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UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: AN UNDERFUNDED INTERNATIONAL MANDATE—THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2008

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:32 p.m. in room 2175, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William D. Delahunt (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Delahunt follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BILL DELAHUNT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT

This briefing will come to order. Today's briefing and hearing are entitled "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Underfunded International Mandate—the Role of the United States."

In American political jargon, when states are required to implement a federal program, but no federal funds are provided, we call that an unfunded mandate.

The international community has been giving the United Nations more and more assignments—particularly in the area of peacekeeping. But these assignments rarely get the necessary level of funding. And what funding they do get is often not delivered on time. So while UN peacekeeping may not be an unfunded mandate—it is certainly an underfunded one.

This has been an ongoing concern. And it deserves our attention. Because it makes thoughtful planning for these missions problematic. Which has major consequences for international peace and stability. And implicates American national security and priorities.

And we bear some of the responsibility. Estimates are that the US owes the UN approximately 1 billion dollars for peacekeeping missions that the US voted for and supported as a Permanent Member of the Security Council.

Let me be clear: the US is not the only country in debt to the UN for peacekeeping. Japan—for example—only recently paid its dues—some 775 million dollars. And there are indisputable inequities in the assessment formula. While the US pays 26% of peacekeeping costs, China only pays 3%. And Russia pays just 1%. These levels should be adjusted to reflect today's global economic realities.

But I would also note that other countries often pay, not with cash, but by contributing troops and police. India and Pakistan, for example, provide over 20,000 uniformed personnel for these missions between them.

And make no mistake: these forces are needed. There are currently 17 missions in operation. Once the Darfur mission gets fully underway—a mission that President Bush has said is urgent—there will be 140,000 UN peacekeepers in the field. As recently as 2004, there were only 65,000 UN peacekeepers. And of that projected 140,000, only 313 are American military—who are primarily in administrative positions—or police. No US combat troops are at risk in a UN peacekeeping mission. There are no reports from those battlefields of US combat deaths and casualties.
To put it bluntly, UN peacekeeping is a bargain for the US, despite the inequities of the assessment formula. My Ranking Member, Mr. Rohrabacher, and I commissioned a Government Accountability Office report a few years ago to compare the costs of US and UN military missions. It found that US-only missions cost American taxpayers eight times more than an equivalent UN mission would. Eight times more. And of course, a UN mission entails no risk to American lives.

One only has to imagine the cost in American blood and treasure if US military forces, for whatever reason, were tasked with keeping the peace in Liberia, East Timor, or Lebanon, or Somalia, or Haiti. All of which are US priorities. All of these are missions that have had the support of successive US Administrations. We voted for them. If the UN did not exist, we would most likely have to address them directly, and often alone.

It is also important to put the costs in perspective. As I said before, there are estimates that we are in excess of 1 billion dollars in the hole to the UN for peacekeeping funds. That sounds like a lot of money. And it is a lot of money. But let’s compare that to the burden that American taxpayers are shouldering in Iraq.

1 billion dollars is about the cost of three days in Iraq. Let me repeat that. For the cost of three days in Iraq, we could fight Islamist terrorists in Somalia. Keep the peace in West Africa. Prevent a refugee crisis in the Caribbean. And protect Israel’s northern border with Lebanon. In my opinion, that is a bargain. And well worth the money. Especially when no US troops are at risk.

I would note that while the UN’s peacekeeping duties have increased rapidly over the last twenty years, there has not been the same expansion in the UN’s capacity to run these missions. It’s only been through the valiant efforts of people like Jane Holl Lute that the UN has been able to produce such remarkable results with such limited resources.

Furthermore, it is important to note that the UN, unlike most nation-states, has no standing army that can be sent out to put out fires as needed. The UN has to start each peacekeeping mission from scratch, begging and cajoling countries to contribute troops. Which means those countries can attach all sorts of strings to the operation. In fact, even when these forces are wearing the blue helmets, the UN doesn’t really control them. And I have long supported efforts to reform these operations to provide more accountability and clearer lines of control.

And the logistical problems are even greater. These troops need food. And water. And transportation. They often operate in places where there aren’t roads or airstrips or electricity. All that has to be put together as well. And all of that costs money.

That’s why I am happy that we have Jane Holl Lute here today to brief us. I will introduce her more formally later, but let me simply say that Ms. Lute is the woman who has kept UN peacekeeping together over the past few years. So she is the one who can tell us exactly what the challenges are. How our money is spent. And what are the practical consequences when we don’t give what is necessary.

Now, let me turn to my Ranking Member, Dana Rohrabacher of California, for any remarks that he might like to make.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Welcome, Secretary Silverberg. And we apologize for the delay. I hope you were served tea and whatever in the adjoining room. At least you had an opportunity to have a preview of what you were going to be queried about.

I would be remiss if I didn’t note the presence of a former staffer to this committee, someone who worked for Congressman Chris Smith and who earned the respect and admiration of all members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary Joseph Rees.

Joe, it is good to see you here.

Ms. Kristen Silverberg is the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs; leads the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, which is responsible for pursuing U.S. interests through international organizations including the United Nations. She oversees U.S. contributions totaling over $2.4 billion. Prior to her current assignment, Ms. Silverberg served as the Deputy Assistant to the President and Advisor to the Chief of Staff in the White House, where she helped to coordinate the development of White House policy. Prior to that appointment, she served as the Deputy Assistant to President Bush for Domestic Pol-
icy. Until October 2003, she served as senior advisor to Ambassador Bremer in Iraq, and she also served as Special Assistant to the President in the White House Office of the Chief of Staff. She was a law clerk to Justice Clarence Thomas, and she earned her bachelor's degree from Harvard and her J.D. with high honors from the University of Texas.

So, welcome. And again, our apologies for the rather lengthy delay that voting sometimes causes. But if you can proceed, Madam Secretary.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE KRISTEN SILVERBERG, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ms. SILVERBERG. Sure. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very glad to be here to talk about this important subject of U.N. peacekeeping. We share the view that U.N. peacekeeping operations are important, cost-effective tools to help address international threats to peace—threats to international peace and security, especially where direct military involvement by the United States is neither necessary nor appropriate.

The U.N. blue helmets are helping to assist transitions to stability in countries like Liberia, the DRC and Haiti. And, of course, our top priority is to assist in the rapid deployment of a peacekeeping operation to Darfur to protect its civilian population and help end the genocide.

The U.S. contributes a substantial share to peacekeeping. For 2008, Congress has appropriated almost $1.7 billion for the CIPA account, including $550 million to support the mission in Darfur. We are also seeking appropriations of another $330 million in supplemental funds in 2008 to cover the full share of UNAMID's budget. So should Congress meet this request, total payments during 2008 would reach over $2.1 billion, a substantial increase over previous years. And I think it is important to keep in mind that just a couple of years ago, just in 2006, the U.N.–U.S. contributions were just over $1 billion. So they have gone up very rapidly in recent years.

I know the committee wanted to talk about the question of U.S. arrears to peacekeeping operations, and I assume we can talk about this more in Q&A. But I just wanted to, by way of introduction, start talking about some of the numbers you have heard from the U.N.

