ACHIEVING VICTORY IN PEACE OPERATIONS:
AN APPLICATION FOR CLAUSEWITZ’S
THEORY ON CULMINATION

A Monograph
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First Term AY 94-95

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Title of Monograph: Achieving Victory in Peace Operations: An Application for Clausewitz's Theory on Culmination

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Accepted this 17th day of December 1994
ABSTRACT

ACHIEVING VICTORY IN PEACE OPERATIONS: AN APPLICATION FOR CLAUSEWITZ'S THEORY ON CULMINATION by Major Daniel J. Schuster, USMC, 41 pages.

This monograph examines the U.S. military operations in Beirut, Lebanon 1982-1983 and Somalia 1993 in the context of Clausewitz's theory regarding a culminating point of victory. The dynamics of peace operations present a unique challenge to military commanders. If the prudent commander is to avoid the risk of a tactical defeat with strategic consequences, a management of the factors leading to military culmination and their linkage to operational assumptions should be the keystone of any planning effort. Recognizing the culminating point of victory provides an essential perspective on the necessary force structure, disposition, and tactics to assure mission success and to prompt their reappraisal at critical junctures that might otherwise be lost in the operational background noise.

The monograph proposes that an analysis of what constitutes a culminating point of victory serves to capture the subjective nature of the decisionmaking process in a quantifiable manner. This framework facilitates the recognition and management of operational risks. A commander then is better prepared to avoid operational culmination due to a tactical defeat.
How does America define victory in peace operations? Why does the nation popularly define the military interventions in Beirut in 1983 and Somalia in 1993 as military and diplomatic defeats? Did we "lose" because we failed to recognize the culmination point of the military's effectiveness to create the environment for diplomatic success - the "culminating point of victory" alluded to by Clausewitz? If so, how do we recognize this point and what can we do to forestall or avoid reaching it?

In Beirut, tactical and operational decisions made by military and diplomatic personnel violated the perception of force neutrality; a concept considered critical to the viability of peacekeeping operations. Yet, the peacekeeping force neither withdrew nor transitioned to peace enforcement (with an accompanying change in structure, tactical dispositions, and rules of engagement). In Somalia, the peacekeeping force transitioned to a peace enforcement mission and pursued this mission with a singular focus that increasingly violated the mission tenets requiring the decisive and discriminate application of force. As a result, in both cases, U.S. military forces suffered tactical defeats that directly and adversely affected the diplomatic objectives of the nation.

The recognition of a Culminating Point Of Victory provides a planner/commander in a peace operation (peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or peacemaking) with a doctrinal means to assess courses of action in terms of overall mission accomplishment. Additionally, the concept may serve to spark a reassessment of tactical actions in the context of their possible strategic influence at critical junctures
in an operation. Without this tool, the planner/commander may fail to recognize the implications of specific tactical decisions on the overall success of a peace operation, when such decisions may be obscured by the background noise of a dynamic environment.

**CLAUSEWITZ AND THE CULMINATING POINT OF VICTORY**

Clausewitz describes the concept of a Culminating Point Of Victory as a matter "particularly important in military theory and (which) forms the keystone for most plans of operation."(1) Without specifically defining the term, Clausewitz proposes that after a certain point, warfare, as a political instrument, loses its usefulness in achieving a desirable resolution of the disputed issue. The validity of the concept rests on two assumptions. First, war is a means to a political end. Second, the military aim lies short of the total destruction of the enemy. The culminating point of a military campaign conducted in this context of limited war is "the turning point at which attack becomes defense" and beyond which further military action "would not merely be useless effort which could not add to success (but) it would in fact be a damaging one."(2) For clarity, a working definition of the term might be "the point after which the opportunity for the optimal form of victory is lost and beyond which further military action is counterproductive."

Clausewitz lists five principal factors that contribute to the culmination of military victory. These factors include **friendly attrition** which has a debilitating
effect on the available fighting forces. Secondly, prolonged exposure of the force over
time makes its flanks increasingly vulnerable to enemy assessment and attack while
efforts to counter this threat dilute the force's freedom of action and offensive
capability. Thirdly, long lines of communication increase the burdens of force
resupply and reduce positive political control. In this latter regard, over time
unexpected contingencies will arise whose immediacy requires the force commander to
take actions without seeking political guidance or suffer the costs of delay in seeking
such guidance. Fourthly, as a result of success, the balance of political alliances
changes. Protectors may come to succor the defeated while allies may flee a victor's
collection in fear that the dominate partner might seize the opportunity to subjugate his
lesser allies as well as the foe. Lastly, a defeated enemy may gather courage over time
and increase his resistance to foreign invasion.(3)

By failing to assess properly the negative impact of these factors on a selected
operational course of action, a commander risks losing not only the opportunity of
achieving a military victory but also of suffering a defeat after which further military
action will attempt merely to lessen the degree of defeat. Additionally, the dynamic
nature of war requires that these factors be reassessed in relation to critical tactical or
operational decisions that may influence the validity of previous assumptions.

ILLUSTRATION OF THE CONCEPT

The Korean War (1950-54) serves as a modern illustration of what Clausewitz
meant by a "culminating point of victory." In this case, the military effort culminated nearly two and a half years before a ceasefire was brokered to end open hostilities.

The initial objective of the U.S. led United Nations coalition, which interceded to protect South Korea from military subjugation by North Korea, was to return to the status quo ante bellum. Following a near defeat, the UN forces pursued a retreating North Korean Army to the original border between the North and South Korea. The Soviet Union, on behalf of its communist neighbor, attempted to broker a ceasefire on terms favorable to the original dictates of the United Nations in an attempt to thwart a counter-invasion. (4)

Perceiving an opportunity for the total defeat of the communist North, the Commander of the UN Forces, General MacArthur advised a rejection of this peace initiative. Instead, he advocated a new campaign objective of reunifying Korea under the democratic South Korean government. MacArthur's operational assessment assumed that the Communist Chinese would be unable to intervene in the conflict to prevent the defeat of their communist neighbor despite their warnings to the contrary. (5)

In November 1950, the Communist Chinese in fact intervened in unexpected strength and forced a withdrawal of the UN forces in North Korea back across the border along the 38th parallel. Neither force, however, had sufficient strength to effect the defeat of the other without a significant escalation of military force. Such an escalation risked the widening of a localized conflict into a total war between nuclear powers. To avoid this risk, negotiations for a ceasefire began in July 1951. Over the
next two and a half years the forces were stalemated along the border, enduring a loss of blood and treasure well exceeded by the defeat of the original invasion and restoration of prewar borders. In the end, the conflict was resolved on terms arguably less favorable then those proffered by the Soviet Union years earlier.

Using Clausewitz's model, a combination of three factors led to the culminating point of victory. These factors included a change in political alliances, the vulnerability of the UN force to the adverse effects of friendly attrition and lengthy lines of communication after crossing the border in October 1950. The operational analysis was based upon an invalid assumption regarding Communist Chinese capability.

Operation Desert Storm in 1991 provides an example of recognizing and not exceeding the culminating point of victory. The initial objective of the UN coalition was essentially a restoration of the international borders ante bellum. The ground operation in late February achieved this goal in 100 hours by decisively destroying Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait. In accomplishing this, the UN forces had preserved virtually all of their offensive capability. The opportunity for achieving the unstated "objective" of toppling Saddam by occupying Baghdad appeared to exist. Operational planners and commanders, however, recognized that seizing this "opportunity" would most probably result in an unfavorable change in political alignment within both the allied coalition and the entire Mideast region. Arab partners in the UN coalition, already fearful of US/European military power in the region, would probably not have supported the subjugation of Iraq by force. Additionally, the destruction of the Iraqi
military would create a power vacuum that may well have been filled by the extremism of Iranian Islamic fundamentalism.

