CHINA ON THE EVE OF THE OLYMPICS

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CHINA ON THE EVE OF THE OLYMPICS

WEDNESDAY, JULY 23, 2008

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman (chairman of the committee) Presiding.

Chairman BERMAN. The hearing on China on the eve of the Olympics is called to order.

I will recognize myself for an opening statement.

Seven years ago, Beijing won the bid to host the 2008 Olympic Summer Games. Chinese people young and old, their faces streaming with tears of elation, flooded the streets by the millions to celebrate. Many Chinese looked upon this as the moment when, after decades of struggle, their country had finally received the respect of the world.

Hosting the Games has given the government a chance to showcase for international spectators the new China, its gleaming skyscrapers, impressive infrastructure projects and world-class cities aglow with the light and the promise of economic prosperity. Chinese officials were equally eager to highlight for a domestic audience, the hard-fought progress the government had brought to its people; and, from an economic point of view, there was much in which to take pride.

China’s ability to transform a nation of more than 1 billion from an impoverished, undeveloped and overwhelming agrarian country into a powerhouse in just three decades is awe inspiring. Since 1980, China has lifted 300 million people out of poverty. If that number made up a single country, it would be the fourth largest in the world.

Yet, for all of its accomplishments, there are sides of China that Beijing isn’t eager for the world to see. Widening economic disparity is leaving the desperately poor behind. Dangerous environmental degradation poisons China’s air, earth and water, threatening the health of Chinese citizens and of our entire planet as China has become the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide.

Underpinning these dark sides of its explosive growth is China’s greatest shame, the ongoing lack of rights and political freedoms for the Chinese people.

There were early indications that China was prepared to improve its behavior as the Games approached. As a condition of hosting the Olympics, I am told that Beijing committed to allowing greater press freedoms and issued new and relaxed rules for foreign jour-
nalists. It also promised to improve its human rights situation. I know from reading our witnesses' testimony that at least one of them calls into question just how much was actually committed at that time. But we will get into that.

But, in any event, the hope was short-lived as China failed to honor these commitments.

Reporters Without Borders announced in its annual report on China that, in 2007, the government did “everything possible to prevent the liberal press, Internet users and dissidents from expressing themselves.”

A recent poll by the Foreign Correspondence Club of China found that 67 percent of foreign journalists felt China was not keeping its promise to allow freedom of reporting.

In March, the world reacted in horror at images of Chinese police arresting, beating and killing Tibetans, both monks and laymen, on the streets of Lhasa and throughout the Tibetan areas of China.

In December of last year, the Chinese authorities arrested Hu Jia, a leading fighter for human rights, health care and the environment, for allegedly inciting to subvert state power. His arrest was a powerful symbol that China is still determined to curb political rights.

China's international behavior has also been disturbing. Despite the international outcry over the brutal policies of the governments in Burma and Sudan, China remains an ardent supporter of both regimes, supplying money and military support even as the people of Burma and Darfur languish in desperation from disasters both natural and manmade.

Beijing likewise has maintained its regard for the brutal Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe, most recently by vetoing a U.N. Security Council resolution that will impose an arms embargo on Zimbabwe and travel and financial restrictions on Mugabe and other senior officials.

China’s behavior in each of these instances and many others is deplorable. Tomorrow, this committee will mark up a resolution that calls China into account for its actions.

What does China’s behavior mean for United States-China policy? The promotion of human rights and political freedom is one of our central goals as a Nation. What of our other goals as they relate to China, such as stopping Iran’s nuclear program, enhancing energy security or combating global warming?

Iran is a particularly pressing issue. A nuclear armed Iran would threaten China's interests as well as those of the United States and indeed the entire international community. But instead of seizing the opportunity to work together with the United States on this critical nonproliferation issue, Beijing has been resistant to joining us in supporting tough sanctions that could change Tehran's current course.

We are often told that China prizes its image in the global community and that the Olympics are a key point of leverage. But how can we work effectively with Beijing when, even on the eve of this prestigious global showcase, it flagrantly flouts its commitments or blatantly ignores its responsibilities as an emerging global power.

There has been a bright spot in China’s behavior this year. After the terrible earthquake in Sichuan, Beijing allowed unprecedented
access to journalists and gave nongovernmental organizations permission to participate in assistance and cleanup. These actions were important signs that China may be more open to the development of civil society and greater participation by the media. What role international pressure played in this is a matter of question.

The United States-China relationship is exceptionally complex. We have areas where we partner closely and share goals and areas where we disagree strongly. It is in our interest to promote positive ties with China, but our foreign policy objectives are intended to define what kind of relationship we hope to have. Human rights are front and center in the United States-China relationship, especially as China prepares for the Summer Games. Yet, to a great extent, China seems to have disregarded our concerns over these issues.

We have testifying before the committee today three individuals who are uniquely able to help us answer some of these questions. We hope to get a better understanding of China, its behavior and how the United States can better achieve our goals there. These issues will be central to United States-China policy long after the closing ceremony in Beijing on August 24th.

Now I would like to turn to the ranking member of the committee, Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for her opening remarks.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, let me say thank you to you and to your professional staff. It is a delight for us in the minority to work with you and your staff. On every committee hearing, on every markup, you consult with us. You keep us abreast of developments on bills. We are able to work in a bipartisan manner, and I deeply appreciate it. Thank you very much.

I would like to welcome the panelists appearing before us today. Yang Jianli, thank you. You are a familiar name and a face to me from the days when I joined other Members of Congress in seeking to gain your release from a Chinese prison. And it was great to see you last year or soon after you were released. I look forward to hearing your comments based on the bitter personal experience that you had with the prison system in China and the grave human rights situation there.

The convening of the Olympic Games should be an occasion for celebrating goodwill and sportsmanship for all the people of the world. One would wish that the motto of this year’s Olympics—one world, one dream—could ring true. Unfortunately, when it comes to upholding human rights and the pursuit of democratic values, we remain a world divided, with a dream unfulfilled.

More than pollution fills the air of Beijing this summer. A people yearning to breathe free are covered by a dark cloud of oppression that hangs over Tiananmen Square, the sight of a great nation’s broken dream. For that midsummer night’s dream symbolized by the goddess of democracy was crushed and the dream transformed into a nightmare on that long night when the tanks rolled into the Square. The Chinese leaders then made their pact with the devil, purchasing continued absolute political power with the blood shed by its very own people; and this same Communist leadership remains cynically manipulative even to this day.
Ask the victims of genocide in Darfur about China’s destructive policies with the regime in Sudan that is responsible for so much death and suffering in Darfur.

Ask the people of Burma, whose Saffron revolution was suppressed last year with the aid of Chinese-made weapons.

Ask the North Korean refugees making their way along a perilous underground railroad through China while living in constant fear of detection.

Ask the people of Tibet who felt the heavy boots of the People’s Liberation Army pressing down on their throats last spring.

Or ask the Muslim Uyghur community labeled with the broad brush of splitists as Beijing conducts a pre-Olympic security sweep.

China’s security operations are in high gear for the suppression of human rights on the eve of the Olympics; and I am especially concerned, as I noted in a letter earlier this year to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, that United States citizens who feel strongly about human rights issues will be caught up in the Chinese police dragnet once they arrive in Beijing for the Games.

And, finally, I would like to underscore the legitimate security issues relating to our longtime friend, the democratic people of Taiwan. Over 1,000 Chinese missiles are aimed today at the people of Taiwan. And in this regard I found Admiral Keating’s remarks at The Heritage Foundation last week that was, in fact, a freeze on arms sales to Taiwan to be a cause for concern. And even more disturbing was the Admiral’s indication that the Chinese leadership had some input in administration decisions about Taiwan’s defensive needs.

The Taiwan Relations Act gives Congress a clear role in the provision of defensive weapons to Taiwan. President Reagan’s six assurances to Taiwan were a solemn commitment made over a quarter of a century ago making it clear that there should be no pre-consultation with Beijing on this matter. Last year, the House adopted a resolution I put forward which declared that it shall continue to be the policy of the United States, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and services as may be necessary for Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense capability. On this matter, there can be no backsliding nor compromise.

I welcome the views of our panelists on Admiral Keating’s statements and other vital issues in United States-China relations on the eve of the Olympics, including the human rights matters I have addressed.

I have 2 minutes remaining, Mr. Chairman; and I would like to yield to my friend from New Jersey, who just returned from China.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much.

I thank the ranking member for yielding and the chairman for convening this very important hearing.

Three weeks ago, when Frank Wolf, a Congressman from Virginia, and I visited Beijing in order to gauge the human rights situation in the final weeks before the Olympics, eight human rights lawyers whom we had planned to meet with for dinner in a public restaurant were threatened and warned off; and several of them were even placed under house arrest by the police. Our meeting never occurred.
We did meet with one senior House Church pastor, and for that he was placed under house arrest. Amazingly, when Pastor Zhang Mingxuan led us in prayer, he prayed for the government; and it was clear from his conversation throughout the evening that he harbored no malice whatsoever toward those who had already arrested him 16 times before.

Frank Wolf and I also met with Ambassador Li Shuzheng, chairman of the NPC's Foreign Affairs Committee. Our exchange was candid and frank and focused primarily on human rights including the genocide in Darfur. We presented him with a list of 734 of the best documented prisoners of conscience, probably the longest prisoner list the Chinese Government has ever received; and we appealed to him and his government to work for their release.

I make that request again on behalf of these prisoners. The prisoners on the list are of every kind: Labor activists, House Church Protestant pastors, cyber dissidents, Tibetan monks, Catholic bishops, a civil rights lawyer who exposed the brutality of forced abortion, and democracy activists. One prominent pastor, Zhang Rongliang, has diabetes, high blood pressure and a heart condition and grows very ill, more ill by the day.

It is not too late. This month can be historic for China and the world. In the weeks before the Olympics, Congress is joining its voice to the voices of millions of suffering Chinese asking the government, in a dramatic gesture of openness, to let the people go.

Chairman Berman. The time of the gentlelady has expired, and the chair and the ranking member of the Asia Subcommittee will be allotted three minutes—the chair is not here but the ranking member is. So, Mr. Manzullo, do you wish to make an opening statement? If so, you are recognized for 3 minutes.

Mr. MANZULLO. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for calling this important hearing on the eve of the Olympic Games in China.

With the opening ceremony just a few weeks away, it is an important time to observe China’s track record on key issues such as trade, civil liberties and human rights. Since the Games represent a significant milestone for China, it is only appropriate that the world is also very focused on our actions as a host.

On the economic front, I continue to be very concerned about America’s trade imbalance with China. The result of years of currency manipulation and unfair trade practices by the Chinese have translated into significant problems for America’s economy.

One of my companies, Kelly Springfield Titan Tire in Freeport, Illinois—I testified in front of the International Trade Commission just this past week over dumping by the Chinese Government and subsidies by the Chinese Government. The International Trade Commission is now allowing countervailing duties, as represented by yesterday’s duties imposed on steel pipe, as to which the Chinese were involved in manipulation of prices and subsidies.

So that continues to go on. Americans continue to lose more and more jobs to China as a result of improper actions on the part of the Chinese. At the same time, we are optimistic that the Chinese can take the opportunity to turn this around.

I had the opportunity as a student at American University to study China and the Pacific under Lord Lindsay of Berker, who
was a colleague of Layton Stuart, two of the founders of Beijing University, and visited China several times to meet with the Chinese on a continuous basis and have a long desire to see relations improve with the Chinese. This is an opportunity during the Olympics that the Chinese people can show and demonstrate to the world that they can step up, that they can be a participant in helping out in human rights. They can take a new interest in protecting the rights of others, including those involved in property rights and intellectual property.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

I am prepared to recognize the gentlelady from Texas for 1 minute for an opening statement.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the ranking member.

This is a very important hearing. I consider myself a friend and certainly a supporter of the people of China, mainland China, the People’s Republic. I supported the opportunities for engagement as was represented to us Members of Congress during the time of the discussion of the PNTR.

I also heard from then former President Jimmy Carter about the rising opportunities for religious freedom and that this engagement process that we were engaging in as Americans was going to help China in leaps and bounds.

I traveled to China with my good friend from Illinois and many others, but I am sorely disappointed in the treatment of the people who live in this great nation, the attitude of the government, the disrespect to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan people. So I am going to be holding a very high standard, Mr. Chairman—I thank you for yielding to me—a very high standard because I believe China has a very low standard.

I yield back.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired.

No other opening statements, we will now turn to our excellent panel of witnesses.

Our witnesses include two of the nation’s foremost China scholars and one of the leading Chinese voices for human rights and democracy in China.

First, we will hear from Kenneth Lieberthal, who I have known for a long time and who has been very helpful to me on many of these issues. Dr. Lieberthal holds several positions at the University of Michigan in the Business School, the Department of Political Science, the Center for Chinese Studies. He is a nonresident senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, and he has consulted with the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce, the World Bank, private foundations and corporations in the private sector. Dr. Lieberthal previously led Asia policy under the second Clinton administration at the National Security Council. He has written widely on Chinese affairs and foreign policy.

We will also hear from David Michael Lampton. Dr. Lampton is dean of faculty, professor and director of China Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Before assuming these posts, he was president of the National Committee on United States-China Relations in New York City and was affili-
ated with the Nixon Center as the founding director of its Chinese studies program. He is a prolific writer of numerous books and articles on Chinese domestic and foreign affairs. He consults with the Aspen Institute Congressional Program—I am one of its patients—and the Kettering Foundation and various government agencies and corporations.

And, finally, we will hear from Dr. Yang Jianli. Dr. Yang, born in Shandong Province in northern China, holds a Ph.D. in mathematics from the University of California at Berkeley and a Ph.D. in political economy from Harvard University. He is currently a Harvard senior fellow as well as the founder and president of Initiatives for China.

In 1989, as a graduate student at Berkeley, Dr. Yang traveled to Beijing to support those who were demonstrating in Tiananmen Square. After narrowly escaping capture, he committed himself to studying democracy.

In 2002, Dr. Yang returned to China to study the growing labor unrest, where he was arrested and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment for spying. Following an international outcry for his release, including a U.N. resolution and a unanimous vote of both Houses of the United States Congress calling for his freedom, Dr. Yang was finally freed in April 2007.

I thank each of you for agreeing to come before the committee, and we look forward to hearing your testimony.

Why don’t you start?

STATEMENT OF KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL, PH.D., ARTHUR F. THURNAU PROFESSOR, DISTINGUISHED FELLOW AT THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE, WILLIAM DAVIDSON PROFESSOR OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to address the committee today.

I am going to orally give a somewhat shortened version as compared with my written remarks.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, members of the committee, the past year has, through the unrest in Tibet, the Sichuan earthquake, the Olympic torch run and other developments, highlighted key realities of China on the eve of the Beijing Olympics.

First, as the government and popular responses to the Sichuan earthquake have demonstrated, relations are evolving between the Chinese state and society. The state has promoted huge changes—urbanization, privatization, marketization, globalization and the information revolution—and these have begun to produce the foundations of public opinion and civil society.

The Communist Party is both supportive of greater popular involvement in managing affairs and uneasy about where this might lead. In this context, China’s leaders are very focused on maintaining an overall social and political stability, even as they continue to promote the enormous transformations just noted in order to develop the country.

Second, the Olympics have called global attention to China’s environmental issues. Put simply, China faces extremely severe envi-
ronmental problems, even more severe in terms of shortages of usable water for much of the country than in terms of the air pollution that has attracted so much recent attention. Thousands of protests every year in China directly focus on environmental insults and their consequences. China now desperately seeks both continued rapid economic development to satisfy the expectations of its populous and also improved environmental outcomes to make that development sustainable.

China's foreign policy reflects the above domestic realities; and it seeks, first and foremost, to support domestic economic growth and stability. This entails using foreign policy to achieve five basic objectives: First, to assure access to needed resources and markets. China is deeply concerned to assure that it will continue to have access to international sources of energy and raw material, given its very poor per capita endowment in most major categories of natural resources.

Second, to combat foreign forces that threaten domestic stability. This includes cooperating in the fight against international terrorism and also includes taking a very tough line against exiles who seek to achieve a restructuring of the Chinese state.

Third, to reduce the perception that the country is becoming a threat. Beijing in recent years has been very sensitive to the reality that its own growth and increasing impact cause other countries, especially in Asia, to worry about Chinese attitudes and ambitions.

Fourth, to encourage international stability. China constantly asserts that it sees the potential for long-term avoidance of military conflict in Asia and that it seeks to promote that outcome. Its willingness to continue to invest on a very large scale to develop its most important economic nodes in militarily highly vulnerable coastal areas suggests that it is serious about this expectation.

And, fifth, to build the capability to protect China's security interests. The PLA budget has gone up by double-digit figures for more than a decade. While part of this is playing catch-up from a period of sharply reduced PLA budgets in the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, there is also serious development of more modern military capabilities.

We have seen reflection of these considerations in China's foreign policy in recent months. For example, China has reacted extremely strongly against what it views as attempts by Tibetans and some Uyghurs to split the country, even as, at the same time, it builds ties to Taiwan now that the Taiwan leadership does not advocate independence.

Beijing is working on building positive support in Japan and Southeast Asia. Yet, at the same time, it reacted with hard-edged fury when the Olympic torch procession was challenged by those with political gripes against Beijing’s policies.

And all of China's foreign policy takes considerations of “face” as extremely important; important both to the leadership and to the public.

I think the Beijing Olympic Games themselves are likely to produce three story lines.

One is a terrific Olympics with spectacular venues and great competition, and that is Beijing’s top priority.
The second story line is of political repression. China’s leaders have issued orders to their security forces that no disruption should occur anywhere in the country to mar the Games, and the security bureaucracies are very focused on assuring this outcome. There will almost certainly be well-founded stories of political heavy-handedness related to security at the Games, and a lot will depend on how central these stories are to overall coverage. China’s security forces do not typically handle things very well, especially when they are in the spotlight.

The third story line will concern environmental problems. Here, again, Beijing is taking absolutely extraordinary measures to reduce the air pollution that is so much of a part of the city and to make overall environmental conditions for the Games benign. But there are limits to what can be controlled, especially if unfavorable winds set in; and, thus, a negative environmental story can end up being a major part of the Olympic coverage.

It is too early to know which of these three story lines will emerge as the dominant international impression from the Games. This issue, though, may significantly affect the atmosphere for United States-China relations in the wake of the Olympics, especially given that the Democratic National Convention convenes in Denver just 2 days after the Beijing Olympics conclude.