First, the U.N. continues to cite as arrears a number of about $500 million, dating from the 1990s, and this is attributable mostly to a congressional legislative cap in place then that limited U.S. payments to about 25 percent, even though we were assessed at—parts of the 1990s—over 30 percent. We refer to those numbers as contested arrears, but we have not sought payment from any appropriations from Congress to go back to the 1990s and pay those amounts.

We also have what the U.N. attributes as arrears of about $160 million for the legislative cap in place between 2005 through 2007. Congress lifted the cap, of course, between 2001 and 2005 and then again in 2008. But for that period it was in place that another about $160 million in so-called arrears was accumulated. Congress
had—I am sorry—the administration has asked Congress to lift the cap retroactively for that period to allow us to pay back those funds.

In addition, each year we defer some payments at the end of some fiscal years because of shortfalls in the account. These shortfalls were about $54 million at the end of 2006 and about $37 million at the end of 2007. But these amounts were subsequently paid at the beginning of the next fiscal year. And sometimes this is a matter of our budget cycle here in the U.S. It may be a matter sometimes of the fact that we are in a congressional notification period on many renewals and those things.

For 2009, the President has requested $1.497 billion for the CIPA account. Although I should highlight that this is an estimate, by definition budgeting for U.N.’s peacekeeping is inherently unpredictable because it is covering situations that change very rapidly on the ground, conflict situations, things that can change, change rapidly.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But it does appear to be a trend in terms of an increase, Madam Secretary; would you agree?

Ms. SILVERBERG. I think that is fair. And I think that has to do mostly—not so much with the fact that ongoing peacekeeping missions are becoming more expensive, but for the fact that we have a lot more of them. So we have about 140,000 authorized now, which is a massive increase. You know, just a few years ago, I think 2004, just before I took this job, I think it was close to 60,000. So this is a massive increase.

And that is the good news and the bad news. The good news is that the U.N. is taking on some of these difficult situations where, as I said, U.S. military involvement is inappropriate. The bad news is it is creating a stretch of capacity both in terms of personnel and financial capacity. So it is creating demands on member states like the U.S. and also creating real demands on how the U.N. plans and prepares for these peacekeeping operations.

So in terms of both their operations in New York and also the availability of qualified troops to deploy in these missions, you know, troop contributors who can provide important enablers like helicopters and heavy transport, all of these things have really been tested by the fact that U.N. peacekeeping operations have expanded so dramatically. So with that, I am happy to take any questions.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Okay. Well, thank you.

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Kristen Silverberg, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to address this Subcommittee today on the critically important subject of United States payments for United Nations peacekeeping. My remarks will focus on the level and timeliness of funding provided by the United States for its assessed contributions to United Nations peacekeeping and the amounts owed for UN peacekeeping. I would like to stress at the outset that the Administration seeks to work in close partnership with Congress in addressing the specific challenges that the unique and inherently unpredictable nature of UN peacekeeping operations—and the sharply increasing demand for them—present for our budget preparation, financial management, oversight, appropriations and expenditures processes.
Before discussing the details of U.S. payments, I would also like to emphasize that the Administration considers United Nations peacekeeping to be in the direct national security interest of the United States. It deserves and it receives both our political and financial support. UN peacekeeping operations are generally authorized and reviewed by the UN Security Council at regular intervals, where U.S. permanent membership and our right of veto ensure that our support is necessary for peacekeeping operations to receive Security Council mandates or to be re-authorized at the end of each mandate period—typically every six to twelve months. We keep Congress informed about these developments through monthly briefings to the relevant committees and written notifications of all new missions or significant changes to the mandates of existing missions.

UN peacekeeping operations serve as important tools to address a wide range of threats to international peace and security—especially those where direct military involvement by the United States is not necessary or appropriate. The tasks of UN peacekeepers are varied, ranging from the separation of opposing forces on Cyprus or the Golan Heights to complex civilian protection and stabilization missions in countries such as Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti and Liberia. And UN peacekeeping is in most cases a comparatively effective, efficient, and successful means of addressing security and stabilization challenges. While UN peacekeeping operations face great difficulties in such hostile environments as Darfur, Chad and Eritrea, and are unable to by themselves resolve difficult underlying political conflicts, as in Cyprus or in Lebanon, UN peacekeeping operations contribute to the prevention or mitigation of conflict and the resulting protection of civilians. The UN’s blue helmets are playing a positive role in the transitions to stability and democratic governance underway in Timor-Leste, Liberia, the Congo and Haiti. Successful peacekeeping operations in Burundi and Sierra Leone have completed their work in recent years, with follow-up efforts now proceeding with the advice and assistance of the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission.

UN peacekeeping has been deemed by a number of detailed studies, including those by the Government Accountability Office and the Rand Corporation, to be a cost-effective means of addressing conflicts and post-conflict stabilization. The international community increasingly relies on UN peacekeeping to maintain security and promote stability in troubled regions. Since 2001, the number of authorized peacekeepers has nearly tripled, from under 40,000 to almost 120,000, as the Security Council has created large missions in Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Cote d’Ivoire, Lebanon, Southern Sudan and Darfur. This dramatic increase in the scope and size of peacekeeping operations has placed a considerable strain on the capacity of the United Nations and troop contributing nations to meet growing demands for troops and equipment as well as the financial resources that are the main subject of today’s hearing.

UN peacekeeping is certainly not cost-free, and it is important to note that the costs involved include human lives as well as financial resources. Ukrainian police officer Ihor Kynal, who died as a result of injuries sustained in a March 18 incident in the city of Mitrovica, Kosovo, was the latest of over 2,440 UN peacekeepers to give their lives in service to international peace.

I now turn to the main subject of this hearing, the financial contributions of the United States to UN peacekeeping. In so doing I would like to highlight the dramatic growth in U.S. payments for this purpose, both from regularly appropriated and supplemental or emergency funds over the past three years—a trend that has largely been driven by the dramatic increase in peacekeepers authorized and deployed around the world.

In fiscal year 2006, the U.S. paid just over $1.022 billion in assessments for UN peacekeeping. In fiscal year 2007, we made assessed payments of $1.465 billion from the Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account. This total was composed of $1.135 billion under the full-year Continuing Resolution, plus $16 million in FY 2007 supplemental funds for new operations in Timor, $184 million in FY 2007 supplemental funds for expanded operations in Lebanon, and $129.8 million in supplemental funds carried over from FY 2006 for operations in Sudan.

In fiscal year 2008, Congress has thus far appropriated $1.691 billion for the CIPA account in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, including $550.4 million in regular and emergency funds intended for use to support the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Just over $1 billion of this amount has already been transferred to the UN to meet outstanding obligations for 15 peacekeeping operations, and we will soon be processing payments for assessments received recently from the remaining two operations. Additionally, $83 million in FY 2007 supplemental funds remained available for use in FY 2008 to support the UN’s newest mission in Chad and the Central African Republic. The
Administration continues to seek $333.6 million in supplemental funds in FY 2008 for UNAMID in order to cover the full U.S. share of the UNAMID budget—$884 million—which we expect to be billed during this fiscal year. Thus, should Congress meet the Administration’s request for supplemental funding for FY 2008, total payments for UN peacekeeping during this fiscal year would reach approximately $2.108 billion.

