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RESCUE ASSAULT FORCES--INTEGRATED STRATEGIC ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTeR OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JOE DOUGLAS PRICHARD, MAJ, USA
B.S., Ouachita Baptist University, 1967

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1982

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**Author:** Prichard, Joe Douglas

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The study includes a historical review of force development as a function of national security objective since the end of World War II. The historical
aspect identifies those major weapons system programs which will likely dominate defense expenditures in the decade(s) ahead.

The concept of an inadequate counterterrorist strategy will focus on the threat to U.S. National Security posed by changes taking place in the Third World. The increased U.S. dependence on foreign Third World natural resources and Soviet geostrategic gains are presented as a basis for challenging the current force development emphasis on nuclear and conventional forces.

To meet the challenge of the possible inadequacy of current counterterrorist priority, a corollary to this thesis examines the potential contribution to National Security which could be made by a permanently organized rescue assault force equipped with the best available strategic transport technology.
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Director, Graduate Degree Programs.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

RESCUE ASSAULT FORCES--INTEGRATED STRATEGIC ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY,
by Major Joe Douglas Prichard, USA, 173 pages.

This study examines the adequacy of present U.S. counterterrorist strategy and force development as an integral part of U.S. National Security policies. Emphasis is placed on countering the hostage and kidnapping duration event forms of terrorism and their destabilizing effect on U.S.--Third World relationships.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction ..........................................................</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Endnotes .......................................................</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Development of National Force Structure and Strategy ..........</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense Strategy Support and Development ................</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Military Force Structure .........................................</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Influence on Force Development ........................</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Endnotes .......................................................</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Challenge of the Third World .....................................</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Dependence on Third World Resources ..........................</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geostrategic Issue of the Third World .............................</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third World Terrorism ................................................</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of U.S.--Third World Relationship ..........................</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Endnotes .......................................................</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. An Assessment of Strategy for Third World .....................</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Endnotes .......................................................</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. The Potential Role of Technology in Counterterrorist Operations</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background of Technology in Warfare ...............................</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology in Counterterrorism: The Iran Raid ....................</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and Development Process--Obstacle to Limited Use Technology</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Incentive--Impact on Limited Use Technology ..........</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Endnotes .......................................................</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Conclusions ..........................................................</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary .................................................................</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure and Utility of a Rescue Assault Force ...................</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Contributions of Proposed Rescue Assault Force</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Limitations of Technology .......................................</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Grand Strategy ......................................................</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Endnotes .......................................................</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Recommendations ...................................................</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Endnotes .......................................................</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Appendix A  
  Technological Concepts for Strategic Transitional Transport .. | |
| Appendix B  
  Planning, Programming and Budget System--Executive Summary ... | |
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-1 Force Employment Spectrum</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1 Comparison of U.S. Military Investment Outlays with Estimated Dollar Costs of Soviet Military Investment Activities</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2 National Defense Outlays as a Percent of GNP</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 Comparison of Defense Outlays</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-1 Import Reliance of 8 Critical Minerals and Metals</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-2 U.S. Stockpile of Critical Metals</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-3 America's Strategic Stockpile</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4 Comparative Oil Traffic</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5 Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents 1968-80</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-1 Warfare Threat Spectrum</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-2 Geostategic Flanking Maneuver for the Defeat of Democracy</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-3 Warfare Threat Spectrum Based on Long-Term Survival of Democracy</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-4 Recuperation of Consumption</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5 Economic Survival Threat Spectrum</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In his address before the Association of the United States Army's 1981 annual meeting, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, General Glenn K. Otis, made the following points:

The Army must not overlook the utility of elite special-mission units in anti-terrorism operations. Of the major threats with which the Army must be prepared to deal, terrorism is perhaps (the) most significant at least in terms of the likelihood of its occurrence. "We've got to be ready to handle it, not just today, but for the foreseeable future."

We must equip, train, maintain and pay for a strong anti-terrorist force," for terrorism can be deterred "if they know they will face a force like the Special Air Service Regiment in Britain—we need that kind of capability."

From this public statement it appears that the higher echelon planners within the Army are convinced of the need to develop a force capable of effectively dealing with international terrorism that affects the U.S. and her allies.

There are two components to be submitted in this thesis. The first aspect contends that the present military counterterrorist strategy is not adequately integrated on a priority basis with other military strategies designed to meet national security objectives. This concept will be studied particularly in light of the increasing threat to U.S. National Security posed by Third World instabilities. To meet the challenge of this view of inadequacy the second aspect of this thesis will be to examine the potential contribution to
National Security which could be made by a permanently organized rescue assault force equipped with the best available strategic transport technology.

For this thesis the term strategy is intended to describe those decisions and actions taken at the national level which will determine how various threats are countered or deterred. Counterterrorism is used to describe those actions taken in response to a terrorist incident. Antiterrorism, which consists of active and passive measures designed to prevent occurrences of terrorism, will not be addressed to any great extent.

Regarding the first aspect of this thesis, there are several points to be presented within this study to support the contention of an inadequately prioritized counterterrorist strategy. In brief, the issues to be presented in support of this theme follow:

- Force development trends within the Department of Defense (DOD) are determined largely in response to national agency assessments of potential threat to the current national security objectives determined by the presidential administration in office.
- Long-range military force development often lacks consistency due to changes in presidential administrations and the corresponding changes in policy direction.
- The high dollar military procurement programs are long-range in nature and as such drive the existing force structure inherited by each succeeding administration. In effect the existing force structure often dictates or limits the military aspect of a president's international strategy.
- Current priorities in force development are oriented toward the traditional nuclear and conventional threats and perhaps are not adequately assessing the significance of the rapidly increasing threat posed by the Third World aspects of terrorism.
There is no broadly accepted definition of terrorism. Presently, the debate continues within the United Nations on a legal definition of terrorism which distinguishes between freedom fighters and criminals. For the purpose of this thesis, the general definition in Army Regulation 190-52 will be used: "The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals, often political or ideological in nature, through instilling fear, intimidation, or coercion. It usually involves a criminal act often symbolic in nature and intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims."

As explained earlier, there are two aspects of this thesis. The first part deals with the overall impact of a counter terrorism strategy on national security. With the broad aspect of national security in mind, it will frequently be more accurate to relate Third World threats and U.S.-Third World relationships in terms of low-intensity conflict, insurgency, or unconventional warfare. This is not intended to confuse but rather to refer to the level of conflict in any given example which poses the greatest potential threat to U.S. national security. The reader must keep in mind that terrorism in any form can be the prelude or concurrent activity of any of the escalating levels of low-intensity conflict (terrorism, insurgency, revolution, unconventional warfare, etc.). Therefore any low-intensity terminology used in this thesis also implies a potential use of terrorism at some point in the conflict. It must also be considered that low-intensity conflict has the potential to expand to mid-intensity conflict if the issues involved are sufficiently significant to national survival and other nations have the capability to become involved.
While part of this research will include the broad spectrum of terrorism, a narrow focus will be on the role of a rescue force in a situation such as occurred in Iran in 1979. The hostage form of terrorism has been selected as a model for study because it constitutes a "worst case" condition from the standpoint of the U.S. Government being able to directly influence the situation. In immediate event forms of terrorism such as bombings and assassinations, the counteractivities of evacuation, bomb defusing, and increased security measures can usually be carried out without threat to unwary or innocent victims. In a duration event such as a hostage or kidnapping situation, the terrorist holds an advantage of power in that his bargaining strength is contained in the threatened life of his hostages. As international terrorists gain more experience, the possibility exists that future hostages will be increasingly more difficult to rescue by force and will require better preparation on the part of the United States. The unwillingness of the United States to be blackmailed by terrorist groups is evident in the attitudes expressed by both Presidents Carter and Reagan. During the Iranian hostage situation, President Carter established the U.S. policy of no government concessions which condemns all terrorist acts as criminal and makes no concessions to blackmail. This policy also states that the United States will not pay, negotiate ransom, or release prisoners in exchange for hostages. This policy was given credibility as the United States demonstrated a determination of will by risking the lives of the Iran raid rescuers and the hostages rather than yielding to Iranian demands.
If the U.S. national policy toward terrorism is to be characterized by nonsubmission, then a well-trained force will be required to combat terrorism. This force must reflect the character, resolve, and determination of a nation concerned about the safety of its citizens abroad and its image as a world power.

Personally, I never had any political or moral regrets about the rescue mission. I felt that we owed it to all concerned to try to rescue our people once there was a good chance of success. At the time, the likely alternative seemed to be either their prolonged incarceration or their murder by the Iranians. My greatest worry was that we would not succeed in preserving secrecy and in achieving surprise. Little did I dream that our failure would involve technology, an area where America normally excels. I knew throughout that there were risks involved, but that was unavoidable. I felt then, as I feel now, that not to have tried, while having the capacity to try, would have been shameful and unworthy of America.

Zbigniew Brzezinski
April 1982

The term "rescue assault force" will be used in this study to describe a U.S. government sponsored special force with the sole mission of preparing and training for the rescue of international hostage and kidnap victims. The primary specialty of such a force would be the initial securing of the victim(s) from their captors hands. The skills required would include covert insertion of rescue personnel and possible violent actions to disarm the terrorist holding the hostage(s). The secondary skills desired would include the removal of the hostage(s) from the hostile environment with minimum destruction and the ability to coordinate and control any additional forces required in the rescue phase of a strategic rescue operation. This thesis will present a corollary to the potential contribution of such a rescue assault force. This theme will be the need to
incorporate the more technological advanced methods of strategic transport for a rescue assault force.

Surprise is a critical element of rescue operations. One of the most significant hindrances in achieving surprise is the strategic distance potentially involved in rescue operations. The distance from an operational staging base was a problem for the U.S. raid on Son Tay, the Israeli raid on Entebbe, and the U.S. attempted raid in Iran. In the latter case, the distance was a limiting factor which contributed to the failure of the mission. With strategic distances presenting such a formidable problem, it will be argued that a rescue assault force requires the capability to develop, procure, test, and train using the most advanced strategic transport means conceivable through modern technology. The terminology "strategic transitional transport" for this study includes more than the term implies. The problem and definition go beyond the basic transport from one point to another by strategic airlift. The requirement this thesis will explore is the need for the capability of a rescue force to depart a secure base, travel global strategic distances, and transition from a strategic deployment directly into a tactical rescue operation to secure hostages. To this add the requirement of maintaining optimum secrecy and achieving optimum surprise.

