Organization for supply to meet a guided missile attack on continental United States by Lt Col L. P. Marden. CGSC. 1947-48.

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Subject No.

Subject: ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPLY TO MEET A GUIDED MISSILE ATTACK ON CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES.

Purpose: To recommend action to be taken now to insure rapid supply of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force) in the event of a guided missile attack against the continental United States.

Scope: Assume Attack via Alaska, and Canada directed at the Great Lakes industrial region (MESABE---SOG---DETROIT AREA). Consider how forces might be employed under current six army plan and a delineation of a Theater of Operations. Propose action which should be taken now to insure:

a. Rapid Supply of Active Forces.
b. Supply of Civilian Components.
c. Supply for Civilian Defense.
d. Supply for Disaster Relief.
e. Supply for Allies.
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- S-12819: Orgn Plan for Postwar Supply.
- N-15043: Industrial Preparedness.
- N-11133: Minutes of Staff Meeting.
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- C-15632: Post War Installation Study (For Planning Purposes only) 29 Sept 1945.
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Command And General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
011200 May 1948

File No. 1-1

Subject: Organization For Supply To Meet A Guided Missile Attack On Continental United States, Via Alaska, Canada -- Directed At The Mesabe - Soo - Detroit Area.

To: The Commandant, School Of Logistics, Command And General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

1. Problem: What actions can be taken now to organize for supply against a guided-missile attack from the direction of Alaska?

2. Discussion:
   a. The present supply system of the armed forces, zone of interior depends upon the Depot system.
   b. At the present a preponderant number of Depots are located in Northeastern United States near centers of industry and population both of which are likely guided-missile objectives.
   c. The Depot system depends upon the land and sea transportation net. The air transport is a vital link but does not carry the bulk tonnages necessary to support the forces.
   d. The railroad net is centered East of the Mississippi River and North of the Ohio River. South of the Ohio River the rail net is moderate with no especially heavy traffic centers. West of the
Mississippi River the rail net becomes sparse and has no large traffic centers.

e. The sea lanes are heaviest through the Great Lakes and from New York to New Orleans; thence South to Panama. The sea lanes are very light from Panama up the West Coast to Alaska.

f. Highways follow closely the pattern of the railroads and traffic density is in about the same proportion.

g. Critical defiles exist in the rail and highway nets at crossings of the Mississippi River, the Missouri, Ohio and other tributaries.

h. Critical defiles also exist at the large traffic centers of rail and highway such as Chicago, Detroit and New York.

i. The bulk of supplies for the zone of interior will continue to move by rail.

j. The heart of United States industry is located between Chicago and New York City and from the Great Lakes to the Ohio River. See Annex 1.


l. Approach to the industrial centers of the United States is blocked only by the Mackenzie Mountains of the Rocky Mountain Continental Divide between Alaska and Canada, and the Wilderness areas of Canada. These cannot be considered effective blocks against guided-missiles but would have considerable bearing on ground and air tactics following up the guided-missiles.
3. Conclusions:

a. That dispersion is the only known, practical form of defense at present against guided-missiles.
b. That an effort should be made to effect some dispersion of the industry of the United States.
c. That the maximum dispersion that can be effected by industry should be coupled with maximum widening of the critical bottlenecks in the transport system.
d. That population density would disperse in proportion to the success of efforts of b. and c. above.
e. That military reserve stocks could be located near Organized Reserve centers and with National Guard Units to enable immediate initial supply in event of mobilization.
f. That personnel from National Guard or Organized Reserve Units reaching age limits or otherwise deferred could form the nucleus of a home Defense or Militia organization.
g. That the Depot and Port systems should be studied with a view to reach an efficient, deep and dispersed, well coordinated plan. See Annex 4.
h. That these depots be fitted into a disaster relief plan which should be directed through the army in event of attack on the United States.
i. That there is no evidence indicating
present organizational policies would not suffice in event of guided-missile attack. However it is believed that flexibility will be of paramount importance and that it can be obtained through accent on cellular units.

