

## **RAPID URBAN SETTLEMENT, VIOLENCE, AND THE DEMOCRATIZING STATE: TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING?**

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### **OVERVIEW**

As one travels the streets of Metro Manila, there's that sensorial assault so familiar in the crowded and impoverished districts of large urban areas around the world: smells from cooking and rot, noise from perilous vehicles wending their ways through choked and chaotic streets, and structures cobbled together so haphazardly it is difficult to believe that anyone lives within them.

The movement of, quite literally, masses of people from rural areas to urban ones is hardly an unnoticed phenomenon in the past decade, but what has changed markedly is the rise in political violence targeting urban centers.

Despite the rapid growth in other cities in Asia, most notably in China and India, Metro Manila remains a unique example of a mega-city in the Asia-Pacific region. When one thinks of Manila, it is more useful to think not of one well-defined urban core, but rather a series of ill-defined areas spanning twelve cities and five municipalities—a combined area of about 636 square kilometers. Poverty reigns for a majority of Metro Manila's residents, casting the pallor of despair over the entire city. A family of six residing in Metro Manila should earn about \$350 per month—the current poverty threshold—but instead about 60 percent of the residents earn less.

Through the lens of Metro Manila and its contemporary experiences, this study explores the security implications of rapid urbanization as an enabler of political violence. Is there a definitive link between urban growth and the level of violence, particularly political violence? It appears that cities tend to have materially higher crime rates than rural areas.

By examining the realm of ungoverned spaces within emergent mega-cities, violent actors, especially terrorists, and the impact from and to political liberalization, the author hopes to provide some insights into whether rapid urbanization enables all forms of extra-legal behavior—particularly political violence and terrorism. Certainly, studying urbanization and its socio-economic impact is hardly new, but the twinned aspects of an increasingly hyper-urban growth in many parts of the developing world and the heightened interest in the rise of political violence make this an increasingly relevant topic.

### **BACKGROUND: AN URBAN EXPLOSION**

Developing theoretical and policy frameworks on the security implications of rapid urbanization coincides with the expected boom in the expansion of an urbanized population. In 1950, for instance, New York City was the only city in the world with a population of more than

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10 million. In 2015, there will be twenty-one, and urban areas with populations between 5 and 10 million will increase from seven to thirty-seven, with most of the growth occurring in the developing world.<sup>1</sup> The connection between deficient social capacity and political violence is an understudied area that promises to yield real and substantive policy benefits not only for the law enforcement and security communities, but also for development efforts.

The trend of mass migrations into urban areas around the globe at end of the twentieth century continues relatively unabated. Swelled by internal growth and a rapid influx of rural migrants, population rates in most urban areas in developing states have grown tremendously and will continue to do so in the coming years. These migrants fill the shantytowns and slums surrounding, and oftentimes within, the major urban centers.<sup>2</sup> Lacking the resources necessary to adequately develop urban infrastructures, these disaggregated urbanized centers can quickly morph into hubs without social services and traditional social interactions.

Of all the problems stemming from rapid urbanization, none is as critical as finding adequate housing. With the populations of many metropolitan areas doubling every ten to twenty years, it is highly unlikely that private developers and public housing will be able to meet the demand. Lacking housing options in the private and public spheres, migrants crowd into existing slums or squatter settlements—“spontaneous housing.”<sup>3</sup>

These undeveloped areas are not accessible by social services associated with urbanized environments in the developed world—public protection by police, fire, and health responders, school systems, and public utilities. Moreover, the influx of migrants creates anonymity that is not found in traditional, rural environments. These two factors—lack of social capital and anonymity—create conditions in which violent actors have not only a place to plan for and from which to launch political violence, but also, most likely, a safe haven to which they can return. Using the case study methodology, this study focuses on the security consequences of rapid urbanization in Metro Manila, the Philippines.<sup>4</sup>

## **UNCERTAIN DEMOCRATIZATION AND VIOLENCE**

Consistent with Huntington’s initial observation of the emergent “third wave” of liberalizing states, a great majority of the world’s countries now consider themselves at least partially democratic—or at least not strictly authoritarian. It is within this context that so many of the states find themselves on an uneasy middle ground—short of democratic consolidation, yet facing myriad social concerns stemming, in many cases, from the very processes of democratization. It is difficult to define democracy such that there is one central concept that is

durable over time and across a range of social conditions.<sup>5</sup> Even so, guarantees of personal and political freedoms, elections as a mechanism to change power within the state, popular accountability for officials, and competing sources of information are some consistent principles in many recent discussions on democracy. Similar to democracy, the concept of democratization is subject to wide and varied meanings, with little agreement as to when a state is democratizing. The very word connotes momentum toward eventual consolidation of democracy, even in the face of an empirical record that shows many, if not most, of the liberalizing states that appeared in the 1990s and early 2000s are stalling or regressing politically.

