Indigenous Police Forces in Counterinsurgency

A Monograph
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**ABSTRACT**

Given the importance of security force assistance in an era of persistent conflict and the need for counterinsurgency operations, what makes indigenous police forces effective in counterinsurgency? This monograph proposes that, if the Army faces an era of persistent conflict and chooses to assist indigenous forces, then paramilitary organization and U.S. military leadership make for effective indigenous police in counterinsurgency operations. To test the hypothesis, this study explores two related areas. The paper begins with an analysis of several cases to analyze what type of organization makes for effective indigenous police in counterinsurgency operations. It continues with an analysis of who should lead the effort to effective indigenous police during counterinsurgency operations. Case research indicates that indigenous police are most effective in counterinsurgency efforts when structured along paramilitary lines. Analysis of these cases suggests that paramilitary police forces are survivable and effective against insurgent elements. Exploration into cases in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate how civilian government agencies are challenged to lead efforts contributing to effective local police forces during counterinsurgency. The research indicates the military is better able to lead efforts to make effective indigenous police for counterinsurgency operations. Based on the research, the monograph provides recommendations. First, establish paramilitary police organizations in Iraq and Afghanistan resembling the successful Philippine Constabulary. Second, expand Army doctrine to greater cover host-nation paramilitary force employment. Third, amend the Foreign Assistance Act to allow the military to lead indigenous police support efforts during counterinsurgency conflicts. Fourth, establish a centralized agency with definite lines of authority over indigenous police assistance in peacetime versus the current course of confused interagency effort. Fifth, and last, improve the vetting of contractors for government employment. The monograph also provides recommendations for further research to address indigenous police corruption, paramilitary transition to a traditional police structure, and the application of the community-oriented policing philosophy.

**SUBJECT TERMS**

Indigenous Police, Host-Nation Police, Training Indigenous Police, Counterinsurgency, Paramilitary, Constabulary
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement).
Abstract

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Organization of Indigenous Police in Counterinsurgency Operations</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The British Organization of Indigenous Police in Malaya</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Host-Nation Police Support in the Philippines</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct American Police Intervention in Post-World War II Germany</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The American Construction of Local Police Units in Palestine</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Agencies, The Military, and Effective Indigenous Police in Counterinsurgency</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting Indigenous Police in Iraq</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host-Nation Police Support in Afghanistan</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Lessons: The Need for Leadership in Unity of Effort</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations for U.S. Government Action</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areas for Further Research</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

“It’s inconceivable, but in fact for eight years we weren’t training the police,” replied Caldwell, taking part in the meeting via video link from Afghanistan. “We just never trained them before. All we did was give them a uniform.” The President looked stunned. “Eight years,” he said. “And we didn’t train the police? It’s mind boggling.” The room was silent.¹

In early February 2004, an Army captain made the long, four-day convoy from Kuwait north through Baghdad to the city of Kirkuk, Iraq. Upon his arrival, he prepared to provide his light infantry battalion with the fire support required given his traditional artillery role. However, he additionally served as the liaison to the Kirkuk Provincial Police Department. The liaison task soon evolved into a full advisory effort. The advisory effort required this officer to lead not only his team of 10 ad-hoc advisors, but also 18 international police advisors under contract with the U.S. Department of State. The captain worked with his battalion and brigade leadership to supervise, lead, train, and equip about 3,500 Iraqi Police officers in the city of Kirkuk.

This advisory effort restructured the Kirkuk Provincial Police Department, pushed for increased patrolling and community engagement, and generally sought the improvement of security for the city. However, during the growing advisory effort, the captain saw many Iraqi Police officers killed and wounded. The insurgents killed the police officers in small groups of two or three, as well as in their homes with their families. The occasional vehicle-borne improvised explosive device killed many more officers and wounded scores. Further, the Iraqi Police lacked arms. Typically, the police officers only received one magazine of 5 to 10 rounds for their AK-47 when on duty, and the officers carried no weapon when off duty. Police officers received only one magazine for initial firearms training. Because they were inadequately armed and insufficiently trained to guard against enemy threats on and off duty, Iraqi Police officers proved easy targets for insurgents.

During the relief-in-place, where the current unit in charge hands over all responsibility to
the new incoming unit, the captain learned that a U.S. Army civil affairs team first organized the
Kirkuk Iraqi Police in 2003. This team organized the Kirkuk Police Department based on an
American police model, the Boston Police Department. As such, the Kirkuk Police resembled a
remedial version of a traditional American police department.

The Department of State provided international police advisors to assist the captain’s unit
in developing the police force. However, the contracted advisors provided by the State
Department frequently refused to leave their compound, citing agency restrictions due to the
dangers present. Unfortunately, these restrictions placed on the contracted advisors left the
support effort to the Kirkuk Police Department with the captain, his small team of enlisted
Soldiers, and the infantrymen in his battalion. Because of this deficiency of government support,
the casualty rates of the Kirkuk Police Department were significant in number and the department
faced challenges to survive and effectively provide security in the volatile counterinsurgency
environment.

In light of the history of the Kirkuk Police Department and his personal experiences
conducting operations with the Iraqi Police, the Army captain questioned how the Iraqi Police
were organized and the effectiveness of civilian U.S. government agencies attempting to support
them. The captain in this narrative is the author of this monograph. These concerns form the basis
of and inspiration for the research presented here. Indigenous security forces such as the Iraqi
Police will be essential if the U.S. Army continues the counterinsurgency fight abroad.

Security force assistance to indigenous police is part of the 2006 U.S. National Strategy.
This strategy supports security force assistance as part of a method to provide lasting security for
the American people by bringing the rule of law, the free market economy, and democracy to
other nations. Accompanying the national strategy, the U.S. National Defense Security Strategy
uses security force assistance across the spectrum of conflict to help partner nations police
themselves and collectively confront threats to international order. Implied in using security force
assistance to help other nations in counterinsurgency and other conflicts, is the recognition by the U.S. government that U.S. resources, military or otherwise, are limited, and the host-nation government has an important role to play in their own security and future.²

The current Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General George W. Casey, Jr., supports effective security force assistance in the area of counterinsurgency in a recent speech and in the U.S. Army 2010 Posture Statement. In a September 2007 address to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, General Casey expressed his understanding of the strategic environment and the complex set of security challenges facing the United States. These challenges included the likelihood of “persistent conflict” where governments, other entities, and individuals would use violence to achieve political or social goals. General Casey sees this era extending into the next decade. He includes the counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan as recent situations for the use of force in this era.³

General Casey articulated his view of persistent conflict in the U.S. Army 2010 Posture Statement. In the statement, he also stated the U.S. Army must not only win in its current counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines, but must additionally prepare to win in future protracted counterinsurgency operations. Further, General Casey discussed in the posture statement the requirement that the Army assist other nations in building security capability. This requirement includes increasing the capacity of foreign militaries and police forces to maintain the rule of law and domestic stability while denying terrorists a safe haven to avoid the development of future conflicts.⁴

This importance of indigenous police to counterinsurgency efforts is recognized by theorist David Galula, historian John Nagl, and current U.S. Army doctrine. Galula writes of the primary role of host-nation police forces in his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, calling them the “eye and the arm of the government” in all concerns of state internal order. Galula considers indigenous police a vital aspect in the early stages of counterinsurgency, and the first likely target for infiltration by insurgents. His analysis describes their efficiency in combating insurgent elements in the number of police available, their competency, police loyalty to the host-nation government, and on the support they receive from the other branches of their government.5 John Nagl, in his book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, confirms the importance of local forces in counterinsurgency. Nagl speaks to the inherent advantages those local forces possess. Local forces have knowledge of their own environment, culture, and politics that outsiders simply do not understand.6 The Army Field Manual on counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24, concurs with these authors on host-nation police significance: “The primary frontline counterinsurgency force is often the police - not the military. The primary counterinsurgency objective is to enable local institutions. Therefore, supporting the police is essential.”7 Because of the stated importance, it is appropriate to explore the organization an indigenous police force should use to prove effective in the counterinsurgency fight.