In addressing the Subcommittee’s interest in the amount of U.S. arrears owed to UN peacekeeping operations, it is important to distinguish among different categories of arrears:

- First, UN records continue to include “arrears” dating back to the 1990s of about over $450 million. Most of this amount relates to legislative or policy restrictions, in addition to funding shortfalls, which prevented the U.S. from paying these assessments. By far the largest single element of this amount, sometimes referred to as contested peacekeeping arrears, is the difference between the rate that was assessed during that period (well over 30 percent) and the 25 percent legislative “cap,” originally imposed in 1994, that restricted U.S. payment for a UN peacekeeping operation to no more than 25 percent of the total assessed contributions for that operation.

- Second, the UN also cites arrears of nearly $160 million between the end of FY 2005 and the first quarter of FY 2008 because of the legislative “cap” that I have already mentioned. This cap was lifted between 2001 and 2005, but was re-imposed for calendar years 2005 through 2007, during which period we were assessed between over 27 percent to just under 26 percent. We are very appreciative of the fact that Congress raised the cap for calendar year 2008 to 27%, which will allow us to pay UN peacekeeping assessments at the full rate assessed by the UN—currently 25.9624 percent. The President’s budget request for FY 2009 also asks Congress to lift the cap to 27.1 percent for calendar year 2009, as well as for calendar years 2005 through 2007, so that the Administration may clear these cap-related arrears and avoid accumulating similar arrears in the next fiscal year.

- Third, the U.S. has deferred some payments at the end of each recent fiscal year because of shortfalls in funding. The amount that might need to be deferred at the end of FY 2008, if any, can be determined only after:
  A) It becomes clear whether Congress will appropriate the remaining $333.6 million of the Administration’s supplemental request for UNAMID (for which $390 million in “bridge” funding was already provided in the FY 2008 CIPA appropriation);
  B) the UN’s peacekeeping budget for the year that begins on July 1, 2008, has been adopted; and
  C) the UN issues assessments for the first part of the upcoming budget year, also taking into account any adjustments or credits that reflect actual spending for existing missions.

We currently estimate that as much as $250 million in CIPA payments may need to be deferred at the end of FY 2008.

With regard to the FY 2009 budget, the President has requested $1.497 billion for the CIPA account. I would like to emphasize the inherently unpredictable nature of UN peacekeeping, which has been characterized by great fluctuations in size and cost over the past two decades. As a result, specific figures for each peacekeeping operation are notional estimates that are likely to be adjusted throughout the budget process, and throughout the year, to account for changing circumstances in each mission. And I would like to assure you that the Administration continually works with our partners in the UN Secretariat and the Security Council to assess the possibility of downsizing or achieving savings in peacekeeping operations. Our request for FY 2009, within the constraints of the overall budget, is intended to ensure that the United States continues to play the leading role in financing UN peacekeeping operations and to ensure that the UN has the financial resources necessary to avoid any disruption or delays.

Finally, while I have focused my remarks on direct payments of UN peacekeeping assessments through funds appropriated under the CIPA account, I also wish to note that the United States has also spent over $800 million over the past five fiscal years through other appropriations that contribute directly or indirectly to multilateral peacekeeping. In particular, I would draw attention to our work under the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI) and the related ACOTA program to train and equip peacekeeping forces from other countries to participate in UN and other international peacekeeping operations. I would also highlight our substantial support until the end of 2007 for infrastructure development and maintenance
for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which operated in Darfur before the transition to UNAMID, and for such purposes as transportation of non-U.S. peacekeeping personnel and equipment to a UN peacekeeping operation.

Thank you.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Again, let me—I do understand the budgetary cycles do cause some confusion. And I understand the—you know, the $500 million that is subject to divergent opinion and pre-Biden-Helms.

Let me ask you this: There is that chart up there. And I think you might have heard my opening remarks are—and I am sure you have had a chance to note the questions and the opinions proffered by my colleague from California. And you could surmise that there is a real difference in terms of how he and I view the role of U.N. peacekeeping. I described it as a bargain. He describes it in his own terms as something else. But I think we do agree on the fact that there is—within the formula are inequities where our GDP, I think, is $14 trillion. The Chinese, for example—they have a $10 trillion economy, and when you take a look at the global economy now and the weakness of the dollar, the fact that we owe the Chinese Central Bank quite a bit of money in terms of hundreds of billions of dollars, there really is an inequity that I think we are all concerned about.

What efforts have been made and what has been the response of major—particularly among the Permanent Five, nations like Russia, for example, that has an economy that is surging, to use a phrase, surging as a result of their energy resources, and yet only pay 1 percent, and the United States is paying 26 percent; the Chinese, which has an economy that would appear to be taking over ours in the foreseeable future and is paying 3 percent, and we are paying 26 percent? Even with those numbers, I still would argue it is cost-effective and clearly takes out of harm’s way the potential of tens of thousands of combat-ready troops that we don’t have being in places where we don’t want to have them.

Has there been any inquiry or discussions between our Ambassador or yourself with representatives—let’s just focus on China and Russia—as to their willingness to stand up because they, too, have an interest in stability—not necessarily democracy, but stability worldwide and the U.N. being a mechanism to achieve that?

Ms. SILVERBERG. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As you know, the U.N. peacekeeping budget starts with a formula that includes as a first matter the U.N. regular budget assessment scale, and then it discounts for countries other than the wealthiest countries, and then on top of that is a surcharge for the P–5 members. Because of that formula, because of the formula that goes into the U.N. regular budget, even countries that have very large GDP get a substantial discount when there is a low per capita income, and that is the impact you are seeing that results in China’s payment is a substantial discount from the fact that their per capita income is quite low. We have said repeatedly that we need to revisit that formula. And when the U.N. scale——

Mr. DELAHUNT. And what have they said repeatedly in response?

Ms. SILVERBERG. Well, it has been interesting because when we debated the scale of assessments about a year ago, we did a couple of things. We joined some Japanese proposals to try to revisit the
scale, including a Japanese proposal to create a floor for permanent members, and that was directed not only at China and Russia, but directed at any new permanent member who could be added to the Security Council in the future. And as you know, there are a number of countries aspiring to eventual permanent membership. Most of those countries have said—the countries like Brazil, for example, have said they would be quite happy to assume responsibility for a floor. We have not heard that from the Chinas and the Russias, the existing permanent members.

We also made a pitch for revisiting the way that the formulas—equations like purchasing power parity, so other kinds of things that could redo the formula in a fairer way. Ultimately what we ended up with was something very close to the preexisting scale.

That was both—it was disappointing that we didn’t get an improvement in the scale, but the one very good thing about it was that we held onto the U.S. cap on assessments, and that is essential because the one—the biggest equity we have in the entire debate was making sure that the cap on the U.S. payments wasn’t lifted. So I think having that debate about a year ago was both sort of success and defeat at the same time. I think my successor will certainly want to make another run at it when this comes up again in 2 years.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I appreciate your answer, but that doesn’t in any way alleviate my frustration. And I am sure I speak for the gentleman from California, because it is galling for the American people to understand that again, despite the fact that it is a bargain, at least from my perspective, that there is an inequity that just jumps out from these countries, particularly with dynamic economies that are occurring. And our inability to really track, if you will—maybe we should look for different criteria, like trade deficits, or maybe national indebtedness. I mean, there is a placard out of some offices here that say, your debt is now $9.4–9.5 trillion. Maybe the Chinese might forgive us some of the debt that we owed them.

