

**SECURING THE NATION'S PORTS AND MARITIME
BORDER—A REVIEW OF THE COAST GUARD'S
POST-9/11 HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND
MARITIME SECURITY**

OF THE

**COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 14, 2011

Serial No. 112-31

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security



Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

72-241 PDF

WASHINGTON : 2012

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

PETER T. KING, New York, *Chairman*

LAMAR SMITH, Texas	BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California	LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama	SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas	HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida	YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia	LAURA RICHARDSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan	DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
TIM WALBERG, Michigan	BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota	JACKIE SPEIER, California
JOE WALSH, Illinois	CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania	HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan
BEN QUAYLE, Arizona	WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia	KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
BILLY LONG, Missouri	VACANCY
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina	
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania	
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas	
MO BROOKS, Alabama	

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, *Staff Director/Chief Counsel*

KERRY ANN WATKINS, *Senior Policy Director*

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, *Chief Clerk*

I. LANIER AVANT, *Minority Staff Director*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, *Chairwoman*

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama	HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas	LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia	SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BEN QUAYLE, Arizona, <i>Vice Chair</i>	BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia	HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina	BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (<i>Ex Officio</i>)
PETER T. KING, New York (<i>Ex Officio</i>)	

PAUL ANSTINE, *Staff Director*

DIANA BERGWIN, *Subcommittee Clerk*

ALISON NORTHROP, *Minority Subcommittee Director*

CONTENTS

	Page
STATEMENTS	
The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security:	
Oral Statement	1
Prepared Statement	3
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security	5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security	6
WITNESS	
Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., Commandant, United States Coast Guard:	
Oral Statement	8
Prepared Statement	10
APPENDIX	
Questions Submitted by Chairman Candice S. Miller of Michigan	35
Questions Submitted by Chairman Peter T. King of New York	36
Questions Submitted by Hon. Michael T. McCaul of Texas	38
Question Submitted by Hon. Benjamin Quayle of Arizona	40
Questions Submitted by Hon. Scott Rigell of Virginia	40
Questions Submitted by Hon. Jeff Duncan of South Carolina	41
Question Submitted by Ranking Member Henry Cuellar of Texas	43
Question Submitted by Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi ..	43
Question Submitted by Hon. Loretta Sanchez of California	43
Question Submitted by Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas	44

SECURING THE NATION'S PORTS AND MARITIME BORDER—A REVIEW OF THE COAST GUARD'S POST-9/11 HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS

Tuesday, June 14, 2011

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller [Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Miller, King, Cuellar, Sanchez, Jackson Lee, Clarke, and Thompson.

Mrs. MILLER. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will come to order.

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony from Admiral Robert Papp who is the commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, to review the Coast Guard's post-9/11 homeland security mission, and I will introduce the admiral after the opening statements.

But I certainly want to tell him how honored we are that he is here at our subcommittee today. We are just delighted that he is here, not only representing himself, of course, but all the brave men and women of the Coast Guard in the United States. We will make a more formal introduction shortly.

For most of this year, this subcommittee has appropriately focused on securing the Nation's borders, both at and between the ports of entry. But the border isn't just the desert or along the Mexican border, or even along the Northern border.

Our border is also liquid. It is in the Great Lakes between the United States and Canada. It is along the Pacific. It is along the Atlantic. The U.S. Coast Guard is missioned with securing those borders.

I want to focus on a very often overlooked, but just as vital issue and that is port and maritime security, and the changing role of the U.S. Coast Guard since September 11.

As a lifetime voter, I have a very deep affinity for the Coast Guard and the fantastic work that they do each and every day, 24/7, whether it is just routing boating safety missions, search and rescue, or keeping our vital shipping lanes clear of ice in the winter and helping commerce flow to our lakes.

I often say that if it is wet, cold, and impossible, send in the Coast Guard and they will get it done.

So, again, let me thank you and the men and women of the Coast Guard for their service to this Nation.

The Coast Guard's motto is *Semper Paratus*, Latin for "Always ready." Since 1798, the Coast Guard has lived up to its motto, fighting alongside the other branches of the military in this Nation's conflicts, even today.

Men and women of the Coast Guard serve off the coast of Iraq, and help to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

Even before 9/11, the Coast Guard had its hands full with its 11 statutory missions like marine safety, ice breaking, search and rescue, and aids to navigation.

But since September 11, we have loaded up the Coast Guard with additional responsibility and asked them specifically to focus resources on port and maritime security.

This committee has jurisdiction of the Coast Guard as it relates to port and maritime security and today we will conduct our oversight on how the Coast Guard has been additionally missioned and if they have been adequately and appropriately funded and resourced.

In fact, the number of hours spent on ports, waterways, and coastal security has increased by more than 900 percent since 9/11.

Admiral Papp has taken a look at these figures and earlier this year he reported that the service may need, as he said, to reduce the number and range of capabilities added since 9/11 until properly resourced.

This Congress must appreciate the candor in which the admiral made these comments and we want to hear from him today, his thoughts on these resources and how we are doing. I know that this Nation has given the Coast Guard a tremendously difficult job. This Congress understands that you can't be everywhere at once.

The Coast Guard must find ways to balance its security role, without subtracting from its core competencies.

However, at the same time, this committee is laser-focused on securing the Nation and our borders. The Coast Guard's role in securing the maritime environment is absolutely critical. We are very interested to hear comments from the admiral, providing us with your comprehensive vision for the security missions of the Coast Guard.

As I mentioned in the letter the Chairman and I sent earlier, we are also concerned about the status of the National Security Cutters, which will be the bulwarks of our homeland defense on the waters.

In a time of budget constraints, we have to be mindful, of course, of the cost to acquire these advanced cutters, but we also cannot sacrifice tomorrow's needed capabilities due to short-term thinking.

I know that the older cutters are costing us far too much, both in terms of less mission readiness, lost operational hours, and higher maintenance costs, and we have to take those costs into account when making long-term acquisition decisions.

Further, if I could be blunt, I find it, probably unacceptable would be the word, that major Coast Guard law enforcement cut-

ters have an average age of more than 40 years, while Navy ships have an average age of only 14.

Not to pick on the Navy. We want to make sure they are resourced, but we need to be cognizant of this fact.

We ask the Coast Guard to do many of the same missions as the Navy, in many of the same waters. Thus, we in Congress need to ensure that the Coast Guard, again, has the resources and assets it needs to safely carry out its operations.

Investments need to be made in the aging cutter fleet. This committee is especially interested in hearing on the trade-offs required to ensure that the Coast Guard has the capabilities required to secure our maritime borders, interdict drugs, and perform other statutory missions of the Coast Guard.

The Coast Guard's Deployable Operations Group is a key example of the heightened role that maritime and port security, and specialized maritime security teams, play in the Coast Guard's post-9/11 mission set.

As you know, this committee strongly supports the Maritime Safety and Security Team, who deploy to provide security and protection in a maritime environment, and the advanced Maritime Security and Response Team that specializes in counterterrorist tactics, and is designed as a first-responder to marine terrorist situations.

The Coast Guard has recently begun a stem-to-stern review of the needed capabilities from both of these teams and other deployable teams. This review passes the common-sense test.

One of the more interesting and valuable programs that leverages their partnership, I think, is the Ship Rider Program. That is something that I follow very closely since the beginning of this integrated law enforcement program, with the first pilot in 2006.

I think it is just a very valuable tool to make our border more secure between the United States and our Canadian partners. It has worked very, very well in the Great Lakes region.

Again, I want to thank the commandant for agreeing to appear today. We certainly look forward to hearing your thoughts on all of this, and how we can assist the Coast Guard to better secure our Nation's ports and maritime border.

The Chairwoman now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Cuellar, for any statements he may have.

[The statement of Chairwoman Miller follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN CANDICE S. MILLER

I now recognize myself for an opening statement. For most of this year, this subcommittee has appropriately focused on securing the Nation's borders, both at and between the ports of entry, but the border isn't just in the desert, or along the Mexican border, or even along the Northern Border. Our border is also liquid—in the Great Lakes between the United States and Canada—its along the Pacific its along the Atlantic and the U.S. Coast Guard is missioned with securing those border. I want to focus on an often overlooked, but just as vital issue—port and maritime security, and the changing role of the U.S. Coast Guard since September 11.

Being a lifetime boater, I have a deep affinity for the Coast Guard and the fantastic work they do every day, whether it is a routine boating safety mission, search and rescue, or keeping our vital shipping lanes clear of ice in the winter and helping commerce flow through our lakes.

I often say that if it is cold, wet, and impossible, you send in the Coast Guard—so let me thank you and the men and women of the Coast Guard for their service to this Nation. The Coast Guard's Motto is *Semper Paratus*, Latin for "Always Ready", and since 1798, the Coast Guard has lived up to its motto, fighting alongside the other branches of the military in this Nation's conflicts. Even today, men and women of the Coast Guard serve off the coast of Iraq, and help to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

Even before September 11, the Coast Guard had its hands full with its 11 statutory missions like marine safety, ice-breaking, search-and-rescue and aids to navigation. But, since September 11, we have loaded up the Coast Guard with additional responsibilities and asked them to specifically focus resources on port and maritime security.

This committee has jurisdiction of the Coast Guard as it relates to port and maritime security and today we'll conduct oversight on how the Coast Guard has been additionally missioned and if they have been appropriately funded.

In fact, the number of hours spent on Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security has increased by more than 900% since September 11.

Admiral Papp has taken a look at these figures and earlier this year reported that the service may need to "reduce the number and range of capabilities added since 9/11, until properly resourced."

This Congress must appreciate the candor in which the Admiral made these comments and we want to hear from him today—his thoughts on resourcing.

I know that this Nation has given the Coast Guard a tremendously difficult job, and this Congress understands that you can't be everywhere at once—the Coast Guard must find ways to balance its security role without subtracting from its "core competencies."

However, at the same time, this committee is laser-focused on securing the Nation and the Coast Guard's role in securing the maritime environment is critical.

We are very interested to hear you elaborate on your comments and provide us with your comprehensive vision for the security missions of the Coast Guard.

As mentioned in the letter the Chairman and I sent to you earlier this year, we are also concerned about the status of the National Security Cutters which will be the bulwarks of our Homeland Defense on our waters. In a time of budget constraints, we must be mindful of the cost to acquire these advanced cutters but we cannot sacrifice tomorrow's needed capabilities due to short-term thinking.

I know that the older cutters are costing us far too much both in terms of less mission readiness, lost operational hours, and higher maintenance costs—and we must take those cost into account when making long-term acquisition decisions.

Furthermore, to be blunt, I find it unacceptable that major Coast Guard law enforcement cutters have an average age of more than 40 years, while Navy ships have an average age of only 14. We ask the Coast Guard to do many of the same missions, in many of the same waters, and thus we in Congress need to ensure that Coast Guard has the resources and assets it needs to safely carry out its operations.

Investments need to be made in the aging cutter fleet, and this committee is especially interested in hearing your thoughts on the tradeoffs required to ensure that the Coast Guard has the capabilities required to secure the maritime borders, interdict drugs, and perform the other statutory missions of the Coast Guard.

The Coast Guard's Deployable Operations Group (DOG) is a key example of the heightened role that maritime and port security, and specialized maritime security teams play in the Coast Guard's post 9/11 mission set.

As you know, this committee strongly supports the Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs) who deploy to provide security and protection in a maritime environment, and the advanced Maritime Security and Response Team (MSRT) that specializes in counter-terrorist tactics and is designed as a first responder to marine terrorist situations.

The Coast Guard has recently begun a "stem-to-stern" review of the needed capabilities from the MSSTs, MSRT, and other deployable teams. This review passes the common-sense test.

One of the more interesting and valuable programs that leverages our partnerships is the Shiprider program. I have closely followed the progress of this integrated law-enforcement program since it was first piloted in 2006. I am fully convinced that it is a valuable tool to make the border between the United States and Canada more secure.

I want to once again thank the Commandant for agreeing to appear before us today, we look forward to hearing your thoughts on how we can assist the Coast Guard to better secure our Nation's ports and maritime borders.

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I am pleased that the subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security is meeting today to discuss the Coast Guard's homeland security missions in the post-9/11 era.

A little over a year ago, I visited the Coast Guard headquarters and met with the previous commandant, Admiral Thad Allen.

We had a good discussion about the role of the Coast Guard in securing our Nation, both the Northern, the Southern, and the coast area. Also appreciate Admiral Papp joining us today to update the subcommittee on the Coast Guard's efforts in support of the Department of Homeland Security.

As a Member of Congress representing a district along the Southern border, I am particularly interested in the Coast Guard's work on three matters related to that region of the country.

First, I have been working to support the U.S. Customs Border Protection Office of Air and Marine's efforts to deploy unmanned aerial systems, UASs, along our land and coastal borders.

It is my understanding the Coast Guard is working with CBP on the maritime barrier of the UAS. I hope to hear from Admiral Papp about the Coast Guard's work with the CBP Air Marine on this program, as well as what work it may be doing along with their colleagues in the U.S. Navy.

Given limited Federal resources, agencies across the Government should do everything possible to share information, technology, as appropriate, and avoid the duplication of efforts in order to secure our country as effectively and efficiently as possible.

Second as many of you know, there has been several incidents of violence on the Mexican side of Falcon Lake, the U.S. portion, which is located in my Congressional district.

The fiscal year 2012 DHS appropriation bill, recently passed by the House of Representatives this last week, recommends that the Coast Guards have an enhanced presence on Falcon Lake and Lake Amistad in order to counter border incursions at that time.

I believe, as a witness testified, you also testified, Admiral, that you also feel that there should be an increased presence on that. We will follow up on some questions on that.

It is my understanding that this area is currently patrolled only by CBP, which is also stretched thin with its border security responsibilities. I am interested in knowing from the commandant what presence beyond "post operations," which we know it is just a low touch, of Coast Guard currently has along the Southern border of the United States and how it would intend to fulfill the language in the appropriations bill, should it become law.

Third, last week the Texas Rangers U.S. Border Patrol, Texas Fish and Wildlife, were involved in a shoot-out across the Rio Grande in Abram, Texas. Suspected drug runners shot across the river from Mexico at U.S. law enforcement officials.