Given the importance of security force assistance in an era of persistent conflict and the need for counterinsurgency operations, what makes indigenous police forces effective in counterinsurgency? This monograph proposes that, if the Army faces an era of persistent conflict and chooses to assist indigenous forces, then paramilitary organization and U.S. military


leadership make for effective indigenous police in counterinsurgency operations. To test the hypothesis, this study will explore two related areas. The paper begins with an analysis of several cases to determine what type of organization makes for effective indigenous police in counterinsurgency operations. It continues with an analysis of who should lead the effort to support indigenous police during counterinsurgency operations.

This work does not address tactical matters associated with advisory assistance, nor does it discuss detailed organizational charts and structure. Instead, it addresses larger operational and strategic matters associated with indigenous police in counterinsurgency, as related to the hypothesis. The monograph uses the terms indigenous police, host-nation police, foreign police, and local police interchangeably. Based on the findings, the monograph provides recommendations for future U.S. government action and areas for further research.

**The Organization of Indigenous Police in Counterinsurgency Operations**

To explore what makes for indigenous police effectiveness in counterinsurgency is to examine the organization the police will take. Many, if not most, police departments have historically armed themselves with either clubs or pistols, and in America the police organization is centered on the patrol officer in his marked patrol car. In recent times, specialized paramilitary units, such as Special Weapons and Tactics Teams, were instituted in the United States to neutralize high intensity threats, such as hostage and terrorist situations. Yet, these are specialized teams within police departments, and the patrolman remains the key figure in protecting life and property, and in preventing and deterring crime.\(^8\)

However, counterinsurgency brings with it a very different and dangerous environment that challenges this type of traditional American police organization centered on the patrolman. While

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the patrolman centered police organization may work fine during peace, another type of police organization may be required during conflict. A force is considered paramilitary if it has a measure of military capability, that is members receive basic military training and firearms. Paramilitary forces are equipped with weaponry and vehicles similar to that of a regular army unit. Professor Alice Hills of the University of Leeds defines the term “paramilitary policing” to describe “…the enforcement activities of armed groups that, while organized on military lines, possessing military-style capabilities or missions, and behaving or looking like soldiers, are not part of a regular military.” For the purpose of this monograph, a paramilitary organization is defined as a group or unit organized along military lines, with basic military training, arms, and general military capability. Additionally Leeds mentions that paramilitary policing is common when threats to internal security are present. This suggests that the situation has a role in police organization.

The environment plays a part in police organization and affects the relationship between the military and host-nation police units. Dr. Erwin Schmidl, a prominent European historian and currently Director of Contemporary History in the Institute of Strategy & Security Policy at the Austrian National Defense Academy in Vienna, views the environment as a driving factor in police organization. In his work, Police Functions in Peace Operations: An Historical Overview, Schmidl discusses the nature of counterinsurgency and security force organization. He writes that in a counterinsurgency environment, militaries tend to adopt police-oriented views because they are facing an unconventional force while police forces tend to take a more military-oriented approach as they work to perform tasks beyond the scope of traditional law enforcement. In

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9 Andrade, xi.
11 Ibid., 216.
essence, both assume a paramilitary posture. This posture during counterinsurgency then dictates a certain relationship between the military and the police.\textsuperscript{12}

Dr. James Corum, Dean of the Baltic Defense College, underscores the importance of the police-military relationship in combating insurgencies in his study on training indigenous forces in counterinsurgency, arguing that the primary role of the military in counterinsurgency campaigns is providing support and personnel for police-type operations.\textsuperscript{13} Likewise, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Cassidy, Ph.D., a fellow at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, feels the use of indigenous forces provides additional manpower and improves the quality of viable intelligence about the enemy and its infrastructure in counterinsurgency operations.\textsuperscript{14} These two authors argue that these ideas are important in identifying the necessary relationship between the military and indigenous police and the organization the police should assume. Historically in counterinsurgency efforts, the local police successfully served as a main force against insurgent elements when they were organized along paramilitary lines and supported by military forces. It is useful to explore historical cases for examples of paramilitary indigenous police contributions to counterinsurgency operations to gain insights into how to organize effective indigenous police units. Therefore, an examination of the use of host-nation forces in Malaya, the Philippines, post-World War II Germany, and Palestine will follow.

**The British Organization of Indigenous Police in Malaya**

During the insurgency in Malaya beginning in 1948, the British military used indigenous police in its counterinsurgency effort. Based on their colonial experience, the British military’s


perspective was that insurgency was principally a police matter and the military provided the needed support to civil authorities. The British initially believed they needed a great number of indigenous police to prevail against the insurgents. This is apparent in the fact that they rapidly expanded the Malayan Police force fivefold to 50,000 from 1948 to 1950 to improve security during the growing insurgency. The British used the Malayan Police as the lead counterinsurgency force. At the same time, the British expanded their own military forces to some 40,000 personnel. This expansion of both indigenous police and British military forces combined to combat a growing and stubborn insurgency during those years.15

Early in the campaign, Malayan Police posts were easy targets for insurgents due to a lack of arms and training. The British recognized that these police posts required strengthening. By 1951, the British converted 40,000 regular Malayan Police into paramilitary Special Constables. Within the Special Constables, 21-man Area Security Units provided food distribution control, and Police Special Squads provided reconnaissance and patrolling capabilities. The British also organized an irregular force called the Home Guard to free the police and army from basic guard duties. Eventually numbering over 200,000, these Home Guards operated in static security units of 35 members and operational units of 12 members that took on a more active role. Like the Special Constables, the Home Guards were a part of the police department. These various paramilitary police units strengthened police posts and patrols and provided not only improved police survivability, but also better security for the population.16

One important feature of the British counterinsurgency effort was the primary role given to the host-nation police from the beginning of the campaign. This effort permitted local authorities to work to impose law and order on their own people. Another was the organization of the Malayan Police along paramilitary lines. This armed and trained the host-nation police for improved effectiveness and survivability. The British constructed 253 platoon-sized Malayan

15 Corum, 5; Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 6-21.
Police jungle patrols. These patrols eventually numbered 3,000 and formed a Police Field Force specially trained for deep jungle operations. This force conducted many ambushes and patrols with an effectiveness comparable to the Malay Army. For example, by 1955 the kill-to-contact ratio of .65 recorded by the Police Field Force was equal to a Malay infantry battalion. By comparison, the average for the combination of Malay and British infantry battalions was .85. Given these ratios, the Police Field Force was comparable in effectiveness to military units in the counterinsurgency fight. Paramilitary organization combined in sufficient numbers and with adequate training provided an effective security capability for Malaya and the British. These ratios are important in that they demonstrate the rate of effectiveness paramilitary police forces are capable of achieving in combating insurgents.

Cassidy points out that the Malayan Police contributed to the counterinsurgency effort by providing critical intelligence. The British recognized the need for a counterintelligence effort and reestablished the Malayan Special Branch at the outset of the campaign as part of the Criminal Investigative Division. The Malayan Special Branch consisted of 459 intelligence specialists and cooperated with the British military. Through 1957, the Special Branch facilitated the majority of successful contacts with the guerrillas and was a key factor in British counterinsurgency success.

At first, the British believed that the quantity of Malayan Police officers was more important than the quality of police officers that they fielded. This emphasis on quantity over quality created challenges to effective training and to achieving any notable level of competency. The lack of competent and qualified local police created conditions in which corruption could flourish. Corum notes, “Rapid recruitment and the lack of trained police leadership afforded many new policemen the opportunity to abuse their power and use their status to extort money

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17 Komer, 38-39.
18 Ibid., 39.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Komer, 41-45; Nagl, 91-92.
from the population.” By 1951, three years into the war, even though the increase in security personnel created a more stable environment, the government was still failing to overcome the efforts of the insurgents.22

In 1952, General Gerald Templar took command of forces in Malaya, became its High Commissioner, and combined military and civil authority. Templar inherited an indigenous police force that had 354 police officers killed in action the previous year. He brought in one of the premier police experts in Sir Arthur Young, Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police, to correct police issues. Young instituted extensive police training programs of four to eight weeks for line police officers, and three to eight months for current and new police leadership respectively. Additionally, he fired 10,000 police for corruption or incompetence during the implementation of his training regime from 1952 to 1953. This focus on competence greatly improved the Malayan Police effectiveness in combating insurgent elements and helped put the British on the path to eventual victory in Malaya.23

The British were successful in Malaya in part due to their efforts to support the indigenous police. Intelligence was a key capability built into the host-nation police organization. Additionally, the hostile insurgent situation in Malaya caused the British to organize the preponderance of host-nation police along paramilitary lines. This type of paramilitary organizational model, backed by intelligence capability, fought the insurgency, provided police officers with increased survivability, and answered the question of what makes indigenous police forces effective in counterinsurgency operations.