I don’t mean to be facetious, but I am. But it is something that I don’t know whether there has been any utilization of Congress in terms of in an appropriate way, in a respectful way being involved in these discussions, because if the world is vested in the United Nations, there comes a point in time when those of us who support the U.N. because we see it as a useful tool for international peace and stability and serves American interests, particularly national security interests, so well that we don’t want to put it at risk because there are some in this Congress, in this building, in fact, that would just as soon see the United Nations disappear, and I think that that would be indeed unfortunate.

Let me ask you this question: There are currently 17 nations or 17 venues where peacekeeping operations that were supported by the U.S. are underway. Has the administration changed its mind on any of them, or do you still continue to support operations? For example, in Lebanon. My friend—and he is my friend—and I have a very wide divergent perspective on the usefulness of those blue helmets between Israel and Lebanon. And I would submit, if they weren’t there, the potential to drag Israel and the entire region into a conflagration, very real, that would implicate the United
States in a very tangible way, even to the point of some sort of overt military engagement that would be far in excess of what we contribute in terms of assessments even at this unfair rate of 26 percent.

Do you regret supporting the peacekeeping operation in Lebanon, or Haiti for that matter?

Ms. SILVERBERG. I think——

Mr. DELAHUNT. Because my own sense is—let me just give a little speech here while I am on a roll.

You know, I think that we would be hearing a response from particularly members in south Florida if there were flotillas of Haitians fleeing the violence in Haiti coming to the shores of Miami and Fort Lauderdale, Boca Raton, Palm Beach, maybe even they would get to California. But the point is, again, not to be facetious, but these really impact the United States in ways that have the potential to be far more costly than what we contribute to the United Nations in terms of peacekeeping operations.

Does the Bush administration have any regrets about these decisions that they made to support these operations? And it is unusual that I am supporting the Bush administration, so take advantage of it.

Ms. SILVERBERG. We will take it.

We don’t regret. We continue to support both MINUSTAH and UNIFIL, and I can talk in more detail about our reason for that. But our policy has certainly evolved with respect to some of the peacekeeping missions either because of changes on the ground, or changes in the way the mission operates.

And so just to give you a couple of examples, the UNMEE, the mission that sits on the border of Ethiopia and Eritrea, has had its mobility severely restricted by the fact that the Eritrean Government has prevented it from buying fuel. This has meant that it has had to draw down the forces, moving them into Ethiopia. It is effectively operating really as a pretty weak observer mission at this point. So we think a strong case can be made for drawing that mission out completely. And we will replace it with a political mission or purely an observer force, and that is a discussion that is ongoing with the Secretary General right now.

The mission in Kosovo is another one where the fact that we are now in the process of moving from UNMIK U.N. force to replace it with some European-led missions. We are in the process of—that transition is, we hope, going to begin over time. So those are clear cases where basically conditions have changed.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right. And I understand that none of these are static. Hopefully they are not static, and hopefully the dynamic goes in a way that we find ourselves dealing with improving conditions, and that these missions can be closed. But, I mean, out of the 17 that are currently in existence, you just described two. Are there any others that we can look forward to in terms of changing their mission because of success, or because we are simply throwing our hands up? Like you describe a situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea that—what do we do now?

Ms. SILVERBERG. I think Liberia is a possible example of a place where——

Mr. DELAHUNT. Success.
Ms. SILVERBERG. This is a genuine U.N. success story. When you think back on 2002, we had our marines off the coast, Charles Taylor running loose, and where we are now, having had successful elections, Charles Taylor in The Hague. We are at the point where the Secretary General recommended and the Security Council accepted a drawdown between now and August of about 2,450 troops, and that is the kind of thing that the Security Council was comfortable could happen safely and without compromising Liberia’s security. So that is an example of where we can see a successful transition.

We have many, many cases, too many cases of the ones you have mentioned, where we called them the long-standing legacy missions, places like Cyprus or Western Sahara, where the mission can sometimes operate as an excuse for a failure to move on the political process, where sometimes the very stability that is essential and created by the peacekeeping mission is the same reason it keeps the parties from dealing with the underlying problem. So we hope, for example, in Cyprus that this recent meeting has basically created an open—a window for us to explore an underlying political agreement. We have had the same thing with Western Sahara. We have had a series of meetings between the Moroccans and the POLISARIO which we hope will create an opening, but they are both longer-term efforts.

Mr. DELAHUNT. If the United Nations did not have a presence in these 17 places, in your experience in the White House and your experience in the Department of State, is it fair to say there would be pressures in some of those instances for American military involvement?

Ms. SILVERBERG. I think——

Mr. DELAHUNT. Whether we would or not would be a decision that obviously would be made by the United States Congress. But would there be pressures that would be brought to bear?

Ms. SILVERBERG. I think undoubtedly. And obviously we have pressure sometimes when there is—for example, in Darfur, obviously a lot of questions have been raised about the adequacy of our U.N.-based strategy with respect to that. So I think it is clear. I very much share the view that the U.N. peacekeeping operations, when they are done the right way, can be a cost-effective way of addressing these lower-level conflicts, which reserves the U.S. military for the things that it is meant to do, namely the high-intensity conflicts, the things that no one else can do. Now, the rub, of course, is when U.N. peacekeeping operations are done the right way, and that is in enormously complicated cases, as I think you know, as Darfur illustrates.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right. But again, let me reiterate what I had alluded to earlier is that in terms of numbers of United States military personnel, if full deployment occurs in Darfur, there is 140,000, and there is 313 American military and police personnel out of that number. In addition, the GAO report that was commissioned by myself and Congressman Rohrabacher indicated a savings of a multiplier of eight. I conclude that that is a pretty good bargain. What I can take—or when we can take U.S. military out of harm’s way and, as you say, save them for those missions that require that level of expertise, the high intensity, I think that was
your term, high-intensity situations, that the investment, to put it in the colloquial, is a good bargain. Would you agree?

Ms. SILVERBERG. I agree with that. I think it can be. And I think the trick is making sure that we deploy, and we have learned a lot of lessons about how U.N. peacekeeping can and doesn’t work.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And we have learned a lot of lessons in the past 5 years in Iraq as well.

Ms. SILVERBERG. I hope we are learning lessons all the time in every case. But I think with respect to U.N. peacekeeping, what it has helped us to do is figure out when deployment of a peacekeeping mission is appropriate and likely to succeed and when it really is not a good alternative.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Secretary.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Madam Secretary, I am looking at one of the issues we have been talking about today is whether or not the United States is getting the credit that it deserves for the commitment that we are making around the world, and creating peace and stability, and at times doing the jobs that the U.N. is supposed to be doing, actually doing part of the U.N.’s job, and then not getting credit for even that because our forces, the pay we give our forces, isn’t even counted in the same way that other countries have—the pay for their forces are accounted for.

I have been noticing in the document, it says here that ranking of uniformed personnel to U.N. peacekeeping as of 2008, February 29, says the United States is way down there at 43, and we only have 313 military personnel. And then I notice here on the next line it says about keeping—personal peacekeeping. It says here that in Kosovo we only have 214 people because it says, United States personnel under U.N. control and only 214.