Despite the domestic criticism endured by political and military leaders for "not going far enough," Operation Desert Storm was a military victory that offered other instruments of national power the opportunity to effect a stable transformation of the Iraqi government while maintaining security for U.S. economic interests in the region.

THE ISSUE OF MILITARY VICTORY

The Korean War and Desert Storm illustrations underscore a fundamental challenge in determining a culminating point of victory - what exactly is military "victory?" Interestingly, the term is not defined in the DoD Dictionary of Military Terms or in three of the four services' keystone doctrinal publications. The Air Force definition of "decisively destroying an enemy's armed force"(6) is too limited for use in anything short of total war.

A pragmatic definition of the term might be "obtaining the political objective through the application of military force while retaining a position of military advantage." The degree of advantage determines the degree of victory in terms of the desired endstate. With this definition, Korea was not a "victory" because it was negotiated from a position of at best military parity though the political objective was ultimately obtained. Conversely, Desert Storm was a victory.

In that war is a political action and in a democracy political action generally
reflects the will of the populace, domestic influences must therefore largely define what constitutes "victory." A cost-benefit analysis model may well describe how the public and its governmental representatives arrive at a perception of military victory. In this model, the public weighs the benefits of the stated objective with the anticipated costs in treasure, blood, and time and places a "value" on the conflict. As the costs exceed the perceived benefits, the degrees of "victory" culminate into degrees of "defeat."

This model assumes that the objective or endstate is clearly stated and understood by the public and that when it changes, the impact of the shift is also fully explained and understood. Problems occur when the endstate is changed but not articulated to the public in such a manner as to build a consensus of support and a new "value analysis." The public expects that the political and/or military leadership will clearly define the desired endstate, expected costs, and the expected benefits to be derived from the military action. Should any of these factors change, the public also expects to be informed of the changes. The nature of a democratic media ensures that the public is well informed of the actual costs of the conflict and of any debate over its benefits.

Determining victory is also largely influenced by organizational imperatives within the military. In the flush of operational success it probably takes more moral courage for a commander to recognize the limits of a military solution and counsel caution while bearing the criticism of losing an "opportunity" for "decisive victory" then to push for a pursuit. MacArthur in Korea pushed for the pursuit while Schwarzkopf in Desert Storm counselled caution.
The Korea and Desert Storm illustrations have suggested the potential of Clausewitz’s concept as a tool for operational analysis. His factors leading to a culmination point of victory can also be reinterpreted to meet the planning requirements of today’s "New World Order" where peace operations are fast becoming the most likely missions for ground forces.

CULMINATING POINT OF VICTORY AND PEACE OPERATIONS

Peace operations are essentially third party interventions into multifaceted conflicts within an existing nation state or in a disputed area between different nation states. The mission of such operations are to monitor and enforce the terms of an existing international agreement and thereby create conditions for a diplomatic settlement of the conflict.

Joint Publication 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures For Peacekeeping Operations, defines peacekeeping as "Military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement."(7) Peace enforcement, in contrast, involves punitive or coercive military actions or the threat of such actions conducted against a recalcitrant party and in support of diplomatic efforts to promote stability. If peacekeeping focuses on deterrence, peace enforcement is a culmination of a peacekeeping operation and focuses instead on forcibly countering and defeating the use of force by one or more
belligerents.

The operative concept for the use of military force in a peacekeeping operation is to create an interlude in hostilities of sufficient length to allow for the successful negotiation of a peaceful resolution to the conflict. An essential element in accomplishing this task is an acceptance of the peacekeeping force as a neutral party by the respective belligerents. Military victory in this environment is the successful monitoring and enforcing of the terms stipulated in its mandate. While military victory is a stepchild of the diplomatic effort, a tactical defeat has a disproportionately adverse effect on the will of the nations providing the peacekeeping force to continue participating militarily in the peace process.

When the peacekeeping force is perceived to have transitioned into a non-neutral position that distinctly favors a particular side in a conflict, its usefulness as a facilitator of a diplomatic solution approaches culmination. The military force must either be withdrawn or drop the pretense of peacekeeping and become actively engaged in peace enforcement operations.

Applying Clausewitz's factors leading to culmination, when a peacekeeping force is no longer perceived as being neutral, the force is vulnerable to culmination from (1) friendly attrition which adversely influences the cost-benefit formula necessary to maintain popular support for peacekeeping, (2) a change in political alliances as one or more belligerents seek alliances to counter the perceived threat of subjugation by the peacekeeping force, and (3) increased popular resistance to the foreign forces once seen as saviors and now seen as invaders. Following actions that
reinforce the growing doubt about a force's neutrality, further military action becomes increasingly counterproductive and its prolonged exposure increases the opportunities for an enemy to mount an attack on the force. The continued presence of the force under these conditions risks national credibility, lives, and money on courses of action that falsely assume the major belligerent parties' support or at least accept the presence of the peacekeeping force. The question of tactical defeat, in this instance, becomes more of a question of "when" than of "if."

From an operational or tactical perspective, it is essential to recognize the particular nature of peacekeeping operations as distinct from other more conventional operations. First, a "military solution" is not sought and the military endstate most probably will be to maintain merely the status quo. Second, nonmilitary people may make tactical decisions that have a profound effect on the operational environment. Third, the traditional tactical decision-making process must recognize the probable impact of tactical decisions on the operational culminating point of victory. Fourth, risk assessments must be clearly articulated and risk management must be "synchronized" with both force protection measures and diplomatic efforts. Lastly, indicators of the culminating point of victory must be identified and intelligence assets dedicated to collect and/or monitor these indicators.

In a peace enforcement operation, military victory is determined by the successful application of the force in coercing compliance with established peace accords by any party that renews hostilities. An Army White Paper on peace enforcement states that the purpose of such operations is "the maintenance or
restoration of peace under conditions broadly defined by the international community. "(8) Peace enforcement tasks may include such actions as the forcible separation of belligerents, the military support of the armed forces of the recognized legitimate government, or the destruction by direct intervention of the combat capability of one or more belligerents.

In comparison to peacekeeping, a peace enforcement force is decidedly non-neutral. The use of combatant forces actively engaged in military operations to defeat a hostile party is a basic characteristic of peace enforcement. The culmination of this form of peace operation occurs when the use of force is either indiscriminate or indecisive. The former instance would serve to alienate the local population and increase popular resistance to force activities. The latter circumstance would encourage alliances with the hostile party as a result of coercion or opportunism, strengthen the political stature of the belligerent, and embolden its disruptive behavior. Additionally, the lack of timely victory would make domestic support more restive as friendly attrition increases without a perception of a conclusive end to hostilities.

As with peacekeeping operations, military operations are an adjunct to the diplomatic process. In peace enforcement operations, however, the pursuit of a "military solution" will dominate the peace process at least temporarily. Nonmilitary people may still make tactical decisions that deeply affect the operational environment and the tactical and operational commanders must analyze these decisions as well as their own to determine their probable effect on the culmination factors leading to victory. Should any decision be "out of sync" with acceptable risks, the
planner/commander must raise the issue and recommend alternative actions to reduce the risks. Additionally, the intelligence effort must be focused on the collection and evaluation of culmination indicators.

An analysis of the failed peace operations in Lebanon and Somalia is illustrative of the dynamics of peace operations from the perspective of operational culmination. Without a clear recognition of a culminating point of victory and of the factors leading to such an event, operational analyses during these missions failed to properly assess the risks associated with various critical decisions. Accordingly, in both cases, the peace force was operationally surprised and defeated in a manner that also marked the culmination of operational victory.