Last year, Coast Guard Authorizations Act of 2010, now which is Pub. L. 111-281, included a provision that I authored in which the Coast Guard, should prepare a mission requirement analysis for the navigable portions of the Rio Grande.

This analysis was due to Congress no later than 90 days after the date of enactment, which was October 15, 2010. Out of courtesy to the commandant, we contacted your Congressional affairs per-

son, just to give you a heads up, that I was going to be asking you, why you all missed this particular deadline, which is statute. It was specifically directed at your office.

Specifically, this provision calls that the mission requirement analysis is meant to assess Coast Guard's mission, assets, personnel assigned to the Rio Grande River.

As you know, the Rio Grande is international waters. It might not be blue waters, as I think some of you folks call it the brown waters, but nevertheless, it is international waters.

Included with the analysis or requirements to identify what will be needed for the Coast Guard to increase the operations, migrant interdiction operations, drug interdiction operations, everything within your 11 points of your mission itself, I hope to hear from Admiral Papp about the status of this analysis. Or if you haven't gotten started, just tell us that you are going to get started on it.

Ultimately, we are talking about narcotics, undocumented aliens, and those who might wish to do us harm.

We know that people will take the route that they perceive to offer the best opportunity to enter the country. If we secure the land borders, people will try to come across maritime borders and vice versa.

We are only as strong as our weakest link, which is why it is imperative that we support the work of the Coast Guard and the sister agencies within DHS.

In closing, I would like to note that more than 40,000 active-duty members of the Coast Guard, supported by thousands more reservists and civilians, do our country proud every day. We thank you for that work that you all do, Commandant.

We thank them, their families, for the service to our country. I appreciate Admiral Papp for joining us here today. I look forward to your testimony.

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentleman.

The Chairman will now recognize the Ranking Member of the full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for his opening statement.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.

I appreciate you calling this hearing. I also appreciate getting the chance to chat in the rear with Admiral Papp.

It has been about a year, a little bit more than a year, since we chatted. But welcome.

This year, we will mark the 10th anniversary of the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. That event changed our Nation, and in the process changed the shape of the Federal Government.

With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, numerous disparate agencies, including the Coast Guard, were brought together to help secure the country.

In my Congressional district alone, the Mississippi River, people think of the Coast Guard for its safety and security, and search and rescue missions, particularly during terrible flooding like what we experienced this year.

But in the wake of 9/11, the Coast Guard's homeland security missions have become more important than ever.

The Coast Guard's work securing our ports, waterways, and coast is an integral part of America's homeland security. With that in mind, I am concerned about the lack of adequate funding for several vital Coast Guard programs and initiatives in the recently passed DHS appropriations deal.

For example, the deal cuts funding for Coast Guard acquisition and construction by \$270 million below the President's request. This is unacceptable.

The Coast Guard prides itself as being always ready, for all hazards and all threats and carrying out its 11 statutory missions. However, without adequate resources, it will be hard pressed to meet that enormous challenge.

Congress must ensure that the Coast Guard has the funding necessary to fulfill its responsibilities on behalf of the American people.

Also, I would be remiss if I did not touch on the Coast Guard's role in the Transportation Worker Identification Credential, or TWIC Program. Along with the Transportation Security Agency, the Coast Guard is responsible for implementing the TWIC Program.

The program has been plagued with problems from its inception.

It is my hope that the long overdue TWIC readers will be deployed as quickly and efficiently as possible, so that full security benefits of this program can soon be realized.

America's maritime workers have done their part by obtaining TWICs. It is now time for DHS to deliver as well.

I have had an opportunity, as I have said, to meet with Admiral Papp at the Coast Guard headquarters, and have seen the good work of the men and women of the U.S. Coast Guard first-hand.

Today, I hope to hear about the commandant's commitment to ensuring the Coast Guard fulfills its homeland security missions with support from Congress.

Again, I thank you, Admiral Papp, for joining us today. I look forward to a robust dialogue about the Coast Guard's role in the security of our Nation.

Thank you. I yield back, Madam Chairwoman.

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentleman for his comments. Other Members of the committee are reminded that any opening statements they may have may be submitted for the record.

Our witness today, our only witness today, which I think is very appropriate, is Admiral Papp, who is, of course, the commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, which is the Nation's oldest continuous sea-going service and one of the Nation's five armed services.

As a flag officer, Admiral Papp served as commander, Coast Guard Atlantic Area, where he was operational commander for all U.S. Coast Guard missions within the eastern half of the world and provided support to the Department of Defense.

Admiral Papp has served in six Coast Guard cutters, commanding four of them, including the Eagle. He also previously served as the commander of the Ninth Coast Guard District, with responsibilities for Coast Guard missions on the Great Lakes and the Northern border.

Again, we want to thank the commandant for joining us today.

The floor is yours, sir. We certainly look forward to your testimony and the opportunity to question you.

**STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ROBERT J. PAPP, JR.,
COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD**

Admiral PAPP. Well, thank you, Chairman Miller. Good morning, once again, Ranking Member Cuellar and full committee Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson, good to see you, sir, and all the Members of the subcommittee.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today and for your unwavering support for our Coast Guard.

It has always been a pleasure for me to come up here to talk about the many great things our service is doing. It is my great honor and privilege to lead and represent the great men and women of the Coast Guard.

But it is also my responsibility and an obligation to my people to inform you of those things that we are unable to do, or lack the resources to do, and to candidly inform you of the challenges that we face in order to secure your support.

America is a maritime Nation. Ninety percent of our goods arrive by or are shipped by sea. These same waters that facilitate commerce and stimulate the economy, also offer routes to our country for illegal activities, such as drugs, and illegal migrants, or security threats.

Additionally, the activities of man, oil spills, dumping, overfishing pose threats to the seas themselves.

The safety and security of our maritime environment impacts the daily lives of every American, regardless of whether they live on or near the water.

Maritime security is not a new mission for the Coast Guard. When our fledgling Nation first confronted these challenges in the 18th Century, the first Secretary of the Treasury, the father of the Coast Guard, Alexander Hamilton, called for the construction of 10 small armed cutters to serve as, as he said, "useful sentinels of the law."

Now, 220 years later, the men and women of today's Coast Guard still work determinedly to safeguard our Nation's maritime interests overseas, on the high seas, along our coasts, and our ports.

They will use our expertise to improve practices, develop and leverage partnerships, and to use risk-based decision making to apply the full spectrum of Coast Guard resources and capabilities.

Just as my predecessors have done for over 220 years, I am strongly committed to the Nation's maritime security. For the Coast Guard, it is job No. 1.

But I now lead a service that is stressed by increased activities and responsibilities during a period of constrained budgets, combined with aging ships, aircraft, boats, and infrastructure. The Coast Guard cannot be all things to all people, nor can it be everywhere, all the time.

Now, in order to carry out our strategy, we apply a layered security system that leverages our unique maritime security authorities' capabilities and partnerships to mitigate risk and maintain se-

curity in our domestic ports, on the high seas, and in the ports abroad.

This begins in foreign ports, where Coast Guard conducts assessments to evaluate the effectiveness of port security and antiterrorism measures. Since its establishment in 2004, the International Port Security Program has assessed ports in 153 countries, visiting over 900 individual ports and facilities.

In cases where effective antiterrorism measures are not in place, conditions of entry are placed on vessels, requiring them to implement additional security measures before they arrive in our ports.

Offshore, a capable major cutter fleet provides a persistent presence that can respond to potential threats, enforce international domestic laws, launch boats and aircraft in adverse sea conditions, and maintain a presence throughout all weather conditions.

This is the layer of security that causes me the greatest concern. Our fleet of major cutters has reached block obsolescence and is increasingly expensive to maintain. They are unreliable and less effective.

But there is encouraging news. The first two National security cutters are operational. The third will be delivered this year. A fourth has been awarded, and the fifth has been funded.

We must expedite the funding of the remaining three National Security Cutters for a minimum of 8 total.

The recent operations of the cutter, *Bertholf*, our first National Security Cutter, highlights the exceptional capabilities of our newest class of major cutters. During *Bertholf's* recent patrol near Alaska, they encountered 20-foot seas and wind in excess of 60 knots, with temperatures below freezing. Yet the crew was still able to launch and recover their helicopter and small boats.

Cutter *Bertholf* previously conducted patrols in the Eastern Pacific, where they successfully engaged the full spectrum of illicit trafficking threats: Self-propelled, semi-submersible, and semi-submersible vessels and fully submersible vessels, small boats, high speed multi-engine, go-fast vessels, and fishing vessels.

In one instance, the *Bertholf* was able to use both their small boats, and the deployed helicopter, and the maritime patrol aircraft to successfully disrupt three small high-speed boats detected simultaneously in the dark of night.

Well before ships arrive in our ports, screening and targeting operations provide critical information regarding these vessels and embarked crews, passengers, and cargo.

As a member of the Intelligence Committee, the Coast Guard collects, analyzes, fuses, and disseminates intelligence information from our Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers, to provide direct intelligence support to our Coast Guard operators in the field and in the ports and offshore.

As vessels arrive closer to the United States, they must submit a notice of arrival. The Intelligence Coordination Center evaluates the information for potential threats.

If vessels pose a risk, the Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan is activated, and the interagency informed.

To engage potential threats approaching our coast, the Coast Guard helicopters and coastal patrol boats provide the ability to monitor, track, interdict, and board vessels.

While maritime security is a shared responsibility, requiring international and domestic coordination throughout all stages of the supply chain, it is most evident to the public when you look at our ports.

In our ports, the Coast Guard, along with our Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners, working in concert with port stakeholders, patrol our waters and critical infrastructure, conduct vessel escorts, and inspect vessels and facilities.

The Coast Guard's approach to liquefied natural gas shipments that arrive from Yemen highlights the concept of layered security and risk-informed decision making. The Coast Guard collaborates with stakeholders to implement enhanced security measures that are placed upon each LNG vessel overseas, transiting to the United States.

Progress of these ships is monitored as they transit. Furthermore, enhanced security measures are applied, including monitoring of crews using biometric identity verification.

Working in close partnership with a number of key partner agencies, the Coast Guard conducts in-depth biometric and biographic screening of each crew member. As the vessels approach the United States, additional monitoring is performed and boarding's are conducted.

The Coast Guard meets with Federal, State, and local partners as well as area maritime security committees to ensure risks are fully identified and mitigated before these vessels are escorted into port by the Coast Guard and State and local partners.

The Coast Guard's Maritime Security authorities, capabilities, and partnerships, coupled with capable cutters, aircraft, and boats, all operated by highly proficient personnel, allow us to maximize those authorities and partnerships to execute layered and effective security throughout the entire maritime continuum from overseas to the critical ports within our homeland.

We protect the country against threats from the sea. We protect people who use the sea. We protect the sea itself.

Once again, thank you for this opportunity to testify. I look forward to answering your questions.

[The statement of Admiral Papp follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ROBERT J. PAPP

JUNE 14, 2011

INTRODUCTION

Good morning Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the Coast Guard's maritime security capabilities.

For more than 220 years, the U.S. Coast Guard has safeguarded the Nation's maritime interests and natural resources on our rivers and ports, in the coastal regions, on the high seas, and around the world. The Coast Guard saves those in peril and protects the Nation's maritime border, marine transportation system, natural resources, and the environment. Coast Guard men and women—active duty, reserve, civilian and auxiliaries alike—deliver premier service to the public. The Coast Guard is an adaptable, responsive, military force of maritime professionals whose broad legal authorities, assets, geographic diversity, and expansive partnerships provide a persistent presence in the inland waters, ports, coastal regions, and far offshore areas of operations. This presence, coupled with over 2 centuries of experience as the Nation's maritime first responder, provides tremendous value and service to the public.

A LAYERED APPROACH TO COUNTER MARITIME RISK

With more than 350 ports and 95,000 miles of coastline (including bays, lakes, and rivers), the U.S. maritime domain is unique in its scope and diversity, requiring an integrated and layered approach to security.

The Coast Guard leverages its unique maritime security authorities, capabilities, and partnerships to mitigate risk and improve security in our domestic ports, on the high seas, and in ports abroad. The Coast Guard's overarching strategy is to increase maritime border security through a layered security system that begins beyond the country's physical borders. This layered approach to security begins in foreign ports where the Coast Guard conducts foreign port assessments, leveraging the International Port Security Program, to assess effectiveness of port security and antiterrorism measures. Offshore, a capable major cutter fleet is able to respond to potential threats, launch boats and aircraft in adverse sea states, and maintain a presence through all weather conditions. This capability is critical to stopping threats well before they approach our shores—and the Coast Guard's planned fleet of National Security Cutters (NSCs) and Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs) are designed specifically to meet these requirements. Along with the fleet of NSCs and OPCs, Coast Guard C-130s and Maritime Patrol Aircraft provide broad surveillance capability maximizing effectiveness of the surface fleet. Well before vessels arrive to our ports, screening and targeting operations provide critical information regarding vessels, crews, passengers, and cargo destined for the United States. To prevent potential threats approaching our coasts, Coast Guard helicopters and patrol boats provide the ability to monitor, track, interdict, and board vessels. In our ports, the Coast Guard, along with our Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners, working in concert with port stakeholders, patrol our waters and critical infrastructure, conduct vessel escorts, and inspect vessels and facilities. The Coast Guard's mix of cutters, aircraft, and boats—all operated by highly proficient personnel—allow the Coast Guard to maximize its unique authorities to exercise layered and effective security through the entire maritime continuum—from overseas to the critical ports within our homeland.

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS

To address threats furthest from our borders, the Coast Guard establishes and fosters strategic relationships with other nations and international forums. The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code was created by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) with significant Coast Guard assistance. ISPS provides an international regime to ensure ship and port facilities take appropriate preventive measures to ensure security, similar to our domestic regime in the Maritime Transportation Security Act. The International Port Security (IPS) Program places Coast Guard men and women in foreign ports that conduct maritime trade with the United States to assess the effectiveness of their antiterrorism measures and to verify compliance with ISPS Code. To date, the IPS Program has assessed more than 900 ports and facilities in more than 150 countries. The Coast Guard also supports the European Commission, the Organization of American States, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community to reduce the number of non-compliant foreign ports, thereby reducing and mitigating risk to U.S. ports. Vessels arriving to the United States from non-ISPS compliant countries are required to take additional security precautions, may be boarded by the Coast Guard before being granted permission to enter, and may be refused entry.

MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS AND OFFSHORE OPERATIONS

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is a diverse set of capabilities that support all levels (strategic, operational, and tactical) of decision-making. It is a continuum of maritime knowledge, from situational awareness through current and predictive intelligence. MDA is more than an awareness of ships en route to a particular port; it also entails knowledge of:

- *People*.—Crew, passengers, owners, and operators;
- *Cargo*.—All elements of the global supply chain;
- *Infrastructure*.—Vital elements of the Nation's maritime infrastructure, including facilities, services, and systems;
- *Environment*.—Weather, environmentally sensitive areas, and living marine resources; and
- *Trends*.—Shipping routes, migration routes, and seasonal changes.

Effective MDA requires efficient information-sharing that demands coordination among numerous participants at international, Federal, regional, State, local, terri-

torial, and Tribal levels of government, as well as with maritime industry and private sector partners.

The Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center's (ICC) COASTWATCH program is one example of efficient information sharing. COASTWATCH identifies vessels of interest that may raise National security concerns regarding the people or cargo aboard, business practices, or crew or ownership associations. COASTWATCH is conducted in partnership with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Office of Naval Intelligence and observes vessels of interest until their arrival at U.S. ports. COASTWATCH also initiated use of CBP's Automated Targeting System—Passenger (ATS-P). ATS-P enables real-time database checks and allows COASTWATCH to develop scenario-based targeting rule sets in order to identify suspect maritime entities. It also has the capability to provide information to the FBI, CBP, and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) for persons discovered with possible terrorism links. For example, COASTWATCH has successfully uncovered and disrupted human smuggling organizations using commercial ships. In 2010, COASTWATCH screened 71.2 million people, more than 257,000 ship arrivals, and generated 309 advance warning reports regarding arriving ships, people, or cargoes posing a potential National security or criminal threat.

Close coordination and joint operations with CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in international programs are also critical. The Coast Guard participates in the Container Security Initiative (CSI) to ensure that all U.S.-bound maritime containers that pose a potential risk are identified and inspected before they are placed on vessels destined for the United States. CSI encourages inter-agency cooperation by developing a capacity to collect and share information and trade data gathered from CSI ports, strengthening cooperation within DHS and facilitates enhanced risk-informed decision making.

The Coast Guard's major cutters and deployable forces are critical to the layered security approach. Major cutters are the only Coast Guard assets able to intercept and board threats far off-shore prior to entering the U.S. waters, and when necessary near the point of departure, in all weather conditions. The Coast Guard's planned fleet of NSCs and OPCs are critical to maintaining our layered maritime defense. Coast Guard LEDETs traveling with naval vessels are also able to employ their unique law enforcement authorities far off-shore. As an example, to date in fiscal year 2011, the Coast Guard has interdicted 7.0 metric tons of cocaine from two self-propelled semi-submersible vessels—vessels specially designed to avoid detection while they deliver mass quantities of cocaine ultimately bound for our shores and streets. The most recent interdiction took place in April when the Cutter SHERMAN, one of our High Endurance Cutters, spotted a self-propelled semi-submersible vessel North of the Galapagos Islands. Once the crew realized they had been detected, they scuttled the vessel. The SHERMAN recovered the crew and a considerable portion of the cocaine.

Closer to home, we have strengthened mutual relationships with the Mexican Navy (SEMAR) and the Mexican Secretariat for Communications and Transportation (SCT). SEMAR and SCT are increasing their engagement with the Coast Guard and the U.S. Northern Command in education, training, participation in exercises and coordinated operations, along with intelligence and information sharing.

At the Northern maritime border, the Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Canada Border Services Agency represent the core border security partnership, formalized in 2007. Working closely together the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) identify, investigate, and interdict individuals and organizations that may pose a threat to National security or are engaged in organized criminal activity along the Northern border. This effort includes 15 maritime IBET regions along the U.S./Canada Border. Over the past 6 years, the U.S. Coast Guard and RCMP have performed numerous pilot operations and developed an integrated cross-border law enforcement operational concept. An Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law Enforcement Framework Agreement between the United States and Canada has been signed and awaits ratification in Parliament. If ratified, this agreement will allow officers to perform intelligence-driven integrated law enforcement operations in the shared maritime border areas.

MARITIME THREAT RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

The Coast Guard has developed new capabilities to address terrorist and weapons of mass destruction threats. Our Deployable Operations Group has forces capable of countering threats unique to the maritime environment. These deployable, specialized forces augment other Coast Guard forces and provide field commanders with additional capabilities.

The Coast Guard has also established a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) program and worked extensively with DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and U.S. Special Operations Command to train and equip Coast Guard personnel to detect and respond to CBRNE threats. In addition, the National Security Cutter is designed to operate in contaminated environments.

U.S. WATERS, U.S. PORTS, AND INTERAGENCY PARTNERSHIPS

Leveraging our long-standing partnerships and unique maritime authorities and capabilities, the Coast Guard and our interagency partners have significantly enhanced our Nation's maritime security. One example of interagency cooperation and coordination is the Joint Harbor Operations Center located at Coast Guard Sector San Diego. Recognizing the multidimensional nature of the threat and the challenges of maintaining a safe and secure environment for legitimate trade and travel, Coast Guard Sector San Diego brought together 20 Federal, State, and local agencies with overlapping jurisdictions and authorities for operational planning and information sharing. Partners include CBP, ICE, and the U.S. Department of Defense, as well as State and local agencies who work in unity to coordinate maritime law enforcement operations, including the interdiction of the illegal movement of people and drugs across the maritime border.

The establishment of additional Interagency Operations Centers (IOCs) for port security is well underway. In ports including Charleston, Puget Sound, San Diego, Boston and Jacksonville, CBP, Coast Guard, and other agencies are sharing workspace and coordinating operational efforts for improved the efficiency and effectiveness of maritime assets. IOCs provide a framework to align agency operations among DHS and other Federal, regional, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and international organizations and port stakeholders. Additionally, the web-based information sharing system Watch Keeper has been deployed in eight ports to date. Watch Keeper supports interagency information sharing and MDA management across port entities.

Coast Guard Captains of the Port, in their Federal Maritime Security Coordinator (FMSC) role, also significantly enhance domestic maritime transportation security and preparedness by increasing cooperation and coordination. As the FMSC, Coast Guard officers manage the Nation's Area Maritime Security (AMS) Plans in coordination with respective AMS Committees. The AMS Committees and maritime stakeholders exercise and review these plans annually.

AMS Plans are informed by the Coast Guard's annual Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model (MSRAM) analysis which involves the participation of hundreds of maritime security partners, including owners, operators, and emergency response and local law enforcement personnel through the AMSCs. MSRAM is used to perform risk assessments on critical infrastructure and key resources. MSRAM offers an analysis interface capable of generating tailored results to support risk management decisions at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Coast Guard Maritime Security and Response Operations (MSRO) reflect the application of pertinent authorities, competencies, capabilities, capacities, and partnerships to deny the use and exploitation of the maritime domain to criminal or hostile actors. The Coast Guard coordinates, integrates, and facilitates the activities of many Federal, regional, State, Tribal, territorial, and local government agencies as well as the maritime industry to generate layered security to prevent, disrupt, protect, respond to, and recover from terror-related risks in the maritime domain.

In 2010, Coast Guard forces conducted:

- More than 2,400 security boardings of high-interest vessels;
- Almost 17,000 security boardings of small vessels;
- More than 3,000 escorts of high-capacity passenger vessels, e.g., ferries and cruise ships;
- More than 1,420 escorts of high-value U.S. naval vessels transiting U.S. waterways;
- More than 850 escorts of vessels carrying certain dangerous cargoes.

The execution of MSRO's antiterrorism, counterterrorism, military outload protection operations, security response, and initial recovery operations deter our adversaries and maximize the probability of disrupting their pre-operational planning and interdicting a maritime transportation security incident.

Finally, in the event that a significant incident occurs, CBP and the Coast Guard have implemented a set of protocols to develop recommended courses of actions to help recover the functionality of the Marine Transportation System (MTS). The protocols provide a forum to identify and act on important issues to facilitate rapid MTS recovery and the resumption of commerce. They also establish a process to collect and disseminate information regarding the status of the National MTS, provide

recommendations for National-level priorities, including cargo or vessel priorities, or strategic actions necessary to facilitate rapid recovery of the MTS and resumption of trade. The protocols have been activated on several occasions, most currently for the floods in the Western Rivers. The Coast Guard and CBP are currently supporting DHS in its efforts to foster harmonized international standards for trade resumption with the International Maritime Organization, the World Customs Organization, and other multinational organizations.

CONCLUSION

The President's remarks at the Coast Guard Academy Class of 2011 commencement perfectly summarize the Coast Guard's critical role in protecting and serving the Nation:

"And while we can never predict what the future may hold, we know that the complex missions asked of our Coast Guard have never been more important. Around the world, we need you to partner with other nations to secure their ports, protect the vital shipping lanes of the Persian Gulf, combat piracy off the Horn of Africa, and help train foreign partners from the Americas to Africa to Asia. Here at home, we need you to stop those smugglers, and protect our oceans, and prevent terrorists from slipping deadly weapons into our ports."

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much, Admiral Papp.

I guess I am going to start my questions by focusing on the cutters. I will start there because you have made it very clear that that really is your priority.

So I appreciate you talking about where you are status-wise with the cutters that are currently deployed and being built, and those that you are looking forward to; hopefully, if we can get them through the Congress here.

I do note that the sixth one was not requested by the President, although we didn't fund it either in the appropriations. So perhaps that is something, as this committee becomes convinced that we really need to focus on.

We are going to be doing an authorizing bill here in this committee. I would suggest to the committee it is something we may want to press.

I was interested to hear you talking about your group in Alaska. I can't even imagine being in those kinds of conditions with the temperatures, and the seas, and everything else, while they were rescuing one of their helicopters. So that really speaks to the capability of the cutter that you are so actively seeking for the Coast Guard.

I don't know if we want to add anything to that, just other than the fact that we need to be helping you to make sure that we continue along that path to authorize and appropriate funds as we can.

I guess, before I have you answer that, obviously the Federal Government is having some terrible fiscal constraints. I don't know, but I am suggesting this, but is there anything else, short of these cutters that would satisfy your need?

Is there any other kind of vessel that we might think about? Or we shouldn't even be going down that road?

Admiral PAPP. Well, ma'am, the challenge, of course, is that it takes a long time to design a ship, to get an acquisition project baseline, and then sustain it.

Right now, we have the acquisition project going in motion. What we need is the predictable funding stream in order to gain the efficiencies of the acquisition process and to work with the shipyards.

The Coast Guard owns part of this issue because we went through rather significant acquisition reform trying to get our act in order.

I feel we are there now.

We successfully negotiated a fixed-price contract. We took out the lead systems integrator. We have been dealing directly with the shipyard. Now we have a fixed-price contract.

We have awarded No. 4. I expect that we will award No. 5 in the near future.

These ships cannot come soon enough.

The major cutters that we have there right now trying to get the job done. I think trying because we have lost effectiveness, and they are unreliable. We are losing ship days because of their mechanical condition.

As you rightly identified, they were built, for the most part, in the 1960s, into the early 1970s. They were designed for a quarter century of use, hard use, and they have got that. But they are rapidly approaching a half century of use now. Probably most of them, by the time they are decommissioned and replaced, will be older than a half century.

We just cannot go on any longer. We need to get the new ships built as quickly as possible.

To answer your question on No. 6, originally, because of working this fixed-price contract, when we finally nailed the price down, we found that we did not have enough money appropriated for hull No. 5. We needed to ask for \$77 million more in the fiscal year 2012 budget, which is under consideration right now, in order to give us the remainder of the money to complete No. 5.

Because of that, we didn't have enough room within our acquisition top line to put the full price of NSC No. 6 in there. So even though it was my final decision, it was a tough decision to make because I needed to keep No. 5 moving along.

However thanks to the Congress, the full funding for NSC No. 5 was ultimately put in the 2011 budget, so that we are able to award the contract this year and move ahead.

Mrs. MILLER. Could you just tell me, just so I understand, how long does it take? What is the time frame we are looking at from, let us say, the money is authorized, appropriated. How long does it actually take to build the ship, and get it launched, and get it going?

Admiral PAPP. Yes, ma'am.

By the time it is appropriated, it would generally take us about 3 years from starting, ordering long-lead parts, getting it constructed, getting it in the water, going through operational evaluation, and then fully operational.

So time is a-wasting. We need to move forward on this.

That is why I am delighted that we got the funding for No. 5, because in reality, that saves us about \$50 million per ship if we can keep the flow of the money going. Because the yard then has a predictable funding stream, and they can order long-lead materials and other things to keep the production line going.

Mrs. MILLER. Admiral, I wonder if you could sort of flesh out for me, a little bit.

I mentioned in my opening statement two of these teams that have come on-line, really, through the Coast Guard since 9/11, the Maritime Safety and Security Team and also this Maritime Security and Response Team, both of which have been incredibly successful, I think, by looking through all the briefing memos that I have had on it.

But if you could just sort of flesh that out a little bit, of how you think those teams are operating with how you have missioned them, and appropriations, I guess, that are following as well, to resource these teams adequately?

Because for instance, I just know in the Detroit area, one of these teams was used when we had the Super Bowl and everybody was raving about it. So I am sure they are being utilized with various kinds of infrastructure targets or what-have-you around the country.

But maybe you could tell us a little bit about how those teams are working, in your opinion?

Admiral PAPP. Oh, magnificent. We are lucky to have them. I am grateful that the Congress provided us the support to give us those teams.

Granted, I need to balance a lot of things across the Coast Guard, but if I had more, I would make good use of them as well. But there are a lot of needs for our Coast Guard right now.

So, let me tell you what we are doing with those teams.

They were initial reaction to post-9/11. Throughout the 1990s, most of our, what I would call, our conventional stations, Coast Guard stations, had been depleted. They were down to the bare minimum in terms of people and boats, just to carry out the search-and-rescue mission.