U.S. Government policy in the run-up to the Games, I believe, should continue to avoid rising to the bait to score political points and instead focus on the requirements to make the Olympics an outstanding international sporting event. The Chinese have invested so much pride in these Games that efforts by the United States Government to use the Olympics in order to make political points are almost certain to generate deep resentment rather than quiet agreement among the people in China. The U.S. Government should continue to pursue the tough issues on the United States-China agenda but should not explicitly tie them to the Olympics.

If the Chinese try to politicize the Games beyond the kind of boosterism common to all Olympic host countries, the United States should critique that abuse on the basis of the need to keep the Games nonpolitical.

More broadly, the United States and China have enormous interests in managing their relationship effectively. In developing policies that are most effective, I think it is important to bear in mind the following key realities: First, the Chinese state obviously is authoritarian, but also, for most purposes, it is decentralized, dynamic, internally competitive and concerned with how to govern more effectively as China continues its quest for economic development. Political reforms increasingly look to China’s pre-Communist past. This legacy, though, does not contain the fundamental assumptions about people and social obligations that typically undergird competitive democratic systems. We need to understand realistically the details of China’s decentralized, dynamic, entrepreneurial and internally competitive authoritarian political system and the changes being made in it in order to develop effective policies to deal with it.

Secondly, the most accurate way to view China, I believe, is as an archipelago of relatively modern islands of over 400 million people surrounded by a Third-World Country of over 800 million peo-
ple. It has capabilities and problems associated with modern industrialized societies at the same time that it suffers from weak capacity in everything from its social safety net to human capital development, to national institutional and physical infrastructure—weaknesses characteristic of a developing country. Helping China build capacity is often an important component of producing outcomes we want to see there.

Third, many Chinese are both very much aware of the outside world and also deeply nationalistic. Chinese citizens are very conscious of the weaknesses of their own system but also frequently very resentful when foreigners point out these problems. They often feel that either the foreign critics are assuming they are too unenlightened to understand the flaws in their own system or that foreign critics’ real agenda is simply to humiliate China. In either case, the reaction may make it more difficult to address the problems that foreign critics are highlighting.

Fourth, China now desperately seeks both continued rapid economic development to satisfy the expectations of its population and improved environmental outcomes to make that development sustainable. Efforts to cooperate with China on the environment must take both of these issues into serious consideration or they will not prove effective.

And, finally, China’s international influence has grown rapidly, especially given its economic achievements. But in many areas China’s Government is still trying to figure out what its posture should be. It is not correct to assume that China’s policies in various areas are necessarily the result of strategic planning. Often they are cautious increments of past behavior designed to feel their way along. American understanding of this reality can produce better informed United States policies that seek to move China in the direction of acting as a responsible stakeholder in the international arena.

In conclusion, United States-China relations deal with issues of great importance for both countries. I have tried to present perspectives that will enable U.S. policymakers to be more effective in achieving the results they seek. I hope these remarks are helpful to your deliberations about how best to deal with China.

I look forward to responding to your questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lieberthal follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL, PH.D., ARTHUR F. THURNAU PROFESSOR, DISTINGUISHED FELLOW AT THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE, WILLIAM DAVIDSON PROFESSOR OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Chairman Berman and members of this committee:

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today.

The past year has, through the unrest in Tibet, the Sichuan earthquake, the Olympic torch run, and other developments, highlighted key realities of China on the eve of the Beijing Olympics.

First, as the government and popular responses to the Sichuan earthquake have demonstrated, relations are evolving between the Chinese state and society. The state has promoted huge changes—urbanization, privatization, marketization, globalization, the information revolution—that have begun to produce the foundations of public opinion and civil society. I was in China directly after the earthquake, and it was obvious that something new is going on, with the communist party explicitly thanking NGOs for their effective assistance and people throughout
the country fully caught up in the effort to provide relief to the families devastated by the quake. The communist party is both supportive of greater popular involvement in managing affairs and uneasy about where this might lead. In this context, China’s leaders are very focused on maintaining overall social and political stability as they continue to promote the enormous transformations noted above in order to develop the country.

Second, the Olympics have called global attention to China’s environmental issues. Put simply, China faces extremely severe environmental problems—even more severe in terms of shortages of usable water for much of the country than in terms of the air pollution that has attracted so much recent attention. Environmental degradation has reached the point where it is producing threats to both sustained high levels of economic growth and to social stability. In North China, home to about forty percent of the country’s population, usable water is already extremely scarce and is becoming more of a constraint on economic growth daily. Thousands of protests every year in China directly focus on environmental insults and their consequences. China now desperately seeks both continued rapid economic development to satisfy the expectations of its populace and improved environmental outcomes to make that development sustainable.

China’s foreign policy reflects the above domestic realities and seeks most of all to support domestic economic growth and stability. This entails using foreign policy to:

- Assure access to needed resources and markets. China seeks energy security and, where possible, mistakenly pursues this through efforts to purchase oil and gas still in the ground. It is deeply concerned to assure that it will continue to have access to international sources of energy and raw materials, given its very poor per capita endowment in most major categories of natural resources.
- Combat foreign forces that threaten domestic stability. This includes cooperating in the fight against international terrorism and taking a very tough line against exiles who seek to achieve a restructuring of the Chinese state.
- Reduce the perception that the country is becoming a threat. Beijing in recent years has been very sensitive to the reality that its own growth and increasing impact cause other countries, especially in Asia, to worry about Chinese attitudes and ambitions. The PRC has therefore become extremely active in diplomatic circles to promote the development of multilateral institutions in Asia and to create various forms of partnerships with many of the countries with which it deals.
- Encourage international stability. China constantly asserts that it sees the potential for long term avoidance of military conflict in Asia and that it seeks to promote this outcome. Its willingness to continue to invest on a large scale to develop its most important economic nodes in militarily highly vulnerable coastal areas suggests that it is serious about this expectation.
- Build the capability to protect China’s security interests. The PLA budget has gone up by double digit figures for more than a decade. While part of this is playing catch-up from a period of sharply reduced PLA budgets in the late 1980’s and first half of the 1990’s and another part is focused on improving salaries and other perquisites for PLA members, there is also serious development of more modern military capabilities. There is a debate in China now as to what types of naval developments should be pursued, given the country’s long supply lines for vital energy and other commodities. That debate has not been resolved at this point.

Growing out of the above, in the run-up to the Olympics China has reacted extremely strongly against what it views as attempts by Tibetans and by some Uyghurs to split the country even as it builds ties to Taiwan now that Taiwan has a leadership that does not advocate independence. Beijing is mending some of its fences with Japan and working on building positive support in Southeast Asia. Yet at the same time it reacts with hard edged fury when the Olympic torch procession is challenged by those with political gripes against Beijing’s policies.

In all of this, being regarded and treated with respect (“face”) is extremely important to the leadership and the public.

I think the Beijing Olympic games themselves are likely to produce three story lines. One is of a terrific Olympics with spectacular venues and great competition, and that is Beijing’s top priority. The amount of preparation for these games, both in terms of physical structures and training of support personnel, has been astonishing.
The second story line is of political repression. China’s leaders have issued orders to their security forces that no disruptions should occur anywhere in the country to mar the games, and the security bureaucracies are very focused on assuring this outcome. They have some legitimate concerns, as Interpol and the US have warned of various terrorist threats, and many advocacy organizations have planned for years to generate publicity for their causes via actions at the Beijing Olympics. There will almost certainly be well-founded stories of political heavy-handedness related to security at the games, and a lot will depend on how central these stories are to the overall coverage. China’s security forces do not typically handle things very well when they are in the spotlight.

The third story line will concern environmental problems. Here again, Beijing has taken absolutely extraordinary measures to reduce the air pollution that is so much a part of the city and to make overall environmental conditions for the games benign. But there are limits to what can be controlled, especially if unfavorable winds set in. Should athletes drop out of some competitions because of air quality problems or heat exhaustion or other ailments related to the physical conditions, the environmental story can end up being a major part of the Olympic coverage.

It is too early to know which of these three story lines will emerge as the dominant international impression from the games. This issue, though, may significantly affect the atmosphere for US-China relations in the wake of the Olympics. The Democratic National Convention convenes in Denver just two days after the Beijing Olympics conclude, with the Republican convention following shortly afterward. Very negative coverage of China growing out of the games can potentially force US-China relations onto the agendas of these national nominating conventions.

US government policy in the run-up to the games should continue to avoid rising to the bait to score political points and instead focus on the requirements to make the Olympics an outstanding international sporting event. This includes keeping on sharing our expertise concerning security and effective management of this type of event. Chinese have invested so much pride in these games that efforts by the US government to use the Olympics in order to make political points are almost certain to generate deep resentment rather than quiet agreement among people in China. The USG should continue to pursue the tough issues on the US-China agenda, but should not explicitly tie them to the Olympics.

If the Chinese try to politicize the games beyond the kind of boosterism common to all Olympic host countries, the US should critique that abuse on the basis of the need to keep the games non-political. For example, the Taiwan team will be participating in the Games under the name “Chinese Taipei.” The Chinese characters approved to convey “Chinese” here (zhonghua) denote ethnic Chineseness. If Beijing uses a different name, employing a term (zhongguo) for the Taiwan team that conveys that it is “China’s Taiwan,” that should be the subject of IOC and international concern.

More broadly, the US and China have enormous interests in managing their relationship effectively. In developing policies that are most effective, I think it is important to keep in mind that:

- The Chinese state is authoritarian but also for most purposes decentralized, dynamic, internally competitive, and concerned with how to govern more effectively as China continues its quest for economic development. While economic reforms focus on the types of development models that have succeeded elsewhere in Asia, political reforms increasingly look to China’s pre-communist past, seeking in many cases to develop ethics of harmony and social obligation from parts of the Confucian legacy. This legacy can place huge obligations on the state to produce good governance, including providing for social welfare, but it does not contain the fundamental assumptions about people and social obligations that undergird competitive democratic systems. This search for a Chinese path of political reform is, like many things in China, very much a work in progress and a matter of contention domestically. We need to understand realistically the details of China’s decentralized, dynamic, entrepreneurial, and internally competitive authoritarian political system and the changes being made in it to develop effective policies to deal with it.
- The most accurate way to view China is as an archipelago of relatively modern islands of over 400 million people surrounded by a third world country of over 800 million people. It has capabilities and problems associated with modern industrialized societies at the same time that it suffers from weak capacity in everything from its social safety net to human capital development to national institutional and physical infrastructure—weaknesses characteristic of a developing country. These two Chinas interact pervasively
across the board—and to neglect either one is to fail to understand the problems and prospects that motivate China’s policies and shape their outcomes. Helping China build capacity is often an important component of producing outcomes we want to see there.

- Many Chinese are both very much aware of the outside world—for example, wanting to study abroad, keyed into popular culture and developments in other countries—and also deeply nationalistic. There is enormous pride in the rapid development of China over the past three decades and a sense that China is now, after more than a century of bad times, finally resuming a place of real significance and honor in the world. Chinese citizens are deeply conscious of the weaknesses of their own system but also, frequently, very resentful when foreigners point out these problems. They often feel that either the foreign critics are assuming they are too unenlightened to understand the flaws in their own system or that foreign critics’ real agenda is simply to humiliate China. In either case, the reaction may make it more difficult to address problems that foreign critics are highlighting.

- China now desperately seeks both continued rapid economic development to satisfy the expectations of its populace and improved environmental outcomes to make that development sustainable. Efforts to cooperate with China on the environment must take both of these issues into serious consideration or they will not prove effective.

- China’s international influence is growing rapidly, especially given its economic achievements, but in many areas China’s government is still trying to figure out what its posture should be. It is not correct to assume that China’s policies in various areas are rigid and are necessarily the result of strategic planning. Often, they are cautious increments of past behavior designed to feel their way along as they try to figure out how best to handle the country’s increasing capabilities and international obligations. American understanding of this reality can produce better informed US policies that seek to move China in the direction of acting as a responsible stakeholder in the international arena.

US-China relations deal with issues of great importance for both countries, including encouraging balanced growth, reducing the chances of armed conflict, better managing nontraditional security threats, and addressing global climate change. In addition, Asia is the most dynamic region in the world over the coming years, and the US has vital national interests throughout the region. Handling the relationship with China effectively is a necessary component of regional success. I hope the above remarks are helpful to your deliberations about how best to deal with China and look forward to responding to your questions.

Thank you.

Chairman Berman. Thank you very much, Dr. Lieberthal.

Dr. Lampton.

STATEMENT OF DAVID M. LAMPTON, PH.D., GEORGE AND SADIE HYMAN PROFESSOR OF CHINA STUDIES, DIRECTOR OF THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM, PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Mr. Lampton. Chairman Berman and Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, thank you very much for inviting me to be here this morning with you to share my personal assessments on four timely issues: One, what does the run-up to the Olympics tell us about Beijing’s internal political development and likely future foreign policy behavior? Two, how are the Games likely to unfold and what impact is this outcome likely to have on United States-China relations? Three, how should Congress and the administration approach the Olympics? And, four, how should Congress and the executive branch conceptualize United States-China relations for the long haul?

Mr. Chairman, I ask that my full testimony be put into the record.
Chairman BERMAN. All the prepared testimonies will be included in the record of this hearing.

Mr. LAMPTON. Thank you very much.

Most fundamentally, I believe the following: First, the United States has an affirmative interest in the perceived success of the upcoming Olympic Games.

Second, we should focus on the period beyond the Olympic Games. We need to pursue a fundamental strategy of managing common threats and common opportunities.

Third, one principal opportunity we should be trying to seize is in the Taiwan Strait. The people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have a window of opportunity for peace and stabilization that is very much in American interests. We should actively foster an environment in which sustained progress there can be made.

And, finally, one Member of Congress said last week that the fundamental threats to our national security, way of life and national well-being, beyond climate change, are the fiscal, energy, and human and physical infrastructure challenges we face domestically. China exacerbates some of these issues and may help address others. In either event, China is not the principal problem we face, though effectively dealing with the spillover effects from its dramatic growth will be a critical national foreign policy challenge for many years, indeed, decades to come.

With respect to the Olympic Games, the United States has an interest in their success. Even as China’s elite has made it abundantly clear that it makes decisions with stability as its first, second and third priority, the reactions that stem from this priority are often justly criticized, though the lethal bomb attacks in Kunming 2 days ago remind us that China, too, faces security challenges.

All things considered, it is difficult to imagine that a Chinese elite that has taken an unprecedented risk on openness by hosting these Games will be easier to deal with and a better global citizen if its leaders and citizens perceive openness to have produced national humiliation.

At the same time that Beijing has reacted excessively due to its stability concerns, China’s leaders and the Chinese populous simultaneously want international acceptance and approval. Beijing therefore seeks to conform to international norms as long as they do not threaten perceived international and domestic stability.

China’s record on the run-up to the Olympic Games, therefore, has been mixed. On the one hand, we see encouraging signs; and each of these encouraging signs is in itself ambiguous, I will be the first to concede. But we see some positive signs with respect to Darfur, some with Burma, some in the dialogue with the Dalai Lama, about which I think we should not be too optimistic, on their desire to open up somewhat in the wake of the earthquake and somewhat more open access for the foreign media, though that access is still far from desirable. Amnesty International recently favorably commented on improved policy vis-à-vis the death penalty, although we have had some recent incidents on that front as well.

On the other hand, domestic dissidents have been harassed or worse, including being detained on the way to a meeting, as was described by Representative Smith and also Congressman Wolf.
Large numbers of persons have been displaced without due process in the course of building Olympic venues. There are tighter rules for the domestic press than for the foreign media. There may have been some racial discrimination in service establishments in the capital, and onerous visa regulations capriciously keep “trouble-makers” and many legitimate tourists out of China entirely.

No one knows how the Games, 2 weeks hence, will actually unfold. The problems in conducting successful Games are considerable. While acknowledging these uncertainties and risks in my written testimony, some with substantial probability of occurrence, my guess is that China is going to exceed expectations and therefore have a relative success. If this occurs, this will be positive for United States-China relations, particularly if the United States is seen to have been cooperative, as I believe it has thus far been.

While we in the West may see an important distinction between expressing disapproval of Chinese Government actions requiring response and attacking China’s culture and people more broadly, China’s history, its nationalism and the more recent socialization of its people tend to lead the Chinese to conflate the two. This produces a paradoxical result seen in the March disturbances in Tibet. Western condemnation of Beijing’s actions and policies directed at the clamp-down produced popular pressure on Beijing to be even tougher on Tibetan demonstrators and others.

A Pew Attitudes Project poll that was released yesterday reports that 79 percent of the surveyed Chinese say that the Olympics “are important to me personally.”

While not overlooking the conflictual and ongoing issues that beset United States-China relations—including human rights problems and all of the problems that have been mentioned here that are entirely legitimate and for the most part absolutely accurate—foreign exchange problems, intellectual property problems, product safety problems—nonetheless, we need a broader, more constructive focus for engagement.

The management of common threats and common opportunities provides such a framework. We should not let the Olympics divert us from this long-term effort. We cannot afford a lack of Sino-American cooperation on common threats, nor can we afford to miss seizing common opportunities.

The real issues are where is China headed in the future, how can the international community best shape forward movement, how can the global community effectively address challenges imperiling us all and what should be United States policy in the years ahead?

A defining characteristic of the 21st century is going to be addressing transnational threats, environmental and climate change and public health contagious disease challenges, nonstate terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, global economic system management, consumer and product safety on a worldwide scale and so forth. These are not only threats. They are also opportunities, as are promoting strategic stability at the lowest possible level with China and seizing the present opportunity to achieve long-term stabilization in the Taiwan Strait. We should make these threats and these opportunities a principal focus of Sino-American cooperation.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, and Committee Members:

Thank you for inviting me to share with the Committee my personal assessments on four timely issues: 1) What does the run up to the Olympic Games tell us about Beijing’s internal political development and likely future foreign policy behavior? 2) How are the Games likely to unfold and what impact is this outcome likely to have on China’s foreign relations, not least ties with the United States? 3) How should Congress and the Administration approach the Olympics with an eye to advancing our foreign policy goals? And 4), Looking beyond the Games, how should Congress and the Executive Branch conceptualize U.S.-China relations for the long haul?