Ensuring security in a world increasingly characterized by insecurity ranks at the top of the competing concerns in the states that have been transitioning from authoritarianism toward democracy in the past fifteen years. These concerns are most acute in the developing world, since most of the “easy cases” of democratization have already occurred.<sup>6</sup> Buffeted by poverty, low levels of education, little societal cohesion, a lack of experience in democratic governance, and elites with a dubious commitment to political liberalization, the democratizing world faces the dual challenge of maintaining strict and powerful state institutions while simultaneously loosening societal and institutional constraints. In providing security to its populace, the three most problematic factors are rapid urban growth related to extreme poverty, weak state institutions, and endemic corruption. So, the major question that this paper addresses is, “Are democratizing states more prone to political violence than consolidated democracies?” The most likely answer is that they are.

## **POLITICAL VIOLENCE**

Many have noted that all political orders naturally rest on violence that has a “real” or “ultimate” purpose of containing the violent capacity of others.<sup>7</sup> Democracies, of course, are no exception. And, democratizing states that have yet to develop more publicly accountable mechanisms to control official violence are particularly prone to violent responses—especially when facing internal turmoil.<sup>8</sup> There is little within the literature to affirm conclusively that there are certain, necessary preconditions to democracy. But, there is some agreement that there are minimum requirements in order for democracy to flourish.<sup>9</sup>

For political liberalization to succeed, a degree of freedom from violence in both the societal and political realms is required. Arguably, the presence of—or even the perception of—a politically-motivated actor employing violence to disrupt institutional processes hinders political liberalization.<sup>10</sup> Renewed interest in the impact of internal violence is wholly appropriate to the

post-Cold War context. Continued involvement in peacekeeping and the promotion of democratic institutions—especially security sector reform—as central pillars in the foreign policies of many developed states, as well as rising non-state, international terrorism and its efforts to recruit disaffected youth in rising poor, urban populations are all internal issues that will need to be addressed by the states—even if it is through violence.<sup>11</sup>

States must indeed deal with “ordinary” violence ranging from thugs who terrorize residents of housing blocs in urbanized areas to violent actors with political overtones. Though governments themselves may be horribly violent, the concept of terrorism is limited to violence by non-governmental actors who primarily have a political aim with a collective interest beyond the personal interests of the participants and the planners.<sup>12</sup> In addition to being premeditated, terrorist violence is almost always clandestine. The actors typically work in secret and plan for an element of surprise. It is this latter, unique feature that forces specialization of police responses. Police must identify and recruit sources to penetrate the veil of secrecy and employ sophisticated surveillance and monitoring technologies. However, the very systemic and institutional factors that hobble further democratization hinder these specialized police forces as well.

### **URBANIZATION AND VIOLENCE**

Is there a definitive link between urban growth and the level of violence, particularly political violence? It appears that cities tend to have materially higher crime rates than rural areas. One global report suggests that sixty percent of urban dwellers in cities with 100,000 or more are victims of some form of crime.<sup>13</sup> Vanderschueren argues that there is a definitive link between the two phenomena, though there are significant inter-city variances, based in large part on regional differences. For example, developing countries and those in Eastern Europe have experienced an increase in both petty and violent crime, while Western European states saw little growth in violent crime. Whether or not there is a solid connection, certain specialists have stressed the importance of overcrowded and impoverished urban settlements in the creation of a sub-culture of violence and crime.<sup>14</sup> However, studies to date, particularly those that compare different political systems, have little evidence to support a similar connection between political violence and urbanization.<sup>15</sup>

Based on this review of significant theoretical ground, it is clear that interesting results and perspectives come from the combination of democratization, urbanization, and the state’s ability to respond to these phenomena—as well as from the effects of political violence,

particularly those related to police and security agencies. Metro Manila, the Philippines is an illustrative case of their intermingling.