PEACEKEEPING CASE STUDY: U.S. OPERATIONS IN BEIRUT 1982 - 1984

The Marine participation in the Beirut Peacekeeping Operation from September 1982 to December 1983 serves as an illustration of the unique nature and challenges of tactical decision-making in a peace operation. The case study highlights the transitional nature of peace operations. In Beirut, the peacekeeping effort culminated as the operation slipped into a peace enforcement effort. The subsequent culmination of this latter phase led to a culmination of the overall peace operation with a tactical defeat that also defeated U.S. diplomatic policies in the region.

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY
In September 1982, Lebanon was suffering from the effects of seven years of internal strife and civil war. The social and political fabric of the country was fractionalized along religious and tribal lines with the once ruling majority of Maronite Christian Phalange now a minority and embattled by Druze and Moslem factions seeking greater political authority. Additionally, various Moslem extremist groups as well as over 100,000 Palestinian refugees found Lebanon a convenient sanctuary. Fearing the spread of the effects of Lebanese civil war across its own borders, Syria partially occupied Lebanon in 1976. In June 1982, Lebanon was also partially occupied by Israel in an attempt to militarily eliminate the terrorist threat posed by the PLO. In August 1982, U.S. diplomatic efforts succeeded in evacuating PLO forces with the support of U.S. Marines and also effecting a withdrawal of Syrian forces occupying Beirut proper. (9)

The decision to deploy U.S. Marines back into Beirut on a peacekeeping mission as part of a Multinational Force (MNF) was predicated upon international outcry following first the assassination of President-elect Bashir Gemayel and then the massacre of unarmed civilians in the Sabra and Shalita refugee camps that were nominally under Israeli control. Through an Exchange of Diplomatic Notes, a MNF composed of forces from the U.S., France, Italy, and belatedly Britain, was to occupy Beirut in order to deter overt hostilities for a period sufficient for the Lebanese government to rebuild the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and provide for its own internal security. (10) The implicit assumption inherent to the success of the MNF in accomplishing this mission was that its very presence would facilitate the restoration of
the sovereignty of the Lebanese government and its authority in Beirut. Withdrawal of
the MNF was tied to the ability of Lebanon to provide for its own security and the
withdrawal of other forces of occupation.

The key elements of MNF mandate included the provisions that the USMNF
would not engage in combat but could exercise the right of self-defense and that the
LAF and government of Lebanon would provide for the security of the force and would
seek assurances from all armed elements in Beirut that they would refrain from
hostilities and not interfere with MNF activities. (11)

The political and strategic objectives for US participation in the MNF was to (1)
facilitate the restoration of a stable Lebanese government, (2) effect the withdrawal of
Israeli and Syrian military forces from Lebanon, (3) provide for the security of northern
Israel, (4) demonstrate superior US influence in the region vis a vis the USSR, and (5)
set conditions for renewed Arab-Israeli peace talks. (12)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Alert Order subject line read "U.S. Force
participation in Lebanon Multinational Force (MNF) Peacekeeping Operations." The
mission statement, as promulgated virtually unchanged to the on-scene commander, the
Commanding Officer of a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), read: "To establish an
environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their
responsibilities in the Beirut area. When directed, USCINCEUR will introduce U.S.
forces as part of a multinational force presence in the Beirut area to occupy and secure
positions along a designated section of the line from Beirut International Airport to a
position in the vicinity of the presidential Palace; be prepared to protect U.S. forces;
and, on order, conduct retrograde operations."(13) Additional guidance found elsewhere in the order specified that the USMNF would not be engaged in combat, that peacetime rules of engagement would apply, and that USCINCEUR would withdraw the force in the event of hostile action. The original mission statement was modified substantively only twice over the next year. The first change expanded the presence mission in West Beirut to include patrols in East Beirut commencing 2 November. The second change issued in the wake of the U.S. Embassy bombing in the spring of 1983 tasked USMNF to provide external security to the relocated embassy.(14)

The essential task of the USMNF in the concept of operations drafted by USCINCEUR was to "assist the LAF to deter passage of hostile elements in order to provide an environment which will permit the LAF to carry out their responsibilities in the city of Beirut."(15) The MAU commander interpreted the overall "presence mission," as it was called, to demand a "visible but nonthreatening posture." Specifically, he held that the USMNF mission was to provide "a presence in Beirut that would in turn help establish the stability necessary for the Lebanese government to regain control of their capital."(16) An essential implied mission based on his analysis was the maintenance of free access to and normal operation of the Beirut International Airport (BIA). This task was deemed important to the overall viability of the MNF concept.(17)

The need for a peacekeeping appearance of impartiality was widely recognized. Accordingly, the exercise of restraint in the employment of the U.S. force was of paramount concern. Admiral Rowden, Commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet later noted
that "we had been constantly reminded of an obligation not to become involved in Lebanese affairs." and that there was even a suggestion that the Marines go ashore unarmed. (18) The peacetime rules of engagement (ROE) for the use of force also emphasized the peacekeeping nature of the mission. Essentially the ROE withheld individual authority to fire unless fired upon and fire so returned would be commensurate with that received. Preemptive fire against "hostile intent" required the specific authority of the force commander. (19)

On 29 September, the Marines returned to Beirut as the USMNF and established a base of operations at BIA following the withdrawal of Israeli forces from this area. The airport perimeter was secured with a series of outposts, most of which bordered the Israeli occupation zone. Movement within the designated U.S. sector of western Beirut was monitored with the use of checkpoints on major roads and active patrolling by vehicle and foot. Although the MAU commander realized that the LAF was tasked to protect the USMNF, he recognized that de facto force protection was accomplished by Israeli suppression of any dissent in the districts they occupied encompassing the USMNF sector. (20)

Both the Israelis and Arabs treated the USMNF with suspicion. Beginning in January 1983, the Israelis violated the neutrality of the buffer area in the American zone with increasing audacity until such violations achieved broad media coverage as a result of a Marine captain facing down an Israeli tank with an unholstered pistol on 2 February. This incident erased Arab suspicions of U.S. - Israeli collusion.

Over the next eight months, however, the situation in Beirut became
increasingly hostile to the MNF and the U.S. force in particular. In March 1983, the first casualties were suffered by the U.S. force as a result of a grenade thrown at a Marine patrol by an Arab. The U.S. Embassy was destroyed by a car bomb parked outside killing sixty people including seventeen Americans. The bombing was later attributed to a local Shiite Moslem group. Mortar, rocket, and artillery fire fell on the Marine positions around BIA in August. Marines returned fire for the first time on 28 August with direct fire weapons against the gunners. Following the death of two Marines from a mortar attack the next day, the Marines were authorized to return fire with their artillery. Marine patrols were suspended on 31 August due to the threat of sniper and rocket attack. With the intermittent shelling of BIA continuing in September, U.S. show of force efforts increased as F-14 aircraft flew spotting missions over Beirut and naval gunfire suppressed suspected artillery positions. In mid-October, two more Marines were killed by sniper fire on the BIA perimeter. On 23 October, the Marine Headquarters at BIA was destroyed by truck bomb, killing 241 personnel. The bombing was apparently the work of an Iranian Shiite extremist group operating with Syrian support.