Most fundamentally, Mr. Chairman, I believe the following: First, the United States has an affirmative interest in the perceived success of the upcoming Olympic Games. Second, we should focus on the period beyond the Olympics; we need to pursue a fundamental strategy of "Managing Common Threats and Common Opportunities." Third, one principal opportunity we should be trying to seize is in the Taiwan Strait. The people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have a window of opportunity for peace and stabilization that is very much in American interests. We should actively foster an environment in which sustained progress there can be made. And finally, as one Member of Congress said last week, the fundamental threats to our national security and national well-being (beyond climate change) are the fiscal, energy, and human and physical infrastructure challenges we face domestically. China exacerbates some of these issues, and may help address other problems. In any event, China is not the principal problem we face, though effectively dealing with the spillover effects of its dramatic growth will be a critical national foreign policy challenge for many years.

The Run Up to the Olympics As An Indicator of China’s Future Political Development and Foreign Policy

The run up to the XXIX Olympic Games confirms what we have known for thirty years about the People’s Republic of China (PRC): China is involved in a tumultuous domestic process of change that involves: urbanizing 300–400 million people (beyond the 300 million already urbanized over the last thirty years); changing the very structure of its economic and social system; providing employment to over ten million entrants into the labor force each year, plus another 10–15 million new rural migrants annually seeking jobs in cities; adapting to globalization; and, dealing with the rising material and other aspirations of a rapidly growing middle class, perhaps already numbering 300 million persons. Consequently, stability is the first, second, and third priority of China's social and political elite.

In the West, we believe (correctly in my view) that expeditious political liberalization and institutionalization of pluralism is a wise strategy to achieve stability (by creating a more just and participatory system). But, China’s leaders do not know how they can dismount the tiger they have unleashed: simultaneously sustain the high economic growth they feel underpins both stability and their rule, and move toward political liberalization. As for China’s middle class at the current moment, it appears more concerned about the dangers to its new-found prosperity represented by the impoverished masses below than the dangers to liberty represented by the elite above. China’s elite is not convinced that Americans or other foreigners understand their necessities.

At the same time, China’s leaders and the Chinese populace want international acceptance and approval, both for reasons of national pride and because integration into the world is helping China prosper. Beijing, therefore, will seek to conform to international norms, particularly those promoting domestic growth and conferring international approval, as long as so doing does not threaten international or domestic stability.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, China’s record on the run up to the Olympic Games has been mixed. On the one hand, Beijing has joined international organizations and regimes of all descriptions that confer legitimacy and help China solve problems. On the other hand, Beijing has engaged in repressive domestic behavior that breeds international and domestic criticism. China has met some important international expectations in its Olympic preparations, the jury is out in some areas, and it has fallen very short in still other areas.
When China’s elite has felt it can move in the direction of accommodating western demands with minimal internal or international risk, it seems to have done so. For instance, the last year has seen China:

- Play a more constructive role on Darfur (with the appointment of a special envoy [Liu Guijin], by giving its support for UN-African Union forces, in this case through an affirmative vote for UN Security Council Resolution 1769, and by posting 315 engineers on the ground in Darfur as part of the joint UN–AU mission).\(^1\)
- Prod (minimally to be sure) the Burmese junta on recent political and meteorological disasters.\(^2\)
- Make positive diplomatic moves in the Taiwan Strait.
- Announce that Central China Television will broadcast Olympic events live through the International Broadcast Center “without time delay” (even though other aspects of media management have been troubling, including a ten second delay domestically).\(^3\)
- Initiate discussions with the most senior representative of the Dalai Lama in the wake of the March 2008 disturbances (though to what effect is unclear, expectations for the talks are best kept low, and PRC rhetoric about the Dalai Lama has been excessive).
- Assist greatly in moving the North Korean regime positively on the nuclear problem.
- Improve relations with Tokyo and Taipei, in part by inviting their rescue teams to help in the aftermath of the tragic May 12th Sichuan earthquake. And,
- Reduce the scope of the death penalty through the Supreme Court review process, though many deficiencies and inequities remain. Amnesty International recently observed this progress in its July 8, 2008, letter to Chinese President Hu Jintao.\(^4\)

On the other hand, particularly with the Tibetan disturbances in March, the subsequent crackdown, and in the wake of the experience with the Olympic torch abroad in April, China’s government has:

- Tightened down on foreign media access to sensitive locales and iconic sites.
- Made visa regulations more stringent and onerous in order to further assure that “troublesome” individuals and groups do not enter China.
- Made it difficult or impossible for dissidents to meet with visiting dignitaries, such as this Committee’s Member Representative Smith.
- Gone to considerable lengths to make sure that domestic dissidents do not get in proximity to Beijing, much less the Games themselves.
- Apparently suggested racial profiling and discrimination in service establishments in at least some parts of Beijing during the Games.
- Decided, as a matter of policy, that the focus of the Games will be more on boosting domestic popular legitimacy than being overly attentive to foreign opinion.
- Constrained the dissemination of information in China beyond usual tight practices. And,
- All along there have been issues of fair and equitable treatment of those displaced by the Games’ venues and related construction.

This mixed record has given rise to mixed evaluations by outside observers. On the one hand, the Chief International Inspector for the International Olympic Committee, Hein Verbruggen, in early July reportedly said, “The quality of preparation, the readiness of the venues and the attention to operational detail for these Games have set a gold standard for the future.” He went on to say more ambiguously: “The organizers need now to deliver the services pledged for . . . the various

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\(^1\) Jim Yardley, “China’s envoy to Sudan defends policy on Darfur,” International Herald Tribune, March 7, 2008.
\(^3\) Xinhua, July 8, 2008. “CCTV to broadcast Olympic events live without delay.”
\(^4\) Irene Khan, Secretary General, Amnesty International, Letter to President of the People’s Republic of China, July 8, 2008.
stakeholders...” Perhaps he was referring, at least in part, to impediments to foreign mass media and environmental concerns. In writing Chinese President Hu Jintao on July 8, 2008, Amnesty International’s Secretary General Irene Kahn prefaced the organization’s call for Beijing to make five human rights improvements, by saying, “Amnesty International recognizes the Chinese government’s efforts to address some longstanding human rights concerns.” On the other hand, in early July, Human Rights Watch issued a report and accused the International Olympic Committee of having ignored Beijing’s broken pledges and denied promised access to foreign media. On July 10, 2008, the European Parliament issued a somewhat mixed, but largely critical, resolution concerning Chinese human rights practices on the eve of the Olympics. To some extent, outside observers are throwing together China’s pledges to the IOC (about which we are not 100 percent certain), various “promises” (and “guidelines”) Chinese officials have made over time, and foreign aspirations for Chinese behavior that PRC officials have never addressed or agreed to.

In judging China’s behavior in the run up to the Games, there is an additional problem beyond the mixed character of PRC behavior—I am informed that there is no comprehensive, publicly available, and authoritative document showing what China’s Olympic Organizing Committee actually agreed to with the International Olympic Committee. Bits and pieces have leaked out. And, in May 2007 China issued a “Service Guide for Foreign Media” that promised international journalists wide latitude in doing their jobs. But, if the United States is to criticize Beijing for its behavior, it should be able to show what the PRC initially agreed to and be able to measure compliance.

In short, China’s record of progress has been mixed, halting, uneven, but overall forward. This has been the case for the last twenty-plus years; it is likely to remain the case well into the future. The Olympic Games have provided incentives for movement in positive directions (particularly in China’s international behavior and bringing international standards in a broad array of areas to China), but domestic stability remains the overriding priority that will trump other concerns, including international image. China has moved most clearly and positively in those areas with the least domestic volatility potential, and least in those areas where it perceives large domestic risks.

The accumulation of severe storms in the Winter, concerns about inflation and global economic stability more recently, the Tibet-related disturbances of March and April, the torch relay incidents abroad, the general sense among Chinese that the international community is biased against China, the tragic May 12 earthquake in Sichuan, and ongoing fears about Xinjiang-related groups, all have come together to create an environment not most conducive to a relaxed Beijing attitude. Somewhat offsetting this anxiety has been the sympathetic response of the world community to the earthquake and other recent friendly gestures of the outside world, including those by the United States, Taiwan, and Japan. Also, recent cross-Strait initiatives from Taiwan’s new president, Ma Ying-jeou, have boosted confidence.

How Are The Games Likely to Unfold and What are The Implications for Sino-American Relations; How Should the Congress and the Administration Approach the Games?

Of course, no one knows how the Games two weeks hence will actually unfold. The problems in conducting successful games are considerable, as discussed by the China Working Group when Congresspersons Mark Kirk and Rick Larsen went to China in August of last year. There are serious environmental dangers that pertain to both air and water that need no elaboration here. There are dangers that international groups will use China as the place to make their statements, even if not directed at China itself. There are international and domestic groups that, for a variety of causes, wish to take advantage of the global media visibility to make their grievances against Chinese policies known. There are terrorists bent on showing they can disrupt anything. There will be dozens of heads of state and hundreds of other senior officials and notables who need security. There is the danger of excessive displays of nationalism by Chinese and non-Chinese sparking ugly incidents. Athletes may choose to make their own personal statements. And, there is the very serious risk of adverse consequences being inflicted upon demonstrators by heavy-handed local and national-level responses to incidents. There probably will be heavy-handed preemptive moves, beyond those that already have occurred.

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Nonetheless, while acknowledging all these uncertainties and risks, some with substantial probability of occurrence, my guess is that China is going to exceed expectations and therefore have a relative success. If this occurs, this will be positive for U.S.-China relations, particularly if the United States is seen to have been basically cooperative, as I believe it has thus far been. U.S.-China cooperation on security for the Games has been basically positive. Agree or not, President Bush’s longstanding and consistent decision to attend the Games’ opening ceremony, and Secretary Rice’s more recent decision to attend the closing ceremony, stands in contrast to hesitations, bobbing and weaving, and refusals of some other national leaders. My judgment on this is that face-to-face interaction between Chinese and world leaders is more effective than attempts at humiliation and isolation. It is difficult to imagine that a Chinese elite that has taken an unprecedented risk on openness will be easier to deal with and a better global citizen if its leaders and citizens perceive openness to have produced humiliation.

While we in the West may see an important distinction between expressing disapproval of Chinese government actions requiring response, and attacking China’s culture and people more broadly, China’s history, nationalism, and the more recent socialization of the populace tend to lead Chinese to conflate the two. This produces a paradoxical result seen in the March disturbances concerning Tibet. Denunciation of Beijing’s actions and policies directed at the clampdown produced popular pressure on Beijing to be even tougher on Tibetan demonstrators and others. In some recent articles, like that by Lucy Caldwell, Kara Hadge, Nayeli Rodriguez, and Derek Thompson in *Slate,* there is whiff of satisfaction in enumerating all the challenges that the Chinese obviously face in conducting a successful Olympics. The United States stands to gain absolutely nothing with the Chinese people by seeming to revel in their problems. In all probability the Games will strengthen popular support for the regime, notwithstanding the many Chinese citizens who have been disrupted and harmed in the course of preparations, the about $40 billion spent on the endeavor, and the concerns with other national priorities. I believe that in the minds of most Chinese, at this point the Games are more about the pride they all feel in a resurgent China than it is a referendum on Chinese Communist Party rule. The Games are going to occur. The United States has an interest in their success, as obviously do all the athletes who are participating. The real issues are where China is headed in the future, how the international community can best shape movement forward, and what American policy should be in the years ahead.

**Thinking About the Future of America’s China Policy and U.S.-China Relations**

If we look at the succession of U.S. policies toward China over the last almost sixty years since 1949, it puts the present moment in context. From 1949 to about 1969, the U.S. policy was “containment,” a concept that speaks for itself. Then from the early 1970s until perhaps 1985, U.S. policy was tacit alliance against the common Soviet menace. Under both Presidents Bush and President Clinton, “engagement” was (and remains) the broad policy signboard, the thought being that dialogue, candidly acknowledging common interests and problems, and enmeshing China in the fabric of international life, all will gradually lead China and the United States to develop common interests and shared norms. There also is the hope that gradual change in domestic governance would occur. In many respects these expectations have been partially, in some cases substantially, realized, but western hopes in the governance domain remain unfulfilled, though not without progress over the last thirty years.

While not overlooking the conflictual and ongoing issues that beset bilateral relations (e.g., human rights, foreign exchange rates, intellectual property, etc.), we need a broader, more constructive focus for engagement: “The Management of Common Threats and Common Opportunities.” We should not let the Olympics divert us from this more important long-term effort. As we enter the Twenty-First Century, we cannot afford a lack of Sino-American cooperation on common threats, nor can we afford to miss seizing common opportunities. By cooperating in the domains of threat and opportunity with China we will better achieve our long-standing objectives.

A defining characteristic of the Twenty-First Century is going to be addressing transnational threats—environmental/global warming and public health/contagious disease challenges, non-state terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, global economic system management, consumer and product safety on a world-wide scale, etc. There also are opportunities: promoting strategic stability at the lowest possible level with China and seizing the present opportunity to achieve long-term...
stabilization in the Taiwan Strait. We should make these threats and opportunities a principal focus of bi-lateral Sino-American cooperation (engagement), not only because they are of transcendent importance, but also because in many cases we share substantial common interests with the PRC. In dealing with these challenges and opportunities, China will be developing institutions and attitudes supportive of more humane, participatory, and legally based governance. All this will take time, perhaps considerable time. Here I have in mind such phenomena and common interests as:

- **Global climate change** gravely challenges both nations; both are major contributors to the problem; and, both share a common interest in breaking dependence on petroleum, if not carbon-based energy more broadly. The U.S. has the technology and China has the demand for it. We might consider joint Sino-American (with perhaps others involved too) research on alternative energy sources and conservation strategies.

- **Counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics.** As China’s power and reach in the international system grows, so will the number of international groups and nations that react to the PRC’s growing impacts, some of which will vent their rage against PRC citizens abroad and at home. This already is happening, with China’s Foreign Ministry and other agencies already restructuring to try to deal with these threats. With respect to narcotics, sky-rocketing production of drugs in Afghanistan and Central Asia is resulting in increasing volumes of drugs finding their way to China and through the PRC’s porous western borders. Sino-American cooperation on counter-terrorism already has proven important in the Container Security Initiative. Such cooperation will become increasingly important.

- **Global supply chain reliability.** Given the globalized and interdependent supply chains that have evolved, the weakest links in the production chain can inflict global damage as seen in the pharmaceutical (e.g., heparin) and toy industries. China has an interest in protecting “Brand China.” U.S. firms have an interest in protecting the integrity of their products and reputations. And, both governments have an interest in protecting their citizens. This is a set of challenges in which Sino-American common interests in addressing a threat far exceed the divergences.

- **Managing the global economy.** Does the G-8 any longer really represent the core of the global economy as it once did? If not, how are we going to address the threat of global economic insecurity—to provide sustained, stable, and equitable global growth? What is going to be the table around which the major economies of the Twenty-First Century sit to agree to a package of joint economic actions (such as exchange rate adjustment, savings and taxation policy, discussion of regulatory policy, growth policy, and investment regimes)? Both China and the United States have overriding interests in international economic system stability and sustained growth. Both China and the United States are economically intertwined in ways scarcely imaginable a decade ago—just consider PRC holdings of U.S. financial instruments. The Administration’s Strategic Economic Dialogue led by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson is a good start in this direction (as it is on energy and the environment); this Dialogue (or some reasonable facsimile) should be continued.

- **Actual and potential military competition.** Neither the United States nor China need the added burden of expenditure and lost opportunity that military competition on the ground, in space, or in the cyber sphere represents. Beijing and Washington need to begin talking seriously about how to defuse emerging threats we both perceive in these domains. The objective should be achieving strategic stability at the lowest possible level of weaponry.

- **The Taiwan Strait.** There are opportunities to be seized, none more apparent than the confluence of leaders in Beijing and Taipei who now apparently wish to work toward a long-term stabilization of the Taiwan Strait. There are numerous difficulties, but, were stabilization to occur, it would be profoundly positive for American interests. We should do what we can to create an environment in which such reconciliation can occur.

- **Global public health and contagious disease challenges.** HIV/AIDS, avian flu and other potential pandemics, and contagious diseases once considered on the wane that now are regaining momentum, all are areas for cooperation.

In short, these are just some of the threats and the opportunities about which we should orient future American policy with respect to China. The Olympic Games are going to happen, we have an interest in their success, and we should not let our
reaction to the Games now reduce the likelihood of addressing “Common Threats and Common Opportunities.” This is the ball on which we all should keep our eyes focused. Of course, the Chinese must do their part—it takes two to tango. Most fundamentally, America must build, rebuild, and renew its financial/fiscal, human, and physical infrastructures so that as China, India, and others move up the value-added ladder, we stay rungs ahead.

Chairman Berman. Thank you, Dr. Lampton.

Dr. Yang. Three doctors.

STATEMENT OF YANG JIANLI, PH.D., PRESIDENT AND FOUNDER, INITIATIVES FOR CHINA, FELLOW, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Mr. Yang. Thank you, Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen and distinguished members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. I am grateful for this opportunity to address you today.

As you know, between May 4th and the June 4th of this year, I walked 500 miles from Boston to Washington, DC, to express my gratitude to the United States Government, to the American people for their support during my imprisonment in China. Because of this support, I am here today, a free man in this great hall of democracy, speaking freely. I will speak not for myself but for the tens of thousands of my countrymen who cannot speak because they are either full of fear or in jail for what I will be doing today. Speaking freely. I will never forget the great compassion of America, and I ask you never to forget or underestimate the powerful voice for freedom that is America.

You have asked me to give my perspective on China’s foreign and domestic relations in the context of upcoming Olympic Games and to provide a perspective on what China’s behavior tells the world about the nature of China’s political development and how China will conduct its foreign relations going forward.

The Chinese Government’s promises back in 2001 to improve its human rights record are well-known. The fact that China’s Government has actually intensified its disregard for the civil and human rights of its citizens in the lead-up to the Olympics is also well-known. This desperate crackdown on its citizens and its blatant disregard for its commitments to the international community speak loudly about how the CCP views the Olympic Games and its role as a governing body in China.

The Chinese Government wants to host the Olympics so it can use the pageantry and the equity of the Olympic Games to project an image of China and its rule as a great, stable and harmonious society. For the Chinese Government, the Olympics are nothing more than a tool for orchestrating a thin veneer of harmony over a society that underneath is a caldron of frustration, disillusionment, discontent and fear.

It is a sweet irony that numerous recent protests, crackdowns and natural disasters made even worse by government corruption have repeatedly punched through this veneer to reveal images of a Chinese society that is more like “one world, one nightmare,” rather than its official one of “one world, one dream.” In this regard, the lead-up to the Olympics has been somewhat of a media disaster for the CCP.
The Chinese Government needs the Olympics to project an image of legitimacy to the world and to its people. However, its actions clearly reveal how corrupt and illegitimate the Chinese Government really is. It knows it has no ideology to offer its citizens. It knows it rules by fear, and its actions tell us it will do anything to any of its people and to tell anything to the outside world to maintain its hold on power.

