The U.S. National Security Council Partnership and Action Plan for Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa states that its objective is to "repress piracy off the Horn of Africa in the interest of the global economy, freedom of navigation, Somalia, and the regional states." This paper describes the extent of the problem and how it emerged, as well as the military structure, civilian initiatives, policies and guidance directed at this problem. The paper then analyzes the effectiveness of the current initiatives and draws conclusions for how the effort should be resourced, supported, organized, and directed. Finally, it provides recommendations for how to enact the proposed plan.
PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA:  
WHAT IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE METHOD OF REPRESSION?

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

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Abstract

The U.S. National Security Council Partnership and Action Plan for Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa states that its objective is to, “repress piracy off the Horn of Africa in the interest of the global economy, freedom of navigation, Somalia, and the regional states.” This paper describes the extent of the problem and how it emerged, as well as the military structure, civilian initiatives, policies and guidance directed at this problem. The paper then analyzes the effectiveness of the current initiatives and draws conclusions for how the effort should be resourced, supported, organized, and directed. Finally, it provides recommendations for how to enact the proposed plan.
INTRODUCTION

The U. S. National Security Council Partnership and Action Plan for Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa states that its objective is to “repress piracy off the Horn of Africa in the interest of global economy, freedom of navigation, Somalia, and the regional states.” Accordingly, and although there are other piracy-infested areas of the world, this paper addresses primarily the Horn of Africa (HOA) because, “…the Gulf of Aden and east coast of Somalia rank as the number one piracy hotspot with 63 incidents reported, accounting for almost a third of the overall reported attacks” in 2008. Further, the number of incidents reported during the previous year contributes to a significantly rising trend from 2004 to 2008 as reported by the International Maritime Bureau. Most recently, the April 2009 kidnap and subsequent rescue of the captain of the American-flagged freighter MAERSK-ALABAMA, along with U.S. President Barack Obama’s pledge to quell such illegal maritime activities, seemingly has sparked an escalation of piracy acts in this region.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982, Article 101, defines piracy as:

a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
   i. on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
   ii. against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft.

Although the UNCLOS definition speaks only of piracy in international waters, this paper treats such acts in territorial waters as part of the definition because pirates often sail into those territorial waters governed by more permissive state laws or less capable law enforcement.
Piracy is commonly seen as a local rather than international problem. However, in affected states, the conditions that facilitate piracy and organized pirate networks generally contribute to the architecture of criminal activities, funding other crimes and weakening legitimate political entities. This in turn offers great opportunity for maritime terrorism and thus influences international security.7 “Further, such attacks undermine confidence in global sea lines of communication, weaken or undermine the legitimacy of States, threaten the legitimate revenue and resources essential to the building of Somalia, cause a rise in maritime insurance rates and cargo costs, increase the risk of environmental damage, and endanger the lives of seafarers who may be injured, killed or taken hostage for ransoms.”8 Unfortunately, most current measures focus only upon the maritime aspect of piracy, without addressing enablers that exist on land. Accordingly, this paper combines operational art principles and effective practices from other geographic areas to argue that the most effective method of repression is to execute a comprehensive combined operational plan that relies on multinational maritime and land components, with exceptional cooperation, to achieve unity of effort.

Historical background and the pirates’ modern operational scheme will be used to describe the problem. Next, operational art factors and functions will be used to assess the effectiveness of current initiatives. Finally, conclusions and recommendations will be made to correct the identified shortfalls, using existing models and best practices when available.

BACKGROUND

Written history records piracy as early as 4,000 years ago, but pirates were nearly eliminated by the 1900s due to the systematic efforts of law-abiding seafaring nations. Modern piracy emerged in the 1970s with a steady rise in the number of attacks.9 Certain criteria have
contributed to this resurgence: legal and jurisdictional weakness, favorable geography, conflict and disorder, inadequate law enforcement and security, permissive political environment, cultural acceptance, and the promise of reward.\textsuperscript{10} Somalia meets these criteria because the piracy problem there began in earnest following dictator Muhammed Siad Barre’s overthrow by warlords in the early 1990s. Order was briefly restored when the multinational Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) established control and shut down pirate bases in May-June 2006. However, the UIC was ejected by Ethiopian military intervention, and has since splintered into the insurgent Al Shabaab movement and another group that has retained the name Islamic Courts.