In the aftermath of this bombing, the U.S. continued to maintain its ground forces at BIA and continued to suffer casualties. F-14's flying reconnaissance were fired upon by Syrian units on 11 November and two F-14's were downed by Syrian fire on 4 December with the loss of one pilot and the capture of the other. The same day Druze gunners killed eight Marines at BIA with indirect fire. Naval gunfire by the battleship New Jersey fired in retaliation at the suspected gun positions. During
January 1984 two more Marines were killed in separate sniper incidents and two wounded. On 8 February President Reagan announced the withdrawal of the USMNF in Beirut and by 27 February the withdrawal was complete.(22)

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

Given this chronology of military action, the catastrophic loss of life in the 23 October bombing marks an apparent culmination of the Beirut peace operation notwithstanding the continued presence of the force for four additional months. In a February 1984 address regarding the decision to withdraw the USMNF from Beirut the President stated "we are redeploying because once the terrorist attacks started there was no way we could really contribute to the original mission by staying there as a target just hunkering down and waiting for further attacks."(23) At some point in the days or months prior to 23 October, the peacekeeping nature of the operation culminated and the force unwittingly transitioned into peace enforcement. In this process the USMNF became "just another belligerent" in the Lebanese conflict.

A Department of Defense Commission assigned to investigate the circumstances surrounding the bombing attack on the Marine Headquarters at BIA, the "Long Commission," noted that the success of the USMNF mission was based on four criteria: that the force operate in a permissive environment; that the LAF provide for the security of the force; that the mission be of limited duration; and that the force would be evacuated in the event of an attack. In the period between the arrival of the USMNF
in Beirut and the bombing attack, the first two criteria had been compromised and the third criteria in doubt.\(^{(24)}\) The principle causes of these changes were attributed to the loss of perceived USMNF neutrality due to its increasingly active support of the LAF, the opportunity for Syria and Iran to further their anti-U.S. agendas by attacking the USMNF, and by the failure of diplomatic efforts to negotiate a withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces from Lebanon.\(^{(25)}\)

An analysis of four key operational and tactical decisions made by or imposed upon the USMNF during this period may provide insight into the dynamics that marked the progression towards the culminating point of victory.

The first break from maintenance of an appearance of strict neutrality began in December 1982 when the MAU commander, with JCS support, honored a Lebanese Ministry of Defense request for training assistance to the enfeebled LAF. Marine Mobile Training Teams were tasked with the training of a Lebanese Armed Forces rapid reaction force in addition to their "presence" duties. This decision was made in part due to the findings of a DoD survey of LAF capabilities and requirements\(^{(26)}\) and in part because the MAU commander perceived that this training would provide a beneficial outlet for Marines becoming increasingly bored with the routine of the ongoing presence mission.\(^{(27)}\) The intended result was the bolstering of a deficient LAF training program and hasten the creation of a viable Lebanese security force. This force could then assume the duties of the MNF fulfilling one of the U.S. strategic objectives. Notably, the basic mission assigned to the USMNF was not modified to include this additional task.
Despite the representation of Druze and Moslem soldiers in the LAF, the LAF was treated with considerable suspicion by the Druze and Moslem populations. The popular perception among the adversaries to the Gemayel government was that the LAF was an instrument of the Maronite Phalange and that non-Phalange soldiers in the LAF were either traitors, opportunists, or dupes of the Phalange. By actively training the LAF, the USMNF inadvertently associated itself as a supporter of the Phalange.

This perception was further reinforced by the nature and location of the training. The LAF training site was visibly conducted at an LAF camp within the BIA perimeter and included infantry, artillery, and armor tactics. The Lebanese Air Assault Battalion was trained in helicopter operations that included mock vertical assaults and helicopter extractions. The appearance of USMNF neutrality was further damaged by the supply of 32 U.S. M-48 tanks to the LAF in March 1983 by the State Department.

The bombing attack on the U.S. Embassy on 18 April 1983 provided the second key decision point. The ROE in effect until this time assumed that the USMNF operated in a permissive environment. Individual weapons carried on patrol or while manning checkpoints of outposts were to be on "safe" with a loaded magazine inserted but no round actually chambered inside the weapon. The USMNF could use deadly force only in self-defense against a hostile act, as specifically defined in the ROE, or against a hostile force declared to be such by the Combined Amphibious Task Force Commander (the direct superior of the MAU commander) who was afloat off Beirut. Marines manning checkpoints or patrolling in their sectors could "warn" personnel of
regulations and prohibitions. The LAF was to be called upon to actually enforce the rules and to repulse security violations that threatened hostility or attempted to bypass Marine checkpoints. (31)

A post bombing analysis of the ROE by USCINCEUR promoted a revision of the standing ROE only to the degree that the definition of a "hostile act" would include attempts to breach barriers or roadblocks approaching the relocated Embassy or the U.S. Ambassador's residence. (32) The analysis apparently assumed that the bombing was an isolated incident and that while the diplomatic offices of the U.S. might be threatened, the USMNF at BIA was a distinctly separate entity and less vulnerable to being a target of opportunity. The USMNF therefore operated with two separate ROE. One ROE in effect while providing security for the Embassy and Ambassador's residence and the original more restrictive ROE remained in effect at BIA. The wounding of three Marines while on patrol several weeks earlier by a grenade was similarly perceived to be an isolated incident. Additionally, because of an perceived increase in the number of "accidental discharges" (the firing of a weapon without specific intent) by Marines around BIA the ground force commander ordered the removal of magazines from individual weapons except when posted on security duty. (33) The intent of this action was to minimize the danger of an incident caused by inadvertent casualties. In hindsight, these twin decisions made the USMNF more vulnerable in a period of increasing hostility. At the time, however, the MAU Commander noted in his weekly situation report that "In spite of the terrorist threat, we are continuing to maintain a proper balance between security and our
presence/peacekeeping mission." (34) This balance, however, was predicated on the assumption of continuing force neutrality; an assumption which was at best suspect.

The third key decision point occurred in August as the LAF became engaged in intense fighting against various Druze and Moslem militias for control of the Alayh and Shuf districts of Beirut. The cause of this fighting was the precipitous withdrawal of Israeli forces from these districts that bordered the USMNF sector and the assumption of their checkpoints by the LAF. Rival militia forces moved into the area in an attempt to wrest control from the LAF and increase their own powerbase. (35) In response to a Lebanese request for additional ammunition, the USMNF actively engaged in the ammunition resupply of the LAF from stocks afloat aboard the amphibious task force and later delivered by Military Sealift Command vessels. (36) During this same period the USMNF came under direct artillery and mortar attack, sustained casualties, and returned fire with both direct and indirect fire weapons. While previous indirect fire impacting near BIA had been attributed to "overs" intended for Israeli positions in the bordering districts or spill over from intermural militia fighting in the neighboring Shuf mountains, the withdrawal of the Israeli forces made such distinctions more questionable. Additionally, the relative protective security offered by the previous Israeli occupation of these districts was lost.

The open logistical support of the LAF in combat and the targeting of the USMNF by militia gunners appear to indicate that the "peacekeeping phase" of the USMNF was fast approaching culmination and the transition to "peace enforcement" had clearly begun. There is no indication, however, that a reevaluation of the mission
or the ROE was conducted. The critical tactical decision made by the USMNF commander was to maintain the central location of noncombat personnel in the perceived safety of the Headquarters Building, a multi-storied steel and concrete structure that afforded cover from the effects of sniper and artillery fire.(37)

USCINCEUR analysis of the hostilities directed at the USMNF apparently did not cross the threshold of "hostile action" which would necessitate even a partial withdrawal of the ground forces at BIA to ships offshore per the original guidance contained in the JCS Alert Order.