The Chinese Government’s position as an Olympic host gave us the right, if not the duty, to hold China accountable. Even at this hour, the United States and the world democracy can never reach the Chinese Government’s desperate need to have a successful Olympics to engage in a constructive and assertive dialogue regarding its human rights record.

At the very least, President Bush should demand the release of political prisoners as a condition for his attending the opening ceremonies. President Bush should also work in concert with other world leaders to develop a coordinated strategy of a conversation of participation in the Olympics tied to specific and measurable actions by the Chinese Government.

We should have no fear in doing this, because the Chinese Government needs President Bush at the Olympics much, much more than President Bush needs to be there. Such a coordinated strategy will also send a powerful message of support for the many courageous Chinese citizens inside and outside of China’s jails who are putting their lives, their families, and their fortunes at risk every day to advance the cause of liberty.

Finally, I urge all of you and all the national and international press to remember the climate of fear and repression we have seen in the events that have preceded the Olympic Games. We have seen the repression of the Tibetan protests. We have heard of arrests and intimidation of numerous journalists and human rights activists. We have witnessed the agony of parents in Sichuan Province who know that their school-aged children would be alive today if it were not for the government corruption that allowed schools in a known earthquake zone to be built to substandard codes.

Do not forget this as the carefully orchestrated Olympic festivities unfold. Journalists may be free to move around Beijing and ask any question of the people they meet, but the true test of a free society is whether people are free to respond. This is clearly not the case in China today.

In his brilliant book, The Case for Democracy, noted Soviet dissident, Natan Sharansky, states that governments which rule by fear are inherently unstable. The world community cannot rely on leaders who do not rely on or trust their own people.

The Government of China remains a one-party totalitarian system, driven by the fear of losing power and are committed to the use of fear to incapacitate any person or organization which it deems a threat to its legitimate hold on power. The hope of many people that political openness in China will follow economic progress is an illusion. Structurally, the Chinese Government is organized to maintain its absolute power at the expense of its citizens.

For example, the Chinese constitution admits the CCP as the only legitimate ruling power in China. Therefore, anyone who
speaks against the government is subjected to charges of treason. The Chinese laws and the regulations established that the judici-
ary reports directly to the Chinese Communist Party. The CCP
tells judges who is guilty and what sentence to give. Trials are lit-
tle more than preordained showpieces. People have no means of re-
dress. This is why, according to the Human Rights Watch Report
of 2007, there are nearly 100,000 protests against the government
each year in China. This is remarkable, given the great risk people
assume for participating in these protests.

The Chinese Government will continue to rule by fear. The CCP
will continue to invest an inordinate amount of resources in con-
trolling the population through fear, hatred and division. It will
make demons of the Tibetans. It will make terrorists of the
Uyghurs. It will make subversives of Christians and Falun Gong
practitioners. This control will stifle political, social and, ulti-
mately, economic development and increase the social unrest. As
unrest grows, it will export its fear abroad, create enemies or situa-
tions that rally the people at home under the banner of nation-
alisim. It will use its economic clout to intimidate and induce for-
egn governments and organizations to capitulate to its rule by fear.

I will quickly conclude.

So we need not look further than the case of Yahoo!. Everybody
knows that case. So if the committee will—I will conclude by telling
a story that was told to me by a fellow inmate while I was in pris-
on. This story speaks to the depths of frustration of my countrymen
and the hope that America holds for them.

A young man was sentenced to death for a minor crime. He spent
many years on death row in China. The night before he was exe-
cuted, he said to a fellow inmate, “If I am to be reborn, I shall look
outside first. If I see China’s flag over the land, I will refuse to be
born. However, if I see an American flag waving in the blue sky,
I will gladly leap into the world.”

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yang follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF YANG JIANLI, PH.D., PRESIDENT AND FOUNDER,
INITIATIVES FOR CHINA, FELLOW, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Thank you Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, and distin-
guished members of the House Foreign Relations Committee. I am grateful for the
opportunity to address you today. As you know, between May 4 and June 4 of this
year, I walked 500 miles from Boston to Washington DC to express my gratitude
to the U.S. Government and to the American people for their courageous support
during my imprisonment in China. Because of this support, I am here today a free
man in this great hall of democracy, speaking freely. I will speak not for myself,
but for the thousands, yes tens of thousands, of my countrymen who cannot speak
because they are either full of fear, in jail, or dead for what I will be doing today.
Speaking freely. I will never forget the great compassion of America. And I ask you
never to forget, or underestimate, the powerful voice for freedom that is America.
It is because of you that I am free. And it will be with your continued support, that
someday soon all the people of China will be free. Thank you.

You have asked me to address two issues today: 1) To give my perspective on Chi-
na’s foreign and domestic relations in the context of the upcoming Olympic Games.
2) To provide a perspective on what China’s behavior tells the world about the na-
ture of China’s political development and how China will conduct its foreign rela-
tions going forward.

First, my perspective on China’s foreign and domestic relations in the context of
the upcoming Olympic Games. It is moot to discuss whether or not the Olympic
Games should have been awarded to China. The vast scope of the Chinese government’s systematic abuse of its citizens has been well documented and is well known to the committee members. The Chinese government’s promises back in 2001 to improve its human rights record are also well known. The fact that the Chinese government has actually intensified its disregard for the civil and human rights of its citizens in the lead up to the Olympics is also well known. This desperate crackdown on its citizens and its blatant disregard for its commitment to tie its international community speak loudly about how the CCP views the Olympic Games and its role as the governing body in China. The Chinese government wants to host the Olympics so it can use the pageantry and the equity of the Olympic rings to project an image of China under its rule as a great, stable, and harmonious society. For the Chinese government, the Olympic games are nothing more than a tool for orchestrating a thin veneer of harmony over a society that, underneath, is a cauldron of frustration, disillusionment, discontent, and fear. It is sweet irony that the numerous recent protests, crackdowns, and natural disasters made even worse by government corruption, have repeatedly punched through this veneer to reveal images of a Chinese society that is more like “One World, One Nightmare” rather than its official line of “One World, One Dream”. In this regard, the lead up to the Olympics has been somewhat of a media disaster for the CCP.

The Chinese government needs the Olympics to project an image of legitimacy to the world and to its people. However, its actions clearly reveal how corrupt and illegitimate the Chinese government really is. It knows it has no ideology to offer its people. It knows it rules by fear. And its actions tell us it will do anything to any of its people, and tell anything to the outside world to maintain its hold on power. The Chinese government’s position as an Olympic host gives us the right, if not the duty to hold China accountable. Even at this hour, the United States and the world democracies can leverage the Chinese government’s desperate need to have a successful Olympics to engage in a constructive and assertive dialogue regarding it human rights record and it persecution of minorities. At the very least, President Bush should demand the release of political prisoners as a condition for his attending the opening ceremonies. President Bush should also work in concert with other world leaders to develop a coordinated strategy of conditional participation in the Olympic games tied to specific and measurable actions by the Chinese government. We should have no fear in doing this because the Chinese government needs President Bush at the Olympics much, much more than President Bush needs to be there. Such a coordinated strategy will also send a powerful message of support for the many courageous Chinese citizens inside and outside of Chinese jails who are putting their lives, their families, and their fortunes at risk every day to advance the cause of liberty. Finally, I urge all of you and all the national and international press to remember the climate of fear and repression we have seen in the events that have preceded the Olympic Games. We have seen the repression of the Tibetan protests. We have heard of the arrest and intimidation of numerous journalists and human rights activists. We have witnessed the agony of parents in Sichuan province who know that their school-aged children would be alive today if it were not for the government corruption that allowed schools in a known earthquake zone to be built to substandard codes. Do not forget this as the carefully orchestrated Olympic festivities unfold. Journalists may be free to move around Beijing and ask anything of the people they meet. But the true test of a society is whether people are free to respond. This is clearly not the case in China today.

I will conclude by giving my perspective on the most important issue: What China’s behavior tells the world about China’s political development and how China will conduct its foreign relations going forward.

In his brilliant book, “The Case for Democracy”, noted Soviet dissident, Natan Sharansky, states that governments, which rule by fear, are inherently unstable. The world community cannot rely on leaders who do not rely or trust their own people. The government of China remains a one-party totalitarian system, driven by the fear of losing power and committed to the use of fear to incapacitate any person or organization, which it deems a threat to its illegitimate hold on power. The hope of many people that political openness in China will follow economic progress is an illusion. Structurally, the Chinese government is organized to maintain its absolute power at the expense of its citizens. For example, The Chinese constitution admits the CCP as the only legitimate ruling power in China. Therefore anyone who speaks against the Government is subject to charges of treason. The Chinese constitution establishes that the judiciary reports directly to the Chinese Communist Party. The CCP tells the judges who is guilty and what sentences to give. Trials are no more than preordained showpieces. People have no means of redress. This is why, according to the Human Rights Watch Report of 2007, there are more than 100,000 pro-
tests against the government each year in China. This is remarkable, given the
great risk people assume for participating in these protests.

The Chinese government will continue to rule by fear. It knows no other way. The
CCP will continue to invest inordinate amounts of resources into controlling the
population through fear, hatred, and division. It will make demons of the Tibetans,
It will make terrorists of the Uyghurs. It will make subversives of Christians and
Falun Gong practitioners. This control will stifle political, social, and ultimately eco-
nomic development and increase social unrest. As unrest grows, it will export its
fear abroad to create enemies or situations that rally the people at home under the
banner of nationalism. It will use its economic clout to intimidate and induce foreign
governments and organizations to capitulate to its rule by fear. We need not look
further than the case of Yahoo, whose executives capitulated to the Chinese Government
by turning over private emails which the government used to send a young
man to prison. We need not look any further than Flushing, NY where peaceable
demonstrators were attacked by mobs incited by the Chinese government. Sowing
fear and discord will be the underlying modus operandi of the Chinese Government's foreign policy.

Strong and sustained American support for human rights in China is not only the
morally correct position it is strategically the right approach for advancing Amer-
ican interests. America cannot allow its great way of life to be subverted by fear.
It is important to realize that China needs the approval of the world community
to legitimize its power. It is important to realize that China needs its economic en-
gine to mollify its citizens. We need not be afraid to challenge the Chinese govern-
ment on its human rights record. Indeed, it is in our strategic interest to do so.
China will respond. It will continue to do business with us regardless of our chal-
lenes, because it needs the approval of the world community and integration with
the world economy to maintain a veneer of legitimacy.

At Initiatives for China we are working very hard as catalysts for peaceful and
incremental change by helping Chinese citizens exercise their citizen power or
GongMin LiLiang in Chinese. It is this display of citizen power that will ultimately
overcome the corruption and the fear induced by the CCP. It is GongMin LiLiang
that ultimately will drive China toward a more open, just, and democratic society.
America's strong, vocal and consistent support will send a powerful and enabling
message to this struggle for peaceful change. And, when the time comes, the tipping
point if you will, for decisive action, the American government must be prepared to
give the right signals in defense of freedom so the forces for freedom and democracy
will prevail for the good of China—For the good of the Chinese government and for
the good of America and the international community.

If the committee will be so kind, I will conclude by telling you a story that was
told to me by a fellow inmate while I was in prison. This story speaks to the depth
of the frustration of my countrymen and the hope that America holds for them. A
young man was sentenced to death for a minor crime. He spent many years on
death row in China. The night before he was executed he said to a fellow inmate,
"If I am to be reborn, I shall look outside first. If I see the Chinese flag over the
land, I will refuse to be born. However, if I see an American flag waving in the blue
sky, I will gladly leap into the world.

Thank you
Chairman Berman. I take that story in its metaphorical sense, not as a desire to see American imperialism.

Thank you all very much for your testimony. I will recognize my-
self for 5 minutes for question and answer. The 5 minutes includes the
answer.

The issue of China is, for me, one of the most anguishing issues
of all. Our first two witnesses spoke about the complex nature of the
relationship, the critical bilateral and transnational issues that
we need to cooperate on to solve. We are pursuing, at the same
time, a number of foreign policy objectives. Are these inherently at
odds with one another? Is there something ultimately
unsustainable about having a series of different objectives in our
foreign policy toward China? Does our goal of promoting human
rights have to take a back seat to our goals of working with China
on shared strategic goals? Two very important ones for me are pre-
venting Iran from developing a nuclear weapon and denuclearizing
North Korea. And, in some sense, the entire climate change, food crisis, energy crisis—China offers so much as a partner of ours in terms of making headway on these issues.

What is your evaluation of how the Bush administration has handled balancing all of these different interests? What recommendations do you have for the next administration? In 3 minutes, shared among you all.

Mr. LAMPTON. Maybe I will take a stab at it.

First of all, there is a kind of time horizon problem. We have many pressing issues: North Korea, nuclear proliferation, Iran and so forth. And then we have the long-term evolution of the society. We are not talking about a small society here. We are not talking about something on the scale of Taiwan or Hong Kong or Singapore. We are talking about 20 percent of the world's people.

So, as difficult as it is, we have to realize this is a very long time horizon we are talking about for social change. So the kinds of social and political values that we would like to see be expressed not only in institutions and in law and observance and lack of corruption, this is a long-term institution-building process. If we are going to be effective in that, we have to get China involved in institutions, international institutions, as we are doing. And, also, as China grows, its economic interests around the world, I think, sometimes conflict with us but sometimes will converge with ours. Now the United States and China are the biggest energy-consuming nations. We are both hostage to OPEC.

And so I think that as these interests converge, and as Chinese institutions change, and as we get Beijing into international institutions, we will see change in behavior. We will see change in international behavior, I believe, before we see change down at the county and village level in China. We have to keep in mind that we have economic and security interests, and these are critical to the American people. We need to focus on them and have longer-term horizons for domestic political change. I wish it were otherwise. I wish I could say that I thought it would happen rapidly. But I think nothing we see suggests that is true.

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. I both associate myself with those remarks, but also add that I think America's greatest impact on China is the way we conduct ourselves. Many Chinese—I started going to China back in the 1970s. Many Chinese in the 1970s and 1980s and well into the 1990s saw the United States as a beacon, marveled at the way our domestic society functioned, and marveled at the way we can accomplish things from technology to protection of rights and so forth. And I think that has dimmed somewhat. So I think that part of this is our being true to ourselves and have that example out there for Chinese to look at, to examine, and I think, in many cases, to admire.

Having said that, China is an extremely different society from ours. It goes back thousands of years with deeply embedded cultural elements. It is just very different from what shaped the United States. So I would very much agree with Dr. Lampton's comments that this is a long-time horizon and a complicated relationship. We have to do a lot for China to build in habits of behavior and incentives. But fundamentally when it gets to things like
principles of human behavior, what we do is more important than what we say.

Mr. BERMAN. So with China, the word “time horizon” as opposed to “timetable” is an appropriate description.

In any event, I yield now 5 minutes to the ranking member for her questions and comments.

Ms. ROSSLLEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

Professor Lieberthal, I wanted to ask you about some statements that you had made in various forums regarding Tibet, and ask you if you could expand on these. At a Council of Foreign Relations forum on June 17, you stated:

“I think that the fact that the Olympic torch ran into so much trouble over Tibet was especially unfortunate given this framing. It would be as if suddenly there were protests all over the world before the Los Angeles Olympics over the history of American treatment of Native Americans, and the Chinese President refused to come because we had mistreated Native Americans historically.”

And earlier, on April 18, on PBS you were quoted as comparing Chinese migration into Tibet to the American settlement of Alaska by stating:

“It is almost in some ways when Alaska became much more interesting to people from the lower 48, they ran up there. And if you look at the Alaskan economy, it is dominated not by Eskimos, but by the people from the lower 48. It is just a cultural difference, who is more attuned to taking advantage of the kinds of opportunities, whether it is from oil money in Alaska or from building a railway from North China all the way up to Tibet in China. And here, I think that Tibetans are just simply not going to be the ones who win in most of these instances.”

And as you are aware, Professor, these remarks caused some distress and even offense in the human rights NGO communities and overseas Tibetan communities. And I wanted to know if you would take this opportunity to expand upon those remarks.

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. Thank you very much for giving me that opportunity, because I think both remarks were quoted by some out of context.

The first remark was in response or as part of a discussion of how do the Chinese see the situation in Tibet; how the Han Chinese population see that situation? And I think that very, very few Han Chinese appreciate the disconnect between Chinese Government policy in Tibet and the way Tibetans see the situation. And they actually think the Chinese Government policy in Tibet is raising the quality of life and the standard of living of backward Tibetans. And so when the Olympic torch relay was disrupted with a tremendous focus on Tibet, at a popular level in China, as Dr. Lampton suggested in his remarks, the reaction was: Get tougher on them. These folks outside are just trying to humiliate us in league with those Tibetans who want independence.
So I was simply trying to explain how most Chinese in China saw that situation. I wasn’t advocating or supporting Chinese Government policy in that.

The second issue is I have been in Tibet several times. If you leave out the People’s Liberation Army, which is obviously up there on a different basis, the Chinese have poured a fair amount of money into Tibet, especially in recent years. The reality is the commercial opportunities have opened up by building a new railway up there, by improving transportation infrastructure, and those kinds of things are ones that Han Chinese are—simply by their upbringing and cultural characteristics and educational levels and so forth—are the ones who have been most effective in taking advantage of it.

So the Tibetans now see a higher standard of living there, but they aren’t the ones on the whole that are enjoying it. It is Han migrants who see an opportunity to make a lot of money there.

So, again, I was trying to explain simply a reality on the ground in Tibet. None of that was intended to endorse China’s policy in Tibet. Indeed, other parts of my comments made very clear that I thought that the Chinese were really missing the boat by not understanding the way Tibetans feel and the real results of their policies.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I thank you for that conclusion.

And just quickly, I just have a minute left, what do you think is going to be the reaction of Chinese security forces when demonstrations begin, foreign or domestic, raising human rights concerns on Darfur and Tibet, Falun Gong and Taiwan? If I could have the other two witnesses in 30 seconds.

Mr. YANG. I think security forces will react very harshly. No doubt about it. Beijing has already become a forbidden city itself. So the Olympics will take place under martial law, so-called martial law.