### **THE CONTEXT: METRO MANILA**

Despite the rapid growth in other cities in Asia, most notably in China and India, Metro Manila remains a unique example of a mega-city in the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>16</sup> When one thinks of Manila, it is more useful to think not of one well-defined urban core, but rather a series of ill-defined areas spanning twelve cities and five municipalities—a combined area of about 636 square kilometers (km<sup>2</sup>). Also known as the National Capital Region, official estimates from 2000 place the urban population at about 9.9 million, although the daytime population may swell up to 13 million or even higher.<sup>17</sup> Poverty reigns for a majority of Metro Manila's residents, casting the pallor of despair over the entire city. A family of six residing in Metro Manila should earn about \$350 per month—the current poverty threshold—but instead about 60 percent of the residents earn less.<sup>18</sup>


In addition to a myriad of natural hazards not discussed, other factors combine to make Metro Manila increasingly vulnerable to environmental and social forces—a rapidly increasing population and large transient population, the concentration of industry and economic activities, an increasing number of squatters and slum dwellers, increasing environmental degradation, a low level of hazard and risk awareness and preparedness, and inadequate facilities and planning for emergency responses.<sup>19</sup>

Metro Manila typifies the reality for many developing states in that there are pockets of extreme wealth surrounded by miles of urban detritus, the most depressing of which are the urban settlements that dot the landscape. Spontaneous settlements are found throughout Metro Manila and are not easily segregated from other urban areas.<sup>20</sup> Settlements are located quite literally in any available open space, from the grounds of the national university to garbage dumps and farm fields further from the central urban area.

On occasion, these settlements are repeatedly destroyed so that their inhabitants are compelled to leave permanently. But, this seems to be the exception.<sup>21</sup> More often, the development of the slums follows a reasonably consistent pattern. In the first months of a settlement, a majority of the structures are made of salvaged materials and are of dubious structural integrity. (Photos 1 and 2) Over time, these structures become increasingly more elaborate, until they become permanent structures with utilities and social amenities.<sup>22</sup> (Photo 3)

A settlement often begins to swell because of a shared contact already residing within the settlement, either a relative or someone from the same region. A pattern eventually develops, in which each settlement within the city is populated primarily by individuals from one, usually rural, community. The addition of subsequent dwellers to a settlement depends to a large degree on them having some common bond with the existing squatters, most especially in the form of shared ethnic or linguistic background.<sup>23</sup>

**Photo 1<sup>24</sup>**



**Photo 2**





**Photo 3**



One net result is that most urban settlements are relatively closed communities. An outside settler would be noticed fairly quickly and may be reluctant to settle in a community where he has no logical filial connection. Interestingly, though, the police may have some contacts within the settlement and may, themselves, even reside in the more developed communities.<sup>25</sup> A logical and consistent development pattern is that the communities become defined by ethnicity and region. This is also true for internal immigrants from the predominantly Muslim provinces in the south that have developed Muslim-dominated settlements throughout the urban areas.

The great majority of urban inhabitants come from impoverished social strata, but Metro Manila does have a population that ranges, contextually, from upper-middle class to the exceptionally wealthy. This intermingling of wealth and poverty leads to interesting social responses, especially towards security. The wealthy attempt to sequester themselves from the sprawl of humanity that, quite literally, pervades every available niche in the Metro Area—and increasingly suburbs that were once considered far-flung—by living in self-contained communities. Usually located off the arterials, they are gated and manned by private security that filters incoming and through traffic, seemingly distinguished only by the type of vehicle that is requesting passage. The Loyola Heights district typifies the living conditions for the wealthiest Manilans:

An elaborate system of iron gates, roadblocks, and checkpoints demarcates the boundaries of the area and cuts it off from the rest of the city, at least at nighttime. The threats to life, limb, and property are the overwhelming common concern of the wealthy residents. Houses are turned into virtual fortresses by surrounding them with high walls topped by glass shards, barbed wire, and heavy iron bars on all windows.<sup>26</sup>

It is this self-reliance for personal and property security that, although not specific to the developing world, creates the perception among the more well-to-do that local governance has limited capacity to protect either. However, it is precisely this need for more state capacity outside of the walled communities that generates many of the perceived threats that force their construction. In short, the Metro Manila civil authorities, like other local governments in the developed and developing world, find it difficult, if not impossible, to provide the basic services for a majority of its citizens despite existing governmental mechanisms.