The fourth decision point marks the completion of the transition of the USMNF from "peacekeeping" to "peace enforcement." On 19 September, the President, on the advice of Middle-East Envoy McFarland and over the objections of the tactical military leaders, authorized the use of naval gunfire in direct support of the LAF engaged in the defense of Suq-Al-Gharb.(37) This overt combat support accomplished several objectives. Suq-Al-Gharb was the first major test of the combat effectiveness of the newly reorganized, trained, and equipped LAF. A defeat of the LAF by the Syrian supported militias fighting for control of this district in the mountains directly above BIA would have been a military disaster for the fledgling force but would also adversely affect U.S. efforts to strengthen the power of the central Lebanese government over the warring militias. Additionally, a demonstration of U.S. resolve would support U.S. diplomatic efforts to secure a withdrawal of Syrian forces.(39) The cost of this action, however, was to cast aside any semblance of neutrality for the USMNF. Clearly, the U.S. was now fully committed to a peace enforcement role. The
Marines at BIA, however were not informed of the mission change, if indeed anyone recognized that the mission of the USMNF had changed. While there is no clear evidence that there is a linkage between the combat support of the LAF and the bombing attack a month later of the USMNF, the Long Commission concluded that such a cause and effect was likely.(40)

Figure 1 graphically depicts a comparison of the decisions made during the key events discussed in this case study with the three major missions of the USMNF. Every decision supports one or more of the assigned or implied missions that were of paramount concern. However, when compared against Figure 2, which assesses the probable impact of these decisions on the basic assumptions that determine whether or not the overall mission remains viable, a much more cautionary perspective is gained.

Figure 3 attempts to bridge the two perspectives shown in Figures One and Two. Using Clausewitz's factors leading towards culmination, each of the major decisions is evaluated in regards to its effect on reaching an operational culmination. The two most important criteria in this instance are decisions that increase the risk of losing the appearance of neutrality (changing alliances) and the risks to force protection (friendly attrition). Each decision, while purportedly supporting the overall mission, also increased the risks of culmination in either or both of the critical factors.

The force commander, however, had to balance two contradictory missions - "presence" and "LAF support." The first, peacekeeping, culminated when the U.S. provided active support to the LAF. The second, peace enforcement, assumed that the LAF could protect the USMNF and that the weight of U.S. military firepower would
**DECISION - MISSION SUPPORT MATRIX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DECISION</th>
<th>EVENT # 1</th>
<th>EVENT # 2</th>
<th>EVENT # 3</th>
<th>EVENT # 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING LAF</td>
<td>NO EFFECT</td>
<td>SUPPORTED</td>
<td>NO EFFECT</td>
<td>SUPPORTED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUAL ROE</td>
<td>SUPPORTED</td>
<td>NO EFFECT</td>
<td>SUPPORTED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESUPPLY LAF</td>
<td>NO EFFECT</td>
<td>SUPPORTED</td>
<td>NO EFFECT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTINUE PRESENCE</td>
<td>SUPPORTED</td>
<td>SUPPORTED</td>
<td>SUPPORTED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT BIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 1**

**VALIDITY OF OPERATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSUMPTION: FORCE NEUTRALITY</th>
<th>EVENT # 1</th>
<th>EVENT # 2</th>
<th>EVENT # 3</th>
<th>EVENT # 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LAF PROTECTION OF MNF</td>
<td>REDUCED VALIDITY</td>
<td>INCREASED VALIDITY</td>
<td>REDUCED VALIDITY</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

**FIGURE 2**
**RISK OF CULMINATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTRIBUTING FACTOR:</th>
<th>FRIENDLY</th>
<th>PROLONGED LENGTHY</th>
<th>CHANGING</th>
<th>LOSS OF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ATTRITION</td>
<td>EXPOSURE LOC (1)</td>
<td>ALLIANCES (2)</td>
<td>POPULAR SUPPORT (3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EVENT #1**
TRAIN LAF | NO EFFECT | REDUCE | NO EFFECT | INCREASE | INCREASE |

**EVENT #2**
DUAL ROE | INCREASE | INCREASE | REDUCE | NO EFFECT | NO EFFECT |

**EVENT #3**
RESUPPLY LAF | INCREASE | REDUCE | NO EFFECT | INCREASE | INCREASE |

MAINTAIN BIA | "PRESENCE" | INCREASE | INCREASE | INCREASE | NO EFFECT | NO EFFECT |

**EVENT #4**
NGF SUPPORT OF LAF | INCREASE | REDUCE | INCREASE | PEACEKEEP | PEACEKEEP |

MAINTAIN BIA | "PRESENCE" | INCREASE | INCREASE | INCREASE | NO EFFECT | NO EFFECT |

**EVENT #5**
BIA BOMB | CULMINATE | PEACE | ENFORCEMENT |

(1) INCLUDES VULNERABILITY TO ENEMY ASSESSMENT & REDUCTION IN FRIENDLY FREEDOM OF ACTION
(2) INCLUDES REDUCING INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE
(3) IN PEACEKEEPING THIS WOULD BE LOSS OF NEUTRALITY

FIGURE 3
prove to be decisive and discriminate in suppressing opponents to the LAF. Figure 2 notes that the first assumption was obviously invalid. The validity of the second assumption was based on a subjective assessment that was disastrously optimistic. As noted in Figure 3, the peace enforcement phase culminated when the force protection measures required to maintain a presence at BIA proved to be inadequate.

The dynamics of the operational environment made mission analysis difficult. The four decision points identified above were juxtaposed against a turbulent background of diplomatic posturing, stalled negotiations, inter and intra factional fighting between loosely organized militias, and a virtual avalanche of intelligence information mostly vague and often conflicting. The Long Commission noted, however, that it was "abundantly clear" that the operational environment of the USMNF was no longer permissive and "that appropriate guidance and modification of tasking should have been provided to the USMNF to enable it to cope effectively with the increasingly hostile environment. The Commission could find no evidence that such guidance was, in fact, provided."(41) Such guidance may have been provided had tactical or operational commanders conducted an analysis of their decisions in the context of a culminating point of victory as described by Figures 2 and 3.

The very nature of a military organization trained for combat missions also contributed to the culmination of the USMNF peace operation. The written and oral admonitions to appear non-threatening pressured the various Marine commanders whose units assumed the USMNF mission, to avoid overt force protection measures that would "send the wrong signal." The implied mission of keeping BIA operational
and accessible to the public forced the commander to balance the immediate need to maintain appearances with the subjective risk that the force protection measures would prove to be inadequate. Similarly, the removal of magazines from individual weapons within the BIA compound in order to avoid an "international incident" caused by an accidental discharge, contributed to a garrison mindset that would discount the threat of a direct physical attack on USMNF positions without adequate warning.

Lastly, if "victory" in this operation was defined by maintaining a U.S. military "presence" in Beirut, then logically the withdrawal of the U.S. force in the face of hostile actions would then appear to constitute "defeat." This linkage alone would provide a significant inducement to tactical and operational commanders to forestall even a partial withdrawal of ground forces even in the face of overt hostilities. Without senior guidance as to what "hostile act" would trigger even a partial withdrawal of the ground forces, the deployed commanders realistically had no options other than to maintain a full "presence" ashore despite the risks. Clausewitz's concept of culmination may have provided a means to structure risk management analysis in a way that would precluded the adverse effects of these organizational dynamics.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT CASE STUDY: RESTORE HOPE 1992 - 1994

Operation Restore Hope, the U.S. peace operation in Somalia, followed a pattern similar to that of the Beirut peace operation ten years previously in the regard that it was initially a peacekeeping operation that transitioned to a peace enforcement
operation. In Restore Hope, however, the transition was abrupt and clearly recognized by the military and political leadership. The chief difficulty in achieving success in Somalia peace enforcement lay not in recognizing that the operational environment had changed but instead in an overly optimistic appraisal of U.S. operational prowess in special operations and an underestimation of the strength and cunning of the "enemy." The result was a series of indecisive tactical actions that became increasingly indiscriminate. As in Beirut, the mission to Somalia culminated when U.S. forces suffered a tactical defeat with a prohibitively high cost in American lives, even though the actual operation stumbled on for five more months.