Al Shabaab reportedly is arming pirates in return for a share of ransom payments, as well as training and cooperating with them to smuggle weapons, supplies, and foreign jihadists, and to develop an Al Shabaab maritime capability.\textsuperscript{11} Somalia’s existing Transitional Federal Government (TFG) lacks the capability to patrol, interdict, or prosecute pirates to improve maritime security off the Somali coast.\textsuperscript{12} In the years since the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime, “... foreign fishing trawlers have increasingly encroached on Somali waters, decimating the local fishing industry and spawning the plague of piracy to ‘defend’ Somali waters (one pirate group even calls itself the coast guard).”\textsuperscript{13} “The pirates say they are fighting illegal fishing and dumping of toxic waste in Somali waters but have come to operate hundreds of miles from there in a sprawling 1.1 million square-mile danger zone.”\textsuperscript{14}

Today, “... piracy off the Horn of Africa is growing in frequency, range, aggression, and severity at an alarming rate.”\textsuperscript{15} According to the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau (ICC-IMB), actual and attempted piracy acts off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden have risen from six to 63 reported incidents between 2004 and 2008. After a lull in activity due to rough seas in January and February 2009, attacks again
spiked upward in March 2009. Further, reported piracy is considered to be a low-end estimate because many incidents are not reported. Specifically, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT) map of the region for 2008 compiles data from the IMB and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), totaling 115 attacks off the Somali coast in 2008.

Pirate boats are equipped with outboard motors and can travel at speeds in excess of 30 knots. These small, fast boats are sometimes launched from “mother ships,” normally fishing trawlers or dhows, to conduct attacks several hundred miles from shore. Although one such event reportedly occurred 900 miles from land, the norm is approximately 400 miles. Many attacks are conducted by darkened boats at night, or in the daytime against vessels traveling slowly (less than 15 knots) by blue-white colored boats that are difficult to see in the reflection off the water. “The majority of arms used by the pirates are Kalashnikov rifles, pistols, PK machine guns, DShK heavy machine guns and RPG-2/7 launchers.” Additionally, the pirates know when and where to attack ships through the use of sophisticated GPS and AIS (Automated Information Systems) capabilities, the same systems that vessels use to send out location, cargo, and other amplifying data to friendly entities.

In addition to the security implications, “piracy…has a direct economic impact in terms of fraud, stolen cargos, delayed trips and higher insurance premiums.” “The Gulf of Aden…is one of the busiest shipping choke points in the world. An average of 50 commercial vessels... [and] more than 3.3 million barrels of oil pass through the Gulf of Aden every day. This represents 4% of the world’s total daily production and 12% of all the oil transported by water daily around the world by sea.” The costs of transiting this area have risen sharply due to piracy. From 2007 to 2008, the cost of insuring a container has risen from $900 to $9000, and
insurance premiums have increased $10,000 to $20,000 per trip since Lloyd’s of London declared the area a “war-risk” zone. Ransom demands for ships captured by pirates range from $500,000 to $2 million. Ships could avoid the Suez Canal and transit the Cape of Good Hope, but this would increase transit time by approximately two weeks. As of June 2008, the insurance policyholder’s surplus was about $505 billion, with vessel and war risk premiums of approximately $350 million, and $833 million in total cargo premiums in 2007. Insurance companies have such a vast pool of available funds that they seem to have accepted the rising threats and costs.