Of course immediately, our thoughts turned to providing security in our ports post-9/11. The MSSTs, the Maritime Safety and Security Teams, were an immediate response to get what we referred to at the time as waterborne SWAT teams, that we could deploy within the ports to provide that extra measure of security.

What we have done over time is we use them for National security events, Presidential protection, and other events that occur in the ports to supplement our conventional forces.

What has happened over time though is that unlike my immediate two predecessors, as the budget was growing significantly over the last 10 years, I am confronted with a completely different landscape in terms of the budget. It is going to be constrained, probably, throughout my term.

Because we had increasing budgets, we kept pushing new missions at these units, trying to add new capabilities on top of the things they were doing already, with the promise of potentially new resources coming as the budget continued to increase.

We are on that right now, is doing a full review of these teams to make sure we are doing the absolute right things, to make sure we have got the right capabilities, that the training is in place to make sure they can do their missions effectively and safely, and that we are fully utilizing them.

Now the MSRC is a different thing. That was one of the original MSSTs, Chesapeake.

What we did within the Coast Guard is we saw the need for an enhanced team, and what we did was we told the Congress and the administration that we could do it resource neutral. What we did was we did away with our Tactical Law Enforcement Team North, and combined that with the Chesapeake MSST, and brought in some other billets from other places.

These were not add-ons. They were reprogramming within the Coast Guard. They are a higher-level tactical team for interdiction of vessels approaching the coast or higher-level security needs.

We are doing a full assessment of all their capabilities as well.

Frankly to make full utilization of this team, they need organic air delivery system, or cooperation from partners to provide air delivery. We do not have it at this time.

Mrs. MILLER. Okay. I appreciate those comments.

The Chairman would recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, Mr. Cuellar.

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

January 15 is the day that this mission requirement analysis was supposed to be turned in to us. That was, as I mentioned a few minutes ago, last year's Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010. There was a provision that we added that a mission requirement analysis for the navigable parts of the Rio Grande, and it was due on January 15.

Any particular reason why this has not been turned in?

Admiral PAPP. No reason at all, sir. That is my fault. I regret that it was not turned in.

The report has been turned in to the Department and it is under review right now. Frankly, knowing of your concern, I went back and took a look at the report.

I would like to take a further look at the report because I don't think it fully answers the mail.

Now it is with the Department right now. It is probably an adequate response.

I would like to take one more look at it myself after the Department does. But it is on the way, sir. It is my fault it was not done on time.

Mr. CUELLAR. I appreciate that.

No excuses.

I thank you for that.

Also, there is some reported language that I added to this appropriation bill that we just passed last week, where the committee also notes that when you testified before the House Homeland Appropriations Committee, you also had mentioned "that some level of persistent presence is required on Falcon Lake." As you know, there has been some instances.

There is some language there also where the House Appropriations on Homeland also recommends that the Coast Guard adhere to your testimony that you provided the committee, and also report to the House whether you will be having some sort of persistent border presence down there.

I would ask you, there is statutes, and now at least from the House version, so far, we have got to wait for the Homeland Appro-

priations Bill to pass. But I ask you would do the same thing, to have some sort of presence there.

I would ask you to go ahead and just take a look at that language which we provided your Congressional affairs folks' office.

So look forward, if you don't mind, I will call you up at a later time, when you have some time. Love to follow up on this, two languages provisions.

The other thing I would ask you, you had mentioned the Coast Guard has strengthened mutual relationships with the Mexican Navy, SEMAR, and the Mexican Secretariat for Communications, Transportation, the SCT. That you all have been increasing the engagement with them, working with them to make sure that we work with them on education, training, participation, and exercise coordinated operations along with intelligence information sharing.

How is that coming along, your relationship? Because as you know, the Chairwoman represents the Northern border, I represent the Southern border. Because of what has been happening with the Mexican drug cartels, it is of interest to me, especially when I live right at the border itself.

Could you tell us how that is coming along?

Admiral PAPP. It is coming along very well, sir.

You know, it is two different partners that we deal with, Canada and Mexico. I have got extensive experience dealing with Canada, because I was the Ninth District commander along the Northern border for a couple of years.

I looked forward with anticipation to getting down to Mexico for the first time, which I did last summer. I had a long meeting with Admiral Saynez, basically their chief of naval operations.

I would characterize our relationship with the Mexican Navy, I think I can say with great pride, probably better than our U.S. Navy gets along with them because they are more like a Coast Guard than they are like our Navy.

They have search and rescue, law enforcement, pollution response, many of the same things that we do. So we have a lot of similarities.

Culturally, it is a little different than dealing with the Canadians as well. The Mexicans value their independence, their sovereignty. So we work that a little bit different.

We do some coincidental operations with them. But our cooperation has continued to improve. We have actually had drug interdiction cases that we have been able to hand off to the Mexicans, and they prosecute them very well, even a semi-submersible.

So we are sharing information. We are sharing best practices. We share training.

More importantly, we are talking to each other. Not only at the highest level, but also our districts that border Mexico, the 11th Coast Guard District out of Alameda, and the Eighth Coast Guard District out of New Orleans.

They work with their local partners as well.

Mr. CUELLAR. I thank you for that cooperation with them.

I would ask you, also, on this analysis, mission analysis. I would ask you to see if you can encourage our Mexican friends to also do a little bit more on the Rio Grande, this international waters, the brown waters as it is called.

I would ask you to take a look at it and see if you can encourage them to work with you on that particular area.

I know you have been doing a lot of work on the Gulf, which I appreciate. But it is that area there that I would ask you to spend a little bit of time, as you do your mission analysis, to tell us what sort of personnel, or equipment, or air boats that you might need, or whatever it might be, whatever assets you are talking about.

But I would ask you to look at that because we have done a job with the border patrol on the river banks and beyond that. But I think the water should sell by the ones that we have neglected. If you can encourage our Mexican friends to work with you, I would appreciate it.

Admiral PAPP. Absolutely, sir. But it is also cooperation within the Department of Homeland Security as well. I can assure you in that regard, that Commissioner Bersin and I meet regularly. We have senior leadership groups that work together.

Both of us carry individual authorities within our organizations. Our resources are distributed a little bit differently. But we are constantly sharing resources back and forth, leveraging off each other's authorities because we have to have a coordinated response from our side as well.

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes. Coordinated in any way you want to, I just want to see the results.

Admiral PAPP. Yes, sir.

Mr. CUELLAR. The results are just more presence on the international waters called the Rio Grande.

Admiral PAPP. Yes.

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you so much. I appreciate all the work you have done.

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentleman.

The Chairwoman would like to recognize the Chairman of the full committee, Chairman King, from New York.

Before I do so, I would just mention to the admiral that it is not every day at our subcommittee we have both the Chairman and the Ranking Member at the subcommittee. I think it is indicative of the respect that all of us feel towards you and your service to the Nation, certainly, sir, but all of the brave men and women of the United States Coast Guard.

The gentleman from New York.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Ms. Miller.

Thank you very much for the leadership you are providing on this subcommittee. Also my good friend, Mr. Cuellar, who demonstrates true bipartisanship, working with you as your Ranking Member.

Admiral, I am sorry. I was not here for your opening statement. I will have to be leaving in a few moments.

I just wanted to, at the outset, commend you for the outstanding job you have done. You and I have had the opportunity to meet several times. I realize just how immense the responsibility is that you have.

As you mentioned, during the time of your most recent predecessors, the responsibilities of the Coast Guard were expanding, but also so was the budget and the resources.

Now you still have the expanded responsibility, but obviously resources being cut, these are tough budget times, so you really have a very, very difficult job. I commend you for what you are doing.

I also commend the Coast Guard.

As a New York resident, I know first-hand, the outstanding job the Coast Guard does in providing homeland security, in working closely with the local police, the State police, and just the outstanding job it has done in the New York Harbor, Long Island Sound.

I remember, during a Republican convention in 2004, the Coast Guard was absolutely essential to the security operation that is in place.

So it is not just New York. It is the Super Bowl. It is Guantanamo. Basically the Coast Guard has been omnipresent since September 11, and has really stepped up to the plate and done an outstanding job.

I just want to assure you, and I think I can speak for both sides of the aisle, is that we appreciate what you are doing. We also realize how tough the days and weeks and months and years are going to be, as you continue these responsibilities, but with limited resources.

We want to work with you. We want to do whatever we can to be an advocate for you. We intend to do an authorization bill this year. We want to work closely with you as we go forward with the authorization bill, as we try to project toward the future, about what is reasonable and what is essential for you.

You should know that we are always available to you as you have been to us.

I want to thank Mrs. Miller for the job she is doing and thank you for your testimony today, that I had the opportunity to read.

Your testimony, your statement and, again, it is the type of leadership that our country needs and the Coast Guard needs, and why you are such an integral part of the Department of Homeland Security, and why I believe that the Coast Guard is such a good partner, both within the Department and also at the State and local level.

I get nothing but rave reviews for your job.

As I said, when we met in your office, and some of us in Congress, you know, we complain about the tough job we have. It is nothing compared to what you have. It really is front line with limited resources.

So thank you for your service to our country, for these many years, and the very, very best of luck in the years ahead. Again, I believe I can speak for the Ranking Member and certainly the Chair of the subcommittee, in saying we want to work with you and do what we can to facilitate your job and enable you to carry out your responsibilities.

Thank you, Admiral. Thank you very much.

Admiral PAPP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored you took the time to come here this morning.

Mr. KING. Thank you.

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentleman from New York.

The Chairwoman recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi, the Ranking Member.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.

Let me say from the outset that Chairman King and I have been on this committee from Day 1. I have never heard him say any more flattering words to anybody before this committee, other than what you just received, Admiral. So you obviously are the man.

Rightfully so, you have done a good job, you represent a good organization.

Taking off from what Ranking Member Cuellar said, that, you know, you handled 11 statutory missions of the Coast Guard. Sometimes it appears that you are going to have to seriously look at all these missions and see whether or not you can really accomplish them.

There have been some hit-and-misses in terms of that discussion. So I am going to give you a softball to kind of say whether or not the missions, the homeland security missions of the Coast Guard are something that you are absolutely comfortable with?

Admiral PAPP. Sir, I am never comfortable with anything.

We have finite resources. We have that broad mission set.

Now, the good news is those finite resources that we have, the ships, aircraft, and boats, are all versatile and adaptable. You can use them across all those mission sets at various times.

More importantly, the people who crew those ships, boats, and aircraft are versatile and adaptable too. They understand how to do multiple missions.

What we do is we pay our leaders, people like me, to make decisions on a daily basis, to use risk-based determinations on where our highest-priority missions are on any given day and then allocate those finite resources across those mission sets.

A good example is last year with the Haitian earthquake. Now we don't have Haitian earthquake Coast Guard cutters sitting around on standby, ready to go and provide humanitarian response. But we had cutters that were deployed in the Windward Passage and the Florida Straits doing migrant patrols. We had drug interdiction vessels that were in the Caribbean.

Overnight, we changed their mission and sent them to Haiti, because it was a higher priority. We needed to respond to that to provide relief to the people of Haiti.

When Deepwater Horizon came up, we didn't have oil spill vessels on standby. What we did was we had to redirect our fleet. Seven of our 16 seagoing buoy tenders, that have oil skimming capability, we took them off their normal eight navigation missions and sent them to the Gulf. Then they worked there for 5 months.

So what we do is we take acceptable risk across all those missions, and we continually evaluate that risk, and then reallocate the ships, aircraft, boats, and people to what we perceive to be the highest threat at any given time.

In terms of homeland security, that is job No. 1, as I said. We are constantly evaluating that. Intelligence, cooperation with partners, cooperation with other countries informs that risk-based decision-making process. There are times when we will devote everything that we have to security.

Mr. THOMPSON. Right.

Admiral PAPP. But on a day-to-day basis, we are doing adequately.

Mr. THOMPSON. I appreciate and compliment the leadership that you offer in addressing that.

I think one of the questions for a lot of us is we have looked at the resources that you have been provided to do that. A term that we have in the South is called, getting blood from a turnip.

So it is obvious, you are able to work wonders with few resources. This last appropriation that this body voted on cut you substantially in critical areas.

If those cuts go forward, what will that do for the Coast Guard in addressing those critical missions?

Admiral PAPP. Well, the—I think you are talking about the House appropriation—

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes.

Admiral PAPP [continuing]. Marked for the 2012 budget.

When we developed that budget, I had two critical priorities. One is sustaining our operations. I didn't want to cut a single person or diminish our service to the people. We are already at pretty much bare minimum across all the mission areas, so I wanted to sustain our operational level.

At the same time, we need to rebuild the Coast Guard. That is our acquisition money.

Where I am concerned on that mark is that it took out two of our six patrol boats, and we desperately need to recapitalize our patrol boats. Ten of our medium-response boats, and probably one of my pet projects is to try and do better for our Coast Guard families, and it cuts some of our housing money for our families as well.

So primarily, the cuts were on the acquisition side. It keeps the money in there to sustain current operations, but it slows down the recapitalization of those old ships and infrastructure that we so desperately need to do.

Which then, in turn, as it slows it down, it increases my operating costs because we are constantly operating older and older equipment that costs more each year to maintain.

At some point, I am going to have cut all the fat in our operating budget. What we are going to be backed into is a situation where we are going to have to cut people and units, because we won't have any more administrative costs that we can cut.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much.

Madam Chairwoman, I have a couple of other questions I will submit for the record.

Now the question relative to the dredging of the Mississippi, I know that is primarily the corp's function, but there are some issues that have come up recently that if the dredging is not maintained in an organized fashion, it puts river traffic at risk.

Congressman Richmond wanted me to provide that question to you, and we chatted a little bit. But I have a formal question that I will submit for your response.

Admiral PAPP. Yes, sir. We will be happy to respond.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Admiral PAPP. Thank you.

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the Ranking Member.

I would also mention that dredging is a huge issue in the Great Lakes region as well as the Mississippi, which is why I am looking forward to working with him and other members on the Harbor

Maintenance Trust Fund, making sure that we spend all the dollars that go into the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund on dredging, rather than going into a black hole of a general fund. Because dredging is important for commerce, and a critical element of our economic path to prosperity, I think.

At this time, the Chairwoman would recognize the gentlelady from California.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I appreciate the time.