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

Somalia in 1992 was more a territory then a nation, ruled by roving militias organized along tribal lines who violently pilfered the remaining wealth of an impoverished people already suffering mass starvation. The last "legitimate" government in Somalia had been under Major General Siad Barre who had seized power in a bloodless coup in 1969. Following a period of increasing violence between various clan militias, Barre was overthrown in January 1991 by armed forces of the Somali National Alliance (SNA) led by General Aidid. A "Manifesto Group" of Somali businessmen and intellectuals briefly claimed power but were swept away by the violence that erupted as fifteen clan and sub-clan militias vied for power.(42)

In an attempt to staunch the ever increasing level of violence and death, the
United Nations established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) on 21 April 1992 to monitor a ceasefire between the warring clans in the capital city of Mogadishu. Regular humanitarian relief shipments to offset the famine ravishing the country began arriving soon thereafter in July. In August, the U.S. initiated its own relief effort with Operation Provide Relief in an effort to buttress the ongoing UN effort suffering from the challenges of the sheer magnitude of the Somali problem. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was tasked with the airlifting of food shipments from non-governmental organizations (NGO's) into southern Somalia. These food shipments, and those of the UN effort, however, were often looted by the warring militias before they could arrive to the distribution centers to feed the starving masses.

Intense media coverage of the Somali "situation" contributed to mounting domestic pressure for the U.S. to become more involved in the humanitarian assistance effort. Still flush from the euphoria of the successful use of military force in Desert Storm eight months previously, the public demand to "do something" focused on a military effort to protect the delivery and distribution of relief supplies.

Against this backdrop, the U.S. escalated its relief effort with Operation Restore Hope, a peacekeeping operation which was initiated by executive order on 23 November 1992. This order tasked CENTCOM with the formation of a Joint Task Force (JTF) that would secure key ports and airfields in central and southern Somalia, facilitate the secure passage of relief supplies, and assist the UN and NGOs in providing humanitarian relief.

The mandate for the operation lay in a UN resolution that requested a U.S. led
coalition to provide security to NGO and UN food distribution efforts. The mission of this force was to create an environment conducive to a more robust UNOSOM assumption of responsibility for the security and distribution of relief supplies. In accepting the task, the U.S., on its part, properly limited the mission in terms of mandate, time, and geographical scope. The stipulated operational objective was to stabilize the military situation only to the extent to avert mass starvation. The expected duration of the effort was to be three or four months at which time UNOSOM would assume responsibility. The relief effort would limited to only those Somali areas beset by starvation. Lastly, the U.S. president-elect had the option to withdraw U.S. forces after he assumed office on 20 January 1993.(45)

The UN secretariat, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, however, desired a more ambitious mission that would later indirectly affect the U.S. peace enforcement effort. The UN desired the disarmament of the Somali clans as a prerequisite to their assumption of the peacekeeping mission, that the U.S. led forces set up a civil administration in Somalia, and that a civilian police force be trained to assist UNOSOM in its duties.(46) Ultimately the "mission creep" associated with at least partly fulfilling these tasks prolonged the U.S. presence in Somalia and made the U.S. at least indirectly responsible for the protection of those clans that willingly disarmed.

The operational objectives of JTF Somalia were phased over an expected four month period. In Phase I, the force would secure the ports and airfield of Baidoa and Mogadishu. In Phase II, the area of operations would expand to include to humanitarian relief distribution sites. In Phase III, security to the convoys delivering
relief supplies to the sites would be established. During Phase IV, security responsibilities would transition to the UNOSOM force. (47)

The overall operation combined a humanitarian relief operation with a peacekeeping operation. Humanitarian relief took the form of assisting the NGOs and UN in distributing supplies. The peacekeeping operation entailed the establishment of a buffer around the relief efforts where no one militia would appear to benefit from the relief operation. The neutrality of the security force was an essential feature in securing agreement from the major clans not to interfere with the military operation.

On 9 December, 1992 U.S. Marine forces commenced an unopposed amphibious landing at Mogadishu, spearheading the JTF introduction of two U.S. divisions, a Marine Air-Ground Task Force from the First Marine Expeditionary Force and the 10th Mountain Division. By 20 January 1993, when President Clinton assumed office, the U.S. "peacekeeping" effort was largely complete. The warring factions had agreed to a conference in March to negotiate the formation of a coalition government, humanitarian relief was being provided without substantial interruption, and U.S. forces had begun a phased withdrawal. On 17 February Phase III was officially declared complete and the transition of the operation to UNOSOM control was forecasted to be complete in March. This transition was completed on 4 May and the remaining U.S. forces in Somalia came under nominal UNOSOM control. (48) The peacekeeping mission had been successfully concluded and "victory" obtained.

In March, however, President Clinton endorsed a new "nationbuilding" mission for its forces in Somalia and in the process redefined "victory." Negotiations for a
Somali coalition government had faltered as a result, in the opinion of the UN Secretary General, of the demands for greater representation by the Habre Gedir clan led by General Aidid. The UN sought a U.S. lead in the assumption of "responsibility for the consolidation, expansion, and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia" as an alternative path toward prompting serious negotiations between clans beset by mutual mistrust. Per UN Resolution 814 of 26 March, the U.S. would provided 8,000 military logistical personnel to rebuild the Somali infrastructure and an Army light brigade of 1,700 troops to act as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to protect the nationbuilding force. Additionally, peacekeeping victory was linked to the broad terms of the UN resolution.

The peacekeeping aspect of the nationbuilding mission abruptly transitioned to peace enforcement on 6 June when the U.S. endorsed UN Resolution 837 which demanded the arrest of General Aidid for allegedly authorizing the ambush of Pakistani peacekeepers the previous day, killing 24 soldiers. The debate regarding the degree of complicity General Aidid had in this event aside, U.S. endorsement of the demand for his arrest and subsequent military actions that attempted to do so, marked the transition of the U.S. from peacekeeper to peace enforcer. U.S. operational and tactical decisions over the next four months had a profound influence on increasing the risk of operational culmination. With this new mission, victory was again redefined to include the capture of Aidid.

The task of finding Aidid was initially conducted by UNOSOM with limited QRF support. The Joint Special Operations Command commanded by Major General
Garrison was given a warning order to be prepared to assume this mission per an agreement between the Commander in Chief CENTCOM, General Hoar and Commander in Chief Special Operations Command, General Downing. Major General Montgomery, the deputy commander of UNOSOM and commander of U.S. forces in Somalia, was to support General Garrison in accomplishing his mission. (52)

General Garrison's initial plan, code named "Caustic Brimstone," would have used a small commando force of 50 soldiers to conduct a "surgical raid" to capture Aidid. This plan, however, was dismissed when intelligence assets were unable to confirm a specific location of General Aidid at any given time. (53) Meanwhile, attacks on UNOSOM forces in Mogadishu by Aidid's SNA militia increased. Mortar attacks of the UNOSOM compound were conducted intermittently and confrontations between UNOSOM patrols and Somalis became increasingly violent.