Now, I happen to have visited Kosovo recently. I think I saw more than 214 people there who were Americans in uniform. I guess they don’t count. No, they don’t. None of the statistics, none of what we are giving counts those people because we have not—we have an American military unit of 1,500 people who have been there for 10 years, yet that does not count as part of the statistics of what we are giving to the United Nations peacekeeping.

Now, are those people not or are they not a major contribution by the United States of America to a peacekeeping operation that was sanctioned by the United Nations and we are getting no credit whatsoever? And when they say we are behind in our payments, that is not even taken into consideration at all, and that is just one example.

Ms. SILVERBERG. I think actually similar analogous examples can be drawn across a range of issues. On the security side, you can think of examples like Afghanistan where the United States contribution on both the security, humanitarian, development side is so extraordinary. When we look at the way the U.N. assesses development contributions, we frequently get this pressure about .7 percent have we contributed—does our national budget provide .7 percent of GDP toward development? And it always excludes the substantial private sector—it neglects the fact that the U.S. is a private economy, and it neglects all of the private sector investments
and things like the Gates Foundation and the many other important foundations that do work on the development side.

And so I think sometimes the U.N., like many large institutions, has a tendency to be U.N.-centric, to think that only things that revolve around the U.N. itself are worth mentioning.

Mr. Rohrabacher. Don't count. Those 1,500 troops don't count because they are not under direct U.N. control even though it is part of a U.N. peacekeeping operation.

Mr. Delahunt. Would my friend yield for just a moment?

Mr. Rohrabacher. Sure.

Mr. Delahunt. I haven't noted anywhere in any of the United States reports giving credit to the U.N. in terms of their role in Afghanistan or their role in Iraq. Now, I am willing to give credit to those 1,500 American soldiers in Kosovo. I think they have played a key role. But I think what we have got to focus on is there are other nations other than the United States; for example, in Afghanistan there is NATO, there is a role for the U.N. And no one is denying credit to the United States military for their role. The question is—at least I would suggest—is the efficacy of the U.N. role doesn't play an appropriate—isn't an appropriate piece, if you will, of the overall resolution.

Mr. Rohrabacher. I am reclaiming my time. I think that is valid, and we have to understand where we are going to place our emphasis on solving problems. And my suggestion is that it is very misplaced to put them in an organization whose, some might say, board of directors are made up of numerous countries that are, you know, worldwide crooks, and gangsters, and murderers, and such.

But let me—just to put this a little bit in perspective of why I have come to my world view that it is not effective to put our money through the United Nations as compared to just doing things directly ourselves or helping people in the private sector, giving them incentives to do things. When I was a young man, I left—I was leaving Vietnam and going into Bangkok on an airplane after spending about 2 months up in the highlands—and actually, more like a month. And I met an American on the airplane, and he said, "Oh, an American young person." I was not in the military at the time. I was not pretending to be in the military. I was doing other things there. But anyway, he said, "We would like you to come to our house. I work for UNICEF. Come to my house for a dinner as an American there in Bangkok."

When he got off the plane, his driver and car picked us up, and we went to his house. And his wife did, in fact, cook a wonderful American meal for us, which we had not had for a long time. And my buddy and I really appreciated it.

In the middle of the meal, he said, oh—and by the way, had he a beautiful house there in Bangkok. He had a driver, and a housekeeper, and he had a cook. And I think—I just got the feeling it all came as part of his price tag for being the UNICEF guy there. And then he said, "God, you know, we don't have enough to drink here. Come with me in the garage." So we went out in the garage, and the garage was stacked with boxes, and all the boxes had UNICEF books, children's books, stamped on the side. And he grabbed one down and he opened it up, and it was filled with whisky bottles.
And that is my first real interaction with the United Nations when I was 19. It left a vivid memory to me of the opulence in which that person was living, which obviously was part of the price tag that we are claiming to have been helping the people of Thailand when, in fact, that person was eating up almost I don't know what share of the money, and then all of these children's books turned out to be bottles of whisky.

Now, I should not say that that is what all U.N. things are. I am not saying that. But we do know that UNICEF became so corrupt—and correct me if I am wrong—that the United States actually stepped away and said, We are not going to fund this until you have reforms. And then refused to actually reform it for years.

Ms. Silverberg. That was UNESCO, actually. Yes, that was the——

Mr. Rohrabacher. UNESCO. Now, that is why we are looking at United Nations organizations. You have to look very skeptically by saying, oh, they are spending this much money to creating change. How wonderful it is. And when you look at what is coming out at the other end, well, quite often it is not—it is just the same effectiveness as huge bureaucratic organizations can be, especially huge bureaucratic organizations that are being run by board of directors that have dictatorialships in the board of directors.

Let's get back to this, to an example that you were giving in Ethiopia and Eritrea, about the successful mission there. I would suggest that the presence of U.N. troops at the border of Ethiopia and Eritrea has given the United States Government, this administration—now, note very closely that this is criticism of this administration, but it is typical of what will happen. So we have the U.N. troops on the border there. That is not the solution. The solution is coming to a conclusion of the dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia, but this administration has chosen a diplomatic path that totally undercuts the solution to the problem between Ethiopia and Eritrea. It is a total failure. In fact, it is such a failure that it will—that the policies that have been laid down between Ethiopia and Eritrea on this border dispute will sow the seeds of chaos throughout the rest of Africa for probably 10 years, because what we did is undercut what was supposed to be a decision that could be made by arbitration, and then once again in Ethiopia, we cut a deal with the Ethiopians to negate that arbitration, which negates our whole policy of trying to solve problems through negotiation. But you know what? The U.N. troops on the border permitted us to do that because now we can just say, ah, you see, there is conflict there. It is the U.N. It can help us out so much. No. At times U.N. troops actually give us leverage to make wrong decisions so that it is the presence of troops rather than the solution to problems that we focus our energy on.

Do you want to comment on that?

Ms. Silverberg. Sure. There are people in that department who could give you a much better explanation of the history of the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, but your general principle that sometimes peacekeeping operations can operate as an excuse for inaction on the political side is absolutely one I share. I don't think that is what we attempted to do in this case, at least not in recent years. You will recall that this is——
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think that we took advantage of the fact that it was there. And if it wouldn't have been there, we would have been much more inclined for—let us get this problem solved by having this arbitration accepted. And the U.N. troops only gave us an out that we shouldn’t have had.

Ms. SILVERBERG. But remember, Congressman, that we forced very much this question of delineation, and the fact that it is exactly to avoid the problem you are describing is the reason why we started this discussion of whether it is time to replace this peacekeeping mission, exactly because we want to avoid the situation where we have an unwillingness to move on the political situation, and obstinance by one of the sides in terms of actually allowing the peacekeeping mission to do its work is why we started this discussion. So it is actually a danger, but one we are trying very carefully to avoid.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So to interpret that, what we are really saying is that peacekeeping missions are not just one-dimensional; well, they are making a really great contribution by being present. At times, a presence of a peacekeeping mission can actually prevent a long-term solution for being met by the players that they are there to hold apart. Now, that may well be what has happened among the beloved peacekeepers of Lebanon. Now, could it be that Israel may have reached some compromises, and the people on the other side may have reached some compromises that they didn’t make in these last 20 years because we have had those peacekeepers there? That may well be the situation.