The technological problem of strategic transitional transport has been chosen for this thesis because it represents one of the greatest obstacles to successful rescue operations which need a priority solution. It also represents the type of large budget investment which would have to compete with other defense department funding under the present budget appropriation system. Because the current
funding strategy is focused on nuclear and conventional arms procure-
ment, and will likely remain so, this thesis will argue that strategic
transitional transport will require innovative technology to equal the
myriad challenges of international terrorist hostage events.

The remainder of this introductory chapter will outline the
specific issues and the purpose of each chapter in developing the
thesis.

(1) The trends of force development in meeting
challenges of U.S. national interests since World War
II and the impact of these trends affecting
development of a counterterrorist force.

(2) The increasing U.S. economic, political and
geostrategic dependence on Third World nations and the
need to secure U.S. interest abroad.

(3) The probability of a continuing terrorist threat
to U.S. interests by Third World nations as an economy
extension of national power.

(4) The historical contribution of technology to U.S.
military development and the potential role of
technology in counterterrorist operations.

The discussion in chapter 2 will review the events since the end
of World War II which indicate that nuclear strategic forces,
conventional mechanized forces in Europe, and development of rapid
deployable light infantry units for Middle East contingencies will
dominate defense spending in the 1980's. In reaching this conclusion,
a study will be made of several factors which have interacted for more
than three and a half decades since World War II to shape the present
military force structure. The factors in this study include: past
presidential administration national security policies, perceived
potential enemy threats during each administration, the degree of
public support for defense policies, and finally, the Congressional budget appropriations provided to achieve national defense objectives.

Chapter 3 will examine the rise of Third World powers and their increasing influence in world affairs. The United States has grown increasingly dependent on Third World nations for both fuel and nonfuel minerals. This examination will highlight the significance of this dependence as it affects U.S. national security and emphasizes the importance of being able to project U.S. military power to secure significant or vital interests when and if required to do so by the national command authority. Although not in the scope of this thesis, the more desirable solutions to terrorist hostage situations are clearly recognized. It is assumed that U.S. respect for Third World nations' sovereignty will continue to be respected and that foreign governments will join in efforts to prevent and resolve terrorist incidents through international accord and law. This thesis does not deny the use of negotiated settlements that do not violate the limits of current U.S. policy toward terrorists is the preferred nonviolent solution for obtaining the freedom of hostage victims. The thrust of this thesis is that if and when the presidential decision is made to employ force, that deliberate preparation will have been made to include the most unreserved implementation of U.S. technological superiority.

During the past two decades, the national security policies of the United States have become increasingly concerned over the rise of power and influence of Third World nations. The military aspect of U.S. national security is particularly significant in two areas of U.S. foreign policy issues related to Third World nations. First is
the economic aspect of maintaining U.S. access to vital resources in Third World countries. Second is the strategic significance of the geographic spread of communist control and influence over Third World nations.

Specifically, chapter 3 will highlight the significance of vital resources and the geostrategic spread of communist influence as it impacts on U.S. national security. The study in this chapter will be made for the purpose of investigating the degree of influence the above two factors may have with regard to the potential future incidence of terrorism involving U.S. interests abroad. The study of terrorism will include the trends which indicate the probable continued occurrence of terrorist activities against the U.S. and its Western allies.

The development of military strategies and force structure are presently designed to provide appropriate response to those areas of enemy threat perceived by the national security council advisors to the President as presenting the greatest security risks to the nation. The most current assessment focuses on the threat of nuclear war as the most serious risk to the survival of the U.S. nation state. The degrees of particular types of risk are also assessed as to the probability of their associated occurrence. A graphic representation of this assessment follows with the military forces appropriate to a deterrence or a counterresponse.
Having established the seriousness of the Third World threat in chapter 3, chapter 4 argues that the use of the above assessment may be incongruent with the stated national interests of the Reagan administration:  

Survive as a nation state.

Remain a global power.

This argument will be presented not only to challenge current strategy formulation, but to further suggest the impact a shift in risk assessment might have for the implementation of improved counterterrorist forces. These forces include the rescue assault forces introduced earlier as the subject of this thesis.
Chapter 5 faces the reality that even if strategic policies were to shift toward a new emphasis on counterterrorism, the program funding procedures of the Department of Defense and Congress would move too slowly to affect the rapid change which possibly needs to take place. Therefore, chapter 5 examines the potential use of technology as a quick and affordable contribution or solution to the strategic transitional transport and operational needs of current U.S. counterterrorist units. This study of technology will include a short review of the open source technology employed by the Iranian hostage rescue attempt in 1980. This review of the United States' most recent special rescue operation will serve to illustrate some of the difficult challenges of remote long-range operations which may again cause international political difficulties for the United States.

Conclusions will be made in chapter 6 to assess the potential contribution of rescue assault forces to national security and the survival of Western democracy.

Chapter 7 presents recommendations for further consideration which possibly could contribute to the solutions of the problems facing future use of rescue assault forces in counterterrorist hostage events. A special emphasis on recommendations for the technological development of strategic transitional transport is presented as additional recommendations at appendix 1.

In summary, this thesis will submit that the United States dependence on the Third World has increased so dramatically that current assessment and force development strategies may not adequately assess the threat and accurately prioritize the preparations for a military response. Since force development trends will likely remain
focused on nuclear strategic and conventional forces, the limited budget expenditures for counterterrorism might appropriately focus on the advantages offered by superior U.S. technology. The technological superiority may be a particular advantage with regard to solving the difficulties associated with rescue operations over global strategic distances.
CHAPTER 1 ENDNOTES


The viewpoints expressed represent the approved opinion of the Army as General Officer public addresses require DA approval. This opinion has been similarly voiced by the Secretary of the Army, also see: David C. Jones, United States Military Posture for FY 82 (1981), 111.


According to the widely-held theory of Mao Tse Tung, the First World consists of the two major superpowers (U.S. and U.S.S.R.); the developed countries of Australia, Canada, Europe, and Japan are the Second World; and the remaining lesser-developed countries in Africa, Asia (including China) and Latin America comprise the Third World.


In this address President Carter stated the U.S. would never yield to blackmail.


Although comments on terrorism are guarded, due to the fact the Iranian hostages were being released as he spoke, President Reagan admonished the enemies of freedom that the American people have the will to fight for peace. American's moral courage as a vital weapon was directed in an admonishment to those who practiced terrorism. Seven days later in a welcome home speech to the hostages, the President warned terrorists that the policy for future incidents would be one of swift and effective retribution.


Former President paid tribute to those raiu participants who died in the rescue attempt.


The cited publication consists of a reprint of the unclassified "Rescue Mission Report" conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff-Special Operations Review Group in August 1980. The group consisted of a five member General Officer panel which was chaired by Admiral Holloway.
CHAPTER TWO

DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL FORCE STRUCTURES AND STRATEGY

This chapter will review the historical development of U.S. national strategies since the end of WW II. For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to review how the United States has arrived at its present military force structure in terms of attempts made to protect U.S. national interests and support foreign policies. This study should make clear those evolutionary defense systems within the DOD which will likely remain "sacred cows" and, as such, remain unlikely to suffer at the expense of new military programs. The purpose of reviewing the historical development of force structure is to consider what possibility exists for quantum progress in funding technological development of the rescue assault force introduced in Chapter One.

Historically, the development and funding of U.S. forces has been in direct response to a need to protect the national interest of the United States. There have been as many definitions of national interest as there have been administrations, but basically, the interest remains much the same regardless of the rhetoric used by the National Command Authority to articulate them. U.S. interests, whether they be vital, significant or important interests have a tendency to evolve from U.S. ideology, economic and political concerns. Since WW II, our interests have been shaped by our concern in surviving as a democracy and maintaining global strength as a world power. As a participant in a world economic market, our economic
interests and therefore, our political and military interests extend beyond the U.S. geographical boundaries. This extension of interests is necessary to maintain access to sea lines of communication, access to economic markets and more importantly, in recent years, access to resources. Particularly significant is the access to raw materials and minerals of foreign nations. In order to survive as a nation, the majority of U.S. defense forces have been designed to respond to perceived nuclear and conventional threats by other nations and ideologies. Therefore, two forces are interacting in force development: -- global conventional power projection for economic and political security -- nuclear power for deterrence of perceived nuclear threats.  

More than any time in its history, the United States is faced with a multiplicity of military-related threats from external global sources. In Europe, NATO is faced by the Warsaw Pact nations with formidable conventional and tactical nuclear armies. The Soviet strategic nuclear threat persists from both inside the Soviet Union and from submarine launch platforms around the world. The Middle East and Indian Ocean Region remains a bubbling cauldron of instability which threatens interruption of vital oil resources to Western democracies. In the Caribbean and Latin America, communist expansion through leftist movements continues to threaten the geostrategic security of the U.S. southern flank. In Asia, the North-South Korean animosity threatens the security of that region. Additionally, the security of the Western world is threatened by acts of terrorism from factions such as Libya, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Red
Brigade and others. At this crucial time when increased military spending is part of the strategic solution, the United States is in the midst of an economic recession. As of this writing, both public and congressional popular support for increased defense spending appears to be waning in favor of retention of social and welfare programs and avoidance of record deficit spending.6

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY SUPPORT AND DEVELOPMENT

The successful support of any national defense strategy requires a cooperative integration of at least four factors:

-- The accurate assessment of perceived threats to national interests.

-- A national will supportive of U.S. involvement or participation in national strategies (military, political, or economic).

-- Congressional appropriations funding of defense needs to adequately finance the military forces required to enforce policy.

-- Popular political and public support for administration defense policies.