Mr. LAMPTON. I just read this morning that the Chinese have designated places for legitimate protests. Now we will see if it is all implemented and how it is implemented. I think, like Dr. Lieberthal and indeed Mr. Yang, looking at the past behavior of the security forces in China, one has to be worried about overreaction. If I could give any piece of advice to the PRC’s security forces, I would say don’t overreact; that legitimate protest will probably—in the end will strengthen both China’s image and China at home. But I have no confidence that is going to happen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Mr. BERMAN. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Woolsey, for 5 minutes.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Lampton, David, I believe you were in the room in Beijing when at a conference on China-American relations when I asked the question of the scholars related to global warming and the environment. And one of the scholars answered boldly that the Chinese people believe that the United States has used more than the United States’ share of the world’s natural resources and in turn spoiled more than our share of the world’s environment. Therefore, he continued, it is China’s turn.
Well, I remember actually gasping at his honesty and also at what this would mean globally and to our children and grandchildren, and Chinese children and grandchildren, because I remember saying, guess what, China doesn't get a turn to be as bad as we were and have been.

So, but that doesn't end it. I mean, you don't get a turn, ha, ha, ha. I don't mean it that way. I mean, what do you suggest—I am going to ask all three of you if there is time—that the United States' role should be to turn this dilemma around? I mean, yes, indeed, we have to set a good example. Do we need to go back and make up for some of our excesses? So I just would like to hear from you what can the United States actually do to forge this partnership?

Mr. Lieberthal. Thank you. This is a very important question. I would say I would make three quick points.

One, the U.S. has to be a leader on this issue. We have not been. So if we want to have a major impact on China, we have to stop giving them an excuse of pointing to us and say, you folks aren't serious about the issue, and we can hide behind your skirts. So I think we need major changes in our own policies, and I, frankly, am quite hopeful that those will occur in the coming few years.

Secondly, we have to be creative about opening up possibilities for bilateral cooperation on a large scale with China to address the climate change issue. We ought to be engaged in codevelopment of relevant technologies. They have a lot to offer in this, and so do we. We need to at a high political level get the will on both sides to be able to work with each other on this issue.

Thirdly, I think we have to recognize that—I mentioned in my opening remarks that China is engaged, among other things, in very large-scale urbanization. The reality is every single month 1.25 million people in China move from rural to urban life, and they have to build infrastructure and so forth, create jobs, etcetera, to keep up with that huge surge. So China is going to continue to expand its economy, and inevitably its carbon emissions are going to continue to grow for some period of time.

Realistically, we have to focus on the issue of energy intensity with the Chinese, push them to adopt rigorous, tough goals on that with transparency and compliance mechanisms that are very substantial; and then, hopefully, within 10 or 12 years, seek to have them move to actual caps and reductions.

So in other words, I think we have to be realistic about where they are. But I think we have enormous opportunity to get a lot more done with the Chinese than has been the case in recent years.

Mr. Lampion. I think that is going to be the sort of paradigm shift question in our dealing with China—looking out at global warming and the environment. I was at the meeting, Congresswoman, that you mentioned and you recounted it accurately. I remember Chinese who said: “You had your gold rush in the 1840s, we are having ours now.” The same sentiment.

But I think there has been somewhat of a shift, particularly in thinking at the top, and they recognize that irrespective of this sort of earlier contribution that we made, that sort of soaking up the capacity to absorb pollution, nonetheless, China now will be af-
fected by drought, loss of coastline and so forth, and so I think there is a recognition they need to do something. But it gets back to the leadership. They want to see the developed world play a leadership role, and they are beginning to, I believe, think about what contributions they could make.

I would just point out one other thing, and it is not well recognized, but from 1980 to about 2000, China grew twice as fast as its energy consumption. Now, in the last few years it has reversed as a problem. But basically China would be putting out about two-thirds more CO2 from coal burning if it hadn’t undertaken serious conservation for the last two-and-a-half decades. So while there is a big problem, they have made some contribution.

Mr. Berman. The gentleman from New Jersey Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, anyone who watches the Olympics should keep in mind that every Chinese young person dancing and waving flags in the opening ceremonies pageantry and virtually every athlete we will watch from China is a survivor of the brutal “one child per couple” policy which has made brothers and sisters illegal through harsh, coercive methods, including forced abortions, to achieve its quotas and goals. That is the nature of the government.

In reading two of these testimonies, and in hearing and reading as well, Dr. Lampton, you make the point that if the United States is to criticize Beijing for its behavior, it should be able to show what the PRC initially agreed to and be able to measure compliance.

As I think you know Liu Jingmin, the vice president of the Beijing Olympic Committee, said, and I quote him: “By allowing Beijing to host the Games, you will help in the development of human rights.”

Today we have heard—and we have been witnessing for months, even a couple of years in this run-up to the Olympics—we have heard Dr. Yang say that it is intensifying. As we all know, it is happening right in front of our eyes. It would be nice to know exactly what was promised to the Olympic Committee. But I think for the United States and other countries, parliamentarians everywhere and human rights activists, seeing with our own eyes, hearing the horrific testimonies of people who are being brutalized, I think that asks too much. And I think I would love to know all of that, but I think that asks too much. We don’t have to have every line and verse as to what was agreed to by the Olympic Committee.

Secondly, in looking at both of your testimonies, Dr. Lieberthal and then Dr. Lampton, you both talk about how the Chinese citizens are conscious of the weakness of their own system, but frequently, very resentful when foreigners point out these problems. And you say some of them, the Chinese, think that we are simply seeking to humiliate China. I would beg to differ on that one in very strong terms.

When we criticize North Korea, when we criticize South Africa for apartheid, the repression of the Soviets, the brutality of the Castro regime, we are standing with the oppressed and not with the oppressor. It seems to me we should be able to look at a record, hear testimonies that are credible, and make a determination that
human rights are being abused to a great degree by the Chinese Government and speak out.

What I think both of you fail to point out is that the propaganda machine and the secret police, as Dr. Yang said, they rule through fear. And when you say you speak and Chinese people tell you, Dr. Lieberthal, who? Who is telling you all of this? If you are relying on polls being done by the Chinese Government, I mean, I have a lot of contact with the Chinese, and I hear a whole different message than you hear, and I find that very resentful. Maybe that is because they are getting propagandized.

I was in a cyber cafe with Frank Wolf, and we, through Google, Yahoo!, and others, tried to get basic information. All of it was blocked when we went across a certain line for anything that seemed to be taboo, including my own Web site, which I could not pull up in China. I think that says a lot. Certainly what this committee does is blocked as well when it comes to human rights.

So, again, this idea that most Chinese are resentful, they feel they are being humiliated, if that is the case with some, it is precisely because the government is propagandizing, just like they do against the Falun Gong, just like they do against the Uyghurs, and virtually anyone else they consider to be outside the purview of what is acceptable by their regime.

So I am very concerned about that kind of line that both of you have taken in your statements. Ours isn’t to humiliate, it is to liberate. And we have to be able to speak boldly. I mean, the Chinese people don’t want this impression. I talked to a Chinese reporter who told me it took her months once in the United States to shed the layers of disinformation that had been caked on her over the course of her lifetime. She began to believe, as she said, the propaganda. But they are not getting any straight information. Radio Free Asia is jammed.

So if you could speak to that issue. I think you say too much, you defend the government too much, maybe unwittingly, in what you are saying in both of your testimonies, and that deeply concerns me. Human rights should be at the top. Yes, we need cooperation on global warming and all the other issues, but human rights has to be at the top of our relationships.

Mr. BERMAN. The gentlemen have 20 seconds.

Mr. LAMPTON. Let me just say and refer back to the chairman’s opening remarks, which I thought struck an absolutely appropriate balance, that this is an agonizing relationship to try to manage. This isn’t Cuba, this isn’t the DPRK. This is 20 percent of the world’s people. They can help us on nuclear weapons in North Korea if they choose to. They haven’t. Now they are the largest emitters of CO2. They held, depending on count, $932 billion in Federal notes and agency debt as of January.

Mr. BERMAN. I am going to have to stop you just because the time has expired. But the gentleman from New Jersey raised a very fundamental question: What do the Chinese people want? And how do we know that? And when do they want it? And somewhere in the course of this hearing, I think we should develop that more, but it won’t be right now.

Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I hope that my opening remarks were not unceremoniously received. They were given in the spirit of collaboration and friendship and hope.

Let me acknowledge the counsel general in Houston, Texas, as a woman who is reaching out to collaborate and to educate our community about China and its virtues. Let me cite one of my constituents, a young hip hop artist, Jay Xavier, who is excitedly looking forward to an invitation to perform at the Beijing Olympics. So there is hope or the potential of hope. But I want to quickly give bullet points and then—so, my chairman, I won't be down to the unpardonable couple of seconds—give you the time to answer.

First, Tibet. I had the opportunity recently to meet with a special envoy, and I had tears in my eyes because the words in that last negotiation were: If you behave yourself, if the Dalai Lama behaves himself, we may talk again. And that talk again, of course, will be after the Olympics.

And so, Dr. Lieberthal, you described the very unique land mass of developed islands and developing or undeveloped country. I want from you the road map for what we should be doing to try to get China to reckon with its place in the world family. And then I ask three quick questions that all of you can point to. The military build-up, if you will, that China has participated in, the history that it has had of providing nuclear weapons to countries in South Asia and South America, and then, of course, the idea of how much—how many resolutions do we need to pronounce on the floor of the House for them to understand that the oppression of religious believers and those who advocate for human rights is not a world standard of a developed nation? And that is what I don't think China understands. When we have sat down with the Chinese, they say: You don't understand us. You go in seconds; we go millenniums, we go in 1,000 years, we go in however long. Look at our history.

And I want them to know I appreciate their history, but we are in the 21st century, and we need a country that addresses human rights and addresses the rights of religious believers in the 21st century.

I yield to you on the question, and you can just yield to—I will start with Dr. Lieberthal. And if you can be cognizant of your other colleagues that I want to jump in on Tibet and the frightening experience that the Tibetans are having.

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. You raised at the end especially the issue of human rights. Let me speak to that and at the same time speak to Congressman Smith's remarks.

First of all, let me make very clear, throughout my career I have cared deeply about human rights and improving the human condition. It has been a very high priority for me personally and professionally.

Secondly, China is a very complicated place. Chinese are smart people. They aren't easily fooled as individuals. A lot of them have very different ideas on a lot of different issues. So there is not one Chinese view. My comments have been based in part on extremely extensive traveling in China over three decades throughout the country. And I speak Chinese. They have also been based——
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Dr. Lieberthal, I have a short period of time, and I know you are answering the Congressman, but I need my questions answered quickly, and I want Dr. Lampton and Dr. Yang to get in. Let me go to Dr. Lampton and I may come back to you. Thank you.

Mr. LAMPTON. Well, first of all, I have been to Tibet twice and met His Holiness the Dalai Lama two or three times. And what has happened in Tibet for the last decades has been deplorable. It has improved over time, but from a very low base.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And how do we go forward with the attitude?

Mr. LAMPTON. As I said, I don't have many expectations for the current dialogue with the Dalai Lama such as it is and such as you describe.

Let me say a couple things on proliferation——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Dr. Yang.

Mr. YANG. I just had a meeting with His Holiness the Dalai Lama 3 days ago. He showed his frustration and disappointment with the government’s attitude. I don't think the Dalai Lama will get anywhere in terms of——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. What pressure should we put on? Quickly.

Mr. YANG. The problem in the United States is the policy, as a foreign policy concern—is the policy treats the Tibetan issue and the issue of democratization as two issues. I think that is wrong. I clearly talked to my idea to His Holiness the Dalai Lama. It is impossible that China’s Government grants Tibetans freedom, not to the freedom of the Chinese Han majority. So this is the one issue. We should have a policy to treat the Tibetans issues, Uyghur issues, the issues of democratization as one. So it seems that it is a shortcut for the Dalai Lama to deal with China's Government directly to strike a deal between two sides. But that is a long way. So the real shortcut is democratization, change the overall situation in China.

Mr. BERNSTEIN. The time of the gentlelady has expired.

The gentleman from Illinois Mr. Manzullo is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

About 4 years ago when I was chairing the United States and China parliamentary exchange, I was in Nanjing at a place called the Johns Hopkins School of International Studies. And Sheila Jackson Lee was with me, and Bill Pascrell. It was an extraordinary situation with 13 Members of Congress in a town hall meeting with about 100 Chinese students and 100 students from the United States.

And there was a question that was asked by one of the Chinese students and answered by Congressman Bill Pascrell of New Jersey. And the question was a twofold question. And she said: “I don't know if the Chinese are ready for democracy,” which I thought was an extraordinary question. And then she asked Congressman Pascrell: “Of the founding documents in your country, which ones or which paragraphs therein would be of most relevance to the people of China?” And Congressman Pascrell repeated the fact that America, based upon the doctrine of natural law, we believe that our rights of liberties come from God and not from human leaders, and China does not believe that. It was an
extraordinary opportunity. And after that I was talking to someone who was with the school who said, “Years ago these types of questions would not even be allowed to be asked.”

But I am concerned as a member of the Congressional Executive Commission on China and somebody who has been involved in human rights for years over the comment by one or both of you, Dr. Lieberthal, Dr. Lampton, that the United States has to step up. I mean, as far as the environment is concerned, China directly subsidizes the people and the manufacturers for their use of gasoline. They have no environmental standards to speak of. And they add 1,000 cars a day to the traffic in Beijing. I am sorry, but I am not going to feel guilty because I am driving an automobile in the United States and trying to set some example as to what China is to do. I mean, what are we supposed to do to step up? I don’t know who—I think, Dr. Lieberthal, you had mentioned that. And my question sounds harsh, but it really isn’t. I am just curious as to what you are referring to.

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MANZULLO. But answer it quickly, because I want three answers.

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. The short answer is our improving our energy efficiency and reducing our carbon emissions is first and foremost in our interest. But in addition to that, our retaining relatively lax mileage standards, CAFE standards, and a lot of other things we do domestically essentially give the Chinese leaders more room to move slowly on their side. Essentially people point to the United States and say: They are so rich, they have so much technology, they don’t do it.

Mr. MANZULLO. But we made them rich. We made the Chinese rich because of our consumption. The Chinese have become rich. We have become their biggest trading partner. I don’t feel guilty about that.

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. I am not suggesting anyone should feel guilty. I am not talking about guilt here. I am talking about interest and effectiveness. I think it is in our interests, for both the Chinese and us and everyone else, for everyone to become more concerned with this issue. And I think that if we do better on this issue ourselves, it will also help to make us more effective in moving the Chinese ahead on this issue. That is all I was saying.

Mr. MANZULLO. Dr. Lampton.

Mr. LAMPTON. Just picking up on the other issue, on Johns Hopkins. This has been an evolutionary progress, but the thing that we hung in there for the first negotiations 20 some years ago was open library stacks, as an American university, no censorship about what goes in, who can check out, who can look at materials. And that has been, with one exception that I am aware of, observed for the last 20-some years.

I would also say that we now started an MA program, and people are doing research on, quite frankly, topics that I wouldn’t have thought 10 years ago would be possible to do research on in China. I am not trying to paint a picture of nirvana. There are many subtle, self-censorship types of problems and so forth. But we can see progress.

Mr. MANZULLO. Quickly, Dr. Yang.
Mr. YANG. The foreign policy toward China is too much driven by urgent need. We always need the partnership from China for security issues, PC issues, environmental issues, pollution, everything. But I just want to remind everybody here: Can you find any reliable partners in history who are or who were dictators? Just one sentence. Thank you.

Mr. BERMAN. It is not fair to raise questions like that at the very last sentence.

The gentleman from Georgia Mr. Scott for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

You know, as a state senator, I played a role down in Georgia helping to bring the Olympics to Atlanta. So I know why we wanted the Olympics and what the Olympics stand for. So the first question begs, why did China want the Olympics? What did they want to accomplish with the Olympics? Especially when you look at the ideals upon which the Olympics was founded on, of freedom, of competition, of kindness to humanity, of sportsmanship, of unity, all of these.

So with just—we have got 205 nations who will be gathered in Beijing in just 3 short weeks. These ideals will undoubtedly be tested. So the question becomes, can these ideals persist amidst the controversy of here is China with lack of religious freedom, with lack of freedom of press, with lack of freedom of assembly? Something isn’t right here.

And then you ask the other questions: There were promises made to the International Olympic Committee, and these promises have not been kept. Diplomatically and economically, they have supported Omar Bashir. China has played an integral part in sustaining the egregious genocide in Darfur. They have oppressed the Tibetan people. They have supported a regressive regime in Myanmar, and they continuously imprison their own citizens.

My first question that I think gets at this is how can China deal with freedom of the press during the Olympics when they suppress the press as a rule in their country? There is a dichotomy here that doesn’t fit. Examine it for me. How are they going to achieve or believe in censorship, and how will censorship play a role in the press coverage of the Olympics?

You see, here is an opportunity for China. It is sort of like giving a man a rope. He can use it to either pull himself up or hang himself. Are the Chinese thinking seriously about using this as an opportunity to show the world, here is who we really are, and use the Olympics as a curtain, to raise the curtain to show the new China in terms of freedom and all the things that the Olympics stand for?

And the other part of that question I want you to answer is why hasn’t the International Olympic Committee held China accountable for not undertaking the promises it made when they were trying to get the Olympics?

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. Sir, you raised a very important issue. First, why did they seek the Olympics? I think to highlight to the world the accomplishments that they have made after what they consider to be 150 very bad years; that China is now on a roll, doing well, and they wanted to show the results of that.

Secondly, though, a much more difficult question, why are they handling these issues the way they are? And I think the reality,
it always is tough to accept, is that to them, when they say show what they have accomplished, their way of doing that is through controlling everything so that the picture is picture perfect. We do it by showing the vibrancy and diversity and liveliness and disconnects there; this is who we are, this is what makes us great. That is not the way their government thinks about this.

And so I agree with you, they are doing it wrong. And that is why I raised in my prepared statement serious concerns about what will be the image of China that comes out of this. I think they are going to go off in the wrong direction, already have on a lot of this. But if you want to understand their way of looking at this, it is this has got to go just right, because it is so important that we show the world how wonderful things have become here compared with the past. And that is what you run into.

Mr. LAMPTON. I think two things. One is that during the earthquake they did have, unprecedented for them, media openness, not only international, but domestic. And there are people that recognize China got more positive coverage out of that in terms of the response of its people and toward its government than it has ever had before. So I think it is dawning on them that repression of the press actually can work against them.