Following the death of four U.S. soldiers by a command detonated mine on 8 August, the President ordered the deployment of General Garrison's "Task Force Ranger," now numbering 400 troops. This force composed of Delta's C Squadron, a Ranger Company, and 16 helicopters from Task Force 60 (a special operation aviation unit), arrived in Mogadishu during the period 22 to 26 August. The operation was code named "Gothic Serpent" and was to be conducted in three phases. The first phase was to last four days and included the deployment and orientation of the force to Mogadishu. Phase 2 would focus on the actual capture of General Aidid. Should this phase be unsuccessful, Phase 3 would attempt to capture his one or more of his six principle lieutenants under the assumption that their removal would in turn make Aidid
more conspicuous as he attempted to fulfill their duties himself or with other Somalis. (54)

According to a chronology based on the research and interviews conducted by journalist Rick Atkinson, the first attempt to capture Aidid on 30 August, reportedly occurred when General Garrison, frustrated by the lack of hard intelligence and the wounding of five task force soldiers by a mortar round, launched a raid on the "number-one target where Aidid has been reported from time to time." The raid, regrettably, captured instead members of the UN Development Program. A second raid on 7 September had the limited success of capturing 17 Somalis identified as SNA members. A third raid on 14 September proved as embarrassing as the first raid. A ranger on escort duty reported to have seen Aidid in a brown Land Rover driving through Mogadishu. The resulting raid inadvertently arrested Ahmed Jilao, the security chief of a militia closely allied with the UN., who had been mistaken for Aidid. Although some subsequent raids in fact succeeded in capturing several of Aidid's top lieutenants, Aidid himself remained elusive and the number of Somali deaths, including women and children, increased with each raid. Moreover, the raids revealed the basic modus operandi of Task Force Ranger. As an Aidid commander later remarked that "the Americans already had done basically the same thing six times." In the last raid before 3 October, supporting helicopters encountered anti-aircraft fire resulting from SNA use of rocket propelled grenades. (55)

On 3 October, Task Force Ranger attempted to capture Aidid at the Olympia Hotel in the SNA controlled district of Bakara Market. The failed raid resulted in the
death of hundreds of Somalis, 18 U.S. soldiers killed and 84 wounded, the capture of a wounded helicopter pilot by the SNA, and the culmination of U.S. participation in the Somalia peace operation. As General Garrison remarked in late September about conducting a raid in the vicinity of Bakara Market and the possibility of civilian casualties: "there's no question that we'll win the firefight. But we might lose the war."(56) Congressional hearings held after the raid, fueled by public outcry regarding the "value" of continued military participation in Somalia, resulted in demand for a withdrawal of U.S. forces by 31 March 1994.(57)

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

While neutrality is the key criteria to mission success in peacekeeping missions, decisive and discriminate action is the key to success in peace enforcement. In Somalia, peace enforcement operations were neither decisive nor discriminate as a result of failed operational assumptions, divergent and contradictory missions, and flawed organizational dynamics. The overall operation culminated when these factors led to an unacceptable level of friendly attrition, concern regarding the depth of popular resistance, and realization that failed military actions had strengthened instead of weakened the opponent's political position.

The success of the peace enforcement operation was based on several assumptions. First, that the U.S. had the intelligence apparatus in place that would be sufficient to locate Aidid, preferably at night when U.S. forces could use the advantages
provided by superior night vision capability. Secondly, that the operation leading to his arrest would be covert, rapid, and "surgical." Successive failures to capture Aidid, if publicized, would serve to boost his popularity and political standing while having a contrary effect on UNOSOM and U.S. credibility. Additionally, indiscriminate killings of Somalis would have a negative effect on U.S. efforts to promote goodwill. Thirdly, that the force deployed was sufficient to accomplish the mission.

The death of the prime human intelligence (HUMINT) source on Aidid's whereabouts in a game of Russian roulette in the final week of August and the inability to obtain information on Aidid's whereabouts at night because informers were hesitant to venture into the Habre Gadir clan's district after dark invalidated the first assumption. Most of the subsequent raids were executed in daylight when the populace thronged the streets to include the disastrous 3 October raid. Airborne national intelligence gathering assets proved to be of little use in searching for one individual in a large city. The second assumption was invalidated when during the period 30 August and 3 October, six attempts to capture Aidid ended in highly publicized failures.

The last operational assumption was invalidated as a result of three loosely related tactical decisions. First, on 14 September, General Montegomery requested that the QRF, which had pursued its own limited attempts to capture Aidid before the arrival of General Garrison, be provided a number of M-1 tanks and M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles to give his force of HMMWVs and light trucks a "barrier breaking" capability. This request was denied by administrators in the office of the Secretary of Defense who
were more concerned with disengaging the QRF from Somalia and reducing UNOSOM's reliance on the force. In the failed 3 October raid, the lack of U.S. armor forced Task Force Ranger to call for Pakistani armored forces to belatedly rescue encircled and embattled U.S. soldiers.

General Garrison's request for AC-130 gunships prior to the 3 October raid was similarly denied by General Hoar on the advisement of Mr. Wisner, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. General Garrison desired to have the gunships as a means to intimidate the Somalis, not necessarily as a fire support platform for future raids. General Hoar believed that the task force helicopters provided sufficient firepower for a raid force and that the gunships would serve only to enlarge the U.S. presence in Somalia, not to mention increasing the danger of inadvertent collateral casualties if they were in fact used.

Lastly, the tactical decision to "go to the well" one more time with the basic plan of inserting the raid force by helicopter, extracting the force through a link up with a ground convoy of armored HMMWVs, and maintaining a reserve drawn from the QRF's motorized forces assumed that the SNA did not have the capability to counter what was now a familiar sequence of events. The SNA did in fact have a plan to counter a possible raid on Aidid's staff meeting at the old Olympic Hotel in the middle of SNA controlled Bakara Market. The plan included the use barrage fire with rocket propelled grenades to neutralize loitering helicopters, the encirclement of the raid force using the sheer weight of numbers to offset U.S. superior firepower, and the ambush and barricade of any attempts to reinforce encircled forces. The SNA capability to
execute this plan with devastating success was demonstrated on 3 October.

Given this sequence of events, two of the three major operational assumptions were no longer valid and the third was highly suspect prior to 3 October. Figure 4 summarizes the adverse influence of the lack of HUMINT sources, the publicity associated with repeated failures, and the various tactical decisions on these assumptions.

The peace operation in Somalia was also complicated by contradictory missions. The U.S. mission by the summer of 1993 had three divergent aims that were reconciled at different levels in the chain of command. General Garrison was tasked with the peace enforcement operation to capture Aidid. General Montgomery, conducting ongoing peacekeeping operations, attempted to maintain a positive posture vis a vis the Somali people at large given the sizable U.S. logistic effort that was ongoing outside Mogadishu. Inside Mogadishu, he had to reassure the Somali clans that had earlier been disarmed by the U.S. forces at the urging of the UN that the U.S. would continue to honor its commitment to protect them. Additionally, even before 3 October, as numerous innocent Somalis were being killed in the clashes between Aidid and UNOSOM the Mogadishu population was becoming increasingly hostile to UNOSOM forces. Meanwhile, General Hoar was being pressured to drawdown the U.S. combat presence, and both he and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Powell had expressed skepticism about General Garrison's mission from the onset.(64) The challenges of maintaining a balance between these objectives is shown graphically in Figure 5.
### VALIDITY OF OPERATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSUMPTION:</th>
<th>INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION</th>
<th>COVERT &amp; RAPID</th>
<th>FORCE SUFFICIENT IN ORGANIZATION &amp; TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EVENT</td>
<td>ADEQUATE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOSS OF HUMINT SOURCE</td>
<td>QUESTIONABLE</td>
<td>NO EFFECT</td>
<td>REDUCED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAILURE OF FIRST 4 RAIDS</td>
<td>INVALID</td>
<td>INVALID</td>
<td>REDUCED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTI AIR ROCKET USE &amp; FAILURE OF FIFTH RAID</td>
<td>INVALID</td>
<td>INVALID</td>
<td>QUESTIONABLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 OCT RAID</td>
<td>INVALID</td>
<td>INVALID</td>
<td>INVALID</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### FIGURE 4