These factors separate national will from popular support; although closely related, they are not really the same. National will is better characterized by what the United States will do when pressed by external pressures or overt threats. Public opinion for defense spending has traditionally been nonsupportive. This nonsupport is usually reflected in congressional attitudes and directly affects appropriations for defense. As a result, congressional defense attitudes have traditionally perceived appropriations requests as either extravagant or inflated and therefore, have seldom financed the full measure of needs identified by military planners.7
Under the present system of defense planning, the President, with the advice of his national security advisors, identifies the threat and articulates a national defense policy for meeting that threat to the desired degree. Defense planners then identify the numbers and types of forces required to meet the prioritized needs in the defense policy. The DOD then submits a budget request to finance the required forces to Congress for approval. The difference in the amount the DOD requests, based on their perception of the need, and the money Congress actually approves has been traditionally referred to as "risk." In contemporary parlance of the Reagan administration, the risk has been referred to as the "margin of safety."  

U.S. MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE

The dual requirement to provide both strategic nuclear forces and conventional forces has been a challenge to every presidential administration since the dawn of the atomic age.

We must implement an overall strategic modernization program that decreases the vulnerability of our strategic forces, restores our strength relative to the Soviets and assures that the Kremlin is denied any prospect of success in nuclear conflict. Accordingly, in our review of the FY 1982 Air Force budget, we are determined to ensure that sufficient funding was provided to carry out the essential modernization of our B-1 bomber, ICBM, and air defense forces as well as related combat communication and control capabilities.

General Lew Allen, Jr
November 1981
Air Force Chief of Staff

Of the potentially violent situations faced by the nation "nuclear war is the least likely" to occur, while the requirement to have "responsive conventional forces" has taken on a new and urgent meaning.

General Edward Meyer
November 1981
Army Chief of Staff
Although these viewpoints appear predictably parochial to the service components they represent, the challenge to the U.S. military aspect of national security for the next decade lies in the reality that both of the officers are correct.

Although having achieved a nuclear monopoly at the end of World War II, the Truman administration actually did very little initially to provide direction for military force development. The administration, having completed a second installment on the "war to end all wars," focused its attention and efforts on America's desire for a return to normalcy. The United States, under public and congressional pressure, accomplished one of the fastest demobilizations in history. In less than a year following VJ Day the Army declined from 8.02 million to 1.89 million soldiers and by 1947 reached 1.4 million. President Truman's determination to balance the budget resulted in the "remainder" method of financing military expenditures. After all other domestic and foreign aid programs were budgeted, defense received the remainder. This reduction in resources left the Navy and Army (to include the Army Air Corps) to develop strategies for the "policy of containment" with existing resources. Added to the difficulty of scarce resources was the lack of specific national direction for planning and lack of cooperation among the services. All components--air, land, and sea--sought methods to prove that their own service could best employ the power of the atomic bomb. Faced with concern over Soviet aggression in Greece and Turkey in 1947, the Truman Doctrine was formed and the evolutionary process began which changed the national military strategy from the traditional concept of "mobilization" to the theory
of "deterrence." This latter concept appealed to the American people and Congress because it represented an alternative to a large standing army which has traditionally been opposed in the American ideology.

Eisenhower not only inherited the same rationale for active nuclear force development following the Korean Conflict, but additionally, he was faced with the increasing Soviet challenge in the nuclear arms race. The Eisenhower administration's policy became known as "massive retaliation" and relied upon the U.S. nuclear arsenal to deter both nuclear and limited war threats. The credibility of the latter was uncertain to potential adversaries and allies because it was clearly overly punitive for limited conflicts or aggression. In a statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in March 1954, Secretary Dulles acknowledged the limitations of nuclear deterrence and cited the need for the U.S. and its allies to maintain "air, sea and land power based on both conventional and atomic weapons" which could be applied "on a selective or massive basis as conditions may require." The purpose of these forces also included a "mobile reserve" for use in small-scale conflicts and to react to indirect aggression and subversion. In spite of the administration's public recognition of this requirement, nuclear deterrence remained the top priority.

Under Eisenhower's "new look programs" the decision was made that U.S. military policy would depend on nuclear weapons to meet contingencies less than general war. Nuclear systems continued to increase to offset a reduction in conventional forces. The strategic nuclear force development in the 1950's consumed as much as one third of the defense budget. This trend continued until 1966 when the Vietnam War took the lead in defense spending.
Faced with the simultaneous challenges of a growing Soviet nuclear arsenal and communist expansion throughout the world, the Kennedy administration developed the policy of "flexible response."

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend or oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty.

John F. Kennedy--Inaugural Address

Under this new policy, President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara attempted to develop a force structure to meet any level of threat with the appropriate selective response, either nuclear or conventional. In the early 60's, the Kennedy administration clearly recognized a dual nuclear and conventional mechanized threat from the U.S.S.R. along with their increased use of unconventional warfare and subversion for spreading communism to lesser developed countries. The establishment of a communist government in Cuba made the public more cognizant of this dual threat. The Army conventional forces were expanded from twelve to sixteen divisions and reserve and National Guard revitalized. To counter the growing communist unconventional threat, the U.S. Army Special Forces were expanded and improved.

With the Soviet Sputnik orbiting in space, a communist Cuba off the coast of Florida, the missile gap campaign issue and Soviet Premiere Khrushchev's prediction, "We will bury you," it was relatively easy for Kennedy to rally Congressional financial support to meet Soviet challenges on all fronts. This popular support for the arms race declined significantly, however, as the Vietnam War began to dominate defense spending in the late 60's. Figure 2-1, which follows, illustrates the comparative U.S. defense expenditures with
and without the cost of Southeast Asia (SEA) war. Also shown are comparative Soviet expenditures during the same period.  

**COMPARISON OF US MILITARY INVESTMENT OUTLAY WITH ESTIMATED DOLLAR COST OF SOVIET MILITARY INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES**

![Graph comparing US and Soviet military investment outlays with estimated dollar cost of Soviet military investment activities.](image)

**NOTES:**

INVESTMENT INCLUDES RDT&E, PROCUREMENT AND MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Figure 2-1. Comparison of U.S. Military Investment Outlays with Estimated Dollar Cost of Soviet Military Investment Activities.  
Source: Annual Report to the Congress by the Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 1983.

The national will of the U.S. in the post Vietnam era did not favor large defense spending. The numerous "great society" welfare programs initiated during the Johnson administration competed fiercely
for Congressional appropriations. Even though the size of the defense budget increased annually following the end of World War II, the buying power of the dollar in the 1970's continued to shrink as inflation increased. The actual gross national product vested in defense since 1955 has continued to decline except during the height of the Vietnam War era.

![National Defense Outlays as a Percent of GNP](image)

Figure 2-2. National Defense Outlays as a Percent of GNP

Source: The United States Budget in Brief FY 83 Office of Management and Budget.

The factors of less public support for defense spending and rampant inflation in the 1970's, along with the U.S.S.R.'s determination to be number one militarily, allowed the U.S.S.R. to surpass the U.S. defense establishment in both conventional and nuclear
arms. 26 Having extricated the U.S. from Vietnam in 1972, the Nixon administration was faced with the challenge of developing national security policies that were realistic in terms of a changing international community, the national will, and a declining economic posture. The Nixon policy concluded that nuclear superiority was impossible to maintain and an attempt to do so would only escalate the arms race. Therefore, a policy of "nuclear sufficiency" was adopted which promoted the concept that a sufficient counterforce was the best force level to maintain realistic deterrence.27

With the Vietnam War over, planners for U.S. Army forces focused their attention on the reestablishment of a strong conventional army. Two areas of potential conflict were identified. The first was the potential for a large mechanized and tactical nuclear war in Europe against a Soviet force which was expanding far beyond the size required for conventional defense of the Soviet homeland. The second threat was a recognition of the lessons learned in Korea and Vietnam that the requirement could arise to fight a small-scale limited war in some other part of the globe.28 This resulted in the "one and a half war" theory around which Army force structure would be developed throughout the 1970's.29 The research, development, and procurement of Army systems to support the strategy of a one and a half war concept in the 1970's were dominated primarily by research and development efforts to meet the challenges of mechanized and armor warfare in the European environment. The more expensive tactical systems included medium-range tactical and theater nuclear missiles, improved fighter-interceptor aircraft, electronically guided antitank systems and the technologically sophisticated M-1 Abrams main battle tank.
A paradox seems to exist from the preceding discussions between the forces developed and the most probable types of conflict to occur. DOD spending for nuclear forces since the end of World War II and expenses for conventional forces since the end of the Vietnam War have been focused on nuclear deterrence and a possible European war, which has been regarded as the least likely type of warfare to occur. The essence of nuclear deterrence depends upon the devastating horror of an intercontinental nuclear exchange. The destructive force is intended to discourage an enemy nation from unleashing a nuclear exchange that would almost certainly invite retaliatory self-destruction. The mechanized war in Europe, although currently recognized by many strategic planners as the greatest threat to U.S.-N.A.T.O. security, is, likewise, unlikely because of the unknown escalation which could occur through Soviet doctrinal use of tactical nuclear weapons. This paradox will be examined further in chapter 4.