In terms of the Olympics, I think you have a dichotomy that, as you suggest, is unsustainable. And that is they are going to try to keep a tighter lid on domestic coverage than international coverage. And, of course, now with the global communications capacity, that compartmentalization is increasingly not going to be possible. But right now they are trying to maintain what the internal populace sees versus what the world sees.

Mr. YANG. Chinese Government.

Mr. Berman. I am sorry, Dr. Yang, but next time we will start with you and go the other way. But the time of the gentleman has expired.

And the gentleman from California Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Just to the last point. All this openness in the media about their earthquake, and I think that was because it was contrasted with what was going on in Burma. But let’s note, why is the dictatorship in Burma in place? Because of the dictatorship in Beijing. Burma is a vassal state of the Chinese Communist Party, for Pete’s sake. And so let us take a look at this.

Dr. Yang, would you say the situation has been getting better or worse in terms of human rights because of the Olympics’ decision to go to Beijing?

Mr. YANG. Thank you for that question. Clearly, over the past year we have seen the intensification of human rights violations in China. But still, I have some hope. I hope the international community will take a more proactive action to apply pressure on China to change its human rights record.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So actually—as we heard earlier about martial law basically around Beijing, so we have actually, in the name of showing the Chinese—giving them the Olympics so they can show off a better China, the regime has actually intensified its repression; has it not?
Mr. YANG. China’s Government has seriously legitimate problems. They wanted to use the Olympics as an opportunity to solidify its legitimacy not only to the outside world, but also to its own people. But now the Olympics are something enjoyable for nobody. I don’t think China’s Government enjoys the opportunity at all. China’s Government is paranoid.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would hope that when the Chinese people see the level of repression going up rather than going down, that they don’t look at the United States and the West and say, oh, this is what the West wanted. This is part of their agreement.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the record a statement by Amnesty International on the Olympics at this point.

Mr. BERMAN. Without objection, the statement will be included in the record.

[The information referred to follows:]
Amnesty International is pleased to submit this statement to this important hearing and we wish to express our appreciation for the steps several Members of Congress have taken to highlight human rights in China before the Olympics. The efforts of the Members of Congress stand in stark contrast to the tepid actions the Bush Administration has taken.

It is important to compare the human rights promises given by the Chinese authorities when they were bidding for the Olympics with the human rights conditions today to determine whether the Chinese authorities have honored their promises. It is also equally important to ask whether the Bush Administration has taken appropriate steps to secure human rights improvements before the Olympics.

Amnesty International has documented numerous human rights abuses committed by authorities in China that are being perpetrated because of the Olympics. There are pre-Olympics "clean-ups" resulting in several "Olympics prisoners." There are also secret detention centers and Chinese activists are barred from talking to foreigners. We are also concerned about the rights of foreigners who will be going to Beijing to attend the Olympics.

**Human rights in China before the Olympics was awarded:**

The scale of China's human rights violations is staggering. A quarter of a million people are languishing in labor camps, imprisoned under the "re-education through labor" detention system, where they are detained without charge or trial at the whim of local police and other officials. China accounts for upwards of eighty percent of all executions documented in the world. China also executes
political prisoners. Torture by law enforcement personnel is endemic resulting in many prisoner deaths while in custody.

Thousands suffer brutal religious persecution and political repression. Religious persecution has led to the detention and repression of thousands of Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, Uighur Muslims and Falun Gong practitioners. Other targets of repression include political dissidents, trade union organizers, advocates of reform, and people using the internet to disseminate information deemed to be "politically sensitive."

North Korean asylum seekers face intense repression and large scale forcible repatriation to North Korea. Women are still compelled to undergo forced abortion and sterilization to enforce the one-child policy. The government regularly denies the right to freedom of conscience, expression, religion and association.

Promises made by Chinese authorities to improve human rights if Beijing is awarded the Olympics:

Authorities in China made several promises to improve human rights:
1) Secretary General of Beijing's Olympics bid Committee, Wang Wei (July 2001): "We will give the media complete freedom to report when they come to China." "We are confident that the Games coming to China not only promotes our economy but also enhances all social conditions, including education, health and human rights."
2) Vice President of Beijing bid committee, Liu Jingmin. (April 2001): "By allowing Beijing to host the Games you will help the development of human rights."
3) Mayor of Beijing Liu Qi: "By hosting the games, social progress and economic development in China would move forward, as would China's human rights situation."

Human rights in China since the awarding of the Olympics:

The human rights situation in China has continued to deteriorate since the Olympics was awarded to Beijing in 2001. The crackdown on journalists, lawyers and human rights defenders has intensified since Beijing won the Olympics bid. Due to these crackdowns we see a new category of abused "Olympics prisoners" who would not have been in prison if not for the Olympics. The authorities have stepped up repression of dissent voices in their efforts to present an image of "stability" and "harmony" to the outside world, which includes human rights violations perpetrated in preparation for the Games.

Two recent crisis situations in west China have challenged the authorities to demonstrate that their human rights commitments are more than empty words.
The recent protests in Tibet and Tibetan-populated areas of surrounding provinces and the subsequent crackdown and media silence imposed by authorities highlighted not only longstanding and unresolved violations of fundamental human rights but also the ongoing censorship of the media.

In contrast, the authorities initially responded to the effects of the devastating earthquake in Sichuan province with uncharacteristic openness, allowing relatively free media access to the region. However, media control tightened as local families began public protests calling for accountability of local officials, especially with regard to the collapse of schools which were allegedly poorly constructed.

Secret detention centers

In September 2007, reports emerged of secret detention centers established on the outskirts of the capital by Beijing liaison offices of provincial governments in China to detain petitioners before they could be forcefully returned to their hometowns. Petitioners were crowded into these facilities with poor food and no proper sanitation facilities or health care. Some sources also reported that guards often beat detainees.

Activists barred from leaving or talking to foreigners

At the end of June 2008, Shanghai police sent notices to activists and petitioners based in the city ordering them to report to the police every week. Some were briefly detained by the police. The new rules barred them from leaving the city without permission and warned them against speaking to foreigners or visiting Beijing until after the Olympics.

Labor Camps (Re-education through labor):

The Chinese authorities continue to rely on abusive systems of punitive administrative detention against a variety of “offenders” including, in many cases, peaceful petitioners and human rights activists. The police enjoy unchecked authority to impose such punishments without charge, trial or judicial review. Far from acting as a catalyst for reform, the authorities have used Beijing’s hosting of the Olympics as a pretext for extending the use of punitive administrative detention, like “re-education through labor.” The police have specifically targeted petitioners and rights activists in their efforts to “clean up” Beijing ahead of the games.

On May 8, 2008, the Beijing city authorities decided that “re-education through labor” would be used as a way to control various types of “offending behavior” to clean up the city’s image in the run-up to the Olympics. This would include serious cases of “unlawful advertising or leafleting, unlicensed taxis, unlicensed businesses, vagrancy and begging.”
Plight of Chinese activists

Many human rights defenders continue to be detained, prosecuted and imprisoned as prisoners of conscience after politically motivated trials, while others are being held under “house arrest” as prisoners in their own homes.

As the Olympics approach, human rights defenders who attempt to report on violations, challenge policies which are deemed politically sensitive, or try to rally others to their cause face a series of risks of abuse. Those who have made connections between human rights and the Olympics have been specifically targeted in the pre-Olympics “clean up.” The police have also used surveillance and arbitrary detention against members of activists’ families, in an apparent attempt to apply more pressure.

The authorities continue to use provisions of the Criminal Law as political tools to suppress dissent. Broadly defined categories of crimes, such as “separatism”, “subversion”, “disturbing public order”, endangering state security”, and “leaking state secrets” continue to be used to prosecute those engaged in legitimate and peaceful human rights activities.

Plight of Chinese Lawyers

Many of those persecuted in the run up to the Olympics are lawyers and legal advisors who play a crucial role in securing the rule of law and the protection of human rights in any society. The vulnerability of Chinese lawyers was underscored in May 2008 when the authorities refused to renew the law licenses of Beijing-based lawyers Teng Biao and Jiang Tianyong. Both had signed their names to an open letter by 18 lawyers on April 3, 2008 offering free legal counsel to Tibetans arrested in connection with the recent crackdown.

According to one of those arrested lawyers, Chinese authorities warned the lawyers and their law firms not to get involved in Tibetan issues. Jiang Tianyong’s law license was eventually renewed at the end of June, but Teng Biao’s has not yet been renewed.

Media and Internet freedom

In view of current patterns of media censorship and control in China, concerns remain that the authorities may seek to block broadcasting of any items deemed “sensitive” or “inappropriate” during the Olympic Games. Despite the introduction of new media regulations increasing the freedom of foreign reporters to cover news stories in China, overseas journalists continue to report being obstructed or hampered from conducting interviews. The Foreign Correspondence Club of China documented approximately 180 incidents in 2007. By July 2008, this had
increased to 230, including over 40 cases after the unrest in Tibet in March and more than 12 after the Sichuan earthquake in May.

**Plight of Chinese journalists:**

Chinese journalists continue to operate in a climate of official censorship and control, with many still languishing in jail for reporting on issues deemed politically sensitive. Internet controls have been increasingly tightened as the Olympics approach with control, regulation and censorship extending to various categories of internet users, including Internet Service Providers, bloggers and website owners. Numerous websites have been closed down for providing information deemed sensitive by the authorities. Internet users who post such information risk detention, prosecution, and imprisonment.

**Foreign Olympics visitors – rights restricted?**

On June 2, 2008 the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (BOCOG) published guidelines which risk violating the rights to freedom of expression and association of foreigners intending to visit China to attend the Olympics, including athletes, officials and other visitors.

The regulations state that foreigners must not “endanger state security, harm the rights and interests of society or disrupt social stability.” Foreign visitors are also prohibited from committing acts of “subversion” or other activities deemed to “endanger the national interest.” They are also warned not to bring into China any materials (including printed mater, DVDs, etc) which “harm China’s politics, economy, culture or morals” or to take any materials out of China whose contents “involve state secrets.” The guidelines also state that entry to China will be denied to anyone “considered likely to engage in activities which endanger state security and the national interest.”

The wording of such provisions parallels the vague and broad wording of state security offences in the Chinese Criminal Law which have long been used by the authorities to prosecute and imprison peaceful Chinese activists and prisoners of conscience in violation of their rights to freedom of expression.

The regulations also prohibit foreign visitors from displaying any “slogans”, banners or other materials of a religious, political or racial nature in Olympic facilities. This appears to be based on Rule 51.3 of the Olympics Charter which bans “demonstrations or political, religious or racial propaganda in Olympic sites, venues or other areas.” However BOCOG’s guidelines contain an additional, broader prohibition on “the display of insulting slogans, banners or other materials to sporting venues.”

No definition is given to the word “insulting” but current practice suggests that it will be interpreted broadly to include anything which authorities deemed to be
offensive. The guidelines provide examples of "socially disruptive behavior" prohibited during "large scale public activities of a cultural or sporting nature." The list includes "displaying insulting slogans, banners or other materials" as well as a catch-all category: "other behavior which disturbs the order of large-scale public activities."

In view of this vague, sweeping wording, Amnesty International fears that the Chinese authorities will use these guidelines as a tool to curtail rights to freedom of expression of athletes, officials and other foreign visitors to China at the time of the Olympics. Anyone bringing in materials, or staging peaceful activities, which are critical of the Chinese authorities risks being targeted.

**President Bush and the Olympics:**

There are only a little over two weeks left until the Olympic Games begin in Beijing on August 8, 2008. President Bush will be attending the opening ceremony and Secretary Rice will attend the closing ceremony. Their attendance shows the importance the Bush Administration is giving to the Beijing Olympics. We are concerned that the importance given by the Administration to the Olympic Games is not matched by the attention given to human rights abuses in China.

Amnesty International believes that the Bush Administration should have done more to improve human rights in China before the start of Olympics. As noted above, the human rights situation has worsened because of the Olympics and the Administration has not been forceful in addressing the situation.

*There is still time for the Bush Administration to act.* Amnesty International would like to recommend the following to President Bush to bring attention to human rights abuses in China even at this late stage.

**Before President Bush leaves for the Olympics:**

1) President Bush should meet with the released political prisoners from China who are residing in the United States before he leaves for the Olympics. There are several Tibetan, Uighur, and other former prisoners in the US.
2) President Bush should make a strong public statement about human rights abuses in China and demand improvements.
3) President Bush should urge the Chinese Government to release some political prisoners and give commitments on the abolishment of labor camps ("Re-Education through labor detention system") as a sign of good will before he arrives to attend the Olympic Games.
While President Bush is in Beijing for the Olympics:

1) President Bush should make a strong public statement on human rights and consider speaking at a University or other public places.
2) President Bush should meet with the foreign correspondents based in Beijing to discuss press freedom.

After President Bush returns from the Olympics:

President Bush should make a statement about human rights concerns in China and outline steps his administration has taken and will take to end the abuses.

Thank you for inviting Amnesty International.

T. Kumar
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Phone: (202)544-0200, ext: 224
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Mr. ROHRABACHER. And, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that the people of China—and, again, all the time when people say China this and China that, they are referring to a dictatorship half the time and a small clique of people who oppress China and not China itself. I would hope that we are a country that is seen as a country that is in alliance with the people themselves and not a clique of gangsters who oppress them. That is why I would hope the American flag, which was referred to earlier, I understand—that when people all over the world see the American flag, they see it as a symbol of freedom, and they see it as a symbol of people who are allied.

You know, American people, what is the United States? We come from every race, every religion, and every ethnic group. We are here because God put us here as a way to show mankind a better way. Our flag doesn't stand for one race or one religion; our flag stands for freedom and justice, the thing our Founding Fathers put down who said we are the gift from God to all people on this planet. And I hope that when people see the American flag that they understand that stands for a group of people who are my friends, because I believe in freedom, too. And, however, unfortunately, we have an influence in this country of people who are making billions of dollars allying themselves and doing the bidding of a dictatorship that fundamentally hates everything this country is all about.

Would you say that the corporate interests that are doing business with China have had a positive role—let us just go down—or a negative role in trying to force China to go in a more free direction?

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. I am not aware of hard data that would allow you——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, your company does represent the Chinese. You said you speak Chinese. Have you ever argued for the release of a Chinese prisoner with a specific Chinese official?

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. Sir, first of all, with all due respect, I am not with a company; I am at the University of Michigan.

Secondly, yes, I have argued for the release of Chinese prisoners. When I was with the government, I worked for the release of Chinese.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And do you think that this is normal corporate policy?

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. I think corporations try to stay out of political issues as much as they can, but I think on balance, the opening of the Chinese economy to Western corporate participation has been a positive for standard of living in China and, let me say also, for the quality of life in China. I think American corporations have generally comported themselves a lot better than corporations from many other countries.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is a good answer.

Mr. BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from California Mr. Costa is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I find this discussion interesting only because it seems to me that if we look back in short-term history, going back to President Nixon opening up the door to China, if I remember correctly, it was
done not with the thought that we admired or respected their form of government, but we felt that there was some way we needed to embrace and have dialogue with 1.2 billion of the planet’s population, and that through that opening of those doors we could make progress to see that there was a better way toward governing. Now, we can talk about the last 30-plus years as to how well that has worked, but the fact is that is how the process began.

My questions are in the short term and long term. Dr. Lampton, we just came back from Africa, learned over 1 million Chinese are in Africa today. It is very clear that the Chinese policy in Africa is predicated upon strategic resources. I was in Darfur last year, and we are all frustrated that the Chinese have not done more, or it seems like they could intervene in a way with the Bashir government to stop this genocide. There were thoughts about using the Olympics or the Olympic card as a means to boycott and to force action.

What do you think the key is, quickly both of you, toward getting the Chinese to use their influence in Africa in a more positive and productive fashion?

Mr. LAMPTON. Well, the Chinese have made some limited progress in this regard, and, in fact, our Government—and when Mr. Negroponte testified in front of the Senate, he spoke to that. So they have made some progress. But given the magnitude of the tragedy that is going on there, it is inadequate.

Mr. COSTA. They clearly have been calculated in their efforts.

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. I actually wish I had a good answer, and I don't. The Chinese generally say you have got to work with the government and not sanction the government.

Mr. COSTA. Right. And they talk about always doing things under the radar screen, and you never know, really, what they are doing.

Dr. Yang, do you care to comment.

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. Fundamentally I agree with your concern, and I don't have a good answer for how to change that.

Mr. YANG. A very general answer. China has been taking proactive roles to export a lot of things, even their idea of ruling people. So they have an impact in Africa that really causes us concern.

Mr. COSTA. I think it should. And I think they are strategically mining the resources out of Africa for their own, obviously, economic gain. And they don't care what kind of government they are dealing with. They will be an enabler if it is to their advantage.

And so I guess in the long term—and this is my question here, because it just seems to me that they are very calculating about how they want to cooperate, whether in North Korea or Myanmar or wherever. They will do a little bit to gain, but it is always very calculated.

And so let us talk about the government for a moment. When they changed from a socialistic economic model to their version of a Chinese capitalistic model, I remember a quote that I think was credited to Deng Xiao Ping, who once said a Chinese proverb, what do you care what color the cat is as long as the cat catches mice?
Some believe that the opening of China economically portends longer term down the road, 10, 15 years, to a Chinese version of a more democratic model. Do you think they get there? Do you think this is a generational thing? I mean, they obviously have great concerns of keeping 1.4 billion people together with all their other internal problems. Is that likely? Is there a progression here?

Mr. LAMPTON. I think there is, but it is not over any short period of time. It is very long. And I don't think it is going to end up in any foreseeable future something you would call democratic. The best we can hope for is a more humane and pluralistic government.

Mr. COSTA. Dr. Yang, do you think in the leadership of China there are any people that are quietly—any Gorbachevs in the world that aspire to a different China?

Mr. YANG. I don't see a Gorbachev in China's Government in my own eyes, but I heard a similar argument to the argument before the collapse of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet dissidents foresaw the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1970s, the prevailing idea in this country—almost every scholar, politician, in this country was convinced that the Soviet Union will last forever.

Mr. COSTA. My time has expired. Dr. Lieberthal, you can let me know your answer later.

Mr. Berman. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne.

But it is the intent of the chair, if for no other reason that I want to ask some more questions, to have a second round. It is great to be chairman.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

Let me ask very quickly each of you, do you think that President Bush should be attending the opening ceremonies of the Olympics? Yes or no.

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. Yes.

Mr. LAMPTON. Yes. And Secretary Rice is going as well.

Mr. YANG. No. I don't oppose engagement of policy. I think that a very important component of the policy is missing, that engagement with the democratic forces in China.

