S. is possible, and therefore, the need to climb the staircase to terrorism will not be seen as necessary or beneficial.

### **C. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT—FIRST FLOOR**

Although immigration enforcement is a significant pressure being applied upon the Hispanic community, particularly in the Southwest, current administrative policies and differing views within the Hispanic community, there is little to suggest that radicalization due to immigration enforcement has occurred or has the potential to emerge as a homeland security threat.

Immigration enforcement is currently focused on those aliens posing a direct threat to national security or poses a risk to public safety with priority of resources being

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<sup>164</sup> Taylor, et al., *When Labels Don't Fit*, 18–22.

directed at violent offenders. While a majority of sentiments are not in favor of immigration enforcement through removals, there is both a willingness and ability to work within the social and political systems to obtain change. Additionally, there is some immigration support within the Hispanic community that mirrors support from the non-Hispanic community for equal prioritization of immigration enforcement and creating paths for citizenship. The localized peaceful protests that do occur are typically formed when removal proceedings for noncriminals are in process. The prioritizing of resources on criminals, emphasis on prosecutorial discretion, more recent policy of deferred action for childhood arrival, and existing options, such as claiming asylum or other various reasons for stays indicated there are a wide range of options that are available to stop, stall, or delay removal processes. In the presence of such options, the ratio between the costs and benefits of forming a social movement weigh in favor of working within the available processes.

#### **D. LANGUAGE USAGE—SECOND FLOOR**

Data on generational decreases of Spanish speakers reveals a subgroup of the Hispanic community that does not speak or understand Spanish fluently. Further, this subgroup is not accepted by the larger Spanish speaking members of the community, who value the ability to speak Spanish. Conversely, the subgroup is not accepted by the non-Hispanic community, as they do not completely share the same ethnicity or culture. Understanding categorization as explained by the minimal group paradigm, coupled with the value placed on speaking Spanish in the Hispanic culture, and negative perceptions expressed by non-Spanish speaking Hispanics, there is a risk of this group to develop a negative social identity. This non-Spanish speaking Hispanic “out-group” lacks a “group identification” or collective “authenticity” due to the inability to speak Spanish. Essentially, those non-Spanish speaking Hispanics become linguistically isolated from the communities and culture they would normally belong.

Due to the negative connotation associated with the group identity, the non-Spanish speaking Hispanic will either try to join a group that can provide a positively contribution to the individuals identity or look to engage in social change. This social

change can be accomplished by changing the relationship of their group to other groups, or by becoming socially competitive and engaging in social conflict. There are various Hispanic organizations that can either provide the positive contribution, such as NCLR or engage in social change by pushing radical nationalist or ethnocentric agendas, such as Nation of Aztlán or the National Brown Berets, even if those radical organizations are identified as fringe organizations.

Those non-Spanish speaking Hispanics, which might gravitate towards radical organizations that engage in social competitiveness or conflict, are of particular concern due to the potential for radicalization as visualized through the “staircase to terrorism” method. With respect to the non-Spanish speaking Hispanics, a large number will remain on the ground floor while a small number may begin to climb the staircase in search of the positive identity and justice that they perceive eludes them. They may feel that their inability to speak Spanish is the result of conditions on the ground floor that were not within their control, such parents subject to racial or economic discrimination as a result of speaking Spanish, and decided they would not teach their children Spanish.

The first floor can provide opportunities for fair treatment, the ability to voice concerns, and improve individual circumstances. For those who are linguistically isolated, such an opportunity may be as simple as learning to speak Spanish and exercising mobility from the out-group of non-Spanish speaking Hispanics to the in-group of Hispanics that speak Spanish. Additionally, some may find a more positive identity with civil rights groups, such as NCLR, which espouse nonviolent means for social change. However, the shame and concern expressed by Hispanics unable to speak Spanish, based upon their perception that a “shared connection” tends to exist between those Hispanics who can speak Spanish, and it seems clear that there are those unable to take advantage of such opportunities presented on the first floor and may have moved to the second floor.

The more radical groups, such as the National Will Organization, Nation of Aztlán, or the National Brown Berets have adopted charters that are decidedly nationalist or ethnocentric in nature and appear to displace aggression on non-Hispanic groups. On the second floor of the “staircase to terrorism,” such displacement occurs as feelings of

frustration, dissatisfaction, and anger increase. Such displacement of aggression is concerning, however, it should be noted that there has been no evidence of physical violence attributed to any of these groups.