The Nixon Doctrine which continued into both the Ford and Carter administrations was titled "Strategy for Peace." This policy consisted of the realistic deterrence policy to counter the Soviet threat as well as an increased reliance on allies to maintain stability in other regions of the world which held vital U.S. interests. National Security Council document number 162 had proposed as early as 1953 the dependence on foreign allied states armed with U.S. equipment to maintain regional stability. In the aftermath of Vietnam, this was a much more popular option to continue supporting than providing U.S. forces in the Middle East to retain access and maintain an uninterrupted flow of oil to the Western democracies.
In an effort to fulfill a campaign platform issue, President Carter attempted to curb foreign military sales including those to the Persian Gulf and Middle East regions. In spite of popular public and Congressional support for the effort, the policies were ineffective and resulted in little or no change to arms sales abroad.\textsuperscript{34}

A "Twin Pillar" strategy was pursued by the Nixon administration which depended on Iran and Saudi Arabia to support the stability of the Persian Gulf region.\textsuperscript{35}

With the fall of the Shah of Iran during the Carter administration, one of the "pillars" collapsed and the 20-year U.S. investment in Persian Gulf stability vanished virtually overnight. The crisis which ensued posed new questions as to the ability of the United States to provide stability in Third World nations—particularly in areas possessing vital resources for the U.S. and other Western democracies. The Iran crisis also caused an increased concern over the reliability of allied efforts to provide stability for U.S. vital interests.\textsuperscript{36}

The need to have a force responsive to foreign threats against U.S. interest in the Middle East was acted upon by the Carter administration in 1979 as a result of the Iranian crisis. This crisis threatened to interrupt the flow of Middle East oil to the dependent Western world. President Carter's partial solution was the creation in 1979 of the multi-service Rapid Deployment Force Headquarters at McDill AFB, Florida.\textsuperscript{37} This planning organization quickly uncovered many shortfalls in the ability of the U.S. to transport and sustain a military fighting force in the Middle East. As a result of this revelation, a significant portion of the U.S. defense budget into the
late 1980's is to be consumed with increased production of air and sea-lift capability.\(^{38}\)

The ground forces designated for the Army contingent of the Rapid Deployment Force include XVIII Airborne Corps and two of its subordinate elements consisting of the 82nd Airborne Division and the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). These units for the past decade have been the contingency forces designated to respond to the so-called "half war" emergencies.\(^{39}\) In 1981 the Reagan administration directed through the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Rapid Deployment Force be integrated into a proposed forward deployed Indian Ocean separate unified command.\(^{40}\) This new command would be similar to the unified commands in Europe and the Pacific. This obviously provides the ability to react simultaneously to conflict in both Europe and the Middle East (or "two wars"). A new problem now confronts contingency planners: since the Rapid Deployment Force has evolved into this new command, what forces will be available to fight the recognized Third World (half war) threat? This threat becomes increasingly significant in light of increased turbulence in the political and military instability of Latin America and the Caribbean. A threat to significant minerals or investments in South America or Africa in the future could be as important as oil resources from the Middle East.\(^{41}\) Of the 36 nonfuel minerals essential to U.S. industry, 22 are crucially dependent upon foreign sources. By controlling the Republic of South Africa, Zaire and Zambia, the U.S.S.R. could severely and adversely affect the U.S. industrial society.\(^{42}\)

It is apparent from this assessment that the U.S. must achieve the capability not only to protect its investments abroad to protect its
economic power but also to prevent Soviet intimidation or coercion through control of significant or vital resource interests.

The magnitude of the Soviet arsenal coupled with its unbridled willingness since World War II to use force to subjugate European and Asian nations\textsuperscript{43} makes it likely that U.S. defense spending in the 1980's and beyond will be forced to match the Soviet threat. This Soviet threat to the free world will force the U.S. to provide nuclear, naval, and conventional force deterrence.

**PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE ON FORCE DEVELOPMENT**

Regardless of the policies a U.S. president may desire to implement, the military force structure he has available to enforce those policies is largely inherited from his predecessor. The strategic direction he implants on force development is seldom realized in a single term of office. The national security objectives between the latter part of the Carter and the new Reagan administrations did not change significantly. This provided some stability in the direction force development was and is moving. The major change which has occurred is the increased funding the Reagan administration has been able to provide for national defense. Although both administrations had proposed increased spending, the Reagan budget proposals provide a rate of increase designed to quickly overcome current shortfalls in the defense posture.\textsuperscript{44}
President Reagan has defined two U.S. national interests around which to design policy in the early 1980's:

--Survive as a nation state.
--Remain as a global power.

The current administration has listed five U.S. National Security Objectives to support these national interests:

--Prevent coercion of the United States, its allies and friends.
--Maintain access to critical resources.
--Oppose geographic expansion of Soviet control and military presence worldwide.
--Encourage long-term political and military changes within the Soviet empire.
The methods for accomplishing these objectives will be determined primarily by the President and top cabinet officials. The tone of the objectives imply that a viable military force may be required to deter, influence, or enforce these objectives at some future time. Of course, the national command authority will make the key decisions as to what combination of political, diplomatic, economic, or military power will be used to achieve national security objectives. Should military forces be required, the broad spectrum of the objectives pose a challenge to the military planners in the Department of Defense. Given the budget limitations for all U.S. programs into the mid-1980's, the military will be pressed to provide adequate forces to execute the multiple operations plans which may be simultaneously required.

In summary, the complexities of funding forces to meet the perceived nuclear and conventional threats of the past have now been compounded with the requirement to quickly fund a deployable force capable of securing U.S. vital interests in the Middle East, Africa and possibly, Latin America. This chapter has highlighted those trends of force development dictated by U.S. national security interests since the end of World War II. President Reagan has made it clear that he believes that in order to protect American interests, the U.S. must be able to conduct foreign policy negotiations from a position of strength. He has stated that our first military priority must be the restoration of U.S. strategic capabilities so that military power can give credibility to U.S. political, economic, and diplomatic powers. The second priority is the military power projection capability that can only be achieved through a balance
between the forces to be moved and the global transportation assets to move them. These two priorities give credence to the assumption that strategic nuclear and strategic transport forces will receive the maximum funding possible until the window of vulnerability in these areas are closed.

From the information presented in this chapter the following assumptions are drawn for the continuation of the main thesis:

--Historical precedence since World War II has indicated a requirement to provide a viable and flexible military force composed of both strategic nuclear and conventional forces.

--The cost of the Vietnam War, public anti-military sentiment, antidefense spending attitudes and inflation have weakened the U.S. defense posture.

--Soviet aggression using surrogate forces, conventional forces and the threat posed by nuclear arms build up suggest that the U.S. must strengthen her military defense capabilities in spite of economic recession trends predicted for the early 1980's.

--The rise of international influence and power of Third World nations, particularly Africa and the oil exporting countries, is of significant interest to the U.S. because of U.S. dependence on minerals and economic investment in these countries.

--The ability of the Department of Defense to fulfill its role in the implementation of multiple national security objectives presents a demanding challenge given the limited budget appropriations likely to be available during a period of economic recession.

With the existing priority to fund conventional and strategic nuclear forces to meet the challenge of the most seriously perceived threats, the outlook for progressive funding of U.S. counterterrorist forces is somewhat dubious. Again, this prospect exists in spite of the fact that the terrorist threat is the more probable type of conflict to occur. (See Figure 1-1, page 10)
Discussion in subsequent chapters will suggest that Soviet anti-American objectives in the Third World made through the mechanism of terrorism is moving faster than U.S. efforts to curb them. Therefore, short-term solutions must be found to arrest the terrorist threat to Third World stability which in turn threatens Western democracy.
CHAPTER 2 ENDNOTES

1The so-called "Carter Doctrine" which emerged from his 1980 State of the Union address does not differ significantly from that of the Reagan administration. Each new administration attempts to change the verbage of national interests and policy objectives but in fact a higher order of reality limits the flexibility of radical changes in strategic policy directions.


Vital Interest--of such importance as to have direct bearing on the attainment of basic U.S. national security objectives. U.S. would risk escalation to general nuclear war to protect vital interest.

Significant Interest--of such significance the U.S. would be willing to use military force to protect it, short of escalation to nuclear war.

Important Interest--of lesser significance than vital or significant interests, but important enough to use limited air, naval and logistical support. Ground forces would only be used in an advisory role.

National Command Authority--President of U.S. as Commander-In-Chief

3Francis P. Hooper and William Schneider, Jr., Arms, Men and Military Budgets, Issues for Fiscal Year 1978 (1977), xi.


6Ed Magnuson, "Playing It Cool or Frozen in Ice?" Time, 119, No. 12 (1982), 34.


11Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (1965), 54-56, 66.

13 Ibid., 63.


16 Ibid., Wells, 41, 42.


18 Ibid., 11-12, 15.


In his 1972 foreign policy report, President Nixon said, "Approaching strategic parity also means that the probability of challenge, below the level of full-scale nuclear or conventional war has increased."

A Soviet viewpoint which may or may not still be valid was made by Premier Khrushchev upon signing the friendship pact with East Germany on June 12, 1964. He articulately stated, "Nuclear war is stupid, stupid, stupid! If you reach for the push button, you reach for suicide."

A contrasting viewpoint that the Soviets perhaps think they can win a nuclear war is presented in the following source:


Cf., Figure 1-1 (Page 10), Force Employment Spectrum.


Reference is to the armed Soviet incursion into Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979).
44 Associated Press, "Defense Spending Bid is Aimed at Restoring Margin of Safety," Kansas City Star, 102, No. 117 (1982), 40A.


CHAPTER THREE

CHALLENGE OF THE THIRD WORLD

Terrorism threatens to interrupt the stability of U.S. National Security relationships with Third World nations. An examination of the issues listed below will serve to identify the degree of concern that may be warranted with regard to combating terrorism and other low intensity conflicts which originate from or within the Third World. Of particular concern to U.S. National Security is the impact of interruption or curtailed access to strategic resources found in Third World countries.

This chapter will take an in-depth look at the national security challenges created by changes taking place in the Third World nations. This study will include three broad issues:

(1) The impact of increased US dependence on vital and significant resources in Third World countries.

(2) The geographical expansion of communist influence and domination of Third World states.

(3) The degree of probability of a continuing threat of terrorism by Third World nations and the impact of terrorism on the U.S. and other western democracies.

U.S. DEPENDENCE ON THIRD WORLD RESOURCES

From the statements which follow it is apparent that both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have been aware for some time of the critical need of vital resources to industrial survival.

"In the war against capitalism, Europe and America are the front, the colonial nations are the rear. You can't win at the front until you neutralize the rear."
We are exploiting the national ambitions of the colonial nations of the world and getting them into the socialist camp. That will deny the industrial nations of the west the fuels, raw materials, and the market without which the industrial nations cannot survive."

Stalin-1945

"Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the west depends: The energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and mineral treasure house of Central and South Africa."