While piracy occurs at sea, its roots begin on land. “Pirate groups are among the few organisations in Somalia to cut across clan lines. Rather than being a clan-based activity, pirate groups ensure that their members are representative of the most important clans living along the coastline, enabling them to operate all along the littoral zone.” The pirates operate from shore bases in the towns of Caluula, Eyl, Hobyo and Haradheere, and the Kismaayo region (see map below). The Haradheere and Kismaayo groups in particular are allegedly strengthening their ties with Al Shabaab and foreign nationals. These loose alliances improve the pirates’ financial prospects through the afore-mentioned arms trafficking, as well as providing combat training. The pirates are reported to have paid approximately $1 million for conventional combat training from Al Shabaab and enhanced training from Bangladeshi, Yemeni, Indonesian, and Iraqi nationals. The combined program consisted of approximately 45 days of “specific training in combat techniques, communication, tactics and intelligence gathering” followed by training in Haradheere, where 14 training speed boats are available.

In addition to a formal training program, the Haradheere and Kismaayo bases are relatively well-organized: the Kismaayo group includes security and attack units operating on
approximately 15-hour shifts; the Haradheere group includes boarding units, negotiating units, planning units (including foreign nationals), and former fishermen with extensive seafaring knowledge. The Kismaayo group has day-to-day operational freedom, but “defers to pirate groups operating in the Harardheere and the Hobyo area for overall operational guidance and logistics, including money, weapons and skiffs. [They] identified themselves to Jane’s as a subsidiary of the pirate groups operating in the Harardheere and Hobyo area.” -- thus, rather than operating as individual mercenary groups, the pirates in this region actually comprise a system of land and sea components that share common training, equipment, and services.  

![Map of Somalia](image-url)
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) “…was developed to ensure … appropriate action against persons committing unlawful acts against ships…[including] the seizure of ships by force; acts of violence against persons on board ships…[International Maritime Organization] IMO can only urge the implementation of these conventions and rely on the efficacy of flag and port state control.”

Somalia is considered a failed state and there is no local law enforcement. The immediate surrounding regions are equally unstable and financially disadvantaged with no means to assist Somalia’s maritime security efforts. Further, Somalia is not capable of protecting its waters from piracy or any other criminal activities, such as poaching and toxic waste dumping that necessitate piracy as an economic solution.

Until recently, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (USNC), under its multinational title “Combined Maritime Forces” (CMF), used existing Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 to patrol and respond to acts of piracy off the Horn of Africa. The Combined Maritime Force includes some 36 ships from Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Pakistan, Canada, Denmark, United States, and United Kingdom, and patrols more than 2.5 million square miles of international waters, with a purpose that does include preventing piracy. However, CTF 150 was established at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom (2001) to conduct Maritime Security Operations (MSO) in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Its purpose is to improve maritime security and “complement the counterterrorism and security efforts of regional nations and seek to disrupt violent extremists’ use of the maritime environment as a venue for attack or to transport personnel, weapons or other material.” When piracy incidents began spiking in late 2008, CTF 150 in conjunction with the IMO worked to
move shipping lanes further from territorial waters into a smaller maritime operational region, the Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA), followed by creation of a new task force:

The MSPA is effectively a coalition of navies that choose when and how they want to participate. Still, Vice Admiral Gortney [Commander, USNC] maintains that “by naming it this way, [navies] have enough flexibility to operate along these lines, as officers in the theatre know how to collaborate.” To lessen the ambiguities about operational mandate, a combined coalition task force, CTF-151, was created in January 2009. It has a counter-piracy mandate, making it easier for states to participate, given CTF-150's narrow counter-terrorist focus.  

CTF 151 includes 14 different navies and 12 to 14 ships patrolling, but merchant ship probability of being hijacked by pirates is still slightly more than one in ten. Even the narrowed MPSA is a 1.1 million square mile area that would require 66 ships to monitor it effectively. Thus, in terms of operational factors space and force, a vast space is being patrolled by an insufficient force. Better economy of effort could be achieved by directing lethal and non-lethal operational fires at the pirate bases on land, as opposed to spreading resources across the exponentially larger maritime domain.