Let me also note that because the——

Mr. DELAHUNT. Would my friend let the Secretary respond to that Israeli-Lebanon hypothesis that you put forward? I am interested to learn whether—if the U.N. peacekeepers weren’t there, whether we could have resolved the dispute between Lebanon, Syria, Hezbollah and Israel.

Ms. SILVERBERG. I think the chairman just hit on the essence of the point that I was going to make, that the problems in Lebanon are not in essence a dispute between the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel. It is a dispute between the Government of Lebanon and what is operating as a private army within Lebanon, Hezbollah; a dispute between the Government of Lebanon and its neighbor, the Government of Syria; a dispute between the Government of Syria and the Government of Israel; the involvement of the Government of Iran. This is a very complicated, multifaceted situation that I think would not have—does not lend itself to easy bilateral negotiations.

I would distinguish between the old UNIFIL, which we agreed was a very weak force and really incapable and unwilling to do some of the things necessary, as we saw with the emergence of conflict, and the new UNIFIL, which doesn’t operate perfectly. And I certainly don’t think it has done everything we had hoped it would do, but it has done a couple of things that are useful. One is to permit the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces to the south for the first time in 40 years, and that really is important because it eliminated this assumption that there were really two Lebanons, the Lebanon that was controlled by the legitimate government and then the Lebanon that was controlled by Hezbollah in the south.
And now for the first time we have a presence of a legitimate government in the south.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How long did that take? We only had U.N. troops there for 35 years?

Ms. SILVERBERG. That is right.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And the new guys are doing so much better than the old guys.

Ms. SILVERBERG. I think there are problems with the new force. And, of course, we have many reports of arms smuggling across the Syrian border. We really worry a lot about Hezbollah reconstituting in the south.

So these are all things we have to continue to work on, both with the Government of Lebanon, which is the ultimate solution to all these—it is a strengthened LAF and a Government of Lebanon that isn’t seized by Syrian-compelled paralysis as it is now—and it is also something we can do with some of our partners, including the European partners. The Germans, as you know, have deployed a pilot program along the border.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me just note that in Lebanon and elsewhere, we are not talking about the blue helmets or nobody. Quite often we are talking about the blue helmets or somebody else. For example, the peacekeepers on this border, maybe these countries would have accepted troops from some other country, not necessarily as part of the U.N., if that option was available to them, instead of us who everyone coming and saying, you are going to get the U.N. operation on this. There are peacekeepers that can be brought into play not just as part of the United Nations. And I might add, those troops may not be representing dictatorships and gangsters’ regimes that have their own agenda that will in some way affect the ability of the troops to do their job.

Now, with that said——

Mr. DELAHUNT. If the ranking member will give Secretary Silverberg an opportunity to tell us what options were available, what countries were knocking on the White House door to get their troops in the middle of the border between Lebanon and Israel.

Ms. SILVERBERG. Well, I think it is an important point, and it is an option we use on a number of occasions. For example, we had a European force deploying under European command but with the Security Council mandate, Security Council approval in Chad.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But what happened in Lebanon? We are focusing on Lebanon.

Ms. SILVERBERG. In Lebanon——

Mr. DELAHUNT. Is there anybody insisting on they wanted us to go rather than the U.N.?

Ms. SILVERBERG. No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DELAHUNT. This force that my friend is looking for, I wish we could find it, because I think I would agree with him. But I just don’t see people rushing up to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue saying, “Please, let us in.” Would the administration have considered putting American troops in there?

Ms. SILVERBERG. I think the other options we considered at the time—and I guess the point I should make first is to remember that the troops constituting UNIFIL today under the U.N. force are the same troops who we likely would have turned to under that
other option. The largest troop contributors in the UNIFIL are the French and Italians. So very serious militaries with—and with very serious force commanders. We explored at the time the option of a European force that deployed not under the U.N. command, but it was the preference of the Europeans and the Lebanese for this kind of arrangement that led us ultimately to this.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But the Europeans have helped.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Reclaiming my time. What we are talking about here is there is NATO, and there are other options of alliances that can be created for these things. And let us note that there have been recent reports now of the new U.N. force on the Lebanon border leaking information and having a very questionable relationship with Hezbollah.

So let us—in other words, I guess what I am trying—the point I am trying to make is that it is very easy to paint the United Nations in these grandiose, idealistic terms as if it is an organization that, like the Olympics, stands for something higher in humankind. But you have got to—but in the reality of the situation, the United Nations has great flaws that limit what it can do and especially for America’s national interest, but also in the cause of international peace. That is just what I believe in. I appreciate the opportunity to have this grand exchange of ideas.

Mr. DELAHUNT. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Chris Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for letting me sit in on this hearing. I am not a member of this subcommittee, but I am certainly very interested in these issues and was once chair of this subcommittee, as you know.

I have just a couple of questions. Secretary Silverberg, welcome to the committee. In the last Congress I chaired two hearings on the very despicable exploitation of young girls, mostly young girls, in the DR Congo. I was in DR Congo in January and visited places where many of these women have been given their lives back, where they have had fistular repairs, where they have been able to get psychological and spiritual counseling. But to hear them tell their stories of exploitation by troops, some of whom may or may not have been U.N. troops—but we know some of the young girls who were exploited, particularly a few years ago, were exploited by U.N.-deployed troops—was just very, very difficult to listen to and to hear and to see the pain in their faces.

We had had Jane Holl Lute testify at those hearings. She did a great job. She is very impressive, and I believe she believes passionately in zero tolerance, meaning exactly that, zero tolerance in implementation. And she has got a record of a number of peacekeepers and police that have been repatriated; they have been dismissed, many individuals. So she has established a record of follow-through that is real and tangible and, I think, impressive.

But I was very concerned to learn on that trip that the Office of Internal Oversight Services was going to be relocated to Nairobi, and, when talking to a number of the OIOS individuals in Goma, they told me that this is a plan that was designed to fail; that without immediate ongoing proximity to victims as well as the accessibility to the command structure, that doing investigations from Nairobi on trips back and forth would prove to be fruitless. As a
matter of fact, one of the OIOS individuals told me that they—even with their proximity to those commands—were getting very little cooperation on a day-to-day basis. You know, the troops, the commands, were kind of saying, “Not here, not on our watch,” which doesn’t help the victims.

I had heard that some 18 positions were going to be cut. This would be implemented by July. I immediately called Ambassador Lagon and asked him to make an increase. I called him from Goma, and I have been back and forth with him. But I wondered if you might update us where we stand on ensuring that that deployment stays on the ground; otherwise we will be back here, Mr. Chairman, as we were with those hearings, trying to ascertain why these troops are raping 13-year-olds and going unpunished.

Secondly, everywhere I go I ask about the training modules. What is actually being imparted or taught to these troops before deployment? I was recently in Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro and talked to some of the NGOs that actually do the training, and frankly, the meeting was not overly impressive. When I met with AU leaders, the African Union leaders, in Ethiopia, I asked, “What are the peacekeepers in Darfur being taught? Where is the package? Let me take a look at it.” And I was not overwhelmed by what I saw there either. Who handles that? Nobody seemed to know. And I wonder if that has changed.