Brezhnev-1973

"An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. And such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

Carter's State of the Union Address
January 1980

In the last decade, the U.S. dependence on Middle East oil was impressed upon the minds of the American public as a result of the 1973-74 oil embargo. Neither the oil dependence nor the increased reliance on African nonfuel minerals should come as a surprise threat to U.S. economic security. In 1948, President Truman commissioned a study to examine the world raw materials situation. The two and a half year study concluded that within 20-25 years America faced a materials problem of large dimensions. The 1973 oil crisis was right on schedule. The problem of U.S. dependence on African and Soviet nonfuel minerals is also on schedule but somewhat lesser known to the populace in general. Estimates by business experts have suggested as recently as October 1980 that a chrome embargo by the Soviet Union and Zimbabwe could bring the entire industrial world to its knees in just six months. West Germany has projected that a cut of only 30 per cent
in chromium supplies would cause a 25 per cent drop in their gross national product.\textsuperscript{6}

Equally important for national security considerations is the lack of Soviet dependence on Third World nations for strategic minerals. The chart following (See figure 3-1) depicts the relative import dependence of eight critical minerals and metals between the western democracies and the U.S.S.R.

Former Secretary of Defense and of Energy James Schlesinger commented in September 1980 that "the task of dealing with the Third World is more complex than conforming to a checklist developed by the American Civil Liberties Union."\textsuperscript{7} This is a particularly important viewpoint in relation to civil rights issues which hamper U.S. relations with South Africa. In the midterm, South Africa is the United State's primary source of several strategic minerals. Together, the Soviet Union and South Africa control the following world production percentages of critical and strategic minerals:\textsuperscript{8}

80\% of gold
76\% of chrome (critical and strategic)
90\% of platinum
75\% of manganese (critical and strategic)
90\% of vanadium
**IMPORT RELIANCE OF 8 CRITICAL MINERALS AND METALS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mineral</th>
<th>Major Sources of U.S. Import</th>
<th>Civilian Uses</th>
<th>Military Uses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COBALT</td>
<td>Major Sources of U.S. Import</td>
<td>Civilian Uses: Steel, Batteries, &amp; Fertilizers</td>
<td>Military Uses: Superalloys for aerospace missile systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHROMIUM</td>
<td>Major Sources of U.S. Import</td>
<td>Civilian Uses: Carbide cutting tools, electronic industries, cancer treatments, loudspeakers, &amp; blue glass coloring</td>
<td>Military Uses: Superalloys for aerospace missile systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TITANIUM (BUFFETE)</td>
<td>Major Sources of U.S. Import</td>
<td>Civilian Uses: Stainless steel, jet engines, electric power plants, gasoline refining, processing of chemicals and food</td>
<td>Military Uses: Superalloys for aerospace missile systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLATINUM GROUP METALS</td>
<td>Major Sources of U.S. Import</td>
<td>Civilian Uses: Space vehicles, aircraft engines, industrial heat exchangers, artificial joints and prostheses</td>
<td>Military Uses: Communications systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUNGSTEN</td>
<td>Major Sources of U.S. Import</td>
<td>Civilian Uses: Auto emission systems, petroleum refining, jewelry, chemical catalysts, dental alloys, &amp; electrical contacts and relays primarily for telephone systems</td>
<td>Military Uses: Superalloys for aerospace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3-1. Import Reliance of 8 Critical Minerals and Metals.** Source: Minerals Illustrated, Vol. 78, No. 64, (March 1987), p. 58-59.
There is a recent example of the impact which can occur when the supply of a critical mineral (and in this case also strategic) is interrupted. The United States presently imports 93 per cent of its requirement for cobalt. In 1978, 68 per cent of the total U.S. cobalt imports came from the central African state of Zaire. Because of a Cuban-backed raid by Angolan-based Katangan insurgents on the mining facility of Kolwezi, Zaire, the supply of cobalt was temporarily halted. U.S. industry experienced serious production delays and the price per pound of cobalt jumped from $6.40 to $50.00.

The dependence of the U.S. on Third World nation's minerals goes beyond the critical day-to-day production requirements of U.S. industry. The strategic mineral stockpile of the United States is in a dangerous condition (See figure 3-2). In March 1981, Secretary of the Interior, James Watt, estimated "that of the 62 basic materials

![U.S. Stockpile of Critical Metals](image)

Figure 3-2. U.S. Stockpile of Critical Metals

stockpiled, only 21 are stockpiled in sufficient quantity to meet national security requirements. These shortages are depicted in the following chart which indicates the metric tons on hand and the quantities to be purchased under the Regan administration's efforts to restore the strategic stockpile (See figure 3-3).

**AMERICA'S STRATEGIC STOCKPILE:**

**US National Defense Stockpile of Minerals and Metals**

(Metric tons unless otherwise indicated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Stockpile Target</th>
<th>Amount to be Purchased</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aluminum group</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminum metal</td>
<td>635,030</td>
<td>633,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauxite, metallurgical grade (dry)</td>
<td>27,100,000</td>
<td>12,941,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminum oxide, abrasive grain group (tons of abrasive grain)</td>
<td>578,785</td>
<td>343,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauxite, refractory grade (calcined)</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
<td>1,225,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beryllium (contained metal in ore, alloy, and metallic forms)</td>
<td>1,107</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bismuth</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadmium</td>
<td>5,307</td>
<td>2,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chromium (contained metal in ore ferroalloy and metallic form)</td>
<td>1,227,422</td>
<td>163,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chromite ore, refractory grade (dry)</td>
<td>771,108</td>
<td>416,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobalt</td>
<td>38,737</td>
<td>17,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbium (contained metal in concentrate, carbide, ferroalloy and metallic form)</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>1,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>907,186</td>
<td>880,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fluorspar, metallurgical grade (dry)</td>
<td>1,542,216</td>
<td>1,168,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fluorspar, acid grade (dry)</td>
<td>1,270,060</td>
<td>457,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graphite, Ceylon amorphous lump and Malagasy crystalline</td>
<td>23,859</td>
<td>2,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>997,904</td>
<td>452,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mica, muscovite, and phlogopite block</td>
<td>2,908</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nickel</td>
<td>181,437</td>
<td>181,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platinum group metals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iridium (troy oz)</td>
<td>98,000</td>
<td>81,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palladium (troy oz)</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>1,744,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platinum (troy oz)</td>
<td>1,310,000</td>
<td>857,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutile (dry)</td>
<td>96,162</td>
<td>60,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tantalum (contained metal in carbide powder, metal, and mineral forms)</td>
<td>3,248</td>
<td>2,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titanium sponge</td>
<td>176,901</td>
<td>147,571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Figure 3-3. America's Strategic Stockpile.**
The oil embargo of 1973-74, the devaluation of the dollar on foreign currency exchanges, the ever-increasing dependence on Africa for industrial minerals, and the dependence on Middle East oil are all strong indicators that U.S. national security policies in the decades ahead must be strongly rooted in economic considerations. The ability of the United States to project power and to influence world affairs in the 1950's and 1960's was the result of strength in U.S. economic, military, and political posture.\textsuperscript{11} As previously discussed in chapter 2, the Vietnam War and the U.S. national will following that war weakened the military establishment. During the late 1960's and early 1970's, the economic power balance shifted from the industrialized nations of the United States, Europe, and Japan to the oil exporting countries of the Arab world. The weakening of both economic and military clout has also affected the U.S. ability to achieve political security objectives.\textsuperscript{12}

The proper balance of political, economic, and military concerns in the decade ahead will be difficult to achieve in concert with the goal of the Reagan administration to reduce and eliminate deficit spending. The challenge to defense planners will be to develop forces that can add credence to political efforts and adequate strength to enforce U.S. claims to vital and significant interests in the international arena. Of key importance are those interests in the Third World which are important enough that the U.S. would be willing to use military force to protect.

The continuing availability of critical resources through normal trade relations with Third World countries is threatened by increased economic participation by the Third World with the Soviet Union. This
increased Third World-Soviet trade relationship has occurred for a number of reasons. First, Third World countries, in an effort to become more independent, have recognized the advantages of diversifying their trade relationships so that a single trading partner cannot dominate political decisions through economic boycotts, sanctions, or coercion. For some Latin American and African states, this pursuit of economic independence has resulted in efforts to escape the traditional economic reliance on the United States. For other countries of the same regions, it has been more a matter of economic survival for them to search for other trade partners, to include the Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union pays in cash, is not overly concerned with balance of payments trade restrictions, and is less concerned with the effects of an unstable government upon their foreign industrial investments.\textsuperscript{13} On the other hand, U.S. industry has been disinvesting in Latin America and Africa due to the profit risk inherent with unstable, fast-changing revolutionary governments.\textsuperscript{14} For the present, most emerging lesser-developed Third World countries, in spite of efforts to expand trading partners, continue to recognize U.S. technology and marketing techniques as the most viable option for achieving economic progress and independence.\textsuperscript{15} The lesser-developed countries of Africa are seeking to develop industrial economies which are capable of participating as an equal partner in the world economy rather than remaining a mere supplier of raw materials to the West. To this end, Africa continues to seek Western involvement in their African progress but rejects those efforts which tend to force them into the former colonized role from which they are trying to escape.\textsuperscript{16}

The above realities require a significant consideration in formulating foreign and economic strategies with Third World resource-rich
nations. The willingness of developing Third World nations to continue business ventures with Western democracies coupled with increased dependence upon these Third World countries by the United States, provides reason to believe that U.S. industry will, of necessity, continue to invest in Third World mining and industry.

This investment participation, which is vital to the economic aspect of U.S. national security, will continue to require the assignment of U.S. citizens abroad. Wherever this occurs, the U.S. citizen becomes a potential target for the terrorist committed to the "war against neo-colonialism, capitalism and imperialism."