The British were not the only great power to support indigenous police successfully in a counterinsurgency. Despite its present struggles in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States was also historically successful assisting indigenous police in counterinsurgency efforts. The United States demonstrated this success during the Philippine Insurrection at the turn of the 20th century.

22 Corum, 5.14-15
23 Ibid., 14-18.
American Host-Nation Police Support in the Philippines

The U.S. Army discovered the importance of local police forces when it became embroiled in the Philippine Insurrection in 1899. After defeating Spain, the United States found itself at war with local Philippine revolutionaries who desired their own state. As a result, the United States sent 65,000 regulars and 35,000 volunteers to subdue and secure a population of over 7 million in a territory comprised of about 7,000 islands spread over 100,000 square miles. The undermanned U.S. forces relied on indigenous capability and capacity that included police and scouts to cover the vast territory.24

Historian Brian McAllister Linn chronicles this story of American use of indigenous forces in his book, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902. Linn writes, “Under the provision of General Order (G.O.) 43 (1899) and G.O. 40 (1900), Army officers established municipal governments consisting of a local presidente, or mayor, a town council, and a police force.” Linn stresses the point and quotes a participant in the campaign, Major George T. Langhorne, who said of the situation in the Philippines, “We can only run these people through their chiefs or leaders.” These orders and comments reflected recognition by the U.S. Army of their need, given their own limited numbers, to employ local leadership and security forces to assist in combating insurgents. Having recognized this need, the Army then organized the host-nation police.25

In 1901, the Army utilized multiple organizations that included municipal police, native scouts, and the Philippine Constabulary. These organizations enlisted many Filipinos, and gave them an economic stake in the American-established government in the Philippines. These actions tied entire villages to American efforts in counterinsurgency.26 Through its experience pacifying the Philippines, the U.S. military learned how to utilize indigenous paramilitary forces

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25 Linn, 21.
26 Ibid., 25.
to boost and maintain decentralized patrolling. Cassidy notes that American forces were seriously
undermanned and relied on local Filipino help first for logistic support, then they turned to local
cPolice and scout units for additional assistance, and finally they armed these host-nation units.\textsuperscript{27}

Reliance on indigenous personnel was not a technique new to the U.S. Army. Many of the tactics,
techniques, and procedures used in the Indian wars during westward expansion applied directly to
operations in the Philippine Insurrection. Twenty-six of 30 general officers who served during the
Indian wars preserved institutional knowledge, and then served in the Philippine campaign.\textsuperscript{28}

On August 18, 1901, the United States, supported the Philippine Commission and
established the Philippine Constabulary. U.S. Army officers organized the Philippine
Constabulary, also referred to as the Insular Police, along military lines, but with police job titles.
The Philippine Constabulary was initially out-gunned, armed only with .45-caliber revolvers. In
response to this armament deficiency, the U.S. Army first issued the Philippine Constabulary
repeating rifles then .30-06 Springfield rifles to better combat insurgents. Armed properly, the
unit then proved their metal as the stabilizing force in the country.

The Philippine Constabulary, numbering fewer than 7,000 men, lived off the jungle, and
the Philippine Constabulary} that, despite losing 1,029 men between 1901 and 1906, the
Philippine Constabulary “…eliminated organized banditry in the Philippine Archipelago and like
terriers they pursued the scattered fragments of such bands until peace came to the Islands.”
Therefore, this historical example highlights another case of military support to effective
indigenous police forces. This success revealed the capability of a paramilitary police
organization in the Philippines that contributed significantly to host-nation security.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{27} Cassidy, 49.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 50.
\textsuperscript{29} Vic Hurley, \textit{Jungle Patrol: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary}, (New York: E.P. Dutton
and Company, Inc., 1938), 12-13, 60, 65
The Philippine Constabulary proved so effective that the Constabulary continued well past the insurrection years of the early twentieth century. According to the Philippine government, “The never outfought outfit is a hybrid, a cross between civilian and military. A major service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, it is performing functions that are, on the whole, civilian in character.” In December 1950, the Philippine Constabulary became the national police force of the Philippines and continued to contribute to host-nation security. This constabulary, originally organized along paramilitary lines, saw such success that it provided a long-lasting benefit to its nation.  

Direct American Police Intervention in Post-World War II Germany

Robert Perito, working for the United States Institute for Peace, writes in his U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations article, “Historically U.S. military forces have been unable or unwilling to perform police functions to control large-scale civil unrest. This was true in Iraq, where looters destroyed government buildings, cultural centers, and commercial areas.”31 However, this is not a historically accurate representation of the U.S. military’s willingness to perform policing roles. There was a time when the U.S. Army identified a need for direct intervention with American police power. During its occupation of Germany after World War II, the U.S. Army recognized the need for police forces and as a result instituted the U.S. Constabulary. This case provides another example of how police forces successfully organized to combat de-stabilizing influences within a nation.

Regrettably, few publications exist on the U.S. Constabulary. The Second World War appears to have overshadowed this small, yet important postwar effort. In his work Policing Germany: The United States Constabulary, 1946-1952, Brian Libby notes, “The United States

30 Reynaldo P. San Gabriel, Col., PC, Crescencio L. Maralit, Capt., PC, Jose Buhain, and Juanito Beo, The Constabulary Story (Quezon City, Bustamante Press, Inc., 1978), 22.
Constabulary is probably the least-known large unit which the Army ever had. One can read the standard works on the Occupation without ever being aware that the Constabulary existed.” Libby reminds the reader, however, that this unit enabled the calm and stable conditions necessary to support the military government in occupied Germany.32

Planning for the Constabulary began in July of 1944. The Third Army recommended the establishment of a small, mobile force for use in maintaining general order and countryside patrolling for the future occupation. In November 1944, the 15th Army made a recommendation that led to the establishment of a Frontier Command to man police posts, roadblocks, and conduct patrols. This paramilitary force, comprised of 15th Army armored cavalry units, went into operation in April 1945 just weeks before the end of the war in Europe on May 7. The U.S. Army evolved the Frontier Command into the District Constabulary in November 1945. The Army further expanded the District Constabulary into the Zone Constabulary. This Zone Constabulary covered the U.S. Zone in Germany as well as Austria, and went into operation on July 1, 1946.33

The U.S. Constabulary was heavily armed and equipped. Organized into Brigades, the constabulary’s core was in motorized and mechanized troops. Each troop had as many as 155 men and an array of armored cars, jeeps, and heavy transport trucks. A troop possessed dozens of light and sub-machine guns, more than 100 rifles and pistols, and included three 81mm mortars. The unit, organized along military lines and never straying far from its cavalry roots, ably operated roadblocks, conducted raids, and supported reprisal actions in the zones concerned.34

The Constabulary contained only troops from the U.S. Army. The Constabulary consisted of some 30,000 men with the mission “…to prevent and suppress German crime...ordinary crime, subversive activity, and black marketeering.”35 Subversive activity was a genuine concern. The Nazi leadership established guerrilla resistance elements called Werwolf Kommando in German,

33 Ibid., 8-10
34 Ibid., 10, 147.
35 Ibid., 55.
or Werewolf in English. In 1944 and 1945, the Werewolf harassed the Allied advance and attempted to make any occupation as difficult as possible.\textsuperscript{36}