There was no evidence found that suggests Hispanic radicalization is occurring on either the third or fourth floors, let alone the execution of terrorist acts characterized on the fifth floor. On the third floor, morality is transformed to justify an “us” versus “them” mentality through affiliation, secrecy, isolation, and fear. The nationalist groups reviewed do not typically act in secrecy or isolate themselves into men-only groups become riskier. The ability to obtain foundational documents, including those that may be perceived as divisive, and evidence that female participation is actively sought support a finding against radicalization occurring on third, or higher, floors. The absence of such findings stands in stark contrast to violence that has been perpetrated by members of extreme right wing groups like the Sovereign Citizens, which have clearly climbed to higher levels on the “staircase to terrorism.”

With an estimated population of 800,000 individuals, the community of non-Spanish speaking Hispanics is faced with a negative identity and general inability to move to a group with a positive identity. Left with little choice, the community of non-Spanish speaking Hispanics is at risk for beginning to seek a positive identity or justice at higher floors on the “staircase to terrorism,” which eventually leads to violent radicalization. That no one in that community appears to have progressed higher than the second floor does not mean policy reforms should not be considered to prevent the climb in the first place. By enacting policy reforms at this stage, before any violent actions may be perceived as a necessary and justifiable action, will allow us to address violent radicalization at the most likely point of success. Omniculturalism is proposed as a policy that has the potential for addressing conditions at the ground floor of the “staircase to terrorism” to overcome theoretical shortfalls of assimilation and multiculturalism.

## **E. CONCLUSION**

A majority (56%) of Hispanics indicates dissatisfaction with the nation’s direction; however, that view is more positive when compared against the general public

in which 78% state their dissatisfaction.<sup>165</sup> It is also critical to note that in 2010 an overwhelming majority (81%) of Hispanics believed that there are better opportunities to advance in the U.S. than their home country.<sup>166</sup> A very small portion (2%) of Hispanics indicated opportunities were better in their home country. In 1999, the proportions were 92% and 1% respectively, which likely captures the economic and healthcare concerns that have been predominant in the last four or five years.

The questions above can be considered as capturing all relevant sociocultural, economic, and political concerns of the Southwest Hispanic Community in combination with internal and external community pressures, represented here by immigration enforcement and language usage. While measures of sociocultural, economic, and political wellbeing of Hispanics in the Southwest indicate a more pronounced disparity compared against the wellbeing of non-Hispanics, the Hispanic community is more positive about the direction of the country and more importantly believes opportunities are better in the U.S. than in their home country. That finding is important in the application of Social Identity Theory for the Southwest Hispanic Community, as it reflects a more positive social identity when comparisons are made against a similar group in their country or origin.

Application of the Resource Mobilization Theory indicates that Hispanics have a reduced natural base from which to form and maintain a social movement. Therefore, any social movements would generally follow the political process model likely requiring resources from the elites at the cost of containment, control, and profiting by those elites. The lack of the formation and maintenance of general or localized Hispanic social movement in the Southwest appears to support a conclusion that the costs of such a movement would outweigh the benefits. Unless and until benefits of social movements to the Southwest Hispanic Community outweigh the costs, the likelihood of a widespread social movement let alone a violent one can be considered to be very low.

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<sup>165</sup> Lopez, Gonzalez-Barrera, and Motel, *As Deportations Rise to Record Levels*, 21.

<sup>166</sup> Mark Hugo Lopez, Rich Morin, and Paul Taylor, *Illegal Immigration Backlash Worries, Divides Latinos* (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, 2010), 5.

The rhetoric used by nationalist movements, although concerning, does not constitute all that is necessary to form or maintain insurgent or terrorist activity. Unlike certain right wing extremist movements, there has been no evidence found to show that nationalist groups are actively employing guerilla operation or applying irregular military tactics necessary for an insurgency. There is even less evidence to support a finding that a terrorist organization would likely evolve from within the Southwest Hispanic Community. That is not to say that efforts, such as monitoring disparities, similar to those methods presented in this paper, or policies to alleviate those disparities should not be implemented such potentials for homeland security threats. Such policies include the implementation of omnicultural approaches where differences are acknowledged but similarities are celebrated.

Good people can be induced, seduced, and initiated into behaving in evil ways. They can also be led to act in irrational, stupid, self-destructive, antisocial, and mindless ways when they are immersed in ‘total situations’ that impact human nature in ways that challenge our sense of stability and consistency of individual personality, of character, and of morality.<sup>167</sup>

Playing upon the fear of non-Hispanics with regards to the dangers of illegal immigration interspersed with the perils of terrorists crossing the Southwest border has the capacity to induce, seduce, or initiate society into behaving in “evil” ways.