The critical need for U.S. citizens abroad places an additional burden on U.S. military planning and resources when a military strategy is selected as the solution for the national military objective of protecting U.S. interests and citizens abroad.17

GEOSTRATEGIC ISSUES OF THE THIRD WORLD

In his book, Kingdoms of the Blind, Dr. Harold Rood carefully describes the geographical expansion of communist domination and influence since the end of World War II. Dr. Rood draws a comparison to the similarities of the U.S.S.R.'s potential use of the Warsaw Pact and "Finlandized" buffer states to the use made by Nazi Germany to launch the World War II offensives. This comparison appears valid as it might apply to conventional, political, and economic warfare.18

There is also a more ancient geostrategic comparison which is perhaps applicable to the present strategies of deterrence. Ancient dynastic warfare practiced in Asia contains examples of national conflicts involving geopolitical and geostrategic maneuver. In the ancient Chinese ideology, the natural order of society was to rule
through peaceful actions. To resort to actual armed conflict was regarded as an admission of failure to rule properly. Therefore, a dynastic ruler wishing to extend his influence would attempt, and most often succeed, to establish a political alliance with less powerful rulers through economic coercion or military intimidation. The selection of alliances with smaller nations was predicated on the geographic position of that state in relation to the true or ultimate objective nation. The collateral effect of this process eventually led to a condition in which the combined geostrategic position and total military strength of the alliance was so overwhelming that the objective nation would concede defeat without a single battle being fought. Some alliances would hasten the submission process further by closing trade routes at strategic chokepoints. This type of warfare considered in terms of Soviet expansion and influence in the Third World suggests relevance to the need to maintain the geographic stability of the Western world just in case a general war should occur. Unlike the Chinese, the Soviet's Marxist Leninist doctrine has no inhibition about resorting to armed conflict to secure the loyalty of their "alliances." Whereas the Chinese dynasties viewed armed conflict as a failure of the governing ruler, the Soviets rationalize the use of force as an expedient measure to more quickly achieve hegemony. The speed of Soviet expansion through force or coercion to obtain geostrategic advantages must therefore be made an issue of important concern in developing National Security Policies and Strategy.

As presented in chapter 2, the U.S. will be hard pressed in the 1980's to provide forces for all perceived threats. Limited budget resources simply will not allow the U.S. to provide forces capable of simultaneously covering every potential trouble spot in the world. By
threatening the southern flank of the U.S. through communist regimes in Central America and the Caribbean, the Soviets could force the commitment of military resources to guard that vulnerability. This, of course, would detract from assets available to be committed to NATO or the Middle East during hostilities or crisis. This diversion of resources is perhaps one consideration that has caused the Reagan administration to place emphasis on the need for a politico-economic and foreign aid solution to the insurgency in El Salvador. The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Enders, has publicly stated that the decisive battle for democracy in Latin America is now (1982) being waged in El Salvador. It is possible, based on this statement, that the Reagan administration believes in the domino theory of communist aggression which was so clearly validated in Southeast Asia following the U.S. troop withdrawal. The geostrategic ramifications of the marxist-backed leftist control of Central America would have an unacceptable impact on the economic aspects of U.S. national security. U.S. shipping would be significantly degraded if denied the secure use of the Panama Canal during a low or mid intensity conflict. Nor could the military cargo sealift from the west coast supply NATO or Mid-East in a timely manner during limited conflict or general war. Future U.S. energy needs might not be met without the oil market of Mexico's Caribbean basin. As recently as 1979, 56 per cent of the refined oil entering the U.S. was refined in the Caribbean. Imported refined oil accounts for approximately 5 cent of total U.S. oil requirements. Ten per cent of the total must be refined abroad partly because the U.S. lacks the deep water ports capable of handling super tankers. In addition to Caribbean refining,
the Carribbean ports are used to load super-tanker crude into smaller tankers for delivery to the U.S. ports. If the Soviets were to gain additional surrogate footholds in Central America, the potential during wartime for total control of the Carribbean sea routes could interdict 50 per cent of U.S. oil imports. If the Soviets could likewise obtain the voluntary or intimidated use of eastern South American and western African states, the Atlantic passageway to Middle East oil could also be severely interrupted. (See figure 3-4) The impact of interrupted supply lines would be more devastating to the European Economic Community than to the United States.

**COMPARATIVE OIL TRAFFIC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South and Central America</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South and Central America</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The import of foreign oil by Western countries has made South Africa's geographic location at the southern tip of Africa a strategic keystone for the Free World. In 1978, an estimated 936 million tons of crude oil was transported around the Cape of Good Hope sea route.

Figure 3-4. Comparative Oil Traffic

Control of the Cape (of Good Hope) route is tantamount, moreover, not only to control of the mineral resources of all of southern Africa, but also to control of Western Europe. Some 25,000 ships per year pass around the Cape, carrying about 90% of Western Europe's oil, 79% of its strategic minerals, and 25% of its food supplies. About 20% of U.S. oil also passes around the Cape, and varying percentages of U.S. mineral imports.

Warren Baker in Seapower, 29 Oct 80

It is not within the scope of this thesis to suggest solutions to the geostrategic changes taking place, but rather to illustrate that geostrategic problems do exist which cannot be ignored when considering U.S.-Third World strategies. If communism should achieve a geostrategic positioning so formidable that in a time of crisis, the U.S. could not hope to overcome it with conventional weapons, it is conceivable that submission might one day be the only alternative to nuclear escalation and annihilation. In short, a return to the ancient dynastic wars of strategic maneuver, or as Sun Tzu has stated:

"Violence is only one part of warfare and not even the preferred part. The aim of war is to subdue an opponent, in fine, to change his attitude and induce his compliance. The most economical means is the best: to get him--through deception, surprise, and his own ill-conceived pursuit of infeasible goals--to realize his inferiority, so that he surrenders or at least retires without your having to fight him." 30

Can it be that the U.S. is pursuing an unrealistic goal of nuclear deterrence at the expense of a viable program to preserve a Western geostrategic advantage? Chapter 4 will examine this possibility in greater detail.

THIRD WORLD TERRORISM

As a contemporary instrument of war, systematic terrorism has roots which date back to the Russian revolution in 1878-1881. 31
serious threat to the United States and other Western democracies, however, there are some indications that terrorism has only begun. The distribution of terrorist incidents since 1968 indicates a definite propensity to occur in either the Western democracies or pro-Western nations\(^{32}\) (See figure 3-5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents, 1968-80, by Category of Attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcade-hostage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter bombing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incendiary bombing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosive bombing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hijacking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabotage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exotic pollution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft, break-in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conspiracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sniping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shot/cut with police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms smuggling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Incidents by Country | 495 | 56 | 674 | 1446 | 2205 | 62 | 218 | 1382 | 176 | 6714 |
| Per-cent-age by Country | 7.4 | .83 | 10.0 | 21.5 | 32.8 | .92 | 3.3 | 20.6 | 2.6 |

**MAJOR DEMOCRACIES**

- Transitional Governments of Latin America
  - Conservative Estimate of Middle East Terrorism directed against Israel
  - Estimate of Total Terrorism Directed Against Western and Pro-Western Democracies
    - 43%
    - + 21%
    - + 15%
    - 79%

**Figure 3-5. Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents, 1968-80, by Category of Attack**

**Source:** Freedom in Peril: A Year-End Assessment 1981, p. 4.
Transnational terrorists who have never set foot on United States soil have succeeded in intimidating the American people, largely by savagery directed at Americans abroad. The kidnapping and murder of U.S. Ambassador John G. Mein by Guatemalan terrorists in 1968 began an epidemic of terrorism that, by 1975, had led to attacks on 82 U.S. diplomats and other officials abroad, 18 of whom were murdered.33

Darrell M. Trent

In a March 1982 interview, CIA Director William Casey expressed the opinion that the United States should expect to see an increase in terrorism directed against U.S. interests. Mr. Casey also stated that the Soviet Union exports terrorism and Libya orchestrates it.34 For years Colonel Muammar Gaddafi has been portrayed as an egomaniac in charge of one of the world's most active Third World terrorist organizations.35 Between the years 1970 and 1980, Libya alone has been responsible for sixty-two terrorist incidents with thirty-two (or 52 per cent) of them successful to some degree.36

One aspect of the terrorist mentality which democracies fail to recognize (or choose to ignore) is the sense of justification the terrorist feels for his action. In the communist writings of Trotsky and Lenin, the use of terrorism is specifically not ruled out as a weapon to be used in the struggle for liberation.37 Today's modern terrorist feels that he is a soldier, not a criminal, and is therefore fully justified in using terrorist tactics to achieve both political and military objectives.38 The principle risk to a radical or leftist terrorist's cause lies in the possibility that the terrorist incident may backfire causing a rising tide of antisentiment among the population. To the terrorist, this usually involves little risk in that the nations normally registering protests of inhumane or criminal
acts are usually in the "war zone" and are considered enemies. The nations in the "peace zone," who are of either Marxist or other leftist persuasion, less often comment on the terrorists' act unless they are attempting to offer additional support for the justification of acts against Western oppression, imperialism, capitalism, etc. On the other hand, most Western democracies do not have the liberty to impose such harsh or severe countermeasures against the terrorist. In this century, the military forces of the French democracy attempted to use extreme counterterrorist and torture tactics to fight the terrorist revolution in Algeria. Although the techniques succeeded militarily in the "Battle of Algiers," the public protest in France and throughout the world contributed to the political victory of the revolutionary FLN and the eventual independence of Algeria. The tactics against terrorism which are palatable to the tastes of most democracies are characterized by restraint, patience, and a willingness to engage in a protracted conflict. The experience of Great Britain in Northern Ireland is one such example of patience in a protracted conflict.

The fact that terrorist organizations are "cheap" to field and supply makes it much more viable as a warfare technique for lesser-developed countries in the Third World. Both training and weapons are readily available from Moscow or Libya. General Otis expressed it this way:

"Terrorism looks to exert maximum leverage for very little risk of force" and "is available to even the poorest nations. What we have seen in the past few years is only scratching the surface."
SUMMARY OF UNITED STATES-THIRD WORLD RELATIONSHIP

This chapter has examined the dependence of the U.S. on foreign fuel and nonfuel minerals which dictates the presence of U.S. economic investment abroad. This foreign investment requires the presence of U.S. citizens in those Third World countries to conduct business. Additionally, U.S. citizens involved in political and diplomatic relationships are also required to assist with both economic and political interchange. The political aspects are particularly important to the geostrategic stability of the Third World, even where vital or significant economic ventures do not exist. These realities coupled with the articulated communist doctrine of destroying the U.S. economically through industrial dependence on Third World markets creates a multiplicity of challenges to U.S. political, economic, and military strategies. The measures required to check terrorism and provide protection for U.S. citizens abroad are demanding considerations for the prospects of economic, political, and geostrategic stability in the Third World. Since terrorism represents the most economical form of warfare to assist or accomplish the communist purpose in economic warfare, it is reasonable to presume the incidence of terrorism will continue or even increase. The Soviets have been previously cited as an exporter of terrorism. With the economic problems currently faced by the Soviet Union, it is also reasonable that they would opt for the most economic means possible to contribute to the U.S. industrial collapse. This is further reinforced in light of the continuing large expenses they feel compelled to dedicate to nuclear and modernized conventional armaments. William Vancleave has stated that the CIA and DIA estimate that Soviet defense expenditures
will continue to increase at a rate of 3 per cent per year. He believes that this growth could lead to a situation in which they might perceive that they can intimidate foreign economy in their favor.  