President Bush, I don't think his continued under-table deal with China will get anywhere. The United States, President Bush should send a message to the Chinese people, should engage with the Chinese people. There are two Chinas in China. So we have to keep that in mind.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I kind of agree with you. There was an out given to the leadership. They didn't say, boycott the Olympics, they said, just don't go to the opening. Steven Spielberg actually had the contract for the opening, and he, with pressure from Mia Farrow and others, gave up this multimillion-dollar contract to have the opening and the closing. And I think that the advocates of the blood Olympics gave an out for countries saying, we are not saying boycott the Olympics, we are simply saying don't go to this very prestigious, joyful, gleeful, everything is great in China, we are showing this to the world. Just boycott that. Go the next day and have your folks there and so forth.

So I think that it is a real mistake. And with Secretary Rice, of course, I am not surprised, just kind of a clone. And I would expect that if Mr. Bush was there, she certainly was there. She might
even have urged him to go. But I think it was an opportunity that we had.

The other thing, China talks about internal affairs. When we talk about Africa, and particularly Zimbabwe, Sudan, they will threaten to veto a resolution unless you weaken it down, et cetera. How do they talk about this, they don't get involved in internal affairs, when they are in Africa giving money for countries to change their position on Taiwan, which was an internal affair in these countries? But yet and still they say, well, we don't get in Sudan because we don't want to be involved in internal affairs. Does anybody have an answer for that kind of rationale?

Mr. LAMPTON. Well, it is clearly a contradiction. And all I would point out is this money game of both Taiwan and the PRC buying small and often not very honest regimes has really degraded the level of governance wherever this has gone on. So I think it is reprehensible. With respect to the Taiwan Strait, there is some opportunity that this particular competition is going—there is going to be, I hope, a cease-fire. So maybe that will get better in terms of the cross-Strait competition.

But you are right, it has been very reprehensible. All I would say is that both Taiwan and the PRC have been involved in it.

Mr. PAYNE. Although Taiwan never said they don't get involved in internal affairs. That is what China said even a year or so ago, when we met with the officials of China, about we don't get involved in internal affairs. Of course, I am not a diplomat, and I was speaking for the Congressional Black Caucus, so I think that was probably a new kind of meeting that the Chinese had. It wasn't like our diplomats that represent our country. I was just representing the voice of people who were very upset about China's exploitation in Africa and their disregard for human rights in general. I really give Mia Farrow so much credit for what she has done to highlight what has happened.

We gave them and President Clinton, our good friend, when there was most favored nation status, I understand it didn't sound too good, so they changed the name to permanent trade relations with China. But we used to in Congress have the opportunity to vote on that, and it was sort of a stick over the head. But we gave them permanent trade relations, which means that it is for good. Do you think that if we still had something that we could have held over the PRC, not giving permanent trade relations which locks it in, that we could have had more bargaining power with them?

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. Congressman, PNTR we tried to hold over the Chinese and get some concessions in various areas, especially on human rights from them over that, and we failed every time we tried. So it proved to be an ineffective stick to use.

I think obviously when you deal with another country, you always want to have things that give you leverage, but partly you also want to have them in the mood to negotiate; in other words, see you as having a difference that you can discuss seriously and try to reach some sort of outcome on, rather than they are assuming that you are out to overturn their system, and, therefore, the best they can do is hunker down and protect against dealing with you effectively.
Mr. BERMAN. The gentleman from California Mr. Sherman is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As Mr. Payne points out, sometimes we put a better name on something; MFN became permanent trade relations. And now kowtowing to the Chinese doesn't sound good, so instead we say our President is going to go visit a sporting event. He didn't go to Italy, he didn't go to Greece, we didn't send a President to Australia, but all of a sudden it is only sports, it is not a matter of politics.

Dr. Lieberthal, you set forth the idea that MFN must have been ineffective because we tried it, and it didn't work. Does that just show that the Chinese knew that we would go through the motions of trying it, and then when we realized that our corporations could make more money if we gave it to them, we would just cave? How do we know it was ineffective if the Chinese could predict that we were going to cave on the issue?

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. Sir, I am not sure the Chinese could make that prediction. I think they just decided——

Mr. SHERMAN. I could. You could.

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. Well, I don't think they understand our system as well as you do, sir. But I am serious, if you look back, my own judgment was they just thought if they caved on this, then the demands would simply escalate. And so they stood firm on it, and it turned out that they ended up calling our bluff. In other words, it was a bluff at the end of the day. But I am not sure that they were confident it was a bluff when they called it, but I can't say for sure, because I wasn't in the room when they discussed this.

Mr. SHERMAN. I think it is obvious that anyone with a passing knowledge of the power of corporations here in Washington knew that it was a bluff. You know it was a bluff, I knew it was a bluff, and anybody who shopped at Wal-Mart knew it was a bluff. To think that we would, here in Washington, let anything get in the way of the kind of enormous profits that have been made importing goods where they pay, what is it, 40, 50 cents an hour, and selling them for less, and selling them to Americans is surprising.

Dr. Lampton, I believe you had a response as well.

Mr. LAMPTON. I was just going to say, in the last two questions, yours and Congressman Payne's, in searching for sticks as well as I will say carrots, I think often if you are going to make a threat, first of all, you don't want to be bluffing. So I think we have to be very careful what we are actually prepared to as a society deliver on. And I think it is more harmful to make threats you are not going to deliver on for whatever set of reasons; but if you are going to make threats, I think through multilateral organizations. The United States now has several actions in front of the World Trade Organization because China has, I think, by my understanding, violated certain aspects of accepted trade practice. So I think we ought to search for where we can get our allies and like-minded people to help.

Mr. SHERMAN. Sir, I just don't think you understand the incredible power of the corporate profits here in Washington. We are bluffing. We bluffed at the idea that the President wouldn't do anything China wanted. He is going to celebrate the actions of their government in a way he wouldn't do for Italy. He wouldn't do it
for Greece, the country that created the Olympic Games. Because the big profits are in importing. I mean, we may occasionally bring an action in the tribunals of the world trade organization, but it is obvious we will do nothing that will significantly impair the enormous profits that can be made by running up the U.S. trade deficit.

Dr. Yang.

Mr. Yang. Yes, I think the link of the trade issue with the human right issue President Clinton did was a major mistake by the United States Government as far as a foreign policy toward China is concerned. It is not even a matter of whether it works. It is inconsistence. So we show the Chinese Government that the United States Government can change with pressure. Once they understand this, they will press you for change every time.

Mr. Sherman. Well, whether it is the illegal actions on intellectual property, the illegal actions blocking our exports—we had hearings on that in our subcommittee—or whether it is their currency manipulation, foreign policy or domestic human rights policy, when you have got Wal-Mart as an ally, the U.S. is bluffing.

And I yield back.

Chairman Berman. The gentleman has yielded back his time, and I recognize myself for 5 minutes.

Dr. Lieberthal, some years ago—what I would like to do is have you focus for a moment on Taiwan and Tibet. You wrote a piece some years ago throwing out the notion of, on this issue, why aren’t we working to facilitate and why don’t the parties come to the conclusion that the best immediate-term solution to this problem is an arrangement whereby Taiwan foregoes any efforts to declare its independence for a period of, let us say, 25 or 30 years and Russia forsweares any resort to military actions to change the situation?

And because he is the kind of guy that won’t mind I mention it, I was mentioning this to Mr. Rohrabacher yesterday on the bus. And I am a guy who he thinks most of the time makes the worst proposals he has ever seen, and he actually liked this notion as a sensible way to go.

But apart from that, the basic point is maybe not so explicitly but maybe by implication, as a result of the recent election, relations between China and Taiwan seem to have calmed down, although this missile issue is still an issue. But we will see how it plays out.

But, on Tibet, the Dalai Lama has said a number of times now, his envoy said it to me here a few months ago, that he does not seek and his supporters do not seek an independent Tibet. Why hasn’t—why are you so pessimistic about the Chinese willingness to accept that at face value and seriously pursue—why don’t they seriously pursue the kind of an autonomy and role for the Tibetans that they apparently are willing to accept for Taiwan as long as independence isn’t the issue?

Mr. Lieberthal. Like my colleague, I have had the privilege of meeting with his holiness, the Dalai Lama. I think the Chinese fundamentally misunderstand this man, attribute to him motives and calculations that are simply not there. And it is a tragedy for the Tibetan people, it is a tragedy for the future of that area, that that is the case.
I don't know how to change their mind. I have argued this to them. Many others have. I think very politely Dr. Lampton has, and I don't know how to get through to them on this issue.

But they feel that—and I think they believe it—that the Dalai Lama and people around him seek eventually to make Tibet independent and that their definition of Tibet—and on this one thing, they are accurate, that the Dalai Lama's definition of Tibet covers a much larger area, including parts of several other Chinese provinces as part of Tibet.

Chairman Berman. So those are the kinds of things you negotiate.

Mr. Lieberthal. I would agree with you 100 percent, sir. And they are—just have this fixation, this net assessment of him that I think is flat wrong, but it certainly gets in the way.

Chairman Berman. Look, I see what you mean. Let me interject. You ended an earlier answer by saying America's image has dimmed recently, but part of the American image that existed was the constant—before 2001, was the constant raising—whether it is in the Congress, the population, to some extent once—sometimes in the executive branch—the constant raising of human rights issues, democracy, more openness with the Chinese.

You know, someone who would disparage it would call it a hectoring about these issues. From that one could conclude that one can pursue critical issues with the Chinese. And I might—for get this, because I am now 10—I am over—well, I will be leaving you with myself at the encouragement of the ranking member.

Why can't that continue to be—obviously, I understand the references you are making to America's—some of our own policies and to the extent they are used against us when we do this. But to the extent we deal with those issues in the future, why can't this continue to be a key part of our push, even as we pursue cooperative relationships on these other issues?

Mr. Lieberthal. That is a very important question.

I think, first of all, human rights should be a key part to our approach to China. I hope what I said today hasn't created a misimpression on that issue. I think it is very important. I think we are effective in that in part, as I mentioned before, by our own example.

I think in part, to refer back to something I raised in my opening statement, there is also an issue of capacity building in China. For example, I think that the Chinese over the years have welcomed American assistance in developing their court system. We have in recent years begun to do something on that. For a number of years, we did not touch the issue. There are a lot of failings in China that are simply the result of their being, in many ways, a third world country and don't have the institutional capabilities, the human capital and so forth to do better.

Finally, I think that, while we should always point to and encourage movement along lines that improve the human condition in China, we are most effective with that when the Chinese regard us as basically well-intentioned and not as standing off and going after them in a way that we may not go after other countries and going after them in a way that, in their view, humiliates them.
I am not talking about a small clique of the leadership. I am talking about popular opinion very broadly across China.

So I think when we position ourselves as those who are prepared to work with China but also feel that it is in everyone's interest and the standards of the 21st century to protect human rights, I think we are on the right side of that issue. I think we should promote it. But there is a fine line between promoting and hectoring, and the line is in the eyes of the beholder in no small part.

So I think a lot of my remarks today have been aimed at trying to highlight the importance of understanding the beholder there so that the message gets the response that—or at least you have a chance of getting a response you want, instead of just simply getting pushed back because they think you are ill-intentioned.

Chairman BERMAN. My time is more than expired, and the ranking member may use as much time as she may consume.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Yes, we shouldn't—I wouldn't want to chastise the Chinese or have them think we are lecturing them as they continue their human rights onslaught violations.

I wanted to ask about the arm sales to Taiwan. Admiral Keating's remarks last week indicate that our Government has had discussions with Beijing over arm sales to Taiwan, and at the same time Congress has been left in the dark, even though the Taiwan Relations Act gives Congress an equal role in the process. I am planning to introduce legislation requiring administration consultations with Congress; and, related to that, in your view, would a freeze on U.S. arm sales to Taiwan be in violation with the Taiwan Relations Act and the six assurances that were articulated by President Reagan to Taiwan? Dr. Yang.

Mr. YANG. Yes. I think Taiwan's democracy serves as a beacon to the Chinese people. I think Taiwan is worthy to be defended in any way possible.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Mr. LAMPTON. I was just in Taiwan and spoke with President Ma and all his subordinates in the security and foreign policy area. I was also in the PRC and spoke to counterparts there.

To your direct question, if a freeze were indefinite, I suppose in some sense it would be inconsistent with taking into account the situation that might change in the Strait and therefore being responsive. So I think a long-term freeze might be as you argued.

Short term, I am not so sure. Right at the moment, the fact of the matter is that we have an unparalleled opportunity where the two sides are talking to each other, principally about economics now but international space and recognition of other countries and so forth and membership in the WHO and so forth. So we have a positive dynamic, and I think we have some time to see that process, and we don't need to necessarily move today or tomorrow. But I would say a long-term freeze would have some problems, as you say.

I think what we ought to be searching for, though, is a way that we can give Ma Ying-jeou, the new President, a kind of confidence to deal with the PRC, which implies some weapons sales and so forth, without making it so massive that we drive this very promising situation off the rails. So I think we ought to be looking for
a balance of meeting the legitimate needs of Taiwan in light of the threat that exists and not driving this process off the rail. I hope there is such a balance point. But I think the administration is wise to at least think about this.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.

Mr. Lieberthal. In terms of the process, the administration certainly needs to consult with the Hill and also obviously needs to consult with Taiwan.

We have—our obligations are to provide Taiwan with sufficient defensive capability. “Sufficient” is not spelled out in the legislation but clearly refers to, given the situation, what does Taiwan really need.

We have a communique that President Reagan signed with the Chinese in 1982 that says—that ties weapon sales to the level of tension in the area. Clearly, thank Heaven, the level of tension is now going down.

I think, in that context, I would associate myself with Dr. Lampton’s comment that we shape our weapon sales in a way that strengthens the possibilities of reducing the chance that the Chinese will never use military force against Taiwan. The specifics of that I think have to be worked out with Taiwan and the Congress. But, as a principal, that should be the way we kind of think about the issue, the way we conceptualize the issue, and that is the goal we should aim for.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much to all three of you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Berman. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, for 5 minutes.

Mr. Scott. Yes. If I may, I would like to talk about China and three entities.

First of all, very quickly, could you tell me in each of your opinions the status of the level of tensions between Russia and China and what is causing it? And if it goes unattended, what could be the consequences brewing between Russia and China?

Mr. Lampton. I will take a quick stab at it.

First of all, I think at one level they have simply good relations. So I wouldn’t say at the moment I would categorize this as a problematic relationship or a highly problematic one for China. Its weapon purchases from Russia are going down, at least in the last year.

But the undergirding relationship I think has a problem. Part of it is China has a massive population of 100 million people right near Russia’s far east with very few people and lots of resources. The Russians worry about that. The Russians also worry about the technology that they have transferred to the Chinese military and how that could be used in the future.

More fundamentally, I think, you know, China is a resource consumer, oil consumer. Russia is an oil exporter. And they have the same conflicts as we have with OPEC, in some sense, with the Russians.

So I wouldn’t worry as a matter of state policy that the Russians and Chinese are going to be comprehensively cooperating against our interests. I think it is very much an issue-by-issue kind of situation.
Mr. SCOTT. And one can slip in the other. I want to get my points in.

Iran, what is your understanding of the—Dr. Lieberthal or Dr. Yang—about China's relationship with Iran and how has China's position on Iran's nuclear program evolved over the past few years? And what factors continue to shape China's position on Iran and what are the prospects for an expanded role for China in the UNSC's plus Germany's negotiations with Iran?

Mr. YANG. Clearly, I am not an expert on this, but I want to answer your question in a general term.

It is in the interest of China's Government to ally with all the dictatorships in the world for the following reason—if Iran—I think this is still the key issue of democratization. That is something I want to talk about.

So we are facing a lot of problems with China. The problem is so difficult simply because China is not democratic. So I think it is time to seriously think the question how to help China democratize.

Mr. SCOTT. So you are saying that China is indeed an ally with Iran. Is that the general consensus here?

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. Can I just add a word to that, sir?

I think China has three interests in Iran. One is energy. The second is maintaining stability in the Middle East, which they are very concerned about. It is in their vital interests. And, thirdly, they have nonproliferation concerns. And they joined the last U.N. Security Council resolution on Iran, but they have also clearly not wanted to ratchet up pressure on Iran as rapidly as we do.

So there is a disconnect in our policies there. But I don't think that this is simply a matter of they love all dictators. I think it is a calculation of national interest.

Mr. SCOTT. Would you say they love Iran more than they love the United States?

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. No.

Mr. LAMPTON. I disassociate myself from those remarks; and I think, in fact, there is a great admiration of the United States in China reflected in that they have had 60,000 students and scholars here for the last two decades plus.

Mr. SCOTT. Do you feel that they have in any way assisted with supplies or materials in their enrichment program?

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. I am not privy to what our intel community may have. From what I know, I am not aware of any specific——

Mr. SCOTT. My final point. I have 44 seconds. I want to get to Darfur for example, before we go. I want to get——

How do you feel the United States should address China's role in the genocide in Darfur? I mean, it is really, really staggering. I don't know if anybody has brought statistics lately. But, as a result, more than 500,000 displacements and deaths. More than 2,500,000 Sudanese have been displaced. The actions of the Janjaweed and the Government of Sudan have been repeatedly described as genocide. It is clearly the most pressing and important humanitarian crisis in the world. What more can the United States do to address China's role in this? What should we be doing? And quickly, please.
Mr. LAMPTON. I would like to see China curtail its investment in Darfur and the oil industry that produces—of course, that is going to have consequences potentially for world oil prices, and we will all be concerned about that.

I would just point out that when we look at China in Darfur, you probably ought to also look at the behavior of India in this respect.

Mr. YANG. I think the United States Government is sending too many messages to China that they can get away with whatever they do. So I think we really need to seriously consider this problem.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

At some point, Dr. Yang, when it is my turn again, I want to come back to you on this issue that essentially, until China becomes democratic, we cannot effectively pursue any of the issues we need their cooperation on. Because I would like to challenge your assertion. But that is just to think about for later.

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Mr. Sherman, I think, made some very interesting points earlier about bluffs. And I would say for the record, except in poker, I never bluff, nor should a nation’s foreign policy ever be built in whole or in part on a bluff.

I would respectfully submit that the mother of all bluffs was Bill Clinton’s executive order in the early 1990s requiring serious and substantial progress in human rights in China or else MFN would be a goner. Midway through that 1-year review, I hand-delivered a letter to the Foreign Ministry officials in Beijing signed by 100 Members, including Speaker Pelosi, that we would back the Clinton administration and deny MFN unless human rights progress actually occurred. We were looking for deeds.