#### DECISION - MISSION SUPPORT MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBJECTIVE:</th>
<th>CAPTURE AIDID</th>
<th>DRAWDOWN COMBAT PRESENCE</th>
<th>POSITIVE RELATIONS WITH SOMALI PEOPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEPLOY TASK FORCE RANGER</td>
<td>SUPPORTED</td>
<td>OBSTRUCTED</td>
<td>SUPPORTED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENY ARMOR SUPPORT TO QRF</td>
<td>INDIRECTLY OBSTRUCTED</td>
<td>SUPPORTED</td>
<td>SUPPORTED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENY AC-130 SUPPORT TO TF RANGER</td>
<td>INDIRECTLY OBSTRUCTED</td>
<td>SUPPORTED</td>
<td>SUPPORTED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTINUE MISSION AFTER INITIAL FAILURES</td>
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#### FIGURE 5
### RISK OF CULMINATION OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT MISSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTRIBUTING FACTORS:</th>
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<th>LENGTHY</th>
<th>CHANGING</th>
<th>LOSS OF</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEPLOY TASK</td>
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<td>NO EFFECT</td>
<td>NO EFFECT</td>
<td>REDUCE</td>
<td>INCREASE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORCE RANGER</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAILURE OF FIRST 4 RAIDS</td>
<td>INCREASE</td>
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<td>INCREASE</td>
<td>INCREASE</td>
<td>INCREASE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROCKET USE AGAINST RAID 5 &amp; FAILURE</td>
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<td>CULMINATE</td>
<td>CULMINATE</td>
<td>INCREASE</td>
<td>INCREASE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 OCT RAID</td>
<td>CULMINATE</td>
<td>CULMINATE</td>
<td>CULMINATE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**
1. Includes vulnerability to enemy assessment & reduction of friendly freedom of action
2. Includes delinkage of political & military objectives
3. In peace enforcement this would also include adding to an opponent's prestige

**Figure 6**
Organizational dynamics also contributed to the failure of the peace enforcement mission. Once the U.S. deployed Task Force Ranger to Somalia, national credibility was tied to mission success and success was defined by Aidid's capture. The failure of two, four, or five missions would be forgotten if the last mission was successful. No one appears to have designated a "limit of advance" that would have signaled when the military efforts to capture Aidid in terms of the "costs" of failure had surpassed the comparative diplomatic "benefit" of his capture. General Garrison, accordingly, had no alternative but continue his mission until informed to do otherwise. Lacking such guidance, the operation culminated even as the political leadership had decided not to risk further failure.

After the failure of the fifth raid, the administration reviewed its policy of using force to broker a peace in Somalia. The decision to cancel further U.S. attempts to arrest Aidid was made in a meeting between President Clinton and the UN Secretary General on 27 September.(65) This decision, however, was not instantly relayed to UNOSOM. The authority to launch a raid was vested in the on-scene commander General Garrison, without the need to consult with Washington. Secretary of State Christopher later expressed surprise that the raid had even occurred.(66) The President, when informed of the disaster, asked "Why did they launch the raid?"(67) The attempt to free the operational commander from micromanagement of unexpected contingencies in effect delinked the continuing military effort from the political objective. The situation was reminiscent of Clausewitz's caution regarding the contribution of "long lines of communication" to the culmination of victory.
The factors leading to culmination are contrasted with the tactical decisions made by the various commanders associated with the Somalia mission in Figure 6. A recognition of these factors during the operation may have prompted a reassessment of the peace enforcement effort at the operational or tactical level at an earlier juncture then late September or 3 October and avoided the defeat of U.S. political objectives in the region.

CONCLUSION

Among Clausewitz's maxims, two appear to predominate in peace operations. First is his admonition that one should never fight a war "without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."(68) Second is his testament that nothing is so central to planning a military campaign as the recognition that there exists a culminating point of victory for all military operations.(69) The dynamics of peace operations present a unique challenge to military commanders. If the prudent commander is to avoid the risk of defeat, a management of the factors leading to culmination and their linkage to operational assumptions should be the keystone of any planning effort. Recognizing the culminating point of victory provides an essential perspective on the necessary force structure, disposition, and tactics to assure mission success and to prompt their reappraisal at critical junctures that might otherwise be lost in the operational background noise.
As indicated by the two case studies, peace operations are conducted in dynamic environments where political and military decisions significantly affect the continuing validity of operational assumptions. As an adjunct to the diplomatic process, the military commander must balance his actions between military imperatives and political appearances. In Beirut and Somalia, the commanders appeared to rely on a largely subjective process that balanced tactical and operational decisions with the specified and implied missions of the force. This process, however, did not account for the broader implications of these decisions on the operational environment and basic planning assumptions. As a result, decisions were justified in only this limited perspective, while a broader view might have revealed unwarranted risks.

An analysis of what constitutes a culminating point of victory serves to capture the subjective nature of the decisionmaking process in a quantifiable manner. This broader framework facilitates the recognition and management of operational risks. Specifically, such an analysis should address the following four considerations. First, in addition to the traditional definition of "desired endstate," planners should also consider what constitutes "victory" and, with this perspective, identify what operational assumptions underlay mission success. Second, indicators of the invalidity of operational assumptions need to be defined. The intelligence collection effort must later focus on these indicators. Third, as courses of action are developed by the planner or decisions made by the commander, the probable impact of friendly actions on the criteria leading to culmination need to be considered. Fourth, as the operation progresses, reassessment of operational assumptions and culmination factors needs to
be an institutionalized procedure to accommodate the inevitable mission modifications mandated by both the diplomatic efforts and the very nature of the operational environment.

By recognizing the existence of a culminating point of victory and then using this concept as a method of risk management, a commander/planner is better equipped to balance the military mission with the diplomatic effort. No operational environment remains static and the military role in a peace operation undergoes gradual or abrupt adjustments as the operation matures in a manner now popularly referred to as "mission creep." As the balances required of the military commander shift, a quantitative analysis of the new mission and subsequent decisions and events from the perspective of culmination may serve to avoid future defeats in peace operations.
ENDNOTES

a. Certificate of Birth, Zanesville City Hospital, Ohio (Feb '55)


2. Ibid., p 570.

3. Ibid., pp 568-569.


5. Ibid., p 277.


15. Ibid., p 36.

16. 32d Marine Amphibious Unit, "After Action report For Beirut, Lebanon Operation,
29 Sep - 1 Nov 82," (12 November 1982), Section III.


22. Hammel, op. cit., 421-425


25. Ibid.

26. Ibid. p 29.


29. Hammel, op. cit., p 5


32. Ibid.

33. Hammel, p. 82.

34. 22d Marine Amphibious Unit, "Situation Report Number 21" (24 April 1983).


36. Long, op. cit., p 42.

37. Ibid., p 74.


40. Long, op. cit., p 42.

41. Ibid., p 41.


43. Ibid., Chapter XI "Transition Of Roles and Functions," p 2.

44. Ibid.

45. J. R. Bolton, "Wrong Turn In Somalia," *Foreign Affairs* (Jan/Feb 49), p 58.

46. Ibid.

47. JULLS, op. cit. Chapter XI, p 3.


49. Ibid., p 62.

50. Ibid. The size of the Brigade differs from that reported by Louise Lief & Bruce Austerin, "What Went Wrong In Somalia?" *U.S. News And World Report* (18 October 1993), p 36. The size of 1,700 quoted by Lief is more plausible.


53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.


57. Steven A. Holmes, U.S. Envoys Says Crackdown Strengthened Aidid's Faction,


60. Lief et al, op. cit., p 36.


64. Holmes, op. cit.


68. Clausewitz, op. cit., p 579.

69. Ibid. p 566.
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