Hence, it can be deduced that the probable use of terrorism by extremist Third World elements must be regarded as a serious threat to U.S. national security. Terrorist activities as part of other forms of low intensity conflict threaten to interrupt or destroy the U.S. industrial lifeline to foreign minerals. Terrorism also fosters the political instabilities of Third World nations which can eventually lead to geostrategic advantages which are unacceptable to both the U.S. national economic and defense postures.
CHAPTER 3 ENDNOTES


4U.S. President's Materials Policy Commission, Resources for Freedom: A Report to the President (1952), 5 volumes. This report is also known by its informal name "The Paley Report."


This article provides reference to civil rights issues impact on South African economic relationships to the rest of the world.

8Ibid., 42.

9Nancy Cooper, "Can Strategic Minerals Hog-tie America?" Mechanix Illustrated, 78, No. 646 (1982), 129.


This reference reinforces Cuban involvement in the raid into Shalia Province of Zaire.


It is also interesting to note that just before the Angolan invasion on Shalia Province, Soviet purchasing agents bought up large supplies of cobalt on the world markets.
10 Cooper, op. cit., 58.

The author of this article contends that shortage of the strategic stockpile is not as serious as suggested. Some of the shortages come from friendly sources such as Canada and Australia while others can be extracted in the U.S. though at a higher cost.

This chapter elaborates on the interdependence of U.S. economic, military, and political bases for a stable national security posture.

12 Ibid.


14 Walter Isaacson, "We Are All Americans," Time, 119, No. 10 (1982), 15.


17 Cf. (page 29).
This refers to U.S. National Security Objectives of the Reagan administration.


21 It required only two years following U.S. troop withdrawals until South Vietnam and Cambodia were militarily defeated by the North Vietnamese Army in 1975.

22 Not only would Atlantic-Pacific shipping require additional time and money to travel around South America but the reliability of shipping around Cape Horn is subject to weather conditions known for their inconsistency. Shortcuts through the Strait of Magellan require the use of a licensed Chilean or Argentine pilot. The backlog of passage using only 34 (average) qualified pilots would cause delays to this option.
In this source Secretary Weinberger states that half of NATO's supplies in wartime would transit from Gulf ports through the Florida Straits. Perhaps for political reason the quantitative significance of potential interdiction of the Panama Canal is not mentioned in the discussion of Central American countries.

Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) indicates stocks of 60 to 100 billion barrels, placing Mexico in the top four oil reserves in the world. This includes the Bay of Campeche which has the highest yield per day in the world.


This study examines the aspect of Soviet military power projection from Africa as a potential part of the theoretical World Island defense of the Soviet Union.


31Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (1977), 11.


Jack Anderson, "Intelligence Reports Profile Libyan Leader," Kansas City Star, 102, No. 147 (March 8, 1982), 9A.
"Khadafy: A Political Zealot from His Early Days," Kansas City Star, 102, No. 148 (March 9, 1982), 11A.


43 William Vancleave, Address to Command and General Staff College evening seminar, 5 April, 1982.
CHAPTER FOUR

AN ASSESSMENT OF STRATEGY FOR THIRD WORLD TERRORISM

It is the responsibility of the strategist not only to formulate strategies for future survival but to reexamine and challenge those precepts which serve as a basis for current strategies.

It is right that each succeeding generation should question anew the manner in which its leaders exercise such awesome responsibilities. It is right that each new Administration should have to confront the awful dilemmas posed by the possession of nuclear weapons. It is right that our nuclear strategy should be exposed to continuous examination.

Alexander Haig, April 1982

The previous chapter examined the seriousness of the potential impact of terrorism on the ultimate survival of the U.S. economy and geostrategic posture. It may be considered prudent in light of those findings to challenge the national threat assessment on which force structure is based.

The purpose of this chapter will be to challenge the validity of the quantified risk assessment in developing U.S. national defense strategies. There is a relationship to the thesis of the argument which follows. Any change in threat assessment perceptions toward the terrorism and unconventional warfare end of the spectrum (See figure 4-1) could probably result in an increase in funding and priority for counterterrorist forces. An increased emphasis on counterterrorist forces might allow a more rapid implementation of the counterterrorist technological developments to be presented in chapter 5 following.
These counterterrorist developments would include the rescue assault force introduced in chapter 1.

Figure 4-1. Warfare Threat Spectrum.²

The figure above indicates that the greatest risk factors (although lowest probable) are associated with major conventional war, theater nuclear war, and strategic nuclear war. As discussed in chapter 2, the force structure of conventional and nuclear arms are heavily budgeted to counter this perceived threat.
Two questions should be asked to challenge this budget-driving concept:

Exactly what is being risked?

What is the relevance of quantifying that risk in the formulation of strategy?

The answers to these questions are not clearly answered in the figure or in the stated U.S. national interests of the Reagan administration which are:

Survive as a nation state.

Remain a global power.

Considering the first interest, it is not clear what is meant by survival. If the interest is defined as the basic physical survival of the nation's population and physical environment, then survival could be attained through submission to the Soviet ideology. This would eliminate the threat of nuclear exchange which receives high impetus on the present risk factor chart. Such an action would most assuredly bring "peace"—Soviet peace. This course of action would not necessarily rule out the achievement of the second objective. Properly transitioned, a communist America could likely remain a global power under control of the Kremlin. The billions spent on defense as well as the rest of the U.S. economic base could be refocused in an effort to raise the world economy and standard of living. This would include better health and less starvation for the rest of the communist world. Communist America would have survived as a nation state and remained a global power for communism. Democracy in the world would disappear as an influential factor but the world and the U.S. nation state would
perhaps stand a more positive chance of survival from potential nuclear annihilation.

It must be realistically assumed then, that the definition which is intended is not mere survival of a nation state, but rather the survival of a democratic nation state. Further, the democratic nation state must remain a global power in terms of its ability to preserve U.S. democracy and to contribute to the survival of democracy elsewhere.

If then, the survival of democracy is the real issue around which U.S. national interests and strategies are designed, the question should be raised: what purpose is served by an attempt to quantify risks? If two factors (terrorism and nuclear war) are equally capable of ultimately destroying democracy, the end result remains the same—the destruction of democracy. To conduct a defense strategy at one end of the threat spectrum at the expense of the other gives the impression of designing a plan to see how long the U.S. can "hold out" as opposed to how well the U.S. can survive across the full threat spectrum. The concept of rating threat on a quantified basis has all the qualities of crisis management focused on immediate problems (nuclear and convention war threat) and, as such, may ultimately prove short-sighted.

Part of the rationale which gives the Soviet nuclear threat a high priority is the obvious quick and violent destruction which could be brought about by a nuclear strike. It is important to consider for further discussion that the factor of rapid destruction associated with a nuclear strike is not likely to be altered in the future. Unless a dramatic disarmament soon takes place, the technology of nuclear arms and delivery systems will continue to absorb significant portions of the defense budget. The concept of continuing to place emphasis on
the nuclear threat when the conquest of democracy is also possible through the strangulation of the U.S. economy again gives the impression of a delaying strategy. This delaying strategy depends upon conditions improving on the nuclear threat end of the spectrum so that scarce budget resources can be reallocated to meet future increase of perceptions affecting the terrorism and unconventional warfare factors of threat. Given the current U.S. economic conditions, which include record unemployment, it is difficult to envision in the decade ahead when the economy will be able to afford keeping up in the continual nuclear and conventional arms race and simultaneously support increased resources to combat the terrorism and insurgencies which threaten Third World stability.

The present U.S. force structure design, based on perceived risk, allows the Soviet Union to apply on a strategic level the classical tactic of flanking maneuver used in modern warfare. If the Soviets can economically "fix" their U.S. enemy with an arms race focused on nuclear forces and European-based conventional forces, this would provide the Soviets time to conduct an inexpensive flanking maneuver in the Third World. This flanking maneuver could focus on an increased geostrategic advantage in the Western hemisphere which could contribute to the economic destruction of the United States, as well as an eventual conventional military advantage (See figure 4-2). The Soviets have demonstrated for over 20 years their willingness to sacrifice consumer goods and an improved standard of living in favor of a relentless build-up of military arms and political strength.
Figure 4-2. Geostrategic Flanking Maneuver for the Defeat of Democracy

Source: Author's Perception

Paul Nitze, one of the more notable strategic planners for the past three decades, outlined some of the concerns depicted in figure 4-2 above in a 1980 article in Foreign Affairs.

Let me outline some of the main Soviet strategic objectives for the 1980s. I would put high on the list the political separation of NATO Europe from the United States. A second aim is to increase Soviet influence and control over the Persian Gulf. A third is the encirclement and neutralization of China. A fourth is to stimulate trouble for the United States in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean. A fifth is the ability to deal successfully with the contingency of a direct Soviet military confrontation with Western military forces. A sixth is to build the image of the Soviet regime as a responsible, legitimate, peace-loving participant in the international community.
Each one of these aims warrants a separate Soviet strategy for its support. All six strategies are interrelated and mutually supportive. It would therefore seem important to the Communist's strategy how they will ultimately subjugate America. It is to the advantage of the Soviet Union to conquer the United States without the use of a nuclear holocaust. It is important in terms of preserving their own lives and economy while bringing under their control the United States with its resources and industrial base still intact. Additionally, without America as a protectorate, the industrial and technological plum of Japan would also soon be intimidated into submission.