### **GOVERNANCE IN URBAN AREAS**

Each of Manila's twelve cities and five municipalities has an elected governing body, with the mayor sitting at the highest rung of a sometimes large bureaucratic structure. Underpinning these local government units are the 1,694 *barangays* which serve as the most basic units of government for most people residing in the spontaneous settlements.<sup>27</sup> In highly urbanized areas, each barangay has at least 5,000 residents.<sup>28</sup> Within each unit, the barangay captain, an official title, serves as the chief executive, with a position equivalent to those of mayor and governor in the cities and municipalities. He is responsible for the everyday affairs—from utilities to security—of the residents of his particular barangay. Barangay officials are notable for wearing brightly-colored vests as they make their rounds through their units.

The urban settlements cause many problems for local officials and politics. On the one hand, even if they could, the settlers are not required to pay taxes, but on the other, they demand services from local governments—for example medical and sanitation services. Since many of the settlers are allowed to vote, the chief executives of the local municipalities avoid alienating these constituents. This restraint, coupled with laws that tend to favor settlers over landholders, leads to legitimization of the settlements with little capacity for social services—chief of which is providing policing services.

## **POLICING MANILA**

Policing in the Philippines is a national-level responsibility, a centralized function overseen by the Philippine National Police (PNP), headquartered in Metro Manila. As of 2002, the PNP had a total of 94,965 members, with a presence in Metro Manila of almost 11,000.<sup>29</sup> The law enforcement division spans both the PNP and the National Bureau of Investigations (NBI). The PNP is overseen by the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), which is subordinated to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), whereas the NBI is under the Department of Justice.

There is most certainly a correlation between official capacity to provide security and the age of a particular settlement. In the earliest stages of urban settlement, the local residents rely on their established relationships to provide security. There is no expectation that local officials would be interested in their plight because their long-term residency has not been established, and the infrastructure and the climate of fear that eviction is inevitable make developing responsive policing more difficult. Since, by some estimates, about half of the land in Metro Manila is owned by a handful of families,<sup>30</sup> establishing land titles for squatters remains one of the most pressing causes of fear among the urban settlers. Multiple evictions from various sites are a common settler experience.

Besides the lack of title, the sheer numbers of urban settlers make it impossible for settlements to become more permanent, thus shifting to the next phase of governance. When homes and businesses are more established, there is an increased demand for state services, particularly utilities and security. The police, however, stretched thinly and forced to respond to the myriad of crimes that pervade the capital, find it difficult to fund regularized patrols. As rational actors, the police are forced to rely on the existing barangay structure as well as develop source networks within the settlements. There certainly is the perception that the settlement areas are rife with criminal activities, especially illegal narcotics, theft, and prostitution.

**Providing Security in the Barangay:** Unable to provide daily presence of uniformed police officers in a great majority of the urban settlements, the governing councils have adopted certain officially-sanctioned strategies to meet the needs of their constituents. For example, the Barangay Security and Development Officers (BSDOs), the Barangay Tanod as they are more popularly known, are local volunteers responsible for helping maintain security in the barangays. These recruited civilian volunteers provide unarmed civilian assistance that includes intelligence collection, neighborhood watches—or rondas—medical, traffic, and emergency assistance, and

gathering of relevant information and data for peace and order planning and research.<sup>31</sup> Some municipalities have adapted the program, taking the liberty of assimilating the concept into native culture and beliefs, including the *Oplan Pakigsandurot* (Barangay Intelligence Network) in Cebu City.