Admiral, first of all, as you probably know, I think the Coast Guard does a great job. So we are really happy to have you before us.

I got to see it first-hand when I was the Chairwoman of this subcommittee. So thank you very much for the work that you all do.

I was going to talk a little bit about the TWIC Program. Because for those who don't know the Transportation Worker Identification Program, that we have a card that would be used by our port workers, and actually anybody who goes onto a port.

We have been trying to get this implemented now for a few years and have had various problems, actually, with it. Certainly delays in implementation, which have cost a lot of workers work time.

Because, for example, if you are a longshoreman and you can't get onto the port to do your 8-hour work day, that is time lost. I mean, that is what these people are selling, their labor for the day. You can't get that back.

So with the budget constraints, I am worried about where we are going to go forward with this.

In fact, in this past Coast Guard authorization, I put in there, I instructed the Coast Guard to help facilitate escorted access for TWIC applicants, who were trying to get to their job, but hadn't been, for whatever reason, been unable to get their card, you know, they have got a background check to go through.

Maybe the place where they have to go get the card is far away. The card got lost in the mail, or the card didn't come or it can't come through the mail. They have to go pick it up, so they have to lose another day to go find it.

There are a lot of people, and by the way, this is affecting a lot of our minority communities, especially African-American and the Hispanic community.

So I had put in something to say that if they were in the middle of that process, the Coast Guard should help facilitate, to escort them onto the port. Because if you don't have a TWIC card and you are not escorted, you can't get onto the port to do your work.

So can you please explain to this committee, because I have heard a lot from a lot of the people who are suffering with this problem, that the Coast Guard hasn't helped to escort workers onto the ports?

If you are indeed providing such a service in accordance with the law that we passed, would you please explain how you are doing that and how you are reaching out to employees and to labor organizations, to help them to understand what the process is if someone is in the TWIC process, for whatever reason, hasn't really been able to pull their card, and still manages to get onto the port to work?

Admiral PAPP. Well, thank you, ma'am.

First of all, let me say that I agree philosophically with everything you said.

You know, as a ship captain, I was always, and I have told this to many of the industry groups, I always was concerned, in my case, about regulations and policy coming out of Coast Guard headquarters that made it harder for me to do my job. I have sort of transferred that philosophy to dealing with the marine industry as well.

Often times, we come up with broad-based solutions to perceived and real problems, and we don't understand full well the difficulty of implementation that goes across the board.

I have heard you and others loud and clear and I have made a personal effort to get out and meet with the industry groups: The Passenger Vessel Association, America Waterways Operators.

I went down to Houston last week and met with industry. First and foremost, I am listening and finding out about their concerns.

Then going back to Coast Guard headquarters, and coming up with, let us come up with some solutions on perhaps how we might modify or change or look at other arrangements for certain segments of that maritime industry population.

But at the end of the day, I agree completely with having a single identification card that can be used across the industry. The philosophy of that has found the course, the details, and the problems out of the implementation, as you have well identified.

I don't have the answer on the escorted process right now. I would be happy to provide that for the record. It is certainly something that I think is reasonable and I understand your concern. I will go back with my staff and work and see what solutions we can come up on that.

We have other challenges that I found out, last week, when I went down to the Harbor Safety Committee and convention that was down in Houston that deals with seamen who come off foreign ships and how they get across the facilities to go out for deserved shore leave as well.

Ms. SANCHEZ. But in some cases, it is easier for them than actually one of our workers to get onto the port, if they don't have this TWIC card.

I agree with the whole issue.

This should be one card. We shouldn't have to have a HazMat card, a something card, a port card, a State card, because it is costing time and effort and money for these people to be credentialed to get onto our ports. But in particular, for those who, other than the process is bogged down, we need to figure out how you help them get onto the port for their day's work until we figure out these other SNAFUs that we are having.

Admiral PAPP. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. SANCHEZ. I would appreciate that. I will look forward to your report on that.

Admiral PAPP. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentlelady for bringing up the question of the TWIC. I think every Member of this committee, certainly myself included, have had a number of conversations with the mar-

itime industry about the, as you mentioned, the implementation of that.

So, perhaps you could provide the committee with the status of where we are, any suggested recommendations you might have on how you intend to proceed, and if there is any additional legislation needed by the Congress or how we can help you work that problem through.

Admiral PAPP. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. MILLER. I appreciate that.

At this time, the Chairwoman would recognize the gentleman from Detroit, Mr. Clarke.

Mr. CLARKE. Yes.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.

Admiral, it is great to see you.

I wanted to commend you for your years in the Coast Guard and also specifically of being the 13th Gold Ancient Mariner of the Coast Guard. That is an extraordinary accomplishment.

I represent the city of Detroit, that Detroit sector that I know you know well. I wanted to follow-up on Ranking Member Thompson's questions, which I believe go to the very heart of the major issue here.

It is whether this proposed 2012 budget provides the Coast Guard with enough money to actually guard our coasts. In particular, I would like to refer to some comments that were summarized to me about your 2011 State of the Coast Guard address, where you stated that in light of the sharp increase in mission-related deaths, the Coast Guard may need to either reduce the number of homeland security missions and the training related to the skills needed to execute those missions. That you are also performing a comprehensive review of deployable specialized forces, and that that review would be coming out sometime in early August.

Will that review, or do you have an opinion, on whether you need more service personnel in order to carry out your additional homeland security mission that you have been given, subsequent to 2001?

Does the proposed budget provide you with the resources you need to hire these people?

Admiral PAPP. Well, sir, we have gained 6,000 people since 2001 and I value and need each and every one of them.

We were reduced in size during the 1990s. Actually, the size of the Coast Guard right now, the active duty force of about 42,000 people is about the same size we were in 1990, and before we went into those reductions.

We have what is adequate right now to meet our mission. But as I have said before, we can't do 100 percent in every mission, every day. We cannot be everywhere and do everything for everybody.

So, we make those risk-based decisions. Our senior leaders make decisions on the allocation of the finite resources to whatever is the most important mission on that particular day.

Having spent some time in Detroit, I was the Federal coordinator up there for the Super Bowl, for Super Bowl XL, a couple of years ago, the Coast Guard certainly can't do it on our own. What the

Federal coordinator does is exactly what I am trying to do with the Coast Guard. We strengthen and enhance partnerships.

When you do a security operation for a National security event like a Super Bowl in Detroit, you have got to bring in the municipal, the State, the other Federal agencies, and then bring them together in a unity of effort to leverage everybody's authorities and everybody's capabilities to get the job done.

Coming into my job, as commandant, one of the four principles I put out was strengthening our partnerships because I foresaw that we would be confronted with constrained budgets, and we would have difficulty building the Coast Guard larger in the years ahead.

So we are reaching out everywhere we can to share partnerships.

The Customs and Border Protection Operations Integration Center, out at Selfridge Field, is a great example of what can be done, enhancing partnerships and bringing people together. In fact, I have directed my folks to see if Sector Detroit can in fact leverage that and perhaps co-locate a little bit better, so that we can bring multiple agencies together to enhance the effectiveness of our security operations that better than one agency can do all by itself.

So these are things that I have been devoting my efforts to, seeing where we can leverage out other agencies, things that the taxpayers are paying for already that we can put to use.

Mr. CLARKE. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral.

Admiral, I have one question regarding your deep water program on whether the proposed 2012 cuts would impact the number of acquisition personnel we have dedicated toward managing that program, especially in light of the fact that this program is to coordinate the acquisition upgrades of aircrafts and vessels that are desperately needed.

The GAO, back in 2007, even indicated that in order for you to step up your presence, in monitoring the acquisition program, you need more people.

Admiral PAPP. Well, I am not aware that the individual cuts on the acquisition side. I don't believe we will cut any acquisition people because we are able to keep the bare minimum going on all the project baselines.

What it will do is it will push to the right the completion of those projects because we are getting fewer patrol boats and response boats constructed this particular year. We still need the people on the projects.

We cannot afford to lose any of our acquisition people.

One of the communities in our Coast Guard, they got hit the worst during the 1990s when we had to cut back, was our acquisition professional corps that we had on the Coast Guard.

We weren't getting money to build ships. We couldn't sustain them. So we lost those people. So then after 9/11, when we started getting a lot of acquisition money, we had to basically rebuild our acquisition work force.

I am confident we are at where we need to be in terms of the makeup, and the structure, and the number of people we have on our acquisition program right now.

What we need is the steady funding stream coming into those projects, so that we can keep those people employed, and get our capital assets recapitalized.

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentleman.

I appreciate the admiral mentioning the OIC, as we call it, the Operational Integration Center at Selfridge International Guard Base, which, of course, is in my district.

We had the Vice Commandant Brice-O'Hara that came out, and was there when we had the grand opening. I know that the gentleman from Detroit was there as well.

Really I do think, particularly in light of the GAO's report about the Northern border being essentially unsecured, and the takeaway from their entire report was how we do have to strengthen our partnerships, as you mentioned, Admiral.

In a time of declining budgets, we have all of the affected stakeholders able to consolidate and analyze data. That is a fantastic operation, that is working very well already, where we have not only the Coast Guard and the CBP, first responders in the immediate area, the County Emergency Management Department, our counterparts with the Royal Mounted Police in Canada.

Everybody, I think, involved there and in analyzing all of this data, so that you do have a working tool at the end of it that can get out into the hands of our folks in the various agencies and on the border to be able to identify threats, et cetera.

But when we think about the total force concept, going forward I think something like that could be replicated, not just on the Northern border, but the Southern border, everywhere, really. It is where we are going to have to go.

I know you are mentioning about your constrained budgets. If it is any comfort, you are not the only one that is taking this. This is the problem that we have in our Nation right now. It is one of the reasons we are having this hearing today, how can we think about prioritizing the resources and making sure we are able to allow you to do the job that you do so fantastically well each and every day.

With that then, the Chairwoman would recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I want to thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member for holding these continued oversight hearings and on such an important issue.

I truly believe the Chairwoman when she speaks to her concern and recognition of the vitality and importance of the Coast Guard, along with my colleague and friend from Texas, who has mentioned eloquently his concern about Coast Guard assistance for the very difficult neighborhood that Mexico is in and difficult challenges that we are in.

I might say, Admiral, that I believe that we have to engage priorities.

I heard from an eloquent constituent that during hard times, it be the consumer spending, business spending, and investment, or Government investment, and for some reason we have turned that upside down.

I think if we take, if my history recalls, we take our historical record from the President who was in office preceding the crash in

1928, that President did not run again because he saw the crash and he knew that the lack of Government investment was sending the United States in a deep, spiraling downhill.

Unfortunately, the President who followed did not understand that and continued to spiral downhill.

It was Franklin Delano Roosevelt that understood that there needed to be Government investment.

So let me just quickly raise the question, the Port of Houston is 25 miles long, and it faces homeland security issues. I would ask what you think the largest threat to a port like Houston and other large commercial ports are.

I would be interested in, as well, if you could start with this question of the TWIC card is very important to ports all over. You all have been rule-making since 2009. The deadline has passed. And I would be interested in knowing what the Coast Guard plans are to issue a final regulation?

I noticed that your ships are an average age of 14, whereas Navy ships are 40. I was in Panama and Columbia, excuse me, 14 years old, 14 years average age.

I was in Panama and Columbia and they were pleading, I won't call their names, pleading for the greater resources and asked that the Coast Guard, because of the constant activity on the waters, with major drug cartels and major finds, they consider the Coast Guard their front line of armor, if you will, and help.

Even if their country's meager resources are out trying to battle these dastardly, if you will, cartels and violent actors, they feel comforted by the presence of Coast Guard equipment.

Can you respond to how you are able to do it or not do it? Would you tell us whether you have all the resources you need to do the job that everyone is asking you to do?

Admiral PAPP. Well in talking to Panama and Columbia, and that particular situation, of course that is the drug interdiction. We are becoming increasingly challenged to provide the bare minimum of Coast Guard cutters down to the deep Caribbean and the East Pacific in response to the requests from Joint Interagency Task Force South.

This is a mission that I believe in because when we are intercepting 4, 5, 6, 7 tons of cocaine in a load, it prevents it from landing in Mexico or other places in Central America, and then being broken down into smaller transportable packages that then contribute to the violence along our Southern border.

So—

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So more resources would help you?

Admiral PAPP. Yes, ma'am, and more reliable resources.

We are trying to build this new fleet of cutters. Quite frankly, my major cutters, I am getting about 75 percent of their programmed hours right now because of breakdowns and other challenges in keeping 40-year-old ships running.

The newer ships will be more reliable, more effective, and will provide a better presence and be safer for our people to operate and will contribute to better effectiveness in that particular mission.

We, right now, are supplementing by putting law enforcement detachments aboard Navy ships and foreign vessels that are down there. But foreign governments are finding it increasingly difficult

to keep ships on station, whether it is French, Dutch, or British. Frankly, the United States Navy is having a hard time keeping ships down there on station as well.

So even with those law enforcement detachments, we are losing time and we are losing effectiveness.

Our interdiction still is pretty good. Of the predicted drug flow, we think we got about 40 percent of it in the transit zone last year. But I think the smugglers are starting to look at other routes as well.

More ships on station will help us out. But those ships are versatile and able to use for other missions across the Coast Guard where we need them also.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I had asked you about the TWIC card. When do you think you are going to have that regulation?

There is a lot of backlog now, when do you think you are going to have that regulation ready?

Admiral PAPP. That is a backlog and, ma'am, I don't have the current prediction on that one. We are, of course, working with TSA. We need to make progress on the TWIC reader. If I may, I will submit that answer for the record.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would you, please?

Madam Chairwoman, if you would indulge me for a moment?

Mrs. MILLER. Actually, just to interrupt for a moment, just before you came in, we had asked the admiral to give us a complete breakdown of the status on the TWIC cards. There have been several questions. So he is going to give a full report to the committee of how we proceed with the TWIC card.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would greatly appreciate it, since the subcommittee that I have has dual jurisdiction to do so.

You did, and quickly, could you just answer the terrorist question, the greatest threat to ports in America?

Admiral PAPP. The greatest threats to ports in America is the small boat threats, simply because we don't have a good handle on sorting. But we, through our small vessel security strategy, working in partnerships, leveraging technology, applying our resources in a risk-based manner, I think we are doing much better.