There is disagreement in the academic community on this insurgent movement’s importance to the Allies. Some historians do not believe the movement was significant. However, Dr. Perry Biddiscombe, Graduate Director of the Department of History at the University of Victoria, argued that it was important. In his 2004 book, \textit{The Last Nazis: SS Werewolf Guerrilla Resistance in Europe 1944-1947}, Biddiscombe, writing on the movement’s importance said, “It certainly was [important] to the hundreds of people - perhaps over a thousand - who died as a direct result of Werewolf attacks.”\textsuperscript{37} The name given this unit by the Nazis implied the intent to generate fear among those who would oppose the Nazi agenda. These fears were real and occupation forces took the threat of Nazism very seriously in postwar Germany. According to Libby, the Constabulary became involved when any suspected subversive German activity was committed. Subversion was any behavior that interfered with the Occupation, undermined American authority, or supported Nazism.\textsuperscript{38}

Supplied with propaganda issued from Werewolf Radio, the guerrilla organization trained thousands of Nazi SS and Hitler Youth in subversion and sabotage tactics. These individuals, encouraged by the Werewolf leadership, operated individually and in small groups. As the Nazi leadership collapsed by the end of the war, so did the central Werewolf leadership. Nonetheless, small groups and individuals loyal to the Werewolf cause remained active. As a result, hundreds of incidents of subversion and sabotage against Allied forces and collaborating Germans continued through 1947.\textsuperscript{39}

Working with local German Police rearmed in late 1945 by the U.S. Army, the Constabulary worked to ensure peace despite sabotage and subversion in the zone. Through 1947,

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 233.
\textsuperscript{38} Libby, 56.
\textsuperscript{39} Biddiscombe, 20-21, 245-246.
however, the Constabulary was the primary police authority in American occupied Germany. The unit prevented and investigated every manner of crime. No other effective police power capable of helping collaborating Germans existed. This collaboration was important to the further establishment of peace and stability in occupied Germany.  

The Nazi insurgent elements left after the war faded following 1947 as Germany stabilized and economic growth under the Marshall Plan became an established fact. Libby summarized the role of the United States Constabulary with the following statement: “It seems not unreasonable to say that the hundreds of thousands of miles of jeep patrols, the shows of force, the search and seizure operations, must have had some impact in deterring crime...there can be no doubt that the Constabulary performed an important function, and performed it very well.” While historians argue about the impact of the Werewolf movement, what is evident is that there was subversive activity and instability in post-war Germany. While not necessarily a true insurgent environment, there were nonetheless challenges to the rule of law and order in this devastated country. Nonetheless, the American constabulary was organized as a paramilitary unit drawn from the U.S. Army to deal with these issues. The secondary sources indicate the U.S. Constabulary assisted in the formation of a secure and peaceful postwar Germany. It served as an important link between the German people, the German police, and the occupying military government. The constabulary further indicates how organization can contribute to host-nation police effectiveness. This paramilitary police organization worked for the United States during this direct intervention. It is then reasonable to say that the United States should encourage the establishment of this type of organization for host-nation police forces that face similar unstable and counterinsurgent environments.

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40 Libby, 55-56, 139.  
41 Biddiscombe, 229-231.  
42 Libby, 139.  
43 Ibid., 139.
The previous cases in Malaya, the Philippines, and post-war Germany demonstrate that paramilitary police power is a contributor to successful counterinsurgency and anti-subversive efforts. Paramilitary police units proved survivable and effective in battling insurgent and subversive elements. Even when the United States intervened directly with its policing power in post-war Germany, it did so with paramilitary police units. This method of police organization is particularly effective when backed with adequate training and arms, sufficient numbers, intelligence, and military support. The research shows that robust indigenous paramilitary police units can increase host-nation security and are effective in counterinsurgency operations. Having explored past cases in indigenous police assistance, the author now explores a recent case involving the U.S. Army.

The American Construction of Local Police Units in Palestine

An excellent example of a U.S. Army-led effort to train host-nation police is currently underway in Palestine. A heavily armed and paramilitary-style organization, the Palestinian National Security Forces, deal with criminal and national security issues that might challenge the nascent Palestinian government. Originally drawn from the former Palestinian Liberation Army, the Palestinian National Security Forces consist of about 15,000 members. The Civil Police, numbering some 10,000 officers, operate alongside the National Security Forces. The Civil Police additionally include a 700-man paramilitary rapid deployment unit trained in counterterrorism and riot operations. 44

In May 2007, the security situation in Palestine was declining toward lawlessness. In Gaza, gunfights were common, and Hamas was directly engaging the young Palestinian National Security Forces. According to Lieutenant General Keith Dayton, the U.S. Army officer and Security Coordinator leading the support effort for the Palestinian National Security Forces, attacks by Hamas created a situation approaching anarchy in the Gaza Strip. The goal of U.S.

security assistance to the Palestinians was to create conditions that promote Israeli-Palestinian peace. Yet, at this stage in development, the legitimate security forces for Palestine were immature and at best, marginally effective.45

United States training of Palestinian security forces is politically very sensitive. Israel remains very concerned that these forces could turn against them, despite their cooperation with the United States in allowing the formation and training of these Palestinian units. For Israel, a precedent for this eventuality exists. Palestinian security forces trained by the Central Intelligence Agency have turned against Israel, most notably during the Second Intifada that began in 2000. The implications of U.S. involvement in supporting and training the Palestinians are serious and the risks are high. In addition to Israel, Jordan, due to its large Palestinian population, is also concerned that the U.S. may be training a future adversary. Despite these challenges, the Palestinian National Security Forces have matured and seen a measure of success in improving the security situation in Gaza.46

Under the leadership of General Dayton, the Palestinian National Security Forces sent about 1,600 people through security courses in Jordan funded by the United States. These forces then increased their role in establishing host-nation security and proved more survivable. By January 2009, Palestinian security forces reached a maturity level that enabled them to maintain order on the West Bank during the Israeli-Hamas War in Gaza. Additionally, Palestinian security and police officers now patrol several West Bank cities in cooperation with Israeli Defense Forces.47

However, results remain mixed. While 2009 brought success for the Palestinian security forces in Gaza, it saw setbacks for them in the West Bank. Several times these forces have failed to overcome insurgents in the West Bank towns of Jenin, Kalkilya, and Nablus. The Israeli Defense Force is then left to take on the more difficult missions. Ethnic and political loyalties to organizations such as Fatah have slowed the development and effectiveness of the Palestinian National Security Forces. Galula mentioned loyalty as a key aspect of police capability to fight insurgent elements.\(^4^8\) The disparate loyalties to groups other than the legitimate Palestinian government are impeding the development of the Palestinian National Security Forces. As such, while forward progress has been made by U.S. coordinators to improve the Palestinian National Security Forces, there remains a great deal of work to be done.\(^4^9\)

This case provides mixed results regarding how best to make effective indigenous police forces for counterinsurgency operations. While paramilitary organization appears to increase survivability and in the ability to provide security as shown in Gaza, it does not necessarily mean that security will indeed improve overall. As mentioned earlier, Galula noted that loyalty to the host-nation government is an important aspect to the efficiency with which local police can combat insurgents. Presenting a significant challenge to the Palestinian effort to build an effective police force, the issue of loyalty could yet undermine the endeavor.

Thus far, this monograph presented four cases involving the effective employment of indigenous police in counterinsurgency. The first three cases indicate that indigenous police can prove effective in the prosecution of the counterinsurgency fight. The Palestinian case displays challenges to local police efforts to combat insurgents due in part to loyalties that lie with organizations other than the host-nation government. In all the cases, the host-nation and American police organized as robust paramilitary units. In Malaya, a majority of the police force consisted of the paramilitary Special Constables. Additionally, irregular Home Guards provided

\(^{48}\) Galula, 31.  
\(^{49}\) Bedein, 15-16.
the most basic fixed-site security to relieve army and police elements of this duty. Furthermore, the Special Branch added intelligence capability. In the case of the United States in the Philippines, the paramilitary Philippine Constabulary was the main police force and would later become the Philippine National Police Force. In the case of occupied Germany after the Second World War, the U.S. Army, in implementing direct U.S. police power, used a paramilitary Constabulary drawn from Army units. Finally, the current case in Palestine illustrates the challenges of the counterinsurgency environment. With leadership by the U.S Army through General Dayton and by facilitating efforts with Jordanian training and Israeli support, the Palestinian National Security Forces have improved and worked, despite struggles, to establish basic law and order in Palestine.