After a year, unfortunately, of serious deterioration and to my shock and dismay, the executive order was thrown into the wastepaper basket. Our trade, our trade policy then emerged with a vengeance, and in that act I believe we lost credibility, and we lost an enormous amount of leverage.

A couple of years later, I was in Beijing; and I met with Wei Jingsheng right when he was let out of prison. And he was let out in order to garner Olympics 2000. He told me a couple of things. One was that when we are predictable and strong, they beat the dissidents less. When we are vacillating and when we just think about money and profits, they beat the prisoners even more.

The day after I met with Wei, I met with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Beijing. The U.S. Embassy set up a very large breakfast meeting, and I asked each and every one of those individuals if they wanted to meet with Wei. Every single one of them turned me down. And it raises a serious question about corporate responsibility. Yet the bottom line is to make a good bottom line. But there comes a part, I believe, when corporate responsibility suggests that if you are wittingly or unwittingly enabling a dictatorship, you need to do something about it, especially if you are made aware of it.

I would ask all of you how you might feel about legislation I have introduced called the Global Online Freedom Act. We have had several hearings in this committee. We have heard from Google, Microsoft, Cisco, Yahoo!, and others. And we believe—I believe and
many of us believe—the sponsors of the bill, including groups like Reporters Without Borders, that we really need to hold these corporate entities to account. Regrettably, they are part of the problem.

The propaganda office loves what Google does. I saw it firsthand again when I Googled one term or phrase after another, including the Dalai Lama and many others. You get blocked. You don’t get anything.

What is your feeling, all of you, if you could, on the Global Online Freedom Act, if you are indeed aware of it?

Secondly—Dr. Yang, maybe you want to touch on this—what do the Chinese citizens think? You know, when the propaganda is relentless, how do you pierce that? How do people form independent viewpoints on anything when everything is the government line?

Like I said, I think you need two things for a dictatorship to survive; and they can survive in perpetuity, in my belief. You need propaganda—and we are enabling that—and you need a secret police, and we are enabling that by way of Cisco and others enabling and facilitating that capability.

Dr. Yang, and then all of you, if you would speak to that, if you would.

Mr. YANG. Yes. China’s society is the rule of fear. So the fear—many, many sides, even including the Chinese Government itself—because its policies oftentimes are driven by fear of losing power and, you know, it intimidates many people and the fear actually exported to the United States, the rest of the international community. So we do not understand the Chinese Government has a serious, legitimate problem.

The only lifesaving strength for the foundation of its legitimacy is economic growth. The China needs the international community more than international community needs the Chinese Government. So it needs to be integrated with the world. They need a partnership with powerful—world powers like the United States.

So, oftentimes—it is troubling to hear professors—I spoke at Harvard—saying, no, we cannot be critical because we won’t have opportunity go to China to do field study or even talk to the top leaders. And we often hear corporate people here, business people saying we don’t want to lose the opportunity to do business there.

So these are self-imposed fear. So the fear actually we see clearly in this country. So we should understand the true situation in China. So they need us more than we need them.

Chairman BERMAN. All right. Dr. Lampton. I took a little more time. We are a little more flexible on this round.

Mr. LAMPTON. With all due respect, Congressman, I don’t know the specifics of your proposed legislation, but I will look into it.

On Google, I would say two things: One is, I wouldn’t own that stock based on their policy. Secondly, there probably is something to be said that information is opening up and information shall set you free. So I am a little conflicted, but I would not personally own the stock.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from—I think you get to jump in because you haven’t had the first round yet. So the gentleman from Texas, Judge Poe.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for being here. I know it has been a long morning for all of you.

I am concerned as a Member of Congress and a citizen of—to me too cozy a relationship that we have with the Chinese. And concerned about especially the trade practices where they send us dog food that is poisoned, they send us lead in paint for children that is bad for kids, and now we are buying these light bulbs that everybody has got to use before 2014 that have mercury in them and you can only buy them in China. I am a little concerned about that.

And, also, the Olympics—you know, I am old-fashioned. I think the Olympics ought to be in Greece every 4 years and to resolve this problem, political issues, just go to Greece. But I am not—I don't make that decision.

The concern really more than China is the relationship with Iran. And if you could be very specific—I mean, Iran boasts about their weapons that they get from China. They are proud of their Chinese weaponry. And Iran, I think, is the world threat. I don't think it is China. I think it is Iran.

How do you see that issue playing out? China militarily helping the Iranians develop weaponry? And if there is something that we can do or should do.

I just throw that open to all three of you, because you would probably have the answer.

Mr. Lampton. Well, I will take on—react to the product safety, and others maybe can address Iran. All I would note on Iran is they have, by our own national director of intelligence, improved proliferation behavior over what it was in the 1980s and 1990s. So there has been some progress, but I have some of the concerns you are talking about.

Regarding product safety, all I would say is that there is enough blame to go around. We have the Chinese with inadequate institutional structure to assure the quality of what is being exported. We have firms that are being driven down to a very thin margin of profit and therefore cutting costs like crazy in China. We have American firms that, in some cases, haven't done their due diligence on what they are importing and selling, and that is certainly to be paid attention to. And then we have a government in the U.S. that is spending very little on inspecting products that are sold to our people in general.

So, what we have to think about in all these problem areas is there are multiple problems in each of these things that we call a single problem. And if we are really serious about it, we must look at all stages of it. The Chinese have a lot of responsibility here, but so do our companies and, frankly, so does our Government.

Mr. Poe. Anyone else want to jump in on that? You are all talked out, huh?

The other concern—just a little more regarding that specifically, I would like to know what you think the long-range relationship between China and Iran is. What is that relationship? Where is it headed? I mean, is China more influential on Iran or is Russia or what country influences Iranian political policy more? I know it is not us. So would one of you comment on that, please?
Mr. LIEBERTHAL. I am being encouraged by my colleagues to comment. The fact is, I am not a specialist on Iranian politics. I really do not know the answer to what country is most influential in Iran. I know if you look at China in the Middle East, it is by no means an Iran-focused strategy in the Middle East. If they have been improving their relationships rapidly with anywhere, it is with Saudi Arabia but more broadly are expanding their ties throughout the Middle East and look for long-term stability there because, by any calculation, they are more depending on Middle East oil than we are, and that dependency will grow despite their efforts to diversify their sources.

But again on the Iranian politics side, sir, I am afraid that isn’t my own area.

Mr. POE. Dr. Yang, would you like to comment——

Mr. YANG. I am not a specialist on——

Mr. LAMPTON. There are a couple of comments that can be made, in addition.

First of all, China is very worried about Islamic fundamentalism. It has 19 million Muslims in China—about. And, therefore, one of the motives for China to improve relations with Iran is simply not to motivate Iran to be doing things that might incentivize the Muslim minority in China. So there is that kind of conflict. And, also, as Professor Lieberthal said, China is an importer of oil and natural gas from Iran; has big contracts there.

But the long and short of it is that China faces that problem, that contradiction that it has with Russia between the supplier and, as we know, the consumer. And so I don’t see a huge sort of geo-strategic alignment of interest between Iran and China. I think it is a very mixed relationship.

And what I understand of Iran, too, is that there is quite a bit of pro-American sentiment among the people in Iran. So, at the same time, I wouldn’t exaggerate China’s closeness to Iran, and I wouldn’t underestimate the potential for a positive future off in the maybe distant future with Iran for the United States.

Mr. POE. Thank you, Dr. Lampton.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, for 5 minutes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. Thank you very much.

Let me just note about those people who are soft-pedaling China’s involvement in the proliferation of certain weapons technology that if you take a look at where Pakistan, which has then transmitted its nuclear weapons technology to other countries—it comes from China, you know. There is the thing.

Where did North Korea get their knowledge? Some cuckoo regime up in North Korea developed their nuclear technology? No. It was China via Pakistan.

And now we see China involved in Iran. I don’t care if the Chinese Government gets along with the Iranian Government. We are worried about what they are doing with the Iranian Government. And in the long term the Iranian Government, yeah, doesn’t have the support of its own people.

What we have here is, of course, that China has become the big brother or the partner to these monstrously negative regimes around the world in Africa and Sudan. Let us face it. They are get-
ting—this bloodshed in Darfur can be traced to resources provided by Beijing, in Burma; and we see them in Cuba and in Venezuela. All the bad guys of the world, China is becoming their big brother. And it is not the people of China. It is this clique that rules China and their allies.

As we have mentioned here on several occasions, corporate America seems to have what I consider to be an unholy relationship with that clique that runs China with an iron fist.

Now, I am sorry if, earlier on, Mr. Lieberthal, I was under the impression that you were involved with corporate—with some corporate interests in China, but you said you are not. What is this Stonebridge International? Is that a corporation?

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. Let me clarify, sir. What I was reacting to was you said “your company” and my——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you are not associated with Stonebridge?

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. No, I am associated as a senior director at Stonebridge.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is that a corporation?

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. Yes. I am not an employee.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So your company—you are on the board of directors? Are you paid by Stonebridge?

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. Yes, I am.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So I wasn’t incorrect in saying “your company.” You are paid by a corporation. And does it have a major economic interaction with China?

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. Stonebridge is a consulting company, and some of the consulting it does is on—you know, advise them on operations in China.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yeah, operations in China. Well, let me just note that that should be taken into consideration when we know—when we listen to your opinions. And this is not—what we are seeing here is a perfect example of where we have corporate interests with huge—making billions of dollars who actually have an influence on public opinion here and governmental opinion here in the Nation’s capital of the United States of America.

And I am not—that doesn’t mean your opinions are wrong, just we need to know about that.

And, quite frankly, I think corporations and some people here have soft-pedaled this. Corporations have had a horrible impact on the future of freedom in this world, because they have gone forward—American corporations have gone forward, and they have not argued the case when they set up their companies to make their billions of dollars off cheap labor in China. They have not argued the case with the local officials that, no, you shouldn’t take this Fallon Gong member away and cut out his organs and sell them. You shouldn’t take Christians and throw them in jail or you should perhaps allow someone to criticize the regime in the newspaper.

The corporate leaders don’t seem to do that because they are not allied with the people of China. They are making a profit off the clique that runs China; and the fact is, as I would suggest, that they are trying to have an influence—those same corporations have been influential here so they——
For example, that we won't condemn the Olympics for deciding to hold the Olympic Games, which supposedly represents the higher aspirations of humankind in a country that is run by the world's worst human rights abuser; and it is traced back again here to corporate interests overriding the fundamental principles that the American people believe in.

What does that flag stand for? I hope when the people of China wake up and they see the American flag, they will think that we are their friends and they are not just a bunch of corporations making money off deals with their oppressors.

Thank you very much.

Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

I do want to interject here that I have known Professor Lieberthal for a long time. My guess is he has never made any effort to hide whatever his consulting affiliations are. But it is the merits and the strength of his arguments you should be focused on anymore than every one of our positions should just be assumed to be worthless——

And I am not even saying you said that. In fact, you didn't say that. But I just want to make it clear that anymore—because we receive private campaign contributions, therefore, we are not—we are not taking a particular position because those interests—because it is what we, from some combination of our values and our intellect, conclude are the right positions.

Mr. Rohrabacher. If the gentleman will yield for a moment.

Chairman Berman. Yeah. Because this guy has always been very straight, and he and I have even disagreed when he worked in the Clinton administration on one particular issue. I had this wonderful amendment that he didn't think was so good.

Mr. Rohrabacher. Would the gentleman yield for just a moment? And that is—look, it is just the answer I got to my question about——

Chairman Berman. He was not here representing a company. He was here because of his academic credentials, his earlier role in China policies and his whole background.

Mr. Rohrabacher. I just had to make that clear. Because my question was predicated on that, and I didn't want people to think that I was inaccurate in assessing that there was corporate influence, and it is not—again, you can have corporate influence and be absolutely right.

Chairman Berman. It was just a non—he was responding to the implication that could have been taken from your words that he was here representing a company.

Mr. Rohrabacher. And just for the other side of that for your benefit, Doctor, and that is that there are a lot of politicians who leave their job here on Capitol Hill as a Congressman or a Senator and then they hire themselves out to either those corporations or to radical governments to represent them here with their former colleagues. And I just think these are moral things that we have——

Chairman Berman. People from our profession do that?

Mr. Rohrabacher. That is correct, from our profession. That is correct.
Chairman Berman. I am going to yield myself just a couple of minutes.

And, Dr. Yang, several times in your testimony you essentially said the key to progress with China is to do what one can to get China to become a democracy, but until that happens there won't be real progress. And I say this with tremendous respect for your courage, your sincerity of your views, what you have been through and think and like what you say, but there are many times in our history where we have not been able to make such clean choices.

In World War II, we went into an alliance with one of the largest mass murders of the 20th century, Joe Stalin, because we thought that was an essential arrangement to deal with the Nazis and the enemy in World War II.

I could give a dozen other examples where we had to make those types of tactical arrangements because America's security interests were better served by making those alliances and arrangements, and I—and, for me, not dealing with what China might be enabling Iran to do or not dealing with what China may be enabling the Sudan to do because China is not yet a democracy I don't think is a luxury we in public policy have, and I just—even though I have an intellectual understanding it would be much easier and much better if that were the case, but I just don't think we have the time to do that.

I just wanted to get that off my chest. If you had anything in response, I think you are entitled to——

Mr. Yang. Yes. Of course, many times in the history of the United States—in history, the United States went to ally with dictators, but my question, what lessons have you learned from it? So do you—have you found any reliable partner in history for whatever problem you are facing who were dictator?

Chairman Berman. In the short term?

Mr. Yang. In the short term and the long term. What lessons have you learned?

So I don't oppose engagement with China. I think we have to deal with China. Ignoring China is just like ignoring a big elephant in the living room nowadays. So we have to deal with it. But while dealing with China, we just cannot afford to ignore the question whether we have a clear consistent policy toward helping China's people democratize this country.

Do you have it? I don't know. I urge you to have one.

Chairman Berman. That is a different proposition, and I don't disagree with you.

Mr. Yang. Could I say a few more words?

I don't think democracy in Saudi Arabia and in the Arab world had been in any public debate in this country, very rarely. So very few people talk about how we democratize Saudi Arabia, things like that or any Arab countries. Suddenly, September 11th. And, before that, everybody tend to believe we have to have a good relationship with Saudi Arabia because they have the most oil reserve in the world.

Chairman Berman. And the irony is that the President who most forcefully articulated this principle about the long-term costs of making good with authoritarian regimes and the consequences of
those policies is the President who is going to the opening ceremony.

Mr. YANG. That is the thing that really concerns us. Consistency is the key. If you change here or there, this way or that way, the—understand the world very well. You can change—press for change every time. It is not the change. Every time see you change. So that is the problem.

Chairman BERMAN. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this additional question.

Three weeks ago in Beijing, Mr. Wolf and I were riding in a van on contract to the U.S. Embassy and we made in jest a comment that we might unfurl a banner in Tiananmen Square. We also made a comment back to the States that we were thinking about that, and it was all done in jest. Within 1 hour, our DCM, Daniel Piccuta, called us and said that the Foreign Ministry of China had contacted them to lodge a serious complaint that if we unfurled a banner in Tiananmen Square, we would be arrested and immediately deported.

My question is, what are your views about the bugging, the surveillance of the Chinese people and with the upcoming Olympics, obviously, journalists and others who might say something that again the government would find objectionable?

Chairman BERMAN. And where are you going to rent your vans?

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. That is right. And from whom we rent those vans.

Because it was amazing. We said this in a conversation. One hour, DCM contacts us. The Foreign Ministry is outraged that we are even thinking about it; and they tell us, with a great deal of threat behind it, you will be arrested—two Congressman and our staffs.

Mr. YANG. The Chinese Government is clearly intimidating the Chinese people not to do anything during the Olympics.

As I said earlier, Beijing is under martial law now. Beijing has become a forbidden city itself.

But we may see something during the Olympics. The international journalists may freely go anywhere they want, may ask any people by chance. You know, it seems that nobody is prepared to answer your question. But, because of the intimidation, because of the fear, people will not tell you the truth.

So just as you said earlier, how can these two gentlemen here get the people’s idea if the people have no freedom to express? That is the problem I think we have to keep that in mind. Probably most journalists will report very good news about China, but don’t be deceived by that. Keep what I just said in mind.

Chairman BERMAN. Either of you, Dr. Lampton or—

Mr. LAMPTON. Mine was just one sentence. I don’t favor Chinese bugging of our officials or anybody else for that matter, including the Chinese people. So you asked a question.

Mr. LIEBERTHAL. Two points. One is, I think they are—bugging practices are absolutely reprehensible; and I think the way you and Congressman Wolf were treated was shameful. And so I absolutely agree with what I take to be the implication of your question.
Secondly, since this has come up several times and just a moment ago again by Dr. Yang, the question of how do you know what the people of China think. And I think one of the best sources we have on that, obviously, beyond simply walking around and having private conversations over long periods of time——

Chairman Berman. Outdoors.

Mr. Lieberthal. Yes, outdoors—is public opinion surveys that are done not by the Chinese but by the Pew Research outfit, by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, by folks who do this around the world, are very professional, have done it for years.

And what those surveys show—they are actually quite consistent, and what they show is that China has changed enormously from the Maoist era. And to a remarkable extent now—this is not just my view; this is what the data shows—to a remarkable extent now, the Chinese people think their national government is doing a very good job. China is going in the direction it ought to be going. They are proud of what it is doing.

They have more complaints about their daily lives personally, but, overall, the broad level of support for where this place is heading gets very high marks.

Now, you can say that they are misinformed or whatever, but that is what every opinion poll shows that is conducted by international organizations throughout the country. And these are people who answered these questions anonymously and are selected to be representative and so forth.

So I am simply reflecting that data, sir. I am not reflecting a set of kind of personal assumptions without a database to it.

Mr. Smith of New Jersey. We probably don't have the time to get to this. But it does beg the question. Why? If you get propaganda, as I said earlier—one of the journalists told me it took months to get rid of the propaganda that was laying all over her. She reeked of it. She said, “I didn't believe that America was what America really is. It took me months to get over what I had been spoon fed.”

And, secondly, a phone interview or any other interview, how do you ensure the confidentiality of what you say, particularly vis-à-vis the government out of that fear factor that Dr. Yang has spoken about?

Chairman Berman. Okay. I think—let us declare the hearing over.

Thank all of you very much and very interesting, and I appreciate your taking the time in preparing your thoughts for us.

[Whereupon, at 12:22 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]