I appreciate the comment on the Port of Houston. I was down there last week for the Harbor Safety Committee convention, which brought in 350 people from across the Nation, sponsored and hosted by the Houston Area Maritime Security Committee and Harbor Safety Committee.

That is my second visit to the port down there. The other being a couple of years ago, after Hurricane Ike went through.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes.

Admiral PAPP. Has made an amazing recovery. Our sector is doing a good job down there. Once again, leveraging intelligence, information, other things, help us to mitigate the risk within our ports, and then applying our boats for escorts and other activities.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. Let me thank you for your service and that of all your personnel. We greatly appreciate it. We thank you for being a very viable part of the United States military.

Thank you again for your service.

Admiral PAPP. Thank you, ma'am.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I yield back.

Mrs. MILLER. Thank the gentlelady for her questions.

We have gone through our first round of questioning. I realize the admiral has other things to do, as do we, but I would like to ask a couple more questions if I could, Admiral.

Full transparency, a bit parochial, with the Great Lakes region, and I know you are very familiar with that.

One of the things I have noticed, I have had an opportunity at Air Station Detroit to go out on the helicopters or the HELOs. They don't have de-icing equipment on these helicopters, which I have to say I was stunned, in that environment not to have de-icing capabilities.

Are you aware of that? Do you think there should be some de-icing put on these helicopters?

What is the cost of such a thing? Do you think that is even a priority?

I know you are already doing emissions with that. But again, it was just startling to me to see that there was no de-icing capability.

My other question, talking about icing conditions, is perhaps you could talk a little bit about where you are status-wise, with the ice-breaking capabilities, within the United States Coast Guard and the kind of things we need to look at in the future.

Admiral PAPP. Yes, ma'am.

Thank you.

That is two great opportunities for me.

Well, first of all, as you know, we have the H-65 helicopter, both at Air Station Detroit and Air Station Traverse City.

Going back in history, Air Station Traverse City used to have larger helicopters until we went through new helicopter purchases. Then probably for standardization reasons, in the Ninth Coast Guard District, they went to H-65s at both those air stations.

The other complicating issue is that we have been directed in statute to provide for the two aviation detachments, one in Waukegan and one in Muskegon. Those use the H-65s, and they are resourced out of Detroit and Traverse City.

I agree with you, we need de-icing. But we can't install it on the H-65. That just adds to the weight of an already semi-limited helicopter to begin with.

It is good for its purpose, but for de-icing and for larger mission profile, we really need our H-60 helicopter, our medium-range helicopter.

When I was the Ninth District commander, I advocated for putting H-60s up at Air Station Traverse City because of the longer distances on Lake Superior and the harsher conditions. Unfortunately, we haven't seen any growth in our helicopter fleet.

Last year, when the 2011 budget, the fiscal year 2011 budget was proposed, because of some reductions that we had anticipated, we were looking at reallocating helicopters, taking H-60s from other locations and perhaps outfitting Traverse City with H-60s.

Ultimately, that was not supported in the budget, so we continue with the H-65.

In an unconstrained resource environment, I would love to have H-60s up at Air Station Traverse City. Because of the challenges they face, we will continue to look at that.

The H-60, as you know, does have de-icing. We will continue to evaluate that and look at the potential for a resource proposal, or a reallocation if it permits us to move further forward.

I am sorry, but I lost the second part.

The second—

Mrs. MILLER. The ice-breakers.

Admiral PAPP. Ice-breakers—

Mrs. MILLER. Where are we with the ice-breakers?

Admiral PAPP. We are in a deplorable condition. We have two 30-year-old polar ice-breakers, neither of which works right now. For a variety of reasons, which does me no good to whine or complain about, except that it is my job now to come up with an action plan to provide us with that capability.

With the 2012 budget, the President has requested \$35 million to put Polar Sea into operation, one of our polar ice-breakers, and to sustain Healy, which is our medium ice-breaker.

That brings the money back into the Coast Guard from the National Science Foundation, which is a good move.

We gave up the operating funds a number of years ago. I think that was a mistake. It was probably for good reasons at the time. But I am glad to get the money back in our budget.

Unfortunately, there is not enough money to run both polar ice-breakers. Ultimately, what we need to do is come up with a long-term solution of what suits our country. Our high-latitude study should inform that decision.

Then what we really need is a policy decision across Government on what the United States is going to fund in terms of capabilities in the Arctic, which doesn't just include ice-breakers. We need to look at aircraft, potentially air stations, search-and-rescue facilities.

I made a trip up to the Northern slope last summer to evaluate the situation. I visited Nome, Kotzebue, and Barrow. We have zero resources up there right now, to carry out Coast Guard missions.

Ice-breakers are a part of that, but we really need the full spectrum of Coast Guard capabilities.

So that will require either a reallocation of resources that I already have, which we already admit we are under-resourced to begin with, or put in a resource proposal for what we need in the Arctic and that is the direction I intend to take.

Mrs. MILLER. Thanks very much.

I recognize the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

A quick question, in your testimony, you referenced that well before vessels arrive to the U.S. ports, screening, targeting operations provide critical information regarding vessels, crews, passengers, cargo destined for the United States.

Tell us how this information flows between the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Coast Guard and how that aids your port security missions?

Admiral PAPP. Mr. Cuellar, that is another great example of strengthening and working our partnership. Once again, no agency can do it all on their own, so we have to share.

Part of the value that the Coast Guard brings to the Department of Homeland Security is we are a member, a named member, of the intelligence community.

Our Intelligence Coordination Center, ICC, is co-located with the Navy's intelligence out at Suitland. So we share information there.

We are also linked with the targeting centers that Customs and Border Protection maintains for both cargo and passengers. So as we get cargo and passenger manifests for those ships that give us their advanced notice of arrival, we are able to screen the passengers, screen the crew, screen the cargo, compare notes with Customs and Border Protection, with Navy intelligence and other agencies to make an assessment on the safety and security of that ship that is coming into our port.

Then, of course, as I said, we have our international port security liaisons that inspect the various foreign ports. It is a support that we don't have to plea confidence in. We can impose additional conditions at entry before they come into our ports.

So it all works together with our partners. It starts overseas.

I would say, also, that it is not just customs providing it. I have been out to the targeting centers, we have Coast Guard people who work with Customs and Border Protection and vice versa, sharing people and information to make sure that it is seamless across government.

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Admiral, for the questions.

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield back.

Mrs. MILLER. Does the gentleman from Detroit have any further questions?

Mr. CLARKE. Admiral, I am just concerned. I want to make sure you are able to upgrade your vessels, and aircraft, and information systems.

So again, this is regarding deep water. Apparently it is indicated that the contract you had with the Integrated Coast Guard System, which is a joint venture between Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin, apparently expired in January of this year.

I just wanted to find out, what is the successor to that in terms of the acquisition planning?

Admiral PAPP. Well, we brought it back into our conventional acquisition program. As I mentioned earlier, we have had a chance, over the last 4 to 5 years, to rebuild our acquisition program, primarily the people, and to update our acquisitions manual and get our people trained in the defense acquisition college.

We have shown significant improvements there. What we have been able to do is we now have resident, the people to be able to negotiate directly with the companies that are producing either the aircraft or the ships.

Before, we had to use a lead system integrator, because quite frankly, we didn't have the capacity within our small acquisition staff to be able to do that.

We have got the lead on it now. We have reformed our acquisition policies and procedures. It has paid benefits in this fixed-priced contract, as I mentioned, for the National Security cutter and actually got better pricing on all the assets that we are doing because we are not paying a middle man.

Mr. CLARKE. Wonderful. You answered my question, appreciate it.

Admiral PAPP. Thank you, sir.

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much, again, Admiral, for coming. You have given us a lot of food for thought.

I know I have got all my notes spread out all over here, about various things that you have said. As we think about our authorizing bill that is coming up this year.

Yet, I made a number of notes about various things. But I am sure that we are going to want to talk to you a little bit more about as we get into the specific detail about what we need to help to resource you with adequately.

We look forward to your report about the TWIC card. As well, if there are any kinds of legislative authorities that we haven't had a chance to talk about today, that you think we could help you with, or comes to you in a couple of days, please make sure that you get that information and suggestions to us.

It is very important.

As I say, we all have our missions. You have yours. We have ours in the Congress, to provide oversight and to help however we can to prioritize some of these resources and give you the, again, the kind of tools that you need to do your jobs so well, that you do.

But we, again, thank you for your service to the Nation.

This committee looks forward to continuing to work with you and the entire Coast Guard. I will notify the Members that the hearing record will be held open for 10 days for any additional questions that they may have.

At this time, we stand adjourned.

Admiral PAPP. Thank you, ma'am, and thank you for your support.

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN CANDICE S. MILLER OF MICHIGAN

Question 1a. Please provide us a status update on the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Program. Can you specifically address the following topics:

What is the status of the TWIC Reader Pilot Program, the TWIC Reader Pilot Program report, and the TWIC Reader Rulemaking? When does DHS plan to issue the final TWIC Reader Rule?

Question 1b. How is section 818 of the 2010 Coast Guard Authorization Bill (Pub. L. 111-281), which allows the escorting of workers without a TWIC card, being implemented?

Question 1c. What recommendations do you have concerning the recent TWIC security deficiencies identified in GAO Report 11-657? Do you believe any additional legislation is needed, and if so, what would this consist of?

Answer. The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program is managed jointly by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard has responsibility for the promulgation of a TWIC reader rule; the TSA manages the TWIC Reader Pilot Program and will compile the TWIC Reader Pilot Program report.

The Coast Guard is analyzing data from the TWIC Reader Pilot Program and the public comments received in response to its Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM). Once the Coast Guard has completed that process, it will finish the development of its rulemaking. As the Coast Guard evaluates the economic and operational impact on the maritime industry, the Coast Guard will continue to seek input and recommendations to develop and propose regulations requiring industry compliance.

The Coast Guard is in compliance with Section 818 of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010. Throughout the implementation of the TWIC program, the Coast Guard has been proactive in formulating TWIC escort policies and procedures. However, it is important to note that the authority to act as an escort for the purposes of the TWIC program is granted by the owner/operator of a facility or vessel. The Coast Guard also plans to address this escorting provision through a Navigation Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) update that addresses procedures for industry to follow should they choose to grant access to individuals with a pending application for a TWIC.

Finally, the Coast Guard does not believe additional legislation is needed to address recommendations made in the GAO Report 11-657. Since the GAO report was issued, DHS has initiated a comprehensive review of current internal controls with a specific focus on the controls highlighted in this report. DHS has established a high-level group to oversee the execution of the recommendations. The group has identified short- and long-term actions needed to address the points raised by GAO and is tracking implementation.

Question 2. Since 9/11, Coast Guard cutters, aircraft, and boats have increased the amount of time they spend on Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) by more than 900%. In order to grow the PWCS missions, have you had to decrease mission hours in other areas? I noticed that over the same period that PWCS missions increased by 970%, your counter-drug mission hours decreased by roughly 30%. Did you conduct less counter-drug operations because you needed to supplement PWCS?

Answer. The September 11, 2001 terror attacks brought increased visibility to the Coast Guard's traditional port-security responsibilities and Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) is a designated "homeland security mission" pursuant to the Homeland Security Act. The percentage of resource hours in support of the homeland security missions increased from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2003, while the percentage of non-homeland security missions decreased during that same

time period. Since fiscal year 2004, the percentage of resource hours devoted to the homeland security missions has gradually decreased, reflecting a more balanced approach to resource hour usage.

The Coast Guard consumed approximately 250,000 more resource hours (aircraft, boats, and cutters) in fiscal year 2009 than it did in fiscal year 2000. This increase can be attributed to the addition of approximately 300 boats and 30 coastal patrol boats to our pre-9/11 inventory level—most of the 970 percent increase cited can be linked to these new assets performing this statutory mission. Overall, small boats and patrol boats performed over 91 percent of all Coast Guard PWCS hours in fiscal year 2009. Hours expended for other missions can vary year to year due to many factors—asset availability, man-made, and natural disasters and other emergencies, emerging or declining threats, etc.—so a perceived shift to PWCS at the expense of other missions should not be assumed.

The Coast Guard expended approximately 33,000 less counter-drug resource hours in fiscal year 2009 than it did in fiscal year 2000. Major cutters (high and medium endurance) have been the primary contributor to counter-drug mission hours over the past 10 years. Due to decreasing availability of these rapidly aging assets, major cutters provided over 18,000 fewer counter-drug hours in fiscal year 2009 than in fiscal year 2000 and is the primary driver in the observed downward trend of counter-drug hours. Additionally, the loss of 14 110' patrol contributed to lower counter-drug hour totals, as these assets were another provider of counter-drug hours. It is also important to note the use of Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments aboard Department of Defense and Allied vessels. While these Detachments contribute greatly to Coast Guard counter-drug efforts, their employment is not reflected in Coast Guard counter-drug asset resource hour totals. Coast Guard capacity in this mission area has diminished over this time frame due to condition of and availability of our cutter fleet, and was not due to result of shifting emphasis to other mission areas. However, declining Coast Guard asset availability during fiscal years 2000–2009 did not significantly degrade Coast Guard counter-drug performance.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN PETER T. KING OF NEW YORK

Question 1. I understand that you have begun a “stem-to-stern” review of the deployable specialized forces that will examine the capabilities needed within each of the different types of security teams of the Coast Guard. Do you anticipate the review recommending reducing the capabilities of the Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs) or the Maritime Security and Response Team (MSRT)?

Answer. Recently, the Coast Guard undertook a comprehensive review of its Deployable Specialized Forces (DSF) to develop “deployable specialized forces of varying capabilities” to align with the 2010 Coast Guard Authorization Act. Coast Guard DSF to include Maritime Safety & Security Teams, the Maritime Security Response Team, Tactical Law Enforcement Teams, Law Enforcement Detachment Teams, Port Security Units and the National Strike Force, provide a wide array of capabilities to meet complex maritime threats. As such, the Coast Guard must ensure that DSF personnel are properly trained, equipped, and supported. The Commandant recently directed a flag officer led comprehensive review of all DSF elements. To carry out this direction, the Deputy Commandant for Operations chartered a review that is being led by the Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security, and Stewardship.