In November 2009, the author interviewed Lieutenant General (Retired) James M. Dubik, former Commanding General of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. General Dubik commanded from June 2007 to June 2009 and, in this capacity, established, trained, and resourced Iraqi host-nation security forces to include the Iraqi Police. Asked what the role of indigenous police should be in counterinsurgency. General Dubik responded:

What do the local police have to do? Are the conditions set for normal policing? These are the questions to ask. If they are not, as in the early years of Iraq, and currently in Afghanistan, the local police force cannot function as a traditional force. The rule of law hasn’t yet been established. As such, the police must look more like a Para-military force while an insurgency is active. It’s the only way they can survive and indeed assist in the establishment of the rule of law and order. Basic security must be established. Presence is incredibly important. Nothing complex.  

50 The general’s comments reflect the same lessons learned in the case studies regarding not only the role indigenous police play in counterinsurgency, but also their organization. General Dubik recognizes the role that indigenous police forces play in counterinsurgency requires paramilitary organization to assist in establishing basic law and order.

50 James M. Dubik, LTG(R) U.S. Army, personal interview conducted by MAJ Timothy R. Mungie, November 4, 2009, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
Government Agencies, the Military, and Effective Indigenous Police in Counterinsurgency

In recent times, civilian government agencies have led much of the foreign support and assistance efforts of the United States. In 1961, the U.S. Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act. This act reorganized and consolidated U.S. foreign assistance programs. Additionally the act separated military and non-military aid programs, and established the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Through the act, USAID was free of military and political functions that had hampered previous and various federal aid organizations. The United States renewed its commitment to the developing world with the adoption of the Foreign Assistance Act. The separation of military from non-military aid in the act is consistent with American historical values and laws such as the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. Posse Comitatus largely prohibits the U.S. military from being used domestically and was instituted in response to those that feared an oppressive government and military. Implied in the Foreign Assistance act is this same culture of concern that ensures even foreign civil matters are kept in civilian hands.

In the recent past, the United States government trained, equipped, and advised indigenous police through USAID’s Office of Public Safety. President Kennedy created this agency in 1962, in response to the crisis in Cuba. This office was the lead agency on foreign police support for the U.S government during much of the Cold War years. The Office of Public Safety promoted the development of effective civilian police forces and provided anti-subversion and counterinsurgency training in countries threatened by Communism. This sub-agency was important to foreign police support efforts as the agency consolidated these efforts for the U.S. government.

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During its 12 years of operation, the Office of Public Safety oversaw 458 police advisors operating in 34 countries. The office provided some $300 million in overall assistance to 52 different nations. Yet, with the adoption of Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1974, the work of the Office of Public Safety ended. The passage of Section 660 came in direct response to the lack of clear policy on assisting governments with records of human rights abuses and due to “counterinsurgency fatigue” from the United States’ 20-year struggle in Vietnam.\(^{54}\)

Walter C. Ladwig III, from Oxford’s Merton College writes that since the passage of Section 660 “Congress has authorized several exemptions that allow police assistance in certain narrowly defined areas. The result is a system that is more chaotic and lacking in clear guidance then at any time under the Office of Public Safety. At present, the Departments of Justice, State, Treasury, Transportation, and Defense all conduct some form of foreign police training.” Given Ladwig’s comments on the diffused responsibility within the U.S. government to support indigenous police, it is easy to appreciate the centralized, national capability of this office. Nonetheless, the U.S. government deemed the Office of Public Safety a failure and shut the agency down. This historical civilian agency involvement is instructive of the problems that past agencies had conducting foreign police support.

Ladwig further believes that the United States only provides informal support to police forces of foreign allied nations. This is because Congress banned most types of assistance to foreign police forces due to past poorly coordinated programs.\(^{55}\) The current laws of the United States place the responsibility of indigenous police assistance with civilian government departments. The standing legal restrictions, governed by the Foreign Assistance Act, limit how the Department of Defense can train and interact with foreign police forces. The act allows U.S. military assistance to foreign police forces only under a Presidential directive.\(^{56}\)

\(^{54}\) Ibid., 289.
\(^{55}\) Ibid.
\(^{56}\) Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, D-1-D-2.
Supporting Indigenous Police in Iraq

The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, under the Department of State, normally hold the delegated lead role to provide foreign police support. Despite this, in 2004 President Bush signed a decision directive allowing the U.S. Central Command Commander to train and equip the Iraqi Police. President Bush’s decision to involve the military in the host-nation police support mission implied the need to use military recourses given the hostile counterinsurgency environment.

Robert Perito and Madeline Kristoff wrote the following for the United States Institute of Peace on Iraq’s Interior Ministry and Police Reform: “Between 2003 and 2005, coalition efforts to reform and develop capacity in the Ministry of Interior alternated between two approaches – capacity substitution (‘doing it for them’) and capacity building (‘helping them do it for themselves’). This tension was at the heart of the advisory effort in Iraq as a whole.” Because of this tension, it was not until 2006, in the third year of the war, that the Iraqi Police would become the focus of major effort. Perito and Kristoff also stated, the United States declared 2006 the “Year of the Police” in Iraq. Given this declaration the coalition undertook a major effort to build institutional host-nation police capacity. This was important because a growing and stubborn insurgency threatened state security and stability in Iraq.

Colonel Anthony Deane published a recent example of a military-led effort during the Year of the Police to employ indigenous police in counterinsurgency. Operating in the Iraqi city of Ramadi in 2006, Deane, Commander of First Battalion, Thirty-Fifth Armor (Task Force Conqueror) wrote of his unit’s situation with their assigned Iraqi police station. His assessment was stark, and while he did not mention exactly who ran the police transition team or advisors when Task Force Conqueror arrived, his comments spoke volumes about the negative effects of a

57 Ibid.
lack of unity of effort. On this issue Deane states, “The supporting U.S. police transition team was not under Task Force Conqueror…control, and it did not maintain a constant presence at this station. Nor did it ever develop personal relationships between the transition team and the Iraqi police.” The initial state of the Iraqi Police proved challenging for the Task Force to improve. However, the unit took on the mission despite the obstacles.59

In an important response to the state of the Iraqi police, Task Force Conqueror identified the need to establish additional police capability in the form of an additional police substation. According to Deane, an out-of-hide police transition team consisting of Army officers and a military police squad created a rudimentary police substation, similar to a combat outpost. The substation played a successful part in securing the city of Ramadi during the Anbar Awakening movement.60 This is an example of a successful military-led, boots-on-the-ground initiative. However, the military was also successful when supported by civilian agencies in other efforts.

In May 2008, five years into the war in Iraq, the Department of State through its embassy in Baghdad, issued a press release emphasizing the effort to train and equip the Iraqi Police through the opening of a Regional Police Training Center in Diyala. A 4-week course teaching and training 400 cadets was credited to the “…combined effort by the Diyala Provincial Reconstruction Team, its military counterpart, and a Defense Department contractor.”61 Military Professional Resources International is the Department of Defense contractor credited with the center’s opening. This contractor worked closely with a provincial reconstruction team. Provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq are military and civilian agency ventures that rely heavily on Army civil affairs personnel to lead and staff the unit. Additionally, the successful 2007

60 Ibid., 86.
military surge in Iraq greatly enabled conditions for this facility to open in 2008. The opening of this training center indicates military-led success in supporting host-nation police in Iraq.

The Diyala Police Academy serves as a hopeful example of potential success in a military-led unity of effort to establish an effective host-nation police force in Iraq. While long-term success is pending, the potential exists for positive results. With a teaching institution in place under proper and competent supervision, it is highly plausible that Iraqi Police officer competence will increase. It is further plausible that this competence will translate into improved host-nation police leadership and overall effectiveness of the force. Additionally, the Diyala Police Academy case displays the unity of effort needed to prove successful in providing effective indigenous police forces for the counterinsurgency fight. This unity of effort was achieved through military supervision of contractors and through Army leadership and influence within the provincial reconstruction team structure.