It should likewise be equally important to the U.S. how democracy will defend itself from extinction from all threats. If, as presented earlier, it is more important for a democratic nation to survive rather than just the physical nation state, then it becomes conceptually immaterial to the U.S. whether democracy perishes in a vapor cloud or through industrial economic collapse. A poor, unemployed, economically broken, and resource-dependent America would have difficulty surviving a conventionally armed Soviet force invading from two oceans and a potential communist-dominated Latin America. This vulnerability would be further increased if the Soviets elected to employ chemical or toxin warfare for which the civilian population is unprepared.

With the above rationale, a case can be made for redrawing the force employment spectrum chart to look like this:
In this version of the chart, the risk is, in all cases, the same. The survival of democracy is the factor being risked. The methods available to achieve the destruction have no relevant values attached. This graphic does not focus on the near term, midterm, or necessarily long terms commonly associated with force strategies. The emphasis intended is what the Soviets consider the ultimate or eventual term. If the Soviet ideology considers communism the eventuality of the world's destiny, then that is the real threat. It is a threat that the Soviets are determined to fulfill on any front, by any means, by any opportunity, regardless of how long it takes.

If it can be assumed that it would serve the communist cause to acquire the United States without massive physical destruction, then a case could be made for directing defense force structure to the end of
the force employment spectrum which is more probable rather than current focus on the least probable events.\textsuperscript{13}

To shift the force development emphasis to the terrorist end of the spectrum is not, however, the intent of the argument. The purpose of this argument thus far has been to challenge the validity of the quantifying risk inversely to the probability of occurrence. The force employment spectrum which depicts risk factors is only one of many analytical studies used to assist the formulation of strategies.

Attention will now be shifted to an entirely different type of analytical tool and further on in this chapter the two will be compared. There are a variety of "survival analysis" types of study which over the years have also been considered in projecting the post-strike survival factors which influence nuclear strategy development.

One of the pioneers in this area of study was Herman Kahn. Over the past two decades, Herman Kahn has been an influential thinker in the design and development of strategy. In the mid-60's, he described a scenario in which the United States was involved in a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. As a physicist, nuclear strategist, and futurist, he made estimates as scientifically speculative as he deemed possible at the time. His estimates shown below indicated a projection that the industrial capacity of the United States would be reduced in the worst case to 20 per cent effectiveness immediately after the nuclear attack. A restoration to 100 per cent effectiveness would require some 10 years\textsuperscript{14} and assumes that a state of truce would exist between the two warring parties permitting reconstruction to take place.
Although his estimates are based on data from the 60's, the information is still of value for theoretical considerations. It would seem logical to predict that Kahn's specific calculations would be, by now, quite inadequate due to the dramatic increase in Soviet nuclear build-up. This is not, however, the case as the following chart emphasizes.\textsuperscript{15}

**POSTNUCLEAR ATTACK STUDIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STUDY</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>FOR</th>
<th>ESTIMATED LOSSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Rand Study</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>35% 55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The SRI Study</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>42% 45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAVUS-75</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>45% 35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAL-67</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>45% 42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PONAST II</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>46%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11%** 63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*With 1973 civil preparedness capability.
**With crisis relocation and expedient fallout shelter.
The more recent destruction estimates, made by civilian research groups for the government, vary from 25 per cent to 40 per cent for initial post strike capacity. Although the estimates of initial reduction capacity are less, the recovery time is about the same as Kahn's estimates, 9-10 years. The more recent studies have predictions on overall gross national product (GNP) recovery instead of "consumption" as in Kahn's model. Recent studies rate America as highly vulnerable to nuclear attack due primarily to lack of preparedness; but only in the most severe scenarios is recovery ruled out.16

The recovery data just presented is available to the same national strategy formulaters who rely on quantified threat assessment for strategy and force development design. In fact, it is the President who presently is a driving force in the development of civil preparedness through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This seems remarkable in that there is a contradiction in the use of quantified risk assessment and GNP post strike recovery projections to develop a single overall strategy for national security.

The poststrike recovery time table projects that restoration of the industrial capacity of the U.S. democracy is possible. Any analytical model that provides an estimate of U.S. economic recovery time in a poststrike nuclear environment would suffice, but for this argument Kahn's more pessimistic estimate is satisfactory. Using Kahn's model, (figure 4-2) the industrial base starts off at a nuclear poststrike 20 per cent production level following the "least likely" event to occur. In other words, the least likely method for destroying America is quantified in risk assessment as posing the greatest overall risk; yet this nuclear destruction has a potential recovery projection for the
poststrike democracy. In this scenario, democracy, although "nuked", still has a prognosis for survival through industrial recovery.

When this prognosis for the survival of democracy through poststrike industrial recovery is compared to the Soviet strategy of destroying America's industrial base through the Third world, an obvious contradiction occurs. If the Soviet strategy should work to bring the United States to its knees through the destruction (or gross reduction) of economic and industrial capacity, then the prospect for democratic survival would be slim. This is true because the Third World strategies designed to bring about the severance of U.S. lifelines to markets and resources would also remain in place to prevent U.S. recovery. In short, if the war of economics (declared by Stalin and Breshnev in the opening of Chapter 3) should succeed; then conceivably the United States could be economically repressed to the 20 per cent level, as in the nuclear strategy example, and kept there until democracy surrendered or was too weak to resist a forced nonnuclear take over.

If Kahn's concepts were translated into an Economic Survival Force Employment Spectrum, the graphic might look like figure 4-5:
Figure 4-5. Economic Survival Threat Spectrum.

Source: Author's perception

This chart would satisfy the beliefs of those strategists who perceive that economic and industrial survival is inseparable from the strategies to insure the survival of democracy. It may be that there are strategists in the administration, Congress, and the National Security Council who believe in this concept. If so, their beliefs are not reflected in the current inversely proportional threat analysis (See figure 4-1) which dictates defense force development and expenditure priorities.
An additional consideration in this comparison is also necessary. If in fact a nuclear strike on the U.S. should become a reality, the importance of a stabilized pro-western Third World becomes essential. Recent poststrike analysis studies stress the vital role of foreign aid (the United States as recipient) to provide industrial minerals and energy resources. Again, if the Soviets control the Third World and the strategic chokepoints of ocean transport, GNP recovery would be either slow in coming or impossible.²⁰

A reconsideration of the potential destruction capabilities across the entire threat and risk spectrum is possibly needed to enhance the survival of the United States and Western democracy. All risks must be judiciously countered by strategies sufficient to prevent the collapse of democracy by any threat. In a resource-dependent nation plagued with inflation and recession, the U.S. strategy for the survival of democracy must consider quantifying the importance of counterterrorism as a priority which, at a minimum, approaches the deterrence significance of the "least probable" nuclear threat.

The realities of strategy formulation and force development, as presented in chapter 2, are characterized by evolution as opposed to revolution. If the threat of democratic destruction through Third World factors were immediately adopted on a parity level with the nuclear threat, the strategy and force development changes required for a quantum improvement in counterterrorist and other low intensity conflict strategies would take years to implement.²¹ The following chapter, therefore, will examine a potential area of contribution to counterterrorism which may be exploitable and affordable in the near
future. The use of properly applied technology has the potential to make a contribution to filling the gap of any possible inaccuracies associated with threat and risk assessment.
CHAPTER 4 ENDNOTES


2 Cf. Figure 1-1 (Page 10).


In this Essay the author cites two vital interests: The well-being of the citizenry or the way-of-life interests which nurture the hopes and aspirations. Second is the prevention of the nation's murder or survival interest. The former is embedded in the concepts of democratic freedom; therefore the two combined form a physical survival of democracy interest.


This one page summary of the Reagan Strategic Program, based on Congressional testimony, highlights five major programs for U.S. strategic forces.

7 Associated Press, "U.S. Unemployment Total Reaches a Record," Kansas City Star, 102 (1982), 1A.

8 Frances P. Hoeber and William Schneider, Jr., Arms, Men and Military Budgets, Issues for Fiscal Year 1978 (1977), xxii, xxiv.


The flanking strategy presented is based partially on the "rimland theory" corollary to Mackinder's "heartland theory" of geo-politics. With control of the rimland being critical to the defense of the heartland (U.S.S.R.) it has been postulated that the Grand Strategy of the Soviets is the control of the rimland.


A similar but more elaborate double envelopment approach involving both Western democracy and China is described in the cited speech. Also included is a comparison of an ancient Mongol tactic of controlling chokepoints of communication's routes.

The concept depicted in figure 4-2 also embraces Liddel Harts "indirect approach" theory of warfare.

For a presentation of the threat to East Asian shipping depicted in figure 4-2 see: Geoffrey Godsell, "Soviet Naval Threat to Japan Oil Route Grows," The Christian Science Monitor, 72, No. 190 (1980), 1.
Also see for concept of Third World flanking: Francis P. Hoeber, Arms, Men, and Military Budgets, Issues for Fiscal Year 1978 (1977), foreward by Eugene V. Roston, xxiv.


These terms refer to periods of time for threat assessment and defense planning purposes.

Near term (2-3 yrs.), midterm (3-10 yrs.) and long term (10-20 yrs.).

Marxist and Leninist doctrine support the belief that eventually the revolt of the masses will lead to a system of world-wide socialism (communism).


As the former Army Chief of Staff under Eisenhower and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Kennedy and Johnson, the author expresses similar concern that the most probable threats are being neglected under the Reagan defense plan.

Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (1978), 90-95.


The following documents provide information on postnuclear strike recovery estimates which is more recent than Kahn's work on the subject.


Roger J. Sullivan, Survival During the First Year After a Nuclear Attack (1979).


Cf., p. 38.

Refers to quotes by Stalin and Brezhnev threatening the survival of the Western world through economic destruction of industry.

In this article economic considerations for U.S. national survival are repeatedly ascribed as part of strategy. The theories of doomsday economists and ecologists Paul Ehrlich and Dennis Meadows are cited as potentially true.

19 The Force Employment Spectrum is a graphic representation of DOD application of National Security Council assessments. The threat assessments determine the types of forces requested to counter the threat assessment.