Aside from the countries represented in TF 151, other navies (including Russia, Canada, Japan, China, and European Union members) conduct anti-piracy patrols in the region. Given the size of the area to be patrolled, even this volume of ships is insufficient and brings its own unique concerns. For example, potential exists for an Al Shabaab terrorist attack (similar to USS COLE) to occur in the littorals. Al Shabaab has been labeled a terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State, linked to al-Qaeda, and designated by Osama bin Laden as the southwestern first line of defense for the Islamic world. Assembly of an uncoordinated international fleet patrolling the Gulf of Aden does present a terrorist opportunity. A second concern is the risk of incident due to ships operating in close proximity with different rules of engagement. “To cover a vast, remote area of operations quickly, efficiently, and in the absence
of host nation support, coordination between the forces is vital. With separate command structures, duplications and even contradictions are unavoidable, likely at the expense of an efficient, cohesive anti-piracy effort. Due to lack of unity of command, these precious military resources are not achieving maximum effectiveness.

The multinational maritime patrols only address piracy symptoms. On land, USAFRICOM’s military-to-military programs and assistance to building a long-term security capability may eventually help correct piracy root causes, but they do not provide immediate, direct action to combat piracy; other actions could be taken to correct piracy root causes in the near term. Nor should AFRICOM be the lead organization for interagency integration.

According to National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, the United States has a vested interest in regions of civil conflict and the U.S. Department of State should lead the stabilization efforts. These efforts include foreign and economic assistance, as well as coordination among military operations, foreign countries, international/regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities in such regions. Interagency cooperation and partnership is extremely limited in this region. The U.S. military efforts in the Horn of Africa (TF 150, TF 151, and AFRICOM) appear to be performing the majority of the Department of State functions specified by NSPD-44. However, there is a lack of unity of effort between the on-going military efforts in the region and other U.S. government agencies.

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1846 specifically directs shipping and insurance companies, sovereign states, and the IMO to provide guidance (best practices) on avoiding and defending against attack. These best practices include a review of the ship’s security plan (SSP), crew briefing and drills regarding emergency measures, an emergency communication plan, additional security watches, group transits, transits as far from territorial
waters as possible, daytime transits through high-risk regions, as well as myriad practices in the event that an attack occurs. It is noteworthy, however, that commercial shipping compliance with best practices is not mandatory. Thus, in terms of protection for commercial shipping, efforts are being made by military organizations to ensure safe transit, but the industry itself often does not take measures to ensure its own safety.

Shipping best practices also discuss pre-voyage planning, to include providing transit information to the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) and liaison with the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) office in Dubai, so they may track ship movements and plan appropriate protection. MSCHOA is the European Union (EU) forces’ planning and coordination authority. UKMTO is a voluntary reporting system that operates in support of UK Royal Navy interests in the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and Arabian Gulf. While UKMTO and MSCHOA are worthwhile initiatives for shared information, they do not provide a secure, comprehensive global network of information shared among all involved commercial and governmental organizations. Thus, lack of shared intelligence inhibits aid from friendly military forces, as well the avoidance of piracy threats.

There are also legal restraints inhibiting an aggressive anti-piracy posture. These restraints include restrictions on pursuit of pirates and insufficient legal framework to prosecute or incarcerate pirates once they are captured or detained. UNSCR 1816 authorized entry into Somali territorial waters to pursue pirates and UNSCR 1846 reiterated the authorization to enter territorial waters when cooperating with the TFG to fight piracy, adding a directive to use any means necessary, consistent with international law, to repress piracy. However, these resolutions are only valid for 6-month and 12-month periods, respectively.
Even if pirates are captured, it is difficult to determine which state should prosecute their crimes and where they should be incarcerated if convicted. Often, ships attacked by pirates are registered in one state, owned and operated by crews from different states, contain cargo from multiple states, and the pirates captured by a warship from yet another state.\(^{45}\) During 2008, many countries simply released Somali pirates after capturing them because of such convoluted difficulties.\(^{46}\) The legal entanglements associated with Horn of Africa piracy have curtailed friendly maneuvers, including pursuit, capture, and prosecution.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Piracy off the Horn of Africa is a multi-faceted problem. The historical background shows that roots of this problem begin on land. The lack of stable government in the region allows lawlessness, and the severely depressed economy provides the impetus for piracy as a means of financial relief. Further, Somalia does not have the means to provide for its own protection even inside territorial waters.