In June 2008, the Department of State awarded U.S.-based DynCorp International with a $545.7 million contract payable over 2 years to train police in Iraq. This contract was essentially a renewal of an initial $152 million agreement made four years previous. The new contract increased the number of DynCorp employees in Iraq to 800, and their job was to advise, train, and mentor members of the Iraqi Police, Ministry of Interior, and Department of Border Enforcement.

DynCorp’s contract award came on the heels of scandal that emerged the previous year. Despite its initial modest contract, additional police training contracts brought the total award to $1.2 billion. In the interim years, DynCorp subcontracted much of the work, supplying

62 Arnold, “Iraqi Regional Police Training Center Open in Diyala.”;
64 Ibid.
equipment and building camps for the Iraqi Police. Subcontractors further subcontracted and this practice left “a mess that so far has left government auditors scratching their heads over $10 billion in taxpayer money seemingly misplaced through sloppy bookkeeping, job delays, bloated expenses and work that was paid for, but never performed,” according to Stuart Bowen, Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.65

Democratic Representative Stephen Lynch from Massachusetts testified during a congressional hearing on the DynCorp contracting matter: “The problem is the tiering of all these contracts. You have a general contractor, a subcontractor and a sub-subcontractor and a sub-sub-subcontractor.”66 In addition to the ambiguous and confusing combination of subcontractor relationships provided by DynCorp were the challenges in oversight provided by the Department of State. Internet news outlets, serving as informal watchdogs to government wasteful spending, were highly critical of the Department of State. David Phiney, of The Rough Cut, published an example of several substandard or uncompleted large regional training camps DynCorp built for $17.9 million. The State Department failed to visit any of the camps during construction because of “security concerns.”67 These investigations into the State Department’s contractor, DynCorp, by government representatives and the press highlight the supervisory challenges of Department of State officials over their government contracts.

In January 2010, The Washington Post reported that the DynCorp Iraqi police contract ballooned to $2.5 billion. Bowen issued a new report that implicated DynCorp, and placed joint responsibility on the Department of State. Bowen’s new report reprimanded the State Department because of its continued inadequate oversight of the DynCorp contract that left over $2.5 billion susceptible to fraud and waste. This reprimand further illustrates the supervisory struggles of the

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66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
Department of State over the effort to support indigenous police forces because of the counterinsurgency environment.  

**Host-Nation Police support in Afghanistan**

Shortly after the fall of the Taliban and the initial military success in Afghanistan, the United States met with partner states in Geneva in 2002. At this meeting, the coalition agreed to rebuild the Afghan security forces. The Afghan Police support mission was a coordinated effort shared by the Department of State and Department of Defense. In a 2006 interagency report, the Inspectors General of the Department of State and Department of Defense noted the initial indigenous police requirements for Afghanistan. The report indicated that the Afghans and coalition partners agreed that the Afghan National Police would number no more than 62,000. This number was based upon the determination of the minimum number of personnel that the government of Afghanistan could fund to function effectively over the long-term. This number, based solely on funding, would later prove insufficient.

The Inspectors General report illustrates an attempt by the coalition to plan the structure of a national police organization for Afghanistan. The assessment for this report stated in part, “The police training program has been well-conceived and well-executed. Trainees, instructors, and Ministry of Interior officials are very positive about the program. The training program has made a good start in raising professional standards and competence.” The report also stated that the Afghan National Police were not at a sufficient readiness level to meet the internal security and conventional law enforcement and community-policing missions. The report appears to contradict itself by calling the training program “well-conceived and well-executed” when that

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70 Ibid.

71 Ibid., 8.
very program did not produce a “sufficient readiness level.” The report is a confusing and convoluted document reflecting the shared responsibility and accountability of the Department of State and the Department of Defense host-nation police advisory effort.

By August 2009, when General McChrystal gave his initial assessment to the U.S. President, the situation with the Afghan National Police was far worse than the Inspectors General report indicated. The Afghan National Police had grown to some 84,000 by mid-2009; however, General McChrystal noted that because of the lack of strategic consistency and resources, the Afghan National Police were not trained, organized, or equipped to effectively combat counterinsurgency. He indicated that some of this deficiency was because training programs that appeared promising progressed too slowly because of the lack of training teams. The unfortunate result was that the Afghan National Police were several years behind in development when compared to the Afghan National Army. General McChrystal’s report contrasts greatly with the Inspectors General report. That report detailed how the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs established Afghan National Police basic and advance courses. DynCorp instructors taught these courses. The report stated that the courses were taught in a professional manner, were technically and tactically accurate, and most importantly, relevant to the security situation faced in Afghanistan. However, this stands in stark contrast with General McChrystal’s assessment that clearly indicated the deterioration of the Afghan Police situation. Problems with contractor supervision and unity of effort have hampered efforts to build a viable Afghan National Police organization. According to General McChrystal, the number of Afghan Police, despite growing beyond initial planned numbers, was still insufficient given insurgent activity. The general’s assessment further stated:

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73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Inspectors General, 19.
The Afghan National Police must increase in size in order to provide sufficient police needed to hold areas that have been cleared of insurgents, and to increase the capacity to secure the population. This assessment recommends further growth of the Afghan National Police to a total of 160k as soon as practicable with the right mix of capabilities that better satisfies the requirements of a counter-insurgency effort.\footnote{McChrystal, G-3.}

Insufficient in numbers, the Afghan National Police were further hampered and ineffective. The Department of State continued to struggle to provide effective host-nation police for counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. Yet, the Department of Defense shares this burden in Afghanistan given the unity of effort that was supposed to occur. To mitigate these issues, General McChrystal made the following request in his assessment:

In an effort to streamline police development efforts and to create greater effort in the development of counterinsurgency capable police, the responsibility and authority for all police training should be placed under the commander Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan/North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan. The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement should transfer responsibility for police training to Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan.\footnote{Ibid., G-5.}

The request was an attempt to correct problems with the unity of effort between the State and Defense Departments. The general’s request seeks to consolidate responsibility within his military command.

Given the challenge of indigenous police oversight, the Internet news and blogs linked the problems with the DynCorp Iraqi Police contract to the war in Afghanistan. Like Iraq, DynCorp held the contract for the Afghan Police.\footnote{Mark Moyar, “Can the Afghans Keep Order,” The Daily Beast (February 18, 2010): http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-02-18/keeping-the-taliban-down/?cid=hp:beastoriginalsR3 (accessed February 22, 2010).} The State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs provided primary oversight of DynCorp in Afghanistan.\footnote{Ibid.} Shortly after Bowen’s January report for the liberal blog \textit{The Huffington Post Investigative Fund}, Cristine Spolar reported the following about the DynCorp Afghan contract:

\footnote{McChrystal, G-3.}
\footnote{Ibid., G-5.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
“The price tag for Afghanistan under the contract so far is $437 million, according to State Department records. The cost of police training there is expected to soar along with the growing American military presence.”\textsuperscript{80} Like the situation in Iraq, the State Department payment to DynCorp in Afghanistan continued to climb to incredibly expensive levels.

Conservative commentary also took issue with DynCorp and the Department of State on this matter. In a February 2010 article for \textit{The Daily Beast}, Mark Moyar, Professor of National-Security Affairs at the Marine Corps University wrote, “As the Marja offensive winds down, it falls to local police to keep order. But the State Department and defense contractors have done a lousy job of preparing them.” According to Moyar, DynCorp and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs wasted six years of training time due to the focus on quantity of training as opposed to the quality. The result was a wasted effort and incompetent indigenous police officers.\textsuperscript{81} On this issue, rare agreement is evident between liberal and conservative political commentators adding a measure of validity to the struggles with unity of effort between government departments and in particular with the challenges of the State Department in their security advisory mission.