**Oplan Pakigsandurot:** Though particular to Cebu City, the second most important economic center in the Philippines, Oplan Pakigsandurot typifies some of the community-centered policing approaches in the Philippines. Initiated by the Cebu City local government in 1983, the Oplan has the purported aims of promoting closer ties between the police and the community, maintaining peace and order through combined crime prevention, and improving police image.<sup>32</sup>

**Pakigsandurot:** A word in the Cebuano dialect that means an act that fosters better relationships for the purpose of getting fully acquainted or obtaining closer, harmonious relationships, but officials refer to it in its more practical meaning of an intelligence network for the barangay.<sup>33</sup> According to Donna Lynn Caparas:

This plan encapsulates the idea of getting the police to be personally involved in the affairs of the community where they reside, specifically on matters of peace and order. The plan conceptualizes a program where the police are enjoined to render two hours voluntary service to their *barangay* residence during their time off-duty and be always on call when the need arises. It calls for their direct participation in conducting patrols and other police actions in their area, side-by-side (buddy-buddy system) with the *tanods*. *Oplan Pakigsandurot* regularly conducts meetings/dialogues or fellowship every second Saturday of the month.<sup>34</sup>

Capitalizing on the initiatives to provide security within the barangay, the civilian police, the army, and the NBI all have competencies and mandates to investigate and prevent acts of political violence throughout the Philippines. Rather than attempt to provide sourcing throughout the metro areas, the NBI—the Philippine police agency most equivalent to the US Federal Bureau of Investigations—targets specific facilities that its agents perceive as the most likely venues for operational planning for acts of political violence.<sup>35</sup> This calls for a short explanatory digression.

At the middle stage of the development of urban settlements described earlier, establishments that provide personal services are prevalent, including boarding houses that cater to transients who have means, i.e., atypical urban settlers. According to security officials, in the southern islands the trend for violent actors—including terrorists and the myriad of criminal actors engaged in human trafficking and narcotics—is to travel from the nearest islands in Indonesia to Mindanao and then to the biggest cities in the Philippines.<sup>36</sup> However, instead of

using the squatter settlements for preoperational planning, the tendency is for them to use the motels and pension houses that are more common in the established, older settlement areas. These businesses are not the international chains found in the city centers of Cebu and Manila, but rather family-owned establishments that shun electronic payments and, in return for cash, provide some anonymity for the residents.

It is precisely these establishments that police and security agencies target to develop indigenous source networks. Particularly in the wake of a politically-motivated attack, the security agents tap into their established networks. Using a combination of persuasion and monetary incentives—and witness protection, if needed—offered by elected officials, the Philippines’ police have a solid record of after-the-fact successes in tracking down and prosecuting violent actors.

When compared to the lawlessness that pervades much of Metro Manila, and other major cities as well, acts of political violence are relatively rare. In other words, the chances of being a victim of an act of terrorism are significantly lower than almost any other form of crime. Although ideologically-centered insurgencies typically pursue government targets in rural areas, metro areas in the Philippines also face periodic acts of violence. The major bombing in Metro Manila in February 2005 demonstrates a type of political violence and the subsequent actions of the security agents.

### **THE MAKATI CITY BOMBING**

Though crimes against persons and property rank Metro Manila among the most violent cities in the world, urban areas in the Philippines are also subject to politicized violence whose primary goals are the disruption of government services and foreign interests. One of the most recent attacks in the center of Metro Manila’s financial district, Makati, provides an instructive case into the methods and profiles of the perpetrators.

On February 14, 2005, near-simultaneous explosions occurred in three major Philippine cities, including Metro Manila’s central business district of Makati.<sup>37</sup> Known collectively as the Valentine’s Day bombings, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) claimed responsibility for all three. Six were killed and over 150 injured. Today, the site of the attack today bears no markers of the previous carnage with the bustle of mainly middle-class office workers going about their everyday business. But this part of Manila was chosen carefully for its large numbers of foreign workers and financial entities and their importance to the Arroyo presidency.

Three suspects were arrested in conjunction with the bombing. About a week after the arrest of Indonesian senior leader of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) group, Rohmat Abdurrahim, Filipino Islamic militants Gamal Baharan and Angelo Trinidad were arrested in separate operations in Mandaluyong City and San Juan—both located in the heart of Metro Manila. The Metro Manila police chief said Baharan was nabbed at around 11:45 p.m. in front of a 7-11 convenience store at the corner of Boni Avenue and Aglipay Street in Mandaluyong and that Trinidad was arrested shortly thereafter at around 4:30 a.m. along N. Domingo Street in the municipality of San Juan.<sup>38</sup> In October 2005, Makati regional trial court judge, Marissa Guillen, sentenced all three to death for their roles in the bloody Valentine's Day bombing.<sup>39</sup>

In March of 2005, shortly after these bombings, Philippine security forces raided an apartment in Quezon City—the largest city in Metro Manila—discovering a cache of 600 kilos of explosives linked to a threat against a US target in Metro Manila. The Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM), consisting of Christian converts to Islam—known as Balik Islam—was linked directly to that cache.<sup>40</sup> The RSM represents a growing threat, and its members have been tied through court documents to the ASG and JI as well as to involvement in the February 14 bombings.<sup>41</sup> However, at the time of their arrest, they were located in Zamboanga City in Mindanao.