In terms of factors space and force, the vastness of the affected maritime area makes it nearly impossible for resource-stretched, multinational navies alone to patrol, deter, and interdict pirates effectively. These scarce military resources are not achieving maximum effectiveness due to lack of the unity of command necessary to make best use of the ships. There is also a lack of unity of effort among the on-going military efforts in the region, other U.S. government agencies, and the international community.

In terms of protection for commercial shipping, effort is being made by military organizations, but the shipping industry itself often does not take the necessary measures to ensure safety of its vessels. As the victim of piracy, the international shipping community could
better posture itself to reduce vulnerabilities. Finally, the legal entanglements associated with Horn of Africa piracy have curtailed friendly maneuvers, including pursuit, capture, and prosecution.

The National Security Council’s Partnership and Action Plan for Countering Horn of Africa Piracy states that maritime success is dependent upon powerful coalition partnerships along three lines of action. These lines of action are to prevent attacks by reducing maritime vulnerability to piracy; interrupting/terminating attacks consistent with international, coastal, and flag state laws, rights, and responsibilities; and to ensure accountability for those who commit acts of piracy. Within these lines of operation are five key principles for implementation – improving operational intelligence; strengthening legal frameworks for trial and detention; disrupting financial networks; improving commercial self defense measures; and expanding diplomatic and public support to discourage piracy. The conceptual solution already exists, but the execution could be improved. The following paragraphs provide recommendations to address the problems previously discussed and to fulfill the strategic guidance in this plan.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

Although Somalia’s lack of stable government may not be fixed in the short term, there are actions that may be taken to address the piracy problem on land. First, coastal pirate bases should be disrupted by coalition military forces in concert with other government agencies. Special operations forces could be used to gather intelligence and employ operational fires to attack bases directly, setting conditions for follow-up conventional forces. Simultaneously with lethal fires, non-kinetic fires may be applied against the pirate financial network. For example, USSOCOM currently works with U.S. Geographic Combatant Commanders, the Combat Support Agencies, interagency partners (Department of Treasury, State, Federal Bureau
of Investigations, Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement), private sector representatives, and other nations to disrupt terrorist financial networks.\textsuperscript{49} This existing interagency model could be employed against the al Shabaab and piracy networks in Somalia. Then, once coalition military forces have disrupted pirate bases, a U.N. peacekeeping force should be established to expand and better train the local police force, along with improving overall quality of life through improved roads, schools, and hospitals. The three “most improved” countries on the 2008 Failed States Index all had a U.N. peacekeeping force assigned.\textsuperscript{50}

The U.S. State Department should integrate with U.N. efforts by helping Somalia establish a law enforcement agency to patrol its coastal waters to interdict pirates, deter toxic waste dumping, and prevent illegal fishing. This law enforcement agency could be partly funded by international military education and training funds (under Section 1206 and 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, and Combatant Commander Initiative Funds). These funds could be used for equipment, information sharing technologies, and training.\textsuperscript{51} The international community could also provide funds and personnel for training and equipment. This approach is successfully exemplified by the Yemeni Coast Guard. It has an anti-piracy unit actively engaged in the Gulf of Aden, patrolling in refurbished boats previously operated by the U.S. Coast Guard.\textsuperscript{52} In Somalia, the direct effect of such a national maritime security agency would be to provide protection for its waters; the effects on land would be economic stimulus due to legal fishing, and jobs and industry related to equipment and maintenance for the newly founded agency (as well as the expanded U.N. trained police force).

While conditions are being set on land, a multinational maritime patrolling force would still be required. The first requirement for the maritime effort is to establish unity of command.
The current CTF 151 organization, the European Union, and other patrolling navies should be subsumed under a single combined joint task force (CJTF). To expand the legal capabilities of the task force, USCG, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), or similar law enforcement personnel could be deployed with U.S. Navy ships to provide the legal expertise and authorization on individual vessels conducting anti-piracy operations. This CJTF should coordinate with the Somali maritime law enforcement agency proposed above to detect and interdict any pirates that are not stopped before they leave territorial waters. And, due to the vast amount of water space being patrolled, CJTF member nations should contribute maritime patrol aircraft to supplement patrolling ships.