4. Recommendations:

   a. That a survey be made of the industrial centers of the United States and of non-industrial areas suitable to receive industry.

   b. That an effort be made following the above survey to induce industry to disperse to other suitable areas.

   c. That a survey be made of potential depot and fort sites suitable by reason of dispersion, natural protection and efficiency for military use.

   d. That following the survey in c. above, any new construction await the present tests being conducted by the U.S. Army Engineers on blast damage to underground installations and that the results of these tests be incorporated.

   e. That a survey be made of the critical crossings of the Mississippi River and its tributaries and of the defiles at traffic centers both for rail and highway.

   f. That following the survey of e. above a plan be devised to provide additional crossings and widen critical defiles, providing alternate routes.
s. That organization for supply emphasize the flexibility of cellular units and that these units be planned in progression from small teams up to and including the Logistical Division.

h. That a national plan be prepared to form Home Defense or Militia units to become active on call or when the National Guard is called up for Federal Service.

i. That present Army Areas remain in effect for peacetime, but that a plan be developed to form Army Zones to the North in event of attack.

j. That organization for supply be planned to meet the conditions imposed by the Army Zones suggested in i. above.

L. P. Harden, Jr.
Lt. Col. Q.M.C.

Annex 1. Photo, Industrial Concentration.
Annex 6. Recommended Army Zones.
CONCENTRATION OF INDUSTRY AS INDICATED BY VALUE OF MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS
Annex 3.

1. Problem: To select critical Port and Depot Areas in the United States the use of which might be mandatory during war, and particularly in event of a guided missile attack from the direction of Alaska.

2. Discussion:
   a. Study of the Port operations of World War II reveals that the major port operations were very concentrated at New York, New Orleans and San Francisco.
   b. In event of a guided-missile attack toward Mesabé-Soo-Detroit area the New York Port would be roughly in the line of attack and presumably would be vulnerable. New Orleans Port would be much more secure in view of its geographic position. San Francisco Port has the advantage of defilade behind the Rocky Mountains as well as distance.

3. Conclusions:
   a. Two World War II major ports would be reasonably safe at the outset.
   b. Other ports would be necessary and would have to be developed.

4. Recommendations:
   That a thorough survey be made.
Annex 4.

1. Problem: To determine the manner in which selected Port and Depot Sites should be planned to effect the required dispersion against guided-missile attack.

2. Discussion:
   a. Ports would have to be dispersed widely so that loading and unloading of ships would take place at widely separated points and no single hit or even a series of hits would destroy the port totally.
   b. The Depots backing up the Port operation would have to be dispersed many miles to avoid disruption by a hit or series of hits. Internally the Depots would also be dispersed by type of supply or operation to avoid destruction critical items.

3. Conclusions:
   a. That Port dispersion could be effected by wide separation of piers and tying these piers together by rail and highway.
   b. That Depots backing up the Ports could be dispersed along the rail and highway routes to the Ports.

4. Recommendations:
   That a survey and plan be made for each Port and Depot Area.
Annex 4.

Schematic Depot And Port Dispersion.
Annex 5.

1. Problem: To select critical river crossings and defiles that create serious bottlenecks in the Rail and Highway Transport System of the United States.

2. Discussion:
   a. The rail and highway bridges across the Mississippi River and its tributaries become bottlenecks at times of floods when traffic is delayed for hours or days.
   b. That other defiles occur in cities where all traffic must go through heavily populated areas.
   c. There are serious defiles where rail and highway lines pass through mountains and canyons.

3. Conclusions:
   a. That all defiles could be subject to widening.
   b. That all cannot be widened or need be widened until they serve commercial uses.
   c. That the most critical defiles should be determined and plans made to widen them.

4. Recommendations:
   a. That a survey be made to determine the ten most critical defiles.
   b. That plans be made to widen these defiles.
Annex 6.

1. Problem: To determine changes in existing Army Areas to meet a Guided-missile attack from the direction of Alaska.

2. Discussion:
   
   a. Present Army Areas in the United States combine features of a Service Command and Army Area.
   
   b. In peacetime Service Command functions can be performed by the Combat personnel as a matter of administrative training, but in wartime it would be more economical of manpower to use overage and physically unfit personnel.
   
   c. The overlapping of Army Combat personnel and the Service Command personnel might divide a house within itself.

3. Conclusions:
   
   a. That Army functions in wartime change from those of peacetime, and that a combination Service Command housekeeping functions with those of the Army Combat training would not be efficient from the standpoint of pursuing an end of the war.

4. Recommendations:
   
   a. That a plan be devised to have no less than three Field Armies to occupy distinct Army Areas along a line facing the direction of a guided-missile attack.
   
   b. That Service Commands be created.