Those Brazilians, as I mentioned, are already in Haiti. If they get 1 hour or 2 hours, is that enough? It seems to me that that training has to be very real.

And then finally on the peacekeeping issue in connection with trafficking, when people are repatriated back to their home country, what is done? I hear the Sri Lankans are making very strong statements that they will prosecute and take very strong actions against those who commit crimes. Sitting behind you is Joseph Rees, who was one of the chief architects of TVPA of 2000 and did a magnificent job on that legislation. The new law that went into effect this January does hold to account the peacekeepers and whether or not there are prosecutions. However, when talking to some of our Foreign Service people, they were unaware that this new minimum standard now was phased in and is effective. And so when we look at the Sri Lankans or any of the others upon repatriation, will our data clause now be such that we capture that information? What happens when Joe goes back to Sri Lanka? Is he or she—but most of them are hes, obviously—is he prosecuted? Is he jailed as a result of abusing little kids or women in the country where he had been put?

So, if you could touch on those, I would appreciate it.

Ms. SILVERBERG. Well, thank you very much.

Ambassador Lagon passed on the OIOS messages so that we could raise it in New York. And as you know, OIOS has said that they want to create these regional hubs in essence for staffing and budget reasons.

I think the idea of regional hubs can work in some context. In some cases that may be an effective use to make sure—as long as we make sure we can get rapid—sort of whenever there is an allegation, OIOS is on the ground quickly.
I think you raise an important point with respect to motives specifically because of the history we have seen with sexual exploitation with this mission, the complexity of oversight. I think you raise a very important point. And so it is one we are raising with New York very assertively, and I hope to keep you posted on that.

With Brasilia, the same concern has been raised that we have now these training materials. We know they have been distributed, but we don't have the kinds of mechanisms in place at the U.N. that can tell us basically the results-based testing to make sure that they have actually been reviewed. And so, yes, I think that is an important point and one that Ambassador Rees has raised as well.

And finally, on the repatriation point, it is very useful that our TIP reports will now include the extraterritorial abuses; so not just trafficking within a country's borders, but the kinds of evidence we see of things that a country's military or troop contributions might do outside their borders. That is incredibly useful in terms of our keeping pressure on governments, because with sexual exploitation the one fundamental point is how a government is—whether governments accept impunity for their own forces, or whether they are prepared to take action. And that is something that we, the U.S. Government, have to follow on a case-by-case basis, follow up every time we have an allegation, with the ambassador in a country, with my counterparts to say, “We are taking these seriously, and we hope you do, too.” But that is something that literally has to be handled on a one-off basis every single time to make sure there is follow-up, because left to their own devices, many countries will sweep it under the rug and move on.

One thing I that I think the U.N. is doing that is useful in this regard is collecting a database to prevent—at least to prevent troops from recycling through missions after they have been repatriated following allegations.

Mr. SMITH. Again, the OIOS, will that deployment stay intact? Are you optimistic? It seems to me we will be right back here. With the investigators, I found a team of people who really put the victim first and don't care if the blue code is violated in some way because—not blue helmet, but very often with the police—wherever the evidence leads, they are willing to go, regardless of who is embarrassed by it, and I was very impressed with by that.

And the people who mandate and are the leaders of it, Michael Michel, the former Mountie from Canada, had 25 years of experience. This is the kind of person you want there and not to lose in the system because he is a trained investigator who knows what to look for and what questions to ask. So I am very fearful of losing those kinds of people as well while we are in this state of flux, of whether it continues or not. It would appear to me it is not going to continue, so I am very concerned about that.

Ms. SILVERBERG. We are working on it, and I commit to keep you posted on the success we have.

Mr. SMITH. And just for the record, January 10 is when the section of the minimum standards went into effect. And while I visited a few countries close to January 10, I raised it with every human rights officer and others that I meet, and virtually every one of them tells me they didn’t know about it. So I hope that can change.
And I am sure it will as we get the data and the information flows back for the TIP report. But the sooner they know about it, the more they can let the countries that they work with know about it.

Finally, the issue on the Human Rights Council, if I could. The Human Rights Commission, as we all know, was a hypocritical exercise. I routinely would go over to Geneva to be a part of it and found that it was one big Israeli-bashing episode. Israel was singled out. China would escape all notice, escape year in and year out, despite the fact that the one-child-per-couple policy has led to genocide; 100 million missing girls in China who are targeted for destruction simply because they are girls as part of the one-child-per-couple policy. All of what they are doing with the Falun Gong, the Uighurs and everyone else, and yet China gets off scot-free. Israel is in the cross-hairs every single year. And now the Human Rights Council is supposedly going to be the replacement, and the reform turns out to be “déjà vu,” as Yogi Berra said, “all over again,” the same old, same old.

As you know, in the State Department foreign ops bill, there was legislation to defund the Human Rights Council. There was a waiver authority, and I am wondering what is being done to send that clear message that we are tired of the hypocrisy, we are tired of human rights being a game that rogue nations play to the detriment of the victims. So I wonder what the situation is on that.

Ms. SILVERBERG. Thank you. If anything, I think you are being too charitable. I think the Human Rights Council is worse than its predecessor. In a number of respects, it is weaker. It eliminated the mandates for countries like Belarus and Cuba. It really gave those governments a victory, an undeserved. It has increased, if anything, the focus on Israel bashing. It has passed some weak resolutions with respect to Sudan, a few resolutions with respect to Burma, but hasn’t done anything on Belarus, or Zimbabwe, or North Korea, or many of the governments where there is a compelling human rights case, where the people of those countries are depending on the United Nations to take effective action.

As a result, we will be withholding our funding this year for the Human Rights Council, our U.S. share of the Human Rights Council, and also for Durban. The Durban conference, which you will recall was a horrifying example of anti-Semitism, which we walked out of, which has now become a U.N. body to be administered by the Human Rights Council. So we will be withholding the U.S. share of funding for both.

Mr. SMITH. Will we also not be participating?

Ms. SILVERBERG. We have not been participating in Durban. The prep com started in August, and starting in that, we and Israel both adopted the practice of sending a note taker. So we have a junior officer sitting in the back of the room taking notes. We don’t have anyone appearing for the U.S. And the Secretary has said basically that she—we think there is no—absolutely no case to be made for participating in something that is going to be a repeat of Durban I. We don’t have any confidence that this will be any better than Durban I, and so we and the Israelis have taken, I think, a similar position on this.

Mr. SMITH. And I appreciate that.
And as you know, Madam Chair, the Canadian Government, to the best of my knowledge, has already taken the position of not participating, and I think the U.N. needs to know that Hate Fest II will not be wittingly or unwittingly supported by the U.S. Government, I am very glad to hear about those actions and applaud the Bush administration for its leadership on anti-Semitism in general, its support for Israel and for its work on this—leading up to this, what could be another hate fest.

Ms. SILVERBERG. Thank you, Congressman.

Just on that point, I think we have tried to applaud the Canadian Government’s efforts on a range of issues relating to the fair treatment of Israel at the United Nations.