In addition to the efforts made by the military and government organizations, the commercial shipping community should also improve its anti-piracy posture. Although the financial burdens of ransom are not (yet) onerous, shipping and insurance companies have a vested interest in building peace in Somalia rather than just paying ransoms. Because piracy is a lucrative business, the commercial shipping industry should help staunch these criminal acts by lessening the likelihood and profitability of attacks in the Horn of Africa. The IMO is the current lead and natural choice to spearhead efforts within the shipping industry. In terms of protection, the IMO should lobby insurance companies to impose significant premium increases for those companies who are not compliant with shipping best practices related to protection and security. Additionally, the IMO could expand its International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, which outlines security procedures for ports and vessels above 500 tons, to include protective measures to make ships less vulnerable to attack. The existing ISPS Code allows authorities at ports of destination to deny entry to vessels who do not meet its requirements.
The costs associated with denied entry and delays may provide the shipping industry significant motivation for compliance.

In terms of intelligence, a regional cooperation with a central information network should be established. Shared information is a key enabler to maritime security and, because threats often cross regional boundaries, information should be shared as widely as possible. The Regional Co-operation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (RECAAP) enacted in November 2004 by 16 countries in Asia -- which includes an Information Sharing Centre (ISC) for continuous, real-time piracy-related information -- is a good model. There has been a significant reduction in piracy acts in Singapore and the Straits of Malacca since RECAAP-ISC inception. Although still awaiting signature, the Djibouti Code of Conduct has a similar charter. Its resolutions include a code of conduct addressing cooperative law enforcement for repression of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean, technical cooperation to include focal points for piracy and information sharing, and a regional training center. Because Somalia is financially and technologically unable to develop and staff this network, the majority of original resources should come from the more financially solvent and maritime capable signatories such as France, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the Seychelles.

In terms of legal framework, the U.N. should expand existing resolutions to remove the 6- and 12-month time limits on entry into Somali territorial waters in pursuit of pirates, and should strengthen and expand the resolutions for pursuit of pirates on land (to include the previously mentioned peacekeeping force). It should also update those resolutions with stronger language compelling the international community to commit resources to both the land and sea efforts.
Additionally, bilateral agreements should be made regarding prosecution and detention of pirates. Both the United States and United Kingdom have signed agreements with Kenya that allow transfer of captured pirates to Mombasa for prosecution. Additional agreements with other regional states should be made to accept and try pirates. These agreements could be integrated within the framework of the Dijibouti Code of Conduct, linking maritime information sharing to real-time reporting and coordination if pirates are captured.

A comprehensive combined operational plan should be executed to suppress piracy effectively off the Horn of Africa. This plan would rely on multinational maritime and land components, with exceptional cooperation, to achieve unity of effort. The current anti-piracy effort is too narrowly maritime-focused, lacks unity of command and effort, and does not include sufficient cooperation with civilian agencies, the shipping community, and contributions from other nations. The plan proposed in this paper addresses these issues, but acknowledges that a significant long-term commitment may be required. The international community, to include commercial shipping organizations, may not be compelled to take additional action until the problem has a more direct economic impact. For the United States, it would require re-allocation of current military and civilian assets, as well as budgetary adjustments. With the current U.S. level of involvement in multiple theaters, Horn of Africa piracy may not receive the desired resources until it has a more direct impact on national security and military strategy goals.
NOTES


3 *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships*, 6.


7 Murphy, 44.


10 Murphy, 13.


14 Kennedy.


16 *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships*, 6.


26 King, 2.

27 “Piracy's rising tide - Somali piracy develops and diversifies.”


30 “Piracy's rising tide - Somali piracy develops and diversifies.”

31 Ibid.


35 Ibid.


41 Ibid.


53 Maritime Security Partnerships: Committee on the “1,000-Ship Navy,” 49.


55 Chalk, 39.

56 Maritime Security Partnerships: Committee on the “1,000-Ship Navy,” 53.


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