These bombings clearly placed pressure on the Philippine security forces for results to help counter the image abroad—especially among tourists and business-people—that the Philippines could not provide for personal security. Because of their overlapping security responsibilities, the military, police, and security forces were mobilized in an attempt to find the perpetrators of the Makati City bombings. Their swift results testify to their professional effectiveness. However, there is a price for this relative efficiency. The relationship between the greater population and the security forces remains fragile and one of mistrust, especially as serious human rights violations of suspects continue and police still act with great impunity.<sup>42</sup>

## **CONCLUSIONS**

The movement of, quite literally, masses of people from rural areas to urban ones is hardly an unnoticed phenomenon in the past decade, but what has changed markedly is the rise in political violence targeting urban centers. As Stephen Graham writes about the nexus of the development of urbanism and politicized violence, "...the parallel transformations of urbanism and political violence in the post-Cold War period, and the increasing constitution of war and terror by acts of violence carefully targeted against urban, local sites, makes the development of such a specifically urban geopolitics an urgent imperative."<sup>43</sup>

Most of the states of the third world are not what has been classified earlier as failed states—those that cannot provide even a modicum of order or service, functions that have become associated with the state in the past century. In other words, this paper did not address the Philippines as a failed state, but rather as one that typifies the realities for a great majority of the class of states that fall outside of the political North where there is some degree of political authority, popular accountability, and relative security for its population. Grappling with the three challenges of attempting to consolidate democratic practices, confronting the real, pressing needs of rapid population growth and rapid urban settlements, and combating all manner of violence, particularly political violence, is a Sisyphean task. In other words, urban poverty abets terrorism and political violence.

Recognizing that there are some methodological constraints in making these conclusions airtight, some tentative observations are instructive.

Rapid urban settlements do create conditions that promote urban violence. Throughout the islands in the Philippines, the urban areas have the highest crime rates, and many of the settlements themselves are havens for human traffickers, drug dealers, and other exploiters of the poor. The police are unable to provide everyday security, at least not until the urban settlements have stabilized populations and reasonably settled constituencies. When a major act of political violence does occur, such as the Makati City bombing, police and security services are able to investigate these crimes *ex post facto* reasonably well by targeting sources that are most likely to have knowledge of persons who do not belong.

The acts are not planned in the most impoverished slum areas; these are reserved for the truly poor. Rather, permanent settlements that offer a modicum of development and infrastructure—most likely guest houses that offer some anonymity for a traveler—are the most likely venues for pre-attack planning and post-attack hiding.

For the outside agent—an international organization or foreign state—that wishes to help the Philippines with its policing and security strategies, two broad areas can be most fruitfully addressed. The first is social. The mass migrations into the urban areas are principally the result of intense rural poverty that forces rural land dwellers—who rarely have title to the lands they work—into the cities at unsustainable rates. These migrants, however, are not traditionally the actors who commit acts of urban violence, at least not in recent years. Instead, their presence complicates the abilities of local and national governments to provide social services, including security.

The security officials tasked with investigating acts of political violence already possess the ability to recruit and maintain source networks that result in rapid conclusions of investigations. For police agencies specifically, the greatest assistance would be help in providing living wages for police and security officers in order to combat the entrenched patterns of corruption that hinder their ultimate effectiveness.

The urban security environment is now an established norm for the developed and developing world—one that promises to be even more challenging and pressing given the increasing patterns of urban migration and settlement. Typical of the mega-city of the developing world, Metro Manila gives a glimpse into how liberalizing states deal with the complexities of urbanization and violence.



## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> As cited in P. H. Liotta, et al, “The Real Day after Tomorrow: Feeble State, Feral Cities, and Eco-Terrorists.” (Forthcoming.)