Ms. JACKSON LEE [presiding]. Let me thank our colleague for his instructive and certainly insightful questioning. Let me pick up where he left off and just have one brief question. And I know that you have been very diligent.

I do, on behalf of Chairman Delahunt for which I am acting, thank Jane Holl Lute, who was here on behalf of the United Nations for the briefing, and certainly, Secretary Silverberg, we are grateful for the time that you have spent here.

I think it is important to explore Durban II, and what I would ask, and I think our colleague has made some instructive points, it is some years later, and I happen to have been at Durban I. And so not knowing where we might ultimately move to, I think the idea of human rights, that is what it should be about is human rights and certainly promoting rights and not denouncing others. Did I hear you say that you were thinking about it or were not participating? I didn’t get your correct comment.

Ms. SILVERBERG. The Durban prep com started in August. We are not participating, and I think there is no argument or suggestion or discussion of changing that policy underway in the administration. I think it is very unlikely that that policy would change. Obviously if there was some dramatic change that absolutely assured us and our allies that this would not be a repeat of Durban I, we would take that seriously.

And I think in that respect, we very much share the views of Foreign Minister Livni, who made an announcement in this regard. She said, “We will not participate in Durban unless it can be proven that it will not be a repeat of Durban I.” And I think that is, in essence, the Secretary’s view as well.

So again, I don’t want to shut the door against any decisions by member states to make this a much better conference. We would welcome that. We just don’t see much evidence that that is where it is headed right now. And the leadership of some of the bad actors in the U.N., in the Durban conference, its association with the Human Rights Council, which, of course, is engaged in Israel-bashing, also doesn’t give us lot of hope or optimism.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, I know that—I am speaking for my colleague Congressman Smith—that it would be a great day and a great deal of sunshine if things could change. But I know that we will be engaged with you and the State Department if there was this movement that I still believe is possible, but in any event to
make this what it should be. It certainly is needed. So if you keep that door open for that discussion, we would appreciate it.

I want to just go straight to—I know that there has been some discussion about Darfur, but I wanted to go to Southern Sudan and your assessment of the U.N.’s activities, period. We have not touched on my specific question, and that is, are we still stalled with peacekeeping troops in Sudan? If you have answered, you can do it quickly. I was there in August, and my last word was it was a land problem. So I just want to know, has the U.N. improved its linkage in terms of Darfur? And also, have they done anything about Southern Sudan, which I understand may be crumbling as we speak?

Ms. Silverberg. We have now about 9,200 troops on the ground and then about 1,300 civilians. But that is much lower—

Ms. Jackson Lee. And this is African Union—this is under the U.N., or this is not United States troops obviously.

Ms. Silverberg. I am sorry. The U.N.–AU hybrid mission has about 9,200 troops on the ground and about 1,300 civilians. That is not where we had hoped to be at this point. We had hoped to have a much larger——

Ms. Jackson Lee. Twenty-six thousand is what I thought we wanted to be at, somewhere around there.

Ms. Silverberg. Yes, ma’am. Twenty-six thousand is the full deployment, and it looks at this point like we won’t be there even by the end of this year. We think we might be able to get to about 17,000 by the end of the year. But again, this is much—moving much more slowly than we hoped, and I think there are a lot of reasons for that.

I think, one, obstruction of the Government of Sudan has been part of it. And we have seen everything from objections to some of the troop contributors, particularly the Thai and Nepali contributions; we have seen some administrative obstacles; the issue you referenced in terms of land use surveys, delay in granting visas and other things. And then we have seen also some very serious cases. At one point the Sudanese armed forces opened fire on a U.N. supply convoy, and that, of course, is the kind of thing that spooks troop contributors very seriously.

We have also had, I think, some sluggishness at DPKO, and that involved mostly administrative—concerning the U.N., and it involves mostly administrative issues relating to contracting. So, for example, we have a number of troop contributors who are prepared to deploy, but don’t have the capacity in place to be self-sustaining for a long period of time. And we want the U.N. to use all of its existing contracting authorities to take care of that situation, to do contracts that can basically ensure that these countries are self-sustaining, and they have been reluctant to do that.

So some of it is working through—you know, I think maybe the most straightforward way of saying it is that the U.N. is using the rule that applies to standard peacekeeping operations, but this peacekeeping operation is a hybrid. It is unprecedented in that regard, and we need to create a new rulebook and one that can allow for very rapid and aggressive deployment.

And then the other major problem has been the failure of the international community. And I think everyone bears some respon-
sibility for this in failing to come up with some of the resources this mission needs, and particularly helicopters, heavy transport and some of the other important equipment that can ensure mobility of the force, which is essential when we are talking about an area the size of the Darfur and a troop level of even at 26,000. That is obviously not enough to cover this entire area unless we have more mobility.

So I think there are a lot of reasons for this slow deployment. I think we are now at a point where we are hoping this will move more quickly, and the special envoy Rich Williamson has set a goal that we deploy 3,600 new African troops by June. That would be made up of Ethiopian, Egyptian and Rwandan troops. And my colleagues in AF are working very closely with each of those governments to make sure they have the resources they need, using the money that Congress appropriated both in 2007, 2008 to support their efforts to deploy quickly.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Ethiopian, Egyptian and Rwanda——

Ms. SILVERBERG. Ethiopian, Egyptian and Rwandan.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And we have handled the apprehension regarding Ethiopian troops. We have handled the sensitivity to Ethiopian troops. They have been stalwarts in certainly helping across Africa, but that has been resolved?

Ms. SILVERBERG. It has. They accepted these contributions. The Egyptian troops are fairly ready to deploy without our assistance, but both Ethiopian and Rwanda, AF has been providing a lot of bilateral support.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Is there any efforts by the U.N. to be engaged in Southern Sudan?

Ms. SILVERBERG. Of course we have the existing mission employed in Southern Sudan. There was a recent rollover of that mission. So generally that mission is deployed and functioning.

I think the issue which AF is much more qualified to talk about is what do we do to shore up the CPA, and as we move to this important period where we have eventually the referendum, so a census and then elections and referendum, what are we doing to support that process, and that is something that I leave to people a lot smarter than I am.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I will pursue it with them. And let me express frustration, but certainly recognition that there is some movement as relates to Darfur. We have been trying for such a long period of time, and we continue to hear that the Sudanese Government remains obstructionist. So I hope that the State Department will be diligent and a constant reminder and really insistence on the U.N. and also the Sudanese Government, albeit the relationship we had when I was there and shortly thereafter, unfortunately through accident or otherwise one of our public servants, international public servants, lost his life. And it is not a pleasant place. It is very difficult to get a visa for Members of Congress trying to be fact-finders. We spent a good deal of our time trying to do so. I have our delegation that I led did get that visa, but others have tried to go in to be of assistance, to be fact-finding.

So I think as strong as the State Department can be, and as strong as it can be as it relates to the U.N., that this is not the occasion to be soft-shoed, if you will, and if we are going to make
this work, they have got to show some elbow grease and a little bit of sternness. And I guess our international neighbors likewise have to join in, because people are still dying, as they are in other places around the world, but they are still dying, and it seems like that is an area that we can at least come to some level of stability.

Let me thank the witness and thank the previous briefer, and hearing no further questions to be asked or answered, this hearing of the International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight Subcommittee and briefing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]