Immigration enforcement and border security is necessary, but terrorist have historically taken advantage of the U.S. visa system not a “porous” border to gain access to the interior. This begs the question as to why Southwest border security is given such a high priority, to the point of failing to address the challenges of comprehensive immigration reform, when there has yet to be a terrorist who gained access by crossing at the U.S. Mexico border? Comprehensive immigration reform can be enacted that ensures a path to citizenship for those who benefit society along with immigration enforcement and border security that is both flexible and capable of addressing realistic threats posed by those intent upon harming this nation.

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<sup>167</sup> Philip Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect* (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2008), 211.

We are best able to avoid, prevent, challenge, and change such negative situational forces only by recognizing their potential power to “infect us,” as it has others who were similarly situated.<sup>168</sup> There may be, at most, a small number of Southwest Hispanics that have climbed as high as the second floor; however it is still important to look at conditions on the ground floor which lead to the creation of negative identities, feelings of injustice, and/or perceptions of shame and anger. Of specific concern are those non-Spanish speaking Hispanics that may have climb as high as the second floor. Instituting reforms at the ground floor level is the key to combating any potential for violent radicalization at higher floors on the “staircase to terrorism” by reducing or eliminating the desire to climb to higher floors.

Whether the status of and pressures upon the community are viewed through Resource Mobilization Theory or Social Identity Theory there are important considerations with regards to how future events may result in a major social movement to evolve from within the Southwest Hispanic Community. The continuing or expansion of sociocultural, economic, and political disparity could allow a tipping point to be reached where the benefits of mobilizing outweigh the costs thereby motivating Hispanics to form a widespread social movement.

The specific limitations for Social Identity Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory should also be kept in mind when applying these theories to specific communities or events. As described earlier Social Identity Theory may result in competition or conflict between groups, however individuals may also take advantage of social mobility to change their group and obtain a more positive social identity. The example of the non-Spanish speaking Hispanic learning Spanish provides an idea of strategies available for social mobility. However, early versions of Social Identity Theory does not account for preferences between the various strategies available. Resource Mobilization Theory can typically be very useful in interpreting events after the fact, but is more limited in its ability predict events reliably given the complex and varying interactions between the Hispanic groups and elite groups that would provide support.

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<sup>168</sup> Philip Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect* (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2008), 211.

## F. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations aimed at alleviating perceptions of shame and feeling of not belonging to society at large should forgo policies of assimilation and multi-culturalism in favor of omniculturalism. Assimilation seeks to eliminate the differences by having them subsumed within the majority language or culture. The English Only movement is an example of a policy of assimilation which aims to eliminate the use of other languages in government operations. Multiculturalism does not seek to eliminate the linguistic and cultural differences but to highlight, strengthen, and celebrate the differences.<sup>169</sup> Multicultural policies seek to create and sustain positive identities in the various groups and have likely attributed to the increased use, acceptance, and valuation in speaking Spanish in addition to English. This increase is evidenced by statistics which indicate today's young Hispanics are encouraged to speak Spanish more so than their parents were when they were young however it is done at the expense of non-Spanish speaking Hispanics.

Omniculturalism focuses on commonalities to build a basis of understanding and then introduces intergroup differences and distinctiveness to emphasize how groups can differ from one another.<sup>170</sup> An omnicultural policy would address conditions on the ground floor by establishing a positive identity open to the vast majority of society which would eliminate or reduce perceptions of shame or anger that occurs among out-groups which are linguistically isolated such as non-Spanish speaking Hispanics.

A related recommendation is to recognize Language as a Complex Adaptive System which will naturally adapt through learning or evolutionary processes in a manner that will ensure success and survival. Those languages unable to adapt have and will continue to disappear as globalization brings different cultures into contact with one another at an increasing pace. Rather than attempt to prevent adaptation through multicultural policies or force adaptation through assimilation policies, support for

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<sup>169</sup> Fathali M. Moghaddam and James N. Breckenridge, "Homeland Security and Support for Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Omniculturalism Policies among Americans," *Homeland Security Affairs*, Volume VI, Number 3 (December 2010).

<sup>170</sup> Ibid.

omnicultural policies can foster natural adaptation and prevent development of in-groups and out-groups which then compete for resources.

Natural adaptation, through omnicultural policies, can be accomplished by highlighting similarities and celebrating differences in a manner that prevents social conflict to allow language to adapt and evolve as different cultures interact in the normal course of events. This “do nothing” approach can only be explored when various groups understand the complexities of language and the unintended consequences of policies and bias. Approaching language as a complex adaptive system will foster that understanding and allow for alternative policies to be considered and successfully implemented.

Acceptance and implementation of such approaches should allow us to realize a nation of the type envisioned by John Jay who eloquently stated “This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.”<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> James Madison et al., *The Federalist Papers* (Hazelton, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 2001), 10.

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