<sup>2</sup> See Howard Handleman, “Rapid Urbanization and the Politics of the Urban Poor,” in *The Challenge of Third World Development*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 177.

<sup>4</sup> For this research, the author also studied Cebu City, the large city located in the southern Philippines. Cebu City was one of the earliest and most vibrant Spanish settlements, and it remains one of the most important commercial centers. Some of the information from these interviews is used throughout this paper.

<sup>5</sup> For an interesting discussion of what democracy means in the abstract, see Laurence Whitehead, *Democratization: Theory and Practice* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002), 7-26.

<sup>6</sup> Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Prone to Violence: The Paradox of the Democratic Peace,” *The National Interest* (Winter 2005/2006): 39-45.

<sup>7</sup> See John Keane, *Violence and Democracy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 11.

<sup>8</sup> Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 51. Diamond argues that the cases of Turkey and Sri Lanka are instructive of how difficult it is to protect human rights and the rule of law when the institutions of the state face violent challenges from well-organized and ruthless insurgents, regardless of their motivations. The inadequacies of democracy in both cases were both causes and effects of this political violence.

<sup>9</sup> Not to devolve too deeply into a discussion of various scholarly topics of interest relating to the preconditions for democracy, but the topic is worth mentioning because of the inordinate impact some conclusions have on contemporary US foreign policies. The general logic of the preconditions arguments is that democracy can only succeed when a mix of environmental factors are present, economic prosperity privileged above all. It stems from Seymour Martin Lipset’s thesis of 45 years ago that economic prosperity expands literacy, creates a secure middle class, and fosters cosmopolitan attitudes. Moreover, it fits the empirical record of the Cold War period during which it was developed when about a third of the world’s countries qualified as democracies and very few of them were poor; adapted from Joseph T. Siegle, Michael M. Weinstein, and Morton H. Halperin, “Why Democracies Excel,” *Foreign Affairs* 83.5 (September/October 2004): 57-71.

<sup>10</sup> Continuing this link between levels of violence and democracy, G. Bingham Powell, Jr. argues “Widespread violence is generally accepted as a sign of failure of the democratic process ... Democracies that are able to avoid such disorder ... are better performers than those that are dominated by violence or that restrict freedom in the name of order.” *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 9.

<sup>11</sup> This work does not seek to identify the underlying source of political violence, but instead state reactions to targeted violence. The field of conflict studies, though, has witnessed a renewal in recent years due in large part to the realities of many developing states in the post-Cold War era. For example, Earl Conteh-Morgan asserts in an introductory text on the competing theoretical constructs on political violence that “[t]he increasing demand and intensity of violent political conflicts is creating a strong demand for courses on conflict, war, or peace.” In *Collective Political Violence: An Introduction to the Theories and Cases of Violent Conflicts* (New York and London: Routledge, 2004), 1.

<sup>12</sup> As Gizewski and Homer-Dixon suggest, most researchers that link political violence to growth in urban settings have focused on collective violence against the state, usually in relation to mass unrest and disaffection with state performance. Peter Gizewski and Thomas Homer-Dixon, “Urban Growth and Violence: Will the Future Resemble the Past?” *Occasional Paper Project on Environment, Population, and Security* (Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science and the University of Toronto, June 1995).

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<sup>13</sup> Franz Vanderschueren, "From Violence to Justice and Security in Cities," *Environment and Urbanization* 8.1 (April 1996): 94. Reports from the latest UN *International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS)*, spanning 1998-2005, are due to be published in late 2006.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 99.

<sup>15</sup> Gizewski and Homer-Dixon, "Urban Growth and Violence."

<sup>16</sup> Jakarta, Indonesia, with an estimated 17 million people in its central city and surrounding suburbs, is the other example of the emerging class of mega-city in the region.

<sup>17</sup> The Philippines' National Statistical Coordination Board [www.nscb.gov.ph](http://www.nscb.gov.ph). Citing data from the UN-HABITAT Urban Indicators Database, Davis (2006:4) places Metro Manila's daytime population at 14.3 million.

<sup>18</sup> Emmanuel M. Luna, Professor of Community Development, the University of the Philippines, interview with author on 17 May 2006, Manila.