The Coast Guard’s DSF “Stem to Stern Review” is an internal review involving a broad cross-section of Coast Guard subject matter experts. Significant third-party involvement is not planned. The review team is conducting an analysis of:

- A DSF Concept of Operations that defines how best to utilize and integrate all DSF units into the broader Coast Guard capabilities mix;
- Updated training and standardization plans;
- Recommended changes to Coast Guard personnel assignment policies; and
- An Integrated Program Management Plan for all DSF units.

The review took a holistic approach to DSF to determine how the Coast Guard could best meet its requirements. The details about specific DSF units and their capabilities have not been fully developed.

Question 2. The 2010 Coast Guard Authorization Act directed the creation of an additional “enhanced” team to serve as a Maritime Security and Response Team (MSRT) on the West Coast. How and when do you plan to implement this provision? Where will the second team be located and will it have similar capabilities to the first MSRT?

Answer. The Coast Guard has not determined a location or composition for a second enhanced team. The Coast Guard’s Deployable Specialized Forces “Stem to

Stern Review” will provide information necessary to making such determinations, as discussed in the answer to Question No. 3.

Question 3a. There are currently five Interagency Operations Centers (IOCs) located in Charleston, Hampton Roads, Jacksonville, Detroit, and Seattle.

Do these centers provide a more integrated and secure law enforcement posture in these harbors?

Question 3b. Why were these five locations chosen as opposed to other harbors?

Question 3c. What specific authorities and resources would be needed to set up IOCs in the other Coast Guard sectors in our harbors with the highest levels of risk?

Answer. The *SAFE Port Act of 2006* mandated the establishment of Interagency Operations Centers (IOC) in all high-priority ports to better plan, coordinate, and execute operations among interagency partners, primarily in the context of maritime security. The Secretary has designated the Coast Guard as the lead agency to establish IOCs and directs that IOCs are to be “organized to fit the security needs, requirements, and resources of the individual port area at which each is operating.” Based on vulnerability assessments, high-priority ports were identified for purposes of FEMA grant-making (only seven port areas are considered Group 1, highest risk). The Coast Guard, in close collaboration with DHS offices, components, and other Government agencies in the ports, is in the process of more broadly improving maritime port interoperability through the establishment of the IOC framework at all key ports. “All key ports” is defined by Coast Guard as the major ports represented by 35 Coast Guard Sector Commands. These 35 Sectors encompass 100 percent of the U.S. maritime ports and borders. In the near future, the Coast Guard plans to declare at least 25 of these ports to have established an initial operating capability in their IOCs.

The five locations identified above have been some of the locations of preliminary and/or prototype IOC efforts with other agencies in the last 5 to 7 years. The lessons learned regarding integrated and secure operations (law enforcement as well as all hazards, all threats) at these locations are being incorporated into the overall IOC concept being deployed Nation-wide as stated above.

Question 4. What role does the Coast Guard have in the Port Security Grant Program? How important do you feel Port Security Grants are in ensuring the security of our harbors?

Answer. Federal Emergency Management Agency Grant Programs Directorate (FEMA/GPD) is the grant administrator for the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) and is responsible for designing and operating the administrative mechanisms needed to implement and manage the program. The Coast Guard provides FEMA/GPD subject matter expertise on maritime security issues.

The PSGP funds eligible projects that close or mitigate maritime security risk gaps and provides funds for maritime transportation infrastructure security activities to implement Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans (AMSPs) and facility security plans (FSPs) among port authorities, facility operators, and State and local government agencies required to provide port security services. Owners/operators of Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA)-regulated facilities and vessels are the first line of detection and defense against a terrorist attack in the ports. The PSGP provides funding to offset the costs of maritime security risk mitigation projects to private and public security providers and incident mitigation responders. The program supports increased port-wide risk management, enhanced domain awareness, training and exercises, expansion of port recovery and resiliency capabilities, and further capabilities to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from attacks involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other non-conventional weapons.

Question 5. What programs does the U.S. Coast Guard have in place or under development to assure that a shielded nuclear bomb or nuclear materials for a dirty bomb do not reach a U.S. seaport?

Answer. The Coast Guard leverages its unique maritime security authorities, capabilities, and partnerships to mitigate risk and improve security in our domestic ports, on the high seas, and in ports abroad. The Coast Guard’s overarching strategy is to increase maritime border security through a layered security system that begins beyond the country’s physical borders. The Coast Guard conducts inspections of foreign ports, maintains maritime domain awareness, employs cutters, aircraft and boats offshore, conducts inspections and boardings of vessels, in the Nation’s ports the Coast Guard, along with our Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners, working in concert with port stakeholders patrol our waters and critical infrastructure, conduct vessel escorts, and inspect vessels and facilities. The Coast Guard’s mix of cutters, aircraft, and boats—all operated by highly proficient personnel—allow the Coast Guard to maximize its unique authorities to exercise layered and

effective security through the entire maritime continuum from overseas to the critical ports within our homeland.

Furthermore, the Coast Guard works closely with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), the Department of Energy, Customs and Border Protection and other Federal agencies to ensure that our program aligns with and contributes to on-going efforts toward building a layered, integrated, defense in-depth global nuclear detection architecture.

In 2003, the Coast Guard implemented a Coast Guard-wide Maritime Radiation Detection Program. The program provides all Coast Guard boarding and inspection teams with human portable radiation detectors with the goal to detect and interdict radiological threats as far offshore as possible and to expand boardings to counter the small vessel threat. Specifically, USCG nuclear/radiation detection capability includes over 5,000 pager-sized, personnel radiation detectors, commonly referred to as PRDs, over 800 hand-held, radioisotope identification devices (RIIDs) and over 200 backpack type, wide-area radiological search systems. Coast Guard radiation detection and identification equipment is deployed on: 210 cutters; 190 boat stations; 35 Sectors; 11 Maritime Safety and Security Teams; the Maritime Security Response Team; 2 Tactical Law Enforcement Teams; 3 National Strike Force Strike Teams, and 60 other Operational/Training Units. This capability is sustained and strengthened by partnerships with other Federal, State and local, private and international organizations. This layered approach to security, leverages technology and partnerships to enhance detection consistent with the goals of DHS' Small Vessel Security Strategy.

Overall, USCG strategy, policy, tactics, techniques, and procedures are in alignment with the DNDO's Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) and the Coast Guard's Maritime Radiation Detection Program is consistent with the requirements of National Security Presidential Directives—43/Homeland Security Presidential Directive—14, and Presidential Decision Directive—41, Nuclear and Radiological Alarm Adjudication and Resolution Process, which is applicable to both domestic and international situations.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MICHAEL T. MCCAUL OF TEXAS

Question 1. The Department of Homeland Security has reported that intelligence seized from the bin Laden raid showed that al-Qaeda is interested “in targeting oil tankers and commercial infrastructure at sea.” There is a large amount of oil and energy production infrastructure within the Port of Houston. What is the Coast Guard doing in response to this heightened threat?

Answer. The information derived from the bin Laden raid with regard to “targeting oil tankers and commercial infrastructure” was not specifically focused on U.S. ports. The information revealed al-Qaeda's focus was broad with the goal of hindering U.S. oil supplies. This threat posed to oil tankers and commercial infrastructure by al-Qaeda is not new.

The Coast Guard uses a layered security approach to counter maritime risks and threats. This approach takes into account that the marine industry operates under rules and regulations spelled out in the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (an international convention) or the Maritime Transportation Security Act (domestic regulations), in an effort to prevent terrorist incidents from occurring on commercial ships and in port facilities. If actionable intelligence is received, and more security measures are necessary, additional requirements or guidance is conveyed through a Coast Guard-issued Maritime Security (MARSEC) Directive, Port Security Advisory, or through ad hoc industry meetings by leveraging existing relationships with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), or through close relationships with trade organizations such as Intertanko, the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), and Recognized Security Organizations. The Coast Guard can issue MARSEC directives to U.S. flagged vessels operating anywhere in the world, and can impose additional security measures for foreign flag vessels when they operate in U.S. waters. The proper execution of vessel and facility security plans, by U.S. and foreign operators can help provide safeguards against terrorist activity.

Immediately following the raid, the Coast Guard coordinated efforts with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop the Joint Intelligence Bulletin that was shared with oil and natural gas industry members. Furthermore, DHS hosted, and the Coast Guard participated in, a teleconference and a meeting with oil and natural gas industry members to discuss the intelligence and remind industry members to remain vigilant when implementing their security plans.

Question 2. I have received the Coast Guard's records concerning drug and migrant interdictions over the past 15 years. I am concerned that in 2010, the Coast

Guard seized less than a third of the cocaine that the service recovered in 2005. Likewise, the size of marijuana seizures and migrant interdictions have both decreased by more than 70% from previous high levels. Why do you think your seizure levels have dropped so dramatically? Is it because more drugs and migrants are transiting across the land borders? Is it because your assets are ageing and are not able to deploy or remain on-scene as long as in the past? Or is it because Coast Guard assets are spending more time focusing on different missions, such as port security, and thus they are not spending as much time on drug and migrant interdiction?

Answer.

Contraband Interdiction Decrease

The Coast Guard utilizes a “defense in depth” strategy by forward-deploying cutters and aircraft close to the source zone of the contraband and at the arrival locations near U.S. maritime borders in the United States. Additionally, the Coast Guard leverages U.S. Navy and Allied nation ships to enhance presence and expand interdiction opportunities by embarking law enforcement detachments on these platforms. Historically, approximately 90 percent of all cocaine moving toward the United States from South America travels via maritime routes in the transit zone to Central America and Mexico. The narcotics are then predominantly transported via land routes to, and over, the U.S.-Mexico Border. The “defense in depth” strategy allows the Coast Guard, working with the U.S. Southern Command via Joint Interagency Task Force—South (JIATF–S), to deploy assets to interdict the maritime conveyances prior to them reaching their transshipment destinations in Central America and Mexico.

The Coast Guard removed 32.3 metric tons of marijuana in fiscal year 2009, which was the most removed since fiscal year 1997. The 16.5 metric tons of marijuana that the Coast Guard removed in fiscal year 2010 is well above the 10-year average, and is the second-highest since 2002.

The Coast Guard attributes the significant decline of contraband removed in fiscal year 2010 to the following factors:

- Reduced Coast Guard asset/resource availability due to equipment casualties and increased maintenance demands associated with operating an aging fleet;
- Major contingency response operations diverting surface and air (detection and interdiction) assets from the drug interdiction mission (i.e., earthquake in Haiti and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico);
- Increasingly sophisticated and evolving Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) tactics;
- Drop in total non-commercial maritime flow of cocaine towards the United States.

A significant increase in major casualties and unscheduled maintenance days caused by the advancing age of the Coast Guard’s cutter fleet and aircraft reduced the availability of deployable assets, both maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and major cutters, operating in the drug transit zone in support of JIATF–S. In fiscal year 2010, JIATF–S lost 548 major cutter days as a result of unscheduled vessel maintenance. Additionally, the early loss of three 179 patrol craft due to structural issues in fiscal year 2010 had a negative impact on overall cutter patrol days, limiting the available hours for mission allocation.

The Coast Guard’s response to the earthquake in Haiti and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico also affected resource hour allocation. Many of the Coast Guard’s major cutters, MPA, and ship capable helicopters were deployed or diverted in support of these two responses. JIATF–S lost an estimated 675 MPA hours and 305 cutter days as a result. The Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron (HITRON), which is the Coast Guard unit primarily responsible for providing Airborne Use of Force (AUF), diverted aviation detachments from counter-drug operations in both the Eastern Pacific and Western Caribbean to support relief efforts for the earthquake in Haiti. Additionally, HITRON provided 219 days of aerial support to Deepwater Horizon, which was originally designated for support to JIATF–S.

Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) continuously modify their smuggling methods and routes to thwart law enforcement counternarcotics efforts. An example is the advent of Self Propelled Fully Submersible (SPFS) vessels to smuggle large loads (6–10 metric tons) via offshore routes. The SPFS’ ability to smuggle large loads, travel submerged only needing to surface for a few hours each day to recharge batteries, or submerge for short periods to avoid detection, greatly challenges the Coast Guard’s ability to detect and intercept these stealth craft. Another current trend has fishing vessels leaving port along with 2 to 6 panga-style go-fast vessels, a few of which will engage in legitimate fishing while others will bounce from fish-

ing vessel to fishing vessel carrying small loads of cocaine in hidden compartments towards their final offload destination. All the pangas will scatter if a law enforcement asset is detected nearby, making it extremely difficult to determine which one is the drug-laden boat. Additionally, DTOs continued to use go-fast vessels primarily travelling the Central American littoral regions with smaller loads of drugs. By using more vessels with fewer drugs aboard each, they reduce the risk of losing large loads. Both tactics challenge the limited law enforcement assets' ability to cover the extremely large transit zone. Consequently, while the number of vessels seized has remained fairly constant, the average load size removed per event for the Coast Guard over the past 4 years has steadily decreased from 5,473 lbs per event in fiscal year 2007 to 1,659 lbs per event in fiscal year 2010, nearly a 70 percent reduction.

Last, reporting indicates there was a reduction in cocaine being smuggled through the transit zone from 1,067 metric tons via non-commercial maritime means in fiscal year 2009 to 682 metric tons in fiscal year 2010, a 36 percent reduction. This is likely a result of more effective supply reduction efforts combined with improved law enforcement successes in source countries.

Migrant Interdiction Decrease

Decreases in migrant interdictions are a function of a decrease in immigration to the United States combined with improved law enforcement results and successful prosecutions of smugglers. Migrant flow has steadily decreased since 2005, primarily due to the following reasons:

- Implementation of biometrics use in the Mona Pass in 2006, which has enabled prosecutions and reduced recidivism.
- Passage of law in Dominican Republic, which provides for prosecution of smugglers (2006).
- Reduced job opportunities in United States due to economic downturn (Dec 2007–Jul 2009).
- Successful prosecution of smugglers in South Florida.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. BENJAMIN QUAYLE OF ARIZONA

Question. I understand that the Coast Guard canceled its own UAV development program in 2007, and is now partnering with the Navy and CBP to test different types of UAVs. Does the Coast Guard plan to procure any UAVs in the future, and if so, when? How will these assets enhance maritime security?