\textbf{Common Lessons: The Need for Leadership in Unity of Effort}

In a 2009 issue of \textit{Parameters}, Colonel Lew Irwin described the conflict and problems associated with interagency cooperation. Irwin stated, “The U.S. government has consistently failed to apply the full weight of its instruments of power during irregular warfare conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, largely due to an inability or unwillingness of various agencies to agree upon the ends, ways, and means needed to prosecute those wars.” Irwin also advocated the use of other government agencies despite these issues: “When coupled with organizational structure that make disjointed visions and efforts the norm rather than the exception, this strategic failing has


\textsuperscript{81} Moyar, “Can the Afghans Keep Order.”
had dire consequences for United States national security, thwarting the ‘whole-of-government’ approach needed to overcome irregular warfare’s complex challenges.”

Yet, is the whole-of-government approach truly effective in supporting indigenous police during counterinsurgency operations?

The author asked General Dubik the following question: “With regard to the whole of government approach, involving a host of government agencies, can the agencies play a part in the training and establishment of indigenous police forces in counterinsurgency?” Dubik replied:

Not really. It’s not practical. Other agencies are simply not equipped or committed to the task. When the mission becomes difficult and dangerous, the Army, the military, is the only organization capable. We have to establish the security situation and structure such that the Department of State, Department of Justice, and so on, can come in later, after combat operations, and further develop the situation. There is an iterative approach here. It’s not ‘all or nothing.’ As conditions improve in one area of the country, the important contributions of the other agencies should be brought to bear. You don’t have to secure an entire country before you begin putting in place the rudiments of a justice system or begin to improve a police force’s capabilities.

Civilian government agencies, such as the Department of State, are challenged in leading support efforts to make effective indigenous police forces for the counterinsurgency fight. The Department of State has struggled to properly manage their contractors, control costs, and provide needed facilities associated with indigenous police support and training. These struggles led to ineffective and incompetent host-nation police and hindered the United States’ efforts to win the counterinsurgency fights in Iraq and Afghanistan. Historically, civilian government agencies had issues with leading indigenous police efforts in counterinsurgency as demonstrated by the defunct Office of Public Safety. The recent troubles of the Department of State and their Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs in both Iraq and Afghanistan are evidence of the struggling efforts to support and make effective indigenous police while in counterinsurgency conflicts.

83 James M. Dubik, LTG(R) U.S. Army, personal interview.
Unity of effort is of obvious significance, as all actors must pull in the same direction for the team to succeed. Yet, even in a unified effort, there must be a leader. The military has shown better leadership in supporting indigenous police due to its resilience, resources, and requirement to operate in the counterinsurgency environment. The case of Task Force Conqueror displays the “can do” attitude required for non-standard missions such as supporting the Iraqi Police. The successful establishment of the Diyala Police Academy served as an example of military influence and leadership effectively supporting host-nation police during counterinsurgency. This academy provides hope for the future and presents a way forward in the development of Iraqi Police officers.

In addressing the question of who should lead efforts to support and make effective indigenous police forces during counterinsurgency conflicts, there may not be a best answer. The cases in Iraq and Afghanistan do exhibit the challenges and struggles of the Department of State in leading host-nation police efforts and in working within unified efforts to produce effective indigenous police. It may be that given this information, the military, specifically the Army is the better choice. Either on its own, as in the case of Deane and Task Force Conqueror in Iraq, or when supplemented by other government agencies and contractors after security conditions are set as in Diyala, military leadership provided a measure of success in making indigenous police effective for counterinsurgency operations.

Recommendations

Recommended U.S. Government Actions

A robust paramilitary organization for indigenous police forces, such as the Philippine Constabulary, is recommended for use in the current counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq, and especially Afghanistan. The Philippine Constabulary was able to survive and evolve into the national police force for the Philippines. The potential exists for the same evolvement for General Dayton’s Palestinian National Security Forces should that forces loyalties hold to the legitimate
Palestinian government. Authorities such as Schmidl and Dubik agreed that police forces in
counterinsurgency should organize along paramilitary lines for effectiveness. The author
recommends this course of action for current and future host-nation police support efforts.

Current U.S. Army doctrine, Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations recognizes a possible
requirement for host-nation paramilitary police forces. This manual states, “The preferred
providers of civilian law enforcement services are civilian police, augmented as required by
military and paramilitary police units with stability policing capabilities.” Yet, Field Manual 3-
07 does not elaborate more on paramilitary police capability. An additional review of Army
document in Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency, finds similar brevity on paramilitary police
forces. This manual mentions only that host-nation police consist of several independent yet
mutually supporting elements. These elements include criminal and traffic police, border police,
transport police, and specialized paramilitary strike forces. Field Manual 3-24 further
acknowledges the possible need for paramilitary home guards or reserve police units. However,
neither Field Manual 3-07 nor 3-24 provide substantial guidance on how to raise, structure, train,
and operate paramilitary police units. Further, these manuals do not provide specific details as to
the size or mission sets required of host-nation paramilitary police units in counterinsurgency.
Further research is needed to address these details for possible inclusion into future Army
document.

The Foreign Assistance Act requires amending. Civilian agencies do not have the resources
afforded the military to operate in the lead or alone amidst the challenging and dangerous
counterinsurgency environment. The author recommends the lifting of the Foreign Assistance
Act’s ban on the Department of Defense to allow the military to lead foreign police assistance and
support programs during counterinsurgency situations. This does run counter to American
traditions of civil control over civil matters. Yet, counterinsurgency scenarios blend over what is

84 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations, (Washington,
85 Field Manual 3-2: Counterinsurgency, 6-19.
normally a clear line between military and civil concerns. As lifting the ban could include additional military involvement abroad, and with it increased public awareness, it may force a greater examination by government leaders of what the United States should be involved in to begin with. While a Presidential directive allows the Department of Defense to conduct this form of assistance, those directives may change with administrations. However, regardless of the administration in political control, the need to assist foreign police remains. The Foreign Assistance Act should reflect the realities of the wars in which the United States is involved.

Outside of war, to include counterinsurgency, either the U.S. government should commit fully to a centralized means of assisting indigenous police or get out of the business altogether. To commit fully to another centralized effort will require the application of lessons learned from the defunct Office of Public Safety, lest the United States repeat a history of failure. Based on the research, the author recommends a centralized agency with definite lines of authority over indigenous police assistance versus the current course of confused interagency effort.

Finally, the U.S. government, specifically the Department of State, their Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and the Department of Defense must all better vet contractors supplying indigenous police support and assistance. Given the massive defense industry of the United States, it seems improbable that only one contractor is capable of this business. In fact, the research provided an example of one other contractor, Military Professional Resources International, which had better success in supporting indigenous police advising and training. Any contractor conducting business in a manner such that the U.S. House of Representatives opens inquiries into their business practices need not be in the employ of the government.

Areas for Further Research

Given its limited scope, this monograph has not explored every aspect of effective indigenous police in counterinsurgency. Corruption of host-nations and their police are certainly
of concern. Corruption, however, can reach well beyond policing and into various facets of host-nation government. Additionally, what one society and culture consider corrupt, another may not. Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations states, “Corruption and graft can hinder efforts to establish governance, restore rule of law, or institute economic recovery. While some level of corruption is common to many cultures, its existence can unhinge reform efforts and put the entire mission at risk.”86 Therefore, an area of recommended research is indigenous police corruption, its relation to the host-nation government and culture, and the ways and means to effectively deal with it.

Another concern requiring exploration is how and when to transition an organized paramilitary police force into a traditional or community-oriented civilian police force. As Dr. Schmidl wrote, “At the end of the insurgency, police forces usually have to be reorganized and ‘reduced’ to their original policing mission.”87 Making this transition during unstable conditions is risky. As such, the author recommends further study on the transition and planning of indigenous police forces from a paramilitary organization to a civilianized police force post-counterinsurgency.

In examining indigenous police in counterinsurgency, the type of policing philosophy to instill appears another important point of study. Dr. Willard M. Olivier, Criminal Justice Professor from Sam Houston State University and Dr. Elaine Bartgis, Assistant Dean of Sociology, Criminal Justice, and Substance Abuse Studies at the University of Central Oklahoma, called community-oriented policing, “…a new paradigm...an orientation that provides a complete cohesive organizational plan for modifying police work to achieve effective crime prevention.”88 The Department of Justice defined community policing as “…collaboration between the police

and the community that identifies and solves community problems. With the police no longer the sole guardians of law and order, all members of the community become active allies in the effort to enhance the safety and quality of neighborhoods." Community-oriented policing was not always the type of policing policy used in the United States.