<sup>19</sup> Consolidated from Rajib Shaw, *Metro Manila Case Study: Development and Realization of the EQTAP Master Plan* (Miki, Hyogo Prefecture, Japan: Earthquake Disaster Mitigation Research Center (EDM)).

<sup>20</sup> Juno M. Ragrargio, "The Case of Metro Manila, Philippines." [http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Global\\_Report/index.htm](http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Global_Report/index.htm). Ragrargio lists 526 communities located in all the cities and municipalities in Metro Manila that have urban settlements, encompassing a total of 2.54 million men, women, and children in the most depressed areas of the metropolis.

<sup>21</sup> One previous resident of a spontaneous settlement in Quezon City—the most populous of the twelve cities in Metro Manila—reported to the author in an interview that he and his family had been compelled to move five times, yet returned to rebuild their homes.

<sup>22</sup> In Quezon City, informal settlers make up more than 50 percent of the population—which translates into about one million squatters. Legaspi, interview with author on 18 May 2006.

<sup>23</sup> Bryan Roberts, *Cities of Peasants: The Political Economy of Urbanization in the Third World* (London: Edward Arnold Publishers, 1978), 146-7, quoted in Mehran Kamrava, *Politics and Society in the Third World* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993).

<sup>24</sup> Photos by Joseph Derdzinski.

<sup>25</sup> Luna interview, 17 May 2006.

<sup>26</sup> Erhard Berner, *Defending a Place in the City: Localities and the Struggle for Urban Land in Metro Manila* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998), 163, quoted in Mike Davis, *Planet of Slums* (London and New York: Verso, 2006).

<sup>27</sup> The term *barangay* originates from the Spanish colonial period when groups of households were designated within certain *barrios*, or neighborhoods. Although most certainly the magnitude of what constitutes a *barangay* has changed dramatically in the post-colonial period, the concept of a relatively compact group remains.

<sup>28</sup> See Ragrargio, "The Case of Metro Manila," [http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Global\\_Report/index.htm](http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Global_Report/index.htm).

<sup>29</sup> See Donna Lynn A. Caparas, "Participation of the Public and Victims for More Fair and Effective Criminal Justice Administration in the Philippines," In *Resource Materials No 56*, (United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI), 2002), 244, [www.http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/index.htm](http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/index.htm). The US Department of State lists the PNP as having 115,000 members. The disparity may be that the State Department includes all PNP employees, not just law enforcement officers.

<sup>30</sup> Berner, *Defending a Place*, 21 quoted in Davis, *Planet of Slums*, 84.

<sup>31</sup> Caparas, "Participation of Public and Victims," 241.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 254.

<sup>33</sup> NBI supervisory agent, interview with author on 24 May 2006.

<sup>34</sup> Caparas, "Participation of Public and Victims," 254.

<sup>35</sup> NBI agent interview, 24 May 2006.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

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<sup>37</sup> The other two bombings were in General Santos City and Davao City, both located in Mindanao, the island located in the southernmost range of the Philippine islands whose inhabitants are predominantly Muslim.

<sup>38</sup> “2 Bombing Suspects Fall: Abu Bandits Identified by Bus Conductor,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 23 February 2005. On the same day, military security officials issued a public statement indicating that the two were arrested in a squatters’ area in Mandaluyong. It seems that the police account is the more definitive, particularly because of the exactness of their details.

<sup>39</sup> “Indon, 2 Filipinos get Death Penalty for Makati Bombing,” *The Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 28 October 2005.

<sup>40</sup> “Philippine Troops Capture Leader of Extremist Group Rajah Solaiman Movement,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 25 October 2005.

<sup>41</sup> Overseas Advisory Council, “Manila, Philippines: 2006 Crime and Safety Report,” 13 Feb 2006, [www.osac.gov](http://www.osac.gov).

<sup>42</sup> See, for example, Amnesty International, “Philippines: Political killings, Human Rights, and the Peace Process,” [www.amnesty.org](http://www.amnesty.org). The Amnesty report expresses the organization’s grave concerns over the intensifying pattern over recent years of political killings, mainly of legal leftist political parties.

<sup>43</sup> Stephen Graham, “Postmortem City: Towards an Urban Geopolitics,” *City* 8.2 (July 2004): 170.