Answer. The Coast Guard terminated the Deepwater Vertical Takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VUAV) procurement, Eagle Eye, in June 2007 due to developmental risks and projected costs above the Acquisition Program Baseline. The Coast Guard's procurement strategy is to acquire cutter-based and mid-altitude land-based UAS, while emphasizing commonality with existing Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense programs. To that end, the Coast Guard is now in the pre-acquisition "Need" phase, and will continue to progress pending "Analyze/Select" phase funding.

Land and cutter-based UASs, with their ability to provide persistent, wide-area maritime surveillance in challenging operational environments, serve as a cost-effective means to provide surveillance capability when and where it is most needed. Considering these characteristics, the Coast Guard is evaluating existing cutter-based and mid-altitude land-based UAS options. Cutter-based UAS will provide tactical commanders with a short-range surveillance capability, employing state-of-the-art sensors, communications suites, and increased persistence, providing greater maritime surveillance, detection, and communications capability, and effectively extending a cutter's surveillance coverage by as much as 225 percent. Land-based UAS will provide strategic commanders with a wide-area surveillance capability, employing state-of-the-art sensors, communications suites, and increased persistence with sorties in excess of 18 hours. In either case, these capabilities provide far greater surveillance time per sortie than their manned counterparts at a fraction of the cost.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. SCOTT RIGELL OF VIRGINIA

Question 1. I was surprised to hear that you recently canceled the Coast Guard's joint training with the Navy SEALs. Some believe that this was an opportunity to build up counter-terrorism expertise that could be brought back to the Coast Guard and used to enhance your law enforcement and security teams, including the Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs), and especially the Maritime Security and Response Team (MSRT), which operates out of Chesapeake, VA. Can you tell me why this program was cancelled?

Answer. The program has not been cancelled. There are currently three Coast Guard personnel operational and two in training with the Navy SEALs. The Coast Guard did not assign any new personnel to the SEALs in 2010 or 2011, and no decision has yet been made for 2012. The personnel in the program have 5 to 6 years remaining before they return to the Coast Guard.

In addition, the Coast Guard is working with the Naval Special Warfare Training Center in Coronado, CA to determine which training courses there may be appropriate for Coast Guard Deployable Specialized Forces personnel. Where we can identify synergies within appropriate courses, we will use the training to help foster our continued fruitful working relationship between Naval Special Warfare Homeland Defense missions and Coast Guard Homeland Security missions.

Question 2. America's Waterways Watch (AWW) is the equivalent of the "See Something, Say Something" campaign for recreational and commercial boaters. However, unlike the "See Something, Say Something" campaign, AWW does not grant immunity from liability for people who report suspicious activities. How important is it for boaters to have immunity if they report suspicious activities? Do you feel that boaters may choose not to report suspicious behavior if they feel that there may be repercussions?

Answer. The general public, through the America's Waterway Watch program, provide critical assistance to the Coast Guard in its efforts to disrupt terrorist activities against the homeland. However, persons who report suspicious activities may always face potential litigation. The degree to which they might seek protection is governed by that which might be available under law.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JEFF DUNCAN OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Question 1. The DHS Small Vessel Security Implementation plan was published earlier this year. As I am sure you know, there are a lot of recreational boaters in the Charleston area. How are we partnering with the boating public to mitigate this threat? What resources are being tied to the DHS Small Vessel Security Implementation plan to ensure it is effective?

Answer. Charleston actively engages in building strong partnerships and fostering open dialogue among all Federal, State, and local authorities in conjunction with engaging the private sector and raising awareness of the general public. Addressing the four goals of the plan, Charleston applies the following:

1. Develop and leverage a strong partnership with the small vessel community: Sector Charleston leverages the use of the local Auxiliary (roughly 800 personnel) and Sector Prevention staff with promoting the "America's Waterway Watch." This National awareness program informs and stresses public notification to Government officials when suspicious activity is witnessed. The Auxiliary is also heavily engaged in educating our local boating community through instructional programs and outreach at key areas such as marinas, dive shops, and marine supply vendors. Also, through numerous outreaches in public affairs (the latest being "Safe Boating Week"), Sector Charleston continues to stay at the forefront with boating safety and security issues with the public.

2. A coherent plan with a layered, state-of-the-art approach: Through the SeaHawk Interagency Operations Center (IOC), the unified command (UC) meets daily to review all source intelligence and information concerning pending vessel arrivals. The UC develops a common risk picture, coordinates activities between agencies, creates a risk-based resource allocation plan and schedules multi-agency prevention, deterrence, and information-gathering operations.

Sector Charleston created the small vessel threat working group that incorporates the collaboration of Federal, State, and local authorities, focused on reducing the threat of small vessels in the Sector AOR. This is accomplished by coordinating efforts and conducting planned operations that identify, interdict, and inspect targeted vessels during times of heavy traffic on the ICW and within the harbor.

3. Leverage technology to enhance the ability to detect, determine intent, and, when necessary, interdict suspicious small vessels: At this stage, Sector Charleston relies on the patrols of the CG and local marine units for identification of possible (small boat) threats. Some local authorities have maritime radiation and nuclear detection equipment. The Sector employs the "Hawkeye" system that incorporates the use of cameras and radar. This system was designed primarily for detection of commercial traffic and has limited ability to track small, recreational traffic. This system does not extend past the Port of Charleston. There have been on-going strategies through the use of Port Security Grants and the AMSC to enhance the technology at the Sector. Over the last 10 years, the AMSC has approved funding of five patrol vessels (19'-27') and repowering eight existing patrol vessels to LE agen-

cy marine units in the Metro-Charleston area. Additional cameras for the SeaHawk wireless network have also been approved to extend systems coverage.

4. Enhance coordination, cooperation, and communication with all partners: The SeaHawk IOC focuses on day-to-day interagency collaboration; integration of “agency-unique, yet complementary” operations; the sharing of field-level intelligence to create situational awareness and the daily risk-based allocation of Federal, State, and local maritime safety and security resources. In addition, Sector Charleston established a local “LE Council” that meets the last Thursday of every month. Membership consists of personnel from all local and State law enforcement agencies, as well as Coast Guard personnel from Sector and Stations. Meetings are designed to provide a forum by which all parties can communicate and share ideas and needs. Operations are planned, high-profile events are discussed, and general items of interest are addressed to the group for further discussion.

Question 2. Is the USCG currently working towards standard operating procedures for State and local law enforcement boats and teams to ensure optimal results? Is this a problem with the sharing of information, or simply a problem with non-standard tactics? What can we do to help rectify this problem?

Answer. The Coast Guard is developing standard operating procedures for Federal and non-Federal maritime law enforcement officers to address, in part, the absence of a uniform standard of training.

Prior to 2008, the Coast Guard and its partners identified two operational gaps hindering cooperative Federal/non-Federal maritime law enforcement and, by extension, their collective force-multiplier effect: (1) The absence of a uniform standard of training, and (2) the need for training in tactical operations at all levels of government. In 2008, the National Association of State Boating Law Administrators (NASBLA), partnering with the Coast Guard Office of Boat Forces, launched the Boat Operations and Training Program (BOAT) Program, a National training system designed to develop and compliment the capabilities of maritime law enforcement officers at all levels of government. The BOAT Program, modeled on the Coast Guard’s boat forces training framework, provides a de facto National standard for the training, qualification, credentialing, and typing of maritime law enforcement and rescue personnel. The adoption and implementation of the BOAT Program effectively provides a National standard, and such standardization should facilitate the interaction of maritime law enforcement agencies and their collective ability to act as force multipliers. In the interim, the Coast Guard continues to develop operating procedures for Federal and non-Federal maritime law enforcement officers.

Question 3a. This subcommittee has done extensive work on achieving “operational control” of the Southwest and Northern Borders.

In your opinion, what would “operational control” of the maritime border look like, in accordance with the definition of “operational control” from the Secure Fence Act of 2006?

Question 3b. Do you feel we have achieved “operational control” of the maritime borders? If not, what additional resources would be needed to do so?

Answer. The Secure Fence Act of 2006 defines operational control as “the prevention of all unlawful entries into the United States, including entries by terrorists, other unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other contraband”. While the Coast Guard has not achieved full operational control of the maritime borders according to this definition, the Coast Guard’s Maritime Governance Model is designed to achieve this control through a layered defense consisting of intelligence, maritime domain awareness, and interdiction assets. Maritime regimes, Maritime Domain Awareness, and operational capabilities are the interconnecting parts that shape the strategy. The fundamental concept of the Coast Guard’s Maritime Governance model is a solid grounding in risk-informed decision-making. The use of risk-informed decision-making allows the Coast Guard to maximize the employment of its limited resources to address the highest-risk targets entering the United States through the maritime border.

The Coast Guard developed a High Interest Vessel evaluation process, imposes conditions of entry, and established Annex I to the Maritime Operation Threat Response plan addressing the highest-risk crew members, therefore focusing the limited resources on boarding only the highest-risk vessels. In accordance with our multi-mission authorities, the Coast Guard field units have met these requirements by diverting operational assets when needed to higher-risk security missions. These actions have improved the Coast Guard’s ability to deter, detect, and disrupt any potential unlawful entry into the United States via the maritime border, but operational gaps will always exist given the nature and extent of the U.S. coastline.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY RANKING MEMBER HENRY CUELLAR OF TEXAS

Question. The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 (Pub. L. No. 111–281) included a provision that required the Coast Guard to prepare a mission requirement analysis for the navigable portions of the Rio Grande. This analysis was due to Congress on January 15, 2011. Please provide the committee with the status of this mission requirement analysis, including the estimated date of delivery to Congress.

Answer. The draft Rio Grande Mission Analysis Requirement is undergoing final review by the Coast Guard. Following the testimony of the Commandant before the House Homeland Security Committee, the Coast Guard updated the report to provide additional information to more fully address expanded Coast Guard presence on the Rio Grande. The updated report has been transmitted to the administration for review and release.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI

Question. On behalf of Congressman Richmond, Ranking Member Thompson would like Admiral Papp to respond in writing with his assessment of the Corps of Engineers' plan for dredging the Mississippi River, especially the Lower Mississippi River. Mr. Richmond would also like Admiral Papp to discuss whether the lack of dredging is making the river less safe for large ships to travel.

Answer. In the budget, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) uses performance measures to allocate the available operation and maintenance funding, which is limited Nation-wide. The Coast Guard works closely with USACE and other key stakeholders to maintain navigation safety and mitigate risks due to shoaling wherever possible to minimize the potential for marine casualties. The safety of the waterway and transiting vessels is paramount and the Coast Guard, working with the USACE and vessel pilots, continually analyzes risk based on prevailing channel depth and width and takes appropriate measures to ensure maximum safety on the river. USACE provides the maximum channel dimensions possible within available funds and provides channel surveys to navigation stakeholders, who then determine what vessels can safely transit the channel and the conditions under which the vessel transits will be made.

For example, conditions in a waterway may require larger ships to wait for high tide, light load the vessel, or offload a portion of their cargo on to smaller vessels or barges, to allow the vessel to transit the waterway safely. If the channel shoals, vessel draft restrictions, vessel passing restrictions, or navigation during daylight hours may be imposed to maintain safe navigation.

In the past, in response to changes in channel conditions in the waterway, vessel draft and navigation restrictions have been imposed at Southwest Pass and elsewhere in the Mississippi River system in order to maintain navigational safety. Based on channel conditions, which are dynamic, and the dredging performed by the Corps, risks due to shoaling could increase or decrease in the future. In that event, the maritime community may see a change in draft and navigation restrictions reflecting what is needed to mitigate the risk.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ OF CALIFORNIA

Question. The United States Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 mandates that the Coast Guard coordinate with port owners and operators to provide escorted access for any TWIC applicant who has a pending TWIC application and needs to perform work in a secure or restricted area. I have heard from individuals within the port industry that Coast Guard has not changed its escorting policy and instead plans to simply reissue voluntary guidance. Is Coast Guard, in accordance with the law, coordinating with port owners and operators to ensure that TWIC escorting is being provided? If so, how is this being done and is Coast Guard reaching out to employees and to labor organizations to help both groups understand the TWIC escorting process and requirements?

Answer. The Coast Guard is in compliance with the law to ensure that Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) escorting is being provided by coordinating with port owners and operators during facility inspections and industry outreach efforts, such as Area Maritime Security Committee meetings and Port Wide Industry Day meetings. Throughout the implementation of the TWIC program, the Coast Guard has been proactive in formulating TWIC escort policies and procedures. However, it is important to note that the authority to act as an escort for the purposes of the TWIC program is granted by the owner/operator of a facility or vessel.

The Coast Guard provided the following TWIC escort related documents to industry:

- Navigation and Inspection Circular 03–07 “Guidance for the Implementation of the TWIC Program in the Maritime Sector;”
- TWIC Program: Small Entity Guide of Applicants;
- TWIC Program: Small Entity Guide for Owners and Operators; and
- Five TWIC/Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) Policy Advisory Council (PAC) Decisions related to escorting (PAC 02–07, 02–08, 03–08, 02–09, and 03–09).

The Coast Guard guidance to the maritime industry provides facility operators with options to meet escort requirements; however, the TWIC escort provisions are not intended to be used in lieu of the TWIC. Workers requiring frequent access to MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels should obtain a TWIC. Therefore, the facility operator may decide to not provide escorting procedures for these workers, or may limit the amount of time escorts are provided.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. SHEILA JACKSON LEE OF TEXAS

Question. I am concerned with the continued delays with full implementation of the TWIC program. Please provide the committee with an updated time line for full implementation of the program. Your response should include a delivery date for the TWIC pilot Congressional report and an anticipated date for release of the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for the TWIC reader rule.

Answer. The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program is managed jointly by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard has responsibility for the promulgation of a TWIC reader rule; the TSA manages the TWIC Reader Pilot Program and will compile the TWIC Reader Pilot Program report.

The Coast Guard is analyzing data from the TWIC Reader Pilot Program and the public comments received in response to its Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM). Once the Coast Guard has completed that process, it will finish the development of its rulemaking. As the Coast Guard evaluates the economic and operational impact on the maritime industry, the Coast Guard will continue to seek input and recommendations to develop and propose regulations requiring industry compliance.