Instead, Police departments evolved in the United States over the past 200 years and underwent periods of professional transformation. U.S. politics largely determined early policing efforts. Corruption during this early period was common, and the institution of professional reform did not occur until the 1930s. This initial reform was in traditional policing where highly centralized police departments carried the goal of deterring and prosecuting crime. Police officer arrest and citation rates served as the basis for evaluations. It took more than forty years, from the 1930s to the 1970s, for police departments to move from traditional roles into community-oriented roles.

Based on this timeline, community-oriented policing is a new phenomenon. The origins of the community-policing philosophy began in the United States in the mid-1970s when police departments worked to involve communities with a series of programs based on a police-community relations approach. Police departments required a better understanding of the populations they dealt with. In turn, the community residents had a better understanding of police operations. Community-oriented policing produced such programs as the Police Explorers, Drug Abuse Resistance Education, civilian ride-along programs, and community relations outreach teams.

Due to the implementation of these successful programs in the United States, the author recommends additional research into the possibilities from applying the community-oriented policing philosophy to indigenous police forces and counterinsurgency. Culture, corruption, and

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the host-nation political structure could all have an impact on policing philosophy implementation. However, exploration into community-oriented policing could prove a way forward for fledgling indigenous police departments.

Conclusion

Given the importance of security force assistance in an era of persistent conflict and the need for counterinsurgency operations, what makes indigenous police forces effective in counterinsurgency? The research supported the author’s hypothesis that if the Army faces an era of persistent conflict and chooses to assist indigenous forces, then paramilitary organization, and U.S. military leadership make for effective indigenous police in counterinsurgency operations. To test the hypothesis, this monograph explored two related areas. First several cases were examined in an analysis of what type of organization makes for effective indigenous police in counterinsurgency operations. It continued with an analysis of who should lead the effort to support and make effective indigenous police during counterinsurgency.

The first portion of research focused on three historical cases and one recent case. The first case explored the British assistance to indigenous police during the Malayan Insurgency. The British viewed insurgency as primarily a police matter that the military was to support. They fielded indigenous police units at the outset of the campaign. However, the police proved easy targets for insurgents and the British response instituted robust paramilitary units in the form of Police Field Forces, Special Constables, and Home Guards. Additionally, the British established the Special Branch police intelligence unit. They further increased training standards and took anticorruption measures to increase indigenous police effectiveness.

The second case explored similar U.S. operations years prior in the Philippines. During the Philippine Insurrection, the U.S. Army supported the Philippine Commission in establishing the
Philippine Constabulary. The Philippine Constabulary had a kill-to-contact ratio rivaling regular infantry battalions. This robust paramilitary police unit proved very effective against insurgents and in ridding the Philippines of lawlessness and banditry at the turn of the twentieth century. In the 1950s, long after the insurrection was over, the Philippine Constabulary became the national police force for the Philippines.

The third case explored the U.S. Army’s role in post-World War II Germany. Dispelling the idea that the Army did not historically have precedent for direct police intervention, the monograph research demonstrated that the Army in fact did have precedent through the establishment of the United States Constabulary. In the occupied zone, the paramilitary Constabulary, originally constructed from Army armored cavalry units, played an important role in combating crime, subversion, and insurgent activity. This case showed that when the U.S. Army chose to intervene with direct police power, it did so with a robust and effective paramilitary unit. A paramilitary police organization worked for the United States. The United States should then encourage the establishment of this type of organization for the host-nations it advises.

The fourth case explored the current security force assistance program in Palestine. In organizing a police force for the Palestinians, General Dayton chose to use a paramilitary structure. The Palestinian National Security Forces were originally drawn from the Palestinian Liberation Army. This robust paramilitary force currently outnumbers the civil police by 50 percent. A large paramilitary anti-terrorist unit additionally supports the regular police. The research found that the paramilitary police in Palestine have proven survivable, but with mixed effectiveness given disparate ethnic and political loyalties.

The research found that authorities such as Schmidl and Dubik support a paramilitary organization for indigenous police. Schmidl equated the nature of counterinsurgency warfare in leading police forces toward paramilitary organization and function. Dubik noted that paramilitary police are necessary given an insurgency and the hostile conditions of that
environment. In total, the research supported the hypothesis through examples that show that
paramilitary organization make indigenous police effective during counterinsurgency operations.

The second portion of the research further explored what make host-nation police effective
by examining who may better lead the police support effort. The monograph illustrated the recent
challenges faced by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan as related to civilian government
agencies and effective indigenous police forces. The monograph discussed the brief history of
civilian agency involvement in indigenous police support in the now defunct Office of Public
Safety. This office closed after 12 years due to war fatigue from Vietnam, and a lack of clear
policy on assistance to nations with human rights abuse records.

Additionally, the monograph discussed the laws of the United States. The Foreign
Assistance Act prohibits the military from assisting foreign police forces except under a
Presidential directive. The Department of State and their Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs normally conducts the lead role to provide indigenous police support.
The research highlighted how the Department of State chose to use contractors to fulfill the
required indigenous police support mission.

In Iraq, the research found that the Department of State contracted with DynCorp to support
the host-nation police. Congress held hearings to investigate DynCorp’s challenges in
performance. DynCorp left a confusing and convoluted subcontractor trail that prevented proper
accountability of their performance and in the tracking of government expenditures. However, the
Department of State struggled to properly oversee or supervise DynCorp. Department of State
civilian supervisors did not visit locations where contracting work for needed police facilities was
taking place because they feared the hostile environment. The Department of State toiled to lead
Iraqi Police support efforts during counterinsurgency operations.

The research continued by exploring two areas where the military led the host-nation police
support effort in Iraq. The first case examined Deane with his ad-hoc team of Army leaders and
advisors. In this case, the research found that the Army successfully put into operation a new
police substation in Iraq. That station did its part to provide effective security in the city of Ramadi. The second case involved the Diyala Regional Police Academy in Iraq. In this case, the research found that the Army was heavily involved in the leadership and advisory effort. In both cases, the military either leading its own effort or leading a unified effort made for effective indigenous police.

In Afghanistan, the research illustrated similar events. The Department of State and their Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs again struggled to supervise contractor programs supporting host-nation police building. Yet they struggled with the Department of Defense in a confused unity of effort. The government contractor DynCorp was supposed to provide training and advisory capability to build the Afghan National Police. This program did not produce effective host-nation police and the situation deteriorated over the years. The problems with unity of effort, led General McChrystal in his 2009 assessment to request control of the program entirely. The research identified in the Iraq and Afghanistan cases that the press, on both ends of the political spectrum, published negative views of the Department of State and DynCorp. These views expressed concerns to the American public of wasted time, money, and effort in the host-nation police advisory mission. Additionally, the research brought to light inquiries by members of Congress into Department of State oversight challenges over contractors and the possible misappropriation of funds in their dealings with DynCorp.

The monograph made several recommendations based on the research. First, establish paramilitary police organizations in Iraq and Afghanistan resembling the successful Philippine Constabulary. Second, expand Army doctrine to greater cover host-nation paramilitary force employment. Third, amend the Foreign Assistance Act to allow the military to lead indigenous police support efforts during counterinsurgency conflicts. Fourth, establish a centralized agency with definite lines of authority over indigenous police assistance in peacetime versus the current course of confused interagency effort. Fifth, and last, improve the vetting of contractors for government employment.
The monograph discovered three areas of importance related to the hypothesis needing further research: indigenous police corruption, paramilitary police transition to normalcy after counterinsurgency, and the community-oriented policing philosophy. All three areas have the potential to impact counterinsurgency efforts. The monograph recommends further study into these areas to ensure the impact is positive.

Indigenous police forces are important to counterinsurgency efforts, therefore it is important that the United States get these forces right. In combat environments, to include counterinsurgency, these police forces should be organized as paramilitaries and the effort to support them should be led by the U.S. military. Doing so will promote greater effectiveness and survivability of indigenous police forces and contribute better toward achieving U.S